dc.contributor.author | Steele, Scott R. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-11-10T11:34:27Z | en |
dc.date.available | 2010-11-10T11:34:27Z | en |
dc.date.issued | 1998-04 | en |
dc.identifier.citation | Steele, S. (1998). "Production, information and property regimes : efficiency implications in the case of economies of scope" (Working Paper No. 023) Department of Economics, National University of Ireland, Galway. | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10379/1375 | en |
dc.description.abstract | A conceptual model and numerical example are used to show that private
property regimes are not necessarily preferable to common property regimes
on efficiency grounds when: (1) agents are risk averse; (2) exogenous enforcement
of risk sharing schemes is not feasible; and (3) the associated common
property regime is characterized by economies of scope in the production of
information. The paper considers a case of idiosyncratic risk in a dynamic
grazing context where the marginality of the resource is such that insurance
markets are thin or non-existent. The policy implication is that the
establishment and maintenance of a common property regime is shown to
be a (possibly) reasonable institutional response in the face of difficult and
particular circumstances. | en |
dc.format | application/pdf | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | National University of Ireland, Galway | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Economics working papers;023 | en |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/ | |
dc.subject | Economics | en |
dc.subject | Economies of scope | en |
dc.subject | Property regimes | en |
dc.subject | Transaction costs | en |
dc.subject | Information | en |
dc.subject | Grazing | en |
dc.title | Production, information and property regimes : efficiency implications in the case of economies of scope | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.description.peer-reviewed | peer-reviewed | en |
nui.item.downloads | 326 | |