Browsing Economics (Working Papers) by Author "Duddy, Conal"
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Aggregating partitions
Duddy, Conal; Piggins, Ashley (National University of Ireland, Galway, 201102)Consider the following social choice problem. A group of individuals seek to partition a finite set X into two subsets. The individuals may disagree over the partition and an aggregation rule is applied to determine a ... 
Arrow's theorem and maxstar transitivity
Duddy, Conal; Piggins, Ashley (National University of Ireland, Galway, 2009)In the literature on social choice and fuzzy preferences, a central question is how to represent the transitivity of a fuzzy binary relation. Arguably the most general way of doing this is to assume a form of transitivity ... 
Manipulating an ordering
Duddy, Conal; Piggins, Ashley (National University of Ireland, Galway, 2009)It is well known that many social decision procedures are manipulable through strategic behaviour. Typically, the decision procedures considered in the literature are social choice correspondences. In this paper we investigate ... 
Manyvalued judgment aggregation: characteriing the possibility/impossibility boundary for an important class of agendas
Duddy, Conal; Piggins, Ashley (National University of Ireland, Galway, 200911)A general model of judgment aggregation is presented in which judgments on propositions are not binary but come in degrees. The primitives of the model are a set of propositions, an entailment relation, and a "triangular ... 
A measure of distance between judgment sets (Working paper no. 169)
Duddy, Conal; Piggins, Ashley (National University of Ireland, Galway, 201102)In the literature on judgment aggregation, an important open question is how to measure the distance between any two judgment sets. This is relevant for issues of social choice: if two individuals hold different beliefs ... 
Proximity by Numbers
Duddy, Conal; Piggins, Ashley (National University of Ireland, Galway, 200911)Imagine that everyone in a group chooses a real number and then these numbers are combined to produce a group number. Suppose that when everyone moves strictly closer to some individual¿s number, the group number either ...