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dc.contributor.authorPiggins, Ashley.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-18T15:27:29Zen
dc.date.available2010-05-18T15:27:29Zen
dc.date.issued2005en
dc.identifier.citationPerote-Pena, J., & Piggins A. (2005)"Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules"(Working Paper No. 0098) Department of Economics, National University of Ireland, Galway.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10379/1076en
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the structure of fuzzy aggregation rules which, for every permissible profile of fuzzy individual preferences, specify a fuzzy social preference. We show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategyproof and satisfy a minimal range condition are dictatorial. In other words, there is an individual whose fuzzy preferences determine the entire fuzzy social ranking at every profile in the domain of the aggregation rule. To prove this theorem, we show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategyproof and satisfy the minimal range condition must also satisfy counterparts of independence of irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto criterion. There has been hardly any treatment of the manipulability problem in the literature on social choice with fuzzy preferences.en
dc.formatapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherNational University of Ireland, Galwayen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper;No. 0098en
dc.subjectFuzzy aggregation rulesen
dc.subjectStrategy-proofnessen
dc.subjectEconomicsen
dc.titleStrategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rulesen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.description.peer-reviewedpeer-revieweden
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