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SOCIETY, POWER AND CLIMATE CHANGE

A Social Critique of Public Climate Change

Receptivity in Ireland

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Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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Abstract

This project examines public receptivity to climate change in Ireland and how this receptivity is connected to the structure of Irish society and the translation of ‘climate change’ into that society. It provides a methodological framework for examining the social dimensions of climate change perceptions and responses built around the socio-cultural theories and methods of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. He viewed practices and power relations, associated with positions within society, as central to the formation of a ‘practical apprehension’ of the world for the occupants of those positions. This apprehension is made up of dispositions that, functioning predominantly at an unconscious level, guide our behaviour and how we classify issues and the actions of others, including those pertaining to climate change. More specifically my work looks at how different social conditions and power relations contribute to diversified climate change perceptions and responses between certain groups: namely teachers, environmental activists, farmers, businessmen and lower economic groups. My thesis also investigates how research participants contribute to their own climate change receptivity.

The thesis demonstrates how inputting the social into research on climate change receptivity highlights the unequal access to choice that participants have towards engaging with climate change. It reveals a powerful connection between social distance from dominant culture and the quality of the receptiveness to the high-cultural and technical veneer of dominant depictions of climate change. The data collected points to the role in enhancing climate change engagement of higher expert literacy, socially empowered communities and moral framing and vice versa: the diminutive effect on engagement when these properties are absent.

Moreover the dominant reformist approach is depicted here as disenfranchising the role of the general public, tending to individualise their possibilities for involvement. In recognising only their individualised consumer-related forms of decarbonisation reformism greatly limits opportunities for public involvement.
Acknowledgements

The development of this thesis has been a highly valuable experience, which has broadened my own analytical capabilities considerably. Truly the completion of my thesis in its current form would not have been possible were it not for the combination of assistance that I have received from many over the years. Firstly, I must thank my supervisor Dr Henrike Rau who showed extraordinary patience and thoroughness in her guidance, my family, Kathleen, Simone and Ed, for standing by me: their support proved to be a life-line. Also thanks to Brendan Flynn and Francis Fahy who as part of the GRC helped give me direction, and to the members of the writing club and Moyola 331. To Hannah Culkin who not only provided emotional backup and sacrificed much of her time reading through multiple drafts to offer feedback but has had to listen to endless talk about Bourdieu and climate change for far too long now. I am also grateful to her mother Elizabeth for her helpfulness and kindness. Finally I must thank the anonymous participants for the moments of their time which proved utterly invaluable to the conclusions of this project, particularly the few who despite my being a total stranger, went out of their way to recruit other participants for me. I am indebted to you all.
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Part I

Background, Theory and Methodology
Chapter 1

1 Socializing Climate Change

1.1 A Call to Order: Bringing Society Back into Climate Change

According to Bourdieu, “the social world is riddled with calls to order that function as such only for those who are predisposed to heeding them as they awaken deeply buried corporeal dispositions, outside the channels of consciousness and calculation” (Bourdieu, 1998b: 54-55). This research examines public responses to the calls to order surrounding climate change. It aims to do this through applying the methodologies of Pierre Bourdieu. The basic premise to Bourdieu’s sociological approach is that humans are dispositional beings and that these dispositions are acquired through absorption of the regularities of everyday life a person is exposed to (or indeed an active agent in). Such regularities amount to the subtle, yet powerful historical and societal relations of the everyday within which the public are situated. It is these relations, and people’s routine (non)responses to them, that form the practical habituated dispositions and classifications of the public who then apply them in their responses to climate change. Thus Bourdieu’s socio-cultural regularities – which his methodology conceptually organises – are an essential component to the thesis’s main goal: to emphasise the centrality of society to people’s climate change perceptions and responses. A core objective of this project is to illustrate that the regularities of social space and their impact on public receptivity to climate change are essential to understanding the social dimensions of climate change.

Crucially, this involves revealing how the physically and symbolically ordered object of climate change mediates through divergent social spaces and how those who occupy those spaces differ in their appreciations of and responses to climate change. Through the Bourdieusian framework the research devised methods of exploring how humans come to co-exist with climate change’s multi-faceted aspects through the social and cultural contexts of the everyday. This is an historical context, involving social relations extending deep into the communal past, through which meaning and culture has filtered into the rules and regularities of daily living. Here societal relations of power and class yield effects on communities and individuals and practices and perceptions are moulded.
Chapter 1

The empirical investigation into these socio-cultural effects on climate change receptivity, on members of the Irish public, involved a multi-methods approach featuring 19 life history interviews and 11 focus groups. The participants occupy divergent social spaces whose diversity serves to illustrate how differences in economic, cultural, educational habituations, practices and resources, which are also differences in social power, influence collective and individual processes of dealing with climate change. The sampling purposively captures social variation between participant groups by drawing upon specific class and societal fields – the fields in question are the business, environmentalist, educational and farming fields. These diverging class and field structures and their ‘occupants’ are central to the qualitative fieldwork. The end result is an in-depth analysis of how people living in Ireland experience the conceptual, practical and physical manifestations of “global climate change in their everyday lives” (Norgaard, 2011).

A brief glance at the predominant understanding of climate change points to powerful interconnectedness with societal relations. The period of the industrial revolution has coincided with a massive increase in the CO₂ concentration in the global atmosphere: from 280ppm, as deduced by scientists, to over 400ppm recorded in 2013 (Sciencedaily.com, 2013). The continuous expansion of a growth-based global economy, that is primarily dependent upon overconsumption and the burning of fossil fuels, is rapidly increasing the proportion of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. These are tied to a rise in global temperatures, which climate scientists attribute to transformations in long-term climate patterns: otherwise known as climate change (IPCC, 2007d). This means human activity is deemed a highly significant contributor to current climate change. The extensiveness of this contribution is recognised by one of the foremost institutions in climate change science, policy and public debate the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007c). Furthermore, the panel anticipates the unequal distribution of human-related impacts of climate change “across socio-economic groups and geographic space” (Nagel et al., 2009: 9). Similarly, US Government science advisors, The National Academies, have produced reports recognizing the social

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I include extreme weather events (flooding, overlong dry spells) and changing local weather patterns (shifting seasons) as physical manifestations of climate change that the public may have experience off. Although one can argue that the influence of global climate change on these localised or regional occurrences is unproven these physical experiences are associated with climate change by the IPCC (IPCC, 2007c: 30) and can be experienced as immediate forms of climate change for persons affected.
importance of climate change in the areas of human activities, societal and economic consequences and human responses (Brand, 2010: 15).

The general nature of the social relationship to climate change stems from climate change being both a physical force – induced by society and transformative of that society – and a socially constructed entity – e.g. shaped conceptually. Any response to climate change needs to pay heed to both aspects. However, in mainstream climate change research, social dimensions remain largely underexplored. This sociological study of climate change perceptions and responses attempts to fill some of that gap by concentrating on the influence of society.

It is for the latter purpose that I use Bourdieu’s sociology, to theoretically frame the project presented in this thesis. His social science approach provides a deep understanding of how the structures of society connect to the daily routines and perspectives of people. It is sensitive to how social and economic conditions interplay with class and individual dispositions and practices. How this interplay shapes the public’s receptivity to climate change and decarbonisation is a primary focus of this project. Decarbonisation refers to actions people can undertake either individually or collectively to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including changing consumption behaviours and improving energy efficiency. The research is also concerned with political action against human-induced carbon emissions. Political action can be undertaken as a political activist, an individual voter or merely through everyday discussion with the hope of informing or defying oppressive silences. The study situates these diverse efforts towards climate change engagement (or lack thereof) within the sociological spaces of class, political economy, and culture and within the social relations of power within which daily life is immersed. Bourdieu’s sociology is concerned with all four aspects (Bourdieu, 1984; 1989; 2005). By drawing on these dimensions, the thesis aims to show how sociological research that recognises the influence of social conditions on public climate change reactions can provide far greater insights than studies that focus more or less exclusively on the thoughts and actions of individuals.

Bourdieu’s methodology is also renowned for recognising other capital besides economic capital, including social, cultural and symbolic capital. These species of capital, which are dealt with in greater depth in Chapter 2, encompass diverse resources such as individual and group prestige, education, literacy skills,
Chapter 1

and social connections, which have powerful implications for life opportunities and social power. Bourdieu ties the distribution of these resources to the structure of social classes, related differences in class-attributed behaviours, and to the structure of the political economy. Changes in the latter structure can lead to changes in what constitutes a valuable resource. For example, market developments such as an increasing demand for energy efficiency, or climate change and environment-related policy initiatives can elevate the value and status of some environmental knowledges and energy-efficiency technical know-how. Whenever such approaches operate with the sincere inclusion of local stakeholders, they have the capacity to increase the value of local knowledge and dialogic skills. A more centralised top-down approach is likely to incur the opposite effect. Bourdieu gains a more nuanced grasp of the interrelationship between social conditions, power and behaviour through acknowledging these capitals and their concrete manifestations in objects (such as works of art or hybrid vehicles), institutions (e.g. the IPCC, university degrees) or embodied dispositions (e.g. linguistic skills). Different social conditions contribute to different opportunities, expectations and dispositions, all of which are involved in the appreciation of climate change and practices of decarbonisation. As will be shown throughout this thesis, this renders his work highly suitable for the investigation of complex social-ecological phenomena.

Furthermore, Bourdieu’s sociology pays heed to the work of construction that is involved in an object of research. Any object, whether it exists as stable observable matter such as a landscape painting; or as a practice, an idea, an interpretation or a possibility of the future, undergoes a process whereby relations of power combine or conflict in the struggle to impose a certain representation of that object. Climate change too must undergo such a construction. How this object is constructed has consequences for how it is received: with respect to the effectuated legacies relating to the social conditions of those receiving it. Bourdieu’s book Distinction illustrates this when he demonstrates one of the principles of dominant, high-brow taste in 1960s France, to be the expansion of abstractness. Meals come to resemble works of art, the form of paintings start to trump content, rendering what it depicts as all but unrecognizable, except to those who have acquired the “cultural code” (Bourdieu, 1984: 3). Such abstractions made dominant taste inaccessible to the French working class who hailed from social conditions that were bereft of the modes of consuming such high-brow art (Bourdieu, 1984). How representations of climate change are rendered by powerful
social elites and how these representations are received by divergent groups of the Irish public are an important focus of the thesis.

Finally, some critics have accused Bourdieu’s social theory as being overly preoccupied with structural reproduction and social stability rather than offering any insight into the nature of social change (Alexander, 1995; King, 2000; Jenkins, 2002; Burawoy, 2008; Bottero and Crossley, 2011). Despite such criticisms, this thesis starts from the assertion that Bourdieu in fact offers a prime methodological complement to the study of change and the implications of such change for the reception and response to climate change, itself a prominent force for potential social transformations (Szerszynski and Urry, 2010: 1). These claims, and how his sociology offers a useful means of analysis for social change, are dealt with in greater depth in Chapter 2.

1.2 Ireland’s Role in Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions

This study focuses on the Republic of Ireland, and specifically Irish variants of climate change receptivity. But what makes Ireland an interesting test case for a Bourdieusian analysis of climate change receptivity? A small country on the Western margin of Europe, Ireland has undergone significant social changes since the 1980s. During the period from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, the country experienced rapid economic growth which was dubbed the ‘Celtic Tiger’. This coincided with large changes in settlement patterns, deteriorating environmental quality and a massive expansion of transport, waste, energy and water usage (Pape et al., 2011: 29). Annual private transport fuel consumption rose by 107% from 1990 to 2005 (Howley et al., 2006: 3) contributing to Ireland having the “highest percentage increase of greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector of any EU state during the period 1990-2003” (Flynn, 2007: 58). The onset of the financial and economic crisis in late 2008 heralded another period of rapid political and economic transformation, this time resulting from government austerity measures – a policy campaign to cut public expenditure – and rising unemployment. These changes are bound to have formed new power structures, dependencies and expectations involved in moulding public responses to climate change: providing ample room with which to apply and confirm Bourdieu’s

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2 Italics are his.
approach’s sensitivity to Ireland’s changing power structures.

Ireland is an island with a relatively small population of 4,588,252 and any reductions in carbon emissions that it manages to make will contribute little directly to mitigating global climate change (Legge and Scott, 2009). However, this is the case for many countries. Acknowledging this serves to stress the potentially enormous importance and relevance that other forms of justification have for lowering most small nation’s emissions. There is consequently greater room for arguments founded upon moral responsibility and global citizenship, which are especially relevant considering Ireland’s high per person emissions rate. Also applicable are arguments pertaining to the green economy and enhancing national energy security through expanding the country’s renewable energy production. Furthermore there is the need to consider the country’s environmental, social and economic resilience in the face of future climate change shocks. Any of these possibilities significantly increases the relevance of Ireland and its public reception to climate change to the global climate change debate. On top of these, Ireland’s history and diplomatic legacy offer huge potential for aiding a global response to climate change. Ireland during the Celtic Tiger years (1995–2007) revealed its capacity for global inspiration, serving as a model for liberal economic growth – albeit with “mirage”-like qualities and ultimately negative consequences for the country (Kirby, 2005; O’Connor, 2009). Still, what this highlights is the possibility for Ireland to become a globally recognised model of sustainability or a renewable energy producer. The country has high potential for wind energy (Motherway and Walker, 2009) and has significant plans to become a renewable electricity exporter (Schaps and Turner, 2012). Also with 13% of the EU coastal resource it has enormous scope for ocean-energy technology (Motherway and Walker, 2009: 32).

Another argument supporting the need for lowering Ireland’s emissions involves the international agreements that preceding governments have already signed up for. These agreements shape much of Ireland’s climate change policy situation making it highly comparable to that of many other countries who share in these commitments. The state is involved in an EU-wide emissions trading scheme (ETS) where certain industries have to trade in market-priced carbon allowances, each equating to a tonne of CO₂ emissions (EPA, 2013). In the non-ETS sectors

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3 This figure refers to the Republic of Ireland only.

4 Although mostly these allowances have been allocated to industries for free.
the government is committed to meeting EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions target reductions of 20% below 2005 levels. They must also reduce final energy consumption by 20% compared to average energy use during the years 2001 to 2005 (IAE, 2013). These targets have large implications for residential, agricultural, public service, commercial and non-ETS industrial sectors. Failure to meet these targets will result in large EU fines. The Kyoto Protocol is another international agreement that Ireland signed up to. Originally thirty-seven industrialised countries and the EU ratified commitments to lower their emissions to an average of five percent below 1990 levels by 2012. One mechanism it employs is the pricing of emissions through the carbon market (UNFCCC, 2011a). Kyoto currently continues with a smaller number of countries until a new international agreement is set in place (Harvey, 2013). Recently Ireland joined others, such as the Nordic countries (Giddens, 2009: 151), in implementing a carbon tax (Howley et al., 2012). Additionally, Ireland has coupled vehicle registration tax (VRT) to CO\textsubscript{2} car emissions (Revenu, 2011). The Irish government has also adopted much of the international green economy mantra which links dealing with environmental problems to job creation and economic recovery (Jackson, 2009: 111; Davies and Mullin, 2011; DJEI, 2012).

Recent surveys indicate most of the Irish public express concern about the environment and the threat of climate change (Motherway et al., 2007; Eurobarometer, 2008a: 10; 2008b; 2009: 17). An all-island survey has found an 86% concern rate for the environment (Lavelle and Fahy, 2012). Similarly, 87% of respondents to a 2011 Eurobarometer survey agreed that climate change was a serious problem: a percentage majority that was repeated across the EU. The survey fails, however, to enquire into beliefs concerning humanity’s role in climate change. Furthermore, it provides no information as to why Ireland, with 57%, lingers near the bottom when it comes to respondents agreeing to climate change being a “very serious problem...at this moment” (Eurobarometer, 2011: 73).

Throughout the Celtic Tiger period, these surveys have been at odds with the public’s performance in regard to private transport and household energy consumption was well above the EU average (O’Leary et al., 2008).\footnote{Much of this was attributable to Ireland’s residential fuel mix which is high in coal and oil (O’Leary et al., 2008: 32).} The impact of
Ireland’s national equivalent carbon dioxide (CO\textsubscript{2e})\textsuperscript{6} at a global scale is small, but per capita rates have ranked as 2nd highest in the EU (CSO, 2012: 20; EEA, 2010: 29).\textsuperscript{7} With the Celtic Tiger’s implosion in 2008, an overall decline in energy use and CO\textsubscript{2} emissions occurred (Howley et al., 2012); although residential use has risen during the years of 2008 and 2010, due in part to an excessive number of cold days. The causes of the overall decline are difficult to properly attribute but some explanation lies in changes to the national fuel mix, the falling economy and a switch to smaller or more efficient cars due in part to linking car emissions to VRT.\textsuperscript{8} Still Ireland’s per capita rates of emission remain stubbornly above the EU average and total private transportation mileage has continued to increase (ibid: 72).

Although the overall emissions rate includes many technical factors – such as type and level of industrial activity and the composition of centralised energy sources (e.g. new Combined Cycle Gas Turbine power plants (Howley et al., 2012: 78)) – the figures are also dependent upon public consumption patterns, along with electoral trends that are favourable (or unfavourable) to decarbonisation policy implementation. Effective execution of policy is largely dependent on the public for their approval and compliance. It is additionally dependent upon them for their vigilance, particularly where policies such as the new Building Energy Rating (BER) are concerned.\textsuperscript{9} However, quantitative surveys and emissions databases, obscured by an effect of magnitude, remain limited in their capacity to access the social contexts behind the public’s carbon contribution. Context-sensitive qualitative studies such as this one can help address these limitations.

\textsuperscript{6} This is a measure which is inclusive of other major greenhouse gases, along with CO\textsubscript{2}; “the concentration of carbon dioxide that would cause the same amount of radiative forcing as a given mixture of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases” (IPCC, 2007a: 372).

\textsuperscript{7} It was still as high as 13.8 of CO\textsubscript{2e} per capita in 2009 despite economic slowdown. When other greenhouse gases are excluded from this figure, Ireland ranks at ninth highest in the EU for this period. This highlights the impact of the agricultural sector, through production of methane and nitrous oxide, on our emissions (CSO, 2012: 20-1). These figures also exclude emissions from imported goods and international shipping and flights – known as “international bunker fuel emissions” – which are reported separately (UNFCCC, 2013).

\textsuperscript{8} Also there are indications that increases in diesel smuggling into the country because of price imbalances (due in part to the disincentives) between Northern Ireland and the Republic, which are not included in official figures (Howley et al., 2012: 14 fn 7), are significant to the overall transport emissions. However, this is difficult to calculate due to the surreptitious nature of the enterprise.

\textsuperscript{9} All homes available for sale or rent must have a BER certificate indicating the energy saving performance of the building (SEAI, 2013a).
1.3 Enriching an Impoverished Climate Change Debate: Contributions from Sociology

Despite many social aspects, including anthropogenic causes, mainstream sociology has been slow to address the problem of climate change (Lever-Tracy, 2008; Nagel et al., 2009: 9). While the subdiscipline of environmental sociology has shown a tendency to discuss climate change as part of multiple environmental crises rather than deal with it specifically, it has fared much better (Schnaiberg and Gould, 2000; Pretty et al., 2007; Catton, 2009; Redclift, 2009; Redclift and Woodgate, 2010). Still, it remains a discipline on the margins of sociology, thereby reducing its visibility in public and policy debates on climate change. That said, attention by mainstream sociologists to the phenomenon of climate change has gathered some momentum over the past decade (e.g. (Urry, 2007; 2010; Beck, 2009; 2010; Giddens, 2009). Climate change also featured as the central item of discussion in the British Sociological Association 2010 Presidential Event which ran under the title of How to Put Society into Climate Change. The prestigious journal Theory Culture & Society also positioned it as the theme for a special issue called Changing Climates published in 2010. In the environmental sociology section of the International Sociology Association World Congress in Gothenburg in 2010, climate change appeared as a continuous focal point. As part of more interdisciplinary projects, the role of sociology has also expanded, with sociologists featuring prominently in edited collections such as Creating a Climate for Change (Bostrom and Lashof, 2008) and Routledge Handbook of Climate Change and Society (Lever-Tracy, 2010). Recent publications, dealing with cultural aspects of environmental degradation more generally, and climate change in particular, include Environmental Argument and Cultural Difference: Locations, Fractures and Deliberations (Edmondson and Rau, 2008) and Living in Denial: Climate Change, Emotions, and Everyday Life (Norgaard, 2011).

Despite these positive developments, the sociology of climate change has yet to establish itself as an important focal point in the social science arena. This is evidenced by a keyword search for “climate change”, “global warming” and “greenhouse gas” in major sociology journals. A search of abstracts and article titles in eight Anglophone sociology journals, along with a prominent Marxist

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Journal ‘New Left Review’\textsuperscript{11}, over the period mid-2005 to December 2010 produced only eight results.\textsuperscript{12} The same web search yielded zero title and abstract results for Lever-Tracy for the time period of January 2000 to mid 2005 (Lever-Tracy, 2008: 451). The significance of this absence is that the debate over public responses to climate change has been made poorer because the role of society is being greatly understated. The study of environmental behaviours and public response has been largely dominated by psychology and economics (Lever-Tracy, 2008; Szerszynski and Urry, 2010). As a consequence, policy-related attempts at decarbonising the daily lives of the public are greatly influenced by the socially myopic and individualized modelling of human behaviour. This is an approach that places the individual at the centre and features a priori notions on human nature: such as being always rational, calculative and self-interested (Jackson, 2005; 21) or hardwired to reproduce certain norms (see Chapter 2). Despite these obvious shortcomings, rationalist-individualistic models are pervasive in the decision-making sphere where government efforts tend to be dominated by a perception of calculative citizenship and economic incentivisation aimed largely at individuals (see also Chapter 4).

Sociology offers different tools of trade to economics and psychology, such as the capacity to analyse both social structures and their agents. In doing so, it can bring relational thinking to the table (Nagel \textit{et al.}, 2009). Relational social science acknowledges the systems of material, social and historical relations through which every research object is connected to society (Emirbayer, 1997).\textsuperscript{13} Our interpretations and experiences of these objects are susceptible to change as the relations they are immersed in change.

Despite being somewhat marginalised, particularly at policy level, some promising sociological socio-cultural approaches to climate change behaviours and receptivity have recently emerged. Much of the emergence is a reaction against the

\textsuperscript{11} The New Left Review did not offer abstracts but a search of articles produced only 3 papers where climate change was one of the main points of focus for the text (Davis, 2010; Hamilton, 2007; Monbiot, 2007).

\textsuperscript{12} The majority of these results tended to centre around Lever-Tracy’s work on the role of sociology in responding to climate change. I excluded a review of climate change books.

\textsuperscript{13} Although the concept of relational sociology is contested (Powell and Dépelteau, 2013) this general interpretation is the one favoured in this project and presented through the project’s Bourdieusian framework.
low standing of climate change in sociology and the narrow asocial take on climate change by the individualised social sciences (Shove, 2010a; Szerszynski and Urry, 2010; Norgaard, 2011: 209; Warde, 2013). Socio-cultural sociologists interested in climate change concern themselves with the social (and sometimes material) origins of climate change receptivity rather than seeking to impose ahistorical and de-contextualized, universal model of human behaviour. For example, there is much new work establishing how consumption culture and consumption-related patterns and lifestyles feed into the high carbon society (Jackson, 2006; Shove, 2010b; Urry, 2011; Davies et al., 2014). Proponents of practice theory – inspired in part by Bourdieu who additionally criticises the aforementioned theoretical individualism for operating “without any great concern for the reality of different kinds of practice or for the real principles of their production” (Bourdieu, 1990a: 47) – have made some inroads into understanding and potentially explaining everyday practices and their embeddedness within wider socio-technical relations (Shove, 2003; Shove and Spurling, 2013). For example, it has been shown that ‘infrastructural systems’ can severely restrict the room for transforming a practice (Darnton, 2004: 11). The set-up of much of American suburbia has been found to encourage car dependency and the reclassification of the car from a ‘want’ to a ‘need’ (Wilk, 2002). Once thought of as a luxury good available only to the privileged, the car is now considered by many as an unremarkable yet essential item.

Other studies have pointed to how cultural and meaning systems, such as within the realm of climate science or national and community identities, filter and reconstruct ‘climate change’ (Norgaard, 2006b; 2011; Edmondson and Rau, 2008; Hulme, 2009; Wynne, 2010). For example, Hulme’s research illustrates how disagreement over climate change is multiplied through cultural and meaning systems, creating multiple variations on what climate change can mean to different people. A criticism of Hulme’s analysis, however, involves his downplay of the role of a powerful coalition of contrarian scientists and extractive industries in purposefully fuelling disagreement (McCright and Dunlap, 2010; Oreskes and Conway, 2010). Conversely however, without any recognition of how scientific definitions of climate change are also subject to socio-cultural relations, individualising approaches must make do with naive realist acceptance of the science.
Norgaard’s groundbreaking research into climate change denial examined the resilience of the production of an everyday reality that managed to keep the urgency of climate change “invisible” (Norgaard, 2006a; 2006b; 2011). Her work acknowledges how power is located in society, with the individual embedded within it. This marks a clear departure from narrow individualized approaches that dominate climate change debates and policies both in the US and beyond. She reveals that it is social processes and not atomised individuals that fashions denial. The values, beliefs and actions of individuals involved in this denial operate as part of social processes rather than distinct from them. Using a case study in Norway, she establishes that collectively, people distance themselves from climate change due to emotional, conversational and attentional norms and often by way of applying an existing “repertoire” of cultural strategies (Norgaard, 2011: 9). For the sake of sustaining emotional and ontological security people avoided thinking about climate change so as to avoid feelings of helplessness and guilt. This in turn prevented some from actively and politically engaging with climate change as an issue (Norgaard, 2006a). She applies to the pseudonymous town of Bygdaby her Zerubavelian\(^{14}\) concept of “socially organized denial”: “an active (albeit rarely conscious)” organizing force, operating through national and local identities and the political economy of an oil-producing nation, keeps climate change at a distance, rendering it absent from the sphere of the everyday (Norgaard, 2011: 60). The work carried out in this research seeks to add to and complement this expanding research area. Norgaard’s work clearly reveals that the socio-cultural world consists of complex systems of relations extending from the macro dimensions of the political economy to everyday exchanges of agents at the micro level of social organisation. This relational expance offers many routes from which to approach the study of climate change receptivity. Consequentially, with an expanse of such systems, researchers are granted the opportunity to study effects of climate change receptivity through the “cultural stock of social narratives”\(^{15}\) and a socially validated and normalised emotionality\(^{16}\) (ibid, 2011), or in the case of this

\(^{14}\) Evitar Zerubavel is the social theorist on whose theories much of her study of climate change denial is based.

\(^{15}\) She describes the use of “perspectival selectivity” such as blaming a mythical “‘Amerika’” for their role, so as to deflect attention from questions of Norwegian responsibility or the notion of “‘Norway is a little land’” thereby downplaying Norway’s role as an oil-producing nation (Norgaard, 2006b).

\(^{16}\) Community inhabitants were encouraged not to be overly sincere about issues in general (Norgaard, 2011: 124).
project, through the micro-social relations of class power and socially legitimated practices. The results need not be mutually exclusive, serving instead to expand the stock of socio-cultural findings on climate change receptivity in opposition to a severely narrow, and as developed in much of this thesis, dangerously incapacitating methodological individualism.

1.4 How my Work adds to the Debate: The Bourdieusian Approach to Merging ‘Climate Change’ with the Irish Everyday

This research supports the vital introduction of more socially sensitive models into the climate change debate. The social science has displayed a tendency to favour quantitative variable-centred approaches which largely obscure the social origins of climate change responses (Wolf and Moser, 2011). This work adds to the more in-depth qualitative stream emerging in this area, while also producing a novel research perspective to Irish receptivity in which no qualitative data currently exists. Moreover the project of connecting an environmental crisis to the socio-cultural interrelationship between the society structures and public receptivity contributes to counterbalancing the severe lack of such approaches in environmental sociology. The discipline has displayed an over-reliance on more quantitative and variable-centric readings of the public (see: Inglehart, 1990; Dunlap et al., 2000; Dunlap and York, 2008). 17

The research additionally serves to critique of the social science that dominates the study of public receptivity, particularly critiquing its failure to account for the social origins of the behaviour and values that they record and their uncritical acceptance of the independence of the independent variable. Variables such as class, education and occupation are not simply taken-for-granted but subjected to and redefined through a critical relational analysis, which recognises how they change as societal relations change. This research challenges substantialist social-science approaches that are, in the manner of the individual behavioural models, employing aprioristic reasoning and

17 Also for a further example of this emphasis see chapter 7 of Bell (2011) An Invitation to Environmental Sociology: A book which provide an overview of environmental sociology.
atomising their research objects. It is against such forms of substantialism in the social sciences that Bourdieu set his own relational approach; to act as a countermanding effort (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Rejecting dominant views of the atomised, socially devoid and rationally acting individual, the Bourdieusian approach adopted in this thesis incorporates socially influenced practical knowledge of agents. As a result, the thesis recognises the centrality of practices and dispositions, with social regularities being treated in combination with the individual rather than distinct from them.

In pursuance of this avenue of research the thesis is demonstrative of how to apply the sociology of Bourdieu to climate change receptivity. Bourdieu’s thinking is here used to understand and reveal a more sophisticated and societally sensitive picture of public perceptions and responses to climate change than much of the currently existing research. While Laidley (2013) too applies a Bourdieusian framework, to cover class-related climate change distinctions in the city of Boston, my work offers a more complete application of Bourdieu’s concepts. In this regard it pays closer attention to Bourdieu’s societally sensitive concept of ‘field’ which I tie to the epistemic, discursive and practical themes of participant groups. In effect this produces a much more nuanced understanding of class. By adopting this Bourdieusian theoretical and methodological framework, my work enhances the existing socio-cultural research on climate change receptivity, focusing in particular on the effects of social difference and the subtleties of class-related social power on people’s climate change responses.

As most socio-cultural approaches to climate change are superior to those of the individualised social sciences, why then do I specifically adopt Bourdieu’s theoretical and empirical approach? Undoubtedly, theories by other prominent sociologists also have the potential to bring climate change into sociology, especially those that explicitly discuss society-environment interactions. For example, Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens have written extensively on human-environment relations in (late) modern societies (Giddens, 1991; 2009; Beck, 2009), contrasting Bourdieu’s lack of explicit engagement with environmentalism throughout his career. However, what makes Bourdieu’s approach nevertheless appealing, and extremely suitable for socio-cultural investigations into climate change receptivity, is its rich methodological framework, which in turn is rooted in highly nuanced, socio-cultural and class-sensitive concepts of human behaviour.
(see Chapter 2). Through applying Bourdieu’s approach, this project aims to capture the effects of class and national-level processes in the construction of climate change and in the development of the conditions of its receptivity.\(^\text{18}\) This strongly contrasts with Beck and Giddens work on transnationalism, globalism and cosmopolitanism which more or less explicitly dismisses the influence of the nation, the state and class relations within nation-state boundaries; seeing the influence of these as largely undermined by globalising processes (Atkinson, 2007a; 2007b, Beck, 2007; 2009). Although there is much more in Giddens’ work that mirrors Bourdieu’s thinking and sociological practice, he often overextends his theories beyond class realities (Giddens, 1991; Loyal, 2003). Overall, class gets subsumed in Beck and Giddens tendency to universalise global developments such as labour market flexibility and the spread of industrial-based risks: towards both developments the dominated classes are more exposed (Bourdieu, 1998a: 30).

Bourdieu’s reflexive approach to sociology functions to anchor the researcher against flights of intellectual fancy – a criticism made of Beck and Giddens’s work on cosmopolitanism (Keane, 2003: 125) – by first grounding research in the empirical and objective relations of its object of study.\(^\text{19}\) This empirical grounding is an essential part of his reflexive approach and must be carried out in tandem with any theorizing (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). In contrast to Beck’s and Giddens’s more or less complete immersion in the realm of theory, Bourdieu’s rejection of any “simple scholastic compilation of canonical theories” (Bourdieu, 1988) meant that he remained committed to the application of his sociology to analysing empirical data. Consequently, Bourdieu developed detailed methodologies, along with a series of research projects that illustrate their application. The analysis of these works have more to say about the relationship between social structures and the behaviour and perceptions of groups and individuals at a micro level – which is essential to this project – than the more macro-oriented theories of Beck, Giddens and others. His work on taste in \textit{Distinction} for example, uncovers such subtleties of behaviour as how the 1960s

\(^{18}\) Although I acknowledge the need to be “mindful” of cosmopolitan processes (Atkinson, 2007b), which for example is expressed in this project by the attention paid to the dissemination of international climate science interpretations of climate change.

\(^{19}\) For example, in \textit{Homo Academicus} he describes the strategies academics used to “impose their vision”. Typically these entailed academics using the close fit of their arguments to “common expectations” and the “façade of scientficity”, thereby exploiting the relationship of academic hierarchies and the “low degree” with which the nature of these hierarchies and their prestige are rendered visible (Bourdieu and Collier, 1988: 13-4).
French “rising” petite bourgeoisie, with relatively low economic capital and a desire to appear middle class, “deploys prodigious energy and ingenuity in ‘living beyond its means’” (Bourdieu, 1984: 322-3). Hence their attempts to make their home look bigger through “‘space saving ideas’: ‘storage areas’, ‘moveable partitions’, ‘bed settees’, etc” (ibid). Such nuanced analysis can just as readily be applied to climate change and carbon-related behaviours. How do conditions of class influence decarbonisation practices? And how do unexamined relations of power function to mould climate change receptivity and manoeuvre related discussions and debates?

Bourdieu’s contribution to assessing the subtleties of these differential societal relations of power at the micro level is perhaps where he has most to add to our understanding of public responses to climate change. His methods recognise how societal power relations become absorbed into the practical and unconscious manner in which people respond to the world. Differences in class consequently lead to behavioural and perceptual differences: which is why he could describe skilled workers, with longer education as “more under the sway of cultural legitimacy” than unskilled workers. Therefore they are more likely to claim an interest and to submit to a subordinate approval of elite cultural forms despite an insufficient level of socially acquired skill or knowledge of such forms: “‘I love classical music but I don’t know much about it’” (Bourdieu, 1984: 336). His interpretation of non-response to survey questions also identifies the workings of power relations. Establishing how higher non-response rates occur amongst women and the lower classes, as the questions on politics require more up-to-date and technocratic policy-based knowledge, he ties the non-responsiveness to the subordination to, and exclusion from, a sphere of technocratic political activity. He depicts a viscous circle where political disempowerment restricts the development of the capacity to exercise political power: “the capacity to vote or ‘talk politics’ or ‘get involved in politics’” (ibid). Thus Bourdieu, through an attentive reading of the micro dimensions of societal power relations, is able to conclude that in relation to public receptivity to politics “indifference is only a manifestation of impotence” (ibid). Such attentiveness to the daily nuances of power is applied in this project in regards to how the different position of persons in relation to societal relations of power feed into distinctions in acceptance of climate change. The latter, like

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20 The word ‘distinction’ as it appears throughout this thesis refers more so to difference and division than to any distinguishing form of pre-eminence. A misconception that
politics and music, is also largely a product of societal power relations, which have come to define it in elite cultural terms.

Furthermore, on top of this ready applicability at a micro level, Bourdieu provides a more elaborated and context-sensitive model of society than either Beck or Giddens: largely through his use of fields, symbolic order and economy of practices. This is a vital part of achieving one of the main objectives of this project, which is to present an alternative to the nonexistent or feeble and indistinct references to society proffered by individualized readings of carbon-related receptivity (see 2.2 and 2.3.1). It is through Bourdieu’s societal model that this project comes to confront the dominant symbolic ordering of Irish society, and how commonly used definitions of climate change and decarbonisation have come to be positioned within that order. A large part of this research is devoted to elaborating on the social space and participant receptivity (micro level) to this ordering.

Breaking with such symbolic orders, or ‘taken-for-granted’-ness of the world, is a key aspect of Bourdieusian research, which seeks to peer beyond the myths hiding the historical processes involved in normalising and legitimising how a society is ordered (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 229). For example, Bourdieu sought to unravel the myths of meritocratic achievement in education and the innateness of ‘good taste’; finding, hidden beneath them, the unequal advantages of privileged cultural backgrounds (Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Similarly, a dominant and somewhat mystifying impression of the world and climate change is likely projected into the sphere of Irish society. Elite actors such as scientists, academic experts, policy-makers and corporations, through their material resources, connections and powers of influence, encourage this symbolic order, which emerges from dominant definitions, representations and modes of behaviour.

The “symbolic order” (Bourdieu, 1994: 14) is that projection of everyday reality wherein much of the world appears to operate in a sort of self-evident harmony. It “rests on the imposition upon all agents of structuring structures that owe part of their consistency and resilience to the fact that they are coherent and systematic (at least in appearance) and that they are objectively in agreement with the objective structures of the social world” (ibid). Thus the mundane habituations surrounded interpretations of Distinction reads the work as a study of how humans are inherently driven to pursue status-related distinction. However, for him ‘distinction’ is about social difference and how they are reproduced and the effects thereof (Bourdieu, 1998b: 9).
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of daily life – its practices and classifications – slip into the unexamined background, but continue to provide a reality that is accepted and seems reasonable. In this way, the school system, for example, reproduces the separation of the disciplines into distinct school subjects, sheering them of inter-relational interdisciplinarity, appearing as a self-evident part of the natural order by not being seen at all.\textsuperscript{21} The prevailing or dominant symbolic order is full of such taken-for-granted classificatory divisions. A multitude of these commonly accepted symbolic relations underlie the operations of daily life and so must inevitably feed into how climate change is being understood. Using Bourdieusian tools for sociological inquiry, this project reveals and demystifies the symbolic order of climate change; unveiling how societal relations of power work to influence its manifestation to the public.

Such a symbolic ordering of climate change must be negotiated with, through the social space of groups and individuals. This project thus draws out climate change receptivity in terms of the social contexts of divergent social space and the carbon-related practices, dispositions and classifications of participants. What is it that communities, sectors, or groups are wont to do when dealing with climate change? How do they define, talk, source information about, and politicise climate change? Do they feel sufficiently empowered to engage in climate change mitigation? Do they act collectively, individually, publically? In terms of the social contexts concerned, the project examines in depth the social origins of these responses and how societal relations of power are involved.

1.5 Research Questions

This research responds to a gap in current social science research on the societal dimensions of public reception to climate change. It sets out to critique the general impoverishment of the debate on decarbonisation brought about by this neglect of the social, providing this project’s findings as an illustrative contrast against more individualising economic and psychology approaches. Moreover, it seeks to contrast the implications for climate change policy of a socio-cultural approach with opposing substantialist claims. To achieve these aims, the research addressed

\textsuperscript{21} Another example: patriarchal domination makes use of the biological categories of male/female (Bourdieu, 2001).
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the following three key questions:

1. How do the regularities of Irish society influence public responses to climate change across divergent social groups?
2. How do power relations, in particular, shape group-specific perceptions of and responses to climate change?
3. Can a Bourdieusian sociological framework be successfully applied to better understand public perceptions of, and responses to climate change?

Ultimately, the research presented in this thesis seeks to develop an understanding of climate change receptivity among members of the public in Ireland and of the societal influences involved in that reception. In fulfilling this goal, the project involved five distinct steps. Firstly, it examined the dominant meanings imposed upon climate change by powerful members of society such as academics and politicians. It then set out to position those definitions in terms of the dominant ordering of Irish society. Thirdly, it looked to how certain Irish social fields, such as the environmentalism and business fields, reinterpret and reposition these dominant variants of climate change. The fourth step delved into the relation of the social context of participants – their social space – to the manner in which they come to organise and classify these various representations of climate change. Finally, the research located decarbonisation in terms of the prevalent practices within participants’ social spaces and how participants have come to categorize certain carbon-related practices, in a way that adds to the acceptance of some practices while delegitimization others.

The multi-methods approach that I employed to fulfil these five steps, firstly involved a broad secondary analysis of policy documents and existing studies. This served to identify the power relations and pertinent properties that predominantly structure and indeed characterise (mostly in a tacit and subtle way) climate change, Irish society and the four Irish fields (education, environmentalism, agricultural production and business). The ‘climate change’ that this analysis developed is not a regurgitation of how climate scientists, most notably the IPCC, define it but encompasses a variety of interpretations that certain institutions, social structures, policies, expertise and media lend their weight to. The research examined how these intervene to render certain interpretations more salient than others in the everyday realities of the Irish public. The approach proceeded to enquire into the effects of these structures on the climate change receptivity of purposively selected
participants (i.e. participants recruited on the basis of their attachments to specific fields or classes). Through life history interviews and focus groups I gleaned the participants’ relationship to climate change. This sort of investigation is very far from merely asking participants for their opinions, justifications and reported behaviours and then taking them at face-value: a sort of rational action analysis of climate change receptivity. Although there is bound to be some element of truth in what people say participants during interviews and focus groups are also engaged in a performance, as indeed they are in everyday life (Goffman, 1969), they are strategising with their words in the practical and tacit manner that they have unwittingly become accustomed to (Bourdieu and Collier, 1988: 94), they are offering justifications that potentially appeal to the nature of the context they are speaking in as much as to their own genuine and often hidden motivations (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 20; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). So although an element of truth may exist in what people say the research examined what they say in relation to how they say it (competence, discourse, tone...) and the active social relations present when they say it (research setting, the practices of discussion prevalent within the setting, the social position and status of the discussants). This data the research compared to the social space of participants to see if they reproduce in their climate change receptivity the practices and classifications of their social space. This multi-methods approach ultimately aimed towards a social critique of the public’s climate change relationship rather than the sum of their ‘rationally’ chosen closed-question responses in quantitative surveys (Eurobarometer, 2011).

The construction of the symbolic order and related social structures and whether they impact on climate change receptivity is generalisable to Irish society. The specificity of the impact, garnered from the small size samples for the different groups, is not meant to quantitatively represent the broader population from which those groups hail: teachers or businessmen. Rather the social contexts and their connections to climate receptivity proffer “theoretical generalisability” (Hards, 2011: 23). In that regard response patterns that the study identifies from a middle-aged small farmers’ focus group to climate change can suggest possible explanations for trends that other studies identify concerning climate change receptivity within the broader community of small farmers (ibid). Similar generalisability applies towards similar class related contexts where the class related resources and skills of participants reflect those of a broader social class.
1.6 Thesis structure

The remainder of this thesis is divided into three distinct parts. Part I introduces the study and lays out the theoretical and methodological framework (Chapter 2 and 3). It also begins critiquing current social science research on public responses to climate change against which this entire dissertation provides a critical contrast. Part II – Chapter 4 – develops the science, policy and societal contexts of climate change, as they apply to both Ireland and the wider world. This part is devoted to the objectification of climate change in Irish society, thereby revealing its dominant symbolic order. The final part – chapters 5 to 8 – captures and critically analyses the realities of climate change receptivity in Ireland. Part III presents a multitude of subjective responses to the prevailing symbolic ordering of climate change and discusses the implications for these findings for climate-focused social science research, policy and related societal decarbonisation activity.

The following chapter – Chapter 2 – synthesises and critically analyses Bourdieu’s sociological approach, which is widely regarded as one of the most influential contributions to sociology in the twentieth century. Bourdieu rejects parsimonious over-simplification in favour of the assimilation of the rather more fuzzy and messy complexities of the social and unconscious realms of human behaviour: “forfeiting a measure of elegance...abdicating the ambition of competing with the purest economics, without for all that ceasing to propose models, but models based on description rather than deduction alone” (Bourdieu, 2005: 13). Given the complexity of Bourdieu’s approach, reinforced by his often circumlocutory style of writing, the main aim of Chapter 2 is to provide an in-depth and lucid description of his main concepts; particularly his three key concepts of habitus, capital and field. Critiquing the social science of climate change, the chapter creates an illustrative and contrasting juxtaposition with Bourdieu’s relational model. Following on from this, the chapter details how this relational approach analyses the regularities of a society, societal relations of power and the individual immersed within them.

Chapter 3 operationalizes the Bourdieusian framework by translating key theoretical concepts into empirically researchable propositions regarding the Irish population.
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public’s climate change receptivity. Firstly, the chapter explains my application of Bourdieu’s methods to reveal how international actors and institutions have defined climate change. This explanation also develops how these methods reveal the construction of climate change within Irish society. This is what Bourdieu calls constructing the object of research. Subsequently, the chapter elaborates on the primary data collection that I use to study, in depth, research participants’ reception to climate change, along with the role of their social space.

Chapter 4 produces a representation of the dominant symbolic order, formed from the regularities and power relations of Irish society, and the structuring of climate change within that order. Following the framework laid out in Chapter 3 the chapter begins by revealing how the global field of climate change science and the social science of climate change contribute to producing several dominant representations of climate change and decarbonisation: e.g. a climate change that is gradually unfolding or abrupt and catastrophic. It also shows how these representations are submitted to further manipulation by powerful players within the global establishment. The chapter finishes by developing how this constructed climate change is symbolically ordered within Irish society. Different aspects of the dominant representations of climate change are subject to greater appreciation through how they mirror the already existing hierarchies of society: e.g. the green economy potential and the Irish state’s economic growth obsession.

Bourdieu particularly focused his research methods towards the study of how specific sectors or fields of society contribute to the views and practices of the persons most connected to them. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of Bourdieu’s approach for the sociological study of climate change, Chapter 5 establishes the influence of certain fields on focus group and interview participants’ climate change receptivity. Here, the thesis examines the contribution of four key fields – agricultural production, education, business and environmentalism – to dominant societal definitions of climate change and to the receptivity of those who occupy these fields. This begins the presentation of the findings regarding participant responses to the dominant cultural representations of climate change outlined in Chapter 4.

How people receive an object, whether it is climate change or a work of art, is shaped by its symbolic ordering. But equally so, that reception depends upon the particular social space in which reception occurs. The findings presented in
Chapter 6 capture the vital role of class-specific social backgrounds, along with the accompanying class power relations, in producing different climate change perceptions and appreciations. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how these patterned discrepancies in the public’s classification of climate change reflect the class-related differences of social space. The chapter also further exemplifies the value of Bourdieu’s methods to understanding climate change receptivity.

Chapter 7 concludes the presentation of the primary qualitative findings by examining the role of class differences in the carbon practices practiced by participants. The chapter reveals how the economy of practices around various positions in social space contributes to participants’ relationship to and evaluation of particular carbon-related practical routines. This involves how choosing flying, engaging in a climate campaign or discussing climate change in a pub, are weighed and legitimated through the logic of different social spaces.

The final chapter – Chapter 8 – evaluates the relevance and contribution of this project’s findings for the social science of climate change. It details the implications of the research for climate change policy and for mobilizing a response to the crisis. It poses some recommendations for decarbonising policies and activism in this area. It also looks at the potential for further sociologically grounded research on the public’s relationship to climate change. Ultimately, the chapter critically assesses the thesis’s exposition of the need for including socio-cultural research in the debate on the public’s grasp of climate change and the composition of their decarbonisation.
2 Revitalising the Social in the Social Science of Climate Change: Bourdieu’s Socio-cultural Model

2.1 Juxtaposing Atomistic and Social Individuals

Bourdieu recognises the dispositional nature of human behaviour and the social unconscious that is absorbed into those dispositions, along with the disposition-forming routines through which we negotiate or strategise – often tacitly – our social conditions. He also recognises multiple sources of social power such as financial wealth, group membership and association, cultural competence, honour and prestige. It is through these premises, and the development of his comparative method of research and analysis, that Bourdieu has managed to convey a unique understanding of class and how it relates to perceptual and behavioural differences. Bourdieu’s “social space” is the point at which persons’ experiences of societal power, class-specific routine and dispositional development converge. It is a non-geographical space where groups and individuals hold homologous, economic, social, symbolic, educational and cultural resources (Bourdieu, 1989: 16-17). Those who hail from the same “social space”, although they may not share local or even interactional space, can experience “identical histories” (Bourdieu, 1990b: 59) such as the “‘closed doors’, ‘dead ends’ and 'limited prospects’” for the most dominated (ibid: 60). Bourdieu has found in his work that through such shared regularities which encourage similar “systems of dispositions” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 105); these spaces are prone to homologous activity, perspective and behaviours (Figure 2.1). This view if applied to climate change receptivity implies that different social spaces should encourage contrasting forms of receptivity. This project investigates the specificity of that relationship, through comparing the societal regularities and climate change receptivity of the occupants of particular social spaces with those of others spaces.

In Bourdieu’s study of taste in 1960s France, he discovered an effect of power operating through class and social space distinctions based on the valuing of

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22 Although Bourdieu recognises the greater likelihood of people of the same social space sharing the same geographical space (Bourdieu, 1989: 16).
cultural goods. He found the differences fed into hierarchical\footnote{Although Bourdieu deals a lot with homologies or social spaces where there exists a sameness of practices and ideas amongst agents or institutions, which may not appear distinctly hierarchical, these homologies tend to be hierarchal in relation to other homologies.} relations of exclusivity embedded in French notions of “high art” or “good taste”, which valued certain properties of cultural goods above those equated with ‘poor taste’. That was particularly the case where the distinctive property distinguished the product from properties equated with the popular taste of the lower classes. Hence “authenticity” and uncommonness enhanced an object by way of contrast to “imitation” and “popularization” (Petit Bourgeoisie buy prints of famous art while upper classes buy the real thing) (Bourdieu, 1984). Such contrasts fed into relations of class subordination and the sense of inferiority of the lower classes who failed to see how supposedly meritocratic systems of legitimization (e.g. career ladder, education) favour the privileged and their greater familiarity with the dominant culture the system seeks to inculcate (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). This observation upon the effects of difference has the capacity to introduce a very novel socio-cultural reading to the study of climate change receptivity: namely how patterns of exclusivity based on distinctions influence how people view and respond to climate change.
Based on his survey data from 1960s France used in Distinction, the graph displays social space tendencies towards taste, cultural activities and political leanings. Social space is arranged here according to capital distribution. Higher overall volume of capital increases rising up the diagram while economic capital increases going from the left to right and vice versa for cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1998b: 5).
Chapter 2

It is the contention of this project that the application of Bourdieu’s socio-cultural approach, particularly its attention to social distinctions, can deepen our understanding of how climate change is received by the public. In order to develop that contention, this chapter begins with a critique of mainstream social-science approaches currently dominating the study of climate change and decarbonisation. It then introduces Bourdieu’s theory and method as a sociological course of analysis. This layout contrasts the benefits of a relational analysis of climate change that is inclusive of society against approaches, which subscribe to a contrary individualised position. The latter, in neglecting the social, completely ignore the social origins of climate change responses, thereby encouraging substantialist interpretations. Based on a discussion between Dewey and Bentley, Emirbayer (1997) comes to disapprovingly define a substantialist method as consisting of a priori objects or essences which are static components of what is being studied. Researchers presume these to be independent of the world of relations (the systems of material, social and symbolic relations which constitute the universe) and thus they lack a sense of history or process (pp: 283–6). Parallel substantialist universes that researchers project onto their analysis include ideas about: individuals utilising an always existent drive of self-interest and calculation to negotiate the world, social structures perpetually exerting their one-sided influence over passive agents, or the public’s zombie-like adherence to static norms. For Bourdieu, this substantialism is often part of doxa, which is a set of “presuppositions that are regarded as self-evident and so outside the field of discussion” (McCullagh, 2007: 140). The dominant symbolic order, mentioned in Chapter 1, functions on the basis of this doxa. The order maintains its legitimacy through the public’s largely unconscious and uncritical acceptance of it. For Bourdieu, academics contribute to the production and reproduction of doxa when they uncritically reduce the world to the simplicity of their models or when they “move from the model of reality to the reality of the model” (Bourdieu, 1990a: 48) (Chapter 4 also features further discussion on this topic). Importantly, he defines his sociology in contrast to these substantialist social sciences that reproduce doxa, particularly “‘methodological individualism’” and rational action theory. Indeed, he often sets up his theory of human behaviour, which is largely dispositional and practical, against that of rational action theory, which is conscious and calculative (Bourdieu, 1990a: 47).

Resisting substantialism requires recognition that human drives, social
structures and social norms change throughout history. Such insight necessitates not just reference to the individual but also to society where historically unfolding processes of material and socio-cultural relations fundamentally (re)configure these drives, structures and norms (Emirbayer, 1997: 287). Research that bases investigation on these relations is called “relationalism” (ibid: 291). Bourdieu’s research, incorporating his social critique of the individualising, substantialist social sciences, fits firmly into the relationalist tradition (Vandenberghe, 1999). Essentially, Bourdieu’s relational approach offers a more in-depth social and historical description of perceptions and responses; whereas the behavioural models, underlying much of mainstream climate change social science, are restricted to individualised and substantialist assumptions about humanity. This chapter’s juxtaposition of these opposing traditions entails an elaboration of the societal and anti-individualistic nature of Bourdieu’s important concepts, along with a response to some of the more relevant criticisms of his societal model.

2.2 Behavioural Models and Substantialist Fallacies: Conjuring Individuals out of Thin Air

Paradoxically, what has been missing from much of the social science of climate change is the ‘social’. The majority of the research “on public response to climate change ... use individuals as their unit of analysis” (Norgaard, 2011: 209). This is largely a consequence of the dominance of psychological and economic perspectives in social science debates of climate change and how the mainstream forms of these two disciplines tend to narrow theoretical perspectives to the individual. This section’s central purpose is thus to illustrate how mainstream social-scientific approaches exclude the social and promote assumptions about individualised behavioural templates guiding human behaviour, including climate change receptivity. The analysis draws on pre-existing critiques concerning behavioural models by Kollmus and Agyeman (2002), Jackson (2005) and Shove (2010). It also utilises Bourdieu’s own dismissal of individualising methods, seeing them as part of a commonsensical reproduction of the false dichotomy between individual and society, a dichotomy which he fervently sought to overcome in his own work. The behavioural model templates that encompass the vast majority of behavioural and perceptual approaches to climate change are 1) rational choice; 2) information-deficit; 3) attitude, behaviour and choice approaches (i.e. the “ABC”
paradigm (Shove, 2010a) and 4) the heuristic approach.

Two main behavioural models – the rational choice model and information deficit model – linger on in the economics and psychology of climate change and have a particularly powerful imprint on decarbonising policy approaches (again also see Chapter 4). The rational choice model positions the person as pursuing their self-interests through conscious deliberation according to an “expectancy-value” rationale (Jackson, 2005: vii-viii): i.e. they weigh expected outcomes of an action or choice and the expected net benefits against the expected net costs (ibid: 26-9). Hence the model assumes that a decision to lower personal greenhouse emissions would involve some form of cost-benefit analysis. Therefore individuals would weigh, for example, any inconveniences and initial expenses from lowering energy use against the long-term savings and possible environmental benefits that they expect to accrue to them.

Rational choice has a strong tradition in the discipline of economics. The conceptualisation of the individual as self-interested and calculative is found in classical economics (Smith, 1910: 400); and can be traced to the latter’s foundations in utilitarianism and Hobbes’ state of nature, that is, the “war of everyone against everyone” (Hobbes, 1651; Hunt and Lautzenheiser, 2011: 126). All cases are substantialist because they take as given the rational intentionality and self-interestedness of an individual’s behaviour, without any recourse to the world of relations. The resulting overemphasis on consciousness leaves no room for the social unconscious that is reflected in individuals’ use of language or pre-existing categories, or the unthought-of actions people continuously engage in: be it talking with a particular accent or obsequiously complying to the suggestions of a more educationally endowed other (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 10, 14). In other words, human beings are "not in possession of the totality of the meaning of their behaviour as an immediate datum of consciousness and their actions always encompass more meaning than they know or wish” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 8, fn 14). The a priori assumptions of conscious intentions, or choices, aimed towards evaluated actions and outcomes, ignores “the intentionality without intention” or “practical intentionality” whereby actions can occur through a pre-

24 Although Smith incorporated notions of sympathy into other strands of his economic theories (Smith, 2009) it is really the legacy of the more individualistic and selfish human archetypes within his work, and that of other neo-classical economists, that have been imprinted upon the rationale of modern neoclassical economics.
reflective practical mastery of the body (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 20). The rational choice model’s narrow notion of interest, generally reduced to material and economic gains, fails to recognise how “historically variable” and socio-culturally induced interests actually are. In contrast, and in deliberately seeking to counteract the failings of this model, Bourdieu’s relational approach recognises the systems of social relations involved and thereby expands “the sphere of interest while reducing that of utility and consciousness” (ibid: 25). Rather than being an eternal absolute behind human motivation, self-interest is an “historical arbitrary” where conceivably the capitalist promotion and rewarding of egoistical values breaths life to the disposition of individual self-interest itself (ibid: 116).

The second main model is one of the simplest and earliest models of pro-environmental behaviour. Social scientists know it as the information deficit model, which sees awareness of the environmental crisis raising concern that then leads to actions – by those newly informed – against the crisis (see Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). Again, this aprioristic reading of the consciously responsive individual ignores the involvement of social and material relations. Undermined by its substantialism, the model fails in its universal application, with many studies highlighting the existence of a “gap” (ibid, 2002) wherein awareness and concern do not necessarily lead to pro-environmental behaviour (Brand 1997; Barr, 2008; Jackson, 2009). Nevertheless much of the information-deficit assumption tends to persist, especially where governments and NGOs pursue awareness campaigns. The deficit role also endures to a degree as part of the rational choice model which is accompanied by an information-deficit component: the expectancy rationale wherein correct information will lead to the correct expectations and ensuing behaviours.

Although this project examines how different versions of climate change knowledge produce different significations, having accurate and advanced information is not essential to decarbonisation. Norgaard (2011) draws attention to the possibility of the paradox where increasing knowledge is accompanied by

25 Some economists do claim that ‘preferences’ need not be coldly economic and can include interests of charity (Economist, 1998) but disembedded from any notion of sociocultural relations the default position for most economists is rational economic calculation. Therefore rational choice interpretations of behaviour become singular and dogmatic despite the claims to a plurality of preferences (Bourdieu, 1990a: 47-8).

26 Italics are from the original source.
decreasing concern (p: 2). In quoting Cohen (2001) she acknowledges the distinction where “knowledge itself is not at issue, but doing the ‘right’ thing with the knowledge” (as cited in Norgaard, 2011, 11). Read et al (1994) point out that to have a sufficient understanding of climate change requires just “two simple facts”: global warming is primarily caused by an increase in CO$_2$ in the atmosphere and that burning of fossil fuels, such as oil and coal, is an important source of CO$_2$. Due to the influence of other greenhouse gases and the debate concerning positive feedbacks and irreversible climate change this is somewhat questionable. However, raising awareness of these basics has been the main objective of public campaigns and are, in reality, not that difficult to grasp. The information-deficit model pays no attention as to why members of the public would ignore, avoid, confuse or deny this relatively simple information or even why others would actively seek out and engage with it in the first place. As all this highlights, the knowledge-decarbonisation relationship is far more complicated than can be explained by mere information deficits.

To compensate for the shortcomings of information-deficit and rational choice explanations for behaviour, psychologists have resorted to expanding the range of factors. The emerging trend has been for increasing variables (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). These variable-centric approaches all subscribe to an ABC formula whereby values and attitudes (A) are seen to “drive the kinds of behaviour (the B) that individuals choose (the C) to adopt” (Shove, 2010a: 1274). The ABC formula is predominantly based on the famous Ajzen and Fishbein Theory of Reasoned Action model (Figure 2.2) (Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002, Shove, 2010a). In the model normative beliefs act with the attitudes that emerge from the expectations and values held concerning the behaviour’s outcome. Both factors supposedly then influence intention to act: “the immediate antecedent” to carrying out the actual behaviour. This ABC logic underlies much of the variable-centred research (Emirbayer, 1997: 285-6) which has become common in researching the public’s connection to climate change. For example frequent attempts to correlate environmental values and environmental behaviours (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002) or the Eurobarometer surveys on European attitudes to climate change, conducted on behalf of the EU. However, despite the add-ons, ABC models,

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27 Ajzen and Fishbein’s Theory of Planned Behaviour that Shove focuses on is itself based on their earlier prototype of Reasoned Action.

28 For example Stern’s value-belief-norm theory model (Jackson, 2005, 56).
maintain much of the rational (ibid, 2002) choice component, such as behaviour based on planning, choice and intention. While some have included social factors, such as Ajzen and Fishbein’s “normative beliefs concerning the prescriptions of others” (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980: 239), they are elusive and under-theorised. Unlike Bourdieu, they do not offer any model of the relations of society itself but exist solely to prop up futile attempts to model the universal individual.

Figure 2.2: Theory of reasoned action model

Source: (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002).

The famous post-materialist hypothesis by political scientist Ronald Inglehart (1990) in many ways conforms to this variable-centric model. The theory holds that once material necessities have been fulfilled individuals develop – albeit gradually and intergenerationally – post-materialist values which includes that of environmental concern. Just like the ABC models it subscribes to notions of attitudes as they are supported by values, ensuing behaviour changes and choice. Inglehart argues that developed countries, where largely concerns with material scarcity have been satisfied, are more post-materialist. This is the models weak and heavily substantialist social component. The model has been strongly criticised for under-emphasising the role of “objective environmental deterioration” and for an

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29 That is perceptions concerning whether others, important to the person, think they should or should not carry out the behaviour (Jackson, 2005: 46).
over-dependence on quantitative results from developed nations to support the hypothesis (Dunlap and York, 2008). It pays little heed to the socio-cultural complexities that can inhibit the move to post-materialist values (Rau, 2010). Additionally, the almost instantaneous return to materialist concerns when populations are exposed to economic crisis points to the instability of these supposed values (ibid).

Bentley and Dewey also characterised the variable-centred approach as substantialist because it depicts variables as repetitively causing the movement between agents irrespective of the agents themselves and their social context. The depiction is of actors, “much like billiard balls”, propelled against each other by their properties of income, gender, education, or personal variables such as attitude (Emirbayer, 1997). Bourdieu also recognises this substantialism when he critiques the “illusion of the constancy of the variables” (Bourdieu, 1984: 18). In reality, he states, that the impact of the so-called independent variable (e.g. age) on the dependent variable (e.g. behaviour) is in fact also dependent upon wider socio-cultural relations that can transform the ‘independent’ and the ‘dependent’ variable respectively. For example, the significance of age changes as society changes. The extension of the age of retirement or average time spent in education can alter what a specific age comes to represent (ibid) along with the behaviours of those bearing the age. As Bourdieu notes in critiquing the variable-centric approach, behaviour is never totally explained through some linear connection to an isolated factor (Bourdieu, 1984: 378). Instead there are “systems of factors” involved (Brubaker, 1985: 767). For Bourdieu, these systems are found in the external societal relations and in the internal systems of dispositions of groups and individuals (ibid).

The cognitive heuristic behaviour model, which deviates from the overly conscious calculation of the aforementioned ABC models, has become very prevalent in the social science of public responses to climate change (Weber, 2006; Mooney, 2011; Biegler, 2012). This model has been inspired by the ideas of Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist much lauded in the sphere of social science (Burkeman, 2011). His research has been based on identifying various reaction tendencies in how humans judge or problem-solve through the application of practical shortcuts or rules of thumb referred to as heuristics. These heuristics draw upon a variety of cognitive biases. Weber (2006) describes the heuristic of the “finite pool of worry” bias where people are deemed to limit their worries to a minimum amount of
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threats (p: 116). The model argues that when other threats, such as terrorism, become more salient people tend to neglect their fears concerning climate change (ibid). Some of these cognitive biases offer useful descriptions of decision-making and judgement: most notably “confirmation bias” wherein people exhibit the “tendency to overemphasise anything that confirms what [they] already believe” (Douglas, 2011). Regarding climate change, the confirmation bias is exhibited when contrarians visit websites that only support the contrarian position or by “cherry-picking” supportive data such as viewing temperature declines during short time-periods as proof against global warming (Mooney, 2011).

Although heuristic models step beyond the ideas of the rational calculating person, they often reproduce a similar substantialism, characterised by a biological determinism, which reproduces an individualizing logic. While the literature recognises that such heuristics can develop out of experience through “trial and error” (Douglas, 2011) advocates of the model often neglect this more socially sensitive genesis in favour of an evolutionary biological origin. Many view human biases as having been hard-wired in the brain as a result of evolutionary development (Winter and Koger, 2004: 5) and often as part of “fight-or-flight reflexes” (Gardner, 2008; Biegler, 2012). They generally support this explanation through the logical fallacy of circular reasoning. Starting with the premise of hunter-gatherer genetic leftovers or hard-wiring as explanation for responsiveness, they then invent or generalise some ancient hunter-gatherer recurrence to support specific claims about how we operate (Biegler, 2012; Camakaris, 2012). This evolutionary hard-wiring emphasis neglects how these reflexes might be influenced by socially and culturally induced dispositions (Bourdieu, 2005: 247).

Essentially the inherent weakness in all of the above substantialist approaches is the rendering of society as the ‘forgotten other’. The evolutionary psychology explanations and heuristic models often obliterate the role of societal contexts by standardising individual psychologies; over-emphasising ancient pre-civilisation legacies and selfish gene survival strategies. The rational-choice model presumes that people act as atomised individuals, according to their self-interests, using cognitive deliberation to achieve outcomes. These three uncritical assertions also

30 For some it seems the miniscule nature of civilisation’s 12,000 years on earth in comparison to the vast period spent in the Stone Age is treated as concrete proof that evolution has anachronistically locked the reflexes of our brain (Gardner, 2008; Camakaris, 2012).
form the bare bones of value-attitude models and attitude-behaviour-choice (ABC) models (Shove, 2010a), despite their claims to distinction. Even if some of these models mention the social the individual remains the central object of research whilst some vague “passing references” continue to externalise society (ibid: 1276): e.g. “normative beliefs”31 (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980), “social norms”, “contextual factors” etc., (Jackson, 2005: 48, 60, 92).

Perhaps the most devastating consequence of substantialist models’ omission of society, especially those seeking to promote behavioural change, is that power is seen as resting in each individual via their behaviour, choice and psychological make-up. This clearly overlooks any workings of structural power in society. Comprehension and responses to climate change are formed through historical societal struggles that define the practices and categories – both latent and discursive – that surround them. These processes are a central part in both determining and enabling forms of decarbonisation. Studying climate change, therefore, requires moving beyond individualistic and substantialist models of human behaviour, thereby transcending the false separation of the individual from society. The socio-cultural impact of these individualising approaches is returned to in Chapter 4 which further develops how the social science of climate change contributes to constructing ‘climate change’ and decarbonisation.

This research seeks to challenge these individualised and substantialist social-science approaches to climate change by adopting Bourdieu’s model of society as well as his detailed relational methodology. His strong references to the social spaces and contexts of society provide a fitting rebuke to claims of universality by individualised and substantialist behavioural models. Additionally, his economy of practices and sensitivity to societal power relations extends the nature of the socio-cultural debate on decarbonisation and climate change receptivity. Therefore, introducing Bourdieu into the discussion of the societal response, to climate change, adds further support for the calls by sociologists to “put society into climate change” (BSA, 2010) and extending the debate beyond the role of individuals. The next section develops how Bourdieu’s relationalism transcends the individual/society dichotomy, along with the restrictive dualisms the dichotomy entails: mind/body, consciousness/unconsciousness, freedom/determination, self-interest/collective interest.

31 Beliefs about what others think concerning how you should act.
2.3 Bourdieu’s Model of the Individual within his Model of Society

To fully understand Bourdieu’s work, it is advisable to first consider the origins and development of his societal model as well as his theory of human behaviour, both of which follow a general theme of overcoming false divisions. One of the key divisions that he transcends is between structure and agency, which had polarised the structuralist and phenomenologist positions in mid-twentieth century France (Joas and Knöbl, 2009: 371). This division directly corresponds to the society/individual dichotomy, with rational action theorists conjuring pure agency in their asocial individuals. Through his research Bourdieu noted how actors do not always operate according to the rules of the structure. Thus he rejected structuralism’s “strange philosophy of action” which “made the agent disappear by reducing it to the role of supporter or bearer of the structure” (Bourdieu, 1995: 179). He compensated for this oversight by introducing “elements of action theory into his originally structuralist theoretical framework” (Joas and Knöbl, 2009: 375). Hence, instead of this false antimony of society and individual, Bourdieu recognised that historical social structures become deeply embedded in the minds and bodies of those who experience them. These same structures, in turn, gain much of what distinguishes them through how these agents adopt, reproduce and adapt these structures whilst operating within and through them. One can see how the structures of mainstream economics externalise much of the social and the environment and reduce much of the world to market-based theories. In just such a homologous manner some agents of the disciplinary field display this reduction of the world to econometrics and economic models in their language and public communication. They internalise values and stances that are in keeping with the tempo of mainstream economics and though differentiated they are homologous enough to be identifiable as economists who collectively produce and reproduce the practices that characterise that economism. While much of this structure-agency relationship is also to be found within Giddens’ structuration theory (see Giddens, 1984), for this project I favour Bourdieu’s more rigorous empirical methodology and field-habitus model of society and societal power (see Chapter 1).

Bourdieu’s anti-dichotomous amalgamation is part of a broader “synthesis of sociology” that he undertook in combining elements from the work of a long list of
philosophers and sociologists (Vandenberghe, 1999: 32).32 Regarding one of his influences, Marx, Bourdieu’s work appears to be an elaboration of the notion of superstructure. In Marx’s thesis of ‘historical materialism’ the economic base provides “the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness” (Marx, 1904: 12). Thus for Marx “the mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life” (ibid). Bourdieu’s work elevates the symbolic realm to a position whereby he recognises that the superstructure also influences societal relations and material conditions of existence (Moon, 2003). Part of this development involved recognising other forms of capital than just economic such as cultural and symbolic capital (see section 2.3.3). The ensuing social relations model of society is sensitive to forms of domination which extend to non-economic opportunities, creating a more nuanced understanding of class and how power operates in society.

Bourdieu’s anti-dichotomous and “systemic concepts” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 96), of “field”, “habitus” and “capital” (see Figure 2.3), provide the relational conceptual base for this research. However, attempting to define any of Bourdieu’s concepts is not an easy task. This is due to his use of what he called “open concepts” (ibid),33 concepts that are not rigorously defined. In part this represented a rejection by him of positivism, in the sense that these constructs deal largely with an unconscious, unobservable realm and operate not as isolable variables but as systems (ibid). As a consequence, much of the subsequent section employs theoretically constructed empirical examples to aid explanation. Unlike those who take a definitive and conclusive stance with regard to the interpretation of Bourdieu’s concepts (Alexander, 1995; King, 2000; Jenkins, 2002; Burawoy, 2008), this thesis explicitly recognises Bourdieu’s relationality and use of anti-dogmatic systemic concepts as offering a certain degree of malleability to his work. The overall goal of this research is not after all to legitimate and reify an ultimate interpretation of Bourdieu, but rather to make use of and develop a conceptual and


33 Italics are his.
methodological framework that suits the complexity and intricacy of socio-cultural climate change research.

2.3.1 Bourdieu’s Concept of Field: Where Society is Not Just a “Passing Reference”

As stated above, this project is committed to examining the role of societal regularities in Irish climate change receptivity. Consequently some understanding of what constitutes society is required. Bourdieu’s concepts offer a model of society (see Figure 2.3) that “allows one to break away from vague references to the social world (via words such as ‘context’, ‘milieu’, ‘social base’, ‘social background’)” (Bourdieu, 1990a: 140). Instead, he developed his notion of field to provide a relational conception of society as a system of differentiated historical fields, for instance the political field and the educational field. These fields are each configured out of a specific “network...of objective relations between positions” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97). A specific network of objective relations, as they are configured between positions, helps identify the space of a particular field. One can discern the manner in which the objective relations of goods, practices and properties like the analytical dispositions, writing styles, and methodologies congregate around the various positions of an academic field (Bourdieu and Collier, 1988).

34 Emphasis is mine.
Figure 2.3: Bourdieu’s Concepts

Field of Power

(Area where the powerful struggle for access to statist capital: e.g., lobbyists, politicians, trade unions, academics, social movements)

Symbolic violence through controlling instruments of knowledge and shaping categories of perception, consecrating certain beliefs as data or unquestioned, imposing a dominant symbolic order where societal objective realities, cultural hierarchies, the absent and silent are normalised, appearing in harmony with everyday realities.

Social capital
Symbolic violence

Field

(Broad historical social network distinguished from other networks through the network’s pertinent configuration, which relates its agents, objects, practices, histories and ideas to each other. The distinctiveness of the network reflects other distinctions.

Distractive field logic (e.g., oil for sale; business is business)
Field illusion: specificity of interests peculiar to the network, the particular stimuli that draw the attention of the agents
Field games: means through which agents and their objectives are advanced in the field
Capital: resources such as economic, cultural, symbolic and social resources which are valued differently by each field. These are employed in the game of the field and are crucial for shifting or maintaining the balance of power and shaping the field logic.

Habitus
Cognitive and corporeal dispositions
Practical apprehensions
Feel for the game
Relational interactions
Strategy
Adapting/adapting positions

Social Space

Non-geographical space where persons hold homologous structure and volume of capital and share societal regularities such as same ‘closed doors’ and ‘situated prospects’
These spaces are prone to activity and perspectives.

Note. The arrows indicate some of the flow of influence between the concepts. The dual arrows in the field of power indicate that this is not a conspiratorially theory but that many of the dominant also unreflectively internalise the dominant logic and are prone to the effects of data. For illustrative purposes the top part of this field overlaps the field of power showing that dominant members of the field have field-of-power influence but this isn’t necessarily always the case.
Understanding what he means by these ‘objective relations’ is key to comprehending Bourdieu’s concepts and his relational reading of the social world. A look at his analysis of how academics within the field of academia, in order to appear efficacious, have employed “the rhetoric of scientifi

city”, helps to provide further elucidation of objective relations. For Bourdieu “scientifi
city” involves cloaking an object – an occupation, an argument, etc., – in anything that intimates the appearance of being scientific, thereby legitimating the object through being associated with science’s prestige. This can involve the use of expert labels such as “heat engineer” (Bourdieu, 2005: 64) or the use of opinion polls to bolster the facade of objectivity (Bourdieu, 1991: 177, 273). The rhetoric of scientifi
city “receives part of its properties” through how these employed scientific associations objectively relate to – e.g. contrast, reflect, outrank – other possible discourses and objects that constitute a different style (Bourdieu and Collier, 1988: 29). In short, the rhetoric of scientifi
city becomes distinguishable by what it is not. For example it often contrasts starkly with more figurative rhetoric. It also gains power through being legitimated, in certain situations, above other styles of rhetoric. Objective relations are composed of such systemic and often hierarchical relations among styles, properties, ideas, practices and all other objects.

These systemic relations of Bourdieu’s fields are structured around different ways of responding to the world. Each field encompasses a competitive system of social relations functioning according to its own specific logic. Through the “game” – where members compete for the particular forms of resources or stake sought after in their field (Moi, 1991: 1021) – a field develops “a logic and a necessity that are specific and irreducible to those that regulate other fields” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97). The game incorporates field struggles over the legitimacy of various meanings and representations of the world, which amount to the characteristic symbolic ordering of the field (Bourdieu, 1990b; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). It is in this way that interest is “historical[ly] arbitrary” and multitudinous as “each field calls forth and gives life to a specific form of interest” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 116-7). Bourdieu illustrates this specificity by juxtaposing the logic of the artistic field against that of the economic field:

“while the artistic field has constituted itself by rejecting or reversing the law of material profit, the economic field has emerged, historically, through the creation of a universe within which, as we
commonly say, “business is business,” where the enchanted relations of friendship and love are in principle excluded” (ibid: 97-8).

Due to the specificity of interests each field bears its own form of illusio, which is the particular stimuli that draws the attention of the agents of the field (ibid: 25-6). As this research aims to show, these field-specific relations also encourage different ways of responding to climate change.

Encompassed within this field logic is the “economy of practices” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 119). Bourdieu’s economy of practice effectively amounts to the organization of practices in society. The field and social spaces in which practices routinely occur, the values and significance attached to them, the mode of their performance which is dependent upon the manner of their embeddedness in dispositions, the technical properties and scarcity of the objects upon which the practices are based, all contribute to this organization (Bourdieu, 1984). The concept of the economy of practices denotes a further break by Bourdieu away from rational calculating economic theories that universally reduce individuals to the role of consumer and their purchasing power (ibid: 224). Within the economy of practices instead of reducing the world to a conscious aiming at ends geared towards profit maximisation and material gains, actions operate via a form of “reason immanent in practices” that accords with the logic of a particular field (Bourdieu, 1990b: 50-1). In every field – including that of class relations – the efficacy and significance of practices relates to the type of interests of the field. In a field of politics, for example, practices that increase public support – from the subtle and often unconscious nods, smiles and handshakes of public representatives to more deliberate policies such as free healthcare to over 70s – hold a “reasonable[ness]” (ibid) and value that they would not hold in other fields. In this way certain practices gain in ascendency to levels of

35 For illusio Bourdieu offers the following illustration: “A middle-class academic who has never been in a ghetto gym or attended fights in a small club can hardly, on first look, grasp the pugilistic interest (libido pugilistica) that leads subproletarian youngsters to value and willfully enter into the self-destructive occupation of boxing. Conversely, a high-school dropout from the inner city cannot apprehend the reason behind the intellectual’s investment in the arcane debates of social theory, or his passion for the latest innovations in conceptual art, because he has not been socialized to give them value” (ibid: 26).
doxic (i.e. latently taken for granted) unquestionability, respectability and even basic acceptability within fields. Power struggles also work to construct other practices within this economy as negative in value – i.e. damaging to ones reputation. Again within the political sphere, for example, active political protest in Ireland appears to have greatly diminished, in part through the co-option of the unions, NGOs and civil society groups during the partnership process (see Chapter 4). As a result, political protest through direct action has also been symbolically de-valued, at least until the onset of the recession in 2008. An important feature of this investigation into the impact of regularities in Irish society upon climate change receptivity is the examination of this economy as it pertains to decarbonisation and energy-related practices.

2.3.2 The Systemic, Social and Historical Being of Habitus

As noted through the un-intentionality operating within the economy of practices, field struggles are not purely explicit acts of will, consciously aimed at imposing dominance. Instead they involve unconscious guidance from “habitus”. The “theory of habitus” is Bourdieu’s answer to the aforementioned failings of the models of rational action (Bourdieu, 1990a: 47). Rather than being the direct outcome of rational calculation, how persons respond to climate change and the world in general is influenced by the “system of dispositions” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 67-8),36 that is, their habitus. The habitus is the “‘practical sense’” that prescribes for us the range of choices and expectations that we perceive as open to us in various situations (Bourdieu, 1991: 13). As a “way of being” (Bourdieu, 1977: 214) that is stored in the body (Bourdieu, 1991: 13) it both restricts and facilitates how persons walk, talk, gesticulate and think. Habitus is acquired over time through routine social experiences, encountered from within one’s social space and involving the practices and relations of fields (Bourdieu, 1990b; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Composed of dispositions, one finds the multiple ingredients of the habitus in the competencies, dexterity, temperament, attitudes to time, tastes, insecurities, mental structures, biases and various other inclinations and predispositions that are present in the mind and body of a person.

Chapter 2

A vital component of the habitus is the “systems of classification”: “mental and bodily schemata that function as symbolic templates for the practical activities – conduct, thoughts, feelings, and judgments – of social agents” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 7). This is an agent’s mental and bodily process of classifying through which different gestures, tempo, rhythms, feelings, arguments or expressions are tacitly – but sometimes explicitly – given meaning or symbolic significance (Lizardo, 2004). The signification is dependent upon masses of contrasting relations and comparisons such as how a multitude of different gestures (with reference to social context) are categorised – e.g. vulgar/polite – and unconsciously evaluated against each other. This includes how agents sense their own position in relation to the object of consideration for example experiencing a piece of highbrow art as ‘not for the likes of us’. Such differential relations are central to Bourdieu’s methodology and developed in more detail in section 2.3.4.

In experiencing field regularities, agents form certain dispositions; thus each field encourages a specific habitus. Consequently, external manifestations of habitus help define the field’s structural appearance and logic. Thus a sociologist may be attuned to seeing the role of social systems and the cognitive psychologist oriented to seek patterns of heuristics. It is partly through studying field regularities of Irish society and the dispositions they help constitute that this project aims to examine the climate change receptivity of divergent social groups.

The habitus is not only influenced by the field that an agent presently occupies. It is also the cumulative effect of all the fields and social positions that an agent has occupied, which includes class position, or social space, as located within the field of social classes.37 Thus a habitus is “transposable” and “durable” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 35), carrying dispositions formed within previous social spaces (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 42-43). Such durability poses problems for naive beliefs in a public who’ll simply consciously and voluntarily decide to decarbonise or engage politically with climate change. The resilience of the habitus points to potential wide-scale difficulties in transitioning to a carbon-light future from a habitus socialised in a carbon-heavy society. Policy-makers, campaigners and concerned members of the public may need to consider the

37 Of significant importance is the primary habitus which is formed in early childhood and has a deep and lasting effect on the rest of a person’s life.
implications of the habitus in advocacy and future planning: planning that caters for the resistant carbon-heavy habitus and the social conditions likely to encourage carbon-light or suitably flexible dispositions that can meet the demands of climate change. Chapter 8 considers this in further depth.

The habitus is also dependent upon how society configures objective relations. As a field consists of networks of objective relations, the field regularities absorbed into habitus are composed of these relations. Absorption can be by virtue of daily impressions of their hierarchical arrangement; thereby informing agents’ modes of classification: e.g. opera being ranked above soap opera as a form of art. Also with traces of the habitus perceptible in certain ways of being, or practical capacities – such as fluency in the ‘rhetoric of scientificity’ – it too is part of and positioned within the systems of objective relations. In this way various fluencies and proficiencies of the intellectual can stand in a hierarchical relationship of difference to those of the early school-leaver. Where the habitus manifests as “hexis”: i.e. in durable dispositions of the body such as the “way of standing, speaking, walking” (Bourdieu, 1990b: 69 - 70), it comes to be ranked against other deportments, mannerisms of gait and accents. The habitus is therefore part of the power relations operating within a society which this project seeks to investigate with regard to climate change perceptions and responses.

Finally, it is important to stress that the determinations of the field and its positions on habitus are not absolute. Agents through their habitus have the ability to strategise (Bourdieu, 1998b: 81), which brings a dimension of choice – albeit not of the individual consumer choice variety but following a “‘fuzzy’” or practical logic (Bourdieu, 1990b: 87) – into how actors navigate the world. Although, the habitus is restrictive of both the options one perceives and the capacity to undertake these choices, the opportunities or “field of the possibles” (Bourdieu, 1984: 110) that remain leave room for invention. This strategising is not necessarily rational or calculating but operates through a “practical mastery” (Bourdieu, 1990b: 75), obtained by experience of playing the game of the field. The acquired skills and aptitude for decoding field classification hierarchies – e.g. a connoisseur in a field of art (Bourdieu, 2010: 59) – restrict but also expand a person’s ability to effectuate their agency. With a fuller sense of the “present and potential situation (situs)” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97, 130) and of the economy of practices, along with the ability to perform those practices, agents can
manoeuvre certain field and class power relations in their favour. Therefore, the habitus, in being the means by which Bourdieu transcends the structure/agency dichotomy, contributes to the structuring of field and “to constituting the field as a meaningful world” (ibid: 127).

2.3.3 Species of Capital

The condition and dynamics of field and habitus are very much dependent upon their relationship with capital. Capital, in the Bourdieusian sense of the term, is also a relation of power and is pivotal to configuring objective relations and the structures of fields. Hence, it is crucial for any examination of how power relations shape group-specific climate change receptivity (i.e. research question 2). As mentioned previously, Bourdieu’s conception of capital not only encompasses traditional economic capital but also non-economic social resources. His work additionally features three other key forms of capital: 1) cultural, 2) social and 3) symbolic.

Cultural capital, which in general amounts to “educational credentials and familiarity with bourgeois culture” (Wacquant, 2006), includes certain forms of legitimated cultural knowledge or material goods, along with the skills to engage with such knowledge and goods. It accumulates in “objectified” forms such as artwork. It is also internalised and “embodied” in the habitus as linguistic competence or habits of thought sufficiently honed to grasp, for example, the specialised application of economics or law. Even the deportment with which people conduct their public practices such as interviews, or simply just greeting someone on the street can be a form of embodied cultural capital. Finally, its third form is “institutionalized” cultural capital, perhaps best represented by educational qualifications (Bourdieu, 1986: 46-51). However, “capital is a social relation” (Bourdieu, 2010: 107) and as such the accepted cultural capital will vary according to the field and its transformations. This is something critics often overlook in their criticism of Distinction where they accuse Bourdieu of declaring a fixed and universal picture of a “highbrow” culture. Rather, in keeping with the changeability of his relationalism, he “charts the [early stages of its] eclipse” in status by the culture favoured by managers and executives (Weininger, 2005: 98, fn

38 Italics are his.
Bourdieu’s idea of social capital is not limited to the social connections that can aid personal objectives. Group membership has also the capacity to provide access to the collective capital of the social group: prestige by association, or access to the group’s cultural knowledge. Social capital can accelerate other forms of capital such as assisting career development through having the ‘right connections’ and by equipping the habitus with marketable dispositions (i.e. the ‘right’ accent). The ‘wrong’ connections and accent, on the other hand, can stunt other forms of capital (Grenfell, 2010: 94) and thereby encourage social inequality: note that I use the common expressions here as Bourdieu’s work often refers to such clichés because they bear traces of social regularities. Hence Bourdieu’s version additionally emphasises how it can contribute to negative social consequences. Thus it offers more than Coleman’s and Putnam’s narrow use of the term ‘social capital’, including their propensity to overstate its positive social effects (O’Brien and Fathaigh, 2005).

The third form of capital, essential to Bourdieu’s understanding of social structures and power relations, is symbolic capital. Symbolic capital manifests itself in the forms of honour, respect, prestige, or personal authority. Importantly, it demonstrates the interconnectedness of Bourdieu’s species of capital. Symbolic capital can emerge through the presence of other forms of capital if these are recognised as a legitimate resource. For instance, financial wealth (economic capital) and intellect (cultural capital) can translate into prestige (symbolic capital). Hence it is formed out of possession of other capital forms and emerges from the recognition or “misrecognition” of their legitimization (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 119). ‘Misrecognition’ in this case involves the failure of persons, perceiving another or some object as prestigious, to discern the arbitrary processes of capital accumulation (e.g. being born into privilege) and the historical conditions of legitimatization that underlies that prestige: e.g. the status of Catholic clergy in Ireland during the time when ministers subjugated health care policy to the wishes of the bishops (Adshead and Millar, 2003). The emergence of symbolic power from other capital forms is Bourdieu’s systematic adaptation of Weber’s ideas on legitimacy and the power of charisma. It is also part of Bourdieu’s incorporation into his theory on social stratification and class, Weber’s conception of status.
groups based around “particular styles of life and attributions of honor or dishonor” (Brubaker, 1985: 747).

As the only capital with the power to consecrate (Everett, 2002), symbolic capital feeds this process of misrecognition as it legitimises cultural arbitraries: the symbolic capital of mainstream economists (i.e. the “new intellectuals” (Bourdieu, 1998a: 6)), particularly those operating as public experts, serves to consecrate – along with other forces of symbolic capital such as government – the narrow economism of public discourse (see also Chapter 4). The effectiveness, however, of this consecration varies by the position it is met with from within the field or by the predisposed receptivity of a habitus. Other social fractions often apply a different valuation to goods and properties and may not recognise either the prestige or the renown that constitutes a consecrating capital: hence the symbolic weight of the words of a climate change scientist will vary as his audience varies. Due to such differences underlying relations of legitimization, certain aspects or interpretations of climate change may dominate over others. Chapter 4 in seeking to provide a relational definition of climate change, using a Bourdieusian framework, uncovers some of the role of symbolic capital in promoting dominant and everyday legitimisation of climate change. The next section shows the importance of symbolic capital to Bourdieu’s sociology and how the functioning of symbolic capital is additionally dependent upon the symbolic order and the historical principles of vision and division that it imposes upon the cognitive world. It highlights just how essential comprehending the dominant symbolic order of Irish society is in order to investigate the legitimation of ways of visioning and responding to climate change.

2.3.4 Differential Relations of Class, Power and Climate Change

Undoubtedly, Bourdieu’s insistence on the centrality of societal power has the potential to transform social-scientific climate change and decarbonisation research. It substitutes a focus on linear individual-variable patterns with an

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39 Where Bourdieu’s take on class specifically deviates from both Weber’s and Marx’s is his recognition of class division based on how systems of dispositions of a class emerge from different social conditions (with group status aligned to certain conditions and dispositions and societal relations of legitimacy) (see Brubaker, 1985: 762).
emphasis on systems of individual-social patterns that extend from the upper power structures of society right down to day-to-day carbon-related actions. This section expands upon how that societal form of power connects to personal behaviours through field-capital-habitus interrelations and the symbolic ordering of objective relations.

As already evident in previous discussions in this chapter, difference is a key part of Bourdieu’s model of society: differences between fields; social conditions, capital and habitus. Bourdieu’s “field of class relations” (Bourdieu, 1991: 186) can be seen as the broad societal configuration of differential homologies of social space (i.e. small farmers, mainstream broadsheet journalists etc.). All of these distinctions are ultimately based on diverse configurations of objective relations. The distinctiveness of habitus developed within each social space emerges from networks of objective relations that are unique to each field and discrete conditions of class. It is agents’ routine experiences and reactions to these objective relations that lead to the formation of the habitus. Indeed, it is because of the differential quality of objective relations that the world is rendered meaningful. For example, a “style” might emerge from certain social spaces that incorporate a particular affinity with “a systematic set of goods and properties” (Bourdieu, 1998b: 8). If eco-friendly-living were to exist in a universe of its own as a style, it would have nothing that would distinguish it by way of comparison. Thus these particular affinities come to characterise such spaces in relation to other particular styles and spaces. Bourdieu’s sensitivity to the meaning-making capacity of “differential relations” can be seen as reflecting the influence of Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure:

“meaning is given to the letter ‘A’ by noticing that A ≠ B, C, and all other signs” (Schinkel and Tacq, 2004: 64). This act of comparison is essential to Bourdieu. In the documentary La Sociologie est un Sport de Combat (2002) Bourdieu describes how examining such relations by locating them within a system of contrasts and similarities goes to the heart of his methodology. He states that “to understand a phoneme you must place it in a system of phonemes”. A painting, for instance, should always be thought of “in relation to the space of paintings that

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40 Although Bourdieu takes issue with the Saussurian distinction of ‘langue’ (i.e. an autonomous and homogenous system of signs) and ‘parole’ (i.e. the performative realization of that system through speech) (Thompson in Bourdieu, 1991: 4-5). This detachment of langue analytically renders it as devoid of socio-historical and situated relations “which have established a particular set of Linguistic practices as dominant and legitimate” (Thompson in Bourdieu, 1991: 5-7).
were painted then”; “to understand what someone does, you have to understand what that person is not doing too” (Bourdieu, in Carles, 2002).

It is through difference that societal symbolic power is able to wield its effect: the accumulation of status and legitimacy within certain objects – discourses, skills, consumer goods – at levels above other objects encourages powerful symbolic hierarchies. Thus the scienticficity of the visiting academic can garner greater attention and validity on the departmental corridor than the words of a passing cleaner spoken in the local dialect. Pre-existing cognitive divisions such as “masculine/feminine, young/old, noble/common, or rich/poor” (Bourdieu, 1999: 336) provide the categorising templates for these differences. Using such “principle[s] of division”, a symbolic profit is to be had by legitimating and attaching oneself to a particular distinction. A particular lifestyle can enrich the bearer with symbolic capital by way of deviation from lifestyles equated with “ordinary, common, banal, ‘average’” (Bourdieu, 1999: 337). Habitus stores an agents’ comprehension of these relations through their systems of classification with which they navigate these contrasting relations and power disparities. This form of practical guidance doesn’t just externally configure the world, but internalises its endless diversity in the form of biases, feelings and values. It also classifies the agent themselves, situating their sense of themselves within this broad sea of power relations. It is in this manner that agents ultimately configure their relationship to climate change (see Chapter 6).

Although the subtleties of these symbolic power relations may exist in the moment of a day-to-day interaction, the dominant source of an object’s legitimacy over another is the field of power. The field of power is where the powerful struggle to gain influence over the state and over “statist capital” (Bourdieu, 1998b: 42). This offers the capacity to “regulate the functioning of different fields” through such statist powers as the manipulation of funding or “juridical intervention” (ibid: 33), “granting power over the different species of capital and over their reproduction” (Bourdieu, 1994: 5).41 Although it may be argued that global corporations have more power now than most states their expansion would not have been possible without a series of government regulations, tax laws, educational policies, pay agreements and international trade agreements. In fact the

41 Reproduction can be facilitated through influence over the education system, which enables cultural arbitraries to be persistently legitimised and normalised through routine (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990).
power of global corporations can be attributed to the fact that they have become the main recipients of statist capital. Bourdieu described the field of power in *State Nobility* as extending “from the economic field, at one end, to the field of cultural production, at the other” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1989: xi). Within one finds the “fields of politics; higher civil service; the professions and the university” (ibid). In short, the field of power is a field of struggle by power-holders for the consecration of their resources over others, both within and across the fields (ibid: 99-100). It is also through such struggles that the field of power configures the hierarchy of fields (see Chapter 6).

This field-of-power ranking determines the influence and role that a particular capital has in society and what amounts to the societal regularities and relations of power that come to hold a dominant position in the everyday. The struggle over climate change can also be viewed as a struggle over the legitimacy and consecration of certain aspects to it – relating to how it is defined and should be responded to – within the field of power (see Chapter 4). The massive expansion of global trade, the centrality of economic growth and the omnipresence of neoclassical economists are all testament to the enormous value that has been accorded economic capital in the field of power. This has implications for the role of economic growth in shaping and positioning decarbonisation within society (see Chapter 4 for further discussion).

These struggles in the field of power in turn help shape what I define as the ‘dominant’ symbolic order, which itself consists of a prevailing arrangement of systems of objective relations configured hierarchically and homologously. For example the dominant symbolic order configures peer-review, p-values and the science academies into homologous relations by way of pertinent association, while at the same time these are configured hierarchically over relations of mere ‘opinion’: ‘vox pop’ interviews, pundits, and online comments sections. The symbolic order provides the categories through which struggles are fought, and fought over. The symbolic order helps to maintain certain aspects of class structure through symbolic violence and by the subtleties inherent in its normalization. “Symbolic violence” is where coercion is aided through consent of the dominated.

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42 The marginalisation of the state in “today’s globalised world order” could be used to query Bourdieu’s concept of power here but the contemporary state displays an “ever weakening ability to secure the welfare of its citizens while, on the other hand, it becomes ever more intrusive in the life of the national economy” (Kirby and Murphy, 2011: 24).
to domination, having only recourse to evaluate the situation through “instruments of knowledge” (i.e., includes all symbolic structures from language to science (Bourdieu, 1991: 167) or even more minutely: surveys, economic measurements, classroom textbooks) and categories of perception (e.g. dichotomies, occupational taxonomies, categories of taste or gender) which are shaped by the structures of domination (Bourdieu, 1998b: 121). Thus hierarchical relationships appear natural, which serves to legitimize the dominators while judging lower classes or their lifestyles as inferior (Bourdieu, 2000: 170). Much of Bourdieu’s work can be seen as the identification and unveiling of a symbolic order along with the symbolic violence that maintains it. In his work on French society, Bourdieu found dominant class position to be validated largely through meritocratic views and practices, such as the acquisition of educational qualifications and their validation as ‘key to success’. However, members of the dominant class have had greater access to culturally legitimised forms of capital and their material manifestations: e.g. appreciation and ownership of works of art. The lower classes, on the other hand, failed to recognise this arbitrary capital accumulation and legitimatization of their dominators. Due to the deep immersion in the logic of fields and by the coercive implementation, particularly through education, of the schemes of perception and “instruments of knowledge”, members of the lower classes are trained to think in terms of the logic of the ruling class. They are thus rendered subordinate through a process of “symbolic violence” wherein they accept the myth of meritocracy (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). These processes of symbolic violence and misrecognition are aided by the largely unconscious nature of habitus. Unwittingly habituated to the workings of the field and social space, it allows certain unquestioned regularities to become doxa. In this manner certain facets of the dominant symbolic order contained in day-to-day routines come to be repetitively internalised in bodies and unconscious minds, to the point of being normalised as natural. As will be explored throughout this thesis, doxa is likely to have a major role in climate change receptivity.

2.3.5 Agency and the Everyday Structuring of Relations of Power

As already noted, such differential relations of societal power extend into daily interactions. Bourdieu states “what exist in the social world are relations – not
interactions between agents or intersubjective ties between individuals, but objective relations...” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97). This is not, as some perceive, proof of Bourdieu downplaying the structuring importance of interactions (Bottero and Crossley, 2011; Crossley, 2011). Instead, it demonstrates how social interactions are entirely composed of objective relations (Fox, 2014). Every exchange is rendered from the participants’ cultural competencies, linguistic traits, gestures and discursive skills, all of which are also objectively related (Bourdieu, 1977:81).

As part of systems of objective relations, the dominant symbolic order, and the symbolic order pertaining to specific fields, enter the interactions: this bears social hierarchies into the exchange (see section 3.5.2). The objective relations pertaining to the interaction carry symbolic power. This means that they are ranked and valued via their position in the dominant symbolic order, but also via the order of the field and the social space of the agents. For example the topic of climate change is also part of systems of objective relations. Within the dominant symbolic order the issue is wrapped in the technical language of dominant scientific experts (See Chapter 4). In a discussion amongst a low-education group, socially far removed from the institutional world of the scientists, the dominant order hierarchy of technical discourse might be experienced as alien to their social space. As a result some may perceive the discussion as either pretentious or daunting. In certain circumstances a group member armed with a morsel of specialist insight might take advantage of this social distance and employ the rhetoric of scientficity to consecrate a particular argument on climate change. In that case technical terminology or pseudo appeals to physics, both configured high in the objective relations of the dominant symbolic order, can coat the discussion in the veneer of dominant legitimacy. In this way through a practical sense of how the objective relations within an exchange are configured or hierarchised, communicators adapt their contributions so as to position themselves – or their ideas, arguments, beliefs etc., – favourably within the exchange. The latter amounts to the strategy, which is also a means of agency for the communicators. Consequently everyday social exchanges are not simply ‘interactions’, as the narrow definition of the word defines them, but subtle manoeuvrings of relations of power “that oppose individuals and groups in the routine interactions of daily life”. Constituting “a
The objects of the occasion, the internal systems of classification of agents, and the strategies employed, hierarchically configure the interactive moment\(^{44}\) and contribute to the ranking of objective relations present. As these “relational interactions” (Fox, 2014) indicate, societal power is omnipresent and stretches from the field of power to the realm of daily social exchanges. This process must play a key part in configuring local notions of climate change along with aggregative development of decarbonizers, contrarians, and the disengaged. Clearly, there is much that lies beyond the narrow horizons of asocial climate change research. To address the second research question, this research pays significant attention to the role of these extensive societal power relations.

2.3.6 A Response to his Critics: Reading Bourdieu through the Substantialism of “Pots and Pans”

Did Bourdieu achieve what he set out to do, namely to move beyond a dichotomous understanding of the social world? This is a question that has obvious implications for how effective Bourdieu’s model is in overcoming the binary failings of existing behavioural models. Perhaps the most prominent criticism of Bourdieu’s social theory is that he ultimately fails in his attempt to transcend the structure/agency dichotomy, instead falling back into an overly structuralist, deterministic model of the social world (Alexander, 1995; King, 2000; Jenkins, 2002; Burawoy, 2008; Bottero and Crossley, 2011). This charge against the rigidity of the habitus, which in its “unconscious” absorption and externalisation of the field appears to smother any possibility for agency (Alexander, 1995: 136-7), continues to stir debate. Bourdieu’s actor is seen as some sort of automaton operating entirely according to his social conditions and as such has no agency and serves only to reproduce these conditions (Alexander, 1995: 136-7; Jenkins, 2002: 51). This in turn is accused of negating the capacity of people, rather than structures, to impose an effect upon the world and as a consequence reducing

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\(^{43}\) Italics are from the source.

\(^{44}\) For an analogy see description of televised discussion (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 256-9).
Bourdieu to ahistoricism where social transformations cannot be explained by a deterministic habitus and field relationship (Jenkins, 2002: 20). In this interpretation any democratic process, including possibilities for expanding the democratic response to climate change, are hopelessly paralysed (Alexander, 1995: 191).

Such dichotomies as individual/society and agency/structure are a central feature of contemporary society’s symbolic order and are embedded in western language. European language is “better suited to express things than relations, states than processes” (Bourdieu as cited in Wacquant, 1992: 15). It impels us towards “process reduction” making it possible to speak of a river as a thing, which is flowing or of wind as something that is blowing “as if a wind could exist which did not blow” (Elias 1978 as cited in Emirbayer, 1997: 283). This language of things fortifies the artificial dualisms that divide our view of the world. It pushes us to “make quite senseless conceptual distinctions which makes it seem that ‘the individual’ and ‘society’ were two separate things, like tables and chairs, and pots and pans” (Elias, 1978: 113). The resultant false 47 oppositions help maintain a “commonsensical perception of social reality” (Wacquant, 1992: 15) amongst social scientists. In much the same way the above misreading of Bourdieu highlights just how powerfully embedded the “pots and pans” of dichotomised categories of perception are. Ironically these academics interpret Bourdieu through the dualisms of determination/freedom and unconscious/conscious which Bourdieu worked to overcome. These two dichotomies are mutually inclusive, with the former operating as an extension of the latter. However, some critics construe habitus as the end-product of field and the immediate and unconscious producer of action, which means humans are the mere automatons of field. This misinterpretation substitutes habitus for an individual’s actions, thoughts and actual experiences (Alexander, 1995; King, 2000: 425), thereby conflating the concept as “Bourdieu’s version of the first-person phenomenological perspective” (Lizardo, 2004: 26). These critics unwittingly reproduce in their interpretations the false notion – reinforced through language’s nominal dichotomies – that consciousness is entirely distinct from unconsciousness (King, 2000: 424; Burawoy, 2008).

45 They are buttressed by the descriptive linguistic heritage of “positivist philosophies of science” (Szerszynski, 1996, 104-139; Wacquant, 1992, 15).
46 Italics are mine.
47 They are ‘false’ because they are actually interconnected rather than distinctly opposed.
Alexander (1995) for example refers to Bourdieu’s “oxymoronic” “unconscious strategy” (p: 154). This he labels as such because with Bourdieu defying a definition of strategy as purely conscious in the rational calculative manner (Bourdieu, 1977: 36; Bourdieu and Collier, 1988: 94), the only other option for dualistically mystified Alexander is its lexical opposite. However, consciousness is co-dependent on unconsciousness; thinking discursively requires access to an unconscious repository of language stored in the habitus. In this way, the habitus is both restrictive and enabling. It limits expectations and possibilities on the basis of what is stored and not stored within it while at the same time it is a capacity, a resource of dispositions and classificatory guides (Lizardo, 2004: 7-8), to be drawn upon in the immediacy of the moment.

The fact that these theorists fail to see the co-dependency between the restrictive dimensions of the habitus and its enabling powers points to their difficulty with seeing another dichotomy – freedom and determination – as anything but polarising. However, “mastering an art” that one has access to via the “inheritances and acquisitions” of their social space expands liberty (Bourdieu, 1999: 340). Absorbing the complex terminology of the economic field within habitus enables a person to articulate themselves through a powerful economic discourse.

The dichotomised misreading by these critics is further enabled by the fact that none of them provide a subtle and nuanced reading of the nature of objective relations: i.e. how they conjoin broad societal structures of field and symbolic order with the microcosm of interactions. As stated “strategy” (both practically and deliberatively) utilises a sense (a feel for the game) of objective relations’ hierarchies to produce an effect of agency upon the world. Therefore academics can, in using the close fit of their theories or arguments to “common expectations” and the “façade of scientificity”, exploit existing hierarchies of discourse, debate and expertise – along with how poorly others look towards the underlying relations behind symbolic capital and legitimation – so as to “impose their vision” (Bourdieu and Collier, 1988: 13-14).

Without recognising these nuances, structure in Bourdieu’s work can easily be

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48 Crossley for example loses much in his abstract summary. For him they consist of the composition and volume of capital, namely economic and cultural, that agents hold. The volume and ratio of which relate agents to other agents (social proximity) through their respective capital (Crossley, 2011: 24).
construed as a prison rather than a facilitator, thereby mislabelling his work as reproduction theory that leaves no room for change. However, objective relations tie his model together, producing a convergence that makes Bourdieu’s triune of concepts – habitus, field and capital – highly relational. Although much of Bourdieu’s work concentrates on the reproduction of class structure, via maintaining power relations through the structured imbalance of resources, this relationality renders his sociology sensitive to continuous change. Changes in the validity of certain objective relations can have knock-on effects throughout the mutually dependent concepts. New or previously overlooked practices, technologies, issues etc., are assimilated into sections of society, toppling old legitimacies. Such developments as recognition of the subconscious; the internet; neoliberalism – along with the rise of environmentalism and the crisis of climate change (see Chapter 5) – have all become interwoven into new objective relations, bringing societal, dispositional and aspirational transformations.

Other criticisms, whether accurate or not, can easily be countered by the flexibility of Bourdieu’s anti-dogmatic open concepts and relationality. Bourdieu, has been accused of adhering to neo-utilitarian self-interest drives, despite his derogation of said interest (Joas and Knöbl, 2009: 390-391). Although distinguished from utilitarian self-interest by the largely unconscious nature of the action, Bourdieu’s actors still appear driven by what is a cynical and presupposed dimension to human nature. Writing in the language of conflict (struggles within fields), his actors seemingly struggle for self-interested motives of status, material gains and the betterment or maintenance of class position.

Just as Bourdieu challenges the notion of a singular interest through the diverse interests of fields, the concept of ‘self’ is equally historically specific. Bourdieu’s work repeatedly expands the degree of selfhood via the collective nature of the habitus. Thus, once again, these conceptions of self and interest by his critics are reproductions of society/individual dichotomies. Unable to look beyond these binaries, they fail to realise that Bourdieu’s conception of interest allows room for social interest, or collective interest. Therefore non-status urges become possible such as the welfare of others or the survival of the planet. Selfhood does not have to be reduced to the individual either. There is the plausibility of the inclusion of ‘others’ in self. It can be extended to incorporate the biosphere, a social movement or nationalism as central to the sense of self (Jackson, 2005;
Arnocky et al., 2007).

Finally, Bourdieu is criticised for his focal imbalance between material and social textures of reality. The emphasis on social signification of how materiality is consumed is seen as neglecting the “functional context” (Miller in Ingold, 2003: 406) and the importance of form in material objects that “tend to lend themselves to certain kinds of cultural appropriation” (ibid). Additionally he is accused of subscribing to a “communicative act paradigm” (Campbell in Miller, 1995: 115) whereby with or without the actor’s knowledge, the intention of the act is oriented towards others. These arguments discount the material requirements of necessity in Bourdieu, such as how “filling and economical meals” fulfil the role of “reproducing labour power at the lowest cost” that is forced upon the lower class worker (Bourdieu, 1984: 177). Furthermore, regardless of how an object is used it still communicates something: even consumption that pursues some escapist hedonism (Campbell in Miller, 1995: 117) can communicate slothfulness, individualism, or a ‘just reward’. Therefore, consumed objects are inescapably social: the material-social relationship forms another part of the relational objective-subjective equation. This material side of objective relations means Bourdieu’s approach is open to recognising social phenomena as “emergent” of physical phenomena, a view that is shared by many critical realists (Sayer, 2000: 13). The materiality of climate change is not an irrelevance. The inherent quality of fossil fuels to emit CO$_2$ and be non-renewable can clearly lend to their meaning and to decarbonisation. The physicality of an encroaching environmental disaster – e.g. death, extinction, extreme weather events – must also contribute to its appropriation by the social world.

2.4 Conclusion

Can Bourdieu’s work really help to advance the social-scientific study of climate change receptivity? In juxtaposing mainstream social science models with an elaboration of Bourdieu’s sociology, this chapter sought to capture the extensive analytical void in climate change social science from the exclusion of an in-depth societal presence. As argued throughout this chapter, Bourdieu’s recognition of the unconscious absorption of broader symbolic systems, such as the economy of practices, field and dominant symbolic order, refutes the individualised behavioural-model parsimony. His socially sensitive concepts provide the means
towards appreciating a deeper contextualisation of the public’s perceptions, actions and inaction, towards climate change.

The vision of climate change receptivity that a Bourdieusian framework allows access to is the role of differences in social space and the resultant formation of divergent dispositions, along with the subtleties of power relations operating through the everyday. These power relations are structured through the disparities of capital and legitimacy of particular ways of being, and visions of the world, over others. This is a large step away from the dominant impetus of the individualising social sciences of climate change to promote universal interpretations of individual motivation. The following chapter – Chapter 3 – outlines the methodology used in this research, which utilises a Bourdieusian framework to frame empirical fieldwork in Ireland. It elaborates on how this research applies his model so as to define Irish societal regularities and societal relations of power and examine their input into the socialization of climate change responses.
Chapter 3

3 Operationalising the Bourdieusian Framework

3.1 Introducing the Research’s Double Reading

Firstly, this thesis reveals the dominant symbolic hierarchies and doxa: of Irish society, specific Irish fields, and climate change representation. This construction is vital in informing the research of how Irish societal regularities and relations of power encourage certain patterns of climate change receptivity amongst divergent groups of respondents. The methodology I employed identified some prevalent forms of these regularities in Ireland’s dominant symbolic order and four specific fields: 1) the agricultural field, 2) the environmentalist field, 3) the business field and 4) the education field. It also established societal regularities found within specific social space homologies (i.e. dispositions, practices and classifications generally pertaining to certain positions) within a field and the structure of class relations. The methodology additionally served to uncover the climate change receptivity of the participants who stem from the social spaces examined.

Ultimately the entirety of the data analysis centred on the relationship of the societal regularities to the climate change receptivity. The analysis constructed the receptivity in terms of the systems of classification, economy of practices and societal power relations that manifest within the primary data collected from participant responses. These concepts, as they are both present in the external social environment and internalised in habitus, provide a bridge between the societal regularities constructed and participants’ climate change responses. This Bourdieusian conceptual and methodological framework also fuelled methodological innovation through examining how relational interactions at focus group and interview level incorporated micro workings of societal power in participants’ responses.

In essence Bourdieu’s research methodology proceeds from constructing the object of research – i.e. defining its pertinent properties, its underlying objective relations and the dominant symbolic hierarchies in which the object is immersed – to capturing the subjective reception of these constructions (Brubaker, 1985). In this project the objects of research are climate change and climate change responses within Irish society. Through a similar methodological progression the
research constructed dominant representations of these objects along with how groups and persons dispositionally relate to them. However, a total and universal construction of the objective relations that underlie and configure these representations is impossible. Instead the significance of how objects relate to each other and the world vary according to the practical comprehension, emerging from a particular social space, that accompanies any seemingly conscious interpretation or sense of a situation or a history, a practice, a gesture etc., (Wacquant, 1992: 9). While a scientist might see the legitimacy of climate science findings in terms of relations of peer-review, amongst other things, others might construe validity in a manner that subordinates these relations to those of media salience and current weather conditions. Thus the reliability of a researcher’s spontaneous attempts or that of the participants, to define these relations is compromised. Such attempts can lead to an overly literal interpretation, reducing the data to the immediate perceptions and actions of the participants, or project the researcher’s preconceptions onto the results.

To compensate for this the research approach “must of necessity effect a double reading” (Figure 3.1) which firstly identifies the external objective structures, pertaining to the object of research, before analysing the “subjectivist standpoint” (Wacquant, 1992: 7, 11) of those attached to those structures (ibid: 11). This is a vital part of Bourdieu’s reflexive approach, a “most pressing scientific priority”, to “construct the object of research” (Bourdieu et al., 1991a: 149; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 229). This initial construction, aims towards identifying widespread and dominant objectified forms of the research object incorporating: how it is positioned in the field of class relations or a particular field, its pertinent properties and the role of dominant players in shaping these properties. This in turn helps to identify the possibilities for being influenced or mislead by prevalent taken-for-granted or “pre-constructed” representations of the object (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 229).
Chapter 3

Figure 3.1: Process Layout of the Double Reading

Reading 1: The Objectivist Context

1. Establish the dominant representation of 'climate change' & 'decarbonisation':
   - Examine the literature of climate change scientists and IPCC reports for the pertinent properties of 'climate change' as it is written in the field of climate change science.
   - Identify in the research of social scientists on climate change and the public the properties they project on carbon emissions, role of the public, the relationship of society to climate change.

2. Construct the dominant symbolic order of Irish society and how 'climate change' is positioned within this order:
   - Through secondary analysis identify movement and accumulation of state capital through state social structures, policy, state nominees, changes in intra- and intergenerational flows of upper classes personages (e.g. movement of politicians into corporations). Identify the interests and properties of expertise and skill-sets – supported, legitimated and normalised by the effectuation of this statut capital. They indicate the field of power hierarchy which in turn indicates the hierarchy pertaining to dominant symbolic order.
   - Employ secondary analysis of Irish policy to construct the relative position of aspects of the climate change and decarbonisation representations within that symbolic order.

3. Establish the general logic and structure of four Irish fields and the presence of climate change within them:
   - Field of agricultural production
   - Field of environmentalism
   - Field of education
   - Field of business

Reading 2: The Subjectivist Context

Focus groups
Focus group questionnaires
Life history interviews

Collect data on how they classify 'climate change' and decarbonisation, their social space routine experiences – including practices they partake in and structure of personal capital, their evaluation of practices related to their climate change receptivity, the micro-social power relations underlying how they discuss climate change.

4. Define participants' social spaces and relative location within the field of social classes:
   - 1. Identify how their capital is valued by the field of power
   - 2. Identify how the field of power values their respective fields
In effect, the symbolic ordering of climate change within Irish society is the object of research that this project aimed to construct. Although climate change is relevant to every country, I chose Ireland mainly due to my own familiarity with its political, cultural and institutional structures. Growing up in this country, I have become an avid consumer of its mainstream media, witnessed the decline of religious reverence and clerical power, and observed the political machinations of the long periods of Fianna Fail government. So too I have experienced firsthand the social transformations of the Celtic Tiger period: seen the changing attitudes and practices of those around me, watched people who never stepped foot outside the country become regular flyers, observed the expansion of house sizes, suburbia, traffic congestion along with the normative development of a once alien concept of household recycling. As an insider I have experienced Ireland’s shifting social patterns and consequently have a greater understanding of which areas of Irish society I should subject to investigation and analysis.

As persons’ practical apprehension of how this Irish order is configured varies according to class and social space, the symbolic order constructed is the most dominant variant and likely the most generalised through the backing and influence of the establishment and the state. This construction therefore also aimed to capture the role of power and the condition of symbolic domination that has attached itself to the issue of climate change in Ireland. Through their control over instruments of knowledge – such as climate science, publications, reports – and their capacity to emphasise certain categories over others, means that dominant classes likely exert great influence over public perceptions. This is perhaps more so the case in complex matters such as climate change towards which the public must rely less on their sensory observations and more on the esoteric instrumentation and technical literacy of specialised persons and institutions such as the IPCC.

The sub-sections of 3.2 present the first step of this double reading, regarding how the project investigated the broadly accepted and often unquestioned regularities of Irish society, and how these regularities have contributed to the entrance of climate change into that society. They also provide the means of examining the formation of dominant climate change representations. Section 3.3’s field analysis is an extension of this step in that it looked into the effect of field-specific symbolic orders, pertaining to the four fields listed, on the representation
of climate change and climate change responses. The analysis also defined the social space of participants in terms of their field positions. A secondary analysis of existing information, including publications and policy reports, provided the general method for uncovering these more objectivist aspects of the double reading.

The objectivist reading equips the researcher for interpreting the subjectivist standpoint of the participants’ responses. It helps to establish what interests are at play and how things are valued in a field or social space thus providing access to a particular type of “practical apprehension” (Wacquant, 1992: 11) – the reasonableness or interpretation that comes from occupying a certain position in everyday reality – of which the researcher may have no practical experience. The second part of the double reading, which pertains to the primary data collection, investigated the climate change receptivity that is guided by this practical apprehension. Section 3.4 introduces this primary multi-methods research approach, which involved a combination of participant background surveys, focus groups and life history interviews.

The participants were chosen due to their connection to the four fields listed above. I included two additional social space groups in order to broaden the reference to class. Both these groups, the production operators and community employment scheme (CES) members provided further access to the influence of lower socio-economic social spaces (see Table 3.1). These fields, social spaces and their participant occupants were central to the primary data collected. The final analysis related this data to the secondary data of the objectivist reading. In other words I checked participants’ climate change receptivity for signs of influence from the symbolic ordering of climate change within Irish society and the field and social spaces of the participants; thus completing the double-reading process. The following section (3.2) begins this chapter’s layout of the first part of the double reading starting with how my approach attends to investigating how elites’ shape prevalent and ‘legitimate’ impressions of climate change and how it should be dealt with.
Table 3.1 Focus Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agricultural Field</th>
<th>Environmental Field</th>
<th>Business Field</th>
<th>Educational Field</th>
<th>Low-skilled Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organic Farmers (4)</td>
<td>Eco-village Members (7)</td>
<td>Business Men/Civil Servants (4)</td>
<td>Former Steiner Pupils (5)</td>
<td>Production Operators (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers (7)</td>
<td>Climate Camp (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>School Teachers (3)</td>
<td>Community Employment (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>University Students (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Academics (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of participants in each group.

3.2 Constructing the Prevailing Regularities of Irish Society and Climate Change

Prominent players within relevant international fields such as the field of climate change science produce the main interpretations of climate change. This climate change construction is filtered into the symbolic relations and doxa of Irish society wherein it undergoes a further construction as it becomes embedded within societal hierarchies (Figure 3.1). As climate change is a global political and social problem, I employed the objectivist reading initially to reveal the work of construction on climate change at the international level. This approach then shifted to assessing the dominant objective configuration and symbolic order of Irish society. The structural analysis then returned to investigating how the dominant global representations of climate change are immersed within these Irish structural regularities.

3.2.1 Elite Constructions of Climate Change and Decarbonisation

In the international fields of climate change science and the social science of climate change, scientific and academic agents and institutions are engaged in the
game of defining climate change and matters of decarbonisation. In order to identify how ‘climate change’ is being re-shaped by these fields, the objectivist reading drew up a list of the “pertinent properties” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 230) that characterise these fields’ multiple climate change definitions. The research examined the hierarchical arrangement of these definitions in order to ascertain which representations have the greatest powers of validity, based on the symbolic power of their hierarchical position.

The products of these fields – climate change definitions and responses – are not necessarily representative of the general and dominant societal orderings of climate change. Instead broader international political structures such as the climate change conferences and the agreements of Kyoto or the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) apply a process of retranslation to these products. In the struggle for the authoritative definition of climate change major players – scientists, NGOs, fossil fuel lobbyists, and politicians – endeavour to have intergovernmental agencies and institutions recognise their favoured representation (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 238-9). Their ultimate aim is of obtaining support at state-level through international agreements (or failure thereof). This struggle is not reducible to any singular disciplinary field but takes places across fields in what is designated here as a global field of power\(^49\) (Figure 4.1). Therefore this construction also looked for the particular representations of climate change with intergovernmental statist capital investments: for example through being written into international policy agreements.

### 3.2.2 Constructing the Dominant Irish Symbolic Order and the Position of Climate Change within that Order

This part of the research developed further the definition of climate change within the framework of the dominant Irish symbolic order, most notably its political economy. The construction of the dominant symbolic order by victors in the Irish field of power – those who have secured statist capital – corresponds to the

\(^{49}\) Although Bourdieu does not deal with a global field of power (he does mention a world economic field (Bourdieu, 1998a)), it is possible to derive it from his field of power as a struggle over statist capital in the global political arena. The struggle is based mostly around producing international trade and regulatory agreements and involves much input from intergovernmental institutions.
hierarchical structure of the field of power. Identifying this order thus makes visible power relations in Irish society. How climate change becomes embedded in that order has significant consequences for how it is perceived. For example a symbolic order that positions carbon-lowering activities and policies below expanding growth and consumerism diminishes the relevance of climate change mitigation for Irish society.

The construction of the dominant symbolic order involved 1) uncovering the legitimated and doxic representations of a particular society and 2) identifying what are the “socially efficient resources” (Wacquant, 1992: 11) or dominant forms of capital of that society (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1989: 266). This required locating the movement and accumulation of statist capital, which are visible in state structures (ibid: xiii, xvii -xviii). One such state structure is the education system which provides an important instrument for to normalise and consecrate certain practices and categorisations. Through its widespread and routine application throughout society it has serious potential for spreading and reproducing the dominant symbolic order (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1989: xiii ; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). This research therefore analysed the nature of that structure and of what the institution inculcates, in order to gain greater access to the structure of Ireland’s dominant symbolic order.

The study also identified movement of statist capital through changes in upper class trajectories, including intra- and intergenerational flows of privileged personages (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1989: 270) which act “as powerful sources of change within the field of power” (ibid: xvi). For example, the decreasing political stature of the clergy and the rising prominence of foreign executives clearly indicate transforming power structures. In addition research revealed the make-up of persons the state nominates to authoritative positions within state boards and prominent research and advisory panels. This indicates the type of expertise and skill-sets the state is bestowing with a powerful societal presence. This investigation of statist capital therefore identified the dominant values and interpretations the symbolic order imposes as well as its general arbitrariness.

Crucially, in the process this investigation also constructed the relative position of aspects of climate change and decarbonisation within that symbolic order. A secondary analysis of Irish policy examined how statist capital reproduces certain dominant variants of climate change mitigation and ignores others. The
research additionally questioned how the dominant symbolic order appeared more congenial to certain climate change representations over others. In many ways this part of the construction compared the configuration of objective relations, which constituted the dominant symbolic order, with the pertinent properties of dominant representations of climate change. Those qualities reflected in elevated positions of the order insinuate the aspects of climate change that Irish society would be generally more receptive to. For example a symbolic order with an elevated position for technical discourses over moral ones would appear to be less accommodating to the moral framing of climate change as opposed to its climate science descriptions.

The Irish media also plays a role in determining an Irish climate change construction and in facilitating the contribution of symbolic violence to that determination. In this research the media are treated in relation to symbolic violence as “instruments of knowledge”\textsuperscript{50} controlled by dominant sectors (corporate owners and professional journalists) that mainstreams particular accounts of climate change. Bourdieu defined the media as comprised of “doxosophers” (in that they disseminate doxa)\textsuperscript{51} because, often lacking the necessary critical training, they operate as merely the public voice of doxa, parroting the presumptions of the symbolic order. They create and distribute a particular worldview in the guise of analysis, description and discussion, which unwittingly and uncritically reinforces pre-existing categories of perception (Bourdieu, 1998a: 7). Furthermore, the media invest their own meaning into climate change via their reporting practices and cultural leanings. For example, the practice of ‘balanced reporting’ whereby in order to fulfil “professional obligation[s] of ‘objectivity’” equal airtime is given to those claiming the existence of human-induced climate change and those who dismiss it. This promotes the impression that there is no consensus amongst climate scientists and that the evidence of both sides is equally matched (McCright and Dunlap, 2010).

\textsuperscript{50} Symbolic violence: coercion is aided through consent of the dominated to domination, having only recourse to evaluate the situation through “instruments of knowledge”, or categories of perception shaped by the dominant order.

\textsuperscript{51} Not necessarily a critical profession, reporters are liable to unwittingly replicate dominant social relations hierarchies.
In ascertaining how the Irish media present climate change, I firstly identified common reporting patterns such as the ‘go-to’ experts, the dominant topics, temporalities and silences and compared it to the objective relations of Ireland’s dominant symbolic order. The comparison establishes a sense of whether the media does parrot doxa and the symbolic order. The analysis then looked to some of the patterns in media reporting of climate change and whether it too reproduces the projection of climate change as it is immersed within the dominant Irish symbolic order.

3.3 Field Analysis and Participant Social Space: Constructing further Irish Societal Regularities

In researching the regularities of Irish society and the power relations defining climate change I also applied a field analysis examining participants’ specific fields and the objective relations directly pertaining to their position within the field, which also relates to their social space. The participants are from agricultural, educational, environmentalist and business fields. These four field categories are particularly relevant to a societal response to climate change. The educational field I chose mostly because of the role of mass education in disseminating and legitimating dominant culture, along with its potential to inculcate perceptions and practices through which the public deal with climate change. The agricultural field’s inclusion is due to its huge impact on Ireland’s EU per capita emissions ranking: the addition of greenhouse gases caused by agriculture (especially methane and nitrous oxide) moved Ireland from 9th position to 2nd for 2009 (CSO, 2012: 20-1). There are also large implications for agricultural production due to changing weather patterns. The environmental field has an obvious role in field of power struggles towards bringing climate change issues to the fore. The centrality of the economy to the field of power and to government decarbonisation policies are the reasons for selecting the business field. The business field is prevalent in Ireland’s political economy. Therefore understanding how climate change is being negotiated with by persons within the social contexts of the business world is of considerable importance.

It is not always easy to identify the pertinent fields. Bourdieu offered a useful guide in this matter stating “an agent or an institution belongs to a field inasmuch
as it produces and suffers effects in it” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 232). The specific logic of a field, its regularities, objects and practices yield an effect upon the institutions and agents which occupy the field. These institutions and agents also yield an effect within the field. As singular agents the effect is likely to be negligible. As part of an aggregate of agents responding to the field’s forces the agent contributes to an effect through passive acquiescence or, en masse, adopting new practices and promoting new ideas. Where the “effects of the field ceases” marks the spatial limits of a field (ibid: 100). In reality participants can occupy several fields at once – e.g. field of social classes, agricultural field and field of education – so it was important to be aware of other fields that participants occupy and be mindful of other potential field influences.

While I selected all other participants for the targeted field analysis on the basis of their specific field connections, the operators and CES participants are not so easily positioned. Despite the production operators’ factory being viewable as a subfield of the field of manufacturing, and the CES participants’ training and community information centre locatable within the field of community service provision, can it really be said that the participants occupy these fields? With only one participant employed as an operator for much longer than a year and with the CES placement both part-time and limited to three years, the depth of the field effects upon them remains questionable. Furthermore the nature of their relationship to these fields, the training that CES members acquired or the nonunionised disempowerment of the operators, in many ways overlaps the class-related power relations that I cover in the broader analysis of the influence of the participants’ positions within the field of class relations. At any rate neither of these occupational arenas had much to offer in terms of climate change save for the fact that their factory and CES spaces excluded it. In the end I deemed it best served the research to restrict the data collected from these participants to the analysis of climate change receptivity in terms of social space and class.

A detailed construction, as exemplified in Bourdieu’s *Homo Academicus*, of each of the four fields, is an endeavour far beyond the scope of this PhD. However, rather than primarily limiting the study to the investigation of broad class-related influences on the object of research this project also examined specific field influences; albeit in ways that suit the scope of this research. Therefore, the research made use of secondary analysis of existing publications and research to
objectify these fields and the social space positions of the participants within them: such as the work of Hilary Tovey (2007) on Irish environmentalism. This broadens the projects illustration of the distinctive applicability of Bourdieu’s concepts to the study of decarbonisation, thereby adding to the applicability of a Bourdieusian framework for the study of climate change receptivity (i.e. research question 3). This work of construction identified the specific capital and logic of the fields through determining the properties of those positioned in the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 107-8): a field with a high level of science-based qualifications amongst its major players, might indicate scientificity or its rhetoric, as a form of capital along with a logic pursuant to evidence-based analysis or assertions. The research must treat this property, however, not in isolation, but with reference to other properties and their distribution within the field. The nature of the reproduction strategies employed by different actors – such as applying for government subsidies, use of private education, building networks and other such approaches used to maintain position and capital – also aids to identify field capital and logic. Having briefly established some of the characteristics of each relevant field, this analysis then looked to how ‘climate change’ entered each field and how the field had come to ‘translate’ it upon its entrance. The research objectified the fields in this manner so as to develop an understanding of the particular field hierarchy – in terms of practices, ways of viewing the world and of interpreting climate change – which in turn provided an idea of how a field might encourage pertinent climate change receptivity amongst relevant participants.

Finally I positioned the participants within the structure of class relations. The class-related position of the groups and participants chosen for this research is expressed through a combination of the social standing of their field, current structure and volume of their capital and social trajectory. The research established the hierarchical position of participants’ fields in relation to each other according to how the Irish field of power positions them. This gave an idea of how the interests, practices and ideas of each field are related in society more broadly. Their class position was also obtained through their volume of ‘socially efficient resources’ such as qualifications, occupation, occupational experience, income estimated from occupation and social capital. Comparing their education and occupations across three generations contributed to uncovering their trajectory: from their current position back to their grandparents (see Appendix). This deviated from Bourdieu’s approach in Distinction where he derived social origins from the father and
grandfather’s occupation and highest educational qualification (Bourdieu, 1984: 508, 512). This is due to the gender-related imbalance of the more patriarchal society of the 1960s and a quantitative limitation of needing to conform to the restrictions of a survey. My more qualitative study included in its assessment of trajectory and class both the maternal background of participants and my primary observations of their “embodied cultural capital” (Everett, 2002) – observed discourses, composure – along with revelations regarding the type of education they received. The research, in juxtaposing the hierarchy of participants’ fields to the position of participants within the field of class relations, provided some objective semblance of the differences in inter-field and intra-group symbolic capital. The more influential the position that a specific field logic, discourse or field interests has within the field of power the more opportunity they have for being consecrated by state power. The same can be said for the more elevated the position that a person has in the field of class relations with the dominant classes being closest to prevailing establishment culture.

3.4 Collecting the Primary Data: Bringing respondents, ‘Climate Change’ and Irish Society Together

The collection and analysis of the primary data provided the subjectivist part of the double reading. The primary data collection encompassed 11 focus groups and 19 life history interviews, conducted over a period of seven months in 2010. The total number of participants was 64. Furthermore I administered two brief survey questionnaires, at the start and finish of every focus group, seeking background information and reported behaviours concerning climate change. My field notes documented some of the interactive mannerisms, tempo and emotional atmosphere of the interviews and focus groups. They also documented various observations occurring outside of transcription periods, relating to recruiting and setting up the focus group. I chose these more qualitative methods in order to gain insight into everyday subtleties of dealing with climate change; something which a more quantitative approach would have overlooked. Ultimately, the primary empirical research design captured the reception of participants to climate change while accessing their social space and identifying the subtle presence of class-based relations of power.
In order to access diverse forms of habitus and facilitate a comparative analysis of the influence of different field and class relations the sample for the focus groups comprised of various class or occupational groupings. The selected groups I drew from the four field categories listed (Table 3.2) along with an extra category of low-skilled workers. Three of the field of education focus groups are representative of more mainstream education: post-primary teachers, university academics and third level undergraduates. The fourth group from the more marginalised Steiner education provides the non-mainstream contrast. The sample of environmentalists included Climate Camp Ireland – a now disbanded direct action and awareness raising climate change campaign group – and the Ecovillage in County Tipperary – a project group set up to develop a low-carbon community and act as a model for sustainable building and living. For the field of agriculture I recruited one group of organic growers and another focus group of small and medium conventional farmers, with the intention of providing a strong comparison that might inform the work of field conflicts and tension. A group of businessmen were drawn from the Irish business field. The aforementioned production operator and CES focus groups made up the lower socio-economic participants that were underrepresented in the field categories. CES is a social welfare scheme for long-term unemployed and disadvantaged people. It provides part-time and temporary placements in local community-based jobs. Income is slightly above that of ordinary unemployment assistance. As climate change affects everyone all groups within Irish society hold relevance for this research. The groups that I purposively selected are broad-ranging so as to intimate towards a wider snapshot of Irish society incorporating a range of contrasting positions of class, occupation, politics and education. This offers the means to open the study up to tensions in the field of power and in the structure of class relations such as between business groups, conventional farmers and the generally opposing environmental activists and organic growers.
In choosing my focus group participants I used snowball sampling (also known as chain referral sampling) in order to facilitate the recruitment of pre-existing groups. This involved recruiting an individual and then asking them to enlist the rest of their group. Their instructions were to recruit according to the criteria of being inner circle friends or colleagues and of stemming from a particular occupation or, in the case of students and former Steiner pupils, a specific educational background. A criticism of the sampling technique is that participants are likely to suggest others with shared interests and similar characteristics (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). This was not a problem for this
project, which was also concerned with taking account of the interactive influences on participants’ elective affinities. Bourdieu criticised snowball sampling for its potential tendency to skew the sample, when recruiting academics, through privileging for selection those with reputational status – “being known and recognised” (Bourdieu and Collier, 1988: 76). However, Bourdieu’s sampling concerns were towards achieving a more representational construction of the agents of the university field. My work is more concerned with examining the role of specific social spaces rather than the entire field. Additionally the prescriptive recruiting criteria of familiarity should diminish any such skewed effects. Perhaps the main problem with the sampling technique is the minor loss of control over who turns up on the night. Although the criteria were pretty specific the researcher can never be sure how well the directions are going to be followed. A prominent advantage of the snowball recruitment was that it happened to gather participants who ordinarily would not have agreed to partake if they had been asked directly by the researcher. It transpired amongst the farmers and business group most would not have attended. The reasons proffered leaned towards not having an interest and not seeing a use for social science research. Other reasons are liable to have been a sense of alienation or discomfort with the topic especially amongst the farmers. Being asked by a person with whom they were familiar, induced an effect of encouragement based on trust and congenial obligation. Not enlisting persons for whom the issue was a low-level concern would have lost access to this significant section of the public.

Although some literature has recommended 10 to 12 participants in any one focus group this recommendation has been seriously questioned with many perceiving smaller focus groups to be more effective (Kelly, 2007). Thus recruitment aimed towards facilitating focus groups ranging from 4 to 8 persons. This was achieved in all focus groups save for the teachers’ which produced 3 participants: the teachers group proved the hardest to recruit. This in part was due to a subject-centred bias that appeared in the recruitment effort where at least one school secretary passed on my request for participants only to teachers whose subjects engaged in some way with climate change. This was quite probably also done by other school secretaries.

In order to provide further access to the particular social space for which each focus group was selected I recruited interviewees from the focus group members.
Chapter 3

Selecting interviewees in this manner also enabled further access to the particular community background of focus group participants and to the participants themselves whom they tend to know as colleagues or inner circle friends. Mostly two interviewees were recruited from each focus group. A small number of groups only managed to produce one interviewee. There were 19 interviewees in total. In keeping with the approval granted by the NUI Galway Research Ethics Committee the use of pseudonyms protects the anonymity of participants throughout this thesis. Participants gave signed consent to participate and be recorded. Information sheets provided participants with details about the research prior to the focus groups along with informing them of their freedom to withdraw at any stage without providing a reason.

Although Bourdieu stated that people who share the same social space need not share geographical space or have had contact with each-other (Bourdieu, 1989: 16), he recognised the potential conditioning effect of interactions between social space occupants:

“In identifying what is worthy of being seen and the right way to see it, they are aided by their whole social group (which guides and reminds them with its ‘Have you seen...?’ and ‘You must see...’) and by the whole corporation of critics mandated by the group to produce legitimate classifications and the discourse necessarily accompanying any artistic enjoyment worthy of the name” (Bourdieu, 2010: 28).

Using the snowball sampling method to recruit pre-existing groups appeared best suited to provide for the recurrence of similar social space based exchanges. Through the use of natural groupings we may see signs of “shared knowledge” and “collective expression”, which shapes and is shaped by the contribution of individual members, but which draws reference from beyond the group to the wider community or field (Callaghan, 2005). Under such circumstances the focus group may act as a portal to the social space within which much of the participant’s life is unfolding. This potentially offered opportunities to examine how issues relating to climate change are tackled by a group of familiars through routine practices, classifications and dispositions that are pertinent to their social spaces. However, these research interactions are not straightforward as the following section demonstrates.
3.4.1 Towards Relational Focus Groups: Societal Power Relations in the Research Setting

The central objectives of examining the role of societal regularities and power relations in climate change receptivity justify the research’s use of focus groups. The focus group method’s interactive component offered a means of studying the micro dimensions of societal power relations and regularities in the development of climate change receptivity. The aforementioned ‘relational interactions’ concept was a key part of this data collection and analysis, recognizing that broad societal structures and power relations are present in focus group interactions. The focus group arena served to stimulate an exchange of relational interactions on the issue of climate change. This was in order for the research to identify how the ease and friction between ontological hierarchies (elective affinities) of participant social space and the dominant symbolic ordering of climate change contributed to group-specific and participant reception of climate change.

As this section further explicates the research moment is not an exchange of rational positions and perspectives. The goal of the research was never to merely record and input the claims of participants into the thesis. To do so would be an acceptance of the rational choice position on human beings. However, no person is wholly aware of the ‘why’ behind their own actions. Instead the research paid attention to the modes by which participants classified and framed their discussion of climate change, along with the discourses they employed during their discussion. As the research was highly cognizant of relational interactions, identifying these modes was essential to establishing how participants’ relationship with climate change extends back to their own social spaces, class and field. Practical strategies and apprehension guide participants as they reproduce and adapt the practices and pre-constructed categories with which they have gained familiarity through their position in society. This is the relational nature of the research situation which the research and analysis worked to uncover.

The focus group method is a “controlled group discussion” (Smithson, 2000, 104) consisting of a moderator and several selected and assembled participants. It is focussed in that “there is an emphasis in the questioning on a particular fairly tightly defined topic” (Bryman, 2008: 474). One of the core benefits of focus groups is that they create opportunities for group interaction. These social exchanges pave the way for investigating power relations: a particular strength of
the focus group method (Morgan and Kreuger, 1993). Unfortunately, in recent decades the group dynamics of focus groups have become lost in the broad sea of market research that reduces the focus group data to a series of face-to-face interviews with groups of individuals. Still many social scientists recognize the interactions as a key part of the method’s analysis and interpretation (Kitzinger, 1994; Myers, 1998; Wilkinson, 1998; Smithson, 2000), offering insights into “the joint construction of meaning” amongst groups (Bryman, 2008: 474), “group norms” and “the formation of views” that are not so readily accessible “via individual interviews” (Barbour and Schostak, 2005: 42).

Additionally the possibilities of guiding these interactions means that focus groups “work best for topics people could talk about in everyday lives - but don’t” (Macnaghten and Myers, 2004: 65). Climate Change was just such a topic, which many participants admitted to leaving absent from their daily conversations. Furthermore the moderator’s careful positioning of guides or cues helped to overcome constraints imposed by a lack of fluency with the subject.

The trustworthiness of these focus group interactions has been subject to considerable debate. A typical criticism concerns how “the group experience” diminishes “the representativeness of any set of focus group participants” and that an “opinionated” or “dominant” participant might bias the data (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1998: 509, 511). However, these criticisms overlook the social basis of human existence and how conversations in daily life often feature dominant voices. Such voices can be indicative of the levels of interest in the issues under discussion and/or the differences in embodied capital which reflect power relations in a group setting, and in wider society.

The setting of the focus group, however, brings participants into immediate proximity with a moderator, a tightly defined topic of discussion and a voice-recorder. For many, these aspects constitute a clear break from everyday conversations and impose a degree of artificiality. The resultant talk has been problematised as constituting a “performance” for the moderator where participants purposely produce and present opinions, as befitting the institutionalised function of the focus group to gather the views of its partakers (Smithson, 2000). The topic itself may also elicit the staged response of the participants, particularly when called upon to discuss a topic that they would not normally discuss. With a topic as complex as climate change, there can be the added pressure to appear
knowledgeable in order to appease possible disapproval: either from an imagined audience or those in attendance. This “invisible ... [but] potentially judgemental” presence of a research audience insinuated by the voice-recorder can also provoke the sense of having to perform (Silva and Wright, 2005: 9).

This raises serious questions regarding how to access the everyday world of participants and the degree of authenticity of the resulting data. However, both natural and institutional talk are present in various daily settings, such as the classroom or the workplace (Smithson, 2000). Additionally, the work of Canadian sociologist Erving Goffman (1969) depicts daily social interaction as a performance where individuals attempt to control the impressions others have of them. So what are the data implications of the participant performance as it occurs within, and is likely stimulated by, this project’s research setting?

Bourdieusian relational interactions (See Chapter 2 for more details) offer considerable input into answering this question and are key to the design and analysis of the method and findings. Although Bourdieu’s work deals with large amounts of qualitative research in the form of interviews, he has had relatively little to say on the use of focus groups, which have only come to be commonplace in sociology in the last 20 or so years (Morgan, 1996). However, Bourdieu presents an important position on interactions being constituted out of objective relations which in turn immerses the interactions in hierarchical or corresponding relations of power. The significance of these interactions for the research is that participants and their actions are not conjured out of thin air within the research moment. Instead they come bearing traces of the outside world within their habitus and the actions their dispositional capacities enable them to carry out by virtue of the socio-historical practices reproduced and adapted in the occasion:

“[e]very confrontation between agents in fact brings together, in an interaction ..., systems of dispositions (carried by “natural persons”) such as a linguistic competence and a cultural competence and, through these habitus, all the objective structures of which they are the product, structures which are active only when embodied in a competence acquired in the course of a particular history (with the different types of bilingualism or pronunciation, for example, stemming from different modes of acquisition)” (Bourdieu, 1977: 81).
Consequently, discourses used, overt emotions, accent, attitude or even deportment are all part of the systems of objective relations, from the world beyond the focus group, that have historical resonance and that cross paths in the moment of the exchange. Relational interactions, through the habitus of participants, carry over into the focus group certain practices and categories that are drawn or adapted from the regularities of society, which incorporate relations of class, field, social space, economy of practices and the dominant symbolic order. Acknowledging this occurrence has huge implications for the analysis of the primary data collected.

Due to the presence of these societal regularities and the inevitable distinctions that are inscribed in objective relations, all social exchanges for Bourdieu incorporate societal relations of power. Attentiveness to how objective relations configured exchanges was an important part of this researcher’s attempt to investigate the micro dimensions of the influence of societal power relations on group-specific classifications and evaluations of climate change. Within the research setting, where the researcher is also engaged in interactions with the researched, the moderator, the institution of the focus group, and indeed the setting itself, are all part of the objective relations. A relational approach to focus groups, which acknowledges the presence of the objective relations, via interactions, participants, and the situated setting, must also recognise that these are ranked, both prior to and via the process of the exchange. The objects of the research situation such as social and historical practices and modes of being, reproduced and adapted within the occasion, along with a sense of the various hierarchies of objective relations, are utilised by agents to produce the interaction. Therefore subtle power struggles emerge within research interactions, where the “systems of classification” internal to the body and minds of participants (i.e. the habitus) confront or sustain each other (see section 2.3.5). In this way, through the resultant coming together of persons in an exchange, participants engage in

52 This is reflected by Bourdieu’s statement that: “the interaction itself owes its form to the objective structures that have produced the dispositions of the interacting agents, which continue to assign them their relative positions in the interaction and elsewhere” (Bourdieu, 1990b: 58-9).

53 “[M]ental and bodily schemata that function as symbolic templates for the practical activities conduct, thoughts, feelings, and judgments of social agents” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 7)

54 “[S]ystems of classification constitute a stake in the struggles that oppose individuals and groups in the routine interactions of daily life...” (Wacquant, 1992: 14).
evaluating and hierarchising various goods and properties: competencies, discourses and arguments.

People classify the world in terms of how they interpret (practically) the symbolic implications of how different concepts, words and actions relate to each other (i.e. objective relations). These systems of classification are largely configured from a series of diverse modes of social hierarchy that can be observed through attentive reading of Bourdieu as occurring repeatedly throughout his writings. The following bullet points provide an outline of these hierarchical modes derived from Bourdieu’s approach. The main hierarchies are further illustrated by way of example in Table 3.3:

- A **dominant symbolic order** emanates from the “field of power”: the arena where the “holders of capital” “play” to win power over the state, “granting power over the different species of capital and over their reproduction” (Bourdieu, 1998b: 42), thereby establishing the hierarchy of fields and their divergent capital. This symbolic order, already discussed, is a core feature of this research.

- The **ranking order within a field** means occupants may view the dominant capital and logic specific to their field as of a higher order than those dictated by the field of power.

- A further ranking system can be seen in the “elective affinity” (Bourdieu, 1984: 241) of different agents and groups. The latter is a sort of **ontological hierarchy** encompassing taste and a sense of one’s place or the legitimated modus operandi befitting a particular group or social space to which one belongs. It can also be interpreted as the hierarchy of social space. Whether between the products of an author and his readers or towards the “clothing, pronunciation, bearing, posture, manners” (Bourdieu, 1984: 241) of friends or

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55 For critics who would take issue with the notion that Bourdieu deals in hierarchies (I have encountered them in correspondence) I argue that firstly Bourdieu’s work was never meant to be interpreted so dogmatically and that the goal of the researcher is to best apply the guidance of the theorist in order to fulfil both the research objectives and theorist’s intentions. This should supersede any role as a devout follower. Secondly this interpretation is not to dismiss the role Bourdieu places in homology and the importance of similarity: similar histories, hobbies, interests etc. However with differential relations being central to his sociology then inevitably the ranking systems in place must come to impose an effect of hierarchy on these relations. However my interpretation here provides for a multiplicity of hierarchical interpretations from the working class labourer who prizes sports over social theory to the academic who loses herself in the endless oblivion of arcane theoretical discussions.
lovers, these sympathies are guided by various homologies of social space and structure (Bourdieu, 1984: 240-241).

### Table 3.3 Bourdieusian Hierarchies and Examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
<th>Hypothetical Example</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Symbolic Order</td>
<td>In a highly liberalised capitalist society, notions of individual achievement and economic capital likely dominate. Elite status and symbolic capital are consequently equated with major corporations, executives, A-list celebrities. Status is also attached to their associated properties: e.g., their materialistic qualities of trophy mansions, “trophy wives”, advertising deals. Conversely, welfare recipients are often castigated as losers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Symbolic Order</td>
<td>In a field of sports structured predominantly around notions of professionalism, competition and human endeavour, dominant values are attached to the athleticism and skilled mastery of the human body that is displayed by the champions of consecrated tournaments. Against these relations other stances in the field such as ‘taking part’ (participating for participation’s sake) are subordinate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontological (local) Hierarchy</td>
<td>A group of young adult males, who are unemployed, poorly qualified and hail from poverty stricken inner city estates might be more inclined to equate acceptable practices of conversation around traditional masculine interests of soccer. On the other hand, references to philosophers, sociologists and other academic experts might be stigmatised through raised eyebrows or ‘slagging’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As noted, these hierarchies influence the systems of classifications of individuals. Therefore uncovering some semblance of how participants classify climate change and decarbonisation is also a means of examining the role of societal regularities and relations of power in climate change receptivity. As such the systems of classifications – or the embodied means through which persons configure a practical symbolic interpretation of all sensed activities and objects – form the subtle subjective dimensions to these social hierarchies. Certain systems of classification, therefore, which enable individuals to read certain social hierarchies, can function as a kind of capital – e.g. the appreciative skill of the connoisseur (Bourdieu, 1984: 66). However, the greater the social distance from
the hierarchy, the more inhibited such a skill is likely to be and can lead to a misreading of the situation, or current trends and advancements or the mechanisms of advancement. This is what Bourdieu terms “allodoxia” which is the mistaking of one thing for another (Bourdieu, 1995: 18). It can be viewed as a sort of pseudo-hierarchy based on misreading the dominant ordering. Identifying the presence and role of all the above hierarchies within the focus group and how they contributed to climate change receptivity was an essential part of this Bourdieusian research.

Returning to the idea of participant interactions as performance within the research setting, the concept of relational interactions recognises the potential influence on that performance of power relations emanating from the research situation itself. Within the focus group, physical interactions coexist with such forces as potential ridicule, recrimination or acceptance and admiration (i.e. the “situs”: the sensed or recognised potentialities of the situation (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, 97). Furthermore, symbolic power resonates from the objective relations clustered around positions of authority: the moderator brings with him the associations of a National University, the institution of the focus group, the bureaucratic formalities of consent forms etc. The emanation of this symbolic violence from the researcher can lead to various distortions of genuine perceptions and realities that the qualitative method seeks to capture. Such distortions might involve the desire to meet perceived expectations of the researcher or a defensive concealment of participants’ experiences and impressions.

Bourdieu’s recommendation for dealing with this is to narrow the social distance between interviewer and interviewee, thereby mitigating the effect of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1999: 609). At times during the fieldwork I employed “controlled imitation” (ibid) as a means of narrowing this distance. I sometimes exhibited looseness of manner or professional succinctness to mirror the basic demeanour of participants yet certain distances sometimes remained. These pertained to inescapable objective relations of the situation itself being aligned to the institutions of academic research.

However, in acknowledging the relational broadness of an interaction, responses to the research experience can themselves be revealing. Silva and Wright (2005) recorded a participant’s reaction induced by the ‘invisible ... [but] potentially judgemental’ presence of a research audience insinuated by the voice-recorder (p: 9). Their focus group study facilitated a quantitative and qualitative
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investigation into taste, cultural knowledge and cultural activities in Britain. They recorded a participant describing an imaginary academic audience, who would listen to his recorded words, “raising their eyebrows at the end of the tape”, apparently taking umbrage at his own views on hunting. In a study dealing with taste, and cultural knowledge, this reaction was incorporated into the data, being interpreted as the articulation of “knowledge of the presence of a dominant culture, as well as the recognition, on behalf of some groups, that they were not part of it” (ibid). In a similar fashion the respondents’ reactions, in this project, to the research setting were evaluated in terms of their social distance from the dominant symbolic hierarchy with which these research institutions bore association. The implications of this are dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6.

3.4.2 Implementing the Focus Groups: the Semi-structured Approach

The focus groups were semi-scripted, with limited intervention by the moderator, allowing respondents to venture into areas of discussion that are of most interest and salience for the group (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1998: 514). A partial script, however, was necessary in order for the researcher to maintain some control and provide cues for a topic that may be difficult for some to discuss. It also assisted the comparability between focus groups. The cues comprised of a series of open-ended questions as well as eight vignettes, and two visual aids. The questions are displayed in Table 3.4 and the vignettes in Table 3.5 (See Appendix 2 for visual aids).

Table 3.4 : Open-ended questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the first images that come to mind when you hear the term climate change?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you think are the causes of climate change?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the impacts of climate change?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the solutions?</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.5: Focus Group Vignettes

1. Fiona would worry about climate change if it weren’t so far off in the future. Instead she feels it’s best to enjoy life now and deal with climate change later.

2. Gerry tries to keep up-to-date with the science of global warming. He regularly reads news articles that refer to the latest scientific findings on global warming. The news depresses him but he will continue to try and stay informed about this issue.

3. Louise often brings up the topic of climate change with her co-workers and in the pub at the weekend with her friends. In a lot of these conversations she often hears the argument that dealing with climate change will hurt the economy.

4. Mike loves the presence of nature around him. The sights, smells, and sounds of a summer’s evening in the countryside, the rustling of the trees on a windy day or even the first drops of rain reminds him of how alive he is. For him this is a presence worth protecting.

5. Rachel has for many years now been turning her houselights off at night and switching off all her electrical appliances when not in use. Sometimes she wonders if she’s doing enough and considers perhaps doing a bit more.

6. Lowering his own carbon dioxide emissions is a pointless exercise as far as Brendan is concerned. He feels there’s really no point bothering as long as voters and the government don’t care about global warming.

7. Lowering his own carbon dioxide emissions is a pointless exercise as far as Brendan is concerned. He feels that it’s really a matter for the Government and the voters to deal with.

8. John lives in Ireland and Salma lives in Bangladesh. Climate change is already having a serious impact on Salma’s country through flooding. John however is unaware of Salma’s situation. Just the other day he took a new three-litre 4-wheel-drive for a test drive.

The vignettes consisted of scenarios involving individuals engaged in various climate change related activities such as sourcing information and lowering energy use. The aim was to discover how the (il)legitimacy of the various scenarios is debated by different groups. Vignettes which set particular types of decarbonisation behaviour against backdrops of social significance can stimulate participants’ reactions, especially where such behaviour defies norms pertaining to such backdrops (Finch and Mason, 1993). For example, many might view climate change as an inappropriate topic for informal conversations between friends or work colleagues or in a pub setting (Table 3.5: vignette 3). Furthermore, the third party aspect of the vignette has the potential to open up the discussion to normative dimensions of the described behaviours. This can facilitate greater insight into participant evaluations of what they see as socially acceptable, or their sense of the
economy of practices regarding acts of decarbonisation. However, perceptions of what a third party ‘ought’ to be doing is not the same as the participant’s view of what they themselves would or should do (Barter and Renold, 1999). Switching the discussion to asking participants what they would do in the same situation or employing a multi-methods approach (ibid) – i.e. in terms of this study using both interviews and focus groups – helps counter this dilemma. The life history interviews easily brought the discussion back to a first person perspective. In addition, the use of the more direct, open-ended questions encouraged participants to share their personal views. The main objective of using these direct questions was to garner data on participants’ own knowledge and understanding of climate change (Table 3.4).

The visual aids (See Appendix 2), introduced to participants towards the end of the focus group, aimed to tap into participants’ reception of dominant emissions based symbolic constructions of climate change (see Chapter 4). One aid referred to Ireland’s per capita emissions and the other to Irish national emissions, both of which were contrasted against the rates from other countries. With national emissions juxtaposed against countries like China and America Ireland’s emissions appeared very small by comparison. The visual on per capita emissions created the opposite effect depicting Ireland as higher than the UK and the African countries Malawi and Zambia. The contrast I purposively chose in order to stimulate potentially contrasting reactions.

Two brief survey questionnaires recorded information relating to the degree of familiarity amongst group participants, their socio-economic background stretching back to maternal and paternal grandparents as well as reported behaviours concerning climate change (see Appendix 1). The structure of the questions drew largely on Babbie’s guidelines (2001) for producing accessible and unambiguous questions – avoiding double-barrels, negative items and overtly biased terminology where possible. Rather than impose too much with some direct questions (e.g. income levels, age) I approximated remaining information gaps from occupational data and observations from research discussions. In addition I queried life history

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56 I state, ‘where possible’, because the polysemic quality of words and the subjective interpretations of participants allow vast possibilities for seemingly benign words to stir prejudicial and partial interpretations – for example the term ‘climate change’ itself can appear to hold considerable bias. However, any obviously loaded terminology such as ‘denialist’ or ‘alarmist’ were deliberately avoided.
interviewees on the general demographic make-up of the group. The focus groups took place several months or weeks before the interviews. Hence the interviews have the added advantage of enquiring further into particular details that emerged within the focus group and questionnaires.

3.4.3 The Life-History Interviews: Examining the Experienced Regularities of Irish Society and Social Space

The interviews invited participants to discuss their life histories with particular emphasis on their routine experiences of Irish societal regularities from early education, family and community life right up to their present position. The questions were open-ended in order to encourage participants to draw from their own knowledge and experiences and to offer room for spontaneity, allowing participants to detour into discussion areas that are more salient for them (Guest et al., 2012: 11). There were several aims to the life history interview which I have listed in the following bullet points:

- To establish a more in-depth account of the societal regularities that accompanied participants’ trajectories through social space, including the changes in personal capital that contributed to those trajectories
- To gather further information on their climate change receptivity and the social space experiences that contributed to that receptivity
- To develop the personal accounts of climate change related behaviours
- To gather supplementary background information on the other focus group members

This collation of interviewee history was also an accumulation of data on the participants’ sense of the Irish societal regularities they were exposed to. For Bourdieu class, social space, and field are not just external objective structures but obtain their meaning – their logic, illusio, interests, value systems – from their internalization in habitus. Additionally the habitus is formed both from exposure to a particular set of social conditions and from how these conditions are routinely sensed and interpreted. Therefore participants’ appreciations can provide some idea of their position in relation to Irish institutions such as formal education; perhaps revealing the nature of the underlying power relations.
Another vital aim of these life histories was collecting data on the climate change dimensions of social space routines incorporating climate change related behaviours. The interviews accumulated data on participant appreciation of the involved practices so as to gain access to their apprehension of an external economy of practices in which carbon related behaviours are socially organised. The practices included carbon-lowering actions, carbon heavy consumption, related activism, information gathering and conversations on climate change issues.

3.5 From Objective Climate Change to the Subjective Climate Receptivity: How a Double Reading Culminates in the Analysis

The overall goal of the data analysis was to identify how the structures defined by the objectivist reading – concerning the dominant symbolic order, dominant climate change representations, fields, social space, and class – were reproduced or adapted within participants’ climate change receptivity. This analysis merged the societal regularities and power relations of the first step of the double reading with the subjectivist standpoint of the second.

With the help of qualitative data analysis software (NVivo 10) my analysis of this subjectivist standpoint grouped primary data according to three sets of theoretical concepts derived from the Bourdiesian framework: 1) systems of classifications, 2) economy of practices and 3) social hierarchies. The systems of classification are those of the participants which underlie the relational interactions through which the receptivity is expressed. Participants’ climate change knowledge, concern, framing of climate change, climate change politics, as well as the saliency of climate change to their daily lives all hint at underlying categories through which the participants filter their appreciation of climate change. For example where an interviewee frames climate change as a moral issue, or in terms of class, it is indicative of how class and morality are active and legitimated categories of their climate change receptivity.

The data pertaining to the economy of practices, I compiled from the participants’ own unwitting allusions to their subjective evaluation of an economy of practices which facilitated and restricted their own climate related actions. This collated information on how participants deemed certain practices such as
conversing about climate change as acceptable, respectable or alternatively undesirable. It also captured their own sense of practice opportunities and expectations such as career-related flying or having the price to afford energy-saving technologies.

Attentive recognition of relational interactions helped uncover the social hierarchies, as identified in section 3.4.1, within the recorded discussions. The analysis grouped the observations (both from descriptive field notes and transcripts) of key moments of interplay between dominant, field, and ontological hierarchies, at the micro level of participant interactions. These moments can be revealed in the “points of quiescence as well as conflict” (Callaghan, 2005: section 7.2) where participants hesitated, struggled to articulate or remained composed and fluent as they worked with or against dominant climate change constructions. The moments were also evident in participant strategies of dealing with climate change: for instance, how participants employed their sense of the symbolic hierarchies within the situated research moment to present their versions of climate change: e.g. adopting particular discursive and argumentative styles valued by the participants. Heeding these interactions helped to uncover how people, through societal relations of power, negotiate with and contribute to the construction of climate change.

In order to conclude the double reading I collated the data arranged in this manner with the data collected concerning the societal regularities pertaining to the participants such as social space, class, field, dominant symbolic order and representations of climate change (i.e. from objectivist reading 1). This was so as to identify how the objective relations of these societal structures mirrored some of the embodied capital, classifications, participant practices and their understanding of those practices. Some of those reflections may infer a particular societal influence. However, in the complex systemic reality, far removed from the linear simplicity of behavioural models, one must be wary about drawing too solid a conclusion on the basis of only a focus group, interview and survey. This necessitates a more tentative approach to both performing and writing up these inferences from the analysis.

The final analysis was a comparative analysis that contrasted the findings of the above double reading as they pertained to the different focus groups. This was also an analysis that compared the findings in terms of the divergent fields, and
social spaces of the participants. It also considered the determinative role of processes of class distinctions and power relations in shaping the group-specific perceptions of and responses to climate change. Constructing these connections and comparisons facilitated the development of relational depictions of respondent climate change receptivity that extend from the social space and habitus of participants right up to the dominant symbolic order. It is the final piece in the application of the Bourdieusian sociological framework and project’s attempt to depict a better means of understanding the public’s relationship to climate change.
Part II
Dominant Impressions
of Climate Change in
Irish Society
4 The Established Order’s Constructed Sense of Climate Change in Irish Society

4.1 Societal Power and the Object of Research

This chapter presents the application of key components of Bourdieu’s sociology: constructing the object of research – i.e. climate change definitions and responses – along with the dominant symbolic order pertaining to climate change within Irish society. It thus provides the thesis’s first display of how Bourdieu’s methodology adds to understanding the social dimensions of climate change. Producing this objective break is an important departure and movement beyond the apriorism of much of climate change social science. Moreover, the import of these dominant constructions, strengthened by symbolic power and/or beyond question through merging with doxa, impress upon people how they are to relate to climate change and the geo-physical world: e.g. temporally, spatially and through their carbon actions. Therefore revealing these constructions is essential for Part III of this project, which looks into how participants deal with them.

Constructing the symbolic order involves producing a summary of the pertinent properties that constitute dominant characterisations of climate change. The opening half of this chapter achieves this by examining the form climate change has come to take in its emergence from the field of climate change science; by the production of its social component in the social sciences, and in its development as an issue of conflict and struggle in the (global) field of power (Figure 4.1).
Although immediate experts and international policy-makers play a key role in constructing climate change attention must also be paid to how dominant Irish societal regularities and relations of power contribute to its general societal entrance. Decarbonisation is not a central issue for many of Ireland’s citizens (see section 1.2) and many people pay little heed to the specifics of the dominant climate change constructions. Instead they contend with the pertinent impressions left by these constructions as they are embedded in and rearranged amongst other doxic and symbolic features of Irish society. Essentially, this necessitates constructing Ireland’s dominant symbolic order. Without necessarily dealing with climate change directly, this order encourages dispositions, classifications and practices which are resistant, or accommodating, to the various climate change representations. The Irish state plays a large role in shaping this order and forms much of the focus for this chapter’s analysis. This analysis includes the response of
the Irish state to climate change. As the chapter demonstrates this response largely accommodates a type of ‘climate change’ that is non-threatening, and even subservient, to the societal practices and classifications which support the state’s competitive vision of the world. The construction of this order and the climate change receptivity of the Irish state are dealt with by the latter half of the chapter, which begins in section 4.5.

Although dealing with participants’ receptivity in 2010 towards dominant climate change constructions, the chapter also acknowledges some major post-fieldwork developments: notably the 2013 release of the IPCC report, the continuation of economic decline, and an Irish government commissioned report on achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. These are applied to critiquing the continuity of certain pre-fieldwork climate change constructions and Irish symbolic order patterns. The major concern, however, is with the prevalent Irish climate change constructions that existed during the course of the fieldwork.

### 4.2 The Field of Climate Change Science

The global field of climate change science is a subfield within the field of science. The main players are the anthropogenic climate change scientists – i.e. those who believe humans are the cause of global warming – and the climate contrarian scientists. At stake in the field is the dominant interpretation of the materiality of climate change. As an encroaching material reality climate change imposes a momentous force on the world. Yet it must contend with a vast system of social relations, which work continuously on its retranslation into the everyday world. Climate change scientists or geoscientists, both in their research and reporting practices, are involved in this production of ‘climate change’.

The field of climate change science can mark 1988 as a pivotal year in its accumulation of academic, economic and symbolic capital. NASA scientist Jim Hansen spoke before the US senate, of strong evidence for an intensified greenhouse effect and the World Meteorological Organization approved the formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which was later backed by the UN Environment Program (Hulme, 2009: 64). The field has since rapidly expanded with the global body of the IPCC being the most prominent institution at its core.
The IPCC is the authoritative representative of climate change science for intergovernmental climate change politics. Every few years the IPCC synthesises the work of thousands of climate change scientists into reports which inform NGOs, corporations and policy-makers throughout the world. The final wording of its assessment reports requires every nation’s signed approval (Pearce, 2013a). Geared towards facilitating a consensus response to the crisis by policy-makers, the institution is in many ways a “highly political” body (Urry, 2011: 28). It carries much of the weight of intergovernmental politics into the field of climate change science. The implications of its political nature are dealt with in greater detail in section 4.2.2.

Within this field, there is strong evidence of a consensus on the existence of anthropogenic global warming (AGW). AGW is the warming of the planet through the intensification of the greenhouse effect primarily due to human activities, namely the burning of fossil fuels. Doran and Zimmerman’s (2009) web-based questionnaire survey of 3,146 earth scientists found 82% affirming their acceptance of AGW. Through Web of Science searches for "global warming" and "global climate change", another survey identified 4000 abstracts, from peer-reviewed journal articles published between 1990 and 2011, which stated a position on AGW. From that sample 97% endorsed AGW (Cook et al., 2013). Yearley (2009a) argues that such surveys do not tell us anything about publishing access and whether bias in the peer-review process unfavourably eliminates those siding against AGW (p: 397). While such issues of access skewing the survey results so massively in favour of AGW seem unlikely, the survey does provide a solid indicator of the degree of legitimacy that AGW holds within the field of climate change science. To be considered a legitimated member of the core of any scientific field, one must be peer-review published. This survey testifies to the strength of AGW’s field legitimacy.

4.2.1 The Anthropogenic Climate Change Construction

The encroaching reality of climate change and its scientific representations have set in motion a rewriting of our connection to the biophysical world. Immersion in the AGW scientific literature, particularly IPCC reports, elicits some salient characteristics to this scientific climate change depiction. The underlying temporality is of a climate change already occurring (IPCC, 2007d: 103-9), which
in turn is intertwining the earth’s “glacial” temporality (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998) with the contemporaneous. The science deeply connects past and present actions to imaginaries of 2050, 2080 and 2100 (IPCC, 2007b: 275, 280) as CO₂ emissions remain in the atmosphere well over 100 years (Anderson, 2012: 20). Spatially, AGW’s depiction is largely global, with the local domain neglected by a highly centralized global climate science field. The science’s abstract and technical qualities likely augment the alienating impact that this has on local stakeholders.57

In defining the human impact of climate change, the literature depicts the death toll as currently unfolding with, according to the World Health Organization, an annual rate in excess of 150,000 deaths (Nagel et al., 2009: 51-2). Already the evidence points to an increased disease burden and heat-related mortality (IPCC, 2007b: Section 8.7; 2009: sections 8.2.5 - 8.2.6). The loss of crops due to extreme weather events is set to increase food insecurity. The IPCC (2009) estimates potentially hundreds of millions people may eventually be “at risk of hunger” (section 5.8.1). Conflict intensification in numerous countries is also likely to be encouraged by climate change (IPCC, 2007b: 299) and possibly already has (Klare, 2013).

Studies implicate an unbalanced distribution of these effects with the greater impact effecting disease prone areas of sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia (IPCC, 2007b: 418). Vulnerable areas are predicted to be those most affected by food shortages (ibid: section 5.8). Disproportionate impacts on the developing world add to the ethical aspects already resulting from cumulative historical emissions having being predominantly produced by developed countries. However, developed countries are not impervious from impacts such as extreme weather events (Vidal, 2013; IPCC, 2014).

This circularity of society’s impact on climate, which in turn impacts on society, demonstrates the systemic and historical interconnectivity of the socio-political and biophysical realm. The climate modelling scenarios of the IPCC (IPCC, 2000) have written in some of this interconnectivity through the inclusion of simulated progress in decarbonisation. Yet despite these systemic qualities, the scientific depiction rigidly reproduces the human/nature dualism. Consistent attempts to distinguish between “human-induced” climate change and weather attributable to “natural variations” points to these particular categories of

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57 This is even more aggravated by the complex computational simulation models.
perception (Goldenberg, 2013). This doxic distinction underlines the entirety of the scientific project towards defining climate change. The failure to recognise a co-evolutionary relationship means the AGW narrative reaffirms both modernistic and strongly anthropocentric notions where nature exists to be reorganized for human interests (Tovey in Share and Corcoran, 2010: 211). This leads to a “discursive terrain” which reduces the moral aspects underlying the threat of disastrous consequences to an alienating technocentrism (ibid). This adiaphorization – “rendering actions ethically neutral and exempting them from ethical evaluation and censure” (Bauman, 2009) – recurs throughout much of the AGW debate. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the moral argument is highly relevant in lieu of significant global climate change mitigation directly emerging from Ireland’s lone emission reductions.

The nature of the evidence, varying from objective data to probabilistic estimates, contributes to this estrangement, along with further exacerbating public confusion. Scientists accumulate instrumentally, rather than tangibly, observed and recorded climate data stemming from the distant and recent past. This data includes Tyndall’s experiment, the Mauna Loa observatory’s rising atmospheric CO\textsubscript{2} measurements and the data of weather stations (Real Climate, 2004; IPCC, 2007d). As the next section illustrates subjectivity comes more to the fore through the practice of climate prediction and the use of computer-generated global climate models (GCMs).

### 4.2.2 Defining Gradualist Climate Futures

Urry (2010) identifies two major patterns that emerge with regard to the scientific predictions which he labels “gradualism” and “new catastrophism” (195). An obvious distinct third outlook stems from the contrarian position, some of which incorporates a negligible interpretation of climate change futures. As this chapter shows, these predictions feed into radically different ways of perceiving how to respond to climate change.

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58 The experiment for identifying the infra-red absorbing properties of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases: a core part to climate scientists’ grasp of the anthropogenic warming (Hulme, 2009: 45).
The IPCC and its use of models – the prevalence of which in climate science has been referred to as the GCM hegemony (Saloranta, 2001: 403) or an “epistemic hegemony” (Mahony and Hulme, 2012) – have come to represent the gradualist position. Much can depend on the choice of variables to include in computer models, or the decision to run past trends into the future, exhibiting an ahistorical linear bias that ignores the possibility of major tipping points (Urry, 2011). The IPCC 2007 report’s “failure to parameterize crucial Earth-system feedbacks” (Davis, 2010: 32), and its omission of these resultant ‘very dangerous’ scenarios from their headline forecasts, has rendered future estimates more conservative. Consequently, the IPCC understates the possibility of large and abrupt climate consequences for policy-makers and the public. This trend has been continuous throughout the IPCC’s history of modelling climate change predictions: from the exclusion of possible positive feedback loops from the GCM models used in the first assessment report in 1990 (Wynne, 2010: 297) to the 2013 IPCC report’s failure to emphasise the feedback scenarios (IPCC, 2013).

This understatement running through the IPCC assessments concerning impact, points to its “political unconscious” (Davis, 2010: 32). Dependent upon “reaching a complex scientific and political consensus” (Brand, 1997), various potentialities have remained absent. Furthermore, for the sake of ‘best estimate’ “factors that climatologists cannot yet successfully model” are excluded from “the modelling studies that deliver the headline predictions” (Pearce, 2013a). This complements an apparent need to provide a politically palatable sense of incremental certainty: echoed in the 2013 report’s movement from 90% to 95% likelihood of AGW (Pearce, 2013). Implicit in these actions by the IPCC is the default message “that projected human-induced climate warming [is]... both gradual and manageable” (Wynne, 2010: 297). The gradualist position emerging out of the IPCC documents appears constructed so as to offer policy-makers a level of manageability within the current economic system.59

59 That said in 2013 the IPCC finally set a cap on the amount of carbon emissions that can be let into the atmosphere. The figure means that most of our fossil fuel deposits need to remain in the ground (Pearce, 2013b). This cap is likely to conflict with current global-wide economic growth policies of fossil fuel subsidization.
4.2.3 The Climate Futures of New Catastrophism

In contrast to the gradualist approach, the abrupt picture, incorporating the threat of positive feedbacks, points to a devastating climate change that is both irreversible and apocalyptic. Accordingly, it demands a much more serious and transformative response, usually with a sense of urgency akin to a Doomsday Clock\(^\text{60}\) temporality, through which massive and immediate reductions are called for (Hansen, 2009; Lovelock, 2009; Anderson, 2012). Urry (2010) labels this “new catastrophism” (p: 36).

Described as a “paradigm shift”, emerging around the year 2000, support has grown for the recognition of the climate as part of complex systems where “small changes can tip large systems ...over a threshold so that there are ‘runaway’ changes” (Urry, 2011: 31, 40). Evidence is emerging that some positive feedbacks are already in effect, such as thawing Siberian permafrost releasing large quantities of the powerful climate gas methane (Urry, 2009). Unlike GCM readings, these changes can involve abrupt shifts from one climate equilibrium state into another. Information on ancient prehistoric climates derived from thousands of years old ice has provided catastrophists evidence for such abrupt transformations (Hulme, 2009: 59-60; Urry, 2011: 31).

The catastrophist narrative challenges the propensity towards underestimation that characterises the gradualist position. Some suggest the IPCC’s “carbon budget” has already been breached (Davis, 2010:34; Hansen, 2009). Current empirical indicators of sea-level rises and Arctic ice shrinkage are used to support the claim that planet warming has been occurring more rapidly than even the “gloomiest of model forecasts” (Lovelock, 2009: 10).\(^\text{61}\) Anderson (2012), a climate science advisor to the UK government, argues that the IPCC’s 2007 readings of an allowable temperature rise of 2°C is likely an overestimation, which may send the world on a path towards catastrophic 4°C rise. A climate condition, he asserts, that without radical emission reductions, will possibly be reached as early as 2050

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\(^{60}\) The clock is a visual metaphor invented by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. It represents the level of danger posed by “civilisation-threatening technological catastrophe”. Each year after the board analyses this threat it sets the metaphorical clock accordingly. For 2014 the clock was set at five minutes to midnight due to the threat of climate change, amongst others: “The closer it is to midnight, the closer the world is to doom” (Pappas, 2014).

\(^{61}\) The IPCC 2013 report it seems has had to increase its sea-level projections on account of it. However, many scientists are arguing that it is not enough (Pearce, 2013a).
These assessments come with some powerful “apocalyptic imaginaries” (Swyngedouw, 2010) such as scientist James Lovelock’s 21st century human cull, reducing the remaining population to “a billion or less” as AGW gives rise to floods, drought and famine (Lovelock in Vince, 2009a).

4.2.4 The contrarian construction

Many labels exist for those who defy the central claims of the scientific consensus: ‘sceptics’ and ‘denialists’ being just some, each of which carry their own connotations. Here I use ‘contrarian’ because this is a group displaying a tendency to reject or mollify the position of the AGW consensus. As this section highlights the effect of the contrarian stance on the AGW construction is to invest climate change with suspicion, confusion and doubt.

Although some contrarians hold the relevant institutionalized cultural capital – Patrick Michaels is a climatologist and Fred Lindzen was one of ten lead authors of a chapter in the third IPCC assessment (Gramelsberger and Feichter, 2011: 102) – generally speaking this group does not hold the same scientific prestige as AGW scientists (Oreskes, 2004; Anderegg et al., 2010). Also its scientific core is small by comparison: the rest of its large community being made up of lobbyists, politicians, journalists and economists. The concerns of this section lie with that scientific core: within the field of climate change science – the subordinate scientific definition of climate change.

The main contentions of the contrarian construction are: that global warming is not happening; nature creates more CO\textsubscript{2} than fossil fuel use does; CO\textsubscript{2} emissions are not the main cause of global warming; the warming will be negligible and emissions will have positive effects to the earth’s biosphere (Sceptical Science, 2013b). Furthermore, contrarians frequently question AGW methods (Singer and Avery, 2007: 70-1; Oreskes and Conway, 2010: 202-3; Christy, 2011). As one can see consistency is lacking as arguments vary across this community (Revkin, 2009).

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62 Those who qualify here to the category of contrarian scientist need not have qualifications in climatology and atmospheric science but must have published as natural scientists on the issue of climate change.
The means by which the contrarian position supports these claims is itself revealing, including use of straw men – e.g. climate having changed before without human interference, disproves human-induced warming now – and cherry picking (Cook, 2010). The latter is a form of selectivity where data segments are portrayed as definitive proof against the broad-based AGW: e.g. using the abnormally hot 1998 to dispel claims of warming thereafter (Kininmonth, 2009; Monbiot, 2009c). Despite their acknowledgment of systemic complexity, and the accompanying uncertainty, contrarian constructions read the projections and claims of climate science research, as the product of a “literalistic truth-machine” (Wynne, 2010: 301). Presenting it as such enables them to discredit the entire AGW hypothesis through each proposed failing.\(^{63}\)

Perhaps the main impact of this contrarian position has been to spread, into the arena of politics and the public, the notion of a discordant climate change science, and a capricious, unreliable ‘climate change’ definition. With contrarian peer-review lacking, much of this debate from the climate change science community has spilled over into mainstream media. In this broader arena, which is not subject to restrictive peer-review entrance criteria, much of the guise of disinterest has fallen. Strategies adopted on both sides have descended into name-calling – e.g. ‘alarmists’ or denialists and “misinformers” (Kininmonth, 2007: 10; Spencer, 2010: 174; Sceptical Science, 2013a). The rhetoric of conspiracy also features strongly. The title of Michaels’ co-authored book is Climate of Extremes: global warming science they don’t want you to know (Michaels and Robert C. Balling, 2009). Contrarians have also accused AGW scientists of holding vested interests towards a ‘communist’ style imposition of tax (Lindzen, 2006).

4.3 The Social Sciences: Costing Climate Change and Constructing its Human Dimension

This section looks to how the social sciences characterise human dimensions of climate change. In some cases this amounts to defining elements of climate change directly, particularly the cost, and for others this has meant attempting to unravel

\(^{63}\) Therefore the centrality of the GCM to the AGW science, being full of possibilities to be wrong, leaves it more vulnerable to any such strategy.
how people define and respond to climate change. Both attempts impose an effect on the human meaning of climate change and how society should respond. Like the field of climate science, experts and models, with high symbolic capital, are involved in shaping the categories of perception through which policy-makers, campaigners and the public perceive the issue.

Prior to dealing with climate change directly mainstream economics has played a significant role in depreciating the environment, externalising it from economic policy and from a powerful economic discourse that has become ubiquitous within public debate. This relationship is evident in how the econometric of gross domestic product (GDP) represents the environment. Being the primary indicator of a nation’s wellbeing bestows GDP with enormous symbolic power. In actuality GDP has the capacity to record positively or omit completely the erosion of the environment. Environmental destruction is usually dismissed in GDP calculations as an unrecorded “externality” (external to the market) but expenditure for dealing with environmental disasters along with traffic congestion adds to the GDP value. Moreover GDP operates on a scale that inputs no limits to how much growth can be achieved regardless of the finiteness of natural resources. The econometric similarly devalues community through excluding non-market household or community-based voluntary services (Jackson, 2009: 40-41, 234 note 40).

Since venturing to consider climate change mainstream economics has done much to define climate change as an economic problem, often embracing the manageability of gradualism. Through historical prominence as government advisors and policy-aligned advocates of continuous economic growth, economists have brought much symbolic capital to their climate change depiction. A principal representative of the economic construction is the ex-World Bank economist Nicholas Stern. He led a seminal review of the economics of climate change for the UK treasury. This was published in 2006 and had a “massive boost” to the political importance of climate change (Jackson, 2009: 11). The report is the origin of the

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64 It can also record increasing firm productivity positively even if that productivity leads to lay-offs. “From 2007 to 2011 the total hours worked in the Irish economy fell by nearly 17 percent, while output declined by 9 percent” (NCC, 2012: 20-1). This also partially explains the phenomenon of jobless growth where periods of rising GDP are accompanied by job loss as was experienced in South Africa during the 1990s (Altman, 2003: 12).
now renowned statement: “climate change is the greatest market failure the world has ever seen” (Stern, 2007: viii). This makes it a pedestal piece in the portrayal of the fraught nature of contemporary capitalism and the environment.

Stern’s report, in important and somewhat fundamental ways, deviates from the traditional mainstream economist narrative. His temporal perspective defies the exponential rate of discounting of mainstream economics,\(^{65}\) which excludes the possibility of future climate changing events (Marshall, 2011). Furthermore Stern allows room for considering the ethical perspectives of “welfare, equity and justice, freedoms and rights” (Stern, 2007: 23), which economism conventionally relegates from consideration.

However, typical of neo-classical and growth-centric economics – a position firmly wedded to a pro-growth horizon – the review sets about establishing how climate change can be rectified within the bounds of the current capitalist system. Through pricing the cost to the global economy of climate change Stern concludes that spending money now on mitigation and adaptation, rather than paying for the consequences later, would be more cost effective (Stern, 2007).

Similar to the IPCC gradualist position, Stern’s own assumptions cause him to curb his work in a manner that he deems amenable to policy makers. Claiming CO\(_2\) levels of 450ppm in the atmosphere “would be very difficult and costly to aim” for (Stern as cited in Jackson, 2009: 83), he settled for the figure of 550 ppm, requiring a reduction in current emissions of 25% by 2050. This approach is characteristic of the neo-classical proposals on climate change mitigation which promote “marginal-based theories” – i.e. climate change mitigation that has minimum possible impact on the economy – based on lower range and gradual AGW predictions (Anderson, 2012: 28). The resultant image projected into the public and political sphere is of a manageable version of ‘climate change’ that technocratic governments must work to internalise into economic growth and mitigate largely through changing supply-side technologies (Stern, 2006).

Since the publication of the Stern review in 2006, many in the economic academic community have contested the leniency of its reduction limits. Stern,

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\(^{65}\) With the assumption that future society is gradually getting richer economists exponentially lower the future resource values. This eventually reaches zero thereby excluding the possibility of costing for far-off future catastrophic environmental impacts (Marshall, 2011).
himself, has revised his target from 550 to 500 and from requisite GDP reductions of 1% to 2%, due to the faster than anticipated advance of climate change (Jowit and Wintour, 2013). PriceWaterhouse Coopers put the cost on 50% global carbon emissions reduction by 2050 at 3% of GDP. These figures of 2 to 3% would put emissions reduction in serious conflict with economic growth; “essentially” wiping out growth as it currently stands (Jackson, 2009: 84). Climate scientist Anderson (2012) has stated that global post-peak emission reductions of 10 to 20% per annum are needed to stay at 2°C (p: 26). This differs massively from Stern’s annual 1 to 3% emissions reduction’s rate (Stern, 2006: xi) and is greatly at odds with maintaining any form of economic growth.

These more dire cost predictions, coupled with dystopian views on the sustainability of contemporary society, encourage a radical alternative to simply working within the current system. Consequently, prominent sociologists such as Serge Latouche (2009) and Tim Jackson (2009) have been calling for a transformation of the entire growth-centric consumerist model of capitalism. So too has the New Economics Foundation (Simms, 2013). American sociologist Juliet Schor (2010) calls for a more locally oriented and self-sustaining model of production. All of them seek to rewrite the preeminent materialistic definition of wealth that has been inscribed in the dominant neo-liberal model. These authors equate wealth with a more community-oriented view of happiness and a sense of security through recognition of the interconnectivity of socio-economic and environmental sustainability.

Paradoxically, academics attached to right-wing think-tanks – like the Heritage Foundation – use similar grim economic costing to argue against decarbonisation. Economists such as Nordhaus and Schelling argue that climate change is too expensive to deal with (Oreskes and Conway, 2010). However, unlike Stern these economists tend to discount the potentially extensive costs of future climate change impacts (Jasonoff, 2010). Often they argue that technological treatment of symptoms has more to offer than decarbonisation, placing much faith in the free-market innovation of future technologies (Oreskes and Conway, 2010: 180-3).

This section reveals the existence of three very different evaluations of climate change economics. One supports dealing with climate change within the current system or reformism. Another calls for radical transformation of that
system: referred to here as \textit{radical transformativism}. The third position argues against dealing with climate change as the process would be too costly. These lines of distinction are also identifiable between gradualist, catastrophist and contrarian approaches to climate science. These distinctions point to diverging patterns of structural affinity whereby gradualism supports reformism and radical transformativism mirrors somewhat the new catastrophism by recognising that AGW is not manageable within current structures. Contrarianism meanwhile supports a business-as-usual (BAU) approach. As this chapter demonstrates this threefold typology forms the basis of the dominant climate change representations that lead towards very different proposed solutions (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Threefold Typology of Climate Change Construction by Field

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business-As-Usual (BAU)</th>
<th>Reformism</th>
<th>Radical Transformative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No essential regulations or reductions</td>
<td>Minimum GHG reductions</td>
<td>Maximum GHG reductions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain societal structures and weaken government regulation</td>
<td>Distant climate goals</td>
<td>Proximal and distant climate goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous economic growth</td>
<td>Mainly supply-side changes</td>
<td>Supply and demand-side changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals to individual interests and conservative values</td>
<td>Maintain economic growth</td>
<td>Transform societal structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contradictory policies</td>
<td>Steady-state/Dc-growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appeals to individuals</td>
<td>Appeals to communities, collectives and class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incentives and some persuasion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field of Social Science</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitigation is incompatible with growth</td>
<td>Mitigation is compatible with growth</td>
<td>Mitigation is incompatible with growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requires limited/no state response — free market will resolve problem</td>
<td>Manageable within current system</td>
<td>Requiring radical structural transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discounts future</td>
<td>Optimal discount rate excludes cumulative emissions</td>
<td>Low discount rate includes cumulative emissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualises behaviour</td>
<td>Individualises behaviour</td>
<td>Social behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed human nature</td>
<td>Fixed human nature</td>
<td>Co-evolving humans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No decarbonisation needed — free market and self-interest will solve crises</td>
<td>Change requires appeals to values, perceptions and human nature through persuasion and incentives</td>
<td>Change is aided by structural change, collective empowerment and moral engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change is sacrifice and an attack on personal rights</td>
<td>Change is sacrifice</td>
<td>Change is for the ‘common good’ and ‘human flourishing’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class structure is earned and justified</td>
<td>Class invisibility</td>
<td>Class is a social justice issue and linked to carbon emissions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These diverging patterns are also visible in the individualised and societal forms of decarbonisation that the field of climate change social science creates through how it constructs the public. As highlighted in Chapter 2, four main model templates form the underlying logic of most climate change behavioural research: the rational choice, information-deficit, ABC and heuristic models. These models namely hail from mainstream psychology and economics (Shove, 2010a; Szerszynski and Urry, 2010), which by virtue of their culturally dominant positions, consecrate a symbolic order doxa based on individualised decarbonisation. This nullifies the roles of class, institutions, infrastructure, social structure and community. Consequently much of the behaviour-changing mechanisms based on these constructions support reformist approaches, whereas alternative options of transforming the society that encourages particular individual perceptions and behaviours are expunged.
The behavioural models tend to portray individuals as consciously calculating, driven by an unchanging human nature of self-interest or unconsciously guided by some hard-wired “unhelpful evolutionary spinoff” (Biegler, 2012). Paradoxically this is the aforementioned human/nature dichotomy centred in the individual, with humans ruled by their biology with little room for a co-evolving relationship with their society. This construction in turn constructs the possibilities for decarbonization in a manner that limits society’s perceived possibilities for initiating change. It identifies invariable and atomistic views, behaviours, or some hard-wired immutability held by individuals, as the root cause of climate change. The ensuing emphasis reduces the problem to the need to package climate change and decarbonisation to fit individual wants, thoughts and values. Being asocial, these individualised behavioural models neglect how these wants, thoughts and values are largely formed by and within the current societal system, which is partly reflective of their disciplinary backdrop.

Although many of the ABC approaches involved in climate change receptivity studies seek to go beyond simple information-deficit approaches by examining the perceptions involved. Implicitly, however, they still maintain a notion of the mobilising quality of having the ‘correct’ information. Examples of the latter can be found in studies which identify people conflating climate change with the hole in the ozone layer (Kempton, 1997) or perceiving climate change as temporally and spatially distant (Leiserowitz, 2006) (see Figure 4.2). In dealing with the basic premise of these knowledge-centric models, the typical answer proffered by academics has been persuasion as opposed to concrete social change (Krosnick et al., 2006).

66 An Irish EPA survey in 2002 found this conflation among 80.3% of respondents. However, even with the conflation respondents still made the important connection between the burning of fossil fuel and climate change (Motherway et al., 2007).

67 An example of persuasion is to counter public obfuscation through simplifying the message through metaphors like “thickening blanket” of greenhouse gases (Leiserowitz, 2008, 40) or “analogies” (Halford and Sheehan, 1991, 606) where the AGW consensus is compared to the consensus on cancer treatment. The latter analogy appeared in the recent public engagement with sceptics by the head of the Royal Society’s Sir Paul Nurse on an episode of the BBC’s Horizon documentary series. Within the program he makes several references to the complexity of science and the need of scientists “to communicate the issues” with the public (Horizon: Science Under Attack 2011).
The models also contribute to an atomized representation of society as a collection of individual consumers, possibly eroding any “sense of capacity and collective responsibility for a shared fate” (Webb, 2012: 120). Furthermore, all of the above individualizing approaches appear committed to delivering a “quiescent public” for scientific knowledge and policy. This contributes to further alienating the public from the climate change debate by overlooking possibilities for the public’s role regarding the purposes and “assumed ends” of the scientific research: i.e. the room for dialogue and “public engagement with the science” (Wynne, 2006: 71, 75).

Conversely, academics that opt to include the social, along with the unconscious, practical and ‘common good’ dimensions, occupy the subordinate position in the social science of climate change receptivity (Hulme, 2009; Wynne, 2010; Norgaard, 2011). Recognising society’s relational input into high carbon
behaviours forces the acknowledgement of the relative arbitrariness of those behaviours: their historical structuring through social relations (Shove, 2010a; Pape et al., 2011). Moreover, an emphasis on the ‘common good’ and carbon-related effects of unequal societal power relations allows climate change to be reconstituted in terms of the moral dimensions of distribution and social justice.

In resurrecting the concept of social structure, these academics reposition the individual’s own empowerment as significantly dependent upon how societal relations of power are structured. This resurrection also renders class-related emissions more visible. For example Foster (2013) cites how the carbon footprint of the US economy’s top quintile was estimated as being over triple that of the bottom, while Monbiot (2009b) reveals the profligate personal machinery of the very rich: e.g. superyachts that can consume as much as 3400 litres of fuel per hour. This subordinate position is therefore supportive of radical transformativism through recognizing that serious carbon-related behavioural change is dependent upon structural, and therefore societal, transformation: e.g. transforming educational, political and economic systems. Under this interpretation didactic information on climate change within the school curriculum is insufficient. Instead the practices and disposition-inducing qualities of the institution itself require radical restructuring (Sterling, 2001; 2003).

This fraction of the social science also constructs a different climate change role for the public beyond individual consumers needing to be enticed or duped. This counter symbolic ordering has room for a co-production model, calling for “public empowerment” and “societal engagement” based on genuine dialogue and negotiation concerning the risks and responsibilities of climate change policy and research (Webb, 2012: 119, 122).

4.4 Climate Change and the Global Field of Power

Climate constructions – whether contrarian, gradualist or catastrophist, individualized or social – acquire the statist capital that secures their popular legitimacy in the field of power. An immense struggle, currently ongoing, within

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68 This contrasts starkly with figures that estimate one sixth of the world’s population producing no significant emissions and street sleepers in India who provide net savings on greenhouse gases through their processing of waste (Monbiot, 2009b).
the global field of power is over the fossil fuel based economy. On one side the “new alliance” (Beck, 2009: 3), of scientists, politicians, journalists, activists; corporations and intergovernmental institutions, are pushing for a low-carbon economy and on the other the fossil-fuel industry, anti-regulation politicians and contrarians are seeking to maintain the status quo (McCright and Dunlap, 2010).

However, these alliances are not monolithic blocs, as their responses can differ radically. This project concentrates on three umbrella terms, from Table 4.1, which refer to the primary political responses to climate change. The first is the BAU model of the fossil-fuel industry and contrarian alliance, seeking to maintain the carbon-heavy economy and resist regulations. The second is the reformist position which seeks change within the current institutional and economic system. The third position calls for radical transformation of the societal structures, institutions, and the economy. Each of these approaches serves to legitimate particular properties of the climate change construction that emerges from climate change science and the social sciences. These properties are the ones most supportive of their struggle and interests within the field of power. As the broken lines in Table 4.1 highlights such distinctions are not rigid, but rather, associated and mutually reinforcing climate descriptions and orientations.

4.4.1 Business as Usual

The BAU approach often finds intellectual support among contrarian scientists and future-discounting economists, whose constructions the BAU lobby promotes to prevent implementation of carbon restrictions against businesses, particularly the fossil fuel and extractive industries. The motives predominantly involve profitability, an ideological belief in the freedom of the market, and national competitive interests. Former US President George Bush completely rejected the Kyoto Protocol in 2000, while claiming it was against the competitive economic interests of the United States (Giddens, 2009: 188).

BAU advocates have deeply engaged in the politicisation of the science. Fossil-fuel industries have given large amounts of funding to groups to lobby against the findings of the IPCC and other climate scientists (Monbiot, 2009a; 2013b) and have funded climate scientist contrarians who carry out a continuous campaign of misinformation (Oreskes and Conway, 2010; Nuccitelli, 2012). Indeed many contrarian scientists appear to be themselves political players in the BAU
campaign. Some have expressed strong free-market leanings against which environmental regulation is a perceived threat (Kininmonth, 2007: 6-7; Spencer, 2008: 109; McCright and Dunlap, 2010: 110). Furthermore, many contrarian scientists are tied to free-market think-tanks who lobby in the interests of corporate freedom from regulation such as the Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation (Oreskes and Conway, 2010).

The strategies of the BAU often involve attempts to discredit or even suppress the expertise behind opposing policy (Monbiot, 2009a). McCright and Dunlap (2010) refer to a particularly powerful group of BAU advocates as the “American conservative countermovement”, who have had enormous input into halting action on climate change during, and largely supported by, George W. Bush’s administration. Through mass occurrences of suppressing or manipulating scientific research, intimidating scientists, exploiting the law and media bias, the countermovement managed to exclude climate mitigation from US political decision-making processes (McCright and Dunlap, 2010). The organizations and lobby groups attached to the countermovement have been in receipt of annual funding of over $900 million, most of it from secret donors (Brulle, 2014). Consequently, it seems that BAU input has amplified the contrarian’s surreptitious and untrustworthy signification of ‘climate change’ (McCright and Dunlap, 2010).

4.4.2 The Reformist Position

With so many countries signing up to Kyoto and the 2011 Doha Platform securing global accord to commit to some climate change agreement by 2015, to take effect by 2020, reformism is the predominant position within the global field of power. Consequently the weight of global statist power lies with reformist interpretations and properties of climate change and decarbonisation, making the reformist construction the preeminent reference for mitigation solutions. However, without legally binding global emissions reduction targets currently in place this dominance appears unstable and remains questionable.

Reformism in general accepts the existence of AGW and recognises the need for a global agreement towards lowering emissions. It also incorporates an ethical component acknowledging the greater emissions contribution of developed nations within international agreements such as Kyoto. However, it maintains that
lowering emissions will be carried out in a manner compatible with economic
growth, along with much of the current economic, political and social systems.
Ultimately, reformism signifies climate change as gradual and manageable within
the current economic system. It presents decarbonisation as a contradictory, top-
down, technocratic and individualistic process that is secondary to growth.

Specifically the reformist position incorporates the gradualism of past IPCC
reports and marginal and market-based neoclassical economic proposals. Adopting
these representations of climate change facilitates a commitment to “optimal”
rather than “robust” policies towards dealing with potential climate change impacts
(Mahony and Hulme, 2012). The ensuing pathway, prevalent throughout
international climate policy documents, advocates aiming below a global warming
increase of 2°C (EC, 2007; UNFCCC, 2010; UNFCCC, 2011b). The language is
conclusive that 2°C cannot be breached. However, the limit is largely
presumptuous. Furthermore, emission reductions being called for give an
Even more problematic is the failure of international policy discussions to write
cumulative emissions into their target objectives which would possibly require
yearly emission targets. Instead, distant targets are the recommended norm.
Distant targets might well be conducive to radical forward “visioning” for
stakeholders equipped with socio-cultural and socio-technical critique and group
motivation (Doyle and Davies, 2013). Conversely it gives policy-makers and the
public the convenient illusion that everything can continue as normal, leaving the
emission reductions to future generations. Moreover, targets tend to be coupled
with predictions of low emissions’ growth and early peaks that are distinctly at
odds with current emission trends. Such “delusion” serves to “facilitate post-peak
reduction rates compatible with economic growth” (Anderson, 2012: 20-1, 26).
The reformist position, therefore, reproduces a dominant symbolic growth over
decarbonisation hierarchy. Such policy predictions are often accompanied by a
positive “‘can do’ language” like “‘a high likelihood of achieving this goal’” (ibid:

69 The Copenhagen accord goes even so far as to note that the temperature limit may need
to be strengthened to 1.5°C.
70 “Conceivably a 2°C target is based partly on a perception of what is politically realistic,
rather than a statement of pure science. In any event, our science analysis suggests that such
a target is not only unwise, but likely a disaster scenario.” (Hansen and Sato, 2012).
32). This is clearly a construction of a manageable, growth-friendly climate change.

The reformist position also reproduces the individualized classification of climate change and decarbonization by the behavioural models, as evident in reformist policy goals which are tantamount to an “individualization of problems” (Cronin, 2009). Policy approaches mimic the assumption of “human practices as individualistic, market-based, and calculative” (Szerszynski and Urry, 2010: 3). Thus, in typical reformist fashion, policy-makers and campaigners, often latently guided by these models, seek to persuade individuals of the personal economic benefits of lowering domestic energy-use. They also locate decarbonization in the informedness of individuals and in winning the public debate on climate change. One can see a level of broad homogeneity towards ‘carrot and stick’ policy prescriptions, encompassing energy efficiency, savings and levies, already being inscribed in EU directives (DOEHLG, 2006; CER, 2011; Revenue, 2011). With the symbolic diminution of the individual to the ‘consumer’, decarbonisation policy comes to inevitably embody self-gain through efficiency savings or sacrifice whereby consumers forgo self-interest for some external and distinct world of the environment.

The belief, often implicitly held in political circles, \(^{71}\) of innate individualism or fixed human nature helps to reinforce the timidity of climate change policy by obscuring the capacity of humans to change. This provides further support for the disproportionate reformist emphasis on supply-side technological solutions\(^ {72}\) over behavioural change (Anderson, 2012: 26). Ironically the political and business establishment has actively encouraged some of this supposed selfishness. The global rise of consumer society and the political and ideological shift away from the “shared responsibility for welfare” towards the neo-liberalist consumer society conception of citizenship – i.e. the “primary right to satisfy individual wants” – are likely to have diluted the effectiveness of pleading for the “common good” (Webb, 2012: 112).

\(^{71}\) It is also often explicitly held by members of more conservative or libertarian parties such as the Tories in Britain and the Republicans in the US (even more blatantly among some members of the Tea-party fraction).

\(^{72}\) Movement of centralised energy production to nuclear and renewables or the use of carbon capture etc.
In maintaining and working within the current system the reformist approach has been greatly hampered by that system. The resultant schism in government policy presents the public with a contradictory and often hypocritical decarbonisation. Working to suit dispositions of self-interest, rather than seeking to change them, may possibly be encouraging a “rebound effect”. This effect occurs where savings from incentivised carbon reductions goes towards other carbon intensive activities or where improved efficiency lowers costs and stimulates demand (Jenkins et al., 2011). Such contradictions stem from the discord between economic growth and pushing for large decreases in emissions that are the product of that growth. For example EU ETS carbon permits were allowed to sink below junk-bond status as EU politicians refused to withdraw permits from an over-supplied market (Monbiot, 2013c). Additionally cap-and-trade countries have been exporting their emissions through importing goods from other countries with higher emissions per unit produced (BBC, 2007; Monbiot, 2013a). Similar contradictions are evident in the patterns of global investment (Jackson, 2009: 114). Unconventional fossil fuel production, such as shale gas or tar sands oil, is expanding (Foster, 2013). Furthermore, many governments are still granting enormous subsidies to fossil fuel industries. A report by the IMF concerning 176 countries points to direct global subsidies in 2011 of $480 billion (IMF, 2013: 1) along with value-added tax exemptions of around $200 billion (Nuccitelli, 2013).

4.4.3 The Radical Transformative Position

The prime characteristic of the third umbrella position is its call for “cutting consumer-driven economic growth” (Webb, 2012: 111) through radical structural transformations of the current system. The climate change costing and de-growth arguments, emerging as an alternative to the neo-classical economic dominance of the debate, underpins this radical transformativism. The position also borrows from social sciences that include the social in decarbonisation and therefore acknowledges the capacity of radical structural change to bring societal transformations that accord with climate change mitigation.

Under this radical transformative umbrella, advocates rupture the doxic order of economic growth (Kirby, 2008: 8; Schor, 2010). Here, dealing with climate change...
change is no longer reducible to mainstream economists’ and politicians’ terms of sacrifice and suffering. Instead room exists for a potential greater communal flourishing in a less competition-oriented economy with reduced work hours (Jackson, 2009: 199; Schor, 2010). Radical transformativists view real change as change to the “social logic” that would stem from reducing systemic inequality; changing notions of prosperity and personal capacity; strengthening social capital and dismantling the culture of consumption (Jackson, 2009: 181). Such transformations would call for the de-emphasis of atomistic notions of consumer freedom; offering instead more favourable evaluations of collective freedom or the ‘common good’.

The rising threat of abrupt irreversible climate change imaginaries is often a feature of this approach. Although on the margins, radical structural change is increasingly the preferred option of recognised climate scientists. For example, a 2012 climate science report called for the replacement of GDP as measure of human wellbeing, empowerment of the marginalised and integration of policies across social, economic and environmental domains. Appraising the current system, one member declared it “is broken ... driving humanity to a future that is 3-5°C warmer than our species has ever known, and is eliminating the ecology that we depend on for our health, wealth and senses of self” (Vidal, 2012). Other climate scientists, such as Anderson and former NASA scientist James Hansen, are also acknowledging, within their framing of the causes and the solutions, the role of power and class-related carbon inequalities (Anderson, 2012; Foster, 2013).

While gaining the support of these prominent climate scientists, the radical transformative position remains completely overshadowed at the intergovernmental level. It has even failed to garner the backing of many major environmentalist movements. This is perhaps a consequence of an “appeasement strategy” (Klein, 2011) within the movement: viewing complimentary economic growth as the only feasible option for getting climate mitigation on the international political agenda. Ironically, their failure to support radical change has strengthened the reformist position whilst greatly invalidating radical alternatives. Currently the outstanding struggle amongst international negotiators is between BAU and weak reformist forces and those promoting tougher reformist measures while radical transformativism is being sidelined.
4.5 Ireland’s Symbolic Order and the Entrance of Climate Change

Having constructed how main players in relevant fields and the global field of power present climate change this chapter looks to how Ireland’s dominant symbolic order reconfigures these representations. The analysis here concentrates on the dominant properties of Irish society as shaped by the power of Irish establishment. It is therefore not concerned with small pockets of resistance to the status quo but rather the nature of the order of the status quo itself. Some of these pockets of resistance – namely environmental activists – are instead dealt with by Chapter 5 in terms of their specific fields. The hierarchical relations identified here are largely borne out of the propagating power of the Irish state. These relations correspond with the existence of a highly depoliticised civil society and asocial, positivist expert-oriented knowledge systems. All are interrelated, through competitive economic growth which is central to government policy, and throughout the boom years of the Celtic Tiger has transformed the political; social and economic landscape. As such, it is at the core of the system of objective relations which constitute, and reproduces the dominant symbolic order. That order largely corresponds to a matrix of hierarchical properties, practices and classifications, which includes those based on the predominance of individualism, substantialism and short-termism and upon the subordinated symbolic worth of class, community and the environment.

These objective relations have greatly accommodated the state’s position on climate change which is predominantly reformist. In accordance to the reformist construction above the supply-side technological option has received €7 billion more investment than demand-side (IAE, 2013). Furthermore, a growing abundance of appeals to the individual and households seek to either incentivise self-interest or address a perceived information-deficit (Pape et al., 2011). The government have launched disincentives to stimulate reductions in fuel use, including carbon taxes (Howley et al., 2012) and coupling vehicle registration tax (VRT) to CO₂ car emissions (Revenue, 2011). They have also initiated energy efficiency labelling (DOEHLG, 2006) and have considered a country-wide roll out of smart meters intended to inform users of where savings can be made (CER, 2011). The individualization of the problem was also clearly manifest in The Power of One government awareness campaign (DOEHLG, 2007). This campaign
appealed to individuals to change energy-related behaviour: the primary incentive being financial savings accruing from energy efficiency (SEAI, 2013b). Thus the campaign classes the carbon footprint of Ireland’s über-emitters – an upper echelon which contains the holders of private jets; super-yachts and colossal mansions (Webb, 2013: 18-19, 21-22) – as effectively the same as persons living in small semi-detached houses in suburban Galway.

The government commissioned report by the Secretariat of the National Economic and Social Council (NESC)\(^{74}\) on movement to a low-carbon society in 2050 indicates some movement away from information-deficit and individualising approaches. The bottom-up focus of the report expanded the role of society: recognising the importance of collective players such as local authorities, firms, civil-society organisations and communities (NESC, 2012: 20, 25-6). The structural change entailing from the realisation of its proposed “public governance system”, which engages with and is informed by grassroots processes is quite radical (ibid: 35). However, the report’s use of the distant 2020 and 2050 targets, while a step away from short-termism, in ignoring more immediate targets maintains reformist hesitancy. Furthermore it dismisses the global summits’ process of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and negotiation attempts to produce binding emissions targets. The dichotomisation of top-down and bottom-up approaches in favour of the latter means it lacks creditability by not producing a *committed* role for the state. Consequently, the report undermines “the crucial importance of political leadership, both at a global level and at a national level, in favour of an entirely bottom-up approach” (Kirby, 2013: 81).

Despite at least some radical leanings in the report, the ensuing draft heads of the climate change bill being considered contain a clear reinforcement of a weak reformist position. The draft heads supplanted the report’s radical transformative bottom-up dimensions with a top-down approach with no reference to stakeholders (DECLG, 2013).

\(^{74}\) The organization advises the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) on social and economic development.
4.5.1 Weak Civil Society and the Co-opting State: Devaluing Popular Protest, Social Change, Class and Local Governance

The state-endorsed response to climate change, which has entered much of Irish civil society, in many ways mirrors the pre-existing economy of practices and classifications of that society. The ensuing objective relations of a heavily centralised democracy and a largely depoliticised civil society favour an economy of practices where commitment to social change, political protest and engagement is minimal. The relations veer instead towards the paradoxically elevated positions of solidarized (English, 2000: 88-9; Kirby, 2010b: 10) and individualised configurations of responsibility (Cronin, 2009; Allen, 2010: 29), sectoralism, the poor visibility of class and an emphasis on service provision rather than actual social change (Meade, 2005; Varley and Curtin, 2006). These objective relations of public depolitisation are visible in the top-down arrival of climate change, the Power of One campaign and the total avoidance of a class narrative.

Trade union density is low relative to many other countries. Political party membership was found to be at 2% of the population – third lowest out of 20 countries in Western Europe (Murphy, 2011: 174). While recent figures on membership of environmental NGOs is lacking, older surveys place the rate at under 4% for 1993 and again for 2002 (Tovey et al., 2007: 18). There is a significant level of volunteering (Murphy, 2011: 174); however this veers more towards service provision rather than political advocacy. The 1987 social partnership arrangements (along with those of 1996 regarding the community and voluntary sectors), which the government sold to the NGOs and unions as participative democracy and a collective bargaining tool for the fruits of economic growth, subjugated much of the civil sphere to the interests of that growth. The arrangement appears to have diminished and restrained active citizenry. Through such instruments as skewed funding the state manipulated associational life towards service provision rather than redistributive justice and social change (Kirby, 2010b). Funding arrangements favoured organisations that withheld from criticising the government: the latter coming under the phrase of “non-adversarial

75 Being higher than the figure attributable to party membership is likely due to the survey’s standard error and increased willingness of environmentalists to partake of a survey on the environment.
partnerships’” used by the NESC in 2005 (ibid: 15). Meanwhile these co-opting developments appear to have quelled radical dimensions to the majority of the trade union movement. Private sector unions failed to mobilise against the “abysmal” ratio of private sector pensions, longer working life than the EU average, and fewer holidays as of 2005 (Allen, 2010: 27). Furthermore throughout this period the expansion of union membership failed to keep pace with rising employment: falling from 53% in 1995 to 32% in 2007 (ibid).

This union suppression is part of the wider history of depressed class politics in Ireland (Tovey and Share, 2003: 181-182; Kirby, 2010b; Murphy, 2011). Class has also been denigrated at the level of academia as evident in the tendency towards individualizing frames of equality of opportunity and rewards as often applied in research by the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) (Share et al., 2007: 162, 169). The dominant Irish treatment of climate change repeats this symbolic pattern through bearing no recognition of the conspicuous emissions of the wealthiest. There is a general absence of class-based statistics on emission rates with state agencies opting instead for the more decontextualising per-capita averages or national figures.

The social partnership has ceased since the Celtic Tiger’s implosion and class-related grievances are more in the limelight due to austerity policies and the excessiveness of developers and bankers who contributed to Ireland’s economic downturn. Yet this depolitisation of civil society largely continues. Furthermore despite the electorate’s response to the downturn resolutely ousting the historically dominant Fianna Fail (FF) party – responsible for much of the depolitisation – they replaced it with Fine Gael, its closest equivalent in Irish politics, along with a centrist Labour Party. The resultant political landscape offers little by way of real systemic change.

The disempowerment of civil society extends to local governance which, under a centralised Irish state, is historically weak77 by Western European standards. They lack serious tax raising capacity (Flynn, 2007: 128), restricting the

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76 Union bosses collected salaries that located them in the upper echelons of society (The Irish Times 2009). Moreover union management bureaucracies mythologized claims of equal partnership with business and government and ‘consensus’ support amongst union members for social partnership (van Dyk, 2009).

77 Until amended in 1999 the Constitution was void of any section on local government (Flynn, 2007: 128).
room for local policy development and implementation (Davies, 2005: 26). Furthermore unelected county managers (Coakley and Gallagher, 1999: 354) often successfully overrule councils and their professional planning staff in planning matters (Flynn, 2007: 110). Local environmental policy implementation is similarly weak. Local Agenda 21 (LA21), part of the 1992 United Nations Earth Summit agreement on sustainability, involves “local plans for environment and development that each local authority is meant to develop through a consultative process with their population” (IPCC, 2001: 378). However, LA21 is under-resourced and encouragement of local empowerment has been relatively minor (Murphy et al., 2012). Local Energy Agencies, setup to assist community energy conservation initiatives, have received less funding than their European counterparts (Davies, 2005: 28). Under such circumstances it is not surprising that in 2011 very few councils had published a local climate change strategy (McGloughlin and Sweeney, 2011).

Ironically the state’s delegitimatization of the local in favour of a centralised national perspective has possibly contributed to a partial subjugation of would-be national issues to a constituency-based regionalism. A post-2002 national general election survey revealed the greater importance of a candidate being “good for the area”, as opposed to contributing to national politics (Marsh et al., 2008: 186-187).

Such candidate-centred-politics reveals voter dispositions that are not strongly based on the more nationally oriented party policies and therefore liable to undermine the recognition of policy-related issues, such as climate change, negotiated and implemented at the national level. Moreover, Ireland’s undervalued local political system signifies a disconnection between the potential of global and national decarbonisation and the merit of local support and effort. The resultant local/national dichotomy is likely resistant to multi-scalar – or glocal – representations of global environmental issues and to local ownership of the

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78 In addition no public representative in the form of a non-executive director exists in the EPA to deal directly with locals (Lowes, 2011).

79 Although national politics appears to be infiltrated by localism it is not necessarily a reflection of local or ontological hierarchy dominating establishment hierarchies. Rather the pro-growth agenda of the dominant order gets assimilated into the hierarchy of the local thus legitimating entrepreneurs and politicians associated with stimulating the local economy (Gallagher and Komito, 1999: 214). Thus the continual constituency support for figures discredited in the eyes of the nation state is likely inspired by relations of domination of the establishment symbolic order – e.g. sole credit for job creation granted to local politicians.
climate change issue. This in turn mirrors much of the alienating spatial qualities already encouraged by dominant climate change constructions.

A strong civil society would potentially create the social conditions favourable for developing a citizenry equipped with a more politically empowered habitus, and an ability to see themselves as part of an empowered collective. Potentially this would provide citizens with a capacity to claim a stake in climate change debates and influence policy, should they find themselves concerned by the issue. Instead weak class politics, low activism and weak local governance offer perfect conditions for creating expectations and dispositions that reflect political alienation and community disempowerment. This state of depolitization contributes to a dominant Irish symbolic order which projects an image of classlessness and a weak Irish citizenry that is very much incapable of radical social change. Consequently it has provided easy access for a reformist, top-down and individualised climate change representation to take a firm foothold in Irish society.

4.5.2 Contemporary Economic Nationalism and the Liberal Growth Agenda: Competing for Economic Growth against Society and the Environment

Through such a centralised political order, with its “essentially populist” (Kirby, 2010b: 10), anti-pluralist and nationalistic “social solidarity”, powerful actors in the 60s wedded national identity to economic liberalisation. Under such hegemonic slogans as “a rising tide lifts all boats” (former Taoiseach Sean Lemass, as cited in Coakley and Gallagher, 1999: 140) economic policy shifted from the national dispute with England to “rapid industrialisation through a greater involvement with the economies of Western Europe” (Leonard and O’Kane, 2008: 27).

The resultant competitive economic growth agenda has pitted the nation state against other nations in a realpolitik battle for foreign direct investment (FDI). Throughout the period of the ‘Celtic Tiger’, Ireland demonstrated its ruthless competitive edge. Although benefitting from Europe’s social model through

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80 Policy which attempted to orient Ireland away from its economic dependency on the common enemy England, in favour of the USA.
receiving aid for overcoming underdevelopment Ireland “undercut that model by introducing the lowest rate of corporation tax” (Allen, 2007: 243). Ireland has contributed to the massive movement of profits declared offshore by US subsidiaries in tax havens through: transfer pricing, special tax exemption agreements and reductions on dividend taxes (ibid). By the mid-2000s, Ireland had managed to attract 25% of the US investment into the EU “despite having only one per cent of the EU’s population” (ibid: 231).

Arguably ideals of international fairness and responsibility are requisite parts to achieving global emission reductions. Yet the ensuing atmosphere of “economic nationalism” (Allen, 2007: 232) clearly hampers the introduction of climate change mitigation policies, which are perceived to threaten competitiveness. A recurring argument brought against the attempted introduction of the Climate Change Bill in 2010 was the creation of an alleged “competitive disadvantage” (McDonald, 2011). In 2012 the Fine Gael-Labour coalition rejected the introduction of the Tobin Tax for fear of weakening its hold over its multinational financial sector (Beesley, 2012). EU leaders proposed the tax as a means of minimising the volatility of market speculation. It offers the potential of raising billions for use in fighting climate change and funding global carbon reduction (Gillespie, 2009).

This undervaluing of ethical considerations continues at the national level where international competitiveness tops the symbolic order hierarchy even at the expense of the political capacity and welfare of Ireland’s own citizens. Due to economic policy Kirby labels the Irish state a ‘competition state’: i.e. in response to the demands of neoliberal globalization it shifts statist capital towards global market competitiveness and away from “social cohesion and welfare” (Kirby and Murphy, 2011: 20). Consequently state agencies geared towards competition such as the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) receive greater investment and support than institutional anti-poverty measures (ibid: 28). Moreover, the state and judiciary allows anti-unionism to persist in most international companies. The foreign direct investment (FDI) employment sector has operated outside the social partnership “national planning mechanism” (Kirby, 2010b: 13) and has the lowest levels of union density of all sectors (Allen, 2010: 28). Within such an order the moral argument – such as for the moral aspects of climate change – appears to hold little currency.

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81 Ireland has a 12.5% corporation tax.
Ireland’s massive property bubble offers another clear example of how a growth-centred economic and political agenda subordinates certain properties that are complementary to decarbonisation. At the core of the boom the government’s drive for accelerated growth granted excess stature to short-termism. Strong responses to climate change doubtlessly require strong forward planning. However, the entire boom can be seen as an exercise in short-termism. As export-growth averages and inward FDI flows declined in the early 2000s the growth-based economy turned inwards towards a deeply unstable debt-fuelled property boom (Kirby, 2010a: 35, 38). A low-taxation approach to stimulating growth forced government revenue towards an over-reliance on tax from the property market.82 Government policies of dropping capital gains tax from 40% to 20% in 1998 increased “speculative lending in real estate and finance” (O’Riain, 2010: 30-1). Furthermore, other tax incentives purposefully encouraged the purchase of a second home “as a commodity investment” (Sparks and Duke, 2010: 113). By 2006, Ireland reached a new house completion rate of “21 dwellings per 1,000 population – the highest house building rate in Europe” (Rau, 2009: 19).

The social and environmental consequences of this short-termism are reflected in the landscapes of empty holiday homes and traditional communities rapidly overwhelmed by urban sprawl, and in the mass of ghost estates scattered throughout the country. In the midst of the abandoned developments, there is also a marked absence of community-based amenities: no overgrown parks, no rusting play areas, and no community halls that might have been. As Sparks and Duke (2010) state these areas “represent the crude vision of houses as commodities and communities as retail clusters” (Sparks and Duke, 2010: 115). They also convey the disregard for ‘future generations’ underlying Ireland’s growth obsession. This disregard is also visible in the link between the boom’s expanding suburbanization and greater car dependency. Ireland has a 30% higher mileage rate than the US, 50% higher than Britain and 70% higher than in France and Germany (Rau, 2008, O’Brien, 2009). Additionally, many buildings were built on floodplains (Hickey, 2010) and inadequately insulated,83 contributing to 2010’s carbon emissions’ rise from household heating during a cold-snap (Howley et al., 2011). These examples offer further evidence of the subordinated position of the environment to economic...(continued)

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82 44.3% revenue came from capital, stamp duty and VAT in 2006 compared to 35.7% in 2001 (O’Riain, 2010: 34).
83 This was due to weak and poorly enforced building regulations (Antonelli, 2012).
growth throughout the Celtic Tiger period and to how that growth has undermined future planning.

The emergence of carbon taxes, cross-party use of the ‘green economy’ rhetoric and a brief rise of Green party electees ⁸⁴ may suggest an elevation of environmental concerns within the state. However, though some even seem to run counter to the growth agenda, they have arrived not in any way by an inversion of hierarchies. Carbon-related policies are largely a result of international commitments and EU directives (Motherway et al., 2007: 11; Pape and Fahy, 2010: 19-20) and green economy advocacy primarily concentrates on its job-creating capacity rather than contributions to reducing emissions (Davies and Mullin, 2011; Rabbitte, 2012). ⁸⁵

A more precise indication of how the state ranks the environment can be found in the appointments made to its regulator. The EPA’s establishment in 1993 is an indication of greater symbolic legitimacy for environmental protection in Ireland. Yet there is no environmental court, which exists in other EU countries, and punitive measures are feeble at best (Lowes, 2011). Furthermore the appointments to the agency highlight a business bias. Its previous director general, Mary Kelly, was the former Assistant Director with responsibility for environmental policy at the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC). Her replacement, Laura Burke, came to the agency from the incineration company Indaver in 2004. Burke has since described supporting economic growth as a key aim of the agency and the need to restrict the prosecution of businesses. In response to the low level fines imposed during the agency’s history, Burke stated that reputational damage was more of a deterrent for businesses (Kelly, 2012). Burke’s appointment offers a clear indication of the lowly position of radical or strong reformist environmentalism within the dominant symbolic order.

⁸⁴ Consisting of 6 TDs and 32 local councillors during the FF-green party coalition of 2007 (Electionsireland.org, 2013), however, those electoral gains have since been washed away in the general election of 2011.

⁸⁵ In 2010 Prime Time, a prominent current affairs programme shown by Ireland’s national TV station, aired a discussion on wind energy which mentioned climate change only once. The rest of the discussion centred around employment, impacts on residents and planning regulations. Neither did Green Party cabinet member Eamon Ryan use climate change to defend his government’s wind energy policy (RTE 2010).
Due to the pre-eminence of economic growth Irish reformism replicates the aforementioned inherent contradiction of the dominant reformist representation of climate change. Though some government policy gestures towards political, environmental and economic convergence (Giddens, 2009: 8), plenty of false convergence and divergence exists. Despite a wind energy target of 40% by 2020 (15% has been met), three peat-fuelled power plants were built since 2000. The government has also agreed to export large quantities of wind energy to Britain (Lumley, 2013). In addition, the government, under the National Development Plan, continues large-scale road-building (RTE, 2013). Moreover the government remains committed to expanding tourism: an activity that strongly contributes to aviation emissions. In contrast, despite commitments, no cohesive national sustainable development is in place (Pape et al., 2011) and the introduction of a climate change bill has been continuously stalled.

Interestingly, the economic crisis has served as an instrument of enforcement for the liberalist growth agenda, accelerating the delegitimation of decarbonisation as a consequence. The fear of collapse and the structural programmes called for under the post-democratic Troika have heaped private debt on the shoulders of the public and spurred cutbacks in public spending, increased privatisation and the marketisation of state institutions. More pronounced forms of economic nationalism, complemented by references to the country as ‘Ireland Inc’, or ‘Brand Ireland’, are reducing a complex society to its business producing capacity. Climate policy-making reflects these concerns for economic recovery which override those of mitigating climate change. In defending the NESC report on “The Climate Change Challenge”, its director Rory O’Donnell, emphasised the importance of meshing climate policy “with the hunger for economic recovery and employment” (O’Donnell, 2013). The institution which he deems best suited for delivering the transition is the Industrial Development Authority (IDA); an institution whose priority is to encourage economic expansion of business and foreign direct investment in Ireland (ibid). Furthermore, the climate change bill

86 The campaign of The Gathering aimed to draw to Ireland an extra 325,000 visitors from the Irish Diaspora, with many of them requiring long-haul flights from America (Boland, 2013).

87 The IMF, EC and ECB.

88 Bestowed on the country by policy-makers during the Celtic Tiger “to encompass the whole society and to stress the perceived need to reorient social sectors to the demands of economic development” (Trench, 2009: 4).
draft heads considered by government have been written as if to ensure carbon mitigation measures can never be a threat to that recovery. The published heads have the need for safeguarding and securing state competitiveness and economic opportunities written into them. The bill also prioritises leaving room for future economic opportunities and conditions (DECLG, 2013).

4.5.3 The Dominant Symbolic Order and Climate Change as Inscribed in Consecrated Expertise, State Education, and the Irish Media.

Here the chapter enters into the domains of Irish expertise, education and media in order to gauge the doxa and symbolic violence that has spread from the dominant symbolic order into wider society. It also looks at how these societal relations of power are congenial to the promotion of a particular representation of climate change amongst the general public. Each of these domains bears the imprint of field-of-power struggles and provides further insight into whose vision of the world is in receipt of statist capital and how that vision is being constituted within wider society (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1989: xvii -xviii; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: xv). Through their “instruments of power” and as disseminators of particular categories of perception these domains are broad sources of symbolic violence. This section, in examining these areas, demonstrates how hierarchical relations of liberal economic growth, which include economism, short-termism and individualization, penetrate all areas of society. These relations in turn pave the way for the reception of a reformist AGW representation within Irish society.

Formerly a key player in Ireland’s ruling elite (Tovey and Share, 2003: 185), the Catholic Church’s doxic veil of religiosity has been lifted from a clergy embroiled in a series of paedophilic scandals and Vatican cover-ups. The moral authority behind the Church’s messages on climate change, incorporating the

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89 The Taoiseach (Prime Minister) has openly rebuked the church for managing “the rape and torture of children” (Kenny, 2011). Though 84% of census respondents admitted to Catholic membership (McGarry, 2012), Inglis describes the development of a paradoxical continuous protestantisation of Catholicism in Ireland whereby catholic members no longer look to the order for definite interpretation of religious values and beliefs (Inglis, 2007). More recently concerns of spirituality and religion featured bottom on a list of 119 priority options in a Vital Signs survey of 1,000 people (Burke-Kennedy, 2013).
ethical dimensions of the “common good” and “ecological conversion” (Cooney, 2009; Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference, 2009), is liable to have significantly weakened as a result. Indeed it is possible that the supplanting of Catholic expertise by an adiaphoristic economism, contributes to a lack of appetite for a moral climate change narrative; or in general an absence of moral messages buoyed by sufficient symbolic capital to be taken seriously.

Ireland’s programme of liberalization and the movement of FDI to the core of Irish politics has nominated another class of experts to occupy the symbolic heights of Irish society. These namely consist of multinational executives, business leaders and neo-classical economists who bring a restrictive economic discourse into political and public debate. Much of the discourse revolves around mercantile notions of prosperity, profitability, and asocial and anti-environmental econometrics like GDP, which is arguably the country’s prime performance indicator.

The pervasiveness of the consecrated expertise of the economists is evident in their central role to the 1965 Investment in education report (O'Sullivan, 2005: 128). The report was crucial in Irish education to replacing the theocentric paradigm of the Catholic Church with the current human capital paradigm. The new paradigm has pushed education into the role as the economy’s ‘handmaiden’; its goal being to establish the necessary manpower to support industry (ibid: 207).

The state’s inscription of its economic interests into state education gears the system towards inculcating the practices and priorities of the dominant symbolic order. The resultant hierarchical relations elevate mathematical and literacy skills and positivist forms of knowledge while subjugating those of citizenship, critical thinking, community and self-empowerment. Additionally, it contributes to further consecration of the individual. Studying is substantially individual-based and the form of achievement and reward, shaped by the systems of examination, encourages individual competitiveness (Share et al., 2007: 220). This individual meritocracy favours the more privileged classes and operates as another means of smothering class visibility through narrowing focus to the ‘innate’ talents of each individual student.90

90A different picture emerges from a large sample and longitudinal study which found that at the age 9 there was a 30% to 8% difference for poor reading skills between offspring of Irish mothers with lower secondary and graduate educational levels respectively (Williams
In theory, were this educational hierarchy inverted a different dominant Irish reception of climate change might be possible: as much concerned with the ethics and morality as it is with an economic costing of the problem. Some developments have sought to expand the role of schooling towards promoting “citizenship” and “combating social disadvantage” (Share et al., 2007, 215-6). Post-primary curriculum introduced the subjects Civic Social and Political Education (CSPE) and Environment and Social Studies (ESS), incorporating environmental, civic and social elements, yet they only have junior certificate status as opposed to the more authoritative leaving certificate\textsuperscript{91} subjects (examinations.ie, 2013).\textsuperscript{92} Despite the changes the emphasis on education as a facilitator of economic development remains the utmost function of formal education in Ireland.

Similar to education the media is an area wherein the dominant order often finds its reflection, through its spaces, temporalities, its focus and silences. The discriminatory qualities of class invisibility and individualisation, along with the dominance of economic doctrine are also reflected in the objective relations of the Irish media landscape. Moffat (2010) points to an emergent “cultural shift”, accompanying the Celtic Tiger, which increasingly portrays Ireland as a “middle-class society”. In this he finds the Irish media complicit in projecting middle-class experiences as the norm, conveniently sidestepping “the issue of structural social exclusion”. He cites their obsession with university enrolment issues despite the majority of the overall population not entering third level education (Moffat, 2010: 242). Moreover the media tends to infuse this classlessness with a specific type of individualism as clearly expressed in the celebrity culture it obsessively publicises. As part of the research for this chapter, a content search through the online archives of Ireland’s top broadsheets and most prominent tabloids\textsuperscript{93} clearly supports the contention that the hierarchical ranking of expertise in mainstream media reproduces state consecrations (see Table 4.2, Figure 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5). With

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{91}The Leaving Certificate Examination is the final post-primary examination in Irish schools; sitting it is generally required for to gain access to third level education. It is the equivalent of the A Levels in the UK.

\textsuperscript{92}Home economics features moral and social components at leaving certificate level, but only in a very minor fashion (NCCA, 2001).

\textsuperscript{93}As listed in the Nexis online newspaper database: the Irish Daily Mirror and Irish Sunday Mirror (the more popular Irish Sun was not listed) (JNRS, 2011; Nexis, 2013).
\end{flushleft}
highest number of articles referring to ‘economist’ or ‘economists’, they dominate the role of the go-to-expert.⁹⁴ ⁹⁵

Table 4.2 Academic Prevalence within Ireland’s Most Popular Broadsheets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broadsheet</th>
<th>Percentage Readership of Population of Over 15s</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Keyword Search</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent and Sunday Independent</td>
<td>13.3% and 26.2%</td>
<td>Date Unknown - 30/01/2013</td>
<td>Economist, Psychologist, Sociologist, “Political Scientist”, Anthropologist</td>
<td>8617 2545 229 80 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Times</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>01/01/2000 - 31/12/2010</td>
<td>Economist excl. finance, Economist, Psychologist, Sociologist, “Political Scientist”, Anthropologist</td>
<td>5436* 10,640 4,575 676 448** 463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table displays the number of search results for the listed academic categories in two main Irish broadsheets using the newspapers’ websites. The Irish Independent website did not offer a custom period option and consequently it is uncertain how far back in time the results go; though it definitely goes back some years. Both papers included plurals in their search results.

* Figure calculated by extracting finance section results from archive of web (as opposed to ‘newspaper’ archive) postings. This figure also excludes the online breaking news section which aligns it more with the probable newspaper archive figures.

** Archive of website postings used because the ‘newspaper’ archive showed searches by automatically splitting ‘political’ and ‘scientist’. Single word search results suggest that differences between the two archives are minimal.

⁹⁴ This is still true for when finance and business sections are excluded from the results of the Irish Times (the Irish Independent website did not offer a results by section facility).

⁹⁵ A lot of this prevalence is due to the business and finance sections and being conspicuously positioned for journalistic commentary by being embedded in government departments and a raft of government bodies; which must be seen as further proof of their sanctity.
Figure 4.3: Academic Prevalence in Irish National Newspapers for First Four Months of 2010

The chart is produced from a search of Irish publications on the Nexis database (Nexis, 2013). A four month period was used because the database only returns results totalling less than 3000. Due to the high volume of results for “economist” it was not possible to retrieve figures for the full year.
Where newspapers look to expertise in human behaviour, hits for ‘psychologist’ greatly overshadow keyword searches for ‘sociologist’, ‘political scientist’ and ‘anthropologist’. With the latter three tending to be the more socially oriented of sciences, these keyword results display a bias in Irish media towards the more asocial and individualising expertise of the psychologist. Through its approval of the expertise of mainstream economics and psychology the media
provides further proof of a symbolic order that debases the very idea of the social. Conversely the omission of the more society-centred social sciences significantly undermines the attention that would be paid to social structure: an essential component for advancing a radical transformative decarbonisation perspective geared towards changing those social structures.

This undue regard to the social finds further complement within journalistic practices. In broadcast media, due to the norm of balance, the practice of debate is widespread but amounts to point-scoring rather than a more socially cognizant participative or deliberative dialogic reasoning. There are, thus, close parallels between parliamentarian debates where politicians struggle to delegitimize opponents in the eyes of the electorate and standard media discussion. This parallel was demonstrated along with the illegitimacy of dialogue in RTE’s 2011 televised debate between five leaders of Ireland’s main political parties (RTE, 2011). Green Party coalition minister Gormley adopted a somewhat dialogic stance – often admitting how mistakes had been made – and was dismissed as peripheral and pitiful for doing so by RTE’s panel member journalist Sam Smyth. Other practices reproduce the dominant symbolic order’s short-termism through the tendency towards the descriptive, the use of present simple headlines and the reduction of stories to episodic framing: i.e. “case study or event-oriented” depictions of “public issues in terms of concrete issues” (Iyengar, 1994: 14) that fail “to place stories into sufficient context” (Boykoff, 2009: 447). Again deep social (and historical) analysis is lacking.

The media even share the same unquestionable enthusiasm towards the expansion of economic growth as the neo-classical economists. The 2008 economic downturn offered possibilities of revelation, breaking open to the public the arbitrariness of the esteemed doxa of economic growth. On such occasions powerful players, having much invested in maintaining doxa, resort to rationalising it in order to defend and justify its continuation. However, rationalising doxa transforms it into visible orthodoxy so that what was once hidden and unquestioned becomes open to public discussion (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1989: 278). The fact that mainstream Irish journalists express no need to even defensively rationalize

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96 Rather than being a mere whack-a-mole game of point and counterpoint, often incorporating uncritical referencing of supposed facts or ridiculing sideswipes, dialogic reasoning is deliberative; open to recognising the societal biases in our arguments.
general economic growth highlights its doxicity, which hasn’t wavered since the downturn.

The same cannot be said for climate change coverage which has nowhere near the same salience, reverence and legitimacy. Figure 4.5 even shows three years of decline, up to 2010, in national coverage of climate change by the main broadsheets.

The low visibility of climate change is particularly notable in keyword searches of local papers (Figure 4.5) which are miniscule in comparison to the two main broadsheets. The poor coverage in local papers points to the persistence of the conflicting relationship between local, national and global spaces. It also hints at how climate change is still not strongly embedded in local realities.

97 The broadsheets chosen were the *Irish Independent*; its sister *The Sunday Independent*; and *The Irish Times*, which have a 2011 proportional Irish readership (over the age of 15) of 13.3%, 26.2% and 8.7% respectively (477,000, 939,000 and 310,000 respectively) (JNRS, 2011).
A review of two years of climate change coverage (2011 to 2013), by *Six One News*, the flagship news programme of the national public broadcaster (RTE), found that their coverage contained an even wider spatial dislocation. The programme had covered the “international spatial locus”, such as reporting on climate summits, over three times more than the national. Furthermore its coverage tends to be episodic or thematically clustered around international climate change events; largely disappearing from the media horizon once the events pass (Cullinane and Watson, 2014). Discussion rarely ventures into where broader socio-cultural dimensions are elaborated upon and climate change is very rarely juxtaposed, aligned or associated with other major events: coverage of Obama’s first 100 days in office examined his performance on a wide range of issues but many ignored climate change (Harnden, 2009; Spillius, 2009; Usborne, 2009). Additionally, RTE’s flagship news programme has displayed a strong tendency to avoid mentioning climate change in areas that are clearly relevant. Over the two year period, it failed to link climate change to any of its items on international
extreme weather events while linking only 3 of its items on national weather. It also failed to tie it into agricultural stories where changing weather patterns were linked to farming difficulties including a fodder crisis. The programme very rarely referenced climate change with regard to its coverage on energy resources. The review authors describe how in 4 segments on a major oil find off the Cork coast there was no mention of climate change and 7 out of the 8 people whose opinions were accessed were from the oil and business community. The entirety of the studio discussions and reporting narrowed the story to the potential economic benefits and the “mechanics of oil extraction”. This example appears to be a striking illustration of how the dominant configuration of societal objective relations is manifest in the media’s treatment of climate change (Cullinane and Watson, 2014). The media serves to devalue the issue of climate change whilst continuously amplifying the need for competitive growth. Its scarce emphasis and the episodic substantialism with which it segregates climate change from other issues helps to portray climate change as nationally and locally irrelevant.

4.5.4 The Dominant Symbolic Order and its Room for Climate Change

This chapter identifies three main climate change constructions which are produced in the fields of climate change science, social science of climate change and the global field of power: BAU, reformist, and radical transformative. This threefold symbolic ordering projects a range of contradictory climate change impressions into the public sphere. These vary between: the individual and the social, the manageable and that which requires sweeping transformations, from total negligibility to the abrupt apocalyptic nightmares of tomorrow. However throughout the fields represented in the construction of climate change the overwhelming balance of power is devoted to maintaining economic growth and to subordinating climate change mitigation to that growth. As a result, reformism is predominant in the international arena.

These fields also contribute to defining the nature of the public’s relationship to climate change. Despite climate change’s systemic qualities, distinctions are

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98 Included in this group were two oil company CEOs, a stockbroker and a president of Cork Chamber of Commerce.
maintained not only between humans and nature but also between researchers, policy-makers and local stakeholders. Through the symbolic violence emanating from specific fields, the issue of climate change has overwhelmingly come to be owned by a community of experts ranging from climate scientists to economists and policy bureaucrats. This technocracy downplays moral and local connections and alienates the general public.

The positioning of these climate change constructions within Ireland’s field of power is very much a case of anything that enters a field does so through the logic and expressions of that field (Ekelund, 1999). The resultant dominant symbolic order, that the field of power has a key role in forming, is congenial to a weak reformism. The Irish political economy, emergent patterns of state nomination, various legitimacies sustained by state education and the media, all seemingly conspire in the order of nationalistic economic growth and individualism. Consequently the type of climate change that the order absorbs and projects is individualised, economised and class-related aspects are ignored. It is reticent concerning the moral dimensions and is often submerged within the narrative of national competiveness.

The commanding role of economic growth in government policy shapes the country’s political, social and economic topography and is central to the system of objective relations which comprise the dominant symbolic order. The unquestionable pursuance of economic growth has expanded the societal presence of service-provision, global competitiveness, short-termism, rational calculation, individualisation, economism, and utility (e.g. the competitive impact of an educated workforce). These are symbolically and doxically elevated to the detriment of their opposites: social activism, global citizenship, forward planning, practical apprehension, community and class, social critique, and creativity (the capacity to imagine real alternatives). This is an order that is anything but supportive of a broad societal call for radical social transformation.

One of the questions to be answered in the remainder of this thesis concerns how much the climate interpretations of the participants are influenced by this symbolic ordering. The following three chapters look to how the projection and reception of this symbolic ordering, along with the dominant orderings of climate change, varies between specific fields pertaining to the social spaces of the participants and to their receptive and reactive dispositions.
Part III
Climate Change
Receptivity
5 Irish Field Hierarchies and the Entrance of Climate Change

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the first display of climate change receptivity recorded from the fieldwork. It also shows how Bourdieusian sociology can enhance the interpretation of that receptivity by paying particular attention to the concept of field and by continuing the reflexive practice of his objectivist rupture – initiated in Chapter 4 – through a partial constructing of the fields. Regarding the second research question, the chapter examines how socio-cultural regularities of Irish society – with respect to different fields – influence public responses to climate change across divergent groups. Some of the ontological hierarchies (what is valued within inner circles) that manifested within the focus groups and life histories reflected the field-related hierarchies. It was often through these relations that participants translated climate change.

The fields in question pertain to education, environmentalism, business and agricultural production and four of the main sections in this chapter concentrate on each field specifically. Having briefly constructed the fields’ logic, particularly concentrating on the field position of participants, the field relationship to climate change is presented. The chapter then describes participants’ field-related perceptions, attitudes and responses to climate change. This juxtaposition of field regularities and observed climate change responses expounds upon field relationships to public receptivity.

5.2 The field of agricultural production

Some pertinent properties of farming in Ireland include the cultural notions of farming as a way of life; emotive attachment to land ownership, the inheritance of the family farm and the centrality of monetary incentivisation to farming operations. The miniscule rate at which land comes on the market demonstrates the powerful attachment to family heritage and land ownership despite the apparent fall of viability: a mere 0.18% a year (Finfacts, 2007) (up to 0.3% of total agricultural land was put on the market in 2011 (Bogue, 2013: iii). The resistance
to the Habitats Directive – requiring certain tracts of land to be set aside for conservation – (Flynn, 2007: 146) illustrates the emotive belief in property rights. Many farmers experience primary production activity as “lifestyle, past-time and social outlet”: contributing to the low acceptance to the concept of the ‘retired farmer’ amongst the farming community (Bogue, 2013: 21). Farming is also very much male-oriented. Daughters still feature poorly in considerations of inheritance (Murphy, 2013) and just over 12% of farms are owned by women (Murphy, 2012).

Between the years 2001 to 2005 direct EU payments to farmers accounted for 80% of average family farm income and 140% of drystock farmers’ (Feehan and O’Connor, 2012: 133). This locates the mechanism of financial incentivisation at the core of the EU’s and State’s relationship to farming practices (Torre and Traversac, 2011: xix).

Small to medium farm-holders occupy a dominated position in the field of agricultural production. This subordination is demonstrated by the historically inequitable distribution of CAP funding with figures released in 2008 showing 37% of the single farm payment (SFP) going to the top 10% of farmers100 (O’Toole, 2012). The policy targets of the main farmers lobby group the Irish Farmers Association (IFA) have also leaned more towards large farmer concerns (ibid) and, despite the strong connection of small Irish farmers to the land, farm numbers fell 25% as average size increased by 25% between 1991 and 2007 (Irish Independent, 2012). This “marginalisation of small producers” (Share et al., 2007: 184) is exasperated by the enormous gaps between prices paid to farmers and those at supermarket checkouts (O’Brien, 2012b).

The globalised food market, the expanding market share of distributors and retailers and ensuing economies of scale have left small farmers particularly vulnerable. Only approximately 30% of farms are considered viable without additional incomes (Walsh, 2009: 85). For many holding onto the family farm is dependent upon recipiency of EU funding and off-farm work. Indeed, in the focus group, three of the farm-holders were found to have held off-farm positions.

Coupling this with the interventions of state, positivist science and mechanization, 99 Incentives “‘bought off’” opposition to the EU Habitats Directive, (Flynn, 2007: 17) and failure to adhere to the Nitrates Directive can lead to penalising SFPs (Buckley, 2012). 100 “Two biggest earners were Larry Goodman’s Irish Agricultural Development, which received €508,390 in subsidies, and Kepak Farm, which received €346,118” (O’Toole, 2012).
conventional Irish farming has come to find the “sustained intrusion of an ‘elsewhere’ into the daily life and strategic decisions of farming enterprises” (Torre and Traversac, 2011: xix).

The EU in particular imposes a significant amount of control on farming and land-use. The Nitrates Directive for example, brought in to limit the leaching of phosphorus and nitrogen into surface waters, has restricted the time periods for ploughing, for spreading slurry, for the storage of slurry, etc., (Buckley, 2012). Quota restrictions to limit yields have also been in place as part of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) response to overproduction. Recent EU funding aims to shift policy emphasis away from primary commodity production towards alternative or value-added foods (e.g. organic, local, seasonal, artisanal), cultural tourism and “management and valorisation of natural resources” (Walsh, 2009: 8 -9). However, perhaps in keeping with embedded notions of what it means to be a farmer, the take-up of this diversification has been limited (Walsh, 2009).

The commencement of mechanisation has encouraged a growth in farmer isolation (Walsh, 2009: 93) by contributing to the erosion of much of the traditional social institution of ‘meitheal’: a traditional collective community activity of helping out on each others’ farms. Practical farming knowledge – a local knowledge derived from generations of working the land (for example, knowing what grows best where) - has been undermined and delegitimated by this intensification (ibid, 2009: 94, 101-102). Instead “codified”,\textsuperscript{101} technological and science-based knowledge, along with the formal agricultural qualification, have risen in validity. A certain amount of highly technical discourse has therefore permeated the field. This is especially marked by the input of Teagasc: the Agriculture and Food Development Authority which has been providing scientific advice, training and research to the farming field since its establishment in 1988. However, take-up of a formal agricultural qualification is not comprehensive; appearing to be particularly less so amongst the successors chosen for farms with less than a 100 acres (Bogue, 2013).

Organic farming is a minor player in the field of agricultural production holding only 0.7% of the total agricultural area in 2006 (Feehan and O’Connor, 2012: 131). Still, being an organic farmer demonstrates an effect of autonomy by

\textsuperscript{101} “[A] form of knowledge, developed by scientists, which requires translation into simple instructions for lay people to act upon it” (Jorgensen, 2006: 121)
winning back some control from the systems of industrial production and consumption, through curtailing the use of chemicals in food production. Furthermore, the movement in organic farming appears to have the added dimension of reclaiming and elevating the practical skill-sets of the grower over the highly centralised and codified knowledge of conventional farming (Jorgensen, 2006: 120-1). Such attempted agency differs from the farming community, which although powerful as a whole, are deeply beholden to a hierarchy made up of EU, IFA, retailers and global markets.

The personnel involved in organic growing are much less traditional and homogenous than the historically anchored conventional farmer. Tovey (2006) identified growers with diverse pasts, which included the indigenous family farmers but also many Irish and international exurbanites, British New Age Travellers, returned Irish emigrants and women who had married into farming. There is also evidence for a more empowered female presence: although farmers’ main representative organizations have never had a woman president, the Irish Organic Producers’ Association (IOFGA) has a female chairperson (Walsh, 2009: 96). Such divergences emphasise how organic farming is not just a change to farming activity but a break from customary producer traits legitimated by tradition. Such changes are liable to encourage transformativist ways of looking at agriculture and climate change.

5.2.1 Climate Change and the Farmer’s Dilemma

Farmers in Ireland have a contradictory relationship to climate change. They are integrally linked into many systems core to climate change relations. Apart from being bound to the climate, dependency on machinery and fertiliser inputs ties them into the global price of oil and energy security. Much of the farming community have suffered the consequences of the recent rise in extreme weather deviations such as from the 2009 flooding (RTE, 2009). Also the rising cost of inputs is having significant impact on turnover (McCullough, 2011). It seems farming could benefit from successful global climate change mitigation strategies, including the development of renewables. Conversely, farming is likely to face restrictions due to its high sectoral emission rates. An inclusion of agricultural emissions of methane and nitrous oxide brings Ireland from 9th to 2nd in the per capita emissions rankings for the EU (CSO, 2012: 20-1).
The entrance of environmental regulation into this way of life has met with resistance from farmers, powerful farming lobbying groups and sympathetic politicians. This has significantly slowed down Ireland’s adoption and implementation of climate-relevant EU directives. For example, the Nitrates Directive, supposed to be introduced in 1995, was stalled until 2005 (Flynn, 2007: 3). On top of this, all main farmer representative groups strenuously lobbied against the introduction of the preceding government’s thwarted climate change bill (Dermody, 2011). However, environmental regulation has been gradually making it through. The Rural Environmental Protection Scheme (REPS), another incentivised approach to greening farming, hit a membership level in 2007 consisting of around 62,000 – more than half of all farmers – and approx 50% of agricultural land (Teagasc, 2010). However, the environmental effectiveness of the scheme has been poorly monitored (Finn and Ó’hUallacháin, 2011) and many large farms were slow to take it up (Flynn, 2007: 193). Additionally CAP policy insists keeping agricultural land, not being used for production, clear of re-growth. This inflicts biodiversity (Monbiot, 2013d) and carbon sinks. Application for REPS closed in 2009, although, those who signed up for the scheme in that year were committed to it for five more years. The scheme has since been replaced by the Agri-Environmental Options Scheme (AEOS), which in turn has been replaced by GLAS (green, low carbon agri-environment scheme) (farmersjournal.ie, 2014). In addition much of the greening of farming under REPS is to become the norm for Irish farming with 30% of single farm payments to be based on fulfilling the environmental conditions (Cadogan, 2014). The GLAS scheme is also to have a decarbonisation element to it. That said the Food Harvest 2020 programme, heavily promoted by government, aims to make massive gains from an industry-led expansion of Irish agriculture by 2020. It includes a 50% increase in milk production which might require increasing the national dairy herd from 1.1m to 1.4m, leading to negative repercussions for Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions (DAFF, 2010; White, 2013). This shows the presence of the contradictory decarbonisation in the farming field, imposed by government’s economic-growth obsession, with Ireland’s reportedly lower-carbon grass-based system forming part of the justification for its expansion (Coveney, 2014).  

102 The cited ‘Coveney’ is Simon Coveney, the Irish minister for agriculture, marine and food.
Organic growers are much more likely to visualise themselves as part of the solution. The Soil Association – a prominent organic farming representative organisation – attribute the use of organic material as fertiliser to higher soil carbon levels; also synthetic fertilisers require more energy in production (Giles, 2009; Soil Association, 2013). Yet conflictual relations are also evident. Farmers are under no obligations to lower greenhouse gas emissions in order to be labelled as ‘organic’. Furthermore the practice, by organic farmers, of using propane burners for keeping weeds down releases greenhouse gases (Giles, 2009). The next section examines the impact of these field relations at a more qualitative level.

5.2.2 The Field within the Focus Groups: Agricultural Producers and Climate Change

The two agricultural focus groups involved small to medium farmers and organic growers. The largest farmer has over a hundred acres; supplying enough income support so as not to require off-farm employment. Liam was accompanied by his son, who also works the farm, and his brother Ger. Ger comes from a farming background but is no longer engaged in farming. The rest of the farmers have smaller farm holdings, requiring supplementary non-agricultural sources of income in order to sustain their standards of living. Small farm holder Noreen, the only woman present is sister to one of the other farmers. Both these families are connected through marriage via Ger. All participants have farming backgrounds stretching back at least to one or more of their grandparents. The majority were gauged as being in their 50s and 60s with the youngest – the farmer’s son - in his twenties. There were 7 participants in all.

During the farmers’ discussion, climate change was predominantly discussed through the changing weather patterns and a defensive rhetoric against regulatory restrictions of land-use. The framing was mostly conducive to a BAU approach to farming with some minor reformist comments.

One participant linked climate change to the local flooding of recent years, to which the others initially resounded in agreement, but then blame shifted in the

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103 The Soil Association admits uncertainty with regard to differences in nitrous oxide emissions between conventional and organic farming (ibid).
104 Pseudonyms are used.
direction of local planning. Both life history participants made reference to experiencing changing local weather patterns and both indicated how these were contributing to an entrance of climate change into daily discussions amongst farmers.

Subsidies featured briefly as a means to encourage lower agricultural emissions. Jim introduced possible mitigating solutions to emissions by switching to non-ruminant animals who release less methane than cud-chewing livestock. However, adding the subsidy dimension to his comment raises the possibility of farmer expectations which would accompany future farming behaviour changes: e.g. emissions-concerned farmers delaying behaviour changes rather than risk future subsidy losses. This raises questions of possible expectations that might be tied to an incentivisation dependency.

Jim also introduced a positivist agricultural science discourse that was generally not reciprocated:

Jim: [...] carbon dioxide we’ll say within a controlled environment is extremely good [...] you can increase the percentage of the carbon dioxide from .03 percent up to .1 percent and you can out three crops of tomatoes out in one season but in an external atmosphere we don’t have any controls you know [...]. (Farmers Focus Group (FG))

He holds a BA in agricultural science and had taught science to post-primary students. A diploma and leaving certificate agri-science standard exists amongst two others. Still, the attempted emergence of a positivist agri-science discourse was generally met with silence. The reproduction strategies of medium to small-sized farming, based predominantly on land inheritance and CAP payments, does not necessitate the acquirement of academic degrees or the constant use of academic discourse. Instead, it was the two farmers who were also teachers that displayed the highest discursive grasp of climate change science’s more abstract literacy.

In contradistinction, the most prominent and vocal position, particularly emphasised by Ger and his brother Liam, drew climate change into a recurring invective against farming restrictions. This vocalisation strongly associated climate...
change with inconvenience, sacrifice and the possibility of further future restrictions:

Ger: “you can't spread slurry, you can't put out nitrogen; [...] the cow can't fart”

The main reference points were the ban on burning waste, compliance with recycling of farming plastics and the nitrates directive. This anti-regulatory stance perhaps accounted for much of the vitriol against the Green Party who presided over the strengthening of the burning waste ban, along with other forms of environmental legislation:

Ger: there was a motorway disrupted for months because the house fulla bats

Liam: John Gormley\textsuperscript{106} should be shot and all them Greens should be shot

Meeting these restrictions was defined as farmers having fulfilled climate change responsibilities:

Liam (in reference to the recycling of plastic used in farming):

[...] I had to get it picked up and it cost a hundred euros for about two hundred bales [...] so we’re doin our bit [...] [unidentified voice]: done enough, done enough!

Peter: can’t do anymore.

This narrative stance seems to concur with the more absolutist notions of private property rights, against which regulation is seen as an infringement. The main opposition to that stance is offered by the REPS farmer Noel who provided a counterpoint narrative of stewardship. Nonetheless, Noel also described meeting his restrictions as proof of his commitment to fighting climate change:

Noel: [...] as a farmer, I have built all modern housing for cattle in the winter and we spread the slurry at the correct time and we ...ahm... comply with the nitrates (Life History Interview (LHI))

\textsuperscript{106} Leader of the Green Party and Minister for the Environment, Heritage & Local Government at the time of the focus group.
However he doesn’t see these restrictions as an unnecessary inconvenience, having most of the limits met before even joining REPS.

His stewardship approach is evident where he expressed a connected sense of heritage, which it seems, is worth conserving. He spoke of hedges that he planted with his father when young, that are still growing or the practice “that dates back to like maybe a couple of hundred years” of planting willows for thatching which he can still see growing near farmhouses. He described the “generations and generations” of cutting into the same section of turf with a slane, cutting turf “into where my father used to cut”, and how machine-cutting by comparison adheres to no such limits (LHI).

He appears keenly aware of a distinction in farming between the stewardship approach and the idea of the land being an object of personal ownership with which the farmer can do with as he pleases. Referring to a farmer, who “up till this year he had effluent running into a river ... he shoulda been closed down like”, he recounted the knocking of old stone buildings, which “shoulda probably been preserved”, and the dug-up conditions a garden was left in:

Noel: it’s an absolute eyesore like, if it was mine anyways I’d be ashamed to bring anyone into it but he doesn’t see it like do-y’know what I mean.

He talked about “conscientious good farmers” like himself as opposed to farmers who adopt the low-cost approach: farming “like the businessman” would (LHI).

It is this stance of stewardship that Noel attempted to introduce into the focus group creating small moments of contention, representing a microcosm of the struggle to define climate change within the field of agricultural production. In his effort Noel mirrored Bourdieu’s notion of strategy, appearing to apply his sense (feel for the game) of the ontological hierarchies of the current farming field context. He appealed to a collective identity ("as farmers...we’re not allowed leave it to the future"), familial duty ("you have to think of future generations, I mean if our grandparents didn't think of us") and blamed their collective suffering from flooding on climate change.

On an overt verbal level, his contributions achieved limited success: mostly where reference to destructive weather evoked participants’ concerns. A counter

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107 A special kind of shovel for cutting turf by hand.
strategy of playing on farmers as victims of regulatory oppression and the
resistance to any coherent and sincere discussion – it remained largely a wild and
jocular affair throughout – dominated the conversation.

The organic growers’ focus group – aged approximately in their 40s and 50s -
was composed very differently from the farmers’. The group mirrored the
demographic characteristics common to the Irish organic community: all were
women; two were native Irish, while the others originated from mainland
Europe. Only two had unbroken connections to farming; stretching back at least
two generations.

Other properties encountered amongst the organic growers pointed to a
coherent and pronounced consensus position with regard to the political and the
moral side to food production:

Mary: [...] it’s not the supermarket that’s paying the cost of the
decreased price cause they’re actually saying to a farmer, ‘we
will take your potatoes at this price or we won’t take them at
all’ [...] (LHI)

Eilis: “ [...] I’d always have been quite I suppose political in my
thinking about food really [...] you know I have really strong objection
to the way things done and what it does to whole communities [...] that would be a major influence on how I think” (LHI)

The sense of organic farming as a form of agency and activism, the desire to break
with certain determinisms, is clearly evident in the following:

Eilis: [...] I suppose being able to live a lifestyle that I enjoy and that I
like and in relative freedom being self-employed, being in charge of
my own destiny so to speak, that would be the major importance to me
[...] (LHI)

Moreover, having an anti-absolutist property rights standpoint – e.g. “in the spring
when they were burning all the firs, I mean it’s craziness” (Mary: FG) – held much
currency amongst the focus group members.

108 Although they have lived in Ireland over twenty years.
Regarding climate change: unlike much of the farmer’s discussion, organic growers tended to see their work as part of the solution rather than the problem. The growers similarly picked up on their connection to climate change by way of immediacy. There was also recognition of the implications to their food production output:

Mary: [...] all that rain we’ve had in summers in the last few years yah I mean that impacts on what you can grow and what you can’t grow [...] (LHI).

Their political and moral position, along with their fears about impacts on food production remained a defining feature of their position on climate change throughout the fieldwork. The following injustice in global food production narrative, typical of our discussions, demonstrates this:

Ulrike: [...] the other effect of it is Governments [...] by promoting to use biofuel they actually cause more hunger in the world because suddenly there is no food produced where people were eating before in poor countries and now they produce biofuel; what goes into the tanks so there is this effect of full tanks and empty plates ... and I think this is a very serious

As to be expected the growers are much more accommodating to the concept of climate change as a threat and as something to be responded to. It slips neatly into their political and moral take on food production. The conventional farmers, on the other hand, are mostly resistant to the concept and their role in responding to it. It is seen largely as an excuse for more restrictions: though one farmer saw it as possibly leading to further incentives while another found room for the problem within his stewardship notions about farming.

5.3 Field of Environmentalism

Studies on environmental movements in Ireland are scant. One of the nearest dates back to Tovey’s 2003-2004 qualitative interviews with 33 members of 21 local and national environmental groups. The study offers some indication of the properties of the field of environmentalism, particularly from the activist fraction. Prominent patterns included: hailing from the educated middleclass, belief that the public are capable of changing for the better if the system were to change, strong negative
appreciations of government and their agencies regarding development and the environment (Tovey et al., 2007: 90, 145, 187). A general “informality” in tasking arrangements can be tied to the resistance by many groups to organizational hierarchy which often finds expression in the application of consensus-building (ibid: 77). Certain forms of cultural and social capital are required to sustain the strength of the movement: social networks appear to be of particular importance; along with the social skill-sets required for fund-raising, project development, collective action and/or community or local consultancy (ibid: 59-67).

Environmentalists’ antipathy towards Ireland’s political and bureaucratic establishment extends back into the environmental movement’s origins. Much of the environmental movement of today began out of the opposition to industrial development projects and the settlement in Ireland of multinationals with a track record of pollution. This pitched much of the conflict against local councils and development agencies such as the IDA who supported and advocated for the location of these tarnished industries to Ireland. With the shift in development to road building, waste and housing during the Celtic Tiger the movement’s focus also moved accordingly (Flynn, 2007: 104-111; Leonard and O’Kane, 2008).

5.3.1 Appeasing Growth for the Sake of Decarbonisation

On matters of climate change, whether as a subjugated compromise or as a believer in the nation’s economic growth agenda, the Irish environmental movement often adopts a reformist position. The Green Party during their spell as a minor partner in the 2007 coalition government gave their support to the “green economy” (Regan, 2009). The Irish branch of Friends of the Earth (FOE), in their 2006 submission to the government’s review of climate policy, praised the 1960s switch to economic liberalisation and presented the switch to low carbon as the next great transition for competitive economic growth. This switch, they state, will open up economic opportunities for Irish businesses (FOE, 2006: 3-4). They also draw on the same tools of manipulation used to advance the liberal growth agenda: appealing to self-interest and social solidarity (ibid).

Friends of the Earth also incorporate a moral component of global injustice. Here, class visibility is broadened to the vagueness of the global North and South narrative which is common to the international political debate on global
The developed North is presented as having a historically advantageous and exploitative relationship to the global South. Apart from some minor references to a polluter-pays price on emissions and assistance for disadvantaged groups to deal with the ensuing price hikes, domestic class relations remain obscured. They repeat the same class obscurity and green economy reformism in their press releases throughout 2010 (FOE, 2010a; FOE, 2010b). The Green Party similarly kept a low register on class-related differences in emissions during government. Perhaps this acquiescence to economic growth and the silencing of the class issue is due to mainstream environmentalism’s position of negotiating from the weaker position. The movement has suffered from low membership, and state funding towards environmental groups has been much lower than in other EU countries (Flynn, 2007: 184). None of their NGOs were admitted to social partnership arrangements during the Celtic Tiger. It was not until 2010 that the environmental pillar (33 environmental groups including FOE) were invited to join the highly influential development board of the NESC (www.nesc.ie, 2013). It is also possible that the Green Party’s subservience mirrors the de-radicalizing properties of co-option observed amongst the unions and NGOs during social partnership.

In contrast Flynn (2007) describes a highly adversarial relationship between the state and environmentalists prior to the recent entrance of environmentalist representatives into the establishment. This would suggest that, operating outside ‘the system’, the environmental sector has tended to be more radical at least until recently? Either way a radical transformative dimension to Irish environmentalism does exist, albeit often outside mainstream environmentalism. Feasta, for example, an academic and research-based advocacy group, look to the sustainability crisis as a consequence of flawed societal systems such as the economic and democratic system. Their means to countering this crisis is to radically transform many of these societal systems such as moving away from growth dependency (Douthwaite and Fallon, 2010: xiv).
5.3.2 Discussing Climate Change through the Lens of Radical Transformativism

The two environmentalist groups, Climate Camp Ireland and the Ecovillagers were selected on the basis of their climate change related activism. Both were in the radical transformative position: manifest by their support of strong low-carbon systemic lifestyle changes. The *Climate Camp Handbook* (2009) speaks of the “current wasteful way of life and failed economic system that is driving the climate crisis” (p:16). Climate Camp Ireland was a group established in 2009 – disbanded in 2011 – which organized events aimed at encouraging sustainable living and protesting greenhouse gas heavy developments and infrastructure: such as a peat-fuelled power plant. Although its main event was only meant to be an annual occurrence happening over a series of days there were many opportunities for greater networking. Most of the focus group members were or had been integrated into the camp’s organizing body which regularly corresponded through an emailing list, meetings and fundraisers. On top of that the climate camp network extended into other areas of protest: such as against plans in Mayo to pump unrefined gas to an inland refinery, the Irish social justice movement, *Critical Mass* involving direct action to promote cycling. Most also frequented the ‘social spaces’ in Galway and Dublin which were buildings where people could hang-out, hold events, attend classes; all for free or the cost of a small donation. Most of the focus group members were also connected through these areas. As part of these networks the Climate Camp participants can really be seen as part of a broader community that regularly offered opportunities for cultivating radicalism. Some members were also connected to other less radical environmentalist groups such as Friends of the Earth.

The Ecovillage involves a more permanent devotion to sustainable living, including the purchase of sites and the building of low-energy homes in a community setting, which includes local energy and community farming developments. The purpose of the Ecovillage as proclaimed by many of the focus group members is not only to provide a means of living sustainably but also to show how it can be done. It is to act as an educational resource on sustainable living. Some of its radical dimensions include the incorporation of a consensus decision-making model, a strong local focus and recognition of “the economy as a subset of our global ecosystem, not the other way around” (thevillage.ie, 2013a).
Although the Ecovillage participants, for the most part, supported these values and purposes, it seemed not to be a priority for every Ecovillage resident as it was reported a few people had moved there to benefit from its strong sense of community rather than environmental concerns. Some members of the group were also connected to Feasta who appear to have strong connections with the Ecovillage. Unsurprisingly, the climate change receptivity of these participants differed in many ways from the majority of other participants. These groups appeared strongly stimulated by a field *illusio*\(^{109}\) of effectuating sustainable social change. They discussed characters and actions portrayed in focus group vignettes, in terms of a broader societal equation, with the climate campers fervently favouring collective activism over individual decarbonisation. Their vignette interpretations tended towards the impact of each character’s action or attitude regarding social change and the obstacles of contemporary society that are involved, while drawing on their own experiences as activists or Ecovillagers with regard to the scenarios portrayed.

In keeping with this *illusio* the notion of the broader social *system*, and of climate change as a socio-*systemic* problem, featured far more in these responses than in any of the other focus groups:

> Scott: \([\ldots ]\) but then there's the other side you have to go through a certain point before you stop just changing light bulbs and actually take a systemic \([\ldots ]\) transformatory line and start to actually try to affect systemic changes \([\ldots ]\) (Ecovillage FG).

Additionally, the preoccupation with the receptivity of others towards the environment was perhaps why more interest was expressed, with regard to the objectives and findings of my research, by these two focus groups than by any other.

Many comments by both members are conducive to the radical transformative stance which is in keeping with the stance of the two environmental groups that they were members of. This includes reference to the devastating effects of the growth economy and claims that denied the possibility of maintaining current standards of living. It is also evident in the anti-doxic reorganisation of priorities:

\(^{109}\) The interests particular to a field and shared by the field agents (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 25-6).
Aaron: [...] the solutions are also complex but we need to consume less, we need a new economic system

Scott: well we need to yah, we need to collapse the [inaudible] economy, practically (Ecovillage FG);

Thomas: [...] hierarchy seems so wrong putting economy over climate seems such a backward way and we have to change that hierarchy [...] (Climate Camp FG).

Despite these structurally transformative sentiments, one participant hinted at the potent presence reformism has within environmentalism. The same participant had ties to a more mainstream organisation. Her words also signify the obliging nature of this reformism that stems from environmentalism’s subservient position:

Karen: [...] just thinking about our\textsuperscript{110} media messages, last year and this year we’re kind of saying no no we’re not trying to ruin jobs, we’re not trying to hurt the economy, we think that rail would be just as good as road but actually maybe we should just be saying the economy is not the most important thing [...] (Climate Camp FG).

Both groups connected with climate change in a more pronounced manner than all other groups. Participants exhibited catastrophist, emotive, temporal and moral reasoning about climate change associated with radical transformativism. Many emotionally connected to the issue through frustration, depression, sadness and guilt at the sense of injustice and hopelessness that surrounds it. Moral reasoning also drew attention to how “unfair” (Rose: Ecovillage FG) it was that climate change impacts more so effected developing countries that have contributed the least to global historical emissions. This perceived injustice was claimed by some climate campers as a key motivation for their activism:

Jane: Yah, I think as well like the whole social justice aspect is kind of my main drive as well, I think because we caused the mess and other people have to suffer the consequences [...] it’s so unfair what’s happening (Climate Camp FG).

\textsuperscript{110} It is not certain who the “our” is referring to here. This participant appeared to have had connections to more than one mainstream environmentalist group besides the more radical climate camp.
The catastrophism was also much more amplified than amongst other participants:

*Pat:* The extinction of the human race

*Jane:* and most other life on the planet (Climate Camp FG);

*Scott:* [...] we’re gonna lose a couple of billion people [...] (Ecovillage FG).

There were also signs of the urgent *Doomsday Clock* temporality which Chapter 4 aligns to this catastrophism:

*Karen:* [...] we’ve only got a couple of years so

*Frank:* ... maybe the next generation will be the solution

*Jane:* We don’t have that much time (Climate Camp FG).

Some Ecovillagers applied it to the effectiveness of their own example of sustainable living and how the slow pace of encouraging transition was at odds with this urgency: “if we started a hundred years ago it would’ve been good but” (Nigel: Ecovillage FG).

The idea of collective action being valued over individual was especially evident amongst the climate campers. Climate campers ridiculed, through reference to the *Power of One* campaign, the vignette which describes Rachel as turning her houselights off at night:

*John:* Did Rachel start off the *Power of One* campaign? (Some laughter)

*Jane:* that’s exactly what I was thinking as well

[...]

*Sarah:* ...we know we have to act together to solve a problem but instead we’re told to act individually in our homes, like on our own, doing tiny little things, like that doesn’t make any sense (FG).

The campers’ vindication of individual actions appears to be ultimately based on how the act might persuade others:
Karen: [...] it’s about creating culture rather than consuming cultures so that’s why they’re tryina consume less, like there’s other really good reasons to like do things that also lower emissions, like it’s really interesting, deciding to travel over land and it shows people that it’s possible and it does spread and other people start travelling over land as well [...] (Climate Camp FG).

The recurring emphasis on collective responsibility was accompanied by recognition of connectedness to a broader society and environment. In criticising individualised approaches to sustainable behaviour Karen stated:

[...] you’re like training people to think about your tiny like where they are and not see the connections to everything else which is like a fundamental thing in education for sustainable development and systems thinking so it’s really bad (Climate Camp FG).

Pat offered an additional description of this kind of anti-individualised connectedness:

[...]I see myself as an individual within a species... and within a community within a society on an island within, on a planet, [...] we’re all linked and how we interact, is extremely destructive, how we interact among ourselves and how we interact with the planet [...](Climate Camp, LHI)

Similarly, hands-on engagement in the form of direct action ranked above personal comprehension of the issue. The esteemed position of hands-on engagement is perhaps best illustrated in Karen’s description of the sense of fulfilment it brings:

[...] because you spend the whole year just like talking about climate change and then for a week you go and you’re actually physically do something about it and that feels amazing just to actually get to use your body in some way to do something about it.

Those involved in the previous year’s protest aimed at a peat-fuelled power plant echoed the elation of participating in the direct action. Apart from indicating a sense of higher connectedness to the issue of climate change this stimulation also hints at field forces, represented by the practice of protest, which reinforce the sense of connection. It was according to this elevated position of direct action that
one Climate Camp participant criticised my own research and queried its usefulness. Upon discerning that it was purely an academic endeavour, she implied that the project was a waste of time:

*Sarah: How many years of your life are you going to spend doing this? (Climate Camp FG)*

The Ecovillagers expressed a similar sense of respect for engagement through being part of the sustainable community, which they depict as a collective act of representative living. They described themselves as trying to “show by example how a community can reduce their carbon” (Aaron: Ecovillage FG) and at the same time improve their quality of life. Some stressed the latter as being an essential part of the project. This rejection of the sacrifice framing of decarbonisation was also voiced by climate campers.

More field forces were evident through the empowering effect of being part of the activist community. This was resonant in many of the focus group and life history responses appearing to enable a stronger response to climate change:

*Aaron: [...] sense of hope really: [...] the Ecovillage [...] it brings together a lot of responses we need to make, you know getting our own food together, thinking about our own energy, thinking about building a local economy, [...]. (Ecovillage FG)*

Finally, climate campers reproduced the dominant field position on class: the North-South narrative. Sarah recalled meeting campaigners from the developing world who drew her attention to how she benefits “every day from the privilege of [her] carbon intensive society” through “nice clothes” and “warm houses”. Others revisited this broadened global class narrative in respect of the consequences of climate change, which they viewed as “exacerbating the existing injustice between the rich and the majority of the rest of the world” (Karen). A participant also pointed to the class relations negatively affecting movement messages when persons of privilege attempt to communicate to the lower classes. Similar sentiments appeared in the camp’s 2009 handbook, which refers to inequalities of privilege and the need to pay heed to such inequalities in order to allow for more equal access to participation. Still no references appeared in the focus group or the accompanying life histories of an imbalance in Irish class-related emissions.
Participants may be aware of these societal class emissions but their relegation to the unsaid points to their diminished salience in comparison to the broader and more de-contextualising and solidarizing north-south frame.

The above commonalities towards climate change largely distinguish these two groups from most other participants. It is difficult to ascertain whether participant attributes, noted here, are formed through the field of environmentalism or whether, through elective affinities, persons possessing these attributes are drawn into the environmental movement. The likely answer is one of mutual influence. However, the participants have portrayed their field experiences of collective action and community activism as empowering. Regularly both focus groups lauded the communal and the active and fretted over the urgent, individualised and catastrophic. It is not inconceivable that these are regularly expressed features within their environmentalist position and by their regularity, absorbed into their environmentalist habitus, encouraging a particular reception of climate change.

5.4 Formal Education and the Steiner Pedagogic

Comparative

Unlike the field of environmentalism the educational field does not constitute itself as directly connected to climate change. As developed in Chapter 4 the education system is increasingly subservient to the business field. The points-race and high points third-level courses, with their associated occupational and salaried hierarchies, imbues the system with the logic of meritocracy. These meritocratic arrangements help to mystify the class inequalities that accompany the continuous occurrence of unequal educational output.

Additionally, the educational field is divisive, not only in terms of class divisions, and the meritocratic streaming of higher, ordinary and foundation level students, but its entire structure is formulated around principles of partition: i.e. distinct disciplines, increasing specialisation of third level courses. For much of the history of Irish state education, and indeed of Western education in general, the division of curriculum into disciplines was doxa. However, it is an arbitrary occurrence; a work of historical construction founded upon the adoption by absolutist western states of Bacon’s reductionism and Descartes’
compartmentalization of fields of knowledge during the 17th century (Strydom, 2002). These disciplines are built upon notions of rational consciousness and positivism and have traditionally relegated practical, emotional and critical forms of knowledge. At third level such specialization is pronounced in the form of college courses. Universities, engaging in the production of niche courses for to compete in the third-level ‘market’, have caused the number of courses available for leaving cert graduates to mushroom, rising from 381 in 1991 to 1400 (Donnelly, 2013a). The lower ranking of the more socially conscious and critical courses is another sign of this pervasive specialisation at third level. Private and public funding towards universities shows bias towards “STEM – science, technology, engineering and mathematics” (Clarke, 2013). Furthermore world university rankings have become central in measuring performance and in the marketability of Irish universities. These rankings however are skewed towards market profile and technical and science based subjects due largely to including journal citations while excluding books: most publications for the arts, humanities and social sciences are in book form (Lynch, 2008). The cross-curricular aspects of the changes to the primary curriculum initiated in 1999, to be phased in over a 6-7 year period (NCCA, 2010: 12), are an indication of the unveiling and rollback of the a priori acceptance of such divisions. The vast majority of focus group participants had left school before these alterations, which additionally supposedly emphasise a more child-centred, emotionally sensitive pedagogy. The phased introduction (6-7 years) means that younger participants would’ve had only a partial experience of the new curriculum. However, the fluency of the application has been hampered by pre-acquired pedagogic dispositions. Implementation has suffered from an overreliance on the

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111 In contrast, to discrete disciplines a figure of similar prominence at the time, Pierre Gassendi, “attempted to maintain a close relationship” between history, science and philosophy. But he was not accorded the same statist capital of institutionalization (Smith, 1998: 52) – such as via the establishment of the Royal Society (Strydom, 2002: 96). Consequently his transdisciplinarity was not reproduced within the legitimate symbolic order.

112 Even the more technical post-primary disciplines such as carpentry, which is now subsumed within the subject of “materials technology (wood)”, requires completion of a written exam paper and emphasises the rationale whereby “solutions should be devised and executed in an analytic and systematic manner through the mechanism of the design process” (Curriculumonline.ie,2012: 1).

113 QS World University and Times Higher Education Rankings.
textbook and the resort to old-style didactic teaching (NCCA, 2010: 14).\footnote{This is perhaps some evidence of what Bourdieu would term the “hysteresis” effect (Bourdieu, 2005: 214) – i.e. the lag where teacher dispositions acquired in the former pedagogy, and indeed in their own mainstream educational background, are carried over into the newer curriculum.}

Predominantly the same divisions persist at secondary. More citizenship-oriented subjects such as ESS at junior certificate level are also supposed to encompass multi-disciplinary dimensions (Curriculumonline.ie, 2013a), yet ironically these are confined to singular disciplines. Possibly such discontinuity is resistant to public appreciations of the socio-material and systemic dimensions of climate change.

Didactic teaching appears also to be the norm in post-primary. The large-scale OECD survey, on mainstream post-primary teachers in Ireland in 2007,\footnote{The surveyed teachers taught students in the lower post-primary years.} noted didactic teaching was favoured over more “student-oriented practices” and “enhanced activities” (Shiel et al., 2009: 24). The latter two involve co-development of lessons with students, “giving students individually adapted tasks” or “assigning projects, debates, essays and the creation of products” \textit{etc.}, (Shiel et al., 2009: 7). Arguably the didactic approach orients dispositions towards docility for students who are receptive to it whereas the co-development approach might serve to instil some sense of participative empowerment.

Against this backdrop of mainstream education, this research has provided a radical comparative. Steiner Education is a very marginal form of alternative education in Ireland\footnote{At the time of writing there are four schools in the Republic (www.steinerwaldorf.org, 2013).} that encourages high levels of student input. Lesson plans can alter due to the interests and questions of the students (Woods et al., 2005: 68). The Steiner pedagogy places a high level of importance in personal development and uses storytelling and art to engage student imagination. Survey data from the 1990s – including a large-scale study of 1,165 pupils from 6 Steiner and 6 state schools in England – supports the assertion that Steiner students in the UK and Germany have a significantly greater capacity for creativity than formal education students (ibid: 28). Additionally, student and teacher relationships are more informal and students often have the same main teacher up until about age nine (Wylie and Hagan, 2003).

Steiner curriculum is also applied in a much more transdisciplinary, integrated
and thematic manner. Each subject is dealt with in period blocks of several weeks and during this period that subject shifts into what ordinarily would be considered other subject spaces.

The “willing/feeling/thinking” tenets of Steiner beliefs about human development allow for a broader understanding of the learner. The willing aspect applies to control of body and recognises the practical dimensions of learning; feeling acknowledges the importance of aesthetics and affect: there is a strong emphasis on art even up to the final years. The thinking dimension seeks to sow a healthy scepticism in how students assess the world. There is a high amount of moral development also interwoven into the pedagogy. The integrated and child-centred approach aspires towards teaching students to value themselves, others and the natural world (Wylie and Hagan, 2003; Woods et al., 2005).

5.4.1 Educating for Climate Change

Into this mix climate change has entered. At mainstream post-primary level, much of its introduction is a work of retranslation to fit the divisional structure of the disciplines. Currently, for example, it gains access through leaving certificate geography; predominantly reduced to its geo-technical form as fitting the reductive language which is prevalent in post-primary geography (Curriculumonline.ie, 2013b). More implicitly, it has entered by way of associated forms such as the concept of energy efficiency and building regulations in construction studies, although ‘climate change’ does get the briefest of mentions (Constructionstudies.ie, 2013).

Of late, An Taisce – Ireland’s equivalent of the UK’s National Trust – has produced the Green Schools programme, which has grown in popularity, now covering over 80% of all schools. The programme aims to raise awareness and initiate pro-environmental actions by students (Pape et al., 2011). Higher green behavioural levels have been recorded amongst students whose schools participate in the programmes (ibid).

At third level there are strong indications of the growing status of academic climate change knowledge. Some social science and earth science departments now offer modules in climate change: geography departments especially (NUIG, 2012; UCC, 2012). To some extent, also, the systemic and transdisciplinary nature of
climate change and human-environment relations more generally, is encouraging the formation of third-level interdisciplinary research projects. For example, the six-year collaboration between Trinity College Dublin (TCD) and National University of Ireland Galway (NUIG) entitled ConSenSus (Consumption, Environment and Sustainability), which examines household consumption and sustainable lifestyles across Ireland (Lavelle and Fahy, 2012; www.consensus.ie). However, funding reflects the technical and natural science-based hierarchy as EPA’s “five landmarked climate change research” projects (ORS, 2013) and its fellowships and research programmes suggest (EPA, 2011).

5.4.2 Climate Change, Social Space and Education

For their immediate ties to the education field I selected four focus groups. First year university undergraduates, university academics and secondary teachers’ focus groups provided access to different stages of formal education. The selection of former students of a non-mainstream Steiner school provided the comparative; although due to the absence of a secondary school equivalent, three participants had to pass through formal secondary education. Almost all participants within each group knew each other and hailed from the same specific school or university.

The research detected some notable differences amongst these groups from the field of education. The clearest patterns concern the piecemeal or fractured condition of formal education, as opposed to the more holistic variety of Steiner; the apparent elevated position of an information-deficit doxa amongst teachers; and the symbolic capital attached to climate science literacy. Some of the climate change receptivity, as manifested within the life histories and focus groups, appears to be shaped by these patterns.

Some of the Green School mentions in this study hinted at the very partial nature of its mainstream implementation and being resigned to the work of individual teachers. The teachers’ focus group hailed from a green flag school where one participant was the green school coordinator. Her experience of surprise and negativity from staff members regarding the completion of a green school

117 There is also NUIG’s Ryan Institute which encourages collaborative research, between engineers, physical scientists, and social scientists on the relationship of human activity to environmental systems (Ryaninstitute.ie, 2013).
project pointed to the lack of whole school involvement. Teachers criticised the project in front of her, unaware that she had presided over it. There were also suggestions of parental resistance concerning safety that may have obstructed attempts to encourage cycling to school; though the obstacle of a hill may have played a part. Helen, from the Steiner focus group, described a similar lack of commitment concerning her green flag secondary school where just one teacher and principle seemed to be involved:

 Moderator: And what would have been the other teachers’ attitudes towards?

 Helen: Oh they’d be like it’s great, it’s great, but they wouldn’t like, they would never enforce like “you just put that in the wrong bin”, they would never care, they probably wouldn’t even know the difference between the bins.

 This detachment had also been observed by a teacher from the organic growers’ focus group. She described work colleagues leaving school in their four-wheel-drive vehicles and failing to connect this act with their green school status.

 Partiality, particularly derived from subject distinctions, also shaped the mainstream education concerning climate change. For the teachers curricular relevance seemed necessary, in order to legitimate instructing students on the environment and climate change. Hence they made repeated associations to their own involvement with climate change through teaching subjects like CSPE and geography. The formal subject-centred system might serve to pigeon-hole the entrance of climate change through narrow subject contexts, whilst at the same time ignoring other possible aspects. The teacher Brendan also taught business, economics and history, yet never once throughout the life history or interview defined his environmentally informative role in terms of these subjects. Instead, he only referred to educating about the environment through his teaching of CSPE. This atomistic and alienating aspect of formal environmental teaching is evident in Robert’s comment within the students’ focus group concerning the discussion of climate change:

 Robert: [...] in secondary school we did it in a class environment, like in geography class we’d talk about it but that would be because that was the topic that was really to do with geography and like as soon
as we left the class we wouldn’t, like we wouldn’t talk about it anymore after that.

The subject delineation that constrains the arrival in secondary schools of the topic of climate change also leads to subject hierarchies that bestow certain subjects with symbolic capital. Classifications based on third level certification, leaving certificate examination, or labour market utility serve as ranking systems for subjects. CSPE, for example, lacks leaving certificate exam status. Additionally, Brendan refers to CSPE’s undervalued position:

*Brendan: [...] it is in many senses the poor relation; a lot of younger teachers get it as a filler when they need a few more hours, they say “oh yah sure teach the CSP” [...] (LHI).*

In contrast to these atomising and alienating conditions of secondary schooling, the former Steiner students conveyed a sense of a more holistic approach. While Robert’s above comment expresses disconnection between inside and outside of school hours, Steiner schooling, as described by the focus group participants, tended to extend beyond school walls: encompassing community events, international projects, and parents that kept their televisions off

119 in order to support the Steiner pedagogy. The experiential significance of these differences was stark for Steiner students upon entry into post-primary formal education:

*Helen: [...] you never even imagine that you're gonna be examined on something and for some reason that makes you absorb it so much easier because you're not thinking absorb it absorb it absorb it [...] it's also the way the teachers teach stuff, like I loved history in the Steiner school, loved it, I loved like all the Irish history, all the European history all of like ancient history, everything, loved it, but as soon as I went into secondary school [...] I hated it; it was the worst thing I'd ever heard, when actually like had to punch myself from falling asleep [...] (LHI).*

The uneasy transition even manifested in psychosomatic form:

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118 In the focus group it was agreed upon by the teachers that examination-based relevance became a powerful source of legitimacy regarding the type of information presented by the teachers when students entered their leaving cert year.

119 Steiner pedagogy discourages too much dependency on TV and computer games (Woods et al., 2005).
Mariel: [...] till the day I left I had a headache pretty much every day. I didn’t like the way the teachers worked together, or they didn’t work together: it was like a big clashy kind of thing which I wasn’t use to because in the Alpha project it was teachers and students on the same level (LHI).

Steiner learning was strongly connected to student enjoyment and interest. In lieu of exam motivation, Helen stated they were spurred on to complete projects, that they got to choose, by the fact that they are just “so interesting” (Helen LHI). Education also regularly emerged through “fascinating” stories and “stomping about in the mud” for twice-weekly gardening regardless of the weather. Engaged in this manner, students were encouraged to become immersed within, rather than distinct from, their education. Under these conditions, the adoption by their Steiner school of the Green school initiative becomes a welcome experience:

Mariel: [...] we did a survey, we got to go round to all these other people and ask them if their taps were leaking and stuff, it was great fun at the time [...]. (LHI)

It is with little surprise that this group immediately rejected the premise of the vignette that “it’s best to enjoy life now and deal with climate change later” on the basis that it was possible to do both. It was even recognised that it was possible to enjoy dealing with climate change itself. Apart from the environmentalists, they were the only other group to reach this conclusion.

Some participants also displayed strong personal empowerment, which appears to be connected to the participative control afforded to them during their Steiner schooling. This empowerment is evident in two of the interviewees having trained as project leaders: a training initiative organised by Steiner representatives within the local community. One has led several youth projects and the other has been accepted as a future project organiser in Europe. This is despite the latter claiming to have been informally (and unfairly) streamed to a lower level group by her Steiner teacher who apparently separated the class in this manner. Perhaps what most displays this empowerment is this interviewee’s stance against state-led education in her first year of secondary school. Deciding the school was not suited to her, she, along with four other former Steiner pupils, took it upon themselves to leave and set up their own variant of the Steiner post-primary equivalent called Alfa. Their actions demonstrate strong agency in defiance of status quo
determinants. It is therefore easy to see how this person, having just moved to her current city, had at her own instigation, already attempted to be part of a public anti-austerity protest (unfortunately she arrived after the procession had disbanded). However, despite at least two participants appearing to be strongly concerned with their carbon emissions, a Steiner background proved no guarantee of low-carbon living or even believing in AGW. Climate change was itself not entered into in any deep discursive manner during their Steiner education (note again the majority had moved to mainstream secondary schooling in their early teens). Furthermore the focus group presented the fieldwork’s only outright “literal” (Norgaard, 2011) denier of climate change who blamed all global warming activity on natural cycles. Unfortunately, the participant spoke much too infrequently to offer deeper insight into his standpoint.

Unlike the Steiner holistic approach, secondary schooling overwhelmingly deals in instructive forms of knowledge. Hence, it may perhaps be no coincidence that the information-deficit approach to responding to climate change featured strongest amongst the secondary teachers’ focus group. As educators they perceive their role in informing their students, or encouraging them to get informed, about issues such as climate change. There was also an implied tutorage-type function towards encouraging future responsibility:

_Brendan: [...] maybe as they grow older you’ve planted the seed that will [...] germinate in the future; I think it is in their mind, I don’t think they’re just going to forget about it._

Another teacher, Noel, from the farmer’s group also referred to his awareness-raising role whilst teaching construction studies. He stated, how, “from a teaching point of view” he would inform pupils about the importance for their parents of reuse and recycle, insulation and limiting fuel use (LHI).

On top of this, the teachers were the sole group not to dispute in some way the vignette on keeping informed about the science of climate change, instead agreeing with the inviolability of scientific informedness:

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120 Gerry tries to keep up-to-date with the science of global warming. He regularly reads news articles that refer to the latest scientific findings on global warming. The news depresses him but he will continue to try and stay informed about this issue.
Chapter 5

Michele: if he reads about things he can [...] change things in his life [...] if he does get the scientific facts he can spread it to his friends that maybe won’t read the journals [...]..

The type of climate change information teachers appeared to be most concerned with was positivist and science-based. This was true for most teachers involved with this project: the long monologue produced in the farmer’s focus group by a retired science teacher was heavily science concentrated. Brendan admitted to not being sufficiently informed on the subject but largely blamed this on a lack of factually distilled and consensus-based information. It was agreed such information should be supported by investment, promoted and made readily available to all. The high esteem of keeping informed about the environment remained a recurring theme throughout.

As teachers play the classroom role of a conduit for knowledge, they may be especially sensitive to appearing knowledgeable. This perhaps explains why one of the farmers, who also happened to be a retired science teacher, felt the need to study the agricultural science aspect of climate change before the focus group. This was revealed directly to me afterwards by both him and his partner.121 His partner added that the farmer had confessed to feeling uncomfortable about being unprepared for the issue. For similar reasons an Irish teacher from a previously arranged group – unfortunately cancelled due to unforeseen complications – admitted to being reluctant to participate.

The fact that the type of informedness considered to be important pertained mostly to science, demonstrates the symbolic power that accompanies climate change science discourse. It is also suggestive of the doxic embeddedness of positivist knowledge amongst the formal teaching profession; along with the limited framing of the issue that formal pedagogy incurs.

The symbolic power of climate change science was even more visible amongst the academic focus group which featured a climate science expert. It also featured an ecologist, a sustainability studies lecturer, a postdoctoral researcher in sustainability and a PhD candidate in geography. The academics similarly reflected the influence of their disciplines and some of them, likewise, expressed their informative role as formal educators. Two lecturers, from the academics’ focus

121 The farmer additionally supplied me with his notes and internet printouts. These almost entirely consisted of technical science-based findings.
group and another from the Ecovillage, listed the latter. However, as one of these participants hails from the humanities and the other lectures in sustainability studies their information-giving tends more towards non-climate science frames. Ecovillager Hugh all but avoided the geo-science components throughout both the focus group and an extensive interview. In the academic focus group Aisling’s words related mostly to public comprehension, policy and the spatial and temporal dimensions:

Aisling: […] when it comes to talking about climate change it seems such a vague and not necessarily futuristic but I think the actual phrase itself they’re in difficulties trying to connect present activities […]

However, Fergus, the other lecturer from the academic group, was firmly embedded in climate science and very much saw his role as a climate science communicator. In fact, his presence may well have proved a controlling factor for Aisling’s general climate science reticence. On more than one occasion she delivered up a ‘let’s leave this to the expert’ type response when the discussion ventured towards the science. Although, coated in good humour, these comments marked moments whereupon the participant verbally stepped aside to allow Fergus to take over. This was despite the fact that a background in geography equipped her with above average climate science insight – the same could be said for other participants. Prior to the discussion, one other participant admitted her reluctance with regard to sounding stupid, concerning the science, in front this expert.

There were times during the focus group where discussion appeared to take on flashes of institutional hubris due to the symbolic capital of climate science. When introducing the questions deliberately left vague, two respondents emphasised and gesticulated towards the preposterousness of having to choose from their abundant AGW knowledge. The climate change impacts question drew out the following:

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122 One included it in her written response to the focus group questionnaire question concerning her “personal actions” (see question 4: Appendix 1)

123 Vagueness was used to encourage participants to lead discussion towards the parts of climate change that were salient for them.

124 What are the impacts of climate change?
Fergus: (inhales and sighs jokingly) ummm (laughs)

Jodi: where do you want me to start?

A parallel response greeted the solutions question. Earlier in the focus group, an experimental (only asked in this focus group) request for general comments on climate change was greeted in an even more supercilious manner:

Fergus: What are you looking for? Are you looking for a comment?
[... do you want a lecture on climate change? Do you want comments on people's perceptions? [...] .

The impacts and solutions question were asked in respectively 8 and 11 other groups, yet nowhere else were these questions resisted in this manner. With academia being a world where claims to knowledge are tied to the accumulation of cultural capital and disciplinary hierarchies, it may not be surprising that here climate change is directly translated into academic power relations.

5.5 The field of business

For the business field the focus group participants who arrived on the day ended up comprising of civil servants and businessmen rather than a homogenous group of the latter as intended. Interestingly, however, this group of four recalls the powerful connection existing between state and business. From 2005 to 2007 one in four of thirty-nine individuals that held over ninety-three directorships in “33 of 40 top public organisations and private Irish businesses” also “sat on the boards of both State-owned and private companies at the same time” (Clancy et al., 2010: iv). The focus group included a company director, a credit union manager and a state agency regulatory compliance manager,125 all of whom are qualified accountants. The fourth member is a retired executive for a state agency and has since worked as a manager and a director for two small companies.

Although this section deals with the field of business in more specific detail its logic is already evident in Chapter 4. In this business world the ultimate measures of success are market share and profits. Personal rewards for reaching the pinnacle of this field are primarily mercantilist, equating wealth with monetary

125 The compliance manager had also spent several years in finance for MNCs and credit unions.
value. Dominant members of the field reproduce themselves through competitive strategies and colonising state institutional structures through exploiting a country’s economic growth dependency. During the economic downturn, large players in the business field – primarily IBEC and IFSC – have utilised “economic nationalism” to sustain Ireland’s tax regime and advocate austerity measures. At the same time they have lobbied for more generous terms for businesses (O’Brien, 2012a; Kerrigan, 2013). IBEC’s adopted logo of “Driving Ireland’s Recovery” (IBEC, 2013a) is typical of the exceptionalism and esteemed standing businesses proclaim above the economic role of consumers, public spending and workers.

5.5.1 The Business of Climate Change

In recent years a reformist climate change has entered the Irish field of business through the profit potential of the green economy and cost-saving capacity of energy efficiency. Recently the government has moved to accelerate the greater efficiency of Irish firms through funding, appeals to business reputation and improvements to the ‘bottom line’. These incentives are also particularly noticeable through attempts to ‘green’ the IFSC in Dublin (SEAI, 2012). A 2008 survey of 21 senior executives hints at the growing inclusion of climate change related legislation and consumer concerns when considering mergers and acquisitions (KPMG, 2008).

Forfás, the government’s advisory board for enterprise, trade, science, technology and innovation, has warned of climate change impacts on business in Ireland (Forfás, 2010). However, climate change as an encroaching transformative entity has yet to hold serious currency within the field. The IBEC quarterly review for January 2013 noted the poor weather impact on crop commodity pricing (IBEC, 2013b: 6). Yet the report never mentioned climate change and the ensuing potential for recurring poor weather conditions. Likewise, 53 “climate change” search results from the online Irish Times business section for

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126 The warning it issues also points to the potential invasion that climate change as a force in itself can bring about in the business field: “...climate changes will impact on Irish businesses through changing markets, impacts on premises and processes, increased vulnerability of supply chains, and may have implications for investments, insurance costs and stakeholder reputation” (Forfás, 2010: 3).

127 The preceding summer, described as “one of the wettest and dullest ... on record”, had diminished the potato crop (Weston, 2013).
2010 featured no articles on direct impacts to Irish Businesses (Irishtimes.com, 2013).

Predominantly the Irish business field has adiaphorised climate change through cost benefit analysis; economic growth opportunism and the projection of economic nationalism. The submission of IBEC to the former attempted introduction of a climate change bill describes it as limiting Ireland’s negotiation standpoint for future EU emissions agreements. It favoured instead an optimal management approach to Ireland’s existing targets, through inclusion of carbon sinks and the option of purchasing credits where Ireland exceeds it emission limits (IBEC, 2011). This is weak reformism bordering on BAU.

5.5.2 The Profit and Loss of Decarbonisation

Field influences on the business participants appeared strong. Climate change was mostly subjected to the amoral rationale of cost benefit analysis and competition, along with an emphasis on its more regulatory aspects. In fact, the regulatory and economic competitiveness discourses proved to be the defining feature of the focus group, being vastly more pronounced here than with any of the other participants.

Emission targets and carbon tax served to associate climate change with inconvenience and an anti-libertarian agenda:

Seamus: [...] is climate change being used as a vehicle to impose restrictions on our behaviour including taxation? (Business FG).

National economic competitiveness served to delegitimise the state’s role in climate change mitigation:

Fiachra: [...] we need to be more productive and more cost effective in terms of delivering goods and services and ah you know you can’t do that if you’re paying a couple of hundred million for something that the Chinese haven’t agreed with. (Business FG).

Contradictorily, the green economy framing offered perhaps the highest potential for legitimating decarbonisation. Two participants had enquired into the investment
value of green technology,\textsuperscript{128} and Seamus suggested Ireland should pursue wave and wind energy opportunities.

In the two life histories from this group, the cost benefit logic featured strongly. Fiachra, in particular, justified much of what might be construed as an attempt at carbon mitigation through this economism. For example, he proceeded to defend his purchase of a Toyota Prius hybrid car on the utilitarian grounds of being a comfortable and cheap family-sized automatic, rather than along the lines of being green. As developed below, this participant had perhaps the strongest connections to this type of economism.

The dominance of such forms of legitimacy invalidates more conscientious justifications. When Fiachra appeared to struggle with his system of legitimacy, he still resisted all moral and environmentalist justifications. Upon approaching the focus group location, Fiachra mentioned having photovoltaic cells installed on his house. Their installation, however, could not be redeemed by his cost-benefit-analysis. Admitting that the energy savings do not recoup costs, he claimed, with a hint of sarcasm, that a “warm fuzzy feeling” of doing something green was his justification. The idea that some altruistic acts are motivated by the pleasant sensation the act stimulates within oneself is a well-known concept in economics known as “warm glow altruism” (Andreoni, 1990; Konow, 2006). It featured in the globally renowned bestseller \textit{Superfreakonomics} (Levitt and Dubner, 2010: 124) which even refers to it at one stage through the identical adjectives of “warm fuzzy” (ibid: 58). The concept is used to redeem economists’ substantialist belief in a world driven by individual self-interest and utility (Konow, 2006). During the interview he extended his justification towards potential savings, should rates tied to the recently introduced Building Energy Rating emerge. When queried further, the participant revealed apocalyptic fears concerning the future:

\begin{quote}
[... ] I’d have ah my Armageddon view of the world where though I say it’s not going to affect us if for example you know massive power cut off or, mini Ice age or something at least we’ll have some energy generation on site [...].
\end{quote}

The contradictory position this respondent happened to find himself in is probably best illustrated by the following statement in the life history interview:

\textsuperscript{128} His enquires left him “sceptical of the investment value” (Fiachra: Business FG).
[...] you know a broad opinion in favour of a more environmentally positive living if you like rather than say environmentally friendly, you know just to try and do something that would be the right thing to do almost am and a certain level of affluence would’ve allowed me to kind of look at doing more green stuff than throwing up a bog standard building [...].

This comment, although admitting to holding some environmental concerns, sought to distance the participant from the environmentalist movement. Through the subsequent reference to affluence the participant avoided being categorised as a self-sacrificing idealist with refuge instead found in legitimated and ‘sensible’ justifications. This perhaps reflects the (sensed) delegitimized position of environmental ‘idealism’ amongst adiaphorising, cost-accounting and regulatory professionals. Hence his focus group claims of the Prius’s green car associations as being a serious drawback and his life history facetiousness concerning the car defining him as a “green nut” or “somebody who’s very passionately involved in green issues and associated themes like animal rights” (LHI).

One can see the multitude of conflicting hierarchies that a person with environmental concerns might find themselves subjected to when occupying the same social space as the participant. The economical cost-benefit-rationale has a pervasive presence in the business field. Furthermore, a firm reader of business literature and being a high-tech business entrepreneur, Fiachra, appeared to be more immersed in the field of business illusion than the other participants. It is possible, that despite (or perhaps because of) the participant’s own high standing in the field, he is also susceptible to the massive forces of symbolic power that exude from this economic rationalism, meaning that alternative moral-based legitimacy would struggle to find expression.

Such adiaphorising legitimacies have the capacity to classify climate change mitigation as naive. One could expect to see sympathy towards environmentalism in this focus group confronted by notions of: “at the end of the day you look after number one” (Seamus: Business FG). The group’s interpretation of the absence of a proper foothold for climate change in the realpolitik of international agreements, appears to make Ireland and its environmentalists irrelevant: “the Chinese [...] if

129 Such as the broadsheet business sections, books on successful or controversial global entrepreneurs and magazines such as Business Week, The Economist, and Fortune.
they don’t buy into it, then four and a half million people in the backend of Europe are not going to make a difference” (ibid). Against such rationality and cynicism, seeking to make a difference may appear delusional and subject to the disciplining effects of light-hearted ridicule: “I know you’re driving a Prius but I’m not like you” (Laughter) (Gearoid: Businessmen FG).

It is not surprising that Diarmuid, the individual displaying the strongest green credentials, began the business focus group on a participative note and then withdrew from much of the remaining debate. He made several subtle but failed attempts, to legitimate climate change as an issue in a manner that might correspond with the discourses on offer: linking it to peak oil and how not dealing with climate change might hurt the economy. However, whether due to having already internalised the adiaphorising discourses of his field or some recognition of its illegitimacy amongst members present, Diarmuid did not provide any moral decarbonisation frame.

5.6 Conclusion

The focus group and life history examples presented and discussed in this chapter serve to illustrate how Bourdieusian fields contribute to climate change receptivity. Ekelund (1999) describes how anything that enters a field has to pass “through a filter of formal demands and a process of translation into those expressions recognised by the field”. Consequently, it was possible to observe marked differences between the focus groups. In the farmers group, climate change was viewed through pre-existing grievances against government restrictions. It also gained admission by reference to changing weather patterns – an essential component of the farming field. Organic growers additionally interpreted the issue through their politicised relationship to food. Analogously, it was ground through the cost-benefit-rationale of the business group. The reaction of some of the formal education participants displayed the reworking of the issue through its reductive subject divisions, positivist knowledge and didactic pedagogy. Alternatively, the Steiner group indicated the possibilities for a more connected relationship to the issue, although this connection was not guaranteed. Finally, the environmentalist participants’ view of climate change strongly reflects the transformativist position

130 He voted for the Green Party and reported lowering his fossil fuel usage.
within their respective field. It is highly salient, systemic, moral and something to be responded to through collective rather than merely small-scale individual actions.

The next chapter – Chapter 6 – extends these field constructions to the field of power. It looks at the inter-field and social space power relations in much more detail, particularly in relation to symbolic power and those who are on the receiving end of that symbolic power. This analysis subsequently informs an in-depth examination of the inclusive and divisive properties of climate change receptivity as it is constructed through the field of social classes.
6 Climate Change Classifications and Social Space

6.1 Introduction

The analysis in Chapter 5 has linked participant social spaces through their respective fields to climate change receptivity. Social spaces, however, are also influenced by how they are positioned within the broader structure of class relations. Both this chapter and Chapter 7 proceed in demonstrating how this relation of social space connects to climate change receptivity. This chapter is particularly concerned with how participants’ filter their climate change perceptions through their systems of classification. These systems emerge largely from participants’ experiences and by unwittingly internalising pre-existing modes of classifying the world. Social space and class encourage particular forms of experience and unwitting internalisation through more homologous relations of capital, similar histories, and class-related status, capacity and sense of empowerment. Consequently, the chapter elaborates upon the class related homologies and distinctions involved in how participants come to define and tacitly relate to climate change (Figure 6.1). This is an elaboration that also draws out the workings of societal relations of power on how participants position themselves in relation to their climate change classifications. In many ways, as this chapter demonstrates, this societal power operates through the relationship between participants’ practical apprehension and elective affinities (i.e. ontological hierarchy) peculiar to their social space and the dominant symbolic order.
Figure 6.1: Social Space and Climate Change Classifications

Notes on graph: Graph is illustrative not representative. It maps participants social space, distributing them according to their structure (i.e. level of cultural and economic capital).
economic) and volume of capital. Black bold caps are dominant modes of classifying climate change. Participants with social space nearest to the caps are more likely to classify climate change this way. The curves divide the participants also according to decarbonisation typology and climate change fluency and composure. Distance from curves is significant. Generally the further left or right of the curve then the more inclined the group is to hold the property represented by that side of the curve. Some participant groups are split due to internal imbalance in cultural capital. These groups share the same colour. Groups in italics are mostly younger than thirty.

Cultural capital is measured from level of educational qualification, parental educational qualification and the close fit of participant qualifications to the dominant forms of cultural capital (economic literacy, technical discursive expertise, scientific degrees, engineers...). Consequently accountancy qualifications are higher in cultural capital than BA degrees. Economic capital is gauged from occupation.

Participants’ classifications are patterned around another (see Chapter 4) threefold typology: the ‘strongly engaged’, the ‘moderately engaged’, and the ‘relatively disengaged’. This typology is based upon the degree with which participants show a willingness to confront climate change, a readiness to alter their lifestyles and/or advocate for decarbonisation. The latter includes campaigning for stronger policies of mitigation and/or promoting greater public engagement. The divisions between the labels are not exact with several participants appearing to straddle the divide between types. This is particularly the case with businessman Fiachra with the schism between his carbon lowering behaviours and economistic justifications and policy outlook rendering him indefinable. Furthermore some participants demonstrated minor concerns towards climate change possibly positioning them beneath a further label of ‘weakly engaged’. However their low attentiveness to climate change, demonstrated by how they failed to discuss or read about the topic and had a poor grasp of the concept, meant effectively that they are disengaged. Others easily fit their category, especially the strongly engaged. They comprise of the two environmentalist focus groups, the organic growers, the academics, and a few individuals from other groups, including two Steiner members, one student and one teacher who coordinates green school activities. The moderately engaged is the smallest grouping consisting of the stewardship farmer, a teacher, two Steiner members, two production operators, one CES member and the greenest member of the business group. The remainder of the farmers, CES members, production operators and students, along with two other businessmen and one Steiner member, make-up the
relatively disengaged. Further divisions, existing beneath the labels become more visible when the typology is taken in tandem with the disparities in participants’ capital and the decarbonisation typology of Chapter 4 – BAU, reformist and radical transformativist.

When considered in relation to the decarbonisation typology a series of definite affinity patterns emerge. My analysis identifies amongst the classifications of the strongly engaged, how catastrophism and moral framings link to an emotive and salient view of climate change. Catastrophism and moral properties are tied to the radical transformativist typology of Chapter 4 and, as chapters 5 to 7 demonstrate, many amongst the strongly engaged show signs of sympathy to that transformativism. Conversely some of the more cynical disengaged stances are tied to what I term latent individualising behavioural models, that is, preconceptions of human behaviour as rational and individualistic. Although not necessarily subscribing to the self-interested individualism of these models a large proportion of the disengaged also discussed climate change in terms of individualised responsibility. Individualised responsibility is what I define as the sharing of responsibility equally as individuals with little reflection on the role of inequalities or social structure and with no tangible sense of collective participation. Some participants see decarbonisation both in terms of individuals’ behaviours and government intervention, with the government needing to intervene in some way in order for the public to reduce their emissions. This is still a case of individualised responsibility as it is defined here, with a stark absence of a narrative between the poles of individual and government, concerning the role of civil society and its groups, movements and institutions, along with class. Such individualization of climate change is accompanied by either reformist or BAU sympathies, which is in keeping with the decarbonisation typology. These sympathies are also aided by the subscription of some participants’ to Ireland’s economic nationalism which again reproduces reformist and BAU commitments to economic growth.

The divergent classifications emerged alongside variations in participants’ sense of discursive empowerment with climate change as an issue. This fits with Bourdieu’s understanding of systems of classification as not just mental but bodily. Hence, participants also tacitly and practically define their relationship to climate change in terms of the relevance of their perceived ‘climate change’ for their lives: e.g. whether it is worthy of their consideration or whether they are even worthy of
considering it. This is very much attached to how position in social space
influences their level and form of technical literacy and composure with expert
discourse. The level of symbolic capital participants hold, along with their sense of
self-empowerment, also plays a crucial part. These are both linked to the ranking of
fields within the field of power and social class position. Field of power and class-
based hierarchies influence participants’ own perceptions of the potential and
validity of certain climate change standpoints and of the legitimacy of their own
climate change perceptions, opinions and actions. The next section positions
participants in terms of the field of power rankings (i.e. in terms of the dominant
symbolic ordering). This chapter also introduces the data from the production
operator and community employment scheme (CES) participants. As noted in
Chapter 3 these participants were recruited primarily to gain some access to the
lower socio-economic stratum and broaden the project’s social class diversity.

6.2 Societal Power Relations as Dictated by the Field of
Power Hierarchy

Respondents too, like the climate change representations and economism of
Chapter 4, acquire some of their symbolic power through how their properties are
positioned within the dominant symbolic order by the Irish field of power. This
section defines the field of power status of the four participant fields investigated in
this thesis – Education, Environmentalism, Business and Farming – according to
their share of statist capital (see Figure 6.2). How the field of power ranks these
fields offers a means to evaluate the social power of respondents’ embodied field
capital (skills, discourses, etc.,) and field perspective (ways of looking at and
understanding world). However, the social power of participants’ properties is also
dependent upon participants’ position within the structure of class relations along
with the position of their own class-related properties within the dominant
symbolic order. This means that despite the low status of a particular field’s ‘way
of being’, occupants of such a field can still hold the necessary capital to place
themselves within the dominant social class. In many ways this positions the
participants within Bourdieu’s more nuanced interpretation of class, which
recognises how persons can be a member of the dominant class while at the same
time being part of the dominated fraction of that class. The chapter alludes to the
latter form of social power throughout.
Chapter 6

Figure 6.2: Hierarchy of Fields accorded by Field of Power Stature

Volume of statist capital rises vertically. The closer a field is to the top of the graph the higher its stature in the field of power. The groups positioned outside the field of power have negligible influence over the state. As the field of business has colonised certain segments of the other fields its shape is top-heavy, overlapping the other fields within the field of power.

The field of business with its wealth of statist capital is the uppermost of the four. As stated previously, formal education frequently acts as a ‘handmaiden of the economy’, facilitating the interests of corporate players and businesses. This relationship is further evident in the 2010 media furore that erupted when representatives of Google, Intel and Hewlett-Packard criticised the quality of Irish graduates (Bielenberg, 2010; Flynn, 2010b; RTE, 2010a). Commenting on the issue, the then minister for education Batt O’Keefe, spoke of the need to respond to boardroom demands, stating that “our approach to developing education policy must be strategic and more aligned with industry needs” (Flynn, 2010a). Since then business leaders have been given a “key role” in an agency setup to regulate third
level academic standards (ibid). The new managerialism that has invaded Irish education (Grummell et al., 2009) is particularly emblematic of the extensive symbolic powers that business practices have accumulated within the field of power and over the field of education. New managerialism is marked by the entrance of econometric notions of performativity and the language of efficiency into the public sector. Consequently, at third level increasingly the value for money supplants cultural values and “needs of potential learners” as universities engage in a competitive commodification of knowledge (Maton, 2005: 699).

The dominated position of the field of environmentalism is also clearly presented in Chapter 4 and 5. Historically the state has institutionally marginalised environmentalists and environmentalism, in the main, feels obligated to coat its messages and policy objectives so that they adhere to the drives of growth and profitability. The green movement’s historical marginalisation doesn’t necessarily translate into low movement activity and in fact less dependence upon the state may allow and encourage some sections to keep their radical edge (Dryzek et al., 2003). However, it does mean that the movement has had less influence than business over the state’s instruments of dissemination and legitimisation, such as the education system and the legislative and executive branches of government. These instruments have the capacity to augment symbolic power and elevate certain positions to the unquestioned level of doxa. The historical marginalisation therefore gives an indication of how the symbolic power of environmentalism amongst the Irish public has been stunted. The radical transformativist climate change position in Ireland, from which most of the environmentalist participants hail, has almost zero access to these statist instruments. This points to the extremely low symbolic capital that the position has managed to so far accumulate.

The farming field also occupies a hierarchically elevated position over the environmentalist field. Historically, agricultural policy has placed farmers’ interests over and above citizen and consumer interests (Feehan and O'Connor, 2012: 134). The core lobby group – the Irish Farmers Association (IFA) – even has a lobbying base in Brussels to deal with the EU. The environmentalist movement is weak politically by comparison (Flynn, 2007: 178-180). In 2006 farmers’ groups managed to have two representatives included in the 5th EPA advisory committee, compared to only one environmentalist representative, (the composition of the committee has since reduced farmers’ representatives back to one). The business
sector also has a representative appointed to the EPA advisory committee (ibid: 178).

Intra-field relations and positioning within the class structure reveal a somewhat different picture. Although the competitive interests of agriculture as a whole (particularly its contribution to Ireland’s GDP) currently outweigh that of the environment, the small and medium farmer participants are located towards the lower dominated scale of the farming field. While the farmers group appeared to sustain a comfortable level of income from non-farm sources their dominated field position likely contributes to a lack of social power. In contrast, the most highly qualified academics, present within both the academic and the Ecovillage group, are part of the dominant social class. Many Ecovillagers had long-term experience within high-status occupations such as consultancy and lecturing. The majority of climate campers too displayed high level qualifications and were the offspring of college graduates.

The elevated position of Teagasc – the Irish Agriculture and Food Development Authority – within the farming field, which has strong foundations in agricultural science and research, points to the growing symbolic power, of technical and scientific expertise over farming practices and traditional farmer knowhow. As pointed out in Chapter 5, few of the participants in the farmers’ focus group appeared overly comfortable with technical-scientistic discourse. Despite the dominance of the field of agricultural production, with such discursive powers tied to educational qualifications and professional position, the farmers are still dominated by relations of class and broader structures of power.

Such technical and economistic literacy has been consecrated by the field of power in Ireland. Because cultural capital is a relational concept tied to the shifting of historical relations of societal power, its structure transforms as changes in the field of power occur. The liberalisation of the Irish economy has brought with it the adiaphorising words of the economists, entrepreneurs, CEOs and professional politicians to displace the voice of poets, patriots and clergy. This econometric and technical (additionally legalistic in terms of policy discourse) system of expression is the current dominant form of cultural capital. As the following section shows the envelopment of climate change in a technical discourse – or even by mere association with expert purveyors of the discourse – emits from the issue a
particular symbolic power. This power connects participants’ climate change receptivity to particular relations of class and symbolic violence.

The production operators and Community Employment Scheme groups broaden the lower class sample for this class analysis. The CE scheme is located at an agency that deals with assisting the unemployed to find work. The group of 5 women and 1 man work part-time and consist of long-term unemployed (out of work for over a year) and the ‘disadvantaged’, which in this case included at least 3 single parent mothers. It remains uncertain whether any of the participants were eligible for the CES through disability. The production operators are workers for a multi-national medical device plant and as typical of these positions, with multinational companies having been outside the social partnership arrangement and resistant to union organization, they represent the more disempowered elements of the Irish workforce. Union membership for plant and machine operatives fell during the Celtic Tiger to 36% in 2008 in contrast to 45% for professional workers (Allen, 2010: 27).

Despite both being the two lowest paid of all the occupational groups in the fieldwork sample some hold third level qualifications. One of the CES participants had recently qualified in her BA and another was in the process of pursuing hers, yet neither could be said to hold high amounts of social power. The massive expansion in higher level education since the 80s (Power et al., 2013) has seen the devaluation of certain qualifications, particularly the bachelor degree, due to an oversupply. For teaching the additional qualification of the Higher Diploma in Education is now required on top of the bachelor.131 Two production operator participants also had university degrees. One of these participants had only recently returned from Australia and had been employed for just over a month. Being in her 20s, it is possible to assume that production operating is a temporary move while she awaits employment elsewhere. The other revealed during the interview his ambitions of using his qualification to gain promotion within the company. A third operator had been in college but dropped out. The two remaining production operators did not have third level qualifications. Two had been employed there for under a year while the third was in his 7th year. The parental background of the production operators points to a lower middle and working class mix amongst all

131 Bourdieu noted such third level degree devaluation in his own work from the massification in the French educational system (Bourdieu, 1984: 143; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990).
participants. The difference in level of qualification appeared to correspond to manifest power differentials within the focus group. The ensuing section considers the power relations that result from all of the above field-of-power, intra-field, intra-group and social class hierarchies against the research responses of the participants.

6.2.1 Power Relations and Issue Ownership: Receptivity
According to Cultural and Symbolic Capital

Varying degrees of empowerment when dealing with climate change were visible both within and between groups. The inter-group differences were more significant, with levels of cultural capital, symbolic capital and class position strongly influencing manifest empowerment. In terms of the typology some of the highest levels of cultural capital and empowerment could be found amongst the strongly engaged while the lowest levels existed amongst most of the CES and farmers, appearing to contribute strongly to their own disengagement from climate change. The same could not be said of the higher cultural and symbolic capital members of the relatively disengaged. The classifications involved in their disengagement are dealt with in section 6.3.1.

Some of this empowerment was evident from the reaction of participants to the research situation. Interviews and focus groups come with the associations of academic research and institutions, which also carry power relations into the research setting. Participant responses to being part of the research situation displayed a power relation disparity. Consider how notifying dominant class members, the Ecovillagers, of the use of vignettes led to repeated interruptions intent on defining their research purpose:

*Sean:* yah but what do we do with them?

[...]

*Rose:* Kind of like free association?

[...]

*Nigel:* A kind of stimulus to discussion is that the idea or?
This amounted to an attempt to exert control over proceedings. Similarly, during a pre-focus group preparatory discussion one participant even suggested I might transform my project into investigating the Ecovillage’s influence on the older village that it was annexed to. Such forwardness contrasted to most of the other groups. As noted previously, some of the climate campers sought to glean information from the project’s current findings. The academics were sufficiently at ease with the setting to be at times dismissive of the questioning.

Such ease with the topic and setting was not limited to the strongly engaged groups for whom climate change was a salient issue. The business group appeared well composed with the topic despite its two disengaged members being unused to discussing it. Their responses also bore not even the tiniest hint of discomfort or awkwardness towards the presence of an officiating moderator, reflecting the lack of social distance between moderator and participants. In fact, participants tended to look towards and address only each other, effectively disengaging the moderator from discussions. One vignette introduction was also interrupted by a participant who sought to recontinue his previous point: something not witnessed in other group discussions. As all of the business focus group members operated at management level their ease with the formal signification of the focus group experience is not surprising.

The majority of the other groups were relatively composed in dealing with the topic. Of particular note, however, are the farmers and the CES groups, both of which exhibited clear hesitancy at the outset. The CES members waited with timid silence while I set up; the farmers greeted my starting question with a long, uncertain pause. While many farmers were treading in largely unfamiliar and uncertain territory, a more obvious reluctance to attempt an articulation of the basics of climate change was evident in the CES group. The introduction of the cue, designed to encourage participants to discuss the causes, was met with a subdued reaction: long silences, interrupted by a few single word responses such as ‘chemicals’ and ‘cars’. Eventually a hesitant explanation emerged based on the conflation of climate change with the hole in the ozone layer: a common misconception (Motherway et al., 2007: 32). This triggered a short uncertain discussion wherein the conflation was not disputed.

132 “What are the first images and thoughts that come to mind when you hear the words climate change?”
An interaction with one of the CES participants during the life history interview is revealing. When I directly broached ‘climate change’ it triggered an obvious startled look by the interviewee. When I enquired further the participant responded with a hesitancy that was uncharacteristic with regard to the rest of our discussion: “climate change I wouldn’t ah am you know too much about it really” (Ruth: LHI).

The differences between groups offer some illumination. Most of the Ecovillagers were highly qualified: three of the above interjectors had lectured at third level and two of them held PhDs. Similarly, the business group were all operating at management level. Despite the few amongst the farmers and CES with bachelor and diploma qualifications, the level of formal education was much lower than among the Ecovillagers and business people. Some CES participants also had the added dimension of experiencing long-term unemployment.

There were other signs throughout the focus groups of these varying levels of in-group climate change assuredness. The tendency appeared to be for those with higher qualifications and career status to speak most confidently on the topic. In the CES group the qualified teacher from Eastern Europe, along with Ruth, who was at the time engaged in a BA and had managed or supervised a small restaurant in the 90s, appeared to be the most at ease in delivering their comments. From the production operators’ FG one of the least qualified participants found himself, on one occasion, being challenged by the two degree holders, on the accuracy of his statement concerning links between the earth’s core and the climate. Against which he struggled to clarify his position. It is also telling that those farmers most equipped and willing to discuss climate change in a technical manner happened to also be secondary teachers. One of which, as stated in Chapter 6, had prepared himself on the science of climate change beforehand, which formed the basis of the aforementioned monologue. Doubtless, his background as a science teacher aided him in his ability to articulate the complex and technical overview that he produced.

This cultural capital facilitation of climate change fluency highlights the elite ownership – already noted in Chapters 4 and 5 - of much of climate change’s construction. Indeed there are suggestions of some of the academic focus group members and the Ecovillage academics being involved, or at least seeing themselves involved, in the struggle to construct climate change. On two occasions,
Ecovillage members discussed how ‘climate change’ should be renamed finding the term overly benign: one suggested “climate instability” (Nigel FG). Another had also published on the issue of labelling climate change. Membership of Feasta also connected some Ecovillagers to the group’s decarbonising *cap and share* policy proposal, which has achieved recognition in international policy circles (HCEAC, 2008: 6-7). This level of issue ownership was also displayed by the climate expert from the academic group whom at one stage aligned himself with the scientist producers of climate change:

> when we checked for global cooling that we found that the opposite signal was the case. (Fergus LHI)

This form of elite ownership of the issue differs radically to how the farmers reacted to the topic of discussion. Initially the farmers displayed resistance towards the power of an expert-oriented climate change, rejecting its dominant discourse along with its accompanying sincerity. The scientistic packaging and dissemination of climate change were subdued under this group’s ontological tempo – a comic and chaotic style – which came to characterise the discussion. A rare moment of solemnity, appearing in one farmer’s long monologue on the greenhouse effect, encompassing terms such as ‘infrared radiation’ and ‘stratosphere’, was met with prolonged silence. Apart from the focus group’s slow start, the prolonged silence was in strong contrast to the liveliness of the rest of the discussion. The predominantly jocose atmosphere on occasion veered into hostility towards government environmental restrictions. The hostility, however, also tended to be part of the humour drawing general laughter from the, at times, hyperbolic and belligerent nature of it; sounding more like parody of resentment than sincere expression:

> Garret: “line them up and shoot the fuckin lotta them” (laughter).

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133 *Cap and share* proposal calls for the issuing of permits to emit CO₂ equal to the entire cap on national emissions. The emission allowances are to be equally shared amongst the population and can be cashed at a bank. Fossil fuel suppliers must then purchase these permits (Matthews, 2010: 245-9). With this increasing the price of carbon heavy goods those who consume the least – the lower classes - are supposedly least affected.
This is not to infer genuine frustrations were never present, but that a sustained, serious and elaborate communication of them was not the ontologically validated form of engagement.

However, despite the apparent resistance by this groups’ social space hierarchy, the subtle pervasiveness of the symbolic violence emanating from dominant field of power hierarchies, was still visible in the diffidence of some participants towards the weighty appearance of scientific discourse. One farmer also repeatedly signalled his sense of expert-oriented hierarchies represented by the institution of the focus group, to which he feared his jocular antics were inadequate: (apologising to the moderator) “Sorry now sorry, sorry now for not being serious”.

Amongst participants with lower educational and cultural capital – most farmers and CES members especially – there seemed to be a prevailing sense of climate change as an alienating expert-owned concept. Encountering dominant climate change constructions risks exposing participants to the sense of their own inadequacy: a fear apparent in Ruth’s reluctance above. A disparity is apparent with regard to the ease with reasoning in the abstract of climate change. In a life history interview one farmer participant claimed to have only heard of climate change two years ago. He then contradicted the unanimous position taken in the focus group concerning climate change being caused by humans. On this occasion he stated it was not “manmade” as it came from the atmosphere, but then immediately he contradicted himself again and stated it was “to do with factories and emissions and all that” (Alan LHI); thus displaying a lack of fluency with the topic. Similarly one CES member in replying to the visual concerning difference in CO$_2$ tonnage per person between countries stated: “a tonne of carbon dioxide that doesn't make any sense to me. I don't know what it means really” (Fiona CES FG).

Notwithstanding these strong connections between levels of embodied cultural capital and appearing composed and competent in discussing climate change, other power relations can diminish the empowering effect of high cultural capital. The environmentalist field, along with its calls for decarbonisation occupy a subordinated position within the field of power. The sense of this subordination can instil an oppressive effect on those exhibiting environmentalist leanings, even if they do hold sufficient cultural capital to display competence with the issue. This effect was particularly visible in the business group, with regard to the light
ridicule towards the green position. In commenting upon how he has always voted for the Green party, Diarmuid was subjected to:

Fiachra: We’ll fix you up there

Gearoid: We’ll sort you out (laughter)

Seamus: you’re not driving a Prius there?

It was further manifest in Diarmuid’s eventual self-exclusion and Fiachra’s belittlement of his own environmental concerns and actions.

The subordinated environmentalist field position – coupled perhaps with the low standing of civic activism – also manifests through the derision with which activists are dismissed by some non-environmentalists. Although inter-sectoral disdain is common in society – e.g. a climate camper referring to the corporate sector as greedy – it is the dismissive tone and content of the derision that marks the symbolic inferiority in which environmentalist activism is beheld. A lot of this rejection was based on aligning the environmentalism with more extreme stereotypes: Fiachra jokingly referred to his purchase of a Prius and the dangers it brought of being associated with an action undertaken by animal rights activists:

Fiachra: “[...] because people do think you’re ah you know ah you’re releasing minks in Donegal you know” (Business FG).

The reference is to animal rights activists that, at the time, had been blamed in the media for releasing hundreds of minks from a Donegal farm (RTE, 2010b). Noel, the farmer who defined his farming role in terms of stewardship, described climate change activists as “too extreme” and “over the top” (LHI). He claimed to have limited trust in the information they provided. More bluntly, they were categorised by Alan as “weirdoes” (Farmer LHI). He also labelled them according to their upper middleclass stereotype as the “rich crowd” (ibid). One of the students who was pretty indifferent to climate change concerns described environmental protesters as “mostly extremists” and “eco-warriors” (Robert: Students’ FG). The low symbolic standing of the environmentalist field and civic activism underwrites such derision, which in turn reinforces a widening of the perceived social distance between these participants and imagined environmentalist others.

Whilst the low standing of environmentalism in the dominant symbolic order contributed to these participants self-distancing from climate change, the climate change receptivity of those more directly involved with environmentalism were
affected in other ways. At times the interviews and focus groups captured intense expressions of frustration or dejection amongst those most committed to environmentalism and engaging with climate change. Several of the climate campers pointed to the despair at the sense of the Sisyphean task that had come to characterise societal decarbonisation along with their own efforts to encourage others:

Karen: I’m just imagine people, like people who I, the people I’m usually trying to talk to about climate change, I imagine them and them not really caring about it, that’s what I think off when I hear ‘climate change’

Sarah: It’s like apathy or something right

[...]

Karen: Yah, I just am reminded that they still don’t care or something

[...] like a kind of a bad feeling like you know what I mean

Jane: Frustration

This oppressive sense of a steep uphill struggle was spread out amongst practically all of the strongly engaged. One academic member, involved in sustainability studies, even alluded to the environmentalist field’s dominated position when expressing her frustration. She spoke of the current dependence of the sustainability position on the symbolic power of the growth economy and private sector to bring legitimacy to the decarbonisation cause:

Aisling: I think one of the biggest influences and I think this is shocking that this is the way it is but the idea that it really took the insurance companies to actually say we’re not going to am insure for example these houses again [...] for actually people to realise “oh there are real consequences about building on floodplains” [...] so unfortunately I think it, and I feel really quite depressed even saying this, but it comes back to economic factors and the private sector (Academics’ FG).

The subdued state of decarbonisation often translated into hopelessness for those engaged or sympathising with the dominated decarbonisation position:
Eilis: [...] I mean there’s probably nothing we can do to stop it at this [...] (Organic Grower LHI)

Mary: [...] do we ever stand a chance (Organic Grower LHI)

Fiona: [...] find it impossible to fight, you can do little things but (CES FG);

Anna: [...] I don’t know what could save us now (Production Operators FG).

Whereas low cultural capital appears to discourage participants from engaging directly with the high cultural technical veneer of the dominant construction of climate change, occupying the dominated fraction of the dominant classes can possibly stymie engagement in other ways. One such Ecovillager has been engaged in an ongoing critique of the status quo societal system. This is a critique to which his environmentalist conscience and climate change position is aligned. Despite his extensive symbolic capital, his confident deportment and his high level of embodied cultural capital, he has suffered disquiet at perceiving an historical contraction of political discussion, which escalated throughout the Celtic Tiger years. For him the contraction stifled critical debate with an “absolutely narrow and self-serving consensus that dominated all the media”. Feeling “particularly alienated” by the Celtic Tiger he recounted an incident, where a work colleague in the early 90s trivialised his own attempts to contribute to critical debate:

[...] it’s just that you’re dismissed and it’s not the ideas are dismissed, you’re dismissed so you know what you write doesn’t have to be taken seriously. I find that very typical of Irish society and it really depresses me and I suppose the older I get I just wonder why do I bother breaking my back writing stuff and trying to contribute to public debate where I feel there’s really very little hope in this [...] (LHI).

This sensitivity and acute emotional dejectedness emerges from his location – and the location of social critique in general – amongst the dominated fraction of the dominant class and from his subordinated position within the field of power. It is conceivable that such heightened frustration causes some concerned, culturally empowered and informed members of the public to steer clear of the climate change issue.
As can be seen from the interview and focus groups excerpts presented in this section, societal relations of power are deeply embedded in participants’ climate change receptivity. These power relations are composed of an array of competing systems of classification which often reproduce the structures of power in Irish society. For example, how activists are classified, how fields are ranked in relation to each other, positioning the environment as subordinate to the economy. This is not just a discursive form of classifying but is also bodily and tacit, incorporating various rhythms and sensations: such as the flow and tempo that befits the ‘proper’ way of discussing climate change or a participant’s sense of themselves in relation to their perception of it as an expert-oriented concept. Power operates through this practical apprehension, embedded in how climate change is constructed and how such issues are legitimately discussed. Power also works through the class relations that feed into participants’ embodied cultural capital and sense of their own symbolic worth in comparison to the symbolic power that emanates from the topic of discussion. The issue of empowerment is explored further in Chapter 7 in terms of the enabling and restrictive practices that participants use in their reception of climate change and decarbonisation.

6.3 Receiving Climate Change through the Dominant Symbolic Order: Diverse Appreciations of Climate Science Constructions

On a more specific level participants’ relations to the climate change science constructions of Chapter 4 varied according to saliency, climate science literacy and the degree to which participants were directly engaged. Striking perceptual differences occurred between the strongly engaged, who mostly occupied social spaces where climate change held prominent status, and all other groups from social spaces wherein climate change had minor visibility. This section explores further the degree to which the strongly engaged are aligned to the catastrophist climate science position whilst some of the disengaged take solace in more gradualist representations.

It was broadly agreed that climate change is currently happening and human induced. The most adamant in this position were the environmentalist activist groups, academics and organic growers. In contrast, the contrarian position was
very much underrepresented amongst participants. Apart from the one literal denier amongst the Steiner group, one production operator claimed to be reserving judgement until he knew more, but at times he indicated towards strong pre-held contrarian doubts about the causal effect of human emissions.

Direct climate science information was not an essential component of believing in climate change. One relatively disengaged student voiced that, despite its seriousness it was being overhyped. However, although being an earth science student, she supported this argument with presumptions about human proclivity towards exaggeration but provided no contrarian science justifications. Others voiced that it was natural but humans were worsening it. Still they did not support their claims with findings from the field of climate science or elaborate further upon the degree to which humans were intensifying the process. Even the most environmentally conscientious of the farmers Noel mollified the implications on the belief that the environment seemed to have a capacity for restoring itself to equivalence. He illustrated this by suggesting, that although corncrakes might be disappearing, there are now more dolphins off the coast of Ireland.

Furthermore, there were a series of errors in attributing causes to climate change amongst the relatively disengaged who had claimed to believe it was happening and manmade. In the questionnaire, for personal “actions aimed at responding to climate change” three CES members listed singly: using t-tree oil toothpaste, reducing litter and, although not entirely incorrect but suspiciously vague, reducing chemical use. Two other CES members echoed this within focus group discussions again mentioning littering along with banning chemicals and plastics. They, along with many other participants displaying at most a modicum of climate science literacy, referred to burning rubbish and recycling. It seems that the prevalence of these behaviours amongst the least climate science literate reflected a process where the uninformed – and the relatively issue-detached – latch onto more tangible environmental items. Burning rubbish has been banned in recent years and the recycling wheelie bin is now visible nationwide.

The above pattern also reflects the tendency to conflate climate change with anything environmental. Several other participants linked climate change to issues

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134 “Do you personally take actions aimed at responding to climate change? If yes please provide some details about the actions you take.”
such as the ozone layer, smog and acid rain. For the majority of those expressing these confluences, climate change was a distant reality. The following description by a participant about when he first came across the notion of climate change provides an example of how this conflation would emerge within research discussions:

*Gearoid: I suppose all this thing kind of in my consciousness came out with [...] all the discussion about the ozone layer being peeled away and all that, that it was CO$_2$ emissions and [...] there seemed to be a great level of consciousness that was kind of a wakeup call at that point in time (Businessmen: FG).*

As evident in this example, it is difficult to ascertain if there is a genuine confusion of climate science knowledge on the part of some participants. Still, the manner in which it is conjoined to other environmental problems suggests that climate change has not become sufficiently distinguishable as an issue in its own right. Conversely for the vast majority of strongly and moderately engaged participants, most bound up with decarbonisation, climate change had amply attained issue-status for them to avoid any hint of conflation.

Concerning climate futures, the gradualist position was common amongst the moderately engaged and relatively disengaged participants. Outside of the most environmentally aligned groups every group held members that corresponded to this position. Gradualism still brought a certain level of anxiety to some of those who held it, such as some teachers, CES and Steiner members. Nonetheless, for many in the gradualist position and for those reserving judgement, climate change lacked an urgency being viewed as something distinct and far away from their everyday lives:

*Brendan: [...] it seems to be something that the governments talk about, that not even the Irish government has any huge say in ammm so it just seems to be a very distant topic in terms of our lives (Teacher LHI).*

Gradualism was a welcome relief for others who viewed government intervention into climate change as a threat to their way of life. When one farmer input the gradualist construction into the discussion it was seized upon to make light of the impacts by the farmers most resistant to decarbonisation and government regulations:
Jim: I think it’s a very slow process y’know in a hundred years it might rise by a few degrees\textsuperscript{135}

[Unidentified voice]: don’t think we’ll ever see it now

Jim: we’re not inclined to take it seriously, won’t go

Ger: you see the odd bear floating on one little bit of ice [...] out in the middle of the Arctic, wherever it is, but he’ll be a long time floating, he won’t go down I think, I don’t think he’s gonna sink yet for another while but I dunno (group laughter).

This interpretation was accompanied by a linear and divisive nationalistic vision of climate change: “it won’t cause awful problems in tis country like” (Jim). This disregards the systematic interconnectivity of the impacts which are likely to impact heavily the globalised Irish economy.

In sharp contrast, the strongly engaged with climate change held the doomsday clock temporality and catastrophist position. The climate expert proved very alert to the threat of positive feedbacks while the teacher Aisling, who co-ordinates the green school activities, spoke of a climate change that could destroy the entire economy.

Some generalities amongst the groups and interviewees relate to the uncertainty of climate change futures and the failure of the concept of adaptation to emerge spontaneously; except for a brief mention in the climate camp focus group and a secondary teacher who raised it in an unelaborated form. This mirrors the overshadowing of adaptation by mitigation that is typical to all dominant climate change constructions. One other participant only spoke about it when questioned on it directly during an interview. It didn’t have a prominent part even in focus group discussions about climate change solutions.

The uncertainty of climate change futures is found in all three climate science constructions. Almost all participants revealed some degree of future climate uncertainty, which varied according to the degree of their engagement. Many among the strongly engaged voiced with perhaps the greatest conviction that

\textsuperscript{135} Climate scientists would actually view a few degrees as quite a lot; however, here it is treated as more of a figurative expression which also fails to take into account the non-uniform manner with which those degrees are to be experienced regionally, seasonally and through weather events: e.g. “2°C might mean that temperatures at the poles rise by up to 6°C” (Anderson, 2012: 18).
the impacts were going to be nightmarish. However, ambiguity still lay within the strongly engaged position; an ambiguity marked by a boding apocalyptic fear built upon their grasp of the climate science of the ‘new catastrophism’. Drawing from some article in *The Irish Times* Nigel stated:

“[…] if the oceans were two degrees cooler we would never have seen a hurricane, now so imagine we go from two degrees cooler we start from that point and we warmed up by two degrees suddenly we’d see the first ever hurricane, we’d think where the fuck did that come from, what was that? Y’know so if we count from two degrees from where we are now […] we could have similar things coming out of the woodwork, we have never seen before. Two degrees doesn’t sound much but we have no idea what it’s gonna do” (Ecovillage: FG).

In contrast, the other groups, for whom the issue was less salient, leaned towards a much lesser degree of sureness but tended to foresee moderate to minor manageable impacts.

### 6.3.1 Climate Change and the Order of Economic Nationalism and the Individual

As noted in Chapter 4 Ireland’s dominant symbolic order is constructed around competitive economic growth. Its depolitization and economism further conspire in the order of the individual. This section develops the notion of how participants whose social spaces offer little, if any, critical resistance to the dominant symbolic order tend to more closely reflect that order. Many amongst the moderately engaged and relatively disengaged display a somewhat individualised understanding of climate change. Most subscribe to the individualisation of responsibility. Others of the relatively disengaged also perceive the climate mitigation role of the public as one of individualised responsibility, but bearing an idea of individuals as fastened to a nature of self-interest they hold little value in such an approach. Furthermore viewing Ireland’s climate change position through an economistic and technical frame they further diminish their esteem for Irish decarbonisation.

The individualisation of responsibility for climate action that was captured in most of the vignettes was uncritically echoed by many focus group participants.
This notion of an equally shared responsibility was often expressed through a mystifying solidarization of the issue as demonstrated by the recurrence of the theme ‘if everyone did their bit’:

*Noel:* [...] we know ourselves as regards climate change what needs to be done and we’re doing our bit and if everybody else done the same like dy’know ehh I suppose the problem would resolve itself [...].

(Farmer LHI)

*Ruth:* [...] everybody should do something

*Fiona:* Yah if everyone does. (CES FG)

*Tony:* Every little, it’s like Tesco man: every little helps. (Production Operator FG)

It was also present in the prevalent tendency of participants to mention or only report personal climate mitigating behaviours. These individualist avenues, as the above quote demonstrates, can filter out other possibilities, at least in some cases. They are mentioned on numerous occasions without explicit recognition of more collective possibilities: such as developing resilient and carbon-lowering local communities or the collective campaigns of which the environmental movement is emblematic. This does not mean that participants are completely unaware of these options but their total silence on them is in sharp contrast to the emphasis of the two environmentalist groups and indicates that amongst the moderately engaged and relatively disengaged collective civic activities are not accorded much priority within their climate change classifications. For participants, perceiving climate change in this individualised manner is congenial to holding reformist or business as usual sympathies. Radical transformativism on the other hand would generally require more apprehension of society as a societal system formed of transformable social structures.

The dominant individual consumer choice logic of the social science of climate change is written into much of this individualisation of responsibility. This quote from the farmer’s group provides an illustrative example:
I think we’ve done enough, we’ve bought environmentally friendly cars and now if you get a ’08 car now it’s top of the range [...] it’s dear, d’you know I think we’re doing enough, we’re doing an awful lot like I mean it’s not just, not just talking about it like.

On occasion framing climate change in terms of individual consumer choice led directly to calls for incentivisation: one of the main reformist instruments of change:

Tony: There should be incentives for people who do want to live a greener life, you know, more than they’re offering now (Production Operators FG).

In contrast to the individualising perspective, class only got brief mentions overall within a few focus groups. The CES group joked about the excesses of John, the fictional test-driving character of the vignette that also made reference to Salma from Bangladesh,136 “don’t ya know well he has a big car like” (Ruth: FG). The same vignette elicited the largest class emissions reference from moderately engaged Anna, in the production operator’s focus group, who expressed disdain for the high-carbon living elite within Bangladesh itself. However, the mention of class emissions was not spontaneous. This was typical of the only other two occasions where class-emissions were mentioned (Academic and Student FGs).

This weak sense of social structure possibly contributes to some of the relatively disengaged participants’ failure to connect the economy to decarbonisation:

Clara: I don’t think it’s relevant at all, you don’t have to spend money anyway how hard is it to just monitor what you buy like (Production Operators FG).

This further aided the positive receptivity for the reformist position, with participants’ failing to see the economy as a threat to climate change mitigation. The vignette introducing the idea that “dealing with climate change will hurt the

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136 “John lives in Ireland and Salma lives in Bangladesh. Climate change is already having a serious impact on Salma’s country through flooding. John however is unaware of Salma’s situation. Just the other day he took a new three-litre 4-wheel-drive for a test drive.”
economy” was resisted by the majority of participants. Most of the moderately engaged and the relatively disengaged saw either little or no conflict or possibilities for greater growth through the reformist green economy. The idea for some was a source of confusion as if the green economy rhetoric was already well embedded:

Ekaterina: But what way do they see the hurt of the economy, if they invest in ecologically friendly energy products, which will be able to replace say, give the jobs to people and ah am not effect the climate that much. What way is it going to hurt the economy, if the researchers are working, the technologies are developed, people are wor’, I don’t understand that argument to be honest (CES: FG).

Fiachra the businessman and some relatively disengaged members with high amounts of cultural and symbolic capital, namely the business group members and the economics teacher, subscribed to some of the behavioural components of the rational choice model. Their predisposed adherence to a concept of human nature as self-interested and fixed offered some foundational support to positioning any requisite behavioural transformation as some predestined ‘lost cause’. Referring to the influence of climate change, Gearoid stated that “[...] it doesn’t change you; it doesn’t alter your way of life” (Business FG). Individual behaviour for him is immutable in the face of apparent self-interest:

[...] she’s not really going to change at any stage, to do anything unless she’s going to have to, you know, she won’t be motivated to change her behaviours to deal with climate change in the here and now or in the future (ibid).

Such indifferent cynicism contrasts sharply to the emotive hopelessness of the more environmentally conscientious participants. Being free of moral or emotive connectedness to climate change serves to relieve one of any personal responsibility:

Fiachra: [...] it’s goinga happen probably anyway so there’s not much you can do to change it you know [...], (ibid)

137: “Louise often brings up the topic of climate change with her co-workers and in the pub at the weekend with her friends. In a lot of these conversations she often hears the argument that dealing with climate change will hurt the economy.”
Brendan, the relatively disengaged economics teacher from the teachers’ focus group voiced his acceptance of a more co-operative version of self-interest. However, this behavioural quality was still presented by him as an accompaniment to rather fixed descriptions of societal structures. His depiction of politicians appeared to be accommodating to ‘cute hoor’ politics:\footnote{Features the “wily politician” in Irish politics, whose cunning and self-interest is admired by much of the electorate rather than condemned (Keohane, 2005).}

Brendan: They’re looking after number one, they’re looking after, they’re behaving in a self-interested fashion and sometimes they’ve to increase taxes and do this, that and the other, and they do all sorts of scandalous things [...]. (Teacher LHI)

He likened his continuous observation of parliamentary politics to watching a “soap opera” or “the discovery channel” where politicians are comparable to the “lions and cheetahs in the Serengeti” (a possible allusion to Darwinian and Spencerian ‘survival of the fittest’ logic). This is something he watches as a distant observer, not something to get attached to or “infuriated by”, instead it simply just is (Brendan: Teacher LHI).

His fixed view of the nature of politicians absolves him of any moral compunction to his own politics. Despite having a vast knowledge of Irish politics, his own voting decisions are restricted to intergenerational transmission of partisanship; whereby he chooses FF because his family has always voted for them. Even in recognising the property and lending bubbles happening under their watch he still admitted to considering FF for his first voting preference;\footnote{The Irish voting system operates according to the single transferrable vote.} claiming somewhat jokingly “that’s my religion” (LHI). Ultimately, bearing a view of all politicians as self-interested, allows him to dissociate himself from any ideas of real political change, thus reducing his vote to that of premiership-type\footnote{The Premiership is the name for the top division of soccer in England.} politics.

He applies the same fixedness to the institutions of religion:

[...] you’ll take polls in fifty years time and [...] seventy percent of people will say that some form of religion is important in their lives, that would be true in a thousand year, that will always be true, it’s part of human nature[...] (ibid).
It is therefore hardly a surprise that, although expressing sympathy for engaging with the issue of climate change both as something to become informed about and perhaps respond to,\textsuperscript{141} he is nonchalant about changing his own behaviours, seeing little hope of a society mitigating its carbon usage. It also appears to be why he mentions adaptation:

\begin{quote}
Brendan: [...] my own belief is that because of the human nature and everything I think that what we’ll probably do is adapt our way out of this or not out of it as the case maybe, I think that’s what we’ll probably do. I think the whole notion of trying to get the whole human race to change direction is maybe noble but I think it’s doomed to failure, sadly and that’s you know I’m saying pessimistically, I mean if we should stop what we’re doing amm I’d be in favour of stopping what we’re doin, ah I don’t think it would be, convince people to stop what they do.
\end{quote}

These more cynically disengaged participants rejected the idea that individualised responsibility approach would lead to real changes. They saw strong government intervention, generally through incentivises or disincentives as the only means of securing carbon reductions from the public. However they remained within much of the individualising narrative by continuing to totally silence the role of civil society. For them the sole players were a public atomised into individual consumers at one end and national government – also international government in the forms of international agreements – at the other.

Unfortunately, according to a belief in universal self-interest, politicians too are afflicted by self-interest. It is through such categories of perception – that of the individual and self-interest – that Brendan and three members of the business group impose a stalemate upon the possibility for change by the politicians:

\begin{quote}
Brendan: They’ll just shove it down the line and have another treaty in another five years just you know that’s what they did in Kyoto as well, they just said “ah yah” you know I mean the people who said we should have an agreement they were delighted but the politicians were just like “yah yah ah shur it’s only what 6% over what thirty
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{141} He recognises a civic duty or one’s responsibility towards others. This fits in with his model of self-interest, which acknowledges that interests are best served through co-operation with others.
years, that’s okay that’s not goin affect me” and so, that’s, so basically that’s what I think political leaders will do over time, it’s just shunted on and shunted on and if the problem gets worse it’ll still get worse. We’re not goin we’re not goina reach a profound moment where we turn a ninety degree or a hundred and eighty degree turn (Teacher LHI).

At any rate three of the business participants, through an economic understanding of decarbonisation, held little legitimacy for serious domestic government action. Although they did support global intergovernmental action, they appeared to see Ireland’s role as meeting the bare minimum of their international commitments: i.e. a kind of optimal targets logic, with the domestic economy in mind. Seamus posited that Ireland as a small contributor to global carbon emissions should sit back and see how other economies hold up against their decarbonisation measures. For all three the government’s priority should be maintaining economic competitiveness. One stated the need for a re-evaluation of Ireland’s reduction targets which he deemed to be too low due to their introduction when Ireland was at a developing stage. They all seemed to agree that “Ireland goes too far”. This sentiment was echoed by many amongst the farmers, with Ireland just “a dot” in comparison to America. Even the stewardship farmer stated Ireland does too much and that the government would be better of concentrating on creating jobs and delivering the recovery.

This position strongly mirrors Ireland’s economic nationalism where Ireland’s competitiveness is placed above the global community. It is a position that relegates moral arguments based on Ireland’s high per capita emissions or on our role as global citizens. It also pays zero heed to more catastrophic scenarios whereby Ireland’s competitiveness and growth might be wiped away and the need to prepare a more resilient economy and society for such a scenario. As the next section shows classifications which situate climate change in terms of moral and catastrophic narratives, while recognising the role of civil society, support a much more engaged approach.
6.3.2 Reception through an Anti-individualist Heterodox \(^{142}\)

The strongly engaged, and some of the moderates, diverged radically from the economic position above. Moral and global citizenship forms of classifying climate change and decarbonisation invalidated the narrative of economic nationalism. Many of them adopted the Stern position that not dealing with climate change would hurt the economy even more. The ‘long-term’ effects on the economy from climate change were mentioned by organic growers, academics and Ecovillagers. The Ecovillagers acknowledged that the current fossil fuel based economy was also the cause of climate change in the first place. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the climate campers criticised the growth-first hierarchy in response to the economy/climate change question. Although one participant mentioned the green economy in a positive light, his comment was met with a distinct silence. Another participant – John – referred to the idea of “sustainable growth” as an “oxymoron”\(^{143}\) (LHI). The campers’ position clearly locates decarbonisation before growth and is therefore open to the radical transformativism, especially where that decarbonisation is seen to be obstructed by maintaining growth.

Although an anti-individualist approach is not as clear-cut amongst the other members of the strongly engaged, this receptivity towards radical transformativism by the two main environmentalist groups is clearly supported by an anti-individualist heterodox. Much of this heterodox was laid out in the preceding chapter where the properties included perceptions of a collective responsibility; valuing the emotive and resourceful power of community and recognition of an ethical concern for distinct others. A statement by one climate camper highlights the polar nature of their perspective in comparison to the ‘if everybody did their bit’ approach: “I think I read somewhere once someone said if it could be solved by everyone just doing a little bit it would’ve been solved by now” (Karen: Climate Camp FG). Instead community-building and collective action is seen as an

\(^{142}\) The type of individualism that this heterodox is opposed to is the “abstract individualism” that Lukes (2006) characterises where individuals’ “instincts, faculties, needs, desires, rights, etc. are assumed as given, independently of a social context” and that social institutions exist for individual ends, rather than being determinative of those ends, along with the individual (ibid: 70). This anti-individualism reverses the under-emphasis of the role of society in our everyday lives.

\(^{143}\) The oxymoronic condition of sustainable growth is already a common expression in environmentalist literature (Porritt, 2007: 72; Latouche, 2009: 10; Keenan, 2011) and its appearance here may be due to the participant’s absorption of the rhetoric of the field of environmentalism.

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important part to responding to climate change.

With climate camp participants rejecting the individualising logic of the dominant social sciences, it is perhaps little surprising that I observed a connection between climate campers and the more socially attentive subordinate social sciences. Since the focus group I have encountered two of the participants. Both informed me that they have since enrolled in sociology courses: one at undergraduate level, the other as a PhD candidate. Prior to the focus group another participant had recently qualified with a BA degree in sociology. Furthermore, John, a PhD candidate in engineering, had frequented philosophy lectures while taking a year out from college. This suggests a connection of affinity between their negative view of individualised decarbonisation, their systemic, interconnected classification of society and their interest in subordinated social sciences. This offers further credence to the radical transformativist affinity patterns listed in the threefold decarbonisation typology.

Amongst the strongly engaged subscription to an anti-individualist heterodox appears to draw support from an intrinsic-value orientation\(^{144}\) that guides subscribers’ interests to a world extending well beyond their immediate social horizon of career, family, friends and locality. This orientation is allied to a cosmopolitan sense of systemic connection to the world, a moral cultivation of the climate change issue and a sense of empowerment. John from the climate camp group offers a strong illustration of the intrinsic-value orientation. He explicitly identified and valued his broader social conscience in contradistinction to the more inner circle mindset of two other members of his family:

*John: [...] where me and my sister, we would both describe ourselves as having more greater social conscience, where family friends and people of even more distant closeness, whether it’s even people in developing countries, that we’d have a more of a pool or have more of an idea that we reach out to all those groups rather than just pick the intimate group and say as long as I protect and it’s kind of for me that’s being protectionist (LHI).*

\(^{144}\)This orientation is geared towards “[i]ntrinsic goals, which concern pursuing self-acceptance (trying to grow as a person), affiliation (having good interpersonal relationships) and community feeling (trying to make the broader world a better place)” (Crompton and Kasser, 2009: 27)
His interview points to an array of intrinsic interests such as popular psychology, philosophy and Zen Buddhism.

Moral classification of climate change that accompanied this form of intrinsic-value orientation was not entirely limited to the strongly engaged. Some who exhibited relative disengagement also employed occasional moral reasoning. It was visible in the emotive denigration by Brendan of the phenomenon of single-occupancy vehicles:

*Brendan: [...] one thing that angers me more and more that I see it is a line of traffic with loads of cars and one person sitting in each one.*

However, describing himself as health conscious (a keen cyclist), relatively frugal and not prone to ideas of lavishness or the status elements of consumption, his moralising of their behaviour appears to have origins not wholly related to social justice aspects of climate change. Gearoid additionally pointed to how he would be more supportive of a carbon tax if it were ring-fenced solely for the purpose of climate change initiatives rather than merely increasing the government’s tax take. The latter for him lacks fairness. Still, he admitted that the tax was not something he would “encourage” (LHI). However, despite investing some of the issue with moral properties decarbonisation is not strongly connected to their own moral responsibility.

### 6.4 Conclusion

This chapter’s findings clearly reveal the strong influence of societal relations of power in Irish climate change receptivity. The hierarchal relations of fields and social spaces work through the systems of classifications of participants in ranking the discourses, and the issue prominence of climate change, along with the constructions involved. Classifications largely vary according to Bourdieu’s more nuanced understanding of class in terms of diverse forms of capital. The class-related cultural and symbolic empowerment of participants is strongly connected to their sense of their own position in society. This in turn subjectively positions them in relation to climate change as it is characterised through the classifications they employ. The clearest example is of how climate change, perceived as a high cultural, technical and expert-oriented object, holds intimidating connotations for the participants with lowest educational attainment and symbolic stature. The
subordinate symbolic standing of environmentalism, largely determined by the field of power, encourages further symbolic power inequalities, having oppressive properties upon many strongly and some moderately engaged participants.

Distinctions in climate change and decarbonisation classifications also arise through the typology of engagement and the affinities these share with the decarbonisation typology of Chapter 4. The most strongly engaged, holding high cultural capital, define climate change through moral, collective and catastrophist categories. Their climate change position is strongly sympathetic to radical transformativism. In contrast the moderately and relatively disengaged classify climate change in more BAU and reformist terms; often sharing a gradualist appreciation of the impacts. Lower cultural and symbolic capital participants produced more non-descript definitions of climate change which tended to lean towards individualised forms of decarbonisation. The higher cultural capital members of the relatively disengaged reproduced classifications based upon self-interest and economic nationalism reducing their climate mitigating positions to those of weak reformism and BAU.

How well Bourdieu’s concepts of cultural and symbolic capital and field of power rankings map onto participants’ classifications and hierarchising of the climate change problem show the primary relevance to climate change research of Bourdieu’s sociology. The next chapter delves more deeply into his concept of the economy of practices where again socio-cultural regularities and societal relations, along with the priorities of social space greatly influence participant decarbonisation.
7 Practical Engagement with Climate Change and the Economy of Practices

Bourdieu’s ‘economy of practices’ is the objective and symbolic organization of practices in society. Consequently the practices involved in climate change engagement carry in them the physical effect of reducing one’s emissions or of spreading knowledge of climate change amongst friends. They also import meaning for the practitioner, as well as for those bearing witness to the practice performance, which socially values the practices as respectable, acceptable, or alternatively undesirable. The meaning and worth, through the tacit nature of the habitus, is often unwittingly comprehended by those involved. Social space and field play a role in structuring this economy of practices through influencing the degree to which practices occur in particular sectors of society, along with what these practices represent within those sectors. This chapter delves deeper into participants’ practical engagement with climate change. The knowledge of participants’ fields and social spaces that Chapters 5 and 6 have already developed guides the chapter’s analysis of participants’ relationship to practices of climate change engagement and the economy of practices.

The relationship between the participants’ climate change engagement and the economy of practices is derived from practices that participants mention along with how they describe and justify partaking in these practices. The practical content of participants’ interview and focus group references to behaviours and the reported behaviours from the questionnaires help identify the practices employed. Reported questionnaire behaviours involved a request to “provide some details” of participants’ personal “actions aimed at responding to climate change”. While it would be misleading to accept at face value self-reported behaviours gleaned from surveys, focus groups and interviews, the kind of behaviours reported nevertheless serve to highlight the salience and prioritization of certain practices for participants. Participants’ justifications for partaking in these practices are similarly misleading. The obfuscating nature of the habitus, and how justifications

145 As in the previous chapter this involves the workings of the systems of classifications.
146 “Do you personally take actions aimed at responding to climate change? If yes please provide some details about the actions you take.”
themselves can be practical strategies of advancing stature, self-esteem or appearing to fulfil social expectations (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999), diminishes the accurateness of participants’ justifications. However like the reported behaviours, the justifications behind participants’ practical engagement with climate change convey for the researcher the salient and legitimated representations of the practices for participants.

The type of reported practical engagement with climate change and the signification of that engagement varied substantially across the different groups of respondents. These differences can again be attributed to participants’ associated field as well as their accumulated economic and cultural capital (see Figure 7.1) and elective affinities particular to their social space. Strong patterns of exclusion from practical engagement emerged that reflect the alienating aspects of the technical and expert oriented construction of climate change and the high investment frequently required for decarbonisation. The discriminatory nature of conversational and networking practices also maintains exclusion through frequently confining climate change dissemination and engagement support within the networks of the strongly engaged. On the other hand a sense of conversational protocol amongst many of the moderately engaged and relatively disengaged often severely limits this type of engagement. This chapter elaborates upon these variations of related practices across social space and the significance of them for the participants. The practices examined pertain to the climate change engagement areas of carbon-related consumption, climate change information gathering and conversational dissemination. The threefold typology of engagement again complements the analysis.
Figure 7.1: Social Space and Climate-related Economy of Practices

Notes on graph: Practices are in black italics and distributed through the graph according to the participants' social spaces where the practice is most likely to be practiced. For other details on the graph see notes for Figure 6.1.
7.1 Distinction and the Economy of Decarbonising Practices

This section offers an in-depth examination of participants’ (lack of) engagement in practices of decarbonisation and how it connects to their tacit exposure to the economy of decarbonising practices. The organisation of the economy of practices, as it varies according to field and social space, encourages different evaluations by participants of decarbonising practices. This is most noticeable where members of the strongly engaged seek legitimacy for the practices in ethical and moral considerations as opposed to the cost-based legitimacy of business participants. For the most part these differences are influenced by whether participants are positioned closer to the radical environmentalist pole or the business field.

As expected, high-level decarbonising practices were reported amongst the environmentalists, organic growers and academics. ‘High-level’ here implies both that the practices entail large-scale personal carbon reductions – e.g. switching to cycling – and involve significant effort, discipline and investment of time and/or money on the practitioner’s behalf. Life-changing commitment of the Ecovillagers to join a sustainable community, efforts towards energy-efficient retrofitting or a person’s decision to grow their own food exemplify high-level decarbonisation. One academic’s description of his decarbonising behaviours provides a good indication of the effort, forward-planning and discipline involved in high-level decarbonisation practices. He claimed to have purchased a terraced house on account of the greater insulation and potential warmth that occurs from being attached to two other dwellings on either side. He also described growing his own food and a strict recycling and composting programme, resulting in an annual average of four bags of non-recyclable rubbish.

The survey response references to decarbonising practices involving high discipline, effort and investment, drops dramatically among moderately engaged and relatively disengaged participants. The relatively disengaged participants generally listed the lowest-level decarbonising practices, including recycling or turning off houselights. One might argue that if these reported behaviours are real then these participants could at least be categorised as ‘weakly engaged’ instead. However it is highly questionable as to whether these reported behaviours were in fact part of their engagement with climate change. This is supported by how often such low-level practices were ambiguously linked to “personal actions aimed at responding to climate change”. For example, ‘recycling’ is more likely carried out
as a consequence of other factors such as normative civic duty, convenience of the wheelie bin collection, more expensive landfill collection, or prevailing attitudes to waste and landfills. The fact that all farmer focus group participants listed recycling (four listed only recycling) is largely due to the regulatory requirements of recycling plastic used in farmland processes (Irish Statute Book, 2001) rather than their concerns towards climate change (see figure 7.2). The two student interviews offer some illustration as to how this false attribution so readily occurs within surveys. Both students listed recycling, while one also listed composting, yet failed to discuss these practices within a decarbonising frame. Instead one student’s waste disposal behaviours were governed by still residing with his parents and adhering to their recycling and composting. This was something he doubted he would continue once he’d moved away from home. The other student linked the practice of recycling to a form of normative civic duty rather than climate change: “we just do what everyone else does around the city, I think most people recycle” (Monica LHI). Likewise another member of the relatively disengaged listed the much stronger decarbonising behaviour of cycling, however once this was discussed within the interview the significance of the practice for her lay in health and cost-savings rather than decarbonisation. Three relatively disengaged participants further reinforce this ambiguous signification of small-scale practices by explicitly claiming “no” “actions aimed at responding to climate change” in the survey, but during interviews admitting to partaking of low-level practices but not for reasons of decarbonisation. Some CES members reported behaviours that are either wrongly or distantly connected to climate change mitigation – lower use of chemicals in the household, use of tea tree oil toothpaste and a reduction in litter – providing added proof of the relative disengagement of those listing only low-level decarbonising practices.

This reporting of pro-environmental behaviour unrelated to climate change mitigation and/or listing widely accepted, ‘weaker’ practices points to the low currency of decarbonising practices amongst these participants. It also repeats some of the conflation found in Chapter 6 where decarbonising practices are not sufficiently distinguished from general environmental practices, indicating a lack of salience for decarbonisation. Many of these participants do not seem to attach the same moral weight to these actions as the strongly and even moderately

147 The list of participants stating no actions taken in the survey included one member of the Steiner group, two production operators and two business people.
engaged and remain removed from any efforts towards a transition to low-carbon living.

**Figure 7.2 Number of people who listed recycling in their “actions aimed at responding to climate change” by focus group.**

In contrast to the reported prevalence of recycling among the relatively disengaged it does not feature in any of the climate campers’ or Ecovillagers’ survey responses (Figure 7.2). Recycling also received just one survey mention by the academics. The failure of these participants to list recycling, an argument that I develop here further, is part of a process of social distinction within climate change engagement. This distinction seemingly develops from the reorganisation of the economy of practices according to the largely alternative value system found among the radical fraction of the environmentalist field. For participants who are more closely connected to this social space, decarbonising practices take on a different appreciation. Climate campers and Ecovillagers rate much more highly collective practices such as community decarbonisation or activism over what they perceive as individualised decarbonising practices. This is particularly so with climate campers who appeared during the primary data collection to purposefully de-emphasise, and distinguish themselves from practices of individualised
decarbonisation. Ironically, despite being strongly engaged, the climate campers listed for the questionnaire some of the lowest reported personal decarbonisation behaviours. One climate camp participant spoke about having stopped flying\textsuperscript{148} yet neglected reporting any personal carbon-lowering actions in the written response. In fact four participants failed to mention any personal decarbonising behaviour in the survey. Instead they wrote about collective and social movement actions with regard to direct action or raising awareness. Other possibilities for these omissions present themselves, although it is unlikely that these environmentally conscientious participants don’t recycle: all strongly engaged interviewees spoke of their recycling. Some participants may not view their appropriation of certain practices such as recycling as specifically “aimed” towards climate change or even decarbonising.\textsuperscript{149} It is possible that the low list of decarbonisation practices by the climate campers reflects a methodological issue to do with the questionnaire. However, the same survey question garnered plenty of personal decarbonisation examples from the responses of other participants. Instead, the climate campers, and indeed some of the Ecovillagers, omission of individualised practices seemed part of distinguishing their own position from the base individualised decarbonisation promoted by the Power of One campaign. Indeed, with the climate camp focus group most cogently expressing the lowest regard for small-scale individual actions, it would be of little surprise if they were dismissively excluding recycling:

\textit{John: It’s very individualistic as well, it’s just like you’re living your own little life and you take out that bit and don’t ask your neighbour can you put recycling into his thing, that’s not the way it works, you just get, you get charged less for recycling than landfill so you just do it and whatever and not even ask that “oh wait a minute is that stuff sent off to China to be sorted, is actually recycling a good thing or what” so

\textit{Karen: [...] it’s so individualistic that it’s just almost like consumerism again. (Climate Camp FG)}

\textsuperscript{148} Not flying is a large inconvenience for this person who hails from mainland Europe and has family there.

\textsuperscript{149} One climate camper also recognised the contradictory relationship of recycling to decarbonisation when talking about Ireland’s recycling being shipped to China (Keenan, 2012)
Furthermore, omitting individualised decarbonisation practices in many ways conformed to an environmentalist field *illusio* of ‘effectuating social change’ referred to in Chapter 5. The climate campers’ omission is interpretable as participants engaging, possibly unwittingly, in advocacy for collective over individual action, towards a target audience of one researcher and whoever else might read this analysis. This is evident where one participant, after listing her social movement actions, introduced her personal carbon actions by writing “individual actions (less important)”. Another participant lectured through the survey by writing the following unrequested justification for their listing of direct action: “...I benefit every day from Europe having a high carbon history” (Sarah: Climate Camp FG Survey Part 1).

A further distinction between the strongly engaged participants advocating collective actions and the relatively disengaged, referring only to personal decarbonising behaviour, relates to the legitimacy of the practitioner. For the climate campers and the Ecovillagers there appears to be a proper mode of partaking of personal decarbonising practices, which legitimates them. The practitioner must demonstrate that there is a high moral and ethical concern in her appropriation of these practices and that the goal of the decarbonisation is instilled with collective properties – e.g. “creating culture”, showing “people that it’s possible” (Karen: Climate Camp FG). For some the authenticity of the decarbonisation seemingly depends upon how self-motivated it is. Scott from the Ecovillage indicated this form of legitimacy when he described one of the vignette characters, Rachel, as performing her small-scale decarbonisation because she was “told to do ...by society” (Scott: Ecovillage FG). The climate camper John pointed to “recycling having become the mainstream”, as a reason “to move on and ... maintain a cynical view towards [it]” (LHI). However, both these participants also demonstrated high moral and ethical appreciation of climate change engagement. Ultimately, subscription to this distinction between practitioners as imitators pursuing what society prescribes for them and

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150 Vignette: “Rachel has for many years now been turning her houselights off at night and switching off all her electrical appliances when not in use. Sometimes she wonders if she’s doing enough and considers perhaps doing a bit more.”

151 This mirrors the form of cultural legitimacy Bourdieu observed in *Distinction* where there is a ‘proper’ way to consume high-brow culture based on authenticity as opposed to an improper mode based on imitation (Bourdieu, 1984: 250).
legitimate, self-motivated decarbonizers, is hardly separable from the legitimacies of moral and ethical participation as well.

Judging from the descriptions of decarbonisation by business focus group members the configuration of the economy of practices in their social space sets a different value on the meaning attached to decarbonising practices. Here the frame of individual consumer choice imposes much greater legitimacy to practices and reduces the acceptability for what might be construed as naively idealistic climate change engagement. While at least three of the business group make no reference throughout the primary data collection to high effort forms of decarbonisation, Gearoid and Fiachra did acknowledge high-cost decarbonisation investments. As mentioned above, another form of high-level decarbonising behaviour involves high investment of money. The practices of investment listed included purchase of a Prius, installation of solar panels and expanding foam and eco-beads insulation. Gearoid even enquired into thermal heating. Fiachra also spoke of the energy efficiency interests of other home builders that he knows, suggesting the prevalence of such practices amongst the more immediate members of his social space. However, these practices of investment were not explicitly linked by the participants to climate change engagement. Instead efficiency and cost-saving potential raised the value of certain decarbonisation practices over others. This is not to say that the participants held no environmental considerations but that acting on them must be secondary:

Again if I had a choice, here’s a car that is eco-friendly and has all, does all the things the other car does, comes at relatively, pretty much the same price, runs as efficiently, does everything as well then I think that is a no-brainer you’d go yes I’ll get that car. (Gearoid LHI)

For Fiachra possibilities did exist for a moral motivation to engage with the issue, yet any such rationale it seems would serve only to symbolically devalue his investments according to his reading of the economy of practices. Consequently, he too resorted to a legitimacy based on individual consumer choice.

Other relatively disengaged participants also legitimated decarbonisation practices through the utility that the practices afforded them. For example the teacher Brendan stated: “I cycle as much as is possible but mostly due to ahh you know, for financial reasons and fitness reasons and convenience reasons etc […]” (LHI). As mentioned above, Ruth from the CES applied cost benefits to the value
she placed in cycling. She also claimed to be carrying it out due to added health benefits to her and her children. However no other participants reproduced such palpable expressions of individual consumer choice as the business participants.

The organization of the economy of practices according to the consumer choice frame limits practical engagement with climate change on several levels. It encourages a lack of appreciation for other practices of climate change engagement such as community based-decarbonisation or direct action. It also invalidates some decarbonisation which offers poor financial returns or personal gains on investment. Moreover, the level of decarbonisation by participants who subscribe to the consumer choice frame is strongly dependent upon their economic capital. This may enhance social distinctions within the economy of decarbonising practices as the already limiting individual consumer choice approach severely inhibits lower economic groups from partaking. Two of the production operators concur on this restrictive aspect:

Anna: [...] buying an electric car would cost you a fortune, changing your house over to solar energy will cost you a fortune

Tony: Very prohibitive yah

Anna: [...] it’s a great idea to help the world but the pocket just sometimes doesn’t allow it. (Production Operators FG)

Their discussion portrays how economic restrictions become central to climate change engagement for lower economic groups when the role of the public is squeezed into the narrow possibilities of consumer choice led investment practices.

The underlying instrumental rationale of the consumer choice approach can also be easily sidetracked by other considerations that are enhanced by low economic capital. Economic concerns and a lack of social power proved an obstacle for a student participant seeking new rented accommodation. Without economic reassurance, consideration for the energy efficiency and insulation quality of the house can be overridden by other concerns: not having the potential landlord thinking you are too “fussy”; needing a quick exit from the current house owned by a difficult landlord; the proximity of the previous house which made it easier for them to move their belongings. In the end these same students ended up with a house with a large problem with drafts (Monica: student LHI). While the low economic capital of middle class students relates to the life-course moment of
being a student the example highlights the limitations for engagement that low economic capital brings to practices of decarbonising investment.

The influence of economic capital is not solely dependent upon affordability. The moderating routines of some lower socio-economic backgrounds appeared to encourage a frugality amongst several participants, which proved accommodating to an economising cost-benefit evaluation of decarbonising practices. Fiachra, the business man, directly connected his concerns with waste and energy to the thriftiness of his childhood which was forced upon him by the low economic capital of his family. Despite his current social stature he hailed from a very low income home. He complained of his father's “dogs abuse” working in a meat factory and “often on short-term work because it was the 1980s” (LHI). The cost-saving legitimacy was also applied by participants currently not earning any significant income. The production operator Derrick, who also remembers being told to keep lights off growing up (his father often moved between part-time teaching work and social welfare payments or low-paying council work), claimed to be very conscious of switching off unused appliances in order to save on electricity bills. This highlights the reliance of the economy of decarbonising practices on ingrained inclinations.

However, such frugality didn’t just encourage decarbonisation based on a sense of economic efficiency but also sensitized other participants towards the moral aspects of wastefulness. For example, Mary from the organic grower groups alluded to the poor stock of national economic capital during the 70s – “everything was tight” – and connected to it the origins of her concern with reusing products. This hints at further subtleties of distinction between moral and economistic decarbonisation, working to divide the manner in which frugality feeds into practical climate change engagement.

Interestingly emergent social distinctions within the economy of decarbonising practices encouraged some of the academic members to see other strongly engaged participants as improper practitioners of decarbonisation. Distinguishing between a higher-purpose self-motivated, moral and ethical form of decarbonisation and decarbonisation formed from class-based pretensions towards accumulating status they belittled the engagement of the Ecovillagers. Buying large decarbonising products such as an energy-efficient home or vehicle requires the economic capital and lines of credit of the middle and upper classes. It is with this
in mind that the academics resorted to labelling the Cloughjordan Ecovillage as elitist. One of them pointed to the excessive cost of a site. Although, introducing the figure with the caveat that her source was “anecdotal”, her statement quickly took on the guise of being factual, remaining this way for the ensuing discussion despite being an exaggeration of nearly double the actual price. Moreover, they restricted Ecovillager intentions to a self-interested status-seeking frame: “[...] middleclass petite bourgeoisie elitism; ‘oh look it we are so green and friendly’” (Fergus Academic FG). Their expressed preference is for the more carbon-efficient retrofitting of pre-existing buildings. Still they made no mention of Ecovillage attempts towards representative living.

This section has depicted the existence of a variety of social distinctions in how participants are involved in symbolically and practically ordering decarbonisation practices. The distinctions relate to the two main opposing forms of hierarchy, one organises practices around moral and ethical considerations and is the main approach of the strongly engaged. The other hierarchy pertains to the relatively disengaged and legitimates practices on the basis of utility and personal returns rather than on decarbonising contributions. Although not developed here, the divide between these two hierarchies amongst members of the moderately engaged seemed not as pronounced, with some participants liable to perceive and legitimate practices through both. For the other groups these hierarchies produced distinctions, not just in what counted as ‘proper’ decarbonising practices, but also in legitimate practitioners and practice participation. The manner in which both sides however justified their – and others’ – appropriation of these practices was not necessarily always a true reflection of motivation. Rather these justifications possibly involved particular social expectations based on the distinctive hierarchies and the perceived need to appear ethical and self-motivated or realistic and displaying a kind of utilitarian maturity. Ironically, another form of distinction to emerge based on economic capital allowed higher participation for the businessmen who could afford decarbonising practices of investment. This indicates how affluence might encourage a misleading impression of personal commitment.

152 Participant stated a figure of €130,000: “Each site is sold at cost price. Prices range from €39,000 for a terrace site to €69,000 for a large site for a detached house. In addition, a Community Development Charge applies at the rate of €10,340 for an apartment site and €15,340 for a house site. A large proportion of this goes towards the cost of providing each home with tanks and heat stations for the district heating system” (thevillage.ie, 2013b).
Chapter 7

7.2 Acceptable Carbon Practices: A Qualitative Look into Class-Related Emissions

Highly valued or acceptable high-carbon practices also frequently reflect distinctions related to economic capital. The manner in which class comes to legitimate or impose various high-carbon practices complements this. In addition, specific social space dispositions can encourage high-carbon practices that contradict the environmental values and decarbonising actions of some of the participants. While some of these practices appear in the form of an uncritical acceptance of everyday routines: “[…] you have to have your shower everyday […]” (Monica: Student LHI), for others maintaining or advancing their class position requires additional emissions. Despite the large efforts undertaken by both of the academics interviewed – one from the Ecovillage and the other from the academic group – flying was considered a necessary, even obligatory, requirement of fulfilling their career role:

Fergus: I suppose aspirationally as well […] would be to become carbon neutral but I don’t see how I can possibly ever do that given the nature of the job I’m in and the fact that international travel and attendance at conferences is considered a critical component of your profile and your career activity as well and would be seen very negatively if you weren’t carrying it out. (Academic LHI)

His last ten years he claimed consisted approximately of one long haul and two short haul flights annually.

Although, such academics might consider their work part of their practical climate change engagement – i.e. in terms of informing the public – the career and reputational concerns of academics may harbour some carbon-heavy extrinsic-value orientations. The latter was much more visible with one of the participants, Fergus, who also listed extrinsic goals of making professor and moving up through the department as some of his priorities. He provided a frank admittance to having purchased a “high status” car. The desire behind the purchase, he linked to the friends in school that he maintained contact with: “[…] highflying professionals and so on and they all have high status cars […]” (LHI). He did however seek additional legitimation of his purchase through an individual consumer choice logic of decarbonisation: “[…] some of the high status cars actually have very good
emissions because am they’re obviously highly engineered [...]” (ibid). This contradicts his strong decarbonizer efforts and his moral legitimisation of aiming to leave “this world a better place than when I found it” (Fergus: Academic, LHI). Of course the habitus is not a linear concept but a systemic one, composed of multiple dispositions. It is quite possible that these contradictory motivations are both present in Fergus. Indeed the incongruous conditions of the carbon-heavy competitiveness of Ireland’s economy – in which the university is now heavily immersed – and the environmentalist push towards decarbonisation likely give birth to such dispositional conflict. This dispositional conflict is what Bourdieu refers to as the “cleft habitus” (Bourdieu, 2007: 100), which Chapter 8 deals with in more detail.

For others extra economic wealth can lead a person into higher emission rates. Scott, despite all his lifestyle changes, membership of the Ecovillage and environmental educational efforts, guiltily admitted to an estimated 200 long haul flights during his lifetime. Many of these were attributed to ‘love miles’ that arose from being non-native, married to an Irish woman and living in Ireland, while his relatives lived thousands of miles away.

The response of one student to a hypothetical situation further highlights how economic capital widens access to and encourages carbon-heavy practices. In asking the students would they purchase a high-carbon emitting vehicle if they were in possession of a lot of money, the moderately engaged student who displayed the strongest concern towards climate change replied:

Mat: *yah I probably would [...] then again I would probably [...] also carbon offset at the same time if I had a load of money.*

This example reveals the extent to which a person’s economic capacity associated with his/her class background can result in obvious consequences to how people respond to climate change (Production Operator FG).

Other aspects of class and social space associated with higher emitting practices were found among some participants with intrinsic-value orientations. As noted in the preceding chapters, such orientations can encourage pro-environmental dispositions and practices. However, they also played a part in legitimising the practice of flying. Former Steiner students interviewed for this study displayed intrinsic orientations but also shared the same propensity for numerous annual flights. Moreover, Steiner schooling appears to have facilitated this, at least to
some extent, with regular group tours abroad leading pupils to forge strong international friendships. At the same time, these trips served to encourage and reinforce an intrinsic-value orientation, and provide further motivation to travelling abroad:

_Helen: Cos that’s the goal of those exchanges as well as always getting to learn about the different cultures which is always really nice._ (LHI)

Mariel had flown to Italy six times in the previous six months. She listed travelling as her number one priority and had gained a friend in Italy through her travelling experiences with the Steiner community. Her future plans involved travelling to Slovenia, Morocco and Jordan. The latter two were because she also had friends in those places. Her activities with the Fishbowl153 had played a clear part in building her fascination with travelling and her international connections:

_Mariel: [...] I worked with fishbowl youth a lot which meant I travelled a lot. We did a project on democracy yah [...] It was amazing [...] we created all these ideas and then last year cause I was working with them pretty much full-time we actually put these ideas to action [...] yah I love it like it’s, I think it’s I wanna work with young people in the future, I don’t know, as long as I still get to travel it’s all good._ (LHI)

This orientation in part stimulates organic grower Eilis to fly abroad: “[…] fascinating just to see how other people do things and I think that’s one thing about going abroad, you is that you kind of have to get into how the locals live and work and stuff like that […]”(LHI). Although unclear as to how often, flying is again the prominent carbon-intensive practice that she allows herself. She utilises her other forms of decarbonisation to justify her flying:

_Eilis: [...] every other area of my life is kind of designed to minimise my impact [...] I’m doing as much as anyone you know could possibly do I think really to minimise the effects of climate change [...]. (LHI)_

Although some emotive connections, from strong guilt to subtle anxiety,
accompanied the mention of flying by the strongly engaged, they all remain
destined to continue. Despite their commitments to freeing themselves from
carbon-intensive practices, giving up flying seemed a step too far. Moreover, for
many other interviewees such as Mariel from the Steiner group flying remained
unconnected to their decarbonising efforts. Here again a certain amount of
economic capital facilitates partaking in the practice:

\[\text{Alan: [...] I suppose circumstances change as you get a little bit more}
\text{comfortable you can afford, you can afford these bits and pieces}
\text{y'know. (Farmer LHI)}\]

This is also evident in how Fiachra from the business group had taken weekly
short-haul flights for a period of time whilst running his business.

One of the younger participants from the student group also exhibited what
might be described as the normalisation of flying for the young middle classes.
Whereas a few of the older participants – e.g. Alan, Eilis, Fergus – spoke of flying
as either a recent occurrence or recounted their first experience abroad as
something very significant, the same could not be said with regard to Monica. The
first-year student at first quickly downplayed a preceding statement that she had
not been abroad a lot without her family to: “not a lot but [...]”. She then offered a
vague recollection of multiple international short-haul flights over very recent
years; six of which appear to have happened since she was 18 (her age during the
interview being approximately 20), exclaiming “[...] it’s all but basically last
minute things like [...]” (Monica: Student LHI). Here class-related economic
capacities, lifestyle and age interact to produce a normalised acceptance of regular
flying.

Relatively disengaged members again used instrumental rather than moral
reasoning to weigh up the propriety of some carbon practices. Some CES members
used it to legitimate the purchasing of a four-wheel-drive – which they granted
unconfirmed health and safety commendations. The narrative of the ‘family car’
also served to maintain the four-wheel-drive’s acceptability. The child restraint seat
legislation introduced in 2006 has massively contributed to this narrative by
making larger vehicles necessary for the transportation of more than two children
(Briscoe, 2012). Use of the four-wheel-drive was an especially normalised carbon
practice amongst the farmers: including for the most environmentally conscientious
farmer. Some of the farmers even responded defiantly to the introduction of the four-wheel-drive vignette:

[Unidentified farmer]: (cheering) go on!!

[Unidentified farmer]: Fair play to him!\(^{154}\)

It is unclear how necessary the practice was for these farmers and how much their four-wheel-drive usage extended beyond farm work. Does owning such a vehicle necessitate owning a secondary vehicle for non-farm work driving? The only particular that this project entertains is how the practice’s legitimacy was confined to the amoral frame of consumer choice.

### 7.3 Practices of Informedness and Sourcing Information on Climate Change

Class too opens up differences in practical climate engagement based upon cultural capital. An important part of this engagement involves becoming informed about climate change and maintaining an interest in knowledge related to the issue. Examining participant engagement with the practices of sourcing information expands upon how cultural capital imbalances contributed to alienating most relatively disengaged participants and greater participation amongst the strongly and moderately engaged.

The strongly engaged participants referred mostly to high-cultural practices of information-sourcing in their responses to a question on how participants sourced climate change information. This question I asked to all focus groups save for the Ecovillage. It is safe, however, to presume that the well-versed, highly qualified Ecovillager participants, some of whom publish on the topic, maintain efforts to keep abreast of the ongoing issue. The sole interviewed Ecovillager mentioned academic and intergovernmental sources such as reports from the United Nations Development Project (UNDP). Academic journals, the most elite knowledge source, were mentioned by the academics and the climate campers. For these sourcing legitimated information on climate change was a valued practice, an obvious essential component of being an academic in sustainability studies. Amongst the climate campers, some argued against the pointlessness of just

\(^{154}\) Due to a lot of talking over each other at this point the speakers could not be identified.
reading and researching without ever taking action. However, staying informed and maintaining an updated fluency with dominant climate change knowledge is a necessary part of communicating the movement: their relative fluency supports this conclusion. Nature columns such as Viney’s in the Irish Times or organic growing and environmentalist magazines and websites granted regular access to the topic of climate change for the organic growers. Other elite sources of information were the magazines and websites, namely New Scientist, whose articles are formed out of the findings of peer-reviewed journals. Again the academics named this source, but it was also listed by one of the teachers: although keeping informed was less a priority for the teacher and more of an intermittent necessity for preparing CSPE\textsuperscript{155} lessons.

Steiner and production operators referred to documentaries which indicates lower commitment to practices of keeping informed on climate change, as documentaries require less effort. They also lack the capacity of producing regular updates and watching them is likely to be a less regular occurrence than reading up on climate change. The lowering of the cultural capital content for these participants’ information sourcing was also indicated by claiming nonspecific websites as sources. The websites remained unnamed even when queried, save for one comment on Wikipedia. The reduced participation in climate change information-sourcing practices continued with the students. Except for one environmentally conscientious participant, they only regarded climate change in passing but were open to watching documentaries on it. Still, being somewhat informed held importance for three of the students enrolled in earth science courses, mainly to appear knowledgeable. Despite this weak commitment, accessing information on the issue of climate change was a respected practice for these groups.

The practice of sourcing information was very low on the ontological hierarchy of the majority of farmers who, although seeing it as an omnipresent news item, ignored it. The excuse of powerlessness – “\textit{what in the name of Jesus can we do about it}” – was used by one member. One of the farmer interviewees stated that he would not put in the effort to find information on it, nor would he read about it if he came across it in the paper. Two exceptions were the teachers:

\textsuperscript{155}Civic Social and Political Education (CSPE) is a post-primary subject which teaches on important social issues such as climate change.
one retired and current. For one, uncovering information proved important for maintaining the image of appearing knowledgeable, which he did by preparing for the focus group. The other had a strong attachment to ‘nature’, read national geographic and considered being informed a necessary complement to his construction studies involving aspects of energy efficiency.

In many ways the CES group excluded themselves from climate change through refraining from sourcing information on the topic. The role of their low cultural and symbolically dominated position is quite apparent in the justification they supplied:

Shane: [...] if you read too much about it you can...
Maura: get confused
Shane: get confused.

Practices of maintaining some insight into the climate change science and its developments were rated poorly and considered a futile endeavour by the relatively disengaged businessmen:

Seamus: [...] I’ve never actually read or sought out a scientific journal on global warming and I haven’t even seen the Al Gore film and ah I’m I love films but I haven’t gone to find Al Gore’s so I guess it’s a long way for, I’m a long way from keeping myself informed [...]. (Business FG)

Despite not going out of their way to source information, these participants still encountered the issue in their large intake of current affairs media. Fiachra did read up on climate change but mostly through the focus of business magazines and their websites or upon its appearance in the Irish Times. The fourth participant with strong environmental leanings appeared to be inclined towards keeping informed: although that is inferred from his prompting on another participant’s description of the potential gulf-stream feedback mechanism.

The degree of hesitancy and proficiency with which participants approached climate change information appeared to be linked to the activation of past practices of information gathering. One of the clearest patterns to emerge from the 19 interviewees was that those capable of dealing with the issue, through legitimate rhetoric, regularly accessed various mediums of legitimated knowledge during their upbringing. That is those who could discuss through reference to technical science,
economic or regulatory descriptions with at least a modicum of verbal competence. Conversely, those who struggled or were the most hesitant to engage with climate change, in terms of its dominant symbolic forms, proved similarly reluctant towards accessing legitimated mediums of elite discourse and knowledge.

These distinctions corresponded with differences in the habituation of an ease with legitimated forms of knowledge. The legitimated forms of knowledge referred to here are those disseminated throughout the education system but also widely available through news broadcasts, broadsheet opinion pieces and media debates that feature knowledge from various recognised experts. This expertise – although its legitimacy varies according to receptivity and changes in societal power relations – is primarily ascribed to university-accredited elites. Regularly accessing these legitimated forms of knowledge through the mainstream media could encourage some confidence and competency in certain expert discourses. Although mainstream media is inherently popularizing, this amounts to a practice of elite cultural informedness, with the sources generally restricted to current affairs news broadcasts and broadsheet newspaper articles or broadsheet newspaper websites. Into this medium of elite public notifications, dominant climate change knowledge is rewritten for public consumption (see Chapter 4). It must be added that as recognised in Chapter 4, Irish media is a domain that privileges the middle-class experience and interpretation. It is also the discourse of the dominant professionalised journalistic class.

Of the interviewees, those displaying an, at least passable, composure with the topic – i.e. a composure that does not easily reveal them to be uneasy or particularly ignorant of the topic – had all been regular readers and or viewers of broadsheets or ‘the news’ broadcasts during their years living in the family home.\(^\text{156}\) This access appears to be somewhat empowering in that it facilitates the development of the capacity to play the game of ‘serious’ and ‘informed’ discussion. Even participants, that practiced the latter form of consumption, with parents of relatively humble economic and cultural capital – two of the business interviewees, one of the climate campers – also displayed this particular ‘feel for the game’.

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\(^{156}\) Though, businessman Fiachra was unsure if he read much of the daily newspaper growing up. However, he did have access to other popularised academic discourse resources such as children’s science books on how things worked and an encyclopaedia that his parents had invested in for him.
The same experience with these forms of legitimated knowledge was lacking for relatively disengaged interviewees, who exhibited the least compunction to discuss climate change in a direct and descriptive manner. Ruth, from the CES group, who was genuinely intimidated at the sudden prospect of having to discuss climate change during her life history, also did not watch TV news broadcasts or read newspapers growing up. She revealed her procrastination in regard to sourcing information in general. As part of the BA she was undertaking at the time of the interview she was required to prepare a diary of news and current affairs media coverage throughout the course. However, rather than maintaining the diary she had accumulated a large mass of media items including recordings of Vincent Brown’s TV3 current affairs show, but was yet to watch it:

*Ruth:* No, I don’t dare sit down and watch Vincent Brown but when I go to writing my diary I have any amount of information there for me.

*(LHI)*

This type of postponement is likely commonplace across an education system oriented towards end of term or end of year examinations. Yet, if the habitus is primarily forged over prolonged exposure to day-to-day social patterns and practices then brief periods cramming for an exam, or in this case sifting through political debate, hardly provides much habitual force for the habitus to form the relevant cultural skill sets. Interviewee Alan similarly hinted at a background absent in current affairs and news items.

*Alan:* [...] not books no, there’d be always a newspaper thrown around

*Interviewer:* and would you yourself be looking at it?

*Alan:* Ah ya would yea yea, yea ya would, not an awful lot. *(Farmer, LHI)*

His contemporary reading patterns also appear to diminish access to public expertise: “first thing I’d look at is sport, second thing I’d look at is deaths and the third thing I'd look at is front page to see what was, what were the main topics” (ibid). It is difficult to establish the degree to which other farmers engaged with middle class media sources but of all the groups their paternal and maternal educational backgrounds were the lowest.

Moreover Alan’s newspaper consumption contrasted sharply with some of
the more issue-composed participants:

Interviewer: any particular sections

Fiachra: No I read through it, sports, current affairs, business

Interviewer: World affairs?

Fiachra: Not so much world affairs, ah more am, more kind of Irish politics, kind of current affairs kind of stuff again. (Businessman, LHI)

Pat: I wouldn’t buy The Sun or The Star cos I would just find them as like pointless drivel, I would try to buy like The Guardian or The Independent. One of the ones that would kind of like actually have a bit of content, whether or not that content might have a particular angle or not, I would try and get one where you would actually get a little bit of national, environmental or political news and then global political or environmental news. (Climate Camper, LHI)

Although the latter participant is more invested in and committed to sourcing information on the issue of climate change than the former, both these participants would not shy away from the climate change subject were they to encounter it.

Finally differences again emerged along high cultural capital and low cultural capital lines concerning the legitimacy of certain newspapers over others. Many of the academics and climate campers mentioned The Guardian as a source for finding information on climate change. The Irish Times was the most referred to Irish broadsheet, used to keep abreast of Irish current affairs, by the participants who were not reluctant to discuss climate change. The farmer Alan, who had only heard of climate change about two years ago, declared his trust in the Irish Independent broadsheet and the tabloid the Sunday World to give him “correct information” (LHI). This contrasted sharply to those exhibiting the most legitimated forms of discourse whilst discussing climate change. Amongst these participants both the Irish Independent and the tabloids were often dismissed. The Irish Independent was described as “doesn’t give correct information on anything” (Noel: Farmer, LHI); not part of “the good newspapers” (academics’ FG). Its Sunday edition was labelled a “rag” (Brendan: Teacher, LHI). Tabloids, where sparsely mentioned, drew the descriptions of “sensationalist” (Academics’ FG) and
“bullshit” (Pat: climatecamper, LHI). The emergent social distinctions again appear obvious.

### 7.4 Conversing with Climate Change and Continuing Patterns of Exclusion

Another practice investigated was that of communicating climate change. This involved how climate change fitted into practices of conversation and whether attempts were made by interviewees to inform others about climate change. For Bourdieu the act of conversing\(^{157}\) is also a means of bringing together broad societal power relations into a micro-struggle, wherein particular ways of classifying the world are consecrated over others (Wacquant, 1992, 14). This includes an unconscious struggle to validate forms of conversational practices and discussion topics, which has obvious relevance for engaging people with the issue.

For the relatively disengaged with low cultural capital the translation of climate change into everyday conversational practices appeared most likely to occur through reference to the country’s spate of strange or unusual weather patterns in recent years. Discussing climate change in terms of weather is the safe option requiring no attention to elite sources. Those participants who excluded themselves from the sourcing of climate change information were as likely to employ the same self-exclusion in not discussing the concept directly. Many self-excluders exhibited reluctance with the topic during the research and even an apprehension with the research situation itself: namely some members of the farmers and the CES groups.

Symbolic violence reinforces the conversational self-exclusion of these participants. A similar symbolic violence appeared to be in operation when, prior to the Ecovillage focus group, I attempted to recruit an Ecovillage member who was also a builder. He had it seems been informed by one of the focus group members as to who would be partaking. His genuine reluctance towards participating was supported, through implying how he could not contribute more than what these high-status members had to offer. Likewise, a visitor to the 2010 climate camp

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\(^{157}\) This is not to say that conversational interaction is the only means according to Bourdieu: e.g. non-conversational routine exchanges or informal daily exhibitions of trends or fashion.
event, and who happened to leave the event early, confided in me of her trepidation at being asked questions about climate change by other campers: the camp appeared to be well stocked with issue-savvy activists.

Mariel presents an interesting contrast to the latter. Although part of a very middle class Steiner community, she stems from a working class familial background. She herself had not acquired the leaving certificate. However, whether due to the empowering effects of the Steiner background – discussed in Chapter 5 – or an exposure to conversational practices engaged in by the Steiner community, she expressed no qualms in discussing climate change with anyone. This is illustrated by her description of a conversation in an elevator occurring on the day of her interview with a woman she barely knew.\footnote{She had only met the person a few days earlier on a course that both of them had enrolled in.}

\textit{Mariel: [...] the woman was like yah sure you know I don’t get why people take the stairs if there’s a lift right there and I’m like shur I do cause it wastes loads of energy and all that you know, it’s effecting climate change and that so if they’re feeling very guilty for being in the lift but am, but you know.}

This participant did not demonstrate any particularly sophisticated and technical grasp of the issue throughout the recordings, but still felt sufficiently at ease with the topic to discuss it with a stranger. In the end she expressed her surprise that the other person had “nothing to say”. The latter suggests the valid and normalised condition of climate change as a topic of discussion amongst the Steiner community. She also claimed that her and her friends (many of whom were former Steiner) discussed it regularly.

For some high-cultural capital participants who were not strongly engaged the topic had limited or no conversational legitimacy. This lack of legitimacy was additionally based on a general view that climate change was not compatible with acceptable conversational practices. They presumed others would not be interested. The economics teacher, for example, rarely enters into discussion on the subject, claiming his friends are indifferent. Gearoid from the business group reduced the value of climate change being mentioned at work among his nine or ten colleagues to the status of a passing reference or on a “very benign level” (LHI). Similarly to Brendan he pointed to the inability of the majority of most of his colleagues to add
value to it due to their general lack of concern. Fiachra admitted to discussing it in a pub but only “possibly with certain friends”. The legitimated depth of the discussion was again relatively benign with the implication being that there’s no point in getting anxious about something liable to “happen probably anyway” (Fiachra Business FG).

Yet despite dismissiveness, the business group members are not adherents to a subordinate self-censorship. As evidenced from the focus group, they are not reticent in discussing a topic that at least two of them have paid passing attention to. Indeed, armed with various legitimated regulatory and economic discourses they feel empowered to do so.

A moderately engaged and climate science astute teacher also provided similar justifications for this issue evasion within discussions. The evasion here is based on presumptions as to what people would want to hear:

*Michele: [...] with my regular friends no it would never really come up, I don’t think they’d want to talk about it [...] again I’d say it’s probably because of fear and just the thoughts of what could happen, they probably would admit they feel it a depressing conversation so probably avoid it. (Teachers FG)*

Underlying these justifications are sentiments that express the marginality of the climate change advocacy position. Its voiced presence is delegitimized here on the basis of contravening ontological hierarchies of conversational practice, positive emotions and the ‘good life’.

This influence of hierarchical ideas of the good life also emerged with regard to practices of pub-talk. The students drew a line between pub-talk and the discussion of climate change. Its depiction as being “a bit depressing” (Jennifer: Students’ FG) served as a delegitimizing descriptor; more gravely a participant from the CES group likened a discussion on climate change to discussing the plague. The ontological invasion of the gravity of climate change irked with the social domains of pub-life: a space reserved by some to exclude anything bearing too much gravity.

Even communicating climate change in a serious manner seemed sometimes an infringement of the carefree and liable to single a person out. Student participant, Eddie, projected a keen interest in climate change: in its science and in
decarbonising his everyday practices. In so doing he drew the description of “passionate” by the life history interviewees. They both expressed “surprise” at the sincerity with which he spoke about climate change. One student even defended his view of Eddie as though speaking passionately on climate change were a *faux pas*: “I don’t think less of him or anything like that” (Robert LHI). This public display of strong concern also caused the other interviewee to depict him as somewhat different: “he’s one of these people that are really deep” (Monica: Student LHI).

As to be expected, climate change was more a valid topic of discussion for the strongly engaged. One climate camper explicitly saw conversation as an important part of fulfilling her role in responding to climate change. The academic Fergus too is regularly engaged in awareness-raising. His academic position is merged with climate change and he discusses it with everyone pretty much everywhere, including the pub. However, he is all too conscious of the sometimes frustrated nature of his efforts’ returns:

> Fergus: [...] I’ve had debates with professional people, with lawyers and doctors and dentists who don’t understand climate change, even after I explain to them [...] they still ask me the most ridiculous amazing questions [...].

He described the glazing over of eyes that he encounters when he tries to impart the seriousness of the issue to friends and colleagues. Similarly, a member of the Ecovillage spoke of being “blank[ed]” out by others, whom he tries to inform. Despite their efforts and their symbolic capital, conversational properties of climate change appear to be reduced around them to marginal legitimacy: i.e. not yet accepted as a common topic.

This low social acceptance for the issue in the economy of conversational practices serves to cause some informed and politicised members to engage in censoring the issue. In the climate camp focus group Karen, who was noted by one other participant as a high-status environmentalist member within the group, stated:

> I would find, I would be really self consciousness about doing that like even people knowing that I’m involved in any kind of climate change

159 Although, the Ecovillagers admitted to becoming conversationally waylaid by the more practical concerns of completing their sustainability project.
campaign makes me shy away from talking about it because I just
don’t want to piss them off and bore them am with bringing it up all
time. (FG)

This conversational exclusion by those more engaged in the issue recurred on
several occasions during the fieldwork. It is perhaps more typically represented in
the seemingly benign depiction of the exclusion offered by Mary, the organic
grower, when asked whether she would tell people what climate change mitigating
actions to take: “[…] sometimes, it depends who you’re talking to really doesn’t
it?” (LHI). The organic growers recalled examples of how these kinds of
distinctions were reproduced between themselves and local farmers. A sense of the
otherworldliness between them is conveyed by Mary, who explained why she did
not approach a neighbouring farmer over his destruction of a wild crop of
blackberries. The apparent marginality of Mary’s position underlines her
explanation:

Mary: [...] if I went around looking at the farmer saying “what did
you do to them brambles, you know, you fecked up my blackberry
picking season”, they’d probably be looking at me, “oh what’s wrong
with your one” like [...]. (Organic Growers FG)

The exclusion evident in the patterns of conversational practices is
exacerbated by the elective affinities and social networking practices of engaged
participants. Tovey (2007) noted in her study the prominence of strong networks in
the maintenance of environmental groups. These networks offer social capital
benefits for those connected to them – such as an effective knowledge resource –
but can, it seems, also serve to exclude those that are not part of them. The climate
camper, John, who claiming to not read “a lot” 160 on environmental issues, relied
on documentaries and being “friends with enough people who do know all the
facts”. He described his idea of socialising as:

John: “[...] think it’s a really good way to learn about different
subjects, rather than just reading books on it just talk to people who
study those things whether it’s something, whether to hang out with

160 Quantifying his version of ‘a lot’ is difficult. It is liable – if he happens to gauge from his
peers who read books, by academics, on the subject – to be similar to or even more than the
claims by many others who would use the term ‘a lot’.
The exclusionary mode in which this heightened social capital exists is suggested by his propensity to socialise with certain types, preferring “open-minded” people to the “close-minded” colleagues of his engineering department. He sees them as favouring technological solutions to climate change, which he deems as conservative. One of the reasons behind why he attends so many activist events is because he enjoys the type of people that he gets to meet at them:

[...] they’re just more my type of people [...], anti-mainstream [...], most of the time when you’re talking about music you’re not going to be talking about music that’s in the charts, if you’re talking about films you’re not going to talk about blockbusters, it’s a general left of field. (Climate Camper LHI)

Perhaps, this might explain how he hadn’t encountered any contrariants until “two or three years ago”. (LHI) Sean from the Ecovillage echoed this pattern of network-based conversational exclusion. His broad circle of environmentalists and academics, among others, is mainly made up of the climate concerned: “by and large the sort of people I mix among will tend to be convinced that this is a major issue”. He also distances himself from contrarians claiming that he rarely meets them and that conversations with them don’t “get very far” as he has “very little patience” for dealing with them. (Ecovillager LHI).

7.5 Conclusion: Social Distinction within Practices of Engagement with Climate Change

The forms of exclusion and self-censorship that this chapter discusses clearly reveal the delineating capacity of social space to create divisions in how the public respond to climate change. The ontological hierarchies, elective affinities, social, cultural and economic capital of social space, all play a part in reinforcing class-based distinctions in practices of engagement with climate change. The cultural capital of participants and the symbolic violence of the climate change topic again play a highly influential role and exclude those for whom such capital is lacking. These people subjugate themselves to a form of practical self-censorship from expert constructions of climate change. However, the capacity of certain familial
and community investments during childhood, such as empowering forms of education – i.e. Steiner – and in types of cultural capital – e.g. broadsheets – appeared to stave off some incapacitating effects of class deprivations. This observation is revisited in more detail in Chapter 8.

Adding to the usefulness of the Bourdieusian framework, this chapter has also reproduced the symbolic order distinctions already apparent in earlier parts of this study. In doing so, it clearly demonstrates the divisive influence of socio-cultural relations and societal relations of power on climate change receptivity. The individualisation of responsibility and individual consumer choice options, which are in keeping with the dominant symbolic order and the reformist position, were shown again to strongly influence the relatively disengaged participants. This influence involved informing them of their practical role in engaging with climate change. These approaches proved to be severely limiting and exclusionary with regard to the range of decarbonising practices that participants could choose from.

The strongly engaged also repeated, through their practices, the more subordinated moral and ethical response. However, on this occasion, an interesting conflict emerged highlighting the resistance of certain class conditions, based on wealth and careers, to decarbonising practices. This proved to even be the case for strongly engaged participants. How field and social space organises the economy of practices by distributing and normalising where certain practices occur – i.e. the prevalence of the practice of flying in the field of academia – can impose very real restrictions on decarbonisation. Chapter 8 looks again at these findings – along with those from the three previous chapters – in order to see how societal restrictions on climate change engagement can be overcome. One of the main objectives of the chapter is to visualise a form of climate change engagement where participants can escape being alienated from it by the limitations of their capital and by the narrow categories that symbolic violence imposes upon their receptivity.
Chapter 8

8 From Broad Societal Power to Participant Social Space: Putting the ‘Social’ into Climate Change Receptivity

Finally, in this chapter the thesis reaches the culmination of its double reading by revisiting the findings to discuss how regularities and power relations of Irish society contribute to participants’ climate change receptivity. The main societal pattern suggested by the research and expanded upon here is the potential importance for climate change receptivity of the relationship between social space and dominant symbolic order. In this research the further participants’ social space is from the dominant social spaces, the more these spaces appear resistant to, or alienated from, the Irish dominant symbolic order. Participant social spaces, closer to and/or more reflective of these dominant social spaces, such as the businessmen, were most accepting of the logic embedded in the symbolic order. In this acceptance they too tended to accept the dominant symbolic order translation of climate change. I develop this in more detail in the opening section: although more in terms of its theoretical generalisability rather than actual representativeness due to the qualitative nature of much of the research.

The chapter also revisits the research through Bourdieu’s prism of symbolic violence and drawing on and expanding the ideas of deliberative democracy it identifies a very anti-democratic ‘climate change’. I argue that this analysis of Irish society, along with group-specific participant data, illustrates how the symbolic ordering of climate change within a society, combined with the unequal distribution of cultural, social, economic and symbolic capital, limits access to the ongoing debate and decarbonisation efforts. Policy-makers, climate scientists and mainstream social scientists all play a part in the symbolic ordering processes and in reproducing structures of exclusion and symbolic violence. They serve to reduce ‘climate change’ to narrow and alienating discourses and pigeonhole the role of the public, thereby diminishing the public’s own sense of issue ownership.

In response subsection 8.2.2 provides some recommendations for democratising ‘climate change’. This incorporates combining the ‘politics of fields’ and ‘habitus’ with ideas from deliberative democracy. These recommendations are
proffered towards interested parties who are engaged in the issue of climate change: be they campaigners, policy-makers, concerned citizens but also contrarians who recognise the value of enhancing freedom and inclusiveness. The recommendations aim towards facilitating a more inclusive role for the public in climate change. The type of inclusion is modelled on participatory and deliberative forms of democracy and is derived from the findings and Bourdieu’s own recommendations on expanding freedom. Ultimately, the depiction is of democratising climate change through rendering the determinants of social relations a more salient part of societal symbolic orders and social space. It also entails cultivating networks for more inclusive participation.

Future social science research on climate change receptivity has also a vital part to play in democratising climate change. This is developed in the final section which deals with future research recommendations. These relay the importance of an in-depth recognition of society for studying how people come to receive and respond to climate change. The potential of future research to broaden the representativeness of some of this thesis’ findings is also discussed in this section. I also answer some questions that might be raised over my application of the Bourdieusian framework, which are in need of resolving for the sake of future applications.

8.1 Climate Change Receptivity and Relationships of Assimilation, Resistance and Subordination to the Dominant Symbolic Order

This thesis has shown that participants’ receptivity to climate change is linked to their social space and field position: e.g. the value of informedness amongst teachers, the prestige of climate science literacy for academics, or the relationship of participants’ cultural capital to their composure with associated expert discourses of climate change. A further pattern to emerge in differences in participant climate change engagement suggest a major role for how readily participant social spaces accept the underlying doxa of Irish society and conform to Ireland’s dominant symbolic order. Participants whose social space most reflects the dominant symbolic order and whose social distance is closest to it appeared more likely to display – or be encouraged to display by peers – weak reformist
proclivities that mirror prevailing trends in national and international climate change thinking and policy. On the other hand, this type of reformism is largely resisted by those who occupy social spaces that are least accommodating to the dominant symbolic order.

As demonstrated in Chapter 4, weak reformism, completely subordinate to economic growth, is the dominant representative form of decarbonisation legitimated by the dominant symbolic order. Dominant climate change representations are defined materially (e.g. extreme weather events), symbolically (e.g. the work of climate scientist and academics) and through how that representation merges with the dominant societal symbolic order. The dominant symbolic structure serves to project a vision of climate change and decarbonisation into the world, which is individualised, gradual and can co-exist with the economy and other social structures, largely as they currently are. This project shows how Irish economic nationalism, the competition state and economism have left little room for moral discourses on climate change or for recognition of the country’s decarbonisation role in terms of responsibility to the broader global community and indeed future generations. This is reinforced by reformist appeals to the pocket along with the classlessness of public discourse and the depoliticisation of civil society. The following section discusses the participant spaces that are more closely aligned to this symbolic societal configuration and how that contributes to climate change engagement.

8.1.1 Reflecting the Dominant Position in Assimilated Social Spaces

The social space of the business group is the most closely associated with the dominant symbolic order. This is not surprising as the dominant symbolic order is heavily indebted to the influence of the business field. In many ways dominant social spaces of multinational executives, public and private directors who hold large sway over the state greatly influence that order, which in many ways is the national legitimation of the culture pertaining to the business class. The business participants in this study, although not all as powerful, share similar interests and respect for the economistic perspective. In that regard the economics secondary
teacher who is trained in mainstream economism up to the level of a Masters degree is also more closely related.

With the exception of the greenest of the business participants who removed himself from much of the focus group discussion,\textsuperscript{161} these participants produced the most apathetic comments with matter-of-fact references to an unrepentant individual self-interest inherent within the general public. This variant of climate change individualism supported opting out from personal responsibility, on the understanding that other individuals pursue the logic of “looking after number one” (Business FG). Viewing the world in terms of self-interest or as something towards which one need only respond through some form of private consumption can have a self-fulfilling dimension to it. Anticipating the struggle to decarbonise society as both a hopeless and amoral cause absolves one of having to consider their own actions or to engage in the issue too deeply. In effect, their belief of self-interest encourages them to act self-interested. Group members also conformed to the dominant weak reformism in favour of the hierarchy of economic nationalism. This closely resembles findings from Mary Kelly’s study who elicited from her environmental managers’ business group a narrative of diminished environmental responsibility due to the self-interested individualism inherent in human nature and the dominance of economic processes (Kelly, 2007: 67-9). The study, concerning environmental debates, was conducted in Ireland in 2003 and involved multiple focus group discussions amongst various occupational, activist and local groups. There was even the manager who, voicing a romantic discourse concerning trees, felt the need to dissociate himself from environmentalists while derisively adding that “I haven’t got the woolly jumper with me in the car” (ibid: 46). This harks back to the dissociative efforts made by businessman Fiachra to not have his energy-lowering investments interpreted as environmentalist actions. Again, this dismissive position towards activists and environmentalism is synonymous with the dominant symbolic order. Although both Kelly’s and this project’s groups are too small to draw more general conclusions, they offer grounds for more broad-ranging future research.

\textsuperscript{161}This participant, however, does not appear to be radically resistant to the dominant symbolic order as it manifests within his social space. His enquiry into the competitiveness of renewable technology (co-conducted with Fiachra) points to his support for the green economy, of which the dominant symbolic order is somewhat accommodating; especially regarding the potential for profit and economic growth.
Larger studies exist that support the conclusion that exposure to the economism of the dominant order reinforces the belief in and legitimisation of self-interest. The disseminated prevalence of Adam Smith’s tenet of self-interest within mainstream economics informs this economism. One study showed Israeli economics students, who upon starting their first-year, rated honesty, helpfulness, responsibility and loyalty the same as students in other subjects. Third-year economics students, on the other hand, rated these values significantly less than their first-year peers. Similar results emerged in tracking game theory (a form of behavioural economics) students through their first semester, finding that they appeared more self-interested by the semester’s end (Carrigan, 2013b). Although the socio-cultural relations involved in each study should be taken into account before drawing ultimate conclusions, the evidence is suggestive of further powers of conformity the closer one’s position is to the dominant symbolic order. This observation, coupled with the illustrative reactions of Fiachra and Kelly’s environmental manager above who seem unduly compelled to avoid association with environmentalism, recalls the expression by Marx as cited by Bourdieu in State Nobility: “the dominant are dominated by their domination” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1989: 4). In this sense although elevated to positions of social power the logic of those positions also operates an effect on them as they uncritically maintain that logic in the course of holding or advancing their positions of power.

### 8.1.2 Anti-doxic Spaces: Building Counter Symbolic Orders

Some strongly engaged participants hold a share in the technical expertise of the dominant social spaces and symbolic order such as the retired engineer and the architect from the Ecovillage. However, climate change and their responses to it have played a part in distancing them from the established order. Becoming radical environmentalists can be seen in the research as a transformation in social space. New forms of social capital are formed from the Ecovillage, climate camp, and broad array of other environmentalist networks. New skills, such as the skills of living sustainably or of direct action are valued and a new illusio founded upon social change becomes inscribed in their daily existence. These participants are actively engaged in detaching themselves from the dominant symbolic order and some even from the class backgrounds that would have aligned them more closely
to that order: i.e. the climate campers whose parents are engineers, bank managers and architects.

It is as if climate change, being a product of an individualising capitalist system, is revealing the arbitrariness of an economic growth doxa and encouraging participants to renounce the self-interest and individuality of that system. This is especially true of the environmentalist participants, actively pursuing possibilities for an alternative value system and strongly advocating thinking systemically and responding collectively; along with aligning that response with a sense of contentment rather than sacrifice. Indeed, the moral and emotive motivations of environmentalists, aided by various social and cultural capacities – e.g. fluency in climate change discourses, environmentalist connections – opposes much of the tenets of rational choice and the dominant rationalist perspective. This is particularly the case where activists remain committed despite recurring feelings of hopelessness or of recognition of the low possibility of achieving climate mitigating objectives. In a rather fascinating contrast to Norgaard’s Norwegian community where residents, in the grip of socially organized denial work to limit emotional attachment to the issue, some of the environmentalist participants reinforce their position of advocacy through becoming emotionally attached. Consider for example the sense of urgency expressed by those displaying a doomsday clock temporality. It would seem that through the call of morality, supportive networks, an alternative value system, these persons are willing to face negative climate change emotions: some even to the point of depression.

The field space they enter into offers these strongly engaged participants a recurring critique of the status quo. Dispositions of empowerment are also encouraged through the strength and experience of acting collectively. The interactive possibilities of belonging to an environmentalist community offer members the conditions of regularity for reflexive examination of the world and their role within it: e.g. the community workshops offered by both groups, the regular organisational meetings; the group support and co-experience of activist participation or sustainable living. It is a means towards inclusivity beyond the drip-feed reformism of the state and the deadening adiaphorization of legitimated experts.

These spaces, the participants are engaged in building, frequently offer opportunities for radical transformation. This is particularly the case with the
Ecovillagers who spend their daily lives engaged in building community as well as more sustainable local food and energy systems. However, the Ecovillage is not the only space with radical transformativist elements. Radical transformativism is also evident in the organic growers with their localised and non-chemical based food structures and the Steiner group with its attempt at shaping their own community and schooling system (two strongly engaged participants were identified from the Steiner group). The transformativist nature of these spaces positions the localised agency of organic growers and the moral and holistic education of the Steiner group in opposition to the rationalist economism and subjugated civic sphere of the dominant symbolic order. In that respect they too offer a contrary value system to the establishment, which offers support and legitimacy for participants to morally connect with climate change. Quite possibly, the non-alienating, intrinsic-value inducing and empowering aspects of Steiner education encouraged participants to imagine dealing with climate change as a fun mode of engagement, rejecting the dominant sacrificial representation.

On the basis of the data the importance of transformative social spaces and the role of social spaces in general cannot be overstated. For example take the role of moral connection. The strongly engaged were morally connected to climate change. This was most pronounced among climate campers. Other studies have also acknowledged moral connection among strong decarbonizers (Corner, 2013a). However, this moral property and engaging with climate change is not a linear relationship of variables but rather moral efficacy is dependent upon systems of relations that pertain to social space. To illustrate, the teacher Brendan expressed stern and moral disapproval towards single occupancy drivers, yet his connectivity to personal responsibility seems stifled by other relations. He failed to discuss climate change with colleagues or perceived a lack of colleagues willing to discuss it, and he held cynical views concerning politics and the rigidity of human nature. Apart from this connection, Brendan exhibited no other examples of moral connectivity, his world existing separately from the system of relations that amounts to the social conditions offered by radical environmentalism. Therein, according to this fieldwork, exists a recurring reinforcement of an understanding of collective. The language of the systemic was also much more evident amongst the environmentalists, who see themselves as immersed within an eco-social system. Their moral engagement is tied to viewing themselves as systemically connected to distant others and would-be victims of climate change. It is also empowered
through their part in the movement collective. Again Brendan acknowledged systemic connectivity in his teaching of the CSPE: that they were to teach the students how ‘[...] you as an individual are connected with your community and you’re connected with country and you’re connected with the wider world [...]’ (Teachers FG). Still, it was not a strong feature of his climate change receptivity. Such sentiments do not linearly connect to climate change engagement but rather they operate systemically within “systems” of mutually inspiring factors that are denoted by the concept of social space (see Brubaker, 1985: 767).

However, these breakaway attempts from the imposing and carbon-heavy dominant symbolic order are not unproblematic. Many of these participants still move in areas largely colonised by the dominant symbolic order such as the Ecovillager who still functions in a university system that continues to reward carbon-intensive practices such as attendance at international conferences that require academics to take long-distance flights. In many ways the contradictory climate change, presented in Chapter 4, could be said to have manifested in carbon-related contradictions of certain participants. A few strongly engaged participants from dominant social groups – e.g. some academics – held contradictory personal aspirations; being driven by both moral impetus to decarbonise whilst pursuing carbon-intensive extrinsic goals. Their surplus economic capital also offered enticements that conflicted with their carbon-lowering intentions. Their internal conflict is possibly illustrative of many of the would-be decarbonizers who find that their ‘good intentions’ must struggle against dispositions and the allure of the high-carbon lifestyle. The emergence of such internalised contradictions, from the clash of carbon-heavy lifestyles and aspirations towards lowering one’s carbon footprint, are reminiscent of what Bourdieu termed the “cleft habitus” (Bourdieu, 2007: 100). This term, which he applied to his own habitus, results from dual experiences that lead to a habitus inhabited by “tensions and contradictions” (ibid). In his case it stemmed from the “very strong discrepancy between high academic consecration” which he encountered for most of his life, and his “low social origin” (ibid). Here it is the dual experience of living in a competitive society with a growth-oriented and fossil-fuel driven economy while, at the same time, attempting to live sustainably. Still, it perhaps was more of a struggle for a strongly engaged member of the academic group, in not hailing from a radical transformativist space, to resist the purchase of his carbon-conspicuous trophy car.
Bourdieu describes the system of dispositions of the habitus as “transposable” which is indicative of how its “manner of being” carries the past into new settings and situations (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 67 fn 1). Indeed, this can lead to a time lag between the expectations of the new social environment and those that have become internalised in the person through their habituation with the old environment (Bourdieu, 1990b, 62). This time lag was particularly evident from the accounts by the former Steiner students of their movement into formal secondary education.

Such enduring habitus effects have possible consequences for the future of decarbonisation as traces of the carbon-heavy habitus tend to linger. Although the hysteresis effect was not as starkly indicated in relation to decarbonisation during this research, especially if compared to Steiner students’ accounts of their difficult educational transition into a non-Steiner secondary school, there were touches of it. For example, the Ecovillage participant who commented on how tough a challenge he found the transition: “[...] it’s a very steep learning curve for me, the challenge to live in an ecological and sustainable way. I fail most of the time [...]” (Sean: Ecovillage FG). Although it is unclear by what he means by ‘fail’, the potency of the challenge indicates the durability of a habitus accustomed to a carbon-heavy world.

Another potential problem of hysteresis subtly hinted at in the fieldwork can be seen to work against the non-hierarchical and anti-establishment value system of the environmentalists. Although the 2009 Climate Camp guidebook emphasised the need to allow access to discursive space for others, whilst recognising the unequal distribution of privilege, old hierarchies are still manifest. One participant spoke about being reluctant to voice his opinions during the focus group because he felt two of the others present, both seasoned environmentalists, knew sufficiently more than he did. In this incidence old hierarchies of stature clearly linger.

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162 Although hardly on the same level, it is worth remembering that lingering relations of power, for which struggles over manifested in infighting and bullying, contributed to the break-up of the supposedly non-hierarchical hippy communes that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s (Viner, 2011).
8.1.3 The Climate Change Alienation of Dominated Social Space

Although distant from the dominant social spaces where the major classes produce much of the dominant symbolic order, the subordinate spaces of the rest of the relatively disengaged are also more subjugated to it. This is even the case with the farmers who may appear in defiance of it and yet remain intimidated by the dominant technical relations in which climate change has become immersed. This subservience in many ways also supports the dominant weak reformist position. The individualising perspective of these relatively disengaged members served in the fieldwork to hide the social structure connections of high-carbon living. Most appeared to not explicitly see their personal options as extending beyond the individual consumer-choice frame, despite seeing their response as part of some vague undefined solidarity. For a few this even manifested itself in failing to connect the issue to the economy. Such asocial vision protects the carbon-heavy status quo by disguising any related-inequalities and class-related emissions, thereby preventing the visualisation of radical transformativist possibilities for decarbonisation which requires recognition of the role played by social structures.

However, as several examples in the primary data suggest, parental investment and a more complete consumption of broadsheet journalism – such as reading world affairs, business and economy related articles – could potentially expand the literacy powers of persons hailing from subordinate backgrounds. This offers a simple means to counter some of the alienation encouraged by the social distance of these spaces from the dominant classes. In a sense this is the literature written by the purveyors of doxa and frequenting its topics, frames and discourses is a means of narrowing the gap to some of the social space regularities of the producers of dominant culture. Such a finding is worthy of further exploration.

8.2 Recommendations towards Interested Parties: Climate Change Inclusivity and the Politics of Habitus and Field

Although liberal democracy, individual consumer choice and the rationalist enlightenment notions of how humans make decisions would suggest that one should have the choice to be involved in climate change, this thesis’ insights into
the significance of social space for climate receptivity and decarbonisation suggest otherwise. The sentiment of voluntarism that dominates public discourse in many Western liberal democracies completely ignores the restrictive basis upon which choice is founded and how an encroaching physicality of climate change acknowledges no such rights. The input of the social into climate change receptivity highlights the unequal access to choice that participants have towards engaging with climate change. This section expands on the implications regarding climate change inclusivity that such restrictions entail, along with how an understanding of the social unconscious embedded within the public can be used to work towards greater inclusivity. The section discusses the idea of democratising climate change in a manner that conforms to participative and deliberative democracy.

Deliberative democracy involves the ideal whereby agents are free to deliberate in a dialogic manner not bound by pre-existing norms, unequal power relations and with access and openness to all relevant sources of information (Cohen, 1997; Gutmann and Thompson, 2009). There is an emphasis on supporting proposals with reasons and on recognising and respecting the “deliberative capacity” of others through the provisioning of such reasons (Cohen, 1997). While the latter is referred to in ‘ideal’ terms and Cohen (1997) is aware of de facto complications that limit the deliberative capacities of some, my own research demonstrates the far from equal deliberative capacity towards climate change of my participants. The nature of Bourdieu’s work serves to redefine much of this deliberative concept in a more nuanced way. It recognises the subtleties of inequality; the symbolic violence inherent in how information is produced and rendered ‘relevant’ and how the social unconscious embedded in the biases and capacities of habitus restricts both openness and access to that information. It highlights how genuine reasons are often submerged behind the expressed rationale and justifications, whose manifestation is really more a part of the strategic logic of fields and the feel for the game. Indeed, the unwitting and wholly unknowable nature of much of the world of habitus and field means that a pure form of the deliberative ideal, free from the distortions of unequal power, is impossible. However, striving towards it is a means to reduce some of these inequalities; a goal for which Bourdieu’s sociology offers much guidance. The next subsection looks to the obstacles to deliberative and participative responses to climate change,
paying particular attention to how the public’s choice and relationship to climate change is heavily dependent upon the power relations and regularities of Irish society. The subsequent section 8.2.2 then looks into overcoming those obstacles and expanding inclusivity.

8.2.1 A Non-deliberative and Anti-democratic ‘Climate Change’: Symbolic Violence, Issue-ownership and Exclusion

Clearly, the choice to engage with climate change is restricted by social determinisms and the level of access (or lack thereof) to a spectrum of alternatives. This is not an information-deficit problem wherein one simply needs to be informed of the available options but a problem that is also based on a multiplicity of field and habitus limits, many of which the would-be citizen has only tacit knowledge of. There exist restrictive effects to choice and freedom by social determinants such as social space, field of occupation, access to cultural capital and its modes of consumption. Additionally symbolic domination, through symbolic violence, legitimates subservience and encourages a sense of subordination to dominant cultural arbitraries, or symbolic order, and the persons and groups who embody them. In the circumstances of this project such power plays a key role in preventing access to a more deliberative and participative climate change. The symbolic order greatly restricts the public’s relationship to climate change and decarbonisation, through concealment or de-legitimation of alternative means through which climate change can be perceived and responded to. Field of power struggles play a large role across fields particularly through the accumulation of statist capital around accelerated economic competition, the legitimisation of technocratic expertise and meritocratic individualism: evident here in the fields of education, farming and business. Less statist capital, on the other hand, has been applied in this country to climate change and decarbonisation. The project finds climate change to be poorly ranked as an issue in its own right within three of the main fields covered, and in the field of power in general. While the reformist position has been consecrated with some state recognition, radical transformativism has been either massively overlooked or deliberately marginalised. It is likely such hierarchies widely impact upon the public position on climate change, preventing them from recognising climate change in terms of grievances and public political issues (Lukes, 1974).
How legitimated categories of the dominant symbolic order – economic nationalism and the individual – are uncritically absorbed into the classificatory systems of participants, and used to comprehend their connection to climate change, is demonstrable of the symbolic violence in climate change receptivity. Many participants perceive their appropriate role as individual consumers, depoliticised and without recourse to other possibilities. This dichotomises the issue, in a way that obscures the role of collective and social structures while emphasising the individual. Moreover, concentrating focus on individualised responsibility in mainstream campaigns such as the *Power of One* imports the message that lifestyle changes are not required and one can carry on pretty much as normal.

In contrast, class remains a category with low visibility in Irish society. The apparent low salience of class inequality in emissions appeared throughout the participant groups, defying social space differences in climate change receptivity patterns. Although global class gradients regarding greenhouse gas emissions - i.e. the north-south distinction regularly evoked at international climate talks – were referred to by members of the Climate Camp, domestic differences within the Irish context slipped past unmentioned. Broadening class emissions to global dimensions is a narrative that is in danger of mystifying, through this broader frame, the specifics of higher emitters from Ireland’s upper and middle classes. Both these global and domestic emission inequalities connect to other narratives of fairness and morality. A failure to offer these discursive options severely restricts deliberative possibilities on the existence of high carbon profligacy. Although research is lacking in Irish class emission studies, studies in the UK point to the massive importance of this dimension to any discussion on decarbonisation. Analysis of a 2005 to 2006 survey based on 6,164 Great Britain households examined their total embodied emissions in consumption (Gough *et al.*, amended 2012). Hence, the direct emissions (from heating fuel or driving a car etc.) – which are normally all that are used in calculating per capita emissions – were included with indirect emissions through the consumption of food, consumer goods and services. Firstly, the authors found that indirect emissions amounted to four fifths of the household emissions. Secondly, it was established that with each increase of £5000 in annual equivalised income, direct greenhouse gas emissions rose by

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163 Equivalised income is a measure of household income, which is weighted to account for differences in household size and age composition (Gough *et al.*, amended 2012: 35).
6.0% and indirect emissions by 6.9% (ibid). Through a focus on class, analyses of greenhouse gas emissions can drastically deviate from the individualising per capita averages.

In ignoring the social origins behind human practices and values, mainstream social scientists paint a picture of an immutable public in need of having their perceptions adjusted in order to appeal to their values and motivations as they currently are. The effect is to conceal possible alternatives. Overemphasising the qualities of the public while ignoring or reducing to essentialism the origins of those qualities presents a rigidified electorate. This potentially invalidates the politics for genuine social change: a requisite for wide-scale decarbonisation of society. Ironically, the classless behavioural levers of persuasion and incentives targeted at individual consumers and supported by the models of individualising social scientists, have anti-democratic consequences. They only facilitate the public towards individualised and reformist responses. They also appeal to, and thereby serve to legitimate, values and decision-making capacities deeply rooted in a doxic order that subscribes to a single-minded economic vision of growth. If anything, they offer governments a means to disavow themselves of what is really required in order to implement serious behavioural change by locating the onus of responsibility on an individualised public (Warde, 2013).

Further anti-participatory implications emerge from the dominant symbolic order’s belief in self-interested human nature and its promotion of competition and meritocratic individualism. These are worth considering in light of internationally recurring survey findings of the contrarians being much more numerous amongst ‘those who strongly support free trade and enterprise and the primacy of private ownership’ (Corner, 2013b: 9). The anti-deliberative effects of notions of fixed human nature have been commented on before by Hannah Arendt who attributed such fixed interpretations to the depolitization of the German populace under Nazi rule. In believing themselves to be “enacting the dictates of the laws of nature” – the politics of the “superior biological organism” - a fatalism was borrowed from Darwinism whereby individuals hand over responsibility and decision-making to the forces of nature (Haugaard, 2002: 133). This “‘naturalisation’ of moral philosophy” whereby purpose is biologically determined – e.g. it is believed to be ‘hardwired’ or written in our DNA – removes the need to interpret one’s position and take responsibility (ibid). Under such conditions of moral naturalisation, the
inevitability of it all tends to render ‘others’ expendable. As evident from the fieldwork, those adhering to a view of a fixed human nature of self-interest appear to be the least morally and sympathetically connected to combating climate change. Connecting the encroaching destruction to suffering in distant countries or outer circle beings is perceived an unnecessary anxiety. It seems a position of ‘people are what they are’ does not support any radical transformative sentiments or further engagement with climate change.

Conceivably, through the permeation of such narrow ideas about human behaviour into policy-circles, through their explicit and implicit absorption into economics (the most policy embedded social science) and heightened presence within the dominant symbolic order, they contribute to limiting the range of options for change considered by policy-makers (see Chapter 4). Quite probably they underlie governments’ weak reformist communication to their publics on changing their energy consumption behaviours such as shifting emphasis to “more cost-orientated messages” as in the Irish government’s Power of One campaign (DCENR, 2008). Additionally they potentially help sustain the fatalistic view of some campaigners. The rigid views on human behaviour promoted by heuristic models and evolutionary psychology seem at least partially responsible for the sense of hopelessness found in the writings of some advocates, scientists and academics (e.g. Hagens, 2010). Gibbons (2011) views behavioural change as largely trapped by the supposedly self-interested survival predispositions of our “reptilian brain” (Rees, 2010). The scientist Lovelock (2009) harbours obvious views on a human nature evolving too slowly for to respond sufficiently to the ecological crisis (p: 80), adding to the overwhelming bleakness of his future climate change imaginary (Vince, 2009b).

Information-deficit approaches to encouraging climate action can also reinforce forms of domination through inculcation. While educating people about climate change under the current educational formats – e.g. green schools, public campaigns – may seem like useful citizen service provision by some, to others it smacks of ‘indoctrination’ (although due to the position of environmental education initiatives within mainstream education – too marginal for sustained indoctrination – such interpretations are harsh). For example, one of the academic

164 An extreme example of a belief in innate self-interest can be found in the work of Ayn Rand who used terms such as “refuse” and “parasites” to deride welfare recipients (Monbiot, 2012).
participants spoke with delight at her god-daughter connecting recycling to saving polar bears in the Arctic. However, a similar connection between car use and “killing” polar bears’ was made by the daughter of an Irish journalist Eilis O’Hanlon (2009) who saw it as an example of environmentalist propaganda and green brainwashing. Interestingly the journalist fails to draw parallels with the role of state institutions such as the education system, or the media, business world and marketing industry, in instilling into the public support for individualism, meritocracy, capitalism and consumerism. Still decarbonisation advocacy should not aim to repeat such underhand and uncritical cultivation. The problem of any educational approach is that it creates conditions for introducing climate change through means of symbolic domination: e.g. the educational authority defining the categories through which climate change is to be understood, may attach the subject to culturally elite and alienating discourses.

The narrow cultural ownership of climate change is demonstrable of this symbolic violence. Participants with lower cultural capital found themselves alienated from the topic. This is not so much that they are incapable of dealing with the technical topic of climate change but rather that they lack the confidence to do so. It is the associations of the issue itself that appears to be disarming. The objective relations surrounding climate change – its discourses and representatives – have the cumulative capacity to exert symbolic violence. Thus those alienated from these relations can feel compelled towards self-censorship when happening upon the topic. Just as when we tell ourselves, ‘I’m terrible at’ languages, or numbers, etc., and so switch-off whenever we encounter them, the same can be true of economics, science, and other discourses associated with academic or technical discourses. In this way apparent “indifference is only a manifestation of impotence” (Bourdieu, 1984: 346). Such symbolic order domination could prove severely obstructive to the development of more inclusive forms of climate change.

The narrow discursive categories of economic, regulatory and climate science into which climate change has been reduced over the past decade or so further diminishes the possibilities for issue-ownership and restricting participation. This is an arena that very much encourages the role of non-deliberative discussion formats based on ‘factual’ point-scoring. Such a discursive environment must surely provide easy opportunity for the more obfuscating aspects of climate change to stir confusion, and for contrarian representations to amplify populist notions of climate
science incongruities (McCright and Dunlap, 2010).\textsuperscript{165} Moreover, activists and campaigners who see the moral argument but adopt the language and values of the dominant symbolic order’s framing of climate change reinforce that frame. For example, arguing about the cost of nature “tells us that it possesses no inherent value; that it is worthy of protection only when it performs services for us; that it is replaceable”. Such a debate demoralises and alienates (Monbiot, 2014). This clearly runs counter to the deliberative ideals of diversity.

Other prominent forms of exclusion in the fieldwork, and dealt with here, are: the self-exclusion by those affected by symbolic power and the social capital network connections through which many appear to gain access to the issue, particularly the more climate-change engaged. There was also the tendency among persons most concerned with climate change to gravitate towards specific personal attributes with which they held an affinity. For example the climate camper who favoured “open-minded” activists to his more conservative engineer colleagues. Finally, the sense of subordination of those concerned about climate change encouraged some to avoid broaching the subject with others, who they saw as lacking concern. The low prestige of the environmentalist position and decarbonisation sees some participants reluctant to discuss the issue with people outside the respective environmentalist field. Divisions of this nature are also maintained through elective affinities and climate change reticence based upon insecurity towards the receptivity of others. The relatively disengaged also excluded themselves further by not discussing it with their peers. This absence of climate change conversation was also identified in another qualitative study (Laidley, 2013). In addition, Norgaard (2011) identifies conversational practices where people manage to avoid any sincere discussion of climate change while referring to it (pp: 52-62).

Such exclusionary practices may prevent others from participating, restricting the possibilities for empowering and decarbonising forms of social capital; thereby curbing the democratising of climate change. Patterns of exclusion were a recurring and effectuating presence throughout the project. Many of the exclusions reflected the divisions of social space, field and dominant symbolic order, but some too

\textsuperscript{165} Although, as identified in Chapter 4, disagreement exists on many matters such as the degree of potential climate change impacts. However, there is not the same level of disagreement when it comes to the existence of anthropogenic global warming.
existed within groups, especially among participants who did not see climate change as a legitimated conversational topic.

Conversing about climate change, in terms of Bourdieusian “relational interactions” (Fox, 2014), is an important part of developing decarbonisation legitimacy. It is within these more immediate and local relations of power that members of the public have possibilities for transforming the systems of classifications of their peers so as to be more accommodating to climate change responses. Certain stances, interpretations or particular ways of being, which are constituted in the broader world of socio-cultural relations, have their – often unwitting – followers who disseminate them through their interaction. Largely unbeknownst to themselves, they are engaged in a struggle to impose a certain vision of the world (Wacquant, 1992: 14). Of note here is the ranking and normalisation of climate change discussions, as well as of more serious discourse in general. This is demonstrated by Noel’s attempt to shift the resistant position of his farming colleagues regarding climate change mitigation towards a more favourable position of stewardship. Although not particularly effective on the day, his strategies may eventually come to fruition, especially if coupled with EU incentives for environmentally sound farming practices. That is not to say that such a position is likely to be particularly supportive of high decarbonisation. However, it is indicative of how broader social relations, such as those pertaining to hierarchies of the farming field, can be manipulated through the micro-social relations involved.

Although potentially enabling the discussion of climate change these micro-social power relations can also work to stifle and pigeon-hole deliberation. The use of other farming field hierarchies, along with more social space ontological hierarchies, were demonstrated by the farmers who suppressed the sincerity of the issue with ridicule and merriment and delegitimized the issue by tying it to a broader field narrative of oppressive regulation. Another distinct example of this micro-social confrontation of systems of power that can inhibit deliberative processes was demonstrated through the acquiescence of the two more environmentally conscionable businessmen. The strategies of ridicule, the employment of powerful realpolitik and competitive growth discourses effectively reduced the room in the discussion for idealist or moral alternatives. Even the dismissive intonation attached to a brief “ah well”, uttered in response to another
participant’s expression of hopelessness during the CES focus group, reflected the subtle manoeuvrings of broad relations of power occurring in the world of the everyday. These descriptions are illustrative of how social hierarchies – dominant, field and ontological – are not mutually exclusive. However, as illustrated here, it is within the formation of ontological hierarchies that the three variants of power relations intersect, thereby shaping the possibilities for more deliberative democratic forms of climate change engagement. The next section attempts to paint a different picture, outlining the conditions under which more participative and deliberative forms of climate change engagement are possible.

8.2.2 Recommendations for Democratising Climate Change through the Politics of Habitus and Field: Realising Agency and Broadening Engagement beyond the Rationalist Perspective

The goal of any attempt to encourage a strong public reaction to climate change should be to address the democratic void left by prevailing power relations. After all, there is a strong moral argument to seeking to expand real freedom of choice and democratic participation. Lukes (1974) alludes to this moral necessity in writing on how the very reality of our goals and objectives can be compromised by the hidden face of power operating through societal structures:

[I]s it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable[?] (Lukes 1974, as cited in Norgaard, 2006b: 133)

To counter the effects of such covert forms of power and best fulfil democratic ideals, these power structures and their effects need to be made visible and potentially countered through a radical form of politics. Bourdieu’s sociology was such a political project aimed at rupturing the concealing and subordinating effects of power. For “genuine and lasting progressive change to occur”, Bourdieu supported “a politics of fields aimed at structured power relations ...supplemented
by a politics of habitus paying close attention to the social production” of “political proclivities” and their underlying classifications (Wacquant, 2004: 10, emphasis in original). The politics of fields suggests a need to reduce the inequalities and advantages of privilege that linger in all field structures. This struggle must be supported by a politics of habitus which acknowledges how the habitus has internalised biases and pre-constructed categories that serve to conceal and reproduce inequalities. A politics of habitus must also seek to transform habitus through what Bourdieu refers to as ‘countertraining’: referred to in more detail below. Adding these approaches to a deliberative and participative approach to climate change has the added effect of increasing the democratisation of the social unconscious, thereby removing obstacles to greater equality and diversity of contributions.

Combining Bourdieu’s sociology with this project’s findings suggests essential tools for a more empowered and participative climate change receptivity. These include widespread issue-ownership; a rearrangement of the dominant symbolic order and the symbolic orders of field, along with a more pervasive application of Bourdieu’s socio-analysis and countertraining. Firstly, I look to transforming the symbolic orders, a step that is integral to Bourdieu’s politics of fields.

One of the means of developing this alternative symbolic order is of enhancing academic and field of power recognition of the socio-cultural and dispositional conception of the human being – i.e. that behaviour is linked to the socio-cultural relations through an absorptive effect into the unconscious. Moving beyond vague and passing references to society in research models is likely to lead to new configurations of objective relations in the struggle over climate change definitions and responses. Moving beyond methodological individualism offers the possibility of producing new expertise that incorporates the critical capacities of reflexivity, systemic and historical thinking, into the dominant symbolic order and the symbolic order of fields. In typical paradoxical Bourdieusian form, a dominant symbolic order that elevates recognition of the social and the social unconscious, rendering social determinants visible, is an order that recognises itself. In this way the determinations of the symbolic order become capacitating. Such an order is potentially the means towards a more reflexive society and, in terms of climate change, more inclusive decarbonisation. With a socially cognizant symbolic order,
the categories of climate change perception can be broadened. This includes the class component of emissions, along with other social inequalities involved. This in turn increases the means through which ethical discourses can enter the discussion.

Raising social critique high within the social hierarchies – ontological, field and dominant symbolic order – may encourage an implosion of the myths of individual choice and freedom: prominent categories whose concealing and depoliticising effects help sustain the dominant system. Public debates about climate change that recognise the social, alert the public to the role of ideology, lobbying, and plutocratic power (McCright and Dunlap, 2010). In coupling these discussions to socially critical tools such as historical, systemic and comparative analyses can reveal the distortive effects of power in climate debates.166

Rendering social structures visible within the symbolic order opens the potential for inspiring radical transformativism, that is, transformations in social structures that encourage reduction in carbon-heavy behaviours. Transforming the symbolic order in a manner that elevates the visibility of the social and the social origins of daily behaviour should open the way for seeing the world as not fixed, and for recognising the means and implications for real social changes. At the moment, an individualist, growth oriented doxa has confined the catalogue of possible solutions to those existing within the current system.

Transforming the symbolic ordering of climate change means also broadening its definition to include nontechnical discourses that persons of lower cultural capital can feel more comfortable with. Allowing moral narratives of climate change to emerge might expand opportunities for engagement. This must also include a recognition of aspects of climate change that are far from accommodating to economic growth as it currently stands. Suppression of the debate in a manner that is acceptable to policy-makers is non-deliberative. The catastrophist position, therefore, held by serious scientists must also be included. A potentially morally concerned public should not be limited to the gradualist representation that may in fact proffer excuses to escape doing anything; as witnessed with respect to the farmers and their flippancy towards a reference to a future climate a hundred years from now. Even if one accepts the possibility that the catastrophist position may

166 Consider Naomi Oreskes historical take on the development of an industry of denial, the legacy of which is currently distorting the climate change debate (Oreskes and Conway, 2010).
prove wrong, not alerting the public to this possibility is non-deliberative. The same can be said for the contrarian position, however, the danger lies in restricting the debate to technical point-scoring, without recognising the political wrangling, ideological conflicts, presumptions and power struggles involved in constructing these different positions (Yearley, 2009b; McCright and Dunlap, 2010; Oreskes and Conway, 2010; Wynne, 2010).

Altering the dominant symbolic order in this way requires large holdings of statist power and huge sway in the field of power, which is something most people engaged in climate change in Ireland do not have. That said, at a more localised level collectives and individuals can effectuate their own resistance to social determinants and thereby expand their own capacity for democratising climate change debates and practices through Bourdieu’s tools of “socioanalysis” and “countertraining”. With symbolic order domination largely embedded in and reproduced through social space practices and habitus dispositions – a largely tacit and uncritical realm – engendering behavioural and perceptual change requires much more effort than any presumed rational choice-making. Bourdieu (2000) states that “while making things explicit can help, only a thoroughgoing process of countertraining, involving repeated exercises, can, like an athlete’s training, durably transform habitus” (p: 172).

Although the term ‘countertraining’ has Orwellian connotations, and may initially be perceived negatively as ‘social engineering’ or ‘brainwashing’, this project has pointed to multiple determinisms that are already impressing mythical ideas about individual freedom. With countertraining one can, theoretically at least, seek to mitigate or reverse the effects of symbolic order, field and social space determinisms along with the dispositions induced by carbon-heavy living. Countertraining can be geared towards inducing dispositions based on the recurring application of Bourdieu’s “socioanalysis”. This involves honing a critical capacity to become cognisant of the determining structures and processes of determination – the influences of the social in categories of perception and practices – that are involved in the formation of one’s habitus. In terms of this project, this means enabling persons to recognise the determinative effects on the manner in which persons perceive climate change or practice carbon-heavy living. Directing persons towards “reflexively mastering their categories of thought and action” can thereby broaden one’s field of possibilities, expectations and opportunities and prevent the
actuation of a “social unconscious embedded into institutions as well as lodged deep inside of us” (Wacquant, 1992: 49). For Bourdieu, identifying the restrictions imposed on the way we see the world by such structures “offers some of the most efficacious means of attaining the freedom from social determinisms” (Bourdieu, 1998b: ix). Potentially, socioanalysis can facilitate persons or groups in deliberating on climate change through rupturing doxa, demystifying the role of power in normalising carbon-heavy living and climate change inaction. In a way, socioanalysis is reminiscent of Goethe’s famous quote, which appeared on banners during the occupy movement and became an online meme: “none are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free” (von Goethe and von Wenckstern, 1853: 3) (see Figure 8.1). The following statement by Bourdieu concerning sociology as socioanalysis reads in part like a paraphrase of the former: “paradoxically, sociology frees us by freeing us from the illusion of freedom, or, more precisely, from misplaced belief in illusory freedoms” (Bourdieu, as cited in Wacquant, 1992: 59 fn 87).

Figure 8.1: Goethe Banner’s from the Occupy Protests

The photo is from the Occupy Wall Street protest in Zuccotti Park in September 2011. Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Day_12_Occupy_Wall_Street_September_28_2011_Shankbone_33.JPG

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In some ways the environmentalist and Steiner social spaces incorporate an equivalent form of this Bourdieusian countertraining. Through the strategy of social networks and community building activity, these minority non-mainstream groupings have constructed sites that allow access to new ways of seeing the world and their civil society role. Such spaces can also be empowering by countering the oppressiveness of their subordination and providing emotional support as well as resource networks. For Haluza-DeLay (2008), these movement conditions provide the potential to facilitate a reflexive “learning in the movement” where regular exposure to status quo critique can offer the countertraining necessary to stave off some of the symbolic order indoctrination. Allowing access into these sites of countertraining, or indeed a grassroots instilling of dominant symbolic order critique into social spaces and fields, may offer others the means to develop a more deliberating and participatory view of climate change. This is not just feeding people information but providing them the critical capacities and confidence to better interpret for themselves: i.e. a more inclusive and reflexive form of climate change receptivity and decarbonisation. In this sense the “habitus offers the only durable form of freedom, that given by the mastery of an art, whatever the art” (Bourdieu, 1999: 340). This could well be the basis to Bourdieu’s politics of habitus.

However, despite the existence of such spaces there is a need to converse beyond them in order to encourage climate change inclusivity. Instigating sincere discussion of the issue amongst peers can be the first step in countering the economy of practices and dispositions that encourage groups not to discuss it. In a way this is a manner of reconfiguring ontological or social space hierarchies (the hierarchies of peers) so as to legitimate such discussions. Also serious discussion of climate change may encourage reframing of the issue towards more inclusive nontechnical concerns based on ethics and local community. Interestingly, some of those not inclined to discuss climate change with colleagues were surprised to discover the views or levels of concern of their peers, when conversation on climate change was induced through the focus group:

Helen: [...] and I was surprised about half, well half, maybe half the group agreed as well and the other half didn’t say anything so [...].

(CES LHI)
Brendan: they were actually quite concerned, you know I didn’t realise that they were that concerned you know so they seemed to be you know two intelligent people who know more about it than I do and they’re quite concerned (A mild tone of amusement here) so maybe I should be you know [...]. (Teacher LHI)

Some were at least temporarily, more open to climate change discussion by their positive focus group experience:

Ruth: A lot was said in the focus group and I learnt a lot from it from what other people were doing and how the simplest things about how to teach your kids as far as recycling goes [...] (CES LHI).

Conversing about climate change more often in ‘good life’ spaces such as pubs or among persons who do not normally discuss it may be a means to release climate change from its isolated pockets and elevate its status in the wider economy of acceptable practices. This project is not advocating that everybody should join radical groups but that the development of new types of conversation and practices within collectives and communities can work to increase opportunities for a deliberative and participative role in climate change. In the end without discussion there can be no deliberation.

8.3 Recommendations for Future Research: Uncovering the Role of Social Relations and Inequalities in Climate Change

Researchers too have their role in democratising climate change discourse and action. In pursuing this objective, their work needs to reveal the workings of social structures, such as fields, and how they affect the classifications and practical apprehension of the public. Socio-cultural relations must become a central component of research on the public’s relationship to broad societal issues such as climate change. Expanding the presence of the social and relational can pave the way for questions concerning the social conditions for the inducement of related practices and dispositions, thereby rendering social structure visible. This potentially enables a more thorough recognition of the political transformations required for the movement to a low-carbon society.
As argued throughout this thesis, receptivity to anything is the result of both outside societal structures, such as government, school, media etc., and more proximate external and internal structures of local, mental and bodily spaces. As this research and the findings of other recent socio-cultural studies show – most notably, Norgaard’s work on Living in Denial and the work of practice theorists (Shove and Spurling, 2013) – climate change perception and behaviour is very much a product of historical legacies, political economic power structures and recurring relations of the everyday. The spaces of the everyday provide the intersection for these broad societal and local relations to interconnect in the formation, adaptation and maintenance of carbon-related practices and perceptions. This thesis does much to show the relevance of Bourdieu’s perspective in mapping these relations, thereby establishing more nuanced aspects of socialization and domination. It demonstrates how Bourdieu captures a deeper understanding of social context and climate change receptivity than variable-centred approaches that seek to connect public perceptions to reductive variable forms of class and education. The discursive themes identified in the focus groups in particular reveal the subtle role of social distinctions that are not simply a question of class and qualifications but stress the effect of other deeper processes such as cultural variations in educational, community and workplace spaces. The relational use of Bourdieu’s concepts by the thesis illustrates how broader relations of power embedded in class, culture and political economy are also played out at micro foundational levels. The subtle remarks of informal chat, for example, can quickly stifle chances to discuss climate change in radical or serious ways. These are the kinds of socially-embedded insights that future research needs to capture and attempt to understand in order to access the public-climate change relationship.

Hence, the necessity to include society into climate change research cannot be overstated. Too much is currently lost by its (almost) complete absence, partly because of the dominance of methodological individualism (Fahy and Rau, 2013). Views on the invariableness of the public, such as those supported by biologisms, a priori beliefs in the fixed human nature of self-interest, or the rigidity of asocial values and behaviours, are perhaps the most misguided of the social science presumptions.

There is a need for academics to routinely challenge the reified views of human nature which underlie assumptions about human behaviour. Clearly
biological determinisms exist as humans must eat and sleep, feel pain and humiliation and have the capacity for language (Archer, 2004: 42-3). However, as practice theorists and Bourdieu in *Distinction* and *Language and Symbolic Power* reveal, these determinisms are subject to being shaped by relations of culture, societal power, infrastructure and the mutable economy of practices. A core part to elevating the relational nature of these developments is for broad recognition of Bourdieu’s dispositional being as part of human nature. Humans are highly dispositional in their doing and their classifying, with those dispositions greatly informed by their experience of the regularities of society. How these dispositions integrate our biological determinisms into our behaviours has crucial relevance to how humanity contributes to accelerating the greenhouse effect: e.g. consider the ongoing pervasion of the meat intensive and carbon-heavy Western diet throughout much of the world (Weis, 2013).

Recognising society in this thesis has pointed to the large influence of class, social space and the triad of social hierarchies – ontological, field and dominant symbolic order. These, as it were, wage war with each other to win dominance over the systems of classification and economy of practices that pervade the mind and social spaces of groups and individuals. Individuals too, through their limited agency partake in the struggle. With the primary data suggesting how differences in capital, which constitutes social space, can radically alter climate change receptivity, it appears disingenuous for so many social scientists to be neglecting the role of class in their research. Additionally, there is the significance of unequally distributed class-related emissions. A large role for social scientists exists here towards revealing inequalities, the exposure of which is a necessary condition to improving deliberative approaches to climate change.

Effective future research must also pay heed to the changeable nature of societal power in order to locate climate change receptivity as part of an ongoing process. Instead of the fixedness obtained through the atomising and universalising perspectives of ontological and methodological individualism, attention to society emphasises the momentum of social power. Utilising Bourdieu carries the influence of material and social forms of power, based on differences of economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital into the debate. Future social science needs to pay heed to these more nuanced capital forms for a more complete study of the dynamics of societal power. Changes to the distribution of species of capital across
society would likely translate to knock-on effects on climate change representations and receptivity.

A social science attuned to the workings of society should also apply that recognition to the immersion of policy-makers and scientists within socio-cultural relations (Wynne, 2010; Webb, 2012). In facilitating greater climate change deliberation, there is a need for researchers to situate the science in its socio-cultural context and unravel the social unconscious that exists in its formation. A danger exists in scientists not recognising the socio-cultural forces influencing their work and being misled as a consequence. Chapter 4 mentions the political unconscious of the IPCC, which highlights the mythical quality of ‘disinterestedness’ amongst geoscientists. There is a need in the institutional science of the IPCC to construct a version of climate change that is workable with the policy environment (Wynne, 2010: 296-7). Wynne (2010) alludes to the notion of IPCC’s “Climate Prediction as Socially Constructed Understatement” presenting a picture of it as “manageable” (pp. 295-6). These conclusions about the needs of policy are presumed by the scientists rather than reached through a rigorous political and social scientific assessment. Take the very unscientific and presumptuous view of the social and political, reflected in a statement in 1994 by a former chair of the IPCC, John Houghton. In it he dismisses the use of surprise and fear, such as that caused by the “possible” but “unlikely” collapse of the West-Antarctic ice-sheet (a positive feedback) as a means of motivating policy decision-making. Instead he argues that “sensible planning ... needs to be based upon the best estimate, not the fear of global collapse or catastrophe” (Houghton 1994, as cited in Wynne, 1996: 384). The statement is loaded with non-scientific, a priori presumptions, from a top IPCC climate scientist, concerning notions of the ‘human condition’ and how the public responds to fear, and “‘proper’ policy needs and capacities” (Wynne, 2010: 368). Recognising such relations in climate science can countervail against the subjugation of social science to a naive realist acceptance of climate science and provide the means for inducing greater reflexivity into the scientific construction of climate change (Yearley, 2009b).

167 As mentioned earlier this was the central discussion in the British Sociological Association 2010 Presidential Event which ran under the title of ‘How to Put Society into Climate Change’.
Such reflexivity could be supported by a greater interdisciplinarity (and transdisciplinarity) in future research (Hadorn et al., 2007; Fahy and Rau, 2013). Explicit recognition of the many political, ethical and cultural dimensions of scientific knowledge production creates space for interdisciplinarity and offer possibilities for enhancing the inclusivity of research by giving greater parity to previously undervalued disciplines. So too can a role be made for lay expertise and indigenous knowledge such as compiled by local historians or the data rich experience of fishers (Hind, 2012). These inclusions may also help to expand the discourses and broaden interpretation. One caveat, however, is that any interdisciplinarity should extend reflexivity to the power relations between the disciplines in order to avoid reproducing Irish field of power disparities which would lead to the elevation of certain disciplines over others: e.g. economics over philosophy.168

8.3.1 Learning from Applying the Bourdieusian Framework

For researchers wishing to apply Bourdieu’s methods and concepts to unveil the inequalities and underlying social relations of climate change, this section revisits some of the complications that occurred during the course of this study. Those interested in studying the role of fields, need to be wary of several things. Some problems did exist with field regarding the universal spread of certain fields, particularly the educational field. Identifying specific characteristics whose origins can be traced to the field of education proved a difficult task. All participants at some stage have passed through the education system. Four other groups – organic growers, farmers, climate campers and Ecovillagers – not selected for their educational field connections, also contained one or more teachers. Additionally, being produced largely by elite state agencies and disseminating dominant forms of culture, formal education in many ways reflects the dominant symbolic order that participants are already exposed to. Finally, due to the absence of a secondary equivalent of Steiner schooling many former Steiner students have had to pass

168 Other power relations worth considering include the potential misuse of interdisciplinarity for the sake of garnering further justification for the expansion of the managerialist efficiency agenda within third level and furthering the objectives of those seeking to defund social science according to a failure to meet a narrow instrumentalist logic (Carrigan, 2013a).
through formal secondary education. That said, some notable differences were observed amongst the chosen representative groups from the field of education (see Chapter 5).

Another problem for applying the field concept is the role of self-selection: i.e. people may join a field while already holding the dispositions and interests peculiar to that field and possibly encouraging a misrepresentation of the field’s determinative effects. Particularly with regard to the environmentalist field there are bound to be pre-existing elective affinities that draw people together and into certain fields. Indeed, one participant stated that some climate camp members had started off in the ‘social justice movement’, which refers to the opposition to perceived global injustices that emerged into the limelight in 2003 with a 100,000 strong protest against the war in Iraq. The movement has since incorporated many themes, including Israeli oppression of Palestine; the use of Shannon airport by the American military, the unequal and environmentally damaging exploitation of resources for profit by globalised capitalism.\(^{169}\) However, as part of the agency-structure relationship agents and their dispositions too must structure field. It is not a one-way relationship. Additionally, the field of environmentalist activism appeared here to offer the means to empower and reinforce dispositions that existed prior to entrance into field: this was visible amongst many participants, particularly the Ecovillagers.

Some of the difficulties regarding the uniformity of the field samples were generated by the method of recruitment rather than by Bourdieu’s sociology. Snowball recruitment, as practiced in this study, can lead to a loosening of control over the focus group sample that arrives on the day. The sampling led to some minor problems with the business group. The business group ended up comprising of one civil servant and businessmen. As it turned out, all business FG participants had some connection at some stage to the field of business; especially through accountancy. In addition, the focus group composition reflects the close ties in Irish society between the state bureaucratic field, which is largely supportive of business, and the Irish business field. Other groups also produced various mixes of occupational fields such as the environmentalist movement and farmers groups. The latter was again merely an effect of the current condition of the farming field,

\(^{169}\) The plurality of issues and means of advocacy has meant a singular label for such a movement is problematic (Cox, 2006).
whereby small farmers have been forced to seek off-farm work to supplement their income. With environmentalism generally not being an occupation, the mixture amongst the environmentalist groups was inevitable. If anything the multiple fields help explain in-group differentials of receptivity such as the greater composure by the farmer-teachers with the highbrow discursive associations of climate change.

Yet all persons exist in and play the games of multiple fields, such as the field of class relations or fields that exist outside of the sphere of occupations like fields of leisure. Here people are involved in various activities, sports and hobbies, many of which potentially influence climate change receptivity. For example the level of escapism from the ecological crisis encouraged through pre-occupation with the world of sports or even the tendency of sports bureaucracies such as FIFA and the IOC to insist on the non-politicisation of sports and to diminish the role of the spectator to that of the consumer. However, as already stated in Chapter 2, socio-cultural relations, which operate through systems, are vast and thus outside the neat, yet overly reductive linear parsimony of methodological individualism. Still, the fields of occupation and class, studied here, are sufficiently regular features in the lives of the public to impose strong and recognisable effects on how they respond to the world.

Studying the impact of social trajectory is an important part of Bourdieu’s study of social spaces. However, in order to maintain his relationality, one must heed the caveat of his critique of variable-centred approaches that treat the so-called ‘independent variable’ as though it were completely independent of social relations. The researcher must remain careful not to be misled by fixed interpretations of variables: such as using all third-level qualifications as an indicator of elevated social power and cultural capital. As noted in Chapter 2, new objective relations have the capacity to encourage transformations across the systems of objective relations in society. Thus the expansion of the third level education system in Ireland saw a large increase in higher-level educated participants, with modest familial socio-economic and educational backgrounds. From 1980 to 2004 the overall rates of admission to higher education rose from 20% to 55% and for the unskilled classes it rose from 3% to 20% during the same period (Power et al., 2013). Several members of the business group were found to hail from low educational backgrounds. Additionally, the parents of most Irish participants over forty years of age did not hold any third-level qualifications.
Younger participants were more likely to have parents with third-level degrees, particularly the climate campers and the students. Although again not representative, it fits with expectations considering Ireland’s historically low stock of national educational capital and its recent expansion: secondary schooling was private up until the 1960s. With this in mind the Leaving Certificate was likely to offer significant access to cultural capital – a privilege of the times – whereas in the present day it would be dismissed as ‘modest’. Thus the academics and Ecovillagers with Leaving Certificate qualified parents likely benefitted from more empowering cultural capital access than the farming group whose parents were attributed only primary educational status. In this regard it is worth pointing out that the farmer who was also an agricultural science teacher and delivered the technical climate science monologue was the only farmer in the group with a parent with a Leaving Certificate. Similar changeable values were noted with regard to third level undergraduate bachelor qualifications (see Chapter 6). Thus although the occurrence of anomalies between cultural capital, familial privilege and participant social power seemingly dispute any connection between trajectory and cultural capital, Bourdieu’s relationalism with its shifting valuation of capital provides room for adequate explanation. Indeed the shifting value of educational qualifications is taken into account in constructing the distinction diagrams in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 (Figures 6.1 and 7.1), where parental Leaving Certificate qualifications are accorded higher value for older participants.

8.3.2 In Conclusion: Recommendations towards Elevating the Political Project of Socio-cultural Research

Despite these potential problems the combined homology, social space or class forming relationship of habitus, capital and field was used in this project to effectively illustrate a socio-cultural phenomenon of distinction in climate change receptivity in Irish society (see Figures 6.1 and 7.1). Such patterns of distinction clearly emerged from the empirical data collected specifically for this thesis. Broader research projects are necessary to investigate the wide-scale applicability of these socio-cultural differences in relating to climate change. These are also essential for developing the recognition and legitimacy of the socio-cultural position in climate change research. This makes socio-cultural research a political project with the ultimate aim of expanding freedom and choice not only in how
people comprehend and participate in climate change debates and actions but in the world in general. Incorporating the complexity of society into research broadens the horizons beyond the current narrow range of options that individualised ontology and methodologies project onto the public.

It is conceivable that a broader societal survey would likely unveil widespread patterns of distinction based on differences in social space practices and levels of capital: particularly with regard to the capital of expert fluency and participants’ subordination to symbolic capital manifestations of climate change. There is also ample room for implementing a quantitative survey that builds on the qualitative work presented in this thesis and that seeks to examine how widespread an effect the social distance from the dominant symbolic order and dominant class has on climate change receptivity. Can patterns be found throughout Ireland that reveal the more respondents’ social spaces mirror the logic and objective relations of the establishment the greater the acceptance of weak reformism, economism, asocial individualism and the competition state? A recent article by Laidley (2013) based on qualitative research also describes how interviewees with the lowest levels of economic and cultural capital display a penchant for proposing individual solutions like recycling. This receptivity pattern is also worthy of future quantitative investigation.

In order to maintain the qualitative depth while expanding representativeness, there is also room for cross-referencing with other qualitative socio-cultural studies on climate change receptivity. To some extent this kind of work has already been initiated through a study by Carfagna et al. (Carfagna et al. 2014) who compare quantitative survey data and four qualitative studies to show a relationship between ethical consumption and new forms of high cultural capital along with the emergence of an eco-habitus. In the future such cross-referencing would be best facilitated through studies with shared concepts such as ‘cultural capital’.

An elevated position for the socio-cultural is especially needed to respond to the defensive forms of economic nationalism which have formed in Ireland since the collapse of the Celtic Tiger. The subsequent crisis has offered some revelatory possibilities by exposing the gross inequities and potential instability of the status quo and by producing a higher salience for class-based politics. Yet society’s subordination to a growth-based economy remains a potent doxa. Even more so than before the slump, Ireland is locked into the dependency on economic growth
to pay off its incurred debts. Such commitments in no way factor in potential insurmountable obstacles of climate change impacts and resource depletion. This reinforcement of the system that contributed to the economic downturn highlights the failure to visualise deep social change; the kind of change required to meet the challenges of climate change. This inertia finds its resemblance in the “hysteresis effect” in which the habitus formed out of the old order lingers; incapacitating one from thinking “historical crises in categories of perception and thought other than those of the past, however revolutionary” (Bourdieu, 1990b: 59). The question of how much this hysteresis effect will haunt the transition to carbon neutrality remains to be answered.
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Appendix 1: Focus Group Questionnaire – part1 and part 2

Focus Group Survey Part 1

1. How well do you know the other members of the focus group? (example: how often do you meet? how long have you known each other? Etc)

__________________________________________________________

2. How long have you been employed in your current field of employment (example construction, finance etc)?

__________________________________________________________

3. In what type of surroundings did you grow up in? (Example: city, town, village, countryside)

__________________________________________________________

4. Do you personally take actions aimed at responding to climate change? If yes please provide some details about the actions you take.

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

5. Please provide the following personal details:

   - Your Full Name: (All information will be used anonymously)
     _______________________________________________________

   - Mobile Number or email:
     _______________________________________________________

   - Marital Status:
     _______________________________________________________ 

   - Number of children if any:
     _____________________________________________________

   - Your Occupation:
     _____________________________________________________

   - Educational qualifications (If college include subject area, example: Cookery, Leisure and Tourism, Philosophy etc):
     _____________________________________________________

   - If you are a student please state the name of your course and your current year:
     _____________________________________________________
Focus Group Survey Part 2

Note: for occupation one can include the category of homemaker or unemployed.
Where there has been more than one main occupation please list all.

6. What is/was the main occupation of your father?
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

7. Please list any educational qualifications that your father may have/have had:
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

8. What is/was the main occupation of your mother?
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

9. Please list any educational qualifications that your mother may have/have had:
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

10. What is/was the main occupation of your grandfather (on your father’s side)?
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

11. Please list any educational qualifications that your grandfather (on your father’s side) may have/have had:
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

12. What is/was the main occupation of your grandmother (on your father’s side)?
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

13. Please list any educational qualifications that your grandmother (on your father’s side) may have/have had:
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

14. What is/was the main occupation of your grandfather (on your mother’s side)?
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

15. Please list any educational qualifications that the your grandfather (on your mother’s side) may have/have had:
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

16. What is/was the main occupation of your grandmother (on your mother’s side)?
17. Please list any educational qualifications that your grandmother (on your mother’s side) may have/have had:

18. If you feel that the questions asked above are too narrow for the answers you would like to give then please provide any additional comments you would like to make here:

Your Full Name:
Appendix 2: Interview Vignettes and Visuals

1. When you hear the words climate change what are the first thoughts and images that come to mind?

2. Fiona would worry about climate change if it weren’t so far off in the future. Instead she feels it’s best to enjoy life now and deal with climate change later.

3. Gerry tries to keep up-to-date with the science of global warming. He regularly reads news articles that refer to the latest scientific findings on global warming. The news depresses him but he will continue to try and stay informed about this issue.

4. Louise often brings up the topic of climate change with her co-workers and in the pub at the weekend with her friends. In a lot of these conversations she often hears the argument that dealing with climate change will hurt the economy.

5. Mike loves the presence of nature around him. The sights, smells, and sounds of a summer’s evening in the countryside, the rustling of the trees on a windy day or even the first drops of rain reminds him of how alive he is. For him this is a presence worth protecting.

6. The causes of Climate Change?

7. The effects or consequences?

8. The Solutions?

9. Rachel has for many years now been turning her houselights off at night and switching off all her electrical appliances when not in use. Sometimes she wonders if she’s doing enough and considers perhaps doing a bit more.

10. Lowering his own carbon dioxide emissions is a pointless exercise as far as Brendan is concerned. He feels there’s really no point bothering as long as voters and the government don’t care about global warming.

Lowering his own carbon dioxide emissions is a pointless exercise as far as Brendan is concerned. He feels that it’s really a matter for the Government and the voters to deal with.

11. John lives in Ireland and Salma lives in Bangladesh. Climate change is already having a serious impact on Salma’s country through flooding. John however is unaware of Salma’s situation. Just the other day he took a new three-litre 4-wheel-drive for a test drive.
World CO2 emissions 2006

2007 Carbon dioxide emissions per person: