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Bargaining theory and portfolio payoffs in european coalition governments 1945–83

dc.contributor.authorSchofield, Norman
dc.contributor.authorLaver, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-24T08:26:21Z
dc.date.available2018-08-24T08:26:21Z
dc.date.issued1985-04-01
dc.identifier.citationSchofield, Norman; Laver, Michael (1985). Bargaining theory and portfolio payoffs in european coalition governments 1945–83. British Journal of Political Science 15 , 143-164
dc.identifier.issn0007-1234,1469-2112
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10379/9848
dc.publisherCambridge University Press (CUP)
dc.relation.ispartofBritish Journal of Political Science
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/
dc.titleBargaining theory and portfolio payoffs in european coalition governments 1945–83
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/s0007123400004130
dc.local.publishedsourcehttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/81707/1/sswp490.pdf
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland