Givenness, grace and Marion's Augustinianism

Abstract

Marion's account of the ego can be understood as an Augustinian critique of the capable ego from Descartes to Kant. This paper will discuss such post-Kantian Augustinianism as a response to a certain Pelagian Stoicism in Modernity and investigate whether this response is phenomenologically demonstrable. The receptive ego of Marion's account when removed from a metaphysically secured Christian ontology leaves open the possibility that the gift of love is directed as much towards evil as good. This leads to the further worry, that of enthusiasm (Schwärmerei). The enthusiast is impervious to reason, for Kant, because he makes claims which transcend the bounds of experience. While Marion rejects Kant's account of experience, this alone does not remove the concern that his Augustinianism leads him to neglect necessary ethical restraints on the erotic reduction. In closing it is suggested that Marion has resources for answering these concerns and these will be briefly explored.