Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorDuddy, Conal
dc.contributor.authorPiggins, Ashley
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-20T12:00:55Z
dc.date.issued2020-03-04
dc.identifier.citationDuddy, Conal, & Piggins, Ashley. (2020). A foundation for Pareto optimality. Journal of Mathematical Economics. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005en_IE
dc.identifier.issn0304-4068
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10379/15889
dc.description.abstractCan an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only Pareto optimal alternatives at each profile of individual preferences? Using the framework of fixed-agenda social choice theory, we present a characterization of the Pareto optimal social choice correspondence. We introduce a new independence condition, P-independence. When combined with three natural assumptions, P-independence leads to the conclusion that the social choice set and the Pareto optimal set are the same.en_IE
dc.formatapplication/pdfen_IE
dc.language.isoenen_IE
dc.publisherElsevieren_IE
dc.relation.ispartofJournal Of Mathematical Economicsen
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/
dc.subjectPareto optimal social choice correspondenceen_IE
dc.subjectFixed agendaen_IE
dc.subjectOligarchyen_IE
dc.subjectP-independenceen_IE
dc.subjectP-oligarchyen_IE
dc.titleA foundation for Pareto optimalityen_IE
dc.typeArticleen_IE
dc.date.updated2020-04-20T11:46:31Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005
dc.local.publishedsourcehttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005en_IE
dc.description.peer-reviewedpeer-reviewed
dc.description.embargo2022-03-04
dc.internal.rssid20047274
dc.local.contactAshley James Piggins, Dept Of Economics, Nui, Galway.. 2300 Email: ashley.piggins@nuigalway.ie
dc.local.copyrightcheckedYes
dc.local.versionACCEPTED
nui.item.downloads121


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland