Reconciling probability theory and coherentism

dc.contributor.author	Duddy, Conal
dc.date.accessioned	2018-09-20T16:06:38Z
dc.date.available	2018-09-20T16:06:38Z
dc.date.issued	2013-06-27
dc.identifier.citation	Duddy, Conal (2013). Reconciling probability theory and coherentism. Synthese 191 (6), 1075-1084
dc.identifier.issn	0039-7857,1573-0964
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10379/11268
dc.description.abstract	Recent results in the literature appear to show that it is impossible for two independent testimonies to jointly raise the probability of a proposition if neither testimony individually has any impact on that probability. I show that these impossibility results do not apply when testimonies agree on incidental details.
dc.publisher	Springer Nature
dc.relation.ispartof	Synthese
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland
dc.rights.uri	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/
dc.subject	coherentism
dc.subject	witness model
dc.subject	probability theory
dc.subject	coherence
dc.subject	testimony
dc.subject	bayesian
dc.subject	justification
dc.title	Reconciling probability theory and coherentism
dc.type	Article
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s11229-013-0310-4
dc.local.publishedsource	https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11229-013-0310-4.pdf
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