dc.contributor.author | Danaher, John | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-09-20T16:05:01Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-09-20T16:05:01Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-06-27 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Danaher, John (2016). An evaluative conservative case for biomedical enhancement. Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (9), 611-618 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0306-6800,1473-4257 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10379/11045 | |
dc.description.abstract | It is widely believed that a conservative moral outlook is opposed to biomedical forms of human enhancement. In this paper, I argue that this widespread belief is incorrect. Using Cohen's evaluative conservatism as my starting point, I argue that there are strong conservative reasons to prioritise the development of biomedical enhancements. In particular, I suggest that biomedical enhancement may be essential if we are to maintain our current evaluative equilibrium (ie, the set of values that undergird and permeate our current political, economic and personal lives) against the threats to that equilibrium posed by external, non-biomedical forms of enhancement. I defend this view against modest conservatives who insist that biomedical enhancements pose a greater risk to our current evaluative equilibrium, and against those who see no principled distinction between the forms of human enhancement. | |
dc.publisher | BMJ | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Medical Ethics | |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/ | |
dc.subject | enhancement | |
dc.subject | information technology | |
dc.subject | philosophical ethics | |
dc.subject | political philosophy | |
dc.subject | extended mind | |
dc.subject | neuroethics | |
dc.title | An evaluative conservative case for biomedical enhancement | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1136/medethics-2015-103307 | |
dc.local.publishedsource | http://jme.bmj.com/content/medethics/42/9/611.full.pdf | |
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