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Closing the neoliberal gap: risk and regulation in the long war of securitization


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Closing the Neoliberal Gap:

Risk and Regulation in the Long War of Securitization

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Abstract: When US military commanders refer today to the “long war”, they could more instructively refer to the “long war of securitization”, involving both practices of war and reconstruction that have always been based on a therapeutic logic of preemption and an endgame of protection from global economic risk. Since the early 1980s, the centrepiece of US foreign policy has been the securitization of the Persian Gulf region, with the newly-created United States Central Command (CENTCOM) given the task of effecting a grand strategy that has subsequently been consistently based on two interrelated tactics: first, the discursive identification and positing of the Persian Gulf as a precarious yet pivotal geoeconomic space, essential to US and global economic health; and secondly the enactment of a dual military-economic securitization strategy to secure, patrol and regulate designated “vital interests” in the region. With the rhetorical power of “risk management” perhaps more palpable today than ever, this paper reflects on the neoliberal discourses of “risk” and “regulation” that sustain a “long war” in which the perennial potentiality of a volatile global political economy necessitates securitization by US military force.

Keywords: geopolitics, geoeconomics, risk, securitization, United States Central Command
A policeman keeps the peace by applying the minimum of force. He does not seek to expose himself unnecessarily… It is enough that he regulates matters (Pelletiere and Johnson II, *Oil and the New World System: CENTCOM rethinks its Mission*, 1992)

Protect, promote and preserve U.S. interests in the Central Region to include the free flow of energy resources, access to regional states, freedom of navigation, and maintenance of regional stability (US Central Command, *Shaping the Central Region for the 21st Century*, 1999)

**Introduction**

In 1981, Joshua Epstein, a RAND Corporation consultant and research fellow in International Relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, reflected that it was “difficult to imagine a region at once so vital economically and so volatile politically as the Persian Gulf today” (Epstein 1981:126). Epstein was not alone in his scripting of US “vital” interests in the “volatile” region of the Middle East in the early 1980s. By then, leading protagonists in IR and Strategic Studies across the United States were increasingly positing the securitization of the Persian Gulf as the necessary endgame of a refocused US geopolitics in the region (Morrissey 2011a). Such an emboldened geopolitics involved from the outset a discursive production of both contemporary and future danger and, by extension, a “long war” of securitization. In 1983, the creation of US Central Command (CENTCOM) marked the US government’s military commitment to this geopolitical and geoeconomic vision, and thereafter CENTCOM was tasked with the military-economic securitization of the Persian Gulf region.

CENTCOM continues today in spearheading US efforts to secure the Persian Gulf. Since its inception, no other regional command has been afforded more funding by the US Department of Defense, no other command has had more troops deployed to it, and no other command has seen more troops killed or wounded in action. In short, CENTCOM’s “Area of Responsibility” (AOR; see figure 1) has been the primary focus of US military activity since 1983. What I want to do
initially in this paper is to sketch two crucial CENTCOM tactics in effecting US grand strategy in the Middle East: the first is the discursive production of the Persian Gulf region as a pivotal region vital to US geoeconomic interests; the second is the operation of a military-economic securitization strategy to safeguard those interests and police the functioning of a neoliberal global economy.

Figure 1 CENTCOM’s AOR, 2010 [Source: adapted from US Department of Defense (2007:5)]
Theorizing International Relations: Geopolitics, Geoeconomics and Securitization

From popular IR “commentators” to frequently cited Strategic Studies “experts”, imperial geopolitics has once again become a key discourse in theorizing the contestation for global power. Bradley Thayer openly “makes the case” for a geopolitical grand strategy for “American Empire” (Layne and Thayer 2007); Robert Kagan sees a bi-polar geopolitical world divided into “liberal” zones and “autocratic” zones (Kagan 2008:4); while Robert Kaplan (2009) conceives of a Mackinder-inspired geopolitical world defined by a simplistic geographical determinism that requires controlling by military interventionism. Indeed, as argued elsewhere, the recent trajectory of US Strategic Studies reveals an emboldening of reductive and imperial “geographically determinist geopolitics” in the scripting of US national security and foreign policy (Morrissey 2009a:37).

Building upon work over the last two decades in the subfield of “critical geopolitics” that has focused on interrogating the discursive and material production of geopolitical space, geographers in recent years have variously resisted such essentialist and dangerous geopolitical formulations by offering important counter-geographies of our contemporary world (Coleman 2004; Dalby 1991; Dowler and Sharp 2001; Hyndman 2007; Kearns 2009; Ó Tuathail 1996; Roberts, Secor and Sparke 2003). In addition to the critique of imperial geopolitics, its apologists and enthusiasts, geographers have also increasingly theorized “geoeconomics” as capturing more closely the dominant concern of international relations in a globalized, if uneven, economic world. Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith (2009:24-25), for instance, point to “recent shifts” that “challenge geopolitical conceptions” of “space, power and security” and illuminate the recalibration of geopolitics by “market logics” and “geoeconomics”. By using the example of recent changes in US maritime border security prompted by the “impossibility of the geopolitical border given the geoeconomic reframing of insecurity”, they lay bare how “market calculation” has come to supplant the “geopolitical logic of state territoriality”, and how “US geopolitical power is earned via global geoeconomic extension”
(Cowen and Smith 2009:32, 34, 43). For this paper, recognizing and interrogating the neoliberal securitization project at the heart of CENTCOM necessarily involves thinking through how US geopolitical power is solidified by geoeconomic calculation and practice, but what I want to do initially is to discuss briefly the paper’s use of the key terms “geoeconomic” and “securitization”.

As a theoretical idiom, “geoeconomic” is a relatively recent term but, nevertheless, has had a number of academic manifestations. Though having an earlier incarnation, the phrase “geo-economics” first popularly emerged in 1990 with the publication of a since frequently referenced Edward Luttwak article in The National Interest. For Luttwak, geo-economics emerged in the immediate post-Cold War era to reconfigure international relations via the “grammar of commerce” (1990:17). In optimistically (and of course naively) foreseeing a “displacing” of “military methods” by economic statecraft, Luttwak argued that “economic regulation” had become a more significant “tool of statecraft” than “military defenses”, and posited “geo-economics” as the “neologism” that best described the “admixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce” that was beginning to supersede the “strategic priorities and strategic modalities” of the Cold War era (1990:17-19). As interesting and even compelling as Luttwak’s argument is, it has a number of fatal flaws; some of which Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith (2009) have recently underlined. Their most important critique is perhaps their insistence on “the geographical unevenness and radical incompleteness” of the globalized geo-economic world envisioned by Luttwak, and they remind us too that “geoeconomic calculation announced itself much earlier than the 1990s” (Cowen and Smith 2009:38); a point borne out in particular by CENTCOM’s emergence being predicated on a post-World War II US grand strategy that increasingly bonded “military” and “economic” security interests in foreign policy projection.

An additional key problem with Luttwak’s thesis is his conceptualization of a universally understood global economic playing field that effectively occludes geography – and moreover the enduring necessity of militarily securing it for “geo-economic practice”. Luttwak anticipated the
emergence of a style of international relations in the post-Cold War era in which geopolitical and military statecraft would be replaced by a form of geo-economic statecraft wherein “competitively, or cooperatively, the actions on all sides would always unfold without regards to frontiers” (Luttwak 1990:17). Aside from the obvious charge of abstraction and essentialism here, it is the negation of the import of geography, borders and boundaries that is most spurious in the envisioning of his neoliberal “geo-economic world”. As I will argue later, what I am calling the “geoeconomic securitization project” of CENTCOM has long relied, and continues to rely, on a necessary regional ground presence across the Middle East to secure vital “land nodes” that enable military-economic practices of regulation.

Geoeconomic concerns have variously featured in US foreign policy calculation in recent years (Dalby 2007; Sparke 2007). Indeed, neoliberal strategies of “capitalist integration” are markedly discernible in all of the key US grand strategy documents through the course of the last decade; including the US National Security Strategy for 2002 and 2006, the US National Defense Strategy for 2005 and 2008, and the 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (US Department of Defense 2005, 2006, 2008; US National Security Council 2002, 2006). As I will argue later, geoeconomics and neoliberal regulation were prominent concerns of CENTCOM too from the very beginning, and these strategic objectives have already been mapped onto the mission of the new regional command, US Africa Command (AFRICOM), formed from part of CENTCOM’s former East African AOR. The Department of Defense’s press briefing on AFRICOM in February 2007 emphasised first and foremost Africa’s “strategic and economic importance” (US Department of Defense 2007:3); AFRICOM’s first Command Brief underlined the “opportunities” of the “rapidly growing economies” of the continent (US Africa Command 2009a:3); while its 2009 Posture Statement identified at length the economic “resources”, “capacity” and “potential” across the continent, and outlined how “persistent and sustained engagement” by AFRICOM forces are “essential if we are to secure the gains made in establishing
peace and security – the essential foundation for national reconstruction and economic development” (US Africa Command 2009b:5, 24, 30). Akin to CENTCOM, AFRICOM’s regulatory and disciplining neoliberal role is additionally evident in its key command strategy objective to “maintain our freedom of movement into and through the AOR” (US Africa Command 2009b:10; see also Lubeck, Watts and Lipschutz 2007).

Returning to CENTCOM, I use the terms “geoeconomic” and “geoeconomics” neither in the sense of Luttwak-ian “geo-economics” nor Mackinder-esque “geopolitics” but rather to theorize how a political economy “regulatory function” of US military involvement in the Persian Gulf featured centrally in the emergence of a logic of intervention, and indeed preemption, that came to dominate formulations of US foreign policy in the region since at least the late 1970s. The terms are employed, in other words, to divulge the US military’s discursive production of a critically important regional geography defined by its dual “military-economic security interests”. And as I outline later, that particular geography and the identified “vital interests” therein were not only geo-graphed as pivotal for a US-centred global political economy but were also scripted as precarious, volatile and therefore in need of “securitization” – by CENTCOM.

Randy Martin (2007:19) has outlined “securitization” as “far from being a reduction of polity to economy” but rather as “an intricate affiliation between the two” (Martin, 2007: 19). For Martin, “[p]ressing on the political meaning of security brings its economic double to the surface” (2007:17). And certainly CENTCOM’s discourse of securitization involves both (geo)political and (geo)economic registers in important ways. In setting out CENTCOM’s securitization project, however, I am drawing upon two more specific understandings of the term; both of which capture in different yet overlapping ways what I am arguing is the dual military-economic securitization mission of the command. The first is the security studies conception of the term – employed particularly by the constructivist Copenhagen School of IR – in which potential security risks become discursively mobilised to legitimate extraordinary measures to counter national security
threats (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1997; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Williams 2007). And, as I will show later, CENTCOM commanders have consistently relied on a strategic risk-securitization discourse to argue for, and legitimize, the necessity of the “military securitization” of the Persian Gulf region. The second conception of securitization that inflects my theorization of CENTCOM’s securitizing mission is the actuarial studies and financial economics use of the term in which identified risk-laden financial interests become bundled into securities in the market that can be insured against (Cox, Petersen and Fairchild 2000; Bougen 2003; Lin and Cox 2008). In this sense, CENTCOM’s “economic securitization” strategy posits the assets and liabilities of the political economy of the Gulf Region as “insurable risks”, and moreover deserving of “continued future insurance-risk securitization activity” (Cox, Petersen and Fairchild 2000:157).

In theorizing CENTCOM’s mission, then, I am arguing that the command’s grand strategy has always been conceived and mobilised for the securitization of both “military” and “economic” interests. Attaining this endgame has revolved around a discursively entwined security and geoeconomic discourse of risk that legitimizes a strategic argument for the necessity of military interventionism. And that interventionism has now taken on a look of permanency that has been achieved by the perpetual scripting of CENTCOM’s “Central Region” as pivotal for the effective functioning and regulation of the global political economy – for both the present and the near future.

**Scripting the “Central Region for the 21st Century”**

Geographers have played an active part in the humanities and social sciences in recent years in challenging reductive scriptings of the Middle East by offering carefully contextualised geographical readings of the ongoing war on terror (Gregory 2004; Hyndman 2007; Sparke 2007; Woodward 2005). In critiquing the essentialist and frequently dangerous “geographical formulations” of geopolitics, geographers have been especially keen to highlight how, as Simon
Dalby so usefully puts it, “the invocation of supposed geographical verities” is used to “denigrate other peoples” and “justify violence”.\textsuperscript{5} To this end, many have underlined the geoeconomic calculation at the heart of contemporary US foreign policy and traced its historical gestation to the current war on terrorism (Cowen and Smith 2009; Harvey 2003; Kearns 2006; Morrissey 2009b). And others have revealed the violent geographies of the US-led occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, and drawn attention too to the exceptional legal and biopolitical governmentalities of the broader war on terror (Flint 2005; Gregory 2006; Gregory and Pred 2007; Morrissey 2011b).

Outside of Geography, there have been important critical contributions from History, Political Science and elsewhere in examining especially the echoes of the imperial and colonial past in contemporary American military interventions in the Middle East (Dodge 2003, 2009; Gardner and Young 2007; Little 2002; Ryan 2007; Young 2009). And the notion of colonial legacies reverberating through our contemporary moment has been developed by geographers too. For Derek Gregory (2004:16), for example, the “colonial present is not produced through geopolitics and geoeconomics alone”, but is “also set in motion through mundane cultural forms and cultural practices that mark other people as irredeemably “Other” and that license the unleashing of exemplary violence against them”. And others too have illuminated the imaginative and affective geographies legitimating that violence (Hannah 2006; Ó Tuathail 2003). What I want to do now, more specifically, is to examine the imaginative and affective scripting of the Middle East by US Central Command, whose discursive productions are situated in a broader assemblage of pervasive geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses that position the US military in a global policing role, managing a volatile, dangerous and risk-laden world.

In tracing the geopolitical arc through which the Middle East has been constructed, CENTCOM’s role stands out. As the command responsible for US military operations in the Middle East, its mission has been at once both strategic and (geo)political, and it has regularly exhibited (especially in Congressional hearings) a particular consciousness of its role in “educating”
the American people and indeed the world at large what that mission was all about (Reveron and Gavin 2004; Robbins 2004; Wrage 2004). Consider, for example, one of the aims outlined in its chief strategy document in 1999:

Educate key leaders and the American public on the mission of USCENTCOM, the importance of the Central Region and the contributions made by our friends in the region in supporting vital U.S. interests.6

We are further educated on what those contributions entail in CENTCOM’s 2001 sub-regional strategy document for Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula:

Our friends in the region have and continue to support our presence in the region [sic]. Their contributions to our engagement in the region have included access to bases and ports, logistical and equipment support, infrastructure improvements and cost sharing of ongoing operations. Since 1990, we have made great progress in our ability to deter and, if needed, respond rapidly to aggression through improvements in our prepositioning programs, infrastructure improvements and force projection capabilities.7

The US-centric and patriarchal positing of “friends” who unproblematically support “vital U.S. interests” is particularly revealing of what CENTCOM sees as its mission in the Middle East. Its agenda and blueprint for action, however, is perhaps most plainly signalled in the title of its 1999 chief strategy document: Shaping the Central Region for the 21st Century. There are three telling elements here. First, the key word “shaping” betrays a long-established liberal imperial urge to configure new political, economic and social spaces for the endgame of securitizing “vital interests” for the metropole. Since 1983, CENTCOM’s “shaping” has been undertaken from the confines of a US Air Force base (MacDill) in Tampa, Florida, and the external reality of the “Central Region” it
has perennially (re)produced forms part of a broader assemblage of what Gerard Toal has highlighted as “the geopolitical surveys of the territoriality of global politics” carried out by authoritative “seeing sites” (Ó Tuathail 1994:261). Secondly, the title reprises the colonial tactic of renaming vast regions – reductively scripting a diversity of people and places from an abstracted, yet all-seeing Cartesian perspective. The “Central Region” is “seen” as central in terms of what the US military calls “full-spectrum dominance” – dominance, that is, of vital global US interests, ongoing military threats and emergent geoeconomic challenges. And, finally, this brings us to the temporal signalling of CENTCOM’s mission: “for the 21st Century”. Before the current war on terror became rebranded as the “long war”, and before the September 11th attacks in 2001, US Central Command was openly planning for the long haul in the Persian Gulf and the perennial need for intervention and deterrence.

CENTCOM’s overt framing of its primary geoeconomic mission to secure “vital U.S. interests” has been somewhat rolled back in recent years. *Shaping the Central Region for the 21st Century* outlined CENTCOM’s foremost goal to “[p]rotect, promote and preserve U.S. interests in the Central Region to include the free flow of energy resources, access to regional states, freedom of navigation, and maintenance of regional stability”. Ten years later, its 2009 mission statement, however, signals a more universalist agenda, presenting the notion of US-led international “cooperation” and “development” and erasing explicit references to US “national interests”:

> US Central Command, working with national and international partners, promotes development and cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and transnational aggression in order to establish regional security and stability.

This purposeful discursive shift to orientate a more universalist neoliberal mission has everything to do with garnering international support for the US-led “war on terrorism” of course. It reflects too the long-established prowess and creative flexibility of US military communications strategy.
However, the new mission statement does not depart from CENTCOM’s foundational remit of geoeconomic securitization of volatile yet vital strategic spaces for the good of the US and global political economy. This has always been, and continues to be, the “mission géoéconomique”.

**Insecurity, Risk and the Temporality of Preemption: CENTCOM’s Aleatory Contract**

The aleatory nature of the Middle East’s future has long been a key discursive touchstone of CENTCOM geopolitical discourse. Since its initiation in the early 1980s, the command’s strategy papers, mission statements and reports to Senate and House Armed Services Committees have implicitly touted it as the fundamental reason for its existence (Morrissey 2009b). In effect, it signed an aleatory contract to securitize the Middle East, and that contract has been legitimized at regular intervals by the discursive production of politically-charged senses of risk, precarity and fear. And as Jennifer Hyndman (2007:361) reasons, such discourses have a particularly potent (geo)political power precisely because they neatly combine an “expression of vulnerability” with a “rationale for security measures”. They function to justify – indeed demand – practices of securitization.

Various social theorists have explored in recent years how discourses of fear, insecurity and risk feature prominently and constitutively in everyday governmentalities and reproductions of the state (Bernstein 1996; Campbell 1992; Giddens 1999; Lupton 1999; Mythen and Walklate 2006). Ulrich Beck’s formulation of how modernity can be characterized as a “risk society” has been a particular source of reflection across various disciplines (Beck 1992, 1999; cf O’Malley 1999). And while Michel Foucault did not write extensively on risk, his work on governmentality has been especially influential in some of the most important recent theorizations of the subject (Braun 2008; Dean 1999; Foucault 1979, 1991, 2007; O’Malley 2004). In the context of the war on terror, “risk” has played a key role in the legitimization of state governmental and military strategies of securitization (Cooper 2008; Dillon 2008). Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster (2007:108), for
instance, have shown how it is through the “perspective of risk management” that “securitization” is so seductively seen to function by “the deployment of technologies to manage dangerous irruptions in the future”. George W. Bush’s declaration of the war on terror in 2001 was predicated on specific notions of insecurity and risk management; and that war had already begun, of course, some years earlier when Bill Clinton dispatched bombing raids on Afghanistan and Iraq. In 1998, Clinton warned the world about the “risks of inaction”, which outweighed “the risks of action”; a key political rhetoric subsequently used by Bush in launching the pre-emptive strikes on Iraq in 2003 (Beck 2009; Heng 2006; O’Malley 2006). Five years later, Bush’s 2008 National Defense Strategy was concluded with a specific section entitled “Managing Risk”. Therein, “future challenges risk” is underlined along with other identified risks as a critical element to be planned for in the strategic projection of US foreign policy (US Department of Defense 2008:20-23).

Military strategies of securitization from “future challenges risk” are justified additionally by neoliberal beliefs that securitization practices simultaneously function to “correct”, to “reconstruct”, to “close the gap” of global security, economic freedom and indeed civilization (Simmons and Manuel 2003; Knights 2006; O’Hanlon 2008; Kaplan 2009). This binary – neatly coupling the identification of risk with the idea that military reconstruction is necessary – results in a therapeutic and persuasive geopolitical argument about permanent interventionism. It is at this point that temporality becomes an important register. From its genesis, CENTCOM’s temporal gaze has been directed to emerging and future danger. Such a focus is militarily to be expected of course given that its theater engagement strategy has consistently entailed pre-emptive strategies of deterrence and containment (US Central Command 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2009). A logic of military preemption, in other words, has long been registered in CENTCOM circles.

The logic of preemption has attracted considerable academic interest in recent years. Randy Martin’s (2007) Empire of Indifference usefully deploys the concept to theorize the dual political and economic calculus of risk that has featured so centrally in recent US military interventionism.
Echoing Naomi Klein’s argument about event-based disaster capitalism, Martin places particular emphasis on the import of the “event” – and the risk of future events – and argues that preemption is the temporality of their securitization, “the future made present” (Martin 2007:18; Klein 2007). For Martin, when such temporality drives foreign policy, “[p]otential threats are actualized as demonstrations of the need for further intervention”. Melinda Cooper (2007) too has argued that US involvement in Iraq is based on a “mode of intervention that is curiously indifferent to its own ‘success’ or ‘failure’, since both eventualities open up a market of future risk opportunities where even hedges against risk can be traded for profit”. And as Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith (2009:42) point out, the everyday rationale for the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may well be pragmatic military geography, but viewed more broadly, both can be seen as “market war[s] par excellence” in which hundreds of corporations have “feasted at the trough” of billion-dollar contracts “committed to destruction and failed reconstruction”. For Cooper (2007), the war on terror has served to provoke a “certain unity of purpose amongst various denominations of militant Islamism, crystallizing alliances that would otherwise have lain dormant”, and the pre-emptive action on the part of the US military has “succeeded in generating “relations at a distance” and risk opportunities where none existed before”. In other words, as Martin (2007:98) argues:

> Fighting terror unleashed it elsewhere, just as well-placed put or call (sell or buy) of stock would send ripples of price volatility through the market. Drops in price can be hedged against, turned into derivatives, and sold for gain. The terror war converts both wins and losses into self-perpetuating gain.

But the gain is only for the few of course, and while the argument is compelling in terms of capturing the mercenary impulses of security contract firms like Blackwater (Scahill 2007), it is perhaps a little too neat to encapsulate the multiple urges of CENTCOM strategists and planners.
However, the notion of CENTCOM consciously signing up to a foundational aleatory contract to securitize the neoliberal gap in the Persian Gulf certainly bears up to scrutiny. One can arguably trace that aleatory contract back to the signing of the Roosevelt-Aziz pact in the immediate post-WWII period, which can be read as an early designation of the link between “economic” and “security” interests in advancing US hegemony in the Middle East (Painter 1986). In the 1970s, a series of “crises” solidified this link: oil supply disruptions; Saudi unease over Horn of Africa crises; the removal of the Shah in Iran; and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was created in Oct. 1979 with “crisis management” as its foundational remit (and CENTCOM, of course, as permanent successor to the RDJTF, effectively took over the management of that ongoing crisis in 1983). In 1980, the Carter Doctrine – the geopolitical pre-scripting for CENTCOM’s initiation as a permanent regional command – posited the entire Middle East and Central Asia region as a vital strategic space for the global political economy:

The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: it contains more than two-thirds of the world’s exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. 11

President Carter emphasised the “potentially grave situation” in the Middle East and made the case for the necessity of “resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come”. 12 He was, in effect, sketching the idea of preemptive military action and a “long war”.

The opening salvo in that long war occurred with little media attention in the summer of 1987. The Iran-Iraq War was still raging and in what became known as “Operation Earnest Will” CENTCOM forces were forward deployed for their first major intervention; the operation would
define the command’s role thereafter. The Reagan administration, fearing an escalation of regional economic volatility, ordered CENTCOM warships to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and ensure freedom of navigation by reflagging them with American ensigns. Such a clear-cut geoeconomic intervention, according to President Reagan, was to demonstrate “U.S. commitment to the flow of oil through the Gulf”. And that commitment was considerable: at the height of what became known as the “Tanker War” in 1987, at least 48 US Navy combat vessels were operating on full alert in the Persian Gulf and northern Arabian Sea.

Reagan’s successor, George Bush, continued Central Command’s neoliberal policing role in emphatically checking Iraqi regional ambition in 1991; in the Gulf War’s aftermath, he spoke of the command’s triumph in securing “global economic health” (Morrissey 2009b). After the war, a more permanent ground presence of CENTCOM forces in Saudi Arabia and a proactive weapons pre-positioning programme across the Arabian Peninsula signalled a new hands-on US deterrence policy to fulfil its policing role in the region. And this shift in command engagement strategy was confirmed by a number of CENTCOM-commissioned reports in the early 1990s (Lesser 1991; Pelletiere and Johnson II 1992). Stephen Pelletiere and Douglas Johnson’s Oil and the New World System: CENTCOM rethinks its Mission, for example, scripted the command’s role thus:

[US Central Command] has a crucial mission to perform – guarding the flow of oil… In effect, CENTCOM must become the Gulf’s policeman, a function it will perform with mounting patrols (1992:v, 26).

CENTCOM’s theater strategy of deterrence built strongly on well-established military maxims honed during the Cold War. Deterrence continued to feature at the heart of US foreign policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and it comprised both a discursive production of defense and prevention rhetoric, and an active operational war-fighting strategy (Klein 1988, 1989). And as Bradley Klein (1994:5) points out, the “strategic violence” of deterrence does not “merely patrol the
frontiers”, it “helps constitute them as well”. Klein’s reminder is important because Western “interventionary” violence has a long history of being incorporated into liberal discourse by the legitimization of aggression as “exceptional”, as “necessary”, as “allowable”. As Klein argues, Western imperial and geopolitical violence “draws upon a variety of discursive resources that are themselves widely construed as rational, plausible and acceptable”, and chief among these is “a series of apparent opposites” such as “domestic and foreign, inside and outside, order and anarchy, peace and war, us and them, good and bad, First World and Third World” (1994:5). And what Central Command’s discursive strategy does in identifying, on the one hand, senses of risk and volatility for the US and world economy, and justifying, on the other hand, practices of securitization and violence is to “provide a map for the negotiating of these dichotomies in such a way that Western society always winds up on the “good” … side of the equation” (Klein 1994:5). In other words, CENTCOM’s risk-securitization discourse ultimately provides a persuasive linking of “risk” to “responsibility” (Giddens 1999): Western responsibility, that is, to intervene, to police and to use military force if necessary.

Posturing for the Long War: War-Gaming, Mobility and Juridical Tactics

In the 1990s, Central Command’s theater strategy, according to successive Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), rested on “five pillars of peace”: “power projection, forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance, and readiness to fight” (Binford Peay III 1995:35). Though hardly qualifying as pillars of “peace”, nonetheless they reflected perfectly a forward strategy defined by its ability to deter, patrol and wage war if necessary. CENTCOM CINC General James Binford Peay III reported to the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on National Security in 1997 that “we know from experience that [Middle Eastern] leaders are intimidated by military strength” and “consequently, we deter these individuals by continuing to organize, equip, and exercise premier joint and combined forces; positioning a credible mix of those forces forward in
the region; maintaining the national will to use them; and communicating our resolve to our opponents”. For General Peay, the geostrategic and geoeconomic interests at stake in the region meant that the concept of “withdrawing” was simply “not an option”.

The concept that did receive particular attention as the US military began to envision its role and capabilities for the 21st century was “rapid troop deployability”. A series of reviews of overseas basing strategy and technological capacity for rapid troop movement gradually refocused the US military’s global posturing, which required redesigning from a static Cold War environment. As CENTCOM CINC General Anthony Zinni outlined to the Senate Arms Service Committee in 2000, Central Command’s power projection strategy in the Persian Gulf hinged on “rapidly deployable forces”. And through the course of the 1990s, CENTCOM forces had been well drilled in “war-gaming” and combat exercises, all orientated for fighting readiness and rapid deployability. Troops stationed at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, for example, periodically war-gamed logistical plans to defend the Gulf. In 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry outlined to the Council on Foreign Relations their operational plan for the protection of US interests and deterrence of regional foes, especially Iraq and Iran:

> We do have such a plan, and it does not just sit on the shelf gathering dust. We war-game it, we exercise it, and we modify it to meet challenging circumstances.

And those plans were indeed quickly operationalized a year earlier during “Operation Vigilant Warrior”, which saw a successful CENTCOM deterrence manoeuvre against Iraq by combining the combat power of forward deployed troops and prepositioned equipment and supplies.

Central Command’s focus on deterrence continued in the late 1990s, and both its right, and capacity to do so unilaterally, were well versed by CENTCOM CINCs in their reports to Congress. In 1999, for example, General Anthony Zinni argued to the Senate Arms Service Committee that
the “ability to project overwhelming and decisive military power is key to CENTCOM’s theater strategy as well as our ability to shape the battlefield”. To this end, strategic air- and sea-lift capabilities and the pre-positioning of fighting materials and supplies became critical components in the command’s theater strategy at the turn of the century (and all of this was to be capitalised on of course when the Iraq War was launched in 2003).

Just before the war in Iraq, the increasingly globally-postured US military received a new tool to enable rapid forward deployment. In February 2003, while the UN Security Council were still in the throes of resisting the US/UK plans to attack Iraq, the military defense company Raytheon announced that it had delivered a deployable command and control headquarters to CENTCOM, and that it was already activated in As Sayliyah, Qatar. The CENTCOM Deployable Headquarters (CDHQ), Raytheon proclaimed, allowed CENTCOM’s field commanders to “maintain seamless connectivity with theater component command staff and command staff at their main headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base”:

CDHQ provides full command and control capabilities and supports rapid forward deployment of essential personnel. It is the first deployable command post for unified combatant commanders. CDHQ can be operated anywhere within CENTCOM’s area of responsibility.

Reacting to his command’s new military medium, then CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks proclaimed that CDHQ fulfilled urgently-needed capabilities. The necessary military capabilities identified by General Franks included most importantly the ability to intervene quickly and decisively in any spaces geo-graphed as “in need of securitization” in CENTCOM’s AOR. As unilateral such an interventionist position may be, it was nevertheless the fundamental geopolitical touchstone of the Bush administration’s war on terror, and one staunchly and endlessly registered. “The world has changed a great deal”, declared President Bush in Cincinnati in August 2004, and “our posture must change with it”, so that “we can be more effective at projecting our strength and
spreading freedom and peace”.22 Bush went on to outline how a “more agile and flexible force” would be globally postured to “surge quickly” to deal with “today’s threats”, “emerging threats” and “unexpected threats”.23

The rapid deployability concept was officially codified with the publication and report to Congress of the Global Defense Posture Review in late 2004. Therein, “bilateral and multilateral legal arrangements” are cited as critical components of “global defense posture”, which allow for the “necessary flexibility and freedom of action to meet 21st-century security challenges”.24 The Global Defense Posture Review’s emphasis on legal arrangements underlines how crucial juridical tactics are in the US military’s long war of securitization. Elsewhere, I have considered the various “spaces of exception” – in terms of legal and biopolitical governmentality – in CENTCOM’s Central Region (Morrissey 2011b). I have argued that Giorgio Agamben’s oft-cited and rather seductive formulation of the “state of exception” fails to capture the bigger picture of Central Command’s forward presence and standard military operations (Agamben 2005). The notion of the “state of exception” is useful for sure in explaining how detainees have been identified and “managed” defensively in extra-territorial spaces; however, it does not account for the bigger CENTCOM concern of managing and protecting its own troops in offensive mode. This involves a separate and rarely-discussed legal strategy that protects US troops in forward deployed areas by the signing of Status of Forces Agreements with host countries. Both Central Command’s offensive and defensive legal strategies work in concert with each other, of course – military facilities throughout its AOR act as both “base” and “prison” – and both strategies rely on emboldened discourses of risk and (in)security that reprise older tactics of colonial biopolitics (Nally 2008).

**Neoliberal Securitization**

Returning to the question of geoeconomic securitization, Central Command CINC General James Binford Peay III declared to the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on National
Security in 1997 that any disruption in the flow of petroleum from the Persian Gulf would “precipitate economic calamity for developed and developing nations alike”.\textsuperscript{25} His successor at CENTCOM, General Anthony Zinni, affirmed the command’s primary role in averting such a scenario by emphatically underlining its geoeconomic mission in his 1998 report to the Senate Armed Services Committee:

America’s interests in [the Central Region] reflect our beliefs in access to free markets, the Middle East Peace Process, protection of and access to regional energy resources, and reduce [sic] the proliferation of conventional and mass destruction weapons. The vast quantities of oil, gas, and other resources present in the gulf region, which includes 69 percent of the world’s known oil reserves plus significant natural gas fields, are essential to today’s global economies. Much of the oil exported from the Arabian Gulf countries passes through at least one of three important maritime choke points: the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, or the Bab el Mandeb between Yemen and Eritrea.\textsuperscript{26}

Zinni was interviewed by the US military’s flagship journal, \textit{Joint Force Quarterly}, the following year. He was initially asked what “basic considerations” underpin CENTCOM theater strategy. Here is his revealing reply:

Our theater strategy is built [on] four elements. The first is obvious – providing access to the energy resources of the region, which is a vital national interest. The second element is something often overlooked – the growing commercial significance of the area. The pattern of global trade is shifting from east to west. Investments are flowing into the region because of its geostrategic position. The third is the number of maritime choke points in the region, such as the Suez Canal and Strait of Hormuz. We must ensure these passages remain open to communication and trade. Fourth, there are issues of stability – the Middle East peace process, extremism, and other concerns that could destabilize the region and reach beyond it.\textsuperscript{27}
In official geopolitical discourse, CENTCOM CINC’s have succeeded in perennially convincing Congress of the need for an ongoing neoliberal securitization project in the Persian Gulf region. And over the last 25 years, Central Command’s securitization discourse winning out in the corridors of political and military power in Washington has been mirrored by an exponential growth in CENTCOM’s ground presence across the region that has facilitated the vital nodes of power to secure geoeconomic calculation. In the early 1980s, apart from the Indian Ocean atoll of Diego Garcia, located over 2000 miles south of the Persian Gulf, the US military held no bases anywhere in the Middle East. Today, in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, involvement in Afghanistan and broader execution of the war on terror, CENTCOM holds at least 128 operational bases across its AOR (Morrissey 2010b).  

A preemptive geopolitical and geoeconomic logic of risk management underpins the current US overseas basing strategy. The Overseas Basing Commission reported to Congress in 2005, for example, that:

> The U.S. overseas basing structure must serve both in the near term and for decades to come. [Bases] cannot be oriented to dealing only with current threats. They must have the capacity to deal with threats that will emerge in decades to come… None of us can predict the future. That, however, is enough to remind us that any base structuring cannot be designed to deal only with the threats of today. The base structure we develop in the near future must enable us to meet the threats that will emerge over the next quarter century and beyond (2005:iii, 6-7).

The Commission went on to cite the example of “Operation Vigilant Warrior” in 1994 (“to respond to renewed Iraqi aggression against Kuwait”) and “Operation Iraqi Freedom” in 2003 (“to secure Iraq’s oil fields”) to expound the vital importance of “maintaining a forward presence” for CENTCOM’s geopolitical and geoeconomic mission (2005:G2). And this military-economic securitization discourse has been echoed relentlessly in US Strategic Studies by an influential
assemblage of foreign policy institutes, defense think-tanks and specialist university and college departments (Morrissey 2010a); what Bradley Klein (1988) calls Washington’s “strategic culture”. A year before the war in Iraq was launched, Sami Hajjar at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, scripted the following aleatory scenario for the Persian Gulf and the subsequent necessity of permanent US military intervention:

In addition to Iraq, the Gulf region is likely to remain fundamentally unstable for several decades to come… In other words, there is no realistic end in the foreseeable future to U.S. military engagement in the Gulf. The vital interests the United States has in the region … and the inability of Japan and European powers that depend on Middle East oil to project power for a long period of time, mean that U.S. engagement is there for the long haul. The Army should plan accordingly, for an over-the-horizon presence strategy is no longer valid … land power is, in the final analysis, what will secure the world’s most precious and coveted real estate (2002:57-58).

Hajjar’s argument about the import of “land power” is significant I think. Much of the recent work on geoeconomics points to how, as Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith put it, the “acquisition or control of territory” is more of “a tactical option rather than a strategic necessity” in terms of the “accumulation of wealth through market control” (2009:42). And they are certainly correct in seeing that accumulation as enabled “through imperial violence” (2009:44). However, while geoeconomics does not rely on territorial control in the colonial sense, it does rely on “land nodes” in the imperial sense, in which bases, logistic facilities and pre-positioning sites enable key policing and deterrence practices of securitization and regulation. Territorial access, in other words, is still vital for geoeconomics; which seems to me an important point conspicuously absent in many of the recent rather ageographical reflections on “globalization” and “empire” (Friedman 2005; Hardt and Negri 2000). This “geography still matters in international relations” assertion is part of Matt
Sparke’s argument about an “American dominance” defined in terms of “global systems management geared to removing security impediments from the global level playing field” (2007:345). Sparke’s point is that the US neoconservative designs for “military intervention” in Iraq were combined from the start with neoliberal hopes to “enable the invisible hand of the free market to tip dominos of democracy and freedom right across the Middle East” (2007:345); i.e. Iraq becoming “the rock upon which the United States projects power” (Thayer 2003:23). And neoliberal designs for swift economic reconstruction and realignment were certainly part of both the pre-planning and initial security operations of the war in Iraq (Klein 2007). A month before George W. Bush’s premature “Mission Accomplished” address aboard USS Abraham Lincoln in early May 2003, and a mere two weeks after the war had been launched, the “Operations and Reconstruction” hearings of Operation Iraqi Freedom had already commenced before the House Committee on Armed Services back in Washington.29

Echoing Sparke’s contention above, Simon Dalby, in reading the 2005 US *National Defense Strategy* in parallel with the works of popular foreign policy commentators, Thomas Barnett and Robert Kaplan, has argued that official and popular US geopolitical discourse collectively reveal a “broad complementarity” of “imperial military action” and “neo-liberal globalisation” (2007:586). The 2006 US *National Security Strategy* further bears out this logic. Out of its nine thematic chapters, four of them address economic and globalization issues that the Bush administration saw as vital to both US national security and the stability of the world economy.30 The 2006 *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* can also be cited in divulging the US military’s broad mission of “neoliberal securitization”.31 In it, the positing of terrorist strategy is juxtaposed in irrational opposition to the security and economic logic of US military strategy:

Extremists use terrorism to impede and undermine political progress, economic prosperity, the security and stability of the international state system... The United States will promote freedom,
democracy, and economic prosperity around the world to mitigate those conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.32

It is this dual military-economic logic that has defined the securitization project of US Central Command for nearly three decades. Successive CENTCOM CINC’s have perennially extolled the command’s role in policing “regional stability and security” in a space scripted ad infinitum as “integral to the political and economic wellbeing of the international community” (Binford Peay III 1995:32). And CENTCOM’s self-declared mission, espoused in its annual posture statements, has been to “protect the United States’ vital interest in the region – uninterrupted, secure U.S./Allied access to Gulf oil” (US Central Command 1995:1). To this end, the negotiation of vital Status of Forces Agreements, a proactive military pre-positioning programme and frequent war-gaming and combat exercises have combined to facilitate a “continuous presence” in the Persian Gulf to “deter conflict, promote stability, and facilitate a seamless transition to war, if required” (US Central Command 1997:5). This is the neoliberal securitization project of US CENTCOM – where strategy and economics are enabled, regulated and insured against.

Conclusion

[CENTCOM must] adopt the role of policeman. A policeman keeps the peace by applying the minimum of force. He does not seek to expose himself unnecessarily… It is enough that he regulates matters (Pelletiere and Johnson II 1992:26).

For more than 25 years, US Central Command has been the focal military instrument of US foreign policy. Its long war of securitization has been sustained by how key spaces in its AOR have been scripted (both officially and popularly) as “in need of various forms of intervention, management and integration” (Dalby 2007:604). It has been underpinned too by an enduring and
emboldened Orientalism by which the Middle East is once again scripted as inherently “backward” and in need of “securitizing from itself”. Looking to the 21st century in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the CENTCOM 2000 project rejected the very idea of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council states being in charge of their own security and defending themselves: “Only CENTCOM can do that” (Pelletiere and Johnson II 1992:v). It is this thinking that is at the heart of CENTCOM’s persuasive risk-securitization discourse, which has so effectively coupled global economic “risk” with Western “responsibility” to intervene, police and regulate.

From its inception, CENTCOM’s mission has been focused on geoeconomic risk, reconstruction and regulation: the Reagan administration used the rationale of “protecting world economic markets” in its deployment of CENTCOM forces to reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers and keep markets steady in 1987; the first Bush administration operationalized a decisive CENTCOM response to Iraqi regional ambition in 1991 to secure “global economic health”; and the Clinton administration championed “economic statecraft” and “economic globalization” across the Middle East and Central Asia that not only promised the neoliberal dream but would also guarantee national security (Morrissey 2009b). In scripting the initial logic of the war in Iraq, the second Bush administration was faced with a cravenly submissive majority in the US mainstream media who failed to ask the big questions from the outset. As the war dragged on and (US) casualties rose, however, the pre-war deceptions of weapons of mass destruction, 45-minute threats, and Iraqi links to Osama Bin Laden were eventually discredited. So what came to replace them as the justifications for the war? Regime change, of course, and the removal of a despotic tyrant who was a former key secular ally (Sidaway 1998). However, in a rare moment of truth, Bush’s prime-time speech on Iraq on 13 September 2007 revealed the unembellished strategic and economic rationales. It was a retreat to a bare-bones, geoeconomic discourse that has always had bipartisan support on Capitol Hill:
If we were to be driven out of Iraq … extremists could control a key part of the global energy supply… Whatever political party you belong to, whatever your position on Iraq, we should be able to agree that America has a vital interest in preventing chaos and providing hope in the Middle East.33

Since 1983, US Central Command has been tasked with securitizing the most pivotal geoeconomic space in our contemporary world – what it calls the “Central Region”. This paper has shown how that objective has been focused on two essential and seemingly convertible components of American foreign policy: “military” and “economic” security interests. In underlining the link between strategy and economics at the heart of CENTCOM’s mission, I have sought especially to highlight the command’s neoliberal policing raison d’être.34 Its role of “geoeconomic regulator”, in effect, points us to a conjoined history of military and financial securitization and a preemptive logic of US involvement in the Middle East that has long involved therapeutic discourses of risk management and explicit appeals to neoliberal economic universality. CENTCOM’s “long war” is about the strategic-economic alignment of the Persian Gulf region for the good of the international community; it is a war of “insurance-risk securitization” for an aleatory future requiring permanent military interventionism; and it is a war enacted by military-economic practices of regulation that sees the “policing” of Gulf assets, the preemptive “deterrence” of regional rivals and ultimately the geopolitical and geoeconomic “shaping” of the most energy-rich region on earth.

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2 Matt Sparke (2007) has outlined its diverse array of applications within Geography.

3 Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith have highlighted how the term appears to have been first used by the French economic geographer Jacques Boudeville in 1966 in conceiving “1960s liberal growth pole theory” (Boudeville 1966; Cowen and Smith 2009:38).

4 President George W. Bush directed the establishment of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) on 6 February 2007. Headquartered at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany, AFRICOM reached its target for initial operating capabilities on October 1, 2007, as a sub-unified command, subordinate to US European Command (the long-term plan is to relocate the AFRICOM HQ to the African continent). It was established as regional unified command with full operational capabilities on 1 October 2008, with all of CENTCOM’s African countries, with the exception of Egypt, becoming officially part of the new Africa Command. See http://www.africom.mil (last accessed 11 October 2009).


10 The US Department of Defense’s 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, for example, outlines in detail a “military strategic communication strategy” in which combatant commanders are called upon to “harness all strategic communication capabilities, including public affairs, public diplomacy (military support to public
diplomacy and military diplomacy) and information operations” to implement an “aggressive … comprehensive strategic communication process for the war on terrorism” (2006:30).


12 Ibid.


16 Ibid.


21 Ibid.


23 Ibid.


33 The White House (2007) President Bush Address to the Nation. Press release, 13 September. Michael Klare (2007:20) has highlighted how prior to Bush’s speech senior figures in both the Republican and Democratic parties were simultaneously calling for “a reinvigorated US military role in the protection of foreign energy deliveries”.

34 Thinking through how US global strategic power is solidified by geoeconomics additionally allows us to see how the intertexts between corporations and the US military work in tandem to facilitate strategy, provide the technologies for its enactment and generate economic opportunities overseas as a result.