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Irish Perceptions of National Identity in Austria-Hungary and its Small Successor States, 1914-1945

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Thesis Submitted for the Award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Summary

This thesis sets out to explore Irish perceptions of and connections with the Dual Monarchy and its successor states, spanning from 1914 until 1945, with the intention of demonstrating the significance of small nations in Irish political discourse. Offering new insights into Irish links with the wider world, in contrast with the persisting image of an inward-looking Ireland, the thesis explores and contextualises Irish parallels with small states in Central Europe. The first chapter concentrates on Irish images of the small nationalities in the Dual Monarchy during the Great War, stressing the significance of the personal experience of Irish intellectuals, journalists and politicians, who were mostly from a Catholic, nationalist, middle-class background. Moreover, it investigates Irish comments on the multiple layers of identities in the multi-cultural empire. The second chapter focuses upon Irish reactions to the revolutionary transformation of Austria-Hungary after the Great War, paying particular attention to the impact of the communist threat and the post-war peace conferences on Irish perceptions. The third chapter examines Irish contact with Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in Geneva and Dublin, highlighting the existence of early diplomatic links with the successor states, while also analysing Irish impressions of extreme politics, irredentism, and borderland conflicts. The final chapter concludes by analysing the challenges small states faced between the years 1938 and 1945, examining Irish reactions to the Anschluss, the Munich Agreement, and the Vienna Awards, in addition to the discussion of Central European exiles in Ireland. By directing scholarly attention to a hitherto often neglected aspect of Irish historiography, this thesis aims to highlight the complexity of Irish perceptions of Central European borders and identities in a wider, transnational context.

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Declaration

I hereby certify that the present thesis is all my own work and I have not obtained a degree in this University, or elsewhere, on the basis of this work.

Lili Zách

28 September 2015

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Abbreviations

CAIR	Catholic Association of International Relations
Dáil Éireann	Lower house of the Irish parliament
DFA	Department of Foreign (formerly External) Affairs
<i>DIB</i>	Dictionary of Irish Biography
<i>DIFP</i>	Documents on Irish Foreign Policy
DT/TAOIS/TSCH	Department of the Taoiseach
G2	Directorate of Military Intelligence
IIA	Irish Institute of International Affairs
IPP	Irish Parliamentary Party
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRB	Irish Republican Brotherhood
MP	Member of Parliament
NAI	National Archives of Ireland, Dublin
NEBB	North-Eastern Boundary Committee
NLI	National Library of Ireland, Dublin
NUI	National University of Ireland
<i>ODNB</i>	Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
PA	Press Association
RIA	Royal Irish Academy
RIIA	Royal Institute of International Affairs
Seanad	Upper house of the Irish parliament
Taoiseach	Irish Prime Minister
TCD	Trinity College Dublin
TD	Teachta Dála (Member of Dáil Éireann)
UCC	University College Cork
UCD	University College Dublin
UCDA	University College Dublin Archives
UCG	University College Galway

Notes on Nomenclature

The constitutional terms ‘Ireland’ and ‘Irish’ are used interchangeably with ‘Irish Free State’ and the ‘Twenty-Six Counties’ following the Irish Free State Constitution Act (1922 and 1937), as well as with Éire (1937-1948) after the 1937 Constitution of Ireland.

In the context of the present thesis, the term Central Europe is used interchangeably with Habsburg Central Europe, the Dual Monarchy, Austria-Hungary and the Austro-Hungarian Empire following the Compromise/*Ausgleich/Kiegyezés* of 1867 until the monarchy’s dissolution in October 1918. For the period after 1919, the term covers the ‘small successor states’ after 1919. Although not the only successors, but for the purpose of this thesis, these terms cover Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, unless stated otherwise. Central European geographical terms, place names or regions follow English usage, and are also provided in the concerned languages, where needed or applicable. For instance, modern-day Bratislava (Slovak) is described as Pressburg (German) and Pozsony (Hungarian) in the pre-1918 era due to the historical uses by the German/Hungarian communities, respectively. Similarly, Upper Region/Upper Hungary is provided in Hungarian as well (*Felvidék*) since it was inseparable from the historical/geographical use of the term in this particular context, which was not covered with the political use of ‘Czechoslovakia’. Moreover, after the partition of the Tyrol after the Great War, the southern part of the region that came under Italian rule under the name ‘Alto Adige’, is referred to as ‘the South Tyrol’ in the present thesis.

As far as parties and political associations are concerned, they are provided in English as well as the relevant native language, where needed. Christian social, communist, fascist and socialist are not capitalised when referring to ideologies, movements, and people, only when applied to parties and governments (the Christian Social Government; the Communist Party of Ireland).

Introduction

In the early twentieth century, the struggle of oppressed small nations for self-determination was shared by Ireland and the subordinated races of the Dual Monarchy. Ireland was in the process becoming an independent small state with border-related problems, was defining her relationship with the wider world and developing diplomatic relations. These were experiences shared by the small states of Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Thus this thesis aims to provide an insight into Irish perceptions of and links with the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its successor states in the years 1914-1945, within the framework of discussions of small nations and small nation states. Starting with the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, which led to redrawing European boundaries, and finishing with the end of the Second World War in 1945, it aims to contribute to our understanding of the significance of small nations in an international context. By examining how the transformation of political frameworks in Ireland and Central Europe shaped Irish perceptions, this thesis focuses on the evolving nature of Irish interest in the formulation of identities in the region. Moreover, it explores links and parallels between Ireland and Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the first half of the twentieth century. The belief that any small nation like Ireland, oppressed by a dominant neighbour, had the right to self-determination was of key importance throughout the period. Nevertheless, Irish commentators were also aware of the persistence of other identities after the formation of these states.

The significance of first-hand experience regarding Central Europe was crucial; many Irish intellectuals, journalists, and politicians travelled to Habsburg Central Europe before the war, or had personal encounters with representatives of its small successor states after 1918. These often occurred at diplomatic posts or meeting points such as the headquarters of the League of Nations in Geneva, or in Ireland itself, especially from the mid-1920s. Additionally, since most people's perceptions were still based on second-hand information, the influence of the Irish press and periodicals needs to be acknowledged.

Maurice Earls, co-editor of the *Dublin Review of Books* has noted (2014) how unfortunate it was that 'the many recently published - and frequently groundbreaking - commentaries on the

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1912-22 period in Ireland show such little interest' in European countries whose pasts were similar to that of Ireland.¹ Earls has stressed that already in the nineteenth century,

...Irish political discourse showed considerable awareness of central Europe and its similarities with Ireland. However, we appear to have lost this awareness as the twentieth century progressed, a loss which perhaps followed from the ebbing of our nationalist passions and, of course, the pervasive cold war narrative which tended to displace everything which preceded it.²

Thus Earls has recognised the need for greater awareness of parallels between Ireland and continental Europe by 'moving the focus from Ireland as an unusual or isolated case' to one that places the Irish experience into a wider European context.³

Indeed, in recent historiography, parallels between Ireland and East-Central Europe have started to attract more and more attention. Firstly, Thomas Kabdebo's *Ireland and Hungary: A Study in Parallels* (2001) has presented a history of Irish and Hungarian nationalisms, analysing Irish nationalism in a comparative perspective and building on the legacy of Arthur Griffith. Kabdebo has traced the similarities between the developments in Ireland and Hungary in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, examining cultural and political characters and events.⁴ Its significance lies in raising awareness of the possibility of further parallels between Ireland and Hungary (and its neighbours). Secondly, Zsuzsanna Zarka's recent doctoral thesis focusing on the 'Images and perceptions of Hungary and Austria-Hungary in Ireland, 1815-1875' (2012) has been noteworthy. Zarka has aimed to investigate the extent and significance of Irish knowledge regarding Hungary in the nineteenth century 'in terms of their importance, utility and endurance in the Irish public mind.'⁵ Thirdly, Róisín Healy's study entitled "'Inventing Eastern Europe" in Ireland, 1848-1918' (2009) has also demonstrated the scholarly interest in examining Irish perceptions of East-Central Europe and their struggle for national independence. Healy has emphasised that on the eve of the Great War, Irish images regarding East-Central Europe were not fixed: 'Ireland's various "Eastern

¹ Maurice Earls, 'The Coast of Bohemia' in *Dublin Review of Books*, Issue 61, November 2014, available online at http://www.drbr.ie/essays/the-coast-of-bohemia?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=The+Dublin+Review+of+Books+mid-November+2014&utm_content=The+Dublin+Review+of+Books+mid-November+2014+CID_032a5b9de63948a5455ff2da663f3cc8&utm_source=Email+marketing+software&utm_term=Coast+of+Bohemia, accessed on 19 November 2014.

² Earls, *The Coast of Bohemia*.

³ Ibid.

⁴ In addition to Irish experience on the Continent, Hungarian travels to Ireland prior to 1900 have also attracted scholarly attention. For details, see Thomas Kabdebo, *Ireland and Hungary: A Study in Parallels. With an Arthur Griffith Bibliography* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2001), pp. 19-51.

⁵ Zsuzsanna Zarka, 'Images and Perceptions of Hungary and Austria-Hungary in Ireland, 1815-1875' (PhD Thesis, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2012).

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Europes” were, like those of other Europeans, inventions that reflected developments at home rather than in the region itself.’⁶ Lastly, Daniel Samek (2009) has explored the history of Irish-Czech cultural relations throughout the first half of the twentieth century.⁷ Although he commented on the history of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Dublin in the first half of the twentieth century, he focused mainly on the literary, educational and linguistic parallels between the Czechs and the Irish rather than on political links or parallels and he did not examine Irish images of the Slovaks. This thesis, however, aims to demonstrate how Irish images of small nations may be discussed in either the context of the Dual Monarchy, or as separate independent small states in post-war Europe, emphasising the continuity of Irish interest in the region.

Irish interest in Hungary, the Czech lands and Austria had been present long before 1918. Different regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had attracted the attention of Irish travellers, clergymen, politicians, and journalists ever since the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), or even earlier than that.⁸ Personal encounters on the Continent, as well as news regarding the Dual Monarchy, shaped Irish opinion of the above-mentioned nations.

Arthur Griffith’s *The Resurrection of Hungary* (1904) is possibly one of the most influential Irish studies on the political history of Hungary within the Dual Monarchy. Having grown disillusioned with the Home Rule movement and mainstream Irish nationalism represented by John Redmond’s Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), Griffith proposed another path; as Griffith’s

⁶ Róisín Healy, ‘Inventing Eastern Europe in Ireland, 1848-1918’ in Cornel Sigmirean (ed) *The Yearbook of the “Gheorghe Sincai” Institute for Social Sciences and the Humanities of the Romanian Academy XII* (Targu-Mures, 2009), p. 117.

⁷ Daniel Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations, 1900-1950* (Prague: Centre for Irish Studies, Charles University, 2009).

⁸ In addition to the history of Irish participation in the Thirty Years’ War, accounts regarding Irish Franciscans in Prague in the seventeenth century also attracted the attention of Irish authors in the first half of the twentieth century. See Richard John Kelly, ‘Ireland and Bohemia’ in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, ser. 4, vol. xxi, (April 1907), pp. 355-360; ‘Gossip: on R. J. Kelly being invited to Prague for the unveiling of a statue of Palacky and on some Irish connections with the city’ in the *Irish Book Lover*, vol. iii, (July 1912), pp. 209-210; Richard John Kelly, ‘The Irish Franciscans in Prague (1629-1786): their literary labours’ in the *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland*, ser. 6, vol. xii, (1922), pp. 169-74, and vol. xiii, (1923), p. 104; Dom. Patrick Nolan, ‘Irishmen in the Thirty Years’ War’ in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, vol. xxiii, (October 1923), pp. 362-369; Mary M. Macken, ‘Wallenstein and Butler: 1634-1934’ in *Studies*, vol. xxiii, no. 92, (December 1934), pp. 593-610; T. Corcoran, ‘A Man of Action: Action for Irish Catholic Education Three Centuries Ago. I: Walter Butler of Roscrea’ in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. lxiii, no. 741 (March 1935), pp. 181-190; T. Corcoran, ‘A Man of Action. Action for Irish Catholic Education Three Centuries Ago. II: Walter Butler of Friedberg’ in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. lxiii, no. 742 (April 1935), pp. 243-253; and Brendan Jennings, ‘The Irish Franciscans in Prague’ in *Studies* vol. xxviii, no. 110 (June 1939), pp. 210-222. For recent secondary sources on the historical connection between Bohemia and Ireland, see the contributions of Gerald Power, Jiří Brňovják, Hedvika Kuchařová and Jan Pařez in Gerald Power and Ondřej Pilný (eds) *Ireland and the Czech Lands: Contacts and Comparisons in History and Culture* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014).

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biographer Brian Maye put it, Griffith ‘hoped to tread a middle way between parliamentarism and republicanism’ – in order to achieve Irish constitutional independence based on the model of a dual monarchy by non-violent, political methods.⁹

The Resurrection of Hungary, originally published in the *United Irishman* as a series of articles in 1904 and reprinted twice in Griffith’s lifetime (including in 1918), promoted the idea of political independence and economic self-sufficiency for Ireland.¹⁰ The policy became finalised in November 1905 with the foundation of the Sinn Féin party at the first annual convention of the National Council. Griffith called for the adoption of a policy of passive resistance (abstention from Westminster) and economic protectionism based on the models he borrowed from recent Hungarian and German history, propagated by Hungarian politician Ferenc Deák and German-American economist Friedrich List, respectively.¹¹ The aim of passive resistance in Ireland was to reach a similar constitutional settlement to the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, following the 1867 Compromise (*Ausgleich/Kiegyezés*).¹² Abstention from Westminster was directed first and foremost towards the Irish Parliamentary Party who took their seats in the British Parliament. Griffith argued that by abstention Irish representatives could take control and legislate for Ireland from Dublin, reviving the perceived glory of Grattan’s Parliament.¹³ However, by the time Griffith’s proposal was eventually adopted, the Sinn Féin he had founded had moved to a more radical position. At the 1917 Ard Fheis, under the presidency of Eamon de Valera, Sinn Féin had officially committed itself to the establishment of an independent Irish republic, moving beyond Griffith’s original idea of a Hungarian-style dual monarchy. Most of its members sought to set up an alternative assembly (Dáil Éireann), which went hand in hand with an armed struggle for complete independence. Several elements of Griffith’s original thesis, including the policy of abstention and economic independence for Ireland, remained key issues even after the radicalisation of the party. The most significant difference between the original 1904

⁹ Brian Maye, *Arthur Griffith* (Dublin: Griffith College Publications, 1997), p. 97, and David G. Haglund and Umut Korkut, ‘Going against the Flow: Sinn Fein’s Unusual Hungarian “Roots” in the *International History Review*, vol. xxxvii, no. 1, (2015), p. 49 and p. 55.

¹⁰ Patrick Murray, ‘Introduction’ in Arthur Griffith, *The Resurrection of Hungary* (Dublin: UCD Press, 2003), p. xii.

¹¹ Donal McCartney, ‘The Political Use of History in the Work of Arthur Griffith’ in the *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. viii, no. 1, (January 1973), p. 16.

¹² In 1861, absolutist measures were reintroduced in Hungary, and the nobility started boycotting Austrian goods and refused general co-operation (paying taxes and speaking German). It was Deák’s Easter Article (1865) that symbolically marked the end of the passive resistance era by stating the Hungarian terms for reconciliation.

¹³ As a result of the efforts of the Irish Protestant Henry Grattan (1746-1820), Ireland gained legislative freedom in 1782, exercised through an independent Irish Parliament until it was abolished by the Act of Union in 1800.

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first print and the third reprint in 1918 was that it was as part of Sinn Féin's propaganda for the General Election in December 1918, and as such, it contained a powerful preface written by Griffith. As historian Patrick Murray (2003) has noted, the impact of *The Resurrection of Hungary* is demonstrated by the fact that withdrawing Irish representatives from Westminster eventually became 'the cornerstone' of the reformed and more radical Sinn Féin's policy.

Nonetheless, the historical accuracy of Griffith's analysis may be considered questionable. Patrick Murray deemed writing *The Resurrection of Hungary* to be 'inseparable from myth-making' and McCartney (1973) emphasised that Griffith 'read history for its political lessons. He delved into Hungarian history for whatever lessons the experiences of that small country linked with a great empire, might have for Ireland.'¹⁴ Moreover, Brian Maye (1997) has also stressed that the purpose of *The Resurrection of Hungary* was 'propagandist and not historical'; and in that regard it was most certainly successful.¹⁵

When examining the applicability of Griffith's 'Hungarian tutorial' in Ireland, David G. Haglund and Umut Korkut (2015) have found that Griffith, who was 'highly idealistic' in his reading of Hungarian history, was largely mistaken to assume that Hungary could serve as a model for Ireland.¹⁶ The application of the parallel was undoubtedly limited; according to Haglund and Kurkut, 'Sinn Fein's Hungarian roots turned out to be shallow'.¹⁷

Michael Laffan (2005) has also expressed doubt as to the validity of Griffith's analogies and labelled them 'false', especially his 'hero-worship of the Hungarians'.¹⁸ Laffan has emphasised that Griffith was first and foremost a 'geographic determinist' and was therefore convinced that 'irrespective of their background or religion, all the people living on the island were Irish and were equal members of the Irish nation – whether they liked it or not'.¹⁹ Furthermore, Laffan has stressed that Griffith 'was a propagandist rather than a scholar and – as in his treatment of other topics – ignored aspects of Hungarian history that weakened his

¹⁴ Murray, 'Introduction', p. x, and McCartney, 'The Political Use of History', p. 8.

¹⁵ Maye, *Arthur Griffith*, p. 99.

¹⁶ Haglund and Korkut, 'Going against the Flow', p. 41, p. 43, and p. 50.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹⁸ Michael Laffan, *The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Féin Party, 1916-1923* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 223.

¹⁹ Michael Laffan, 'Griffith, Arthur Joseph', *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (ed.) James McGuire, James Quinn. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2009 [henceforth: *DIB*] (<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a3644>), accessed on 6 September 2014.

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case.²⁰ Moreover, even as far as the impact of *The Resurrection of Hungary* was concerned, he argued that it failed to make significant numbers of converts.²¹ Interestingly, Laffan has added that, with a few exceptions, Griffith's Sinn Féiners did not look beyond Ireland 'to see how other societies conducted their affairs.'²² Laffan's literal interpretation of 'Sinn Féin amháin' is isolationist and seems to overlook the fact that, as Maye has argued, Griffith 'was a Europhile long before the idea of close European cooperation gained currency'.²³ Maye has emphasised that Griffith's newspapers (including the *United Irishman* and *Sinn Féin*) included a considerable number of articles on European countries similar to Ireland. Awareness of and contact with these small nations were not considered to threaten a separate Irish identity. Laffan's claim is also contradicted by Griffith's argument emphasising self-reliance, claiming that 'it was from the little countries Ireland must learn the way to steer her course', which indicated the new direction Griffith imagined for Irish nationalism; an outward-looking, self-sufficient, independent Ireland.²⁴ Furthermore, Sinn Féin's campaign for the General Election of December 1918 also demonstrated an increased awareness of the history and current status of small nations in Europe – again, with a very specific purpose. As early as 1917, in a pamphlet entitled *Small Nations*, Sinn Féin had already 'pointed towards the peaceful way of a wider European application which, via the example of smaller Nations, should also be appropriate for Ireland.'²⁵ The significance of references to other small nations rests in an apparent parallel between the Irish struggle for independence and small nations in Europe, dwelling on a number of questions such as language movements, religious and ethnic minorities and economic independence. Furthermore, Stephen Howe (2000) has emphasised the fact that Griffith was, together with Maud Gonne, a well-known supporter of the rights of small nations since the Second Boer War (1899-1902).²⁶ They, among other advanced nationalists, saw the Boer War as an imperial conflict. Because of his belief in cultural nationalism, Griffith actually explained why 'the Magyars' treatment of Hungary's minorities [...] did not deflect him in the slightest from the conviction that Hungary resided on the side of the angels in international politics. Indeed,' argued Haglund and Korkut,

...Griffith's Hungary was universally praiseworthy, not only because of the leadership of the saintly Deak, but also because of its cultural nationalism. [...] Because he saw great virtue in the resurgence of 'Gaelic' pride at the turn of the century, Griffith could hardly have found in 'Magyarisation' campaigns

²⁰ Laffan, 'Griffith, Arthur Joseph', *DIB*.

²¹ *Ibid*.

²² Laffan, *The Resurrection of Ireland*, p. 223.

²³ Maye, *Arthur Griffith*, p. 4.

²⁴ *Sinn Féin*, 13 September 1913, quoted by Michael Laffan. See Laffan, 'Griffith, Arthur Joseph', *DIB*.

²⁵ Kabdebo, *Ireland and Hungary*, p. 45.

²⁶ Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 58.

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much that was either reprehensible or incomprehensible, so long as these were conducted nonviolently.²⁷

Griffith laid great emphasis on the fact that the Irish were ‘an ancient, cultured European people’, when providing parallels with Hungary.²⁸ Stephen Howe has claimed that even though Griffith had been a supporter of the Boer republics, he was against comparisons between the Irish experience and that of ‘other, non-European subject peoples in the British Empire and beyond’, mostly on racial grounds, similarly to Douglas Hyde and Erskine Childers.²⁹ As Irish references to small nations under imperial rule include those in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, linking the Irish case to non-European colonial parallels would obscure the complexity of Irish perceptions.

After 1920, the Austro-Hungarian Empire that Griffith had originally examined was a different political entity; the main successor states were then Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. This thesis investigates the connection between Ireland and these small states, as opposed to focusing on general geographical categories like Central Europe. Yugoslavia (in 1918 named the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), Romania, the Polish Republic and Italy also included territories from the former empire, but not in their entirety. That is why this project focuses on Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, which were re-born as small states after the Great War. The transformation involved a loss of status for Austria and Hungary, and a profound impact on their self-image as small states as well. Of course there will be references to the other members of the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania formally allied after August 1922) and Poland as well, but only in terms of their relationship with Austria, Czechoslovakia or Hungary. Irish references to Catholic Poland, though plentiful, point to the need for separate studies – for which Róisín Healy’s research on Irish-Polish connections in the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries may provide the historical framework.³⁰ They portray independent Poland more in relation to the power struggle between Russia and Germany, than in relation to the territory of Habsburg

²⁷ Haglund and Korkut, ‘Going against the Flow’, pp. 52-53.

²⁸ Howe, *Ireland and Empire*, pp. 44-45.

²⁹ Howe, *Ireland and Empire*, pp. 44-45 and p. 56; McCartney, ‘The Political Use of History’, p. 8; Terence Denman, “‘The Red Livery of Shame’: The Campaign against Army Recruitment in Ireland, 1899-1914’ in *Irish Historical Studies*, vol. xxix, no. 114, (November 1994), p. 212 and p. 217; and Keith Jeffery, ‘The Irish Military Tradition and the British Empire’ in Keith Jeffery (ed) *‘An Irish Empire’? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire* (Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 96.

³⁰ Róisín Healy, ‘Irish-Polish Solidarity: Irish Responses to the January Uprising of 1863-64 in Congress Poland’ in Niall Whelehan (ed) *Transnational Perspectives on Modern Irish History* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 149-164.

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Central Europe.³¹ As power relations changed considerably after 1918, Catholic Austria, no longer a great power, was seen in a different light from in the days of the Habsburg Empire. The coherence of Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia as a unit of study has also proved to be effective in the research of Gábor Bátonyi (1999), who expertly examined the diplomatic links between Central Europe and Britain (not including a social or an intellectual perspective) before 1933 and focused on the British point of view without referring to the Irish dimension.³² Like Bátonyi's work, this thesis also focuses on Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, since Irish comments focused on them most heavily, in describing the political struggle in the Danube basin between the two World Wars.

Certainly, the imaginary borders of Central Europe were redrawn arbitrarily frequently during the twentieth century. For western historians, especially in the English language tradition, Eastern Europe has tended to 'denote the area of the newly independent Succession States of 1918', while Hungarians, Poles and Czechs', argued historian Robin Oakey (1992), have 'claim[ed] a central European status for themselves.'³³ The contrast between the self-perception of East-Central Europe and their perception by Western Europeans is also demonstrated in the studies of Larry Wolff (1994) and Maria Todorova (1997). While Wolff argued that Eastern Europe was essentially the invention of the West, and has been in existence since the eighteenth century, Todorova pointed to the possibility of multiple Western interpretations of Eastern Europe/the Balkans.³⁴ Gábor Bátonyi has also emphasised that 'today it is impossible to define the geographical limits of the middle zone of Europe without making a political choice between the individual countries involved'.³⁵ He himself adopted the narrow definition of Central Europe, meaning the 'zone of small nations' in the Danube basin: 'the triangle of Vienna, Budapest, and Prague'.³⁶ Furthermore, in her monograph on Central Europe, Mária Ormos has also provided multiple interpretations for the

³¹ The Russian Empire, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Kingdom of Prussia divided up the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in a series of three partitions in the late eighteenth (1772, 1793, 1795), as a result of which the Polish state ceased to exist until Polish independence was fully restored at the end of the Great War in 1918.

³² Gábor Bátonyi, *Britain and Central Europe 1918-1933* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).

³³ Robin Oakey, 'Central Europe / Eastern Europe: Behind the Definitions' in *Past & Present*, no. 137, (November 1992), p. 104.

³⁴ Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); and Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

³⁵ Bátonyi, *Britain and Central Europe*, p. 1 and p. 3.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-5.

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region's complexity.³⁷ The fact that 'Central Europe' has not been fixed in space, and neither are its boundaries or its definition stable, is illustrated by the fact that 'Mitteleuropa' or 'Zwischeneuropa', among other labels, have been used to describe it.

The rationale behind the timeframe of the thesis is linked to the transformation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during and after the Great War, in addition to the growing significance of small nations in Irish political discourse from 1914 onwards, and the expectation of change that was associated with their rights to self-determination. Furthermore, the end of the Great War saw not only the birth of the small states of Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia; it also coincided with the Irish struggle for independence, culminating in the birth of the Irish Free State in December 1922. The emphasis is on the evolution of perceptions throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the shifting nature of these perceptions, depending on the change of circumstances in Irish as well as European politics.

In comparison with earlier periods, the growing number of first-hand encounters ensured that Irish commentators who expressed interest in Habsburg Central Europe were better informed than Irish travellers in the nineteenth century. The personal experience of Irish nationalist intellectuals, revolutionaries, politicians, businessmen, and journalists regarding Austria-Hungary was crucial and it influenced their reactions to the transformation of the political order as well as national identities in the region. As for the significance of the Irish intelligentsia as the agents of socio-cultural change at the turn of the century, John Hutchinson (2002) argued that 'the conjunction between cultural nationalism and the intelligentsia was of great importance'.³⁸ Recent studies by Senia Pašeta (1999), R. F. Foster (2014) and Ciarán O'Neill (2014) have pointed to the significance of exploring the mentality and background of these intellectual and political elites, whose voice was most influential in the newly independent Irish Free State. Exploring the role of the Catholic intelligentsia in Ireland at the turn of the twentieth century, Senia Pašeta's work was ground-breaking in analysing the factors shaping the mentality of this generation of élites that turned out to be 'more "nationally minded" than later republican propaganda allowed.'³⁹ The present thesis

³⁷ Mária Ormos, *Közép-Európa: Volt? Van? Lesz?* [*Central Europe. Was? Is? Will be?*] (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 2007), pp. 17-21.

³⁸ John Hutchinson, 'Cultural Nationalism, Elite Mobility and Nation-Building: Communitarian Politics in Modern Ireland' in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds) *Nationalism. Critical Concepts in Political Science*, vol. ii, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 592.

³⁹ Senia Pašeta, *Before the Revolution: Nationalism, Social Change and Ireland's Catholic Elite, 1879-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 1.

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confirms Pašeta's conclusion that 'through education, Irish students had been exposed to modern thought, and had come to see themselves as part of a larger European student community. Their nationalism was often expressed within a European context'.⁴⁰ Similarly, Ciarán O'Neill's study on the significance of this new elite has explored the transnational interpretation of this generation even further.⁴¹ Furthermore, R. F. Foster's *Vivid Faces* (2014) has aimed to reconstruct 'the processes, networks, experiences and attitudes of the Irish revolutionary generation' in order to 'recapture the voices of people from the era'.⁴² Most importantly, this thesis builds on the possibility, also acknowledged by Foster, that 'the parallels with other countries experiencing disruption at a time of war are worth bearing in mind, and the intersections between religion, nationalism and revolution, so potent then, remain vividly present elsewhere in the world today.'⁴³

In debates on Irish nationalism, the complexity and controversial nature of national identity in the early twentieth century were noteworthy.⁴⁴ Language and religion were significant factors in defining national identities but the persistence of regional loyalties was also reflected in Irish discussions of Central European borders. Hutchinson has pointed out that Irish cultural nationalists such as Douglas Hyde, Protestant Gaelic scholar and founder of the Gaelic League, first President of Ireland, proposed 'a mobile vision of the nation interacting with the wider world'.⁴⁵ Therefore, the Irish language heritage by no means excluded awareness of other nations fighting similar struggles for emancipation in the late nineteenth- early twentieth centuries. Furthermore, the interest Irish nationalists developed in other nations' identities, building on the above-mentioned categories, first and foremost reflected their own political and cultural priorities. For Irish cultural nationalists, parallels with Central Europe, among other places, served the purpose of highlighting the distinction between the small nation of Ireland and its oppressive neighbouring great power, Britain.⁴⁶ Therefore, defining 'Irishness' often involved 'repudiating every possible connection or similarity with England or

⁴⁰ Pašeta, *Before the Revolution*, p. 133.

⁴¹ Ciaran O'Neill, *Catholics of Consequence: Transnational Education, Social Mobility, and the Irish Catholic Elite 1850-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

⁴² R. F. Foster, *Vivid Faces: The Revolutionary Generation in Ireland, 1890-1923* (London: Allen Lane, 2014), pp. 4-5.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴⁴ For historical surveys of Irish nationalism, see David George Boyce, *Nationalism in Ireland* (New York: Routledge, 1995); and Tom Garvin, *Irish Parties and Irish Politics from the 18th Century to Modern Times* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2005).

⁴⁵ Hutchinson, 'Cultural Nationalism' (1987), p. 483.

⁴⁶ John Hutchinson, 'Cultural Nationalism, Elite Mobility and Nation-Building: Communitarian Politics in Modern Ireland' in the *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxxviii, no. 4, (December 1987), p. 482 and p. 486.

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Englishness; language, culture, political and bureaucratic institutions were all denounced as un-Irish.⁴⁷ Likewise, Howe has claimed that ‘undoubtedly, and inevitably, all strands of Irish nationalism worked and through, even as they reacted against, English and British ideas, traditions, beliefs, and discourses.’⁴⁸ In addition to the parallels with continental Europe, the Irish struggle for independence and subsequent partition have been more often compared to similar challenges in India, South Africa or Palestine, within the context of the British Empire. Hence Alvin Jackson (2004) has claimed that ‘the partition of Ireland had a wider imperial resonance’.⁴⁹ He has stressed that the idea for partition stemmed from the fear of the ruling minority of anti-colonial national movements.⁵⁰ More specifically, Joe Cleary (2002) has compared the British support for Ulster Unionists to that for the Zionist movement and has viewed partition within the context of colonialism, arguing that both depended on imperial support.⁵¹ This is a different theoretical framework from the one used for examining the cases of Trianon, the Sudetenland, or The South Tyrol. However, the national struggle against ‘alien rule’ and clashing rights to self-determination were present in all cases.

In recent historiography, alternative perspectives and interpretations have been offered for studying nationalism. Erez Manela (2007), among other scholars, has emphasised that nationalism in the aftermath of the Great War cannot be fully understood without considering the significance of its international context.⁵² Undoubtedly, American President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points (8 January 1918) became central due to the significance of the principle of nationality and of national self-determination. And although Manela has primarily focused on the internationalisation of Wilsonian ideas and interpreted the post-1918 national independence movements from a colonial perspective, he has noted the freedom of small nations across Europe as well. As far as the question of national identity was concerned, the impact of Benedict Anderson’s study (1983) on how nations, which were essentially ‘imagined’ political communities, ‘have come into historical being, in what ways their

⁴⁷ Pašeta, *Before the Revolution*, p. 153; Hutchinson, ‘Cultural Nationalism’ (1987), p. 483; and Timothy G. McMahon, *Grand Opportunity: The Gaelic Revival and Irish Society, 1893-1910* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2008), p. 215.

⁴⁸ Howe, *Ireland and Empire*, p. 40.

⁴⁹ Alvin Jackson, ‘Ireland, the Union, and the Empire, 1800-1960’ in Kevin Kenny (ed) *Ireland and the British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 145.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

⁵¹ Joe Cleary, *Literature, Partition and the Nation-State: Culture and Conflict in Ireland, Israel and Palestine* (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 7-8, and p. 37.

⁵² Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 8.

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meanings have changed over time', was ground-breaking.⁵³ Most importantly, he has claimed that although nations imagined themselves as old, they were essentially modern social constructions that emerged since the late eighteenth century. Within the context of Irish historiography, Hugh F. Kearney (2007) has acknowledged that Anderson's concept had particular relevance as 'one man's imagined community was not necessarily shared by all his fellow countrymen', emphasising that the Irish experience was comparable to that of other nations.⁵⁴ Besides investigating the validity of Anderson's thesis within the Irish context, Kearney has also examined Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), which linked nationalism with the rise of industrialisation. Kearney has claimed that Gellner's hypothesis linking nationalism and industrialism is not valid in the Irish context because Irish nationalism was stronger in rural areas.⁵⁵ Building on Kearney's argument that the Irish experience 'in relation to the membership of the nation' ran 'parallel to that of other nations and nationalist movements', this thesis proposes to investigate Irish nationalists' awareness of similarities with Habsburg Central Europe.⁵⁶

Likewise, in his *National Thought in Europe* (2008), Joep Leerssen has argued that the Irish experience was 'representative of many national movements throughout Europe.'⁵⁷ When tracing the rise of nationalism and the emergence of the modern European nation-state, Leerssen has claimed that the Versailles Treaties had undoubtedly provided their mental framework for the twentieth century.⁵⁸ However, when examining Irish images of Central European small states, instead of accepting the 'nation-states' as the norm, we need to reassess the concept of 'nation', and also acknowledge the persistence of regional loyalties. In his *Nationalism Reframed* (1996), Rogers Brubaker has argued for the need for reframing nationalism that was associated with, among other issues, the political transformation in post-Great War Europe. This was characterized by clashes between 'historic-territorial and ethnocultural versions of nationhood'.⁵⁹ John W. Mason has also stressed that in contrast with

⁵³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), p. 4. [First published in 1983].

⁵⁴ Hugh F. Kearney, *Ireland: Contested Ideas of Nationalism and History* (New York: NYU Press, 2007), pp. 52-54.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Joep Leerssen, *National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), p. 223.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

⁵⁹ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 4-5, and Rogers Brubaker, 'Myths and misconceptions in

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Western Europe, the concept of ‘nation’ in East-Central Europe was not territory-based but rather a ‘personal concept, a blood-tie which existed irrespective of where a person lived’.⁶⁰ Therefore, the terms ‘state’ and ‘nation’ never became identical, hence multinational states developed instead of actual nation-states. This is not surprising given the fact that, as Leerssen has pointed out, European nation-states were not ‘ideologically equipped to accommodate cultural diversity’ within their borders.⁶¹

Irish commentators recognised that European borders did not always correspond to the ethnic composition of the territories in question. They frequently referred to regions, rather than the newly independent states, especially in the discussions of minorities in Irish journals. Traditionally, the interwar years in Central Europe were seen a period of much focus on borders: the Little Entente’s aim to consolidate them and maintain the status quo; Hungary’s to revise them. Actual military conflicts took place 1918-1920, which was followed by political agitation in 1920s and 1930s. As Declan Kiberd has explained, after the war ‘the builders of modern nation-states were expected to dismantle the master’s house and replace it with a better one, using only what tools the master cared to leave behind.’⁶²

A transnational approach may help examine identities outside the scope of ‘nation-states’, such as regional identities, which persisted even after the borders of newly independent states were drawn and deemed unsatisfactory by some of the states concerned. Transnational history places great emphasis on the movement of ideas, people, or goods across national borders. Investigating issues from a transnational perspective does not mean ignoring the existence of ‘nation-states’; it is only shifting the focus away from them as the centre of scholarly attention. Therefore, it provides alternative frameworks to that of the nation-state and draws attention to the persistence of identities older than nation-states. And although Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier (2009) have considered transnational history ‘not as a theory or method but as “an angle, a perspective”’, it serves to provide the methodological framework for the present thesis.⁶³ It may facilitate further interpretations of the spread of ideas across

the study of nationalism’ in John A. Hall, *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 279.

⁶⁰ John W. Mason, *The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 1867-1918* (London: Longman, 1997), pp. 9-10.

⁶¹ Leerssen, *National Thought in Europe*, p. 250.

⁶² Declan Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland: The Literature of the Modern Nation* (London: Vintage, 1996), p. 338.

⁶³ Akira Iriye, and Pierre Saunier, (eds) *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* (London: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2009), p. xx.

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international borders, including the idea of self-determination of small nations, and, paradoxically, concepts of nationalism that promoted the emergence of independent nation-states. The drive for national independence was not considered to be isolationist by Irish nationalists, as those involved wanted a break with the British Empire and not with the rest of the world. Instead, looking beyond Ireland for lessons and examples to follow became a frequent part of Irish political rhetoric. Moreover, a transnational approach could also benefit greatly from discussions of the travel experience of Irish intellectuals, journalists and politicians in Habsburg Central Europe. Patricia Clavin (2005), among other scholars, has emphasised that transnationalism was ‘first and foremost about people: the social space that they inhabit, the networks they form and the ideas they exchange.’⁶⁴ Clavin has further claimed that the study of ‘smaller nations’ is compatible with a transnational approach; she has emphasised that naturally, smaller nations have always been considered to be ‘more outward-looking because they have to be’.⁶⁵ The aim of focusing on the experience of small nations, Clavin has argued, is to identify ‘the history of some of Europe’s borderlands or regions as areas of special transnational interest.’⁶⁶ As far as Ireland was concerned, Clavin has also noted that historical evidence ‘demonstrates how the inhabitants of Ireland imagined, and had access to, a more cosmopolitan world’ than has been portrayed.⁶⁷ She has referred to the fact that Ireland aimed to forge new, transnational connections with the wider world in addition to its existing contacts with the British Empire, pointing to the emergence of transnational organisations such as the League of Nations.

As Stephen Howe has noted, investigating Irish concepts of national identities in postnationalist and transnationalist contexts has been ‘widely and variously proposed among Irish thinkers.’⁶⁸ The applicability of a transnational approach to Central European history has already been illustrated by the volume entitled *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives* (2002), edited by Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Jeremy King (2005) and Tara Zahra (2010) have also argued that in order to go beyond the borders of nation-states, the transnational framework

⁶⁴ Patricia Clavin, ‘Defining Transnationalism’ in *Contemporary European History*, vol. xiv, no. 4, (November 2005), p. 422.

⁶⁵ Patricia Clavin, ‘Time, Manner, Place: Writing Modern European History in Global, Transnational and International Contexts’ in *European History Quarterly*, vol. xl, no. 4, (October 2010), p. 632.

⁶⁶ Clavin, ‘Time, Manner, Place’, p. 634.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 633.

⁶⁸ Howe, *Ireland and Empire*, pp. 239-240.

⁶⁹ Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, and Jürgen Kocka, (eds) *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002).

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may be used in order to ‘uncover the blind-spots of national history’.⁷⁰ King and Zahra have pointed to the significance of non-national or regional/local identities prior to the birth of the self-declared nation-states in 1918, and have stressed that these co-existed with national identities even after the Great War. With this approach, we may be able to overcome issues such as the invisibility of bilingualism or Jewish identity in the Monarchy in the first decades of the twentieth century, which lack clear definitions in contemporary Irish sources as well. When identifying Irish trends of portraying certain communities in Habsburg Central Europe, instead of solely relying on ethnicity as the only marker, multiple loyalties are worthy of investigation.⁷¹ This may challenge the historiographical consensus regarding politics in Habsburg Central Europe and therefore lead to an increased awareness of conflicting perceptions of nationhood, instead of defining ‘nations’ as the successors of ethnic groups.⁷² The differences in prioritising ethnicity, religion or local/regional affiliations varied from community to community; moreover, perceptions of these differed even in Ireland, due to the personal backgrounds of the commentators. An important aspect of pre-Independence Irish writings regarding Austria-Hungary was the fact that it was not uncommon for Irish nationalists to focus on the division and conflict between the different ethnicities, disregarding the cooperation and connection that had arguably existed before the Great War.

This thesis proposes to investigate the movement of people and ideas across borders between Ireland and Central Europe, which was considerable throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Many Irish commentators had personal experience in relation to the successor states, either in Central Europe or at larger meeting points like the headquarters of the League of Nations at Geneva or London, due to the significance of Britain-based Central European politicians and intellectuals. Particularly from the 1930s, the movement of people and interaction between them also took place in Ireland; firstly, as a result of the foundation of

⁷⁰ Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Jeremy King, ‘Austria vs. Hungary: Nationhood, Statehood, and Violence since 1867’ in Philipp Ther and Holm Sundhaussen (eds) *Nationalitätenkonflikte im 20. Jahrhundert: Ursachen von inter ethnischer Gewalt im europäischen Vergleich [Nationality Conflicts in the 20th Century: Causes of Inter-Ethnic Violence in European Comparison]* (Berlin: Harrassowitz, 2001), pp. 163-182; Jeremy King, ‘The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond’ in Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield (eds) *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2001), pp. 112-152; and Tara Zahra, ‘Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis’ in the *Slavic Review*, vol. lxix, no. 1, (Spring, 2010), p. 102 and p. 114; Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

⁷¹ Tara Zahra, ‘Imagined Noncommunities’, p. 143.

⁷² King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*, p. 8.

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Central European (honorary) consulates in Dublin, and secondly, after the arrival of refugees.⁷³ With a transnational approach, the gaps left open by diplomatic history may be filled, resulting in a more complex comprehension of Irish perceptions of other small states.

Most recently, a collection of essays entitled *Transnational Perspectives on Modern Irish History* (2015), edited by Niall Whelehan, has focused on ‘what new questions and perspectives transnationalism can bring to modern Irish history and aims to demonstrate some of the advantages of transnational Irish history in practice.’⁷⁴ Building on this concept, the present thesis aims to illustrate that a transnational approach may provide further interpretations for the changing nature of Irish nationalism throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

Despite the limitations of the ‘nation-state’ concept mentioned above, Irish political figures hoped that the newly independent Irish Free State would develop beneficial relationships with other small states in Europe. The lack of extensive research on the link between Ireland and East-Central Europe may be explained by the absence of direct diplomatic links between Ireland and the small states in the Danube basin before the mid-1970s.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the lack of specific secondary sources does not mean a lack of awareness, interest or contact; diplomatic records indicate the contrary.⁷⁶

In his ground-breaking studies, *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy* (1973) and *A Place among the Nations: Issues of Irish Foreign Policy* (1978), Patrick Keatinge has investigated the development of foreign policy in Ireland.⁷⁷ He has drawn attention to the fact that it was indeed possible for small states to have foreign policies and actively participate in

⁷³ For details on the significance of the League as a transnational body, see Patricia Clavin, *The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

⁷⁴ Niall Whelehan, ‘Introduction’ in Niall Whelehan (ed) *Transnational Perspectives on Modern Irish History* (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 1.

⁷⁵ Due to the financial constraints on the Department of External Affairs (and after 1945 due the emergence of the Cold War), Ireland and the successor states did not establish full bilateral diplomatic relations until the second half of the twentieth century (with Austria in 1951; with Czechoslovakia in 1975; and with Hungary in 1976).

⁷⁶ The number of publications in the field has been slowly growing; recent additions to the historiography include Gerald Power and Ondřej Pilný (eds) *Ireland and the Czech Lands: Contacts and Comparisons in History and Culture* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014), and Aidan O’Malley and Eve Patten (eds) *Ireland, West to East: Irish Cultural Connections with Central and Eastern Europe* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014).

⁷⁷ Patrick Keatinge, *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1973); Patrick Keatinge, *A Place among the Nations: Issues of Irish Foreign Policy* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1978).

international debates. Nonetheless, since Keatinge has argued that Anglo-Irish issues were the priority before 1949, he has not devoted much attention to Ireland's relationship with other small nations.

Since the 1990s, scholars have paid more attention to investigating Irish history in its broader European context. Hugh F. Kearney, among others, represents the line of historiography that has emphasised that 'Irish nationalism can only be properly understood within an international perspective'.⁷⁸ Michael Kennedy, in his *Ireland and the League of Nations* (1996), has assessed Irish experience within the League and argued for the re-evaluation of the traditional practice of analysing Irish foreign policy only from the viewpoint of Anglo-Irish relations.⁷⁹ As far as Central European small nations are concerned, he has focused on greater international conflicts such as the Munich crisis after September 1938.

Kennedy's research focus corresponds to the works of Dermot Keogh (1988) or Paul Sharp (1990), among others, who also wished to step aside from the historiographical tradition that had focused on viewing Irish history in the light of the British dimension and the Commonwealth.⁸⁰ Other contributions of Kennedy⁸¹ and Keogh,⁸² published in the *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, are of similar importance, together with the contributions of authors such as Karen Devine,⁸³ Ronan Fanning,⁸⁴ Eunan O'Halpin,⁸⁵ to the historiography of

⁷⁸ Kearney, *Ireland: Contested Ideas*, p. 101 and p. 117.

⁷⁹ Michael Kennedy, *Ireland and the League of Nations 1919-1946. International Relations, Diplomacy and Politics* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996), p. 13.

⁸⁰ Dermot Keogh, *Ireland and Europe 1919-48* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1988) and Paul Sharp, *Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990).

⁸¹ Michael Kennedy, "'Civil Servants cannot be Politicians': The Professionalisation of the Irish Foreign service, 1919-1922' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. viii, (1997), pp. 95-110; Michael Kennedy, 'The Irish Free State and the League of Nations, 1922-1932' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. iii, no. 4, (1992), pp. 9-23; Michael Kennedy, "'Nobody Knows and ever shall Know from me that I Have Written it": Joseph Walshe, Eamon de Valera and the Execution of Irish Foreign Policy, 1932-1938' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. xiv, (2003), pp. 165-183; Michael Kennedy, 'Our Men in Berlin: Thoughts on Irish Diplomats in Germany 1929-1939' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. x (1998), pp. 9-39.

⁸² Dermot Keogh, 'Profile of Joseph Walshe, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 1922-1946' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. iii, no. 2, (1990), pp. 59-80.

⁸³ Karen Devine, 'A Comparative Critique of Practice of Irish Neutrality in the "Unneutral" Discourse' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. xix, (2008), pp. 73-79; Karen Devine, 'The Myth of "the Myth of Irish Neutrality": Deconstructing Concepts of Irish Neutrality using International Relations Theories' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. xvii, (2007), pp. 115-139.

⁸⁴ Ronan Fanning, 'Irish Neutrality – a Historical Review' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. i, no. 3, (1982), pp. 27-38; Ronan Fanning, 'Small States, Large Neighbours: Ireland and the United Kingdom' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. ix, (1997), pp. 21-30.

⁸⁵ Eunan O'Halpin, "'According to the Irish Minister in Rome...": British Decrypts and Irish Diplomacy in the Second World War' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. vi, (1995), pp. 95-105; Eunan O'Halpin, 'Long Fellow, Long Story: MI5 and de Valera' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. xiv, (2003), pp. 185-203.

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Irish neutrality during the Second World War. And even though the works of Keatinge, Keogh, and Kennedy on different spheres of Irish foreign policy are crucial in defining Ireland's attitude towards political changes in Europe, they do not offer detailed conclusions on the actual relationship between Irish diplomats and their Central European counterparts. Although Keogh's *Ireland and Europe* (1988) has provided precise accounts of European politics and has also generated a renewed interest in Ireland's connections with the Continent, no particular attention was given to small nations such as Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The years after independence were challenging for the Irish Department of External Affairs, greatly restricted by the lack of funds and personnel, as we learn from the biography of Joseph P. Walshe, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs (1923-1946), written by Aengus Nolan (2008).⁸⁶ The League of Nations, which the Irish joined in September 1923, provided the framework for Irish diplomats and shaped Irish foreign policy in the interwar era, both under the rule of Cumann na nGaedheal (1923-1932) and Fianna Fáil (from 1932). Biographies offer valuable information about contemporary political figures. Andreas Roth, for instance, has provided considerable insight into the life and work of the one of the most controversial diplomats, Charles Bewley, Irish minister in Berlin before 1939.⁸⁷ Likewise, Douglas Gageby and Paul McNamara's contributions regarding Sean Lester, secretary-general of the League of Nations; and that of Niall Keogh in relation to Con Cremin, the Irish minister in Berlin after 1943 cannot be overlooked as vital sources of information on key diplomatic figures of the Irish Free State.⁸⁸ Based on archival and press materials regarding the Austrian, Czechoslovak and Hungarian (Honorary) Consuls in Dublin, this project proposes to fill the current gap in Irish diplomatic history in terms of its relationship with the Danube basin. Notwithstanding the recent analysis of Irish-Czechoslovak relations undertaken by Daniel Samek (2009), the diplomatic connections between Ireland and the successor states of the Dual Monarchy have still not been exploited in a comprehensive study.

⁸⁶ Aengus Nolan, *Joseph Walshe: Irish Foreign Policy 1922-1946* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2008).

⁸⁷ Andreas Roth, 'Mr Bewley in Berlin: Aspects of the Career of an Irish Diplomat' (MA Thesis, University College, Galway, 1998).

⁸⁸ Douglas Gageby, *The Last Secretary General: Seán Lester and the League of Nations* (Dublin: Town House and Country House, 1999); Paul McNamara, *Sean Lester, Poland and the Nazi Takeover of Danzig* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2008); and Niall Keogh, *Con Cremin: Ireland's Wartime Diplomat* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2006).

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In the context of the post-war transformation of power in 1918, given the similarity of circumstances among newly independent small states, Irish commentators were aware of the struggles Ireland shared with the successors of the Dual Monarchy. The perceptions of Irish intellectuals, diplomats and journalists were undoubtedly of an evolutionary nature and depended on domestic Irish circumstances as well as the wider European context.

Since the 1960s, political scientists and historians have provided a variety of interpretations for the study of small states; however, no ultimate definition has been established to date. The term ‘small nation’ can be used to denote a group of people with a common identity and an aspiration to independence, and ‘small state’ to refer to the political entity after independence. These were often used interchangeably in both primary and secondary sources. More specifically, the terminology used by Irish primary sources varies among the following: ‘small nationalities’ (prior to 1918); ‘small nations’, ‘little nations’, and ‘weaker nations’ (throughout the first half of the century); ‘small countries’ and ‘small states’ (post-1918). This thesis follows the choice of terminology used by the authors of the primary and secondary sources quoted, even when the author did not clarify the distinction between ‘small nation’ and ‘small state’. In the context of Irish history, academic interest in ‘small nationalities’, ‘small nations’ or ‘small states’ is demonstrated by the work of Paul Sharp, who has indicated the difficulty in finding an ultimate definition. Even though Sharp has focused mostly on the Irish experience within the European Community after the Second World War, his study may serve as a stepping stone. Sharp has stressed that it is not ‘size *per se*’ that determines the behaviour of small states, stressing the significance of ‘other factors such as resources, culture, position and relationships.’⁸⁹ Sharp has relied on the definitions of Michael Handel (1981) and Håkan Wiberg (1987), who have emphasised that small states were not easily classified but have noted that it was their weakness and strategic role as opposed their size that determined their smallness.⁹⁰ In addition to Paul Sharp, Ben Tonra has contributed to the historiography of small states and explored their connection with the idea of Irish state identity.⁹¹ Furthermore, together with John Doyle and Michael Kennedy, Tonra has commented on developments in the post-World War II period and pointed out that the size of

⁸⁹ Sharp, *Irish Foreign Policy*, p. 22.

⁹⁰ Michael Handel, *Weak States in the International System* (London: Frank Cass, 1981), p. 257; Håkan Wiberg, ‘The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defenses’ in the *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. xxiv, no. 4, (1987), pp. 339-340.

⁹¹ Ben Tonra, *Global Citizen and European Republic: Irish Foreign Policy in Transition* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).

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states was ‘not as clear cut in foreign policy as it might seem at first’, adding that, however, ‘the issues of size, wealth and military power are of course related.’⁹² Furthermore, Ben Tonra and Eilís Ward (2002) have also claimed that investigating ‘the Irish experience adds to our understanding of small state foreign policy development.’⁹³ They have investigated Ireland within the post-1945 world characterised by decolonisation, Cold War tension, UN membership (1955) and European integration (1975 EU membership). Furthermore, in his *Ireland in International Affairs: Interests, Institutions and Identities*, Ben Tonra has also stressed how crucial it was to avoid examining the Irish experience in isolation. As for comparing the foreign policy of post-1945 Ireland with that of other small states, Ben Tonra’s *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union* (2001) has great significance, with special regard to the significance of Europeanisation in the late twentieth century.⁹⁴

In recent historiography, Pertti Joenniemi (1998) has emphasised that the term ‘small nation’ is a relative one that may be used to categorize relevant countries in a more flexible manner.⁹⁵ Furthermore, Laurent Goetschel has pointed to the possibility that they could even compensate for their quantitative weaknesses by ‘emphasizing their qualitative virtues’ such as acting as mediators in the international system.⁹⁶ Goetschel, among other scholars who have contributed to the volume he edited, entitled *Small States Inside and Outside the European Union Interests and Policies* (1998), has illustrated how small nation theory may be applied in a variety of situations and contexts, including, possibly, in Ireland especially within the League of Nations.⁹⁷ In examining Irish attitudes to other small states, this thesis builds on the interpretations above, providing new insights into the relationship between weaker states

⁹² John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, ‘Chapter 1 – Theories, Concepts and Sources’ in Ben Tonra, Michael Kennedy, John Doyle, and Noel Dorr (eds) *Irish Foreign Policy* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2012), pp. 8-9.

⁹³ Ben Tonra and Eilís Ward, ‘Introduction’ in Ben Tonra and Eilís Ward (eds) *Ireland in International Affairs: Interests, Institutions and Identities: Essays in Honour of Professor N.P. Keatinge, FTCD, MRIA* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2002), p. 5.

⁹⁴ Ben Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).

⁹⁵ Pertti Joenniemi, ‘From Small to Smart: Reflections on the Concept of Small States’ in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. ix, (1998), pp. 61-62.

⁹⁶ Laurent Goetschel, ‘The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small States in Today’s Europe’ in Laurent Goetschel (ed) *Small States Inside and Outside the European Union Interests and Policies* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), p. 16.

⁹⁷ For further details, also see Otmar Höll, (ed) *Small States in Europe and Dependence* (Vienna: Braumuller, 1983).

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and great powers, highlighting that the mutual relations between small states should not be overlooked due to the impact of their powerful neighbours.

In general terms, one of the simplest and most straightforward definitions for small nations has been associated with the Czech thinker and writer, Milan Kundera. Although not a historian, Kundera should nevertheless be considered as one of the most significant voices of intellectuals in the late twentieth century. In his *The Tragedy of Central Europe* (1984), the writer has made it clear that ‘the small nation is one whose very existence may be put in question at any moment; a small nation can disappear and it knows it’.⁹⁸ Even though the article was aimed to serve as political criticism and not primarily a historical analysis, it may still be used as a basis for historical discussions of small nations. Most importantly, the vulnerability and weakness of post-1918 small states have caught Kundera’s attention; a central quality in the explanations provided by researchers in the second half of the twentieth century.

Similarly, István Bibó’s *The Misery of the Small Eastern European States* (1946) has explored the challenges small states faced due to the emergence of ‘language-related nationalisms’ in the successor states of Habsburg Central Europe.⁹⁹ As the right to self-determination was not applied consistently after the Great War with regard to the new borders, Bibó has argued, this led to a seemingly irreconcilable conflict between the small states in the region.¹⁰⁰ He was convinced that adhering to democratic principles and moving ‘beyond militant nationalism’ were the keys to progress.¹⁰¹

Czechoslovakia appears as a case study in a number of comparative studies of small states. In *The Survival of Small States* (1971) David Vital has used the example of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938, approaching the Czechoslovak political crisis as part of the struggle between

⁹⁸ Milan Kundera, ‘The Tragedy of Central Europe’ in the *New York Review of Books*, vol. xxxi, no. 7, (1984), available online at http://euroculture.upol.cz/dokumenty/sylaby/Kundera_Tragedy_18.pdf, accessed on 17 March 2013. Also quoted in Ismee Tames and Madelon de Keizer (eds) *Small Nations: Crisis and Confrontation in the 20th Century* (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2008), p. 9.

⁹⁹ István Bibó, *A kelet-európai kisállamok nyomorúsága [The Misery of the Small Eastern European States]* (Budapest: Argumentum Kiadó, 2011), p. 52.

¹⁰⁰ Stefánia Bódi, ‘The Interpretation of the Central and Eastern European Conflict based on the Theory of István Bibó’ in *AARMS* vol. v, no. 2, (2006), pp. 167-175, p. 173.

¹⁰¹ Tibor Zs. Lukács, ‘István Bibó on the Conditions of Danubian Reconciliation’ in Ignác Romsics and Béla K. Király (eds) *Geopolitics in the Danube Region: Hungarian Reconciliation Efforts, 1848-1998* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), p. 269 and p. 271.

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great and small powers.¹⁰² Similarly, Yohanan Cohen's *Small Nations in Times of Crisis and Confrontation* (1989) has provided another case study of Czechoslovakia, exploring the general behaviour of small states, when threatened by great powers.¹⁰³ It is worth noting that neither scholar has provided completely balanced studies of the Czechoslovak Republic's history in the interwar years. However, both have demonstrated that small nations/small states were worth studying even in their own right. Furthermore, in a more recent study, Carlos Reijnen (2008) has examined the Czechs, focusing on the Czech self-image in the twentieth century, highlighting its political, cultural and intellectual complexities.¹⁰⁴ Most importantly, he has emphasised that the image of the small Czech nation was pivotal in constructing the new, Western Europe-oriented state's national identity.¹⁰⁵ As Ismee Tames and Madelon de Keizer, the editors of the volume *Small Nations: Crisis and Confrontation in the 20th Century* (2008) have noted, most of the historiography on small nation states had focused on their roles in the post-1945 world, including the cold war era as well as the post-1989 decades. Their main concern was to determine the key strategies adopted in times of crisis or war. In contrast, this thesis provides a detailed overview of the interwar years (time of peace), as well as the changes in perceptions during the First and Second World Wars. Moreover, this thesis aims to present one small nation's perception of the Central European small nations and subsequent nation states, and to assess the extent to which that perception contributed to the formation of Irish national identity in the first half of the twentieth century.¹⁰⁶

More specifically, Chapter 1 explores Irish perceptions of the 'small nationalities' in Austria-Hungary during the Great War. The first half of the chapter concentrates on the significance of Irish personal experience of Habsburg Central Europe, together with the analysis of the main markers of identity, as perceived by Irish commentators. The second half of the chapter examines the right of small nations to self-determination in Irish political discourse.

¹⁰² David Vital, *The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power - Great Power Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); also see David Vital, *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations* (London: Greenwood Press, 1980).

¹⁰³ Yohanan Cohen, *Small Nations in Times of Crisis and Confrontation* (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1989), p. 330.

¹⁰⁴ Carlos Reijnen, "'Small, but ours': Czechs and the Mission of a Small Nation' in Ismee Tames and Madelon de Keizer (eds) *Small Nations: Crisis and Confrontation in the 20th Century* (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2008), pp. 25- 45.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁰⁶ Ismee Tames and Madelon de Keizer, 'Introduction' in Ismee Tames and Madelon de Keizer (eds) *Small Nations: Crisis and Confrontation in the 20th Century* (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2008), p. 7.

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Chapter 2 discusses Irish reactions to the revolutionary transformation of Austria-Hungary (1918-1922), which coincided with significant political change in Ireland, leading to the birth of the independent Irish Free State. First the chapter examines how the significance of small nations in Irish political discourse had changed since the war years. Then it considers the impact of communism and the Paris Peace Treaties on the border question in Central Europe, concluding with reflections on religion as a marker of identity after 1918.

Chapter 3 analyses the changing perceptions of the successor states after the Irish Free State joined the League of Nations in September 1923. In addition to discussing the relationship between Irish diplomats and small states at the League, it notes the significance of consular links with the successor states in Dublin in cultural matters as well. Besides analysing Irish impressions of extreme politics, it also considers debates regarding the question of borders, irredentism, and the minority question.

The final chapter focuses on the challenges small states faced in the years of conflict, 1938-1945, starting with an introduction of the context to Irish neutrality. This is followed by Irish perceptions of political agreements that redrew the borders in Central Europe: the Anschluss, the Munich Agreement, and the Vienna Awards, in addition to the discussion of Central European exiles in Ireland during the Emergency. By investigating the reaction of Irish diplomats, politicians, academics and journalists to these changed circumstances, the chapter aims to determine whether during the war years Ireland was the inward-looking state it is often said to have been.

The thesis draws heavily on the records of the National Archives, more specifically, on files from the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of the Taoiseach for the information they contain on the Czechoslovak, Austrian and Hungarian (Honorary) Consulates. The records of the Department of Finance concerning economic links with Central European states, and records from the Department of Justice on Central European exiles, also proved relevant.

In addition to departmental records, private papers of political figures were also indispensable, hence the significance of University College Dublin Archives (UCDA). Border-related questions and the importance of nationality in post-Great War Europe were issues of significance for scholar and Minister for Education John Marcus O'Sullivan, who

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represented the Free State as a delegate at the League in 1924 and again 1928-1930. Likewise, the papers of Gaelic Revivalist-turned Minister for Education Eoin MacNeill are of key importance due to MacNeill's well-documented expectations of cooperation between Ireland and other small nations, especially within the context of the League of Nations. Moreover, the papers contain relevant information on the question of borders, as he represented the Free State in the Irish Boundary Commission in 1924-1925. Following his accession to power in 1932, Eamon de Valera acted as Minister for External Affairs besides filling the position of President of the Executive Council. As he frequently referred to the rights of small nations and their role in the League, his papers from the mid-1930s, commenting on the question of small nations, proved indispensable.

The *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy* series (volumes i-vii) provides an excellent starting point for research in the field of Irish foreign policy.¹⁰⁷ However, it is important to stress that the list of documents in these collections is not fully comprehensive. Given the importance of the Berlin legation in terms of gaining information about East-Central European countries, the memoirs of the controversial Charles Bewley, the Irish minister in Berlin known for his anti-Semitic and pro-German sentiments, are also significant in presenting Irish opinions of Central Europe through an anti-British, pro-Nazi lens. Nonetheless, Dermot Keogh, among other historians, has emphasised the unreliability of Bewley's memoirs and has stressed that they 'do not accord in a number of cases with the contemporary historical record.'¹⁰⁸ In addition, the *Memoirs of Senator James G. Douglas – Concerned Citizen* provide an insight into the perceptions of one segment of Irish nationalists regarding aliens, the League of Nations and then during the debates regarding Irish neutrality in the Second World War.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, Dáil and Seanad debates also offer further insight into Irish political opinion on Central European small states as they provide unedited views of those responsible for political

¹⁰⁷ *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy* [henceforth: *DIFP*] volumes i-vi, 1919-1941, available online at <http://www.difp.ie/>, accessed on 23 September 2015; volume vii, 1941-1945, Catriona Crowe, Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh and Eunan O'Halpin (eds) (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2010). For insights into the structure of the Department for External Affairs in relation to the first volume of the *DIFP* series, see Michael Kennedy, "'Publishing a Secret History": The Documents on Irish Foreign Policy project' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. ix, (1998), pp. 103-118. For the background, the structure and the selection process of the *DIFP* project, see Michael Kennedy, 'Establishing and Operating a Diplomatic Documents Publishing Project' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. xv, (2004), pp. 191-204.

¹⁰⁸ Charles Bewley, *Memoirs of a Wild Goose* (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1989); Dermot Keogh, *Ireland and the Vatican: The Politics and Diplomacy of Church-State Relations, 1922-1960* (Cork: Cork University Press, 1995), p. 87; and Michael Kennedy, 'Bewley, Charles Henry', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a0640>, accessed on 13 November 2014.

¹⁰⁹ J. Anthony Gaughan, (ed) *Memoirs of Senator James G. Douglas – Concerned Citizen* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 1998).

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decision making. The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk's visit to Dublin in November 1944 was the most outstanding example of the clash that took place in the Dáil between the members of the government and the opposition in relation to matters concerning Central Europe.

The investigation of contemporary print media is a crucial component of this project. The most relevant primary sources are Irish national daily newspapers such as the traditional nationalist *Freeman's Journal* (1763-1924), which in 1924 merged with its rival, the pro-Catholic and similarly nationalist (associated mostly with the Irish Parliamentary Party) *Irish Independent* (1905-).¹¹⁰ Once the voice of the Unionist Anglo-Irish Ascendancy, under the editorship of Robert M. Smyllie, the *Irish Times* (1859-) was transformed into 'one of Ireland's most progressive newspapers' after he took over as editor in 1934, considerably changing the ethos of the paper.¹¹¹ As Smyllie pointed out in 1941, the policy of the paper was 'to advocate the maintenance of a strong Commonwealth connection [economically], while insisting, no less strongly, on Irish political independence.'¹¹² In addition, the *Irish Press* (1931-1995), which was founded by Fianna Fáil leader Eamon de Valera in order to provide favourable publicity and electoral support for his party before the 1932 general elections, forms another significant part of the analysis in this thesis.¹¹³ Mark O'Brien has studied the significance of the *Irish Times* and on the *Irish Press* with regard to placing them into context (2001; 2008). In relation to the general historiography of the Irish press and perceptions of the wider world, John Horgan (2001), Hugh Oram (1983), Christopher Morash (2010), and most recently, Mark O'Brien and Felix M. Larkin (2014) have provided the most significant contributions.¹¹⁴ In addition, as James T. O'Donnell has highlighted in his recent PhD thesis (2014), the above mentioned newspapers 'should not be regarded as passive,

¹¹⁰ For detailed analyses on the link between the empire and the *Freeman's Journal* and the *Irish Independent*, compare Patrick Maume, 'The *Irish Independent* and Empire, 1891-1919', and Felix M. Larkin, 'The Dog in the Night-Time: The *Freeman's Journal*, the Irish Parliamentary Party and the Empire, 1875-1919' in Simon J. Potter (ed) *Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain: Reporting the British Empire, c. 1857-1921* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004).

¹¹¹ Caleb Richardson, 'Transforming Anglo-Ireland: R. M. Smyllie and the *Irish Times*' in *New Hibernia Review / Iris Éireannach Nua*, vol. xi, no. 4, (Winter 2007), p. 17.

¹¹² Mark O'Brien, *The Irish Times: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008), p. 81.

¹¹³ Mark O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press: The Truth in the News?* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001).

¹¹⁴ John Horgan, *Irish Media: A Critical History since 1922* (London: Routledge, 2001); Hugh Oram, *The Newspaper Book: A History of Newspapers in Ireland 1649-1983* (Dublin: MO Books, 1983); Christopher Morash, *A History of the Media in Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Mark O'Brien and Felix M. Larkin, (eds) *Periodicals and Journalism in Twentieth Century Ireland* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2014).

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powerless recipients' of international news coverages as they managed to assert 'their uniqueness and independence within the international systems and structures of news supply'.¹¹⁵

This thesis investigates reflections of Catholic journals like *Studies*, the *Catholic Bulletin*, the *Irish Rosary*, the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* and the *Irish Monthly* on how the wider world was perceived in Ireland, especially with regard to the formulation of national identity. Frank Shovlin has stressed that Irish journals and literary periodicals after independence represented 'a powerful means of understanding Irish cultural and historical trends'.¹¹⁶ He has argued, therefore, that the period spanning 1920s-1950s was not 'some sort of artistic dark age' by any means.¹¹⁷ Likewise, Susannah Riordan has identified the contributors of these periodicals as intellectuals who encouraged the national development of independent Ireland 'in accordance with Catholic social theory'.¹¹⁸ As cultural historian Bryan Fanning argued, journals such as the Jesuit *Studies: an Irish Quarterly Review* provide an example for the role intellectual politics played in post-Independence and how their ideas 'helped shape modern Ireland'.¹¹⁹ Even though these journals were clearly directed towards a Catholic readership, their scope was remarkably wide and their contributors represented a considerable part of the Irish intelligentsia in the interwar era. Without investigating them, it is not possible to gauge the impact of Central European events and ideas on Irish intellectual life. Due to the overt Catholic profile of such journals, contributors naturally included priests and well-known Catholic academics. Most of the articles mentioning the successor states of Austria-Hungary were written by Irish authors, but contributions from foreign authors were also included. We can still consider those important in constructing a unique image of Central Europe as seen by Irish intellectuals, as their articles were selected by Irish editors and presented to an Irish audience.

¹¹⁵ James T. O'Donnell, 'International News Supply in Ireland, c.1899-1949' (PhD Thesis, National University of Ireland, Galway, 2014), pp. 360-361.

¹¹⁶ Frank Shovlin, *The Irish Literary Periodical* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), pp. 3-4.

¹¹⁷ In addition to the above-mentioned ecclesiastical journals, the *Irish Statesman*, produced by George Russell (Æ), was also noteworthy as 'the leading mouthpiece of the Irish literary movement'. Nonetheless, it showed limited interest in the political transformation of Habsburg Central Europe. One of the few relevant articles it published was on the question of minorities in Transylvania. See Edward Doyle Smith, *A Survey & Index of the Irish Statesman (1923-1930)* (Washington: University of Washington, 1966); and Z. de Szasz, 'The Minorities in Roumanian Transylvania' in the *Irish Statesman* vol. viii, (1927), pp. 404-406.

¹¹⁸ Susannah Riordan, 'The Unpopular Front: Catholic Revival and Irish Cultural Identity, 1932-1948' in Mike Cronin and John M. Regan (eds) *Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922-1949* (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 101.

¹¹⁹ Bryan Fanning, *The Quest for Modern Ireland: The Battle of Ideas 1912-1986* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2008), p. 1.

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Political changes in Central Europe often featured in the *Catholic Bulletin*, even though this outspoken monthly was not primarily concerned with politics but rather devoted its attention to a great variety of topics including literature, history, religion, and social questions.¹²⁰ Following its establishment in 1911, it set out to warn Irish Catholics about the dangers of immoral literature, but soon enough it became dedicated to ‘waging cultural and psychological war against the malign influence of Protestant Anglo-Ireland.’¹²¹ Brian P. Murphy, author of *The Catholic Bulletin and Republican Ireland with Special Reference to J. J. O’Kelly* (‘*Sceilg*’) (2005), has aimed to rehabilitate the *Catholic Bulletin* as a historical source and therefore has drawn attention to its diversity, without having ‘the scholarly pretensions of other journals tailored for a highly educated readership’ such as *Studies*, for instance. In contrast, Bryan Fanning labelled the *Catholic Bulletin* ‘luridly anti-Protestant and anti-Semitic’, which has been the prevailing view in historiography. This has been opposed by Brian P. Murphy’s in-depth studies referred to above.¹²²

Most importantly, *Studies* was involved in discussing a wide range of issues that were inseparable from ‘nation-building projects in post-independence Ireland’.¹²³ Under the editorship of Timothy Corcoran (1912-1914) and then Patrick Connolly (1914-1950), the journal sought to educate readers on issues of the wider world as well. As for its authors, *Studies* ‘attracted contributors from the pinnacle of Irish Catholic academia’, many of whom had connections with the Continent; therefore, they were well-informed regarding matters abroad.¹²⁴ Examining their analysis of events in Central Europe reveals how complex the Irish perception of other small nations was in the first half of the twentieth century. Furthermore, besides the significance of its contributors, the ‘relatively small yet highly influential’ readership of *Studies* is also worthy of notice since they constituted an important segment of Irish society.¹²⁵

¹²⁰ Brian Murphy, *The Catholic Bulletin and Republican Ireland with Special Reference to J. J. O’Kelly* (‘*Sceilg*’) (Belfast: Athol Books, 2005), p. 167.

¹²¹ Stephen J. Brown (Rev.), ‘The Press in Ireland’ in *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* [henceforth: *Studies*] vol. xxv, no. 99, (September 1936), p. 50.

¹²² Fanning, *The Quest for Modern Ireland*, p. 141 and Murphy, *The Catholic Bulletin*, p. 190.

¹²³ Fanning, *The Quest for Modern Ireland*, p. 68.

¹²⁴ Fanning, *The Quest for Modern Ireland*, p. 68 and Murphy, *The Catholic Bulletin*, p. 217.

¹²⁵ Brian P. Kennedy and James Meenan, ‘Seventy-Five Years of *Studies* [with Comments]’ in *Studies*, vol. lxxv, no. 300, (Winter, 1986), p. 370.

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Unlike *Studies* or the *Catholic Bulletin*, the *Irish Monthly* had an overwhelmingly literary profile and consequently, it did not offer as much variety. It rather devoted its attention to educational, social or historical issues.¹²⁶ As declared by the journal's editor in 1923, they did not wish to 'deal with the political contentions of the hour'.¹²⁷ The main issues in the *Irish Monthly* included historical topics like the connection between the Irish and continental Europe in the age of the Thirty Years War, together with articles of religious and literary-cultural focus. The *Irish Rosary*, produced by Irish Dominicans, stood in sharp contrast to the above mentioned periodicals and reviews, focusing on popular Catholic issues, in a less academic format.¹²⁸ The most noted contributors of the *Irish Rosary* included Stephen J. Brown, Kees van Hoek and Aodh de Blacam. Even though the journal devoted significant attention to the communist threat throughout the 1930s, the successor states of the Dual Monarchy did not often feature in the articles. They, especially Hungary, came up in connection with cultural and religious-historical topics; or, in the case of Austria, as travel accounts. As Christopher Morash noted, the *Irish Rosary* was 'one of the most vociferous journals of the Catholic right'.¹²⁹ In contrast, the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, founded in 1864, started off as a clerical publication and aimed to serve as a link between Rome and Ireland. Its articles were directed to the clergy but the periodical soon outgrew its initial purpose and covered a whole range of intellectual issues of Irish history, religion and culture.¹³⁰ According to Murphy it was prone to snobbishness, though, and that is what characterised its publications.¹³¹

¹²⁶ Brown, 'The Press in Ireland', p. 433.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ E. E. Reynolds, 'A Tyrolean Night' in the *Irish Rosary* (August 1919), pp. 609-614; R. T. Williamson, 'St. Stephen, King of Hungary' in the *Irish Rosary* (September 1931), pp. 709-712; M. P. Cleary, 'Our Lady of Győr' in the *Irish Rosary* (March 1933), pp. 195-197; 'A Dominicaness in Headington', 'The Lost of the Arpads' in the *Irish Rosary* (November 1939), pp. 865-866; Benedict O'Sullivan, 'St Margaret of Hungary', in the *Irish Rosary* (May – June 1944); Anonym, 'Petoefi, National Poet of Hungary' in the *Irish Rosary* (May – June 1938), pp. 459-464.

¹²⁹ Morash, *A History of the Media in Ireland*, p. 154.

¹³⁰ Brown, 'The Press in Ireland', p. 439.

¹³¹ Murphy, *The Catholic Bulletin*, p. 190.

1. Irish Perceptions of Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918

The outbreak of the Great War in the summer of 1914 was a watershed not only for continental Europe but also in the development of Irish nationalism. In historiography, 1912-1923 has been labelled the ‘revolutionary period’, implying the political transformation of Ireland. In 1912, the growing tension between unionists and nationalists became manifest in the establishment of the unionist para-military organisation, the Ulster Volunteers, followed by that of the nationalist Irish Volunteers in response, within the framework of the Home Rule debates.¹ Although the Third Home Rule Bill, which granted self-governance for Ireland within the United Kingdom, was passed in 1914 (Government of Ireland Act 1914), it did not come into effect because of the outbreak of the Great War. The declarations of war and the start of hostilities not only marked the start of the war in military terms; they also changed the role small nations had played in international and Irish political discourse. Irishmen (to the call of John Redmond) were recruited under the banner of fighting for the small Catholic nation of Belgium that had fallen victim to German imperial aggression. As Joseph P. Finnan (2004) has argued, Redmond’s war policy served as an opportunity to ‘demonstrate Ireland’s new national status’ by sending Irish soldiers to fight for the rights of small nations.² The call to join the British army caused division between constitutional and radical nationalists, leading to a split in the Irish Volunteers. The radicalisation of Irish nationalists then culminated in the Easter Rising of 1916, which has recently been examined by Fearghal McGarry (2015) in a transnational framework. He has stressed the need for greater awareness of ‘transnational connections that may add to our current understanding of the Rising.’³ Indeed, exploring the nature of transfers and connections between Ireland and the wider world was significant in relation to the transport of German guns into Ireland and in securing Irish-American aid as well.

¹ The Irish Volunteers were founded by Irish nationalists, under the leadership of Eoin MacNeill, as a response to the Ulster Volunteers, in November 1913. In the autumn of 1914, the Volunteers split: the majority of those who supported John Redmond constituted the new National Volunteers, while those who remained members of the Irish Volunteers, opposed the British war effort.

² Joseph P. Finnan, *John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912-1918* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), p. 79; and John Redmond, ‘Woodenbridge Speech, 20 September 1914’ in Michael McLoughlin, *Great Irish Speeches of the Twentieth Century* (Dublin: Poolbeg Press, 1996).

³ Fearghal McGarry, ‘“A Land Beyond the Wave”: Transnational Perspectives on Easter 1916’ in Niall Whelehan (ed) *Transnational Perspectives on Modern Irish History* (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 165 and p. 183.

This chapter covers the 1914-1918 period, ending with Sinn Féin's victory at the General Election in December 1918. The aim is to focus, firstly, on how Irish interest in the nationalities of Habsburg Central Europe manifested itself, and secondly, on the role of small nations in Irish political discourse. Hence the first half examines Irish perceptions of the Dual Monarchy in the final years of the empire. Firstly, taking the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 (*Ausgleich*) as a starting point, it devotes special attention to the problematic nature of the nationality question in Habsburg Central Europe. Undoubtedly, nationality was a central topic in Irish discussions of Austria-Hungary. As Joep Leerssen has argued, nationality was inseparable from 'the people's own sense of identity, their self-identification', interpreting it as 'a state of mind.'⁴ In the present chapter, primary emphasis is laid on the first-hand experience of respected Irish scholars, politicians and journalists who took an interest in a variety of Austro-Hungarian issues, indicating an open mind-set among Irish nationals to look to the wider world for inspiration. Referring to the many-faceted nationality question was of central importance, and a variety of markers of identity were discussed. Secondly, this chapter examines the small nation of Ireland through its relationship with other small nations, in contrast to the established practice of viewing small states solely in their relationship with great powers, and mostly in time of war. This chosen angle, however, is not to underestimate the role of great powers (or empires) in Irish political discourse, but to show the significance of contact with and influence from other small states in Irish political and intellectual discourse. The place of small nations in this radicalising Irish political context constitutes one of the key elements in the present chapter. Certainly, the fate of small nations formed a significant element of Irish political rhetoric throughout the war years, but became most prominent in the campaign leading up to the General Election in December 1918, illustrating that all groups of Irish nationalists referred to the rights of small nations whenever they wanted to bolster their own arguments.

The nationality question in war-time Austria-Hungary

As far as parallels between Ireland and the Austro-Hungarian Empire are concerned, Jérôme aan de Wiel (2009) has pointed to the significance of the nationality question.⁵ He has

⁴ Leerssen, *National Thought in Europe*, p. 229.

⁵ In addition to Jérôme aan de Wiel, William O'Reilly and Andrea Penz also contributed to the study of parallel national movements in Ireland and Hungary, focusing on the long nineteenth century. See Jérôme aan de Wiel, *The Irish Factor 1899-1919: Ireland's Strategic Importance for Foreign Powers* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2009), pp. 88-89; and William O'Reilly and Andrea Penz, *Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit als imperative*

emphasised that Irish nationalists – Michael Davitt, founder of the Land League, Arthur Griffith, the founder of Sinn Féin (1905), as well as John Dillon of the Irish Parliamentary Party – found inspiration in the struggles of the Dual Monarchy after 1867.⁶ Undoubtedly, the birth of the Dual Monarchy as a result of the Compromise between the Habsburg Austrian Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom marked a watershed in the history of nineteenth-century Central Europe. This settlement followed the troublesome relationship between the two countries, which culminated in the 1848-1849 Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence, suppressed by Austria with Russian aid, in 1849. In the aftermath of the revolution, military dictatorship was established in Hungary and maintained by neo-absolutist measures, suspending most democratic institutions. This led to an unexpected response from the Hungarian nobility: passive resistance under the leadership of Ferenc Deák. In other words, Hungarian politicians avoided any kind of collaboration with the Austrian Government; MPs did not take their seats in the imperial parliament in Vienna. It was not until Austria's defeat in the Austro-Piedmontese and then the Austro-Prussian War that the Habsburgs considered a compromise.⁷ The *Ausgleich* of 1867 guaranteed equal status to Hungary and Austria, sharing a common monarch (Franz Joseph), as well as military, foreign, and fiscal policy, but having separate parliaments in Vienna and Budapest.⁸ Noticeably, it was the growing pressure from non-Magyar nationalities that indicated the nature of challenges the 'multi-cultural' empire had to face. As John W. Mason (1991) has noted, the 'nationality question dwarfed all other problems in the Habsburg Monarchy' and failure to resolve it led to the empire's downfall in 1918.⁹ Similarly, Samuel R. Williamson has argued that the nationality issues in the Dual Monarchy 'often transcended the borders', representing not only a domestic problem but an international and diplomatic one.¹⁰

As argued in the Introduction to this thesis, Arthur Griffith's *The Resurrection of Hungary* was one of the first and most significant comprehensive studies to explore the historical and

Postulate: Nationale Bewegungen in Irland und Ungarn im Vergleich (1780-1870) [Freedom and Independence as Imperative Postulates: National Movements in Ireland and Hungary in Comparison (1780-1870)] (Graz: Leykam, 2006).

⁶ Davitt met the most significant leader of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence (1848-49), Lajos Kossuth, in 1885. See Aan de Wiel, *The Irish Factor 1899-1919*, p. 90.

⁷ Austrian defeat by Franco-Sardinian troops in the Battle of Solferino in 1859 finished the process of Italian unification. This was followed by the Austrian defeat at Sadowa/Königgrätz in 1866, which put an end to controversies surrounding German unification, finally carried out by Prussia.

⁸ The unification of Buda, Óbuda and Pest took place on 17 November 1873.

⁹ Mason, *The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire*, p. 9.

¹⁰ Samuel R. Williamson, Jr, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War* (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 22.

political background of the Carpathian basin. It raised Irish awareness of the Austro-Hungarian settlement early in the twentieth century and, proposed a similar solution in Ireland, as an alternative to Home Rule. However, in the final years of the Great War (and following the radicalisation of Sinn Féin in the post-Easter Rising period), moderate nationalists became more critical of Griffith and therefore his ‘Hungarian Policy’. The supporters of Home Rule and the Irish Parliamentary Party, in particular, criticized the Compromise of 1867 and Sinn Féin’s policy of abstentionism (labelled ‘Mr. Arthur Griffith’s Hungarian nonsense’ by the *Freeman’s Journal* contributor, ‘Ulad’), aiming to undermine Sinn Féin, particularly in the campaign for the post-war General Election in 1918.¹¹ As other articles from the *Freeman’s Journal* demonstrate, Sinn Féin faced criticism from the national daily with the same intensity since 1917.¹² According to the paper, ‘fantastic as was the “Hungarian Policy,” [Sinn Féin’s] new variant of it revealed a simplicity of mind that would be refreshing, were its authors not juggling with the destinies of a nation.’¹³ Furthermore, the Irish Parliamentary Party and their sympathisers claimed that ‘abstention produced no weakening of Austria’s attitude towards Hungary. It took Sadowa to achieve that.’¹⁴ Róisín Healy also confirmed the Irish Parliamentary Party’s view that ‘defeat at Sadowa in 1866, not Hungarian abstention, was responsible for the Compromise.’¹⁵ Moreover, founder and editor of *The Leader* (1900-1936), D. P. Moran, was also highly doubtful of the validity of Griffith’s claims regarding the Hungarian parallel. He attacked everything ‘West British’ and was one of the best known advocates of Irish Irelanders/Catholic Gaelic nationalism. Hugh F. Kearney has emphasised that the Irish-Ireland movement under Moran’s leadership ‘looked forward to the victory of a Catholic and “Gaelic” ethno-cultural nationalism’.¹⁶ He called Griffith and his Sinn Féin party the ‘Green Hungarian band’, ridiculing and condemning Griffith for sacrificing the Irish national character.¹⁷ Therefore, Griffith’s belief in a dual monarchy and passive resistance did not enjoy overwhelming popularity in Irish nationalist circles before 1916.

¹¹ ‘Hungarian Policy. Fallacy of Sinn Fein History Exposed (By Ulad)’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 22 September 1917.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ ‘Sinn Fein’s Foreign Policy’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 7 November 1917.

¹⁴ ‘Hungarian Policy. Fallacy of Sinn Fein History Exposed (By Ulad)’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 22 September 1917.

¹⁵ Healy, ‘Inventing Eastern Europe in Ireland’, p. 114.

¹⁶ Shovlin, *The Irish Literary Periodical*, p. 2; Patrick Maume, ‘Moran, David Patrick (“D.P.”)’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5957>, accessed on 1 November 2014; and Kearney, *Ireland: Contested Ideas of Nationalism and History*, p. 74.

¹⁷ The origins of the expression ‘Green Hungarian Band’ were discussed in the aftermath of the Easter Rising in May 1916, referring to the musicians belonging to ‘one of the most fashionable and largely patronised musical importations to Dublin [...] known as the Blue Hungarian Band’. See ‘Current Affairs’, *The Leader*, 27 May 1916; McCartney, ‘The Political Use of History’, p. 12; and Murray, ‘Introduction’, p. a-xiv.

Many respected Irish intellectuals, including contributors to influential Catholic journals or nationalist newspapers, had personal experience (educational and/or travel) on the Continent prior to the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy and the declaration of Irish independence. Such writers were open to news and influences from the wider world. Bryan Fanning, among other scholars, has emphasised that the founders of *Studies*, for instance, had been educated outside Ireland.¹⁸ There is much evidence of committed Irish nationalists discussing matters on the Continent and linking them to the Irish cause, such as identifying the nation with language, for instance in the case of Bohemia.

In the period between *The Resurrection of Hungary*'s first publication in 1904, and its third edition in 1918, politicians, academics and journalists across the spectrum of Irish nationalism found the settlement between Austria and Hungary worthy of comparisons. The majority of articles, published in journals such as the *Irish Monthly* and *Studies*, however, emphasised the fragility of the Dual Monarchy, due to its multi-cultural composition.¹⁹ Even years before the outbreak of the Great War, Irish intellectuals such as the owner and editor of the *Tuam Herald*, Richard John Kelly, were directing their readers' attention to the ill-treatment of Slav nationalities by the Austrian and Hungarian leaders of the Monarchy. In articles published during the war years (1914-1918), there was generally a strong anti-Hungarian sentiment due to the Irish writers' personal experience or the influence of pro-Slav British writers, such as historian Robert William Seton-Watson.²⁰ Nonetheless, the opinion of Richard John Kelly regarding the central European state before 1914 also echoed Griffith's arguments. Kelly was speaking from personal experience as he had visited the Czech lands on several occasions before the war, claiming to have 'found an inspiration for the Irish national revival' right at his first visit to Prague.²¹ As for his outlook on the political settlement in Habsburg Central Europe, despite his open and consistent admiration for the Czechs, in the early days he urged the adoption of Austria-Hungary's 'dual arrangement' in Ireland when he argued that he knew of 'no case more closely analogous to ours than that of the relations of Hungary towards

¹⁸ Fanning, *The Quest for Modern Ireland*, p. 67.

¹⁹ Transnational historian Patricia Clavin has suggested the use of the term 'multi-cultural' as opposed to 'multi-national'; this thesis follows the same logic. For details, see Clavin, 'Defining Transnationalism', pp. 430-431.

²⁰ Henry Wickham Steed, rev. R. J. W. Evans, 'Watson, Robert William Seton- (1879-1951)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004 [henceforth: *ODNB*], <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36024>, accessed on 4 June 2015.

²¹ The occasion of his first visit was the 1905 Jubilee Exhibition in Prague. See Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations*, p. 32.

Austria [...].²² He regarded the struggle of different nationalities within the Empire to have been due to ‘racial prejudices’, and he also added that ‘fortunately religion [did] not enter into or influence matters’.²³

Kelly’s articles on Bohemia, published in the *Tuam Herald*, *The Leader*, and even in the national daily *Freeman’s Journal* indicate that not only were his writings on the history and culture of Bohemia known across the country, but also that his efforts were noticed in Czech circles. For instance, in his letters to Kelly, the Lord Mayor of Prague, Dr Karel Gros expressed his gratitude for Kelly’s ‘successful endeavours to bring before the eyes of your countrymen the remarkable and unparalleled revival of our language to give them the necessary encouragement in their great struggle for the revival of their national literature.’²⁴ By labelling the Czech language movement ‘unparalleled’, however, he seemingly belittled the parallel with Irish efforts in the same field.

Even before the war years, in his articles and public lectures, Kelly noted ‘instructive parallels between Bohemia and Ireland and showed many grounds of similarity’.²⁵ His writings illustrate that when it came to the Czech lands, the focus was on the region of Bohemia, occasionally including Moravia or references to Silesia, but rarely the Slovaks, even after the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic in October 1918. This may be explained by the fact that Slovaks had been under Hungarian rule, while Bohemia and Moravia were under direct Habsburg domination. Therefore, the perceived conflict with the ruling German minority population, with which he characterized the Czech lands, could not be valid for the Slovak population.

By the time the war broke out in the summer of 1914, Kelly had fully embraced the cause of the Czechs, (who had been and still were ‘oppressed by German domination’) and argued that the Slav cause was the one ‘for which the Allies are now fighting’ – not exactly the reason voiced by the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, John Redmond, in his speech to the Irish Volunteers at Woodenbridge on 20 September 1914.

²² ‘The Dual Arrangement in Austro-Hungary’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 4 January 1908.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ ‘Mr R. J. Kelly and Bohemia’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 4 April 1911.

²⁵ ‘The Irish Rosary’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 6 March 1915; (untitled), the *Tuam Herald*, 19 January 1907.

Evidently, Kelly, who had travelled to Habsburg Central Europe on several occasions before the war, had great appreciation for Slavic culture in general. Following the July Crisis in 1914, in an article published on 3 August 1914 in the *Irish Independent*, he aimed to direct attention to Serbia and its recent past so that his readership gained a fuller understanding of the circumstances of the outbreak of war. Admittedly, up to that date, he had not visited the country; nevertheless, he claimed to have ‘read a good deal of its history and [...] know some of its chief men.’²⁶ He was aware of the aspirations of the All-Serb Movement that was promoting the primacy of a common bond of nationality among Serbs of separate states in the Balkans (including Serbs in Austria-Hungary). Kelly proved to be aware of the weight of Austria-Hungary’s actions towards Southern Slavs, especially regarding Bosnia Herzegovina’s annexation in 1908, which he considered ‘the cause and origin of the present war’.²⁷ This was in sharp contrast with the majority of writers and reporters who blamed Prussian aggression for it. However, even though the Turkish menace seemed to be more pronounced than Austrian supremacy in the Balkans, Kelly still emphasised the possibility of the ongoing war turning into a racial conflict, a ‘great and bloody fight between Teuton and Slav-German and Slavonian’.²⁸

In the first half of the twentieth century, Hubert Briscoe revealed ongoing and continuous interest in East-Central Europe, first as a Catholic journalist, then from the mid-1920s, as the Honorary Consul of Hungary in Ireland.²⁹ Writing in February 1908, eight months before Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia Herzegovina (6 October 1908), Briscoe sensed the gravity of the conflict, claiming that it had the potential to lead to further complications.³⁰

Nevertheless, after the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina, he still adhered to his conviction that the Habsburgs ‘had done magnificent work’ since 1878 and saw the events of 1908 not as a sign of aggression by a great power, rather ‘a preliminary to the granting of a complete measure of autonomy to the Bosnian people’, similar to the idea of the Irish Home Rule.³¹ Regarding the greater lesson learned from this issue, Briscoe underlined that

²⁶ ‘A Glance at its History’, *Irish Independent*, 3 August 1914.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Hubert Briscoe was no relation of the later Fianna Fáil politician Robert Briscoe.

³⁰ ‘In the Balkans. Bosnia’s Rapid Progress’, *Irish Independent*, 28 February 1908.

³¹ ‘Bosnia’s Advance. A Word for Austria’, *Irish Independent*, 14 October 1908.

Irish perceptions of Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918

...if ever any great Power has earned the right to sovereignty over a smaller nation, Austria-Hungary, by her enlightened policy and sympathetic rule, has surely vindicated her present claims in the case of Bosnia. Indeed the whole latter-day history of the province stands as a striking object lesson to the countries nearer home.³²

Briscoe's interest in the region stemmed from his trip to the southern parts of the Dual Monarchy in May 1907, when he was 'privileged to join an organised party of literary folk who were bound for a few weeks' excursion to Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina.'³³ Travel accounts that he published later included Lisbon, Gibraltar, Constantinople, Montreal, and Montenegro.³⁴

During the years of the Great War, Irish intellectuals such as the Head of Modern History at University College Dublin, John Marcus O'Sullivan, took note of the peculiar position of the various 'subordinate races' of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.³⁵ Generally Irish intellectuals, journalists and politicians used a variety of names to describe the 'strange medley of races' living within the framework of the Dual Monarchy.³⁶ This resulted in the creation of an empire that O'Sullivan perceived as a 'mosaic without a pattern'.³⁷ Therefore, it was not only the rights of the Belgian or Serbian small nations that attracted the eminent Catholic scholar's attention, but also the various nationalities that constituted the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It came to his attention that 'racial diversity', however troublesome in political terms, gave a 'special character to the history of Austria-Hungary'.³⁸ Due to the time he spent at Heidelberg and Bonn universities as a student, O'Sullivan gained a detailed knowledge of the history of German speaking lands, including Habsburg Central Europe. While undertaking his doctorate in philosophy, he undertook courses in history as well.³⁹ In explaining the effects of the

³² Ibid.

³³ 'Off Beaten Tracks. Where West Meets East. By Hubert Briscoe', *Irish Independent*, 2 July 1904.

³⁴ 'By the Tagus. A Visit to Lisbon by Hubert Briscoe', *Irish Independent*, 3 February 1908; 'Gibraltar. The Irish on the Rock by Hubert Briscoe', *Irish Independent*, 25 March 1908; 'In Constantinople. An Exciting Sojourn by Hubert Briscoe', *Irish Independent*, 20 April 1909; 'Constantinople. A Visitor's Memories by Hubert Briscoe', *Irish Independent*, 13 November 1912; 'Montreal. Rome of North America by Hubert Briscoe', *Irish Independent*, 2 September 1910; and 'A Balkan Fastness. The Climb to Montenegro by Hubert Briscoe', *Irish Independent*, 14 October 1912.

³⁵ John M. O'Sullivan, 'Hungary since 1815' in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. xlv, no. 525, (March 1917), pp. 150-158; John M. O'Sullivan, 'The League of Nations of a Century Ago' in *Studies* vol. viii, no. 32, (December 1919), pp. 565-579; and John Marcus O'Sullivan, 'Austria Hungary under Francis Joseph' in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, ser. 5, vol. ix, (February 1917), pp. 89-101.

³⁶ O'Sullivan, 'Hungary since 1815', p. 150.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Abganszeugnis. Document formally noting the lectures attended by O'Sullivan at Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn, Marcus O'Sullivan Papers, 1905, UCDA LA60/1; and Abganszeugnis. Document formally noting the lectures attended by O'Sullivan at Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, Heidelberg, for the years 1905-1907, Marcus O'Sullivan Papers, UCDA LA60/3.

Habsburgs' Germanising policies over the non-German population of their empire, he drew on first-hand research experience on the topic. The years spent in Germany 'laid the foundation of a knowledge of the west, south, and south-east German scene which could not easily be rivalled.'⁴⁰

Years before the outbreak of the Great War, Irish and British writers had already directed their readers' attention to the ill-treatment of Slav nationalities by the leadership of the Monarchy. For instance, the writings of pro-Slav British writers, such as historian Robert William Seton-Watson or Henry Wickham Steed, correspondent of *The Times* in Vienna, were reviewed and commented upon in contemporary Irish newspapers and Catholic journals.⁴¹ Seton-Watson had an international reputation, 'widely recognised as a champion of the rights of Central and Eastern Europe's small nations'.⁴² Irish readers had access to his ideas and were influenced by his opinion on Habsburg Central Europe, which proved to have a lasting impact in the interwar years as well.

Irish and British authors often focused on the perceived antagonism between the 'subordinate races' of the Dual Monarchy and their 'oppressors'. However, when it came to actual conflicts, radical nationalists were said rather to compete with 'rival parties within their own national camps than in combating their so-called national enemies.'⁴³ For Seton-Watson, witnessing the Hungarian constitutional crisis of 1905-1906 represented a watershed in his attitude towards Hungary as it converted him from being a pro-Hungarian thinker into the best-known supporter of Slav minorities in Britain.⁴⁴ The constitutional crisis turned out to be controversial on many levels. Despite Seton-Watson's turn against Hungarians, it actually proved that the most authoritarian measures in Hungary were directed against the Hungarian political opponents of the government as much as against non-Magyar nationals.⁴⁵ After the

⁴⁰ Mary M. Macken, 'John Marcus O'Sullivan: Obit 9 February 1948' in *Studies*, vol. xxxvii, no. 145, (March 1948), p. 2.

⁴¹ Henry Wickham Steed, rev. R. J. W. Evans, 'Watson, Robert William Seton', *ODNB*.

⁴² László Péter, 'R. W. Seton-Watson's Changing Views on the National Question of the Habsburg Monarchy and the European Balance of Power' in the *Slavonic and East European Review*, vol. lxxxii, no. 3, (July 2004), p. 655.

⁴³ Gary B. Cohen, 'Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914' in *Central European History*, vol. xl, no. 2, (June 2007), p. 267.

⁴⁴ The Hungarian parliament was dissolved in 1906 after the allied opposition won the general elections the previous year, under the leadership of the Party of Independence and '48 (*Függetlenségi és 48-as Párt*). The King did not nominate the glorious parties to form a government but nominated baron Géza Fejérváry as a puppet Prime Minister. The shift in Seton-Watson's attitude is documented by his *Racial Problems in Hungary* (London: Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., 1908).

⁴⁵ Cohen, 'Nationalist Politics', p. 273.

crisis, there was no pro-Hungarian sentiment to be found in his writings, whether discussing the history of Romanians in Transylvania, the Southern Slavs, or the Slovaks.⁴⁶

One of the most striking observations of Seton-Watson was the growing sense of ‘unity and nationality’ that characterized the Southern Slavs during the Great War.⁴⁷ He claimed that there was a general sense of self-awareness among Serbo-Croats within the Empire - and across the border, in the Kingdom of Serbia as well.⁴⁸ Arguably, the conflict between the Slavs and the ‘rulers’ of the monarchy became more pronounced after 1914 due the rulers’ fear of being ‘garrisoned by alien races with memories of wrongs to avenge’.⁴⁹ It was not uncommon for Seton-Watson to project an image of the Austro-Hungarian Empire where the intentions of the ‘easy-going and good-natured’ Austrians were in sharp contrast with the ‘energetic and impetuous Magyar, who would allow no nationality other than his own in his dominions.’⁵⁰

After his trip to Hungary in 1861, William Smith O’Brien, one of the leaders of the failed 1848 Young Ireland Rebellion, became an ardent devotee of passive resistance, as pursued by Hungarian politician Ferenc Deák.⁵¹ In the light of the attention Irish nationalists such as O’Brien and later Arthur Griffith had devoted to Hungarian struggle for independence, it is also worth investigating Irish war-time reflections on Austria-Hungary as those writings shed light upon the changing intellectual and political framework in Ireland after 1914. By the time John Marcus O’Sullivan’s ‘Hungary since 1815’ was published in *Studies* in 1917, it had

⁴⁶ S. M. R. (review), ‘Roumania and the Great War by R. W. Seton-Watson’ in *Studies*, vol. iv, no.15, (September 1915), pp. 506-507; R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Roumanians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934); R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question* (London: Constable, 1911); and R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans* (London: Constable, 1917); and R. W. Seton-Watson, *The New Slovakia* (Prague: F. Borový, 1924).

⁴⁷ M. F. E. (review), ‘German, Slav, and Magyar. A Study in the Origins of the Great War by R. W. Seton-Watson’ in *Studies*, vol. vi, no. 22, (June 1917), p. 336.

⁴⁸ Serbia won its independence following the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 and became the Kingdom of Serbia in 1882.

⁴⁹ M. F. E. (review), ‘German, Slav, and Magyar’, p. 336.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ For detailed studies on O’Brien’s Hungarian experience, see Róisín Healy, ‘An Example to Follow for Ireland: William Smith O’Brien, Irish Nationalist Politician on Hungarians’ [in Hungarian] in Árpád Hornyák and Zsolt Vitéri (eds) *Idegen szemmel. Magyarsággép 19-20. századi útleírásokban [Through foreign eyes. Images of Hungary in 19-20th Century Travel Writings]* (Pécs: Publikon Kiadó, 2010), pp. 15-31; Róisín Healy, ‘Inventing Eastern Europe in Ireland’, pp. 103-19; and Thomas Kabdebo, ‘William Smith O’Brien’s Hungarian Journey’ in *Hungarian Review* vol. ii, no. 4, available online at http://www.hungarianreview.com/article/william_smith_o_brien_s_hungarian_journey, accessed on 9 September 2014.

become apparent that Irish intellectuals were divided on the question of the *Ausgleich* and the lessons it could possibly offer for Ireland.

Unlike Griffith, O'Sullivan interpreted the historical events of the 1848-49 Revolution and War of Independence and the 1867 Compromise from a pro-Slav (or generally pro-minority) point of view, describing Hungarian revolutionaries as oppressors – or what is more, even 'chauvinists' – who were eager to 'force the Magyar language and Magyar ideas on all the subjects of the Crown of St. Stephen'.⁵² According to this article, the achievements of 1848-49 became detrimental to the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary, even though the focus of Hungarian revolutionaries was on achieving independence; the nationality question did not enjoy priority on their agenda.⁵³ O'Sullivan's opinion on the *Ausgleich* may be characterized in similar terms; he was convinced the Hungarians gained the most from it - a view definitely not shared by the majority of contemporary Hungarian politicians; a sense of 'sacrifice' was always stronger than the 'gain'. Like in the case of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence (1848-49), the *Ausgleich* of 1867 was also interpreted by O'Sullivan as an excuse for Hungarians to 'force their language and civilisation on the other peoples'.⁵⁴

O'Sullivan did not make a direct link between the Southern Slavs and Romanians choosing to fight on the side of the Habsburgs in 1848-1849, and the 'delayed' reaction of Hungarians to this after 1867, although that was a decisive factor. Furthermore, he emphasised that for the Hungarians, 1867 was 'a national victory, not a democratic one, and that the great mass of people still continued to be without political rights'.⁵⁵ One of the most significant indicators for this was the 'Law of Nationalities' in 1867, which declared Magyar to be the official language of the State, although, O'Sullivan added, 'in local affairs a fairly wide recognition was accorded to the other principal tongues'.⁵⁶ O'Sullivan's sensitivity over the nationality question in Habsburg Central Europe also characterized many other writers and reviewers in Catholic Irish periodicals. A contributor to the *Irish Monthly*, for instance, when reviewing Arthur Yolland's *Hungary* in 1917, criticised the pro-Hungarian British author for hardly recognising 'the existence of the Slav peoples of Hungary, treated [...] in much the same way

⁵² O'Sullivan, 'Hungary since 1815', p. 154.

⁵³ The 'Twelve Points', which constituted the demands of Hungarian revolutionaries (15 March 1848) targeted the establishment of an independent, liberal Hungary, in Union with Transylvania. They became law (known as the April Laws) on 11 April 1849 when signed by Emperor Ferdinand V.

⁵⁴ O'Sullivan, 'Hungary since 1815', p. 252.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

⁵⁶ John W. Mason has pointed out that the Magyarisation policy 'was social, not racial: it aimed not at the extinction or expulsion of non-Magyars, but at their assimilation.' See Mason, *The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire*, p. 17; and O'Sullivan, 'Hungary since 1815', p. 253.

as the Magyars used to be treated by the Austrians.’⁵⁷ The perception of the *Irish Monthly*’s reviewer was closer to the ones well known in Britain at the time, most notably those of the aforementioned R.W. Seton Watson and his circle.⁵⁸

During the war years, Irish intellectuals repeatedly noted that its multi-ethnic composition was likely to cause further troubles for the Dual Monarchy, regardless of the outcome of the ongoing war.⁵⁹ The many-faceted minority problem, noticed by Irish thinkers, included a wide range of issues: the conflicting interests of Czechs and Germans in Bohemia; the quest for reviving Polish statehood in the shadow of Prussian, Austrian and Russian empires; the challenges that the Uniate Ruthenian peasantry had to fight off from their Catholic Polish landowners; the lack of political rights among the considerable Romanian population of Hungarian Transylvania; and the relationship between large numbers of the Southern Slav population and their Austro-Hungarian rulers. Not surprisingly, the common thread in Irish writings was the perceived parallel with Irish political circumstances, shared struggles and possible lessons to consider. These featured some of the successful language movements in Habsburg Central Europe as well as the role religion played in some territories.

Interpretations of the connection between religion and the struggle for national independence dominated Irish nationalist discourse on Austria-Hungary during the war years. Firstly, in Bohemia, Catholicism was presented as the religion of the vast majority. Writing in late 1918, Jesuit Professor of Theology, Patrick J. Gannon, for instance, alleged that ‘in religion Bohemia is now almost exclusively Catholic, alike in its German and Czech population’, even though the whole picture was much more complex.⁶⁰ Gannon was one of the few authors in Ireland who distinguished between different regions in the Czech lands. He briefly referred to Moravia and Slovakia (and devoted a paragraph to each) as well, but he only listed Austrian Silesia as part of the historical Czech lands and his focus remained on Bohemia. In his analysis he introduced each historical province based on criteria such as language, ethnicity,

⁵⁷ Arthur Battishill Yolland, an English-born literary historian, lecturer, journalist and football-referee, resided in Budapest from 1896 to his death in 1956, and penned many articles and studies on Hungarian history, literature and culture, as well as translated many original Hungarian texts into English. (Review), ‘Hungary by A. Yolland’ in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. xlv, no. 533, (November 1917), p. 748.

⁵⁸ Anonym.

⁵⁹ Aan de Wiel has provided figures for the ethnic composition of Austria-Hungary, detailing which nationalities constituted the 28 million people in the western part of the empire (out of the total of 50 million inhabitants). For a demographic survey of nationalities in Austria-Hungary, see László Katus, ‘Hungarians and National Minorities’ in Ferenc Glatz (ed) *Hungarians and their Neighbours in Modern Times* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 13-21; and Aan de Wiel, *The Irish Factor*, p. 89.

⁶⁰ Patrick J. Gannon, ‘Bohemia and its Ulster Question’ in *Studies*, vol. vii, no. 28, (December 1918), p. 646.

and to a lesser extent, religion. In terms of ethnicity, the territories he mentioned covered Czechs, Germans, Slovaks but not Ruthenes. As for the Slovaks, Gannon pointed to the uncertainty of the people's future, since the Slovaks were said to 'barely outnumber the Magyars and Germans in the territory they claim.'⁶¹ Furthermore, in terms of socio-economic developments, Gannon regarded the Slovaks to be 'much more backward than the Czechs, which is attributed to the systematic subjection in which they have been held by the Magyars.'⁶² As for religious diversity, Gannon only focused on the main characteristics of Catholicism in Bohemia and failed to include Jews or Uniates from the future Czechoslovak territory – as he argued, it was 'the Czechs who have been the mainstay of their cause.'⁶³ As far as Czech contemporary self-perception was concerned, the thesis of nineteenth century nationalist (Moravian, Protestant) historian, František Palacký needs to be noted: he used the terms 'Bohemian', 'Czech', 'Protestant' interchangeably as for him, the essence of Czech nationalism was rooted in the Hussite Protestant spirit.⁶⁴ In spite of this, the relatively peaceful Catholic and Protestant co-existence lasted till the end of the Great War, and the transformation of the previously religious framework into a nationalist one, which centred on the use of the national language; hence the start of the 'war of the tongues'.⁶⁵ In contrast, Richard John Kelly, who had more first-hand experience in Bohemia, pointed to the limited significance of religion as opposed to role of the national language.

With reference to the Polish population and territories, Irish attention was also directed to the question of religion, and the perceived parallel with the sufferings of Catholic Poland, after the state's disappearance from the map in the late eighteenth century. During the years of the Great War, when the Poles were discussed in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy, most regularly they were depicted as a traditionally Catholic people, struggling for their independence. In John Marcus O'Sullivan's 'The Problem of Poland', however, the relationship between Austria and the Poles was noted to have been not as harsh as, for instance, that between Russia and the Poles. More specifically, the Habsburgs seemed to have been 'the least aggressive of Poland's enemies'.⁶⁶ O'Sullivan saw the Catholicity of the

⁶¹Ibid., p. 648.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Martin J. Wein, "'Chosen Peoples, Holy Tongues": Religion, Language, Nationalism and Politics in Bohemia and Moravia in the Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries' in *Past and Present*, vol. ccii, no. 1, (February 2009), p. 55.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 56.

⁶⁶ J. M. O'Sullivan, 'The Problem of Poland' in *Studies*, vol. vi, no. 21, (March 1917), p. 84.

Habsburgs as the force of cohesion between the two nations in the second half of the nineteenth century, especially after Austria's defeat by Germany at the battle of Sadowa/Königgrätz in 1866, when good relations were desirable for Austria (not only with Poland but also with Hungary, leading to the 1867 Compromise); hence the greater Polish autonomy in the second half of the nineteenth century. Therefore, O'Sullivan emphasised, 'no effort [was] made to prevent the development of the Poles of Galicia along their national lines', which may also serve as an explanation for the lack of Germanisation in the region at the time.⁶⁷

The religious division of Eastern Hungary was also perceived to be a source of antagonism by British and Irish intellectuals. Reviewing Seton-Watson's *Roumania and the Great War*, for *Studies*, S.M.R. declared that, in general, the blame for the Transylvanian Romanian peasantry's hardships lay with 'the dominant Magyar faction'; however, the problem could not be settled easily.⁶⁸ The peculiarity of the Transylvanian Romanians was rooted in the fact that half of their population were Uniates who were not eager to become part of the Orthodox State of Romania after the war.⁶⁹ Therefore, according to S. M. R., a possible settlement for these Uniates could have been to remain within the Habsburg Empire but demand greater autonomy as part of a reformed 'Confederate Monarchy' instead of the existing Dual Monarchy. This suggestion was much milder than Seton-Watson's original idea as he, already at the time of publication in 1915, confidently declared the winners of the war to be the Entente powers, who were to define Hungary's post-war eastern frontier as well. In contrast to S.M.R.'s opinion, the British writer Darley Dale, in his article on Romania, published in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, argued that religion was of no significance in Romania.⁷⁰ All in all, S.M.R. did not question Seton-Watson's conclusions, which may suggest the authority he enjoyed in Ireland in the field of Eastern European issues. However, one shortcoming of Seton-Watson's study on Romania was noted by the reviewer; *Roumania and the Great War* did not include Bessarabia, which suggested the Irish reviewer's awareness of that particular aspect of the minority question in Eastern Europe. The situation in Bessarabia was worth notice, as the proportion of Romanians was much higher there than

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

⁶⁸ S. M. R. (review), 'Roumania and the Great War', p. 507.

⁶⁹ The Uniate Church is an Eastern Catholic Church that accepted the Pope as the head of the church while keeping control over liturgy and organisation. In nineteenth century Transylvania, it played a great role in standing up against the government's Magyarisation policies.

⁷⁰ Darley Dale, 'Roumania' in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, vol. ix, (January – June 1917).

in Eastern Hungary (or Transylvania to be precise). Furthermore, they also had a 'historical political union' with Romania, which suggested that Romanians' position in Bessarabia was similar to Hungarians in Transylvania. S.M.R. was actually not as biased towards Romania as the subject of his review, as he pointed out the ambivalence lying in Romania's claims: 'Surely the author does not believe that the Allies are cynical enough to apply the healing doctrine of nationality only to the possessions of their enemies?'⁷¹

Undoubtedly, Catholicism in Austria-Hungary was seen as the most significant connecting point with Ireland. Despite being severe critics of imperial rule, Irish nationalists did not present Habsburg Austria in an exclusively negative light, but produced rather balanced reports due to the perceived Catholic connection. Comparisons between Ireland and the Tyrol region, in particular, generally focused on shared Catholic beliefs.⁷² In the travelogue 'War Time in Austria', written in Innsbruck, the Irish author interpreted the war in an unconventional manner; he found it painful that the 'truly Catholic land' of Tyrol 'should suffer from enemies who are fanatically anti-Catholic.'⁷³ Moreover, inevitable difficulties arose from the question of religion and nationality. After the County of Tyrol was occupied by Italian troops in November 1918 as per the secret Treaty of London (1915), it was incorporated into the Kingdom of Italy. Discussions of the region and its ethnic/religious constitution then became recurring topics on the agenda of interwar Catholic Irish journals. For instance, Jérôme aan de Wiel pointed to the Viennese liberal *Neue Freie Presse* to demonstrate that there was an awareness on the Austrian side of possible comparisons between Ulstermen and the Tyrolese.⁷⁴

Furthermore, ethnic differentiation between the constituent nationalities of Austria-Hungary was also extremely pronounced in the eyes of Irish nationalists. In some cases the background knowledge and depth of research was questionable: a variety of terms were in use, some even incorrect (Slav, Czecho-Slav, Servs/Serbs, or calling the Moravians Russian – Russian used as the synonym for Slav). The complexity of determining national identity in Habsburg Central Europe is demonstrated by the fact that focusing solely on data regarding daily language use (such as in the 1910 census) led to confusion since the records did not reflect the

⁷¹ S. M. R. (review), 'Roumania and the Great War', p. 507.

⁷² D. Ua F., 'Brixlegg' in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. xlii, no. 492, (June 1914), p. 323.

⁷³ D. Ua F., 'War Time in Austria' in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. xliii, no. 499, (January 1915), p. 19.

⁷⁴ Aan de Wiel, *The Irish Factor*, p. 97.

bilingualism of certain people.⁷⁵ Language seems to have been the major deciding factor for Irish writers, and not only for those directly associated with the Gaelic League, such as Liam Pádraig Ó Riain (William P. Ryan).⁷⁶ As John Hutchinson has highlighted, Gaelic revivalists in the 1890s ‘put forward a mobile version of the nation interacting with the wider world, in which its culture [...] was continually renovated according to the needs of each generation.’⁷⁷

Terminology regarding the constituent nationalities of Austria-Hungary was diverse in Irish journals and newspapers; ‘subordinate race’ was the most frequent one during the war years – as opposed to rare allusions to small nationalities/nations before 1918. In order to find the root for the problems of the Dual Monarchy, Irish and European scholars alike tended to approach the question from the perspective of the nationalities. The conflict between the concerned nations was seen to have made any ‘compromise impossible.’⁷⁸ Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian system, according to contemporary French historian Bertrand Auerbach, ‘was based on the rottenest of all foundations, the rule of a majority by a narrow minority’, which even the ‘dominant races’ knew was ‘in the wrong’.⁷⁹ This point of view also appeared in contemporary Irish newspaper reports that labelled Austria-Hungary the ‘ramshackle empire’ even before its military defeat.⁸⁰ The leadership of the Dual Monarchy, according to the aforementioned P. J. Gannon’s review of Auerbach, was alleged to hate their subject peoples, calling them inferior.⁸¹ Auerbach, as Gannon remarked, saw the ‘national tongue’ as the key to the successful emancipation of subordinate races, a thought that resonated with most Irish scholars investigating the issue of ethnic minorities within Austria-Hungary.

From the mid-nineteenth century, language movements in the Habsburg lands became closely associated with struggles for national independence. Accordingly, historian Mark Cornwall

⁷⁵ Peter Teibenbacher, Diether Kramer, and Wolfgang Göderle, ‘An Inventory of Austrian Census Materials, 1857-1910: Final Report’ in *Mosaic Working Paper* (December 2012), p. 10, available online at Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, *Mosaic Working Paper WP2012-007*, <http://hauster.de/data/MOSAIC-WP-2012-007.pdf>, accessed on 14 April 2014.

⁷⁶ For details on Ó Riain and his pamphlet, *Lessons from Modern Language Movements* (1926), see Chapter 3.

⁷⁷ Hutchinson, ‘Cultural Nationalism’ (2002), p. 591.

⁷⁸ P. J. Gannon (review), ‘Les Races et les Nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie by Bertrand Auerbach’ in *Studies*, vol. vii, no. 28, (December 1918), p. 705.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ The term ‘ramshackle empire’ is attributed to British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who in his speech ‘The Great War’ of 19 September 1914 described Austria-Hungary’s dissolution as not simply unavoidable but desirable. Irish journalists kept using the term throughout the first half of the twentieth century when emphasising the weakness and non-viability of the Dual Monarchy on the eve of the Great War. See ‘The Great War’ in *Internet Archive*, available online at

<https://archive.org/stream/greatwarpeechde00lloyuoft#page/n1/mode/2up>, accessed on 1 November 2014.

⁸¹ Gannon, (review) ‘Les Races et les Nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie’, p. 705.

(2005) claimed that in Bohemia, for instance, ‘language use became symbolic of a whole host of other issues, including access to jobs and education, and cultural and political dominance.’⁸² Therefore, political power became determined more and more by ethnicity and social class, replacing the previously significant ‘common experience and interests’ of Bohemians as a community.⁸³ As for Irish contemporaries, P. J. Gannon repeatedly emphasised the significance of the national language when looking at the Czech example as a lesson to follow. The biggest challenges that the Czech national movement faced in the first half of the nineteenth century, according to Gannon, were the Germanising and Magyarising tendencies of the ruling classes. The Jesuit author did not find it necessary to go into any details about the shifting tendencies a couple of decades later, or about how the political status quo may have changed after the 1867 Compromise. Nonetheless, he realised the practical implementation of the national language and the significance schools, banks and factories represented for the Bohemian Czechs in the course of their overall political and economic emancipation.⁸⁴

After the outbreak of the war in July 1914, the majority of Irish commentators viewed Bohemia as part of the Pan-Slav world, emphasising that the Czechs of Bohemia, were, due to their Slav origins, ‘more akin to Russia than to German-Austria’.⁸⁵ They ignored the fact that most Czechs ‘supported the continuing existence of Austria-Hungary’, except for the group of Young Czechs under the leadership of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk.⁸⁶ In the early phase of the war in particular, Irish commentators were convinced that the Czechs were to ‘sympathise with their brother Slavs in Russia and Servia’, referring to the linguistic bonds between the above-mentioned nations.⁸⁷ The *Irish Independent* took notice of the pro-Russian sympathies across Habsburg Central Europe but especially in Bohemia, which, together with the arrests of extreme Czech left-wing politicians and the suppression of radical newspapers, further deepened the conflict between Slavs and Germans in Bohemia.

The contributors of the aforementioned *The Leader*, were known to be avid supporters of a Catholic, Irish-speaking Ireland and criticized analogies such as Arthur Griffith’s Hungarian

⁸² Mark Cornwall, (ed) *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: A Multinational Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2006), p. 94.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 51 and p. 91.

⁸⁴ Gannon, ‘Bohemia and its Ulster Question’, pp. 654-655.

⁸⁵ ‘Austria’s Fears’, *Irish Independent*, 13 November 1914.

⁸⁶ Cornwall, *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary*, p. 91.

⁸⁷ ‘Matters of Moment. Revolt in Bohemia’, *Irish Independent*, 22 August 1914.

parallel. Nonetheless, Arthur E. Clery, nationalist politician and Professor at University College Dublin, claimed in a 1919 issue of *Studies* that the successes of Czech, Magyar and Polish language movements, which served as bases for national unity, should be noticed and followed by the Irish population as well.⁸⁸ Furthermore, Róisín Healy has drawn attention to a pre-war article in *The Leader* entitled 'How a Language was Revived'. This celebrated the efforts of the Hungarian Reform Age politician Count István Széchenyi, in promoting Hungarian language use, with the intention of providing inspiration for the Irish readership.⁸⁹ Therefore, besides looking at the minority languages in Austria-Hungary for inspiration, Irish language revivalists were drawn to the Hungarian language movement as well. Even though in the last decades of the Dual Monarchy, Hungary was portrayed in the role of the oppressor of non-Magyar nationalities, her efforts for reviving the national language half a century before the Compromise were found worthy of inspiration.

Although Jeremy King and Tara Zahra have pointed to the significance of non-national or regional/local identities prior to the birth of the self-declared nation-states in 1918, their coexistence with national identities needs to be stressed even after 1918, not only in terms of self-perception, but also as far as Irish perception was concerned. It was still common in interwar Ireland, for instance, to refer to Bohemia and the Bohemian small nation instead of Czechs (ethnic distinction) or Czechoslovakia (the self-declared 'nation-state'). Furthermore, it is especially the borderland regions such as, for instance, the Sudetenland, Silesia, Ruthenia, Transylvania and the South Tyrol, which were mentioned in interwar Irish studies and reports, due to the controversial territorial issues and border questions.

Taking the example of Galicia, historian Tara Zahra has drawn attention to the fact that assessing the loyalties of the local populations across Habsburg Central Europe was far from straightforward. Even during the war years (the record quoted is from 1915), the locals of the region, 'Polish- and Ukrainian-speakers alike often insisted that they were simply peasants. Others replied that they belonged to the 'Catholic' nationality.'⁹⁰ Irish attention, when referring to the Polish population and territories, was also directed to the question of religion, and the perceived parallel with the sufferings of Catholic Poland, after the state's disappearance from the map in the late eighteenth century. Irish-Irelanders often pointed to

⁸⁸ Arthur E. Clery, 'The Gaelic League, 1893-1919' in *Studies*, vol. viii, no. 31, (September 1919), p. 399.

⁸⁹ Healy, 'Inventing Eastern Europe in Ireland', p. 114.

⁹⁰ Zahra, 'Imagined Noncommunities', 102.

the parallel between Poland and Ireland, both being predominantly Catholic and under foreign rule. For instance, in an article dated 10 October 1914, *The Leader* labelled Ireland ‘The British Poland’, while Poland was referred to as ‘The Russian Ireland’.⁹¹ The aforementioned Richard John Kelly was among the most noted authors in *The Leader* to point to the significance of Poland in an Irish context and emphasise that ‘the brave Poles and their brave children are an example and an inspiration for us.’⁹²

As for the peculiarity of the position of Ukrainians within the Habsburg Monarchy, Irish authors were not consistent in their terminology. Ruthenes, Ukrainians, Galicians, Poles, Slaves were among the names used to label the (otherwise mixed) population in the borderland between today’s Poland, Ukraine and Slovakia. Nevertheless, ethnic differentiation was not the only or main focus of Irish scholars; the religious division of the population in the north-eastern part of the Dual Monarchy were controversial enough to attract Irish attention. John Marcus O’Sullivan, for instance, noted that the Uniate Church had a key role in the national movement of Ukrainians, as both ‘ignored political frontiers between Russia and Austria’.⁹³ The region of Galicia was perceived to be one of the main centres for the national movement; here the Ruthene lower classes, associated with the Uniate Church, used the ideas of their church against their mostly Catholic Polish landowners. O’Sullivan stressed that ‘the Ukrainophil movement’ was a definite factor to consider when analysing Polish nationalism.⁹⁴ Irish fascination with the religious and ethnic peculiarities of the region is also demonstrated by intellectuals coining phrases such as the ‘Ruthenian enigma’.⁹⁵ Moreover, Jesuit Irish intellectuals like Patrick J. Connolly, (signed as ‘P.J.C.’), editor of *Studies* (1914-1950), had considerable historiographical knowledge on this cross-border region. Connolly’s articles on Karl Lueger, Catholic Mayor of pre-war Vienna, based on his personal experience in Austria, also demonstrated his interest in Habsburg Central Europe.⁹⁶ He even referred to Henry Wickham Steed and Professor Alison Phillips, who published writings on the same topic. Connolly regarded them to be more knowledgeable and

⁹¹ ‘War Terms’, *The Leader*, 10 October 1914, p. 207.

⁹² ‘The Poles’ Fight for Their Language’, *The Leader*, 17 January 1914, p. 573, and ‘Slav and Teuton. By R. J. Kelly, K.C.’, *The Leader*, 5 December 1914, p. 403.

⁹³ M. O’Sullivan, ‘The Problem of Poland’, p. 86.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁹⁵ P. J. C. (review), ‘Modern Austria: Her Racial and Social Problems’ in *Studies*, vol. v, no. 18, (June 1916), p. 307.

⁹⁶ P. J. Connolly, ‘Karl Lueger: His Rise to Power’ in *Studies*, vol. iii, no. 11, (September 1914), pp. 280-292; P. J. Connolly, ‘Karl Lueger: Mayor of Vienna’ in *Studies*, vol. iv, no. 14, (June 1915), pp. 226-249; and C. J. Woods, ‘Connolly, Patrick J’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a1956>, accessed on 2 September 2015.

impartial than the subject of his review, journalist Virginio Gayda's *Modern Austria: Her Racial and Social Problems* (1916), although it was written based on the author's personal experience (he spent five years in Austria). At this stage Gayda was not as committed in ideological terms as subsequently when he became an avid supporter of fascist leader Benito Mussolini in the 1920s-30s.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, the choice of the topic is telling. Connolly found fault with Gayda's analysis of the Ruthenes in Galicia, who, contrary to Gayda's information, were, according to Connolly, Russian, and their language merely one of the many Russian dialects.⁹⁸ All in all, Irish references to the borderland regions of Habsburg Central Europe, and the identities within, demonstrate how regional and transnational studies may be used to 'uncover the blind-spots of national history'.⁹⁹

Speculations regarding the future of Habsburg Central Europe appeared years before the peace conference and continued to attract the attention of historians well after the Great War. Theoretically speaking, the watershed in the study of Central Europe was German liberal German Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa (Central Europe)* (1915), in which he imagined a federation of nations, led by the union of Germany and Austria-Hungary. This book, which was also reviewed in *Studies* during the war years, analysed, among others, the chances of small nations for survival in the post-war world. According to Naumann, small nations in the region could not stand alone, arguing that small nations had no choice but to rely on great powers, as an alliance between them was unavoidable.¹⁰⁰ When *Central Europe* was written in 1915, a German victory seemed very plausible, which might explain the author's confidence in Germany's future actions and leading role in creating a federation of nations in Central Europe. Writing in 1915, Russian Bolshevik politician and thinker, Nikolai Bukharin, also speculated that in the era of imperialist wars, Central Europe was going to be unified under German and Austrian rule. He expected that independent small states were going to be absorbed by large capitalist formations with considerable military strength. He did not foresee, however, the emergence of post-war national liberation movements neither in Central

⁹⁷ The Italian fascists under the leadership of Benito Mussolini seized power in October 1922 (Marcia su Roma).

⁹⁸ P. J. C. (review), 'Modern Austria', *Studies*, vol. v, no. 18, (June 1916), p. 308.

⁹⁹ Zahra, 'Imagined Noncommunities', p. 114.

¹⁰⁰ T. A. F. (review), 'Central Europe by Friedrich Naumann' in *Studies*, vol. v, no. 19, (September 1916), p. 474. For further details on Naumann, see Moshe Zimmermann, 'A Road Not Taken - Friedrich Naumann's Attempt at a Modern German Nationalism' in the *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. xvii, no. 4, (October 1982), pp. 689-708.

Europe. Nor did he refer to, as Stephen Howe has pointed out, Irish national self-determination.¹⁰¹

As Tony Judt (1990) has emphasised, by the end of the war, ‘Naumann’s vision was rendered obsolete’.¹⁰² The re-emergence of small states following the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy gave ‘the prewar idea of a unified Central Europe a quite new meaning. In the face of ethnic and national pride and the territorial claims and insecurities of the new countries, Mitteleuropa was at best an anachronistic utopia’.¹⁰³ While before 1918 Central Europe was imagined to be under German leadership both in terms of language and economy, the Mitteleuropa of the interwar period, like the association of the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania) ‘was conceived of not only without Germany but against it’, functioning as a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and Germany.¹⁰⁴

The role of nationality in the context of the Great War was an appealing topic for academics and politicians equally. Contemporary British scholar Arnold Toynbee’s *Nationality and the War* (1915) caught the attention of Irish journal editors as well. It was reviewed in *Studies* by Jesuit priest and educationist Timothy Corcoran (‘T.C.’) in September 1915.¹⁰⁵ The review was of particular importance in historiographical terms since it took note of Toynbee’s main sources: the works of R. W. Seton-Watson and Hungarian historian Henrik Marczali.¹⁰⁶ Toynbee, despite having his background in Classical Studies, got involved in ‘government propaganda work’, during the Great War; this also turned him into a ‘public commentator on international affairs’ and later in 1919 as part of the Foreign Office, a member of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.¹⁰⁷ At this stage, Toynbee had not reached the peak of his reputation; it was after the Second World War that his work was openly challenged and criticized because of his strong anti-Semitic tone and his prejudice against certain ethnic

¹⁰¹ Nikolai Bukharin, *Imperialism and World Economy* (London: Bookmarks Publication, 2003), p. 151; Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: a Political Biography, 1888-1938* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 35-36; Stephen Howe, ‘Historiography’ in Kevin Kenny (ed) *Ireland and the British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 246.

¹⁰² Tony Judt, ‘The Rediscovery of Central Europe’ in *Daedalus*, vol. 119, no. 1, (Winter 1990), p. 25.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Jacques Rupnik, ‘Central Europe or Mitteleuropa?’ in *Daedalus*, vol. 119, no. 1, (Winter 1990), p. 256; and Robin Okey, *Eastern Europe 1740-1985: Feudalism to Communism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 157.

¹⁰⁵ T. C. (review), ‘Nationality and the War by Arnold J. Toynbee’ in *Studies*, vol. iv, no. 12, (September 1915), pp. 510-11.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Fergus Millar, ‘Toynbee, Arnold Joseph (1889-1975)’, *ODNB*, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/printable/31769>, accessed on 15 March 2014.

groups. As far as the question of nationality was concerned, Toynbee provided the readers with multiple possibilities and alternative border suggestions ‘for a medley of races contained within the limits of Austria and Hungary.’¹⁰⁸ For many thinkers in Western Europe, redrawing the map of Central Europe was a valid point to consider even as early as in 1915. Irish intellectuals and journalists kept a close eye on the issue and therefore when it came to the peace conference at Versailles, they did not miss the chance to comment on the case of recently independent small states and the possible conflicts that could have occurred because of the newly (re)drawn borders.

Small nations in Irish political discourse

Although the primary focus of this thesis is on Irish perceptions of the small successor states of Austria-Hungary, an examination of Irish attitudes towards small nations prior to their independence is necessary in order to provide the context for both the Irish small nation and the small successor states, in view of the relationship they had with empires. Furthermore, in relation to both the Irish and the successor states of the Dual Monarchy, identification and self-identification as a small nation did not at all times coincide with independent statehood; hence the variety of terms as well (small nationalities, small nations or small states).

Prior to the end of the Great War, the multi-ethnic composition of the Dual Monarchy received ample attention from Irish intellectuals and politicians. Bohemia of the Czech lands stood out in these studies in terms of its self-identification as a small nation, emphasising its historical right to independence. As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, Poland has been the subject of numerous Irish studies in the given period due to the Catholicity of the country. However, as it was not part of Austria-Hungary in its entirety, an in-depth analysis of Polish comparisons is outside the scope of this present study. Austria and Hungary, on the other hand, of course, were not regarded as small states prior to 1918, due to their leadership of the Dual Monarchy. Focusing on this Czech self-image as a small nation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Carlos Reijnen has highlighted the significance of the concept in relation to Czech national identity. Even though presenting the Czechs as a small nation had been part of political discourse since the days of historian František Palacký, the significance of philosopher and first president of the First Czechoslovak Republic, Tomáš Garrigue

¹⁰⁸ T.C. (review), ‘Nationality and the War’, p. 511.

Masaryk, was noteworthy, especially in terms of the successful ‘self-promotion as a small nation’.¹⁰⁹

Masaryk was convinced that a ‘Zone of Small Nations’ located in Central Europe between Germany and Russia would be the solution for the problems in the region.¹¹⁰ In addition, his confidential memorandum entitled ‘Independent Bohemia’ was written for British sympathisers and members of the British Government in April 1915. It presented his views on the principle of nationality, small nations of the East and West, and more specifically, the case of Bohemia.¹¹¹ Masaryk’s views also attracted attention in Ireland, as demonstrated by the article on his inaugural address as lecturer in King’s College, London, entitled ‘The Problem of the Small Nations in the European Crisis’ in the *Irish Independent*.¹¹² His lecture strongly defended the right of small nations to self-determination from a moral and philosophical point of view.¹¹³ Besides press reports, political accounts such as that of Irish republican Bulmer Hobson made references to Masaryk within the context of Irish claims. Hobson, who was associated with the Irish Volunteers and the IRB before the Easter Rising, highlighted the British support Masaryk enjoyed, in contrast to the British condemnation of Roger Casement as a traitor for the same mission as Masaryk’s.¹¹⁴

Therefore, the self-determination of small nations was often discussed in Irish political, public and religious circles. Apart from contemporary newspaper reports, the speech was also quoted later in 1925 by another Czech politician, Eduard Beneš, in his lecture ‘The Problem of Small Nations after the War’, delivered at King’s College London, and printed in the *Slavonic Review*.¹¹⁵ Masaryk referred to Beneš’s lecture in his letter to the pro-Slav R. W. Seton-Watson ten years after the war was over, when he expressed his opinion that ‘the problem of Small Nations in Europe [...] which the Great War had rendered acute, still exists today [November 1928], though in a different form.’¹¹⁶ He also alluded to the problematic nature of

¹⁰⁹ Reijnen, “‘Small, but ours’”, p. 27.

¹¹⁰ Tadayuki Hayashi, ‘Masaryk’s Zone of Small Nations’ in His Discourse during World War I’ in Tadayuki Hayashi (ed) *Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present* (Hokkaido: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University 2007), p. 8 and p. 16.

¹¹¹ See details in R. W. Seton-Watson, *Masaryk in England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943.)

¹¹² ‘Liberation of Small Nations’, *Irish Independent*, 20 October 1915.

¹¹³ Reijnen, “‘Small, but ours’”, p. 32.

¹¹⁴ Bulmer Hobson, *Ireland Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow* (Tralee: Anvil Books, 1968), pp. 82-83.

¹¹⁵ Eduard Beneš, ‘The Problem of Small Nations after the War’ in the *Slavonic Review*, vol. iv, no. 11, (December 1925), pp. 257-277.

¹¹⁶ Tomáš G. Masaryk, ‘A Message from President Masaryk’ in the *Slavonic and East European Review*, vol. vii, no. 20, (January 1929), p. 242.

blending different nations and races, not only in Central Europe but also within the United Kingdom, with the evidence lying in the language itself.¹¹⁷

What seemed to have caught the attention of the Irish nationalist press in particular was Masaryk and the concept of the 'Czecho-Slovak Ulster', describing Bohemia and its German population.¹¹⁸ When discussing the special case of German minorities in Europe, the correspondent of the *Irish Independent* stressed that there were 'strong points of resemblance' between the Irish Ulster and the continental Ulsters.¹¹⁹ He pointed to 'the colonists and the great intermixture of both nationalities in each case. [...] The Ulster question seems to settle itself in every country except Ireland'.¹²⁰ According to historian Harry Hanak (1963), Masaryk's critics often drew connections between Austria-Hungary and Ireland, which Masaryk himself failed to point out; they talked about 'ascendancy', 'coercion', 'home rule'.¹²¹ As Hanak argued, home rule was seen as the answer for the nationalities of Austria-Hungary, adding that it was 'a pity that Masaryk never dealt with this particular situation.'¹²² In the recent years, there has been a growing awareness of the existence of parallels between Ulster and, as Stephen Howe has noted, 'a range of conflicts both colonial and non-colonial: Bohemia, Moravia, Prussian Poland, French Algeria, the US South, Cyprus and the Lebanon.'¹²³

Besides presenting Masaryk's politics and his contribution to defending the rights of small nations, the Irish press also introduced him as a writer/scholar. For instance, in June 1919, Masaryk's book, *The Spirit of Russia: Studies in History, Literature and Philosophy* was reviewed in the *Irish Independent*.¹²⁴ The paper introduced him as the President of the new Bohemian Republic, who aimed at preserving the nation through cultural and economic efforts in place of a futile military and political action. 'This professor', argued the *Irish Independent*, 'who made a nation is a Positivist philosopher of eminence, an opponent of Historic Materialism and a nationalist.'¹²⁵

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 243.

¹¹⁸ 'Our London Letter. Through our Private Wire', *Irish Independent*, 2 December 1918.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ 'Our London Letter. Through our Private Wire', *Irish Independent*, 2 December 1918.

¹²¹ Harry Hanak, 'T. G. Masaryk's Journalistic Activity in England during the First World War' in the *Slavonic and East European Review*, vol. xlii, no. 98, (December 1963), p. 184.

¹²² Ibid., p. 189.

¹²³ Howe, *Ireland and Empire*, p. 220.

¹²⁴ 'The Spirit of Russia. Background of the Revolution', *Irish Independent*, 23 June 1919.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

Masaryk's work regarding small nations in Austria-Hungary was well received and backed by the British Foreign Office and certain political and press circles such as R. W. Seton-Watson and his journal *New Europe*. Seton-Watson co-founded the journal (with Henry Wickham Steed, Ronald Burrows, Frederick Whyte), which was devoted to international affairs. Oddly, it had no permanent writers or reporters.¹²⁶ Hayashi has highlighted the fact that *New Europe* 'shared a special consciousness' similar to Masaryk's.¹²⁷ The *Irish Independent* noted this attention when they reported that

...Prof. Masaryk, the President of the new Czecho-slovak Republic, arrived in London last night, and was received by Mr. R. F. Syngé, of the Foreign Office, on behalf of Mr. Balfour. [...] The President [...] will remain a few days in London before proceeding to Prague, and will be entertained at a luncheon to-day by Mr. Balfour. Interviewed at Liverpool, Dr. Masaryk said that Britain and France had already helped the new Republic, and he was promised the help of the United States. One of the aims of the Peace Conference was reconstruction of Eastern Europe.¹²⁸

Therefore, with the birth of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, not only did the political status quo change in Central Europe but so did Masaryk's plans for small nations.¹²⁹ Since he favoured an alliance of small nations, independent Czechoslovakia was founded with the involvement of Slovaks (Masaryk himself was half-Slovak), instead of Bohemia on her own. Furthermore, the realities of the new, multi-cultural republic contradicted the general characteristics of the previously idealized small state model. According to Reijnen, it was due to the successful propaganda campaign of Czechs that the country was long considered to be 'the ideal-typical' small nation.¹³⁰

In the early twentieth century, radical Irish nationalists were convinced that national identity was meaningful only in contrast with others. In the case of Ireland, this meant contrasting Ireland and Britain (a small nation versus a great power), which, indeed, has formed part of Irish nationalist political discourse before the birth of the independent Irish Free State in 1922. In relation to the Second Boer War, media historian Felix M. Larkin has pointed out that the most popular Irish nationalist daily at the time, the *Freeman's Journal*, for instance, often 'drew parallels between Ireland and the Boer republics'.¹³¹ More specifically, the paper

¹²⁶ Harry Hanak, 'The New Europe' in the *Slavonic and East European Review*, vol. xxxix, no. 93, (June 1961), pp. 369-399.

¹²⁷ Hayashi, 'Masaryk's Zone of Small Nations', p. 17.

¹²⁸ 'The Peace Conference. Distinguished Visitors', *Irish Independent*, 30 November 1918.

¹²⁹ Reijnen, "'Small, but ours'", p. 32.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ Larkin, 'The Dog in the Night-Time', p. 118.

‘sought to attack the war while avoiding hostility towards the empire.’¹³² In any case, the *Freeman’s Journal* ‘did not focus on imperial concerns’; references to the empire remained largely rhetorical, serving ‘the paper’s agenda in relation to Irish politics.’¹³³ The *Irish Independent* was even more ‘outspoken in its support for the Boer republics’ and in attacking British policy in South Africa.¹³⁴ As for its relationship with the empire, as of 1912, the *Irish Independent* supported the idea of dominion status for Ireland. By the summer of 1914, it openly claimed that ‘Ireland’s economic and political interests lay with the empire’.¹³⁵

Reports from nationalist daily newspapers *Irish Independent* and the *Freeman’s Journal* indicate the Irish awareness of international events in the war-time and post-war world, including the opinions of religious and political figures in Europe, America, Canada and Australia. As for Irish views on the link between small nations and Irish politics, readers’ letters to the editor of the *Irish Independent* should not be underestimated, as they may be regarded as an important source of public opinion on domestic and/or foreign issues.

In August 1914, the German attack on Belgium caused widespread outrage in Britain and Ireland; British Prime Minister David Lloyd George claimed defending the rights of the small nations of Belgium and ‘Serbia’ to be the duty of Britain. In his ‘Vigorous Speech’, he emphasised that ‘the world owes much to little nations—and to little men.’¹³⁶ As the independence and neutrality of Belgium had been guaranteed since the Treaty of London (1839), British declaration of war on Germany seemed to be imminent. British propaganda played a key role in gaining support from the press and the public; the war came to be ‘depicted [...] as a struggle against German “barbarism” and as a fight to vindicate the fight to vindicate the “rights of small nations”’.¹³⁷ As Harry Hanak has argued, the British saw themselves as maintaining ‘some common and fundamental interest of mankind. For this reason they idealised subject peoples and small nations in the mass.’¹³⁸

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid., pp. 119-120

¹³⁴ Maume, ‘The *Irish Independent* and Empire’, p. 132.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 139.

¹³⁶ ‘A Vigorous Speech’, *Irish Independent*, 21 September 1914.

¹³⁷ John S. Ellis, ‘“The Methods of Barbarism” and the “Rights of Small Nations”: War Propaganda and British Pluralism’ in *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies*, vol. xxx, no. 1, (Spring 1998.), p. 49.

¹³⁸ Hanak, ‘The New Europe’, p. 382.

As far as Ireland as was concerned, nationalist politicians under the leadership of the Irish Parliamentary Party and John Redmond, supported the British war effort and therefore called on the Irish Volunteers to enlist 'in defence of right, of freedom, of religion in this war', with special regard to those of Catholic Belgium.¹³⁹ Redmond found it essential to show support for the British war effort as a guarantee to secure the implementation of Home Rule for Ireland after the war.

Besides John Redmond, other nationalists such as Erskine Childers¹⁴⁰ supported the war effort, 'hoping that Ireland would benefit from this war on behalf of small nations.'¹⁴¹ Among those who decided to fight for the Belgian cause was the previously pro-Boer Thomas Kettle as well.¹⁴² He was against the idea that Irish identity 'could or should rest entirely on "native" influences and feared that Irish-Irelandism would force the exclusion of European ideas from Ireland.'¹⁴³ This coincided with his conviction that the cause of European civilisation was greater than that of Ireland, which may explain his insistence on promoting participation in the British war effort. Prior to the war, he had had first-hand experience of continental Europe, including Innsbruck in Austria-Hungary, providing him with an insight into Habsburg Central Europe. In addition, Willie Redmond, M.P., once co-treasurer of the pro-Boer Irish Transvaal Committee and brother of John Redmond, also supported the war, defending the 'little Catholic nation' of Belgium.¹⁴⁴ Both Kettle and Willie Redmond were killed on the front.

Undoubtedly, the case of Catholic Belgium was the most frequently recurring theme in the Irish press at the time. Moreover, in addition to Belgium, Serbia, Poland, Holland, and the

¹³⁹ John Redmond, 'Woodenbridge Speech, 20 September 1914' in Michael McLoughlin, *Great Irish speeches of the Twentieth Century* (Dublin: Poolbeg Press, 1996).

¹⁴⁰ English-born Erskine Childers joined the Boer War as a volunteer in 1899, as well as the Great War in 1914, as an intelligence officer. His political career was marked by a shift from the supporter of home rule through favouring dominion rule for Ireland to eventually a committed Irish republican. See M. A. Hopkinson, 'Childers, (Robert) Erskine', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a1649>, accessed on 18 September 2014.

¹⁴¹ Mary Harris, 'Aspects of Nationalism and Anti-Imperialism in Ireland in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries', in Mary Harris, Anna Agnarsdóttir and Csaba Lévai (eds) *Global Encounters European Identities* (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2010), p. 179.

¹⁴² Irish parliamentarian Tom Kettle supported the Irish Parliamentary Party, and therefore stood behind Redmond and his appeal for joining the war on the British side. He was killed on the battlefield in September 1916. See Donal Lowry, 'Kettle, Thomas Michael', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a4530>, accessed on 18 September 2014.

¹⁴³ Senia Pašeta, 'Thomas Kettle: "An Irish Soldier in the Army of Europe"?' in Adrian Gregory and Senia Pašeta (eds) *Ireland and the Great War: 'A War to Unite Us All?'* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 13.

¹⁴⁴ Harris, 'Aspects of Nationalism', p. 179.

Boers in South Africa, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Greece, Romania, Montenegro, and Portugal were also frequently mentioned as ‘small nations’ in nationalist Irish dailies. As for official Irish political opinion, John Redmond also included Serbia when arguing for the freedom of small nations during the Great War— a very different case from Catholic Belgium. The *Freeman’s Journal* described Serbia briefly as the ‘small Slav State [...] under the protection of Russia [...]’, currently under Austrian attack.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, in his letter to the editor of the *Freeman’s Journal*, Richard John Kelly called for the liberation of Poland, Bohemia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Moravia, Dalmatia, Rumania, Tyrol, Bulgaria, and ‘other States now kept under the heel of Austria-Hungary’, in addition to Servia, Montenegro, and Belgium.¹⁴⁶ His reference demonstrates the shift in Kelly’s attitude towards the Dual Monarchy: from a pro-Hungarian stance to standing up for the rights of minorities. The list of small nations Irish newspapers and journals associated with the term was constantly changing, depending on the focus of Irish politics. Belgium and Holland stood out during both world wars; they featured in Irish diplomats’ accounts mostly during war time and less often in the interwar-era. Nevertheless, several of the newly independent small states became part of the Irish political and academic discourse on small nations, especially through their connection within the League of Nations from the mid-1920s.

John Redmond’s recruitment campaign bitterly divided Irish nationalists, and led to a split in the Irish Volunteers. Michael Laffan has pointed to the role of conscription (or rather, the fear of it) as a catalyst for advanced nationalists opposing the war effort.¹⁴⁷ The differences in opinion within the Irish Volunteers regarding involvement in the European war were visible since August 1914. L. Mac Eochadha’s article in *The Irish Volunteer*, entitled ‘The European Crisis. Where Stand the Volunteers? For Ireland First’, illustrated the belief of the minority under the leadership of Eoin MacNeill that ‘the welfare of Ireland must be, first, lastly, and all the time the sole objective of the Volunteers’.¹⁴⁸ The contributors to the *Irish Volunteer* were sceptical of the intentions of the British as to their declared goal of fighting for the liberty of small nations. Writing in early October 1914, Seumas O’Haodha highlighted that ‘England’s deep concern for Catholicity and small nationalities in this war [...] brings out in

¹⁴⁵ ‘What Germany wants’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 1 December 1914.

¹⁴⁶ ‘Small Nationalities and the War’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 22 December 1914.

¹⁴⁷ Laffan, *The Resurrection of Ireland*, p. 128.

¹⁴⁸ ‘The European Crisis. Where Stand the Volunteers? For Ireland First’ in the *Irish Volunteer*, 15 August 1914, p. 5; ‘“Arm for Ireland Alone.” The Small Nation that Needs YOUR Help is IRELAND!’ in the *Irish Volunteer*, 31 October 1914, p. 8.

unmistakeable fashion the radical antagonism of the principle of Empire and the Principle of Nationality.’¹⁴⁹ Therefore, the Irish Volunteers following MacNeill openly called for Irish neutrality and staying out of the war: ‘All we ask for Ireland is to be left out of this horrible shambles’, claimed ‘a Veteran’, in November 1914.¹⁵⁰

In order to resist the threat of conscription, the Irish Neutrality League was founded in October 1914 by the socialist James Connolly as president, with the founder of Sinn Féin, Arthur Griffith, as a committee member, among others.¹⁵¹ Notably, Francis Sheehy-Skeffington was one of the most prominent voices of neutrality and pacifism in Ireland. He was also among the early commentators on the question of small nations – but from a very different angle to Redmond’s. As a nationalist, radical and pacifist, not only did he campaign against recruitment during the Great War, but was also imprisoned for his anti-recruiting speeches in May 1915.¹⁵² In his ‘A Forgotten Small Nationality: Ireland and the War’, he elaborated on the boundaries of Irish independence.¹⁵³ Sheehy-Skeffington was concerned that English propaganda greatly endangered the very existence of small nations. ‘All of them’, he claimed, ‘from their very nature, are subject to the perils and disadvantages of independent sovereignty’. However, these, argued Sheehy-Skeffington, were ‘entirely outweighed by the benefits which complete self-government confers upon the small nation itself, and enables it to confer on humanity.’¹⁵⁴

Moreover, Sheehy-Skeffington was convinced that the contrast between fighting for independence and being satisfied with achieving home rule was not an exclusively Irish problem. On the one hand, ‘Bohemia,’ he stressed, ‘has home rule within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Is Bohemia contended?’ He emphasised that Bohemians also wanted an independent state in Central Europe and this led to the question: ‘again, if Bohemia, why not Ireland?’¹⁵⁵ In December 1918, Sinn Féin’s election propaganda was similarly built on comparisons between Ireland and the small nationalities of Central Europe.

¹⁴⁹ ‘Imperialism versus Nationalism. By Seumas O’Haodha’ in the *Irish Volunteer*, 3 October 1914, p. 3.

¹⁵⁰ ‘Rank and File Notes. By a Veteran’ in the *Irish Volunteer*, 7 November 1914, p. 15.

¹⁵¹ Fergus A. D’Arcy, ‘Connolly, James’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a1953>, accessed on 18 September 2014.

¹⁵² Patrick Maume, ‘Skeffington, Francis Sheehy- Skeffington’, *DIB*,

(<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a8105>), accessed on 18 September 2014.

¹⁵³ Francis Sheehy-Skeffington, *A Forgotten Small Nationality: Ireland and the War* (New York City: The Donnelly Press, 1916).

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

On the other hand, Sheehy-Skeffington was more cautious in commenting on the small nation of Belgium, the focal point of Irish recruiting campaign. He was sceptical about the idea of fighting for Catholic Belgium while not doing the same for Catholic Galicia in Eastern Europe, which was to become part of the independent Republic of Poland later in 1918 and ‘which was then [in early 1915] in possession of the anti-Catholic Russians.’¹⁵⁶ He was convinced that Ireland had no concern with the ongoing war, ‘waged in behalf of Belgium and of the principle of small nationalities imposed on a few, but not for long [...]’.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, he saw other small nations such as Holland, Denmark, Sweden or Switzerland as better equipped for joining the war fighting for the small nation of Belgium, as they were ‘all richer and more densely populated than Ireland’.¹⁵⁸ If the peace conference brought ‘freedom to Belgium and Poland, perhaps to Finland and Bohemia’, then why, he wondered, would Ireland not be included amongst them – which turned out to be a very valid claim for Irish representatives at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, who were not granted permission to present their proclamation and their claims in front of the Committee after all. Writing in 1915, Sheehy-Skeffington had high hopes for the United States, as a leading power at the future conference of ‘comity of nations’ to fight for defending those principles upon which the war against Germany was supposed to be based in the first place. This optimism, which also characterized the majority of advanced Irish nationalists, disappeared in early 1919.

Following the execution of the leaders of the Easter Rising, the rights of small nations came up again on the agenda of Irish nationalists. This time it was not Belgium or Serbia but the small nation of Ireland that claimed its right to self-determination. Radical nationalist propaganda became ‘more efficient and more centralized’, and as a result, the nature of articles in Irish national dailies mentioning small nations also changed considerably.¹⁵⁹

Evidently, Sinn Féin greatly benefitted from the British recruitment campaign. As Laffan has emphasised, Irish ‘opposition to war, and more specifically to the recruiting campaigns of the British Government in Ireland, solidified support’ for the party.¹⁶⁰ Advanced nationalists such

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Laffan, *The Resurrection of Ireland*, p. 260.

¹⁶⁰ Ben Novick, *Conceiving Revolution: Irish Nationalist Propaganda during the First World War* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2001), p. 18.

as the Irish Archbishop of Melbourne, Reverend Dr Mannix, began to stress the validity of Irish (and Sinn Féin) claims:

... We have been asked – young men and even old men – to rush to Europe to avenge the wrongs of Belgium and the other small nations, and the call has not gone unheeded. (Cheers). But there is a small nation whose wrongs are older. (Cheers). (A voice – ‘Ireland’). (Cheers). There is a nation whose scars are deeper than Belgium’s scars. (Cheers). Her daughters have been ill-treated and her shrines and churches laid in ruins – and that not by Turks, or Austrians, or Germans. (Cheers).¹⁶¹

The controversy regarding conscription was often debated in the Irish press throughout the war years, and also surfaced in readers’ letters in newspapers. From a small nation’s perspective, former soldier and prominent member of the Irish Volunteers, Col. Maurice Moore,¹⁶² argued that it was, under the circumstances (late 1916), ‘useless to make sentimental appeals to Irishmen to fight in the defence of the liberty of small nations,’ while their own small nation was denied the same liberties.¹⁶³ At the time of the Volunteer split in 1914 Moore supported Redmond. However, in 1916 he believed that if England was expecting soldiers from Ireland, instead of supporting Polish and Bohemian patriots, it first needed to do justice closer to home.¹⁶⁴

The Congress of Small and Subject Nations in October 1917 was of key importance, as far as publicity and small nations’ propaganda was concerned.¹⁶⁵ At the occasion, held at the Hotel McAlpin, New York, USA, the Irish nation was represented by Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington, radical nationalist and widow of Frank Sheehy-Skeffington. According to the Irish representative, subject and oppressed nations ‘under the yoke of Germany, Austria, or Turkey, but also those under the British Empire – Ireland, India, Egypt, and the Boers’ were invited. Even though no official action was taken against the congress, ‘a powerful effort was made to suppress [...] it and influences were set to work in Washington to have certain of its speakers – the Irish and the Indian – arrested.’¹⁶⁶ Despite this incident, the congress proved to be a success and, in the words of Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington, ‘all the representatives of the small

¹⁶¹ Novick, *Conceiving Revolution*, p. 101.

¹⁶² Maurice Moore was a supporter of the Gaelic League, committee member of the Irish Volunteers, and after 1917, a supporter of Sinn Féin. He took part in the Boer War and condemned the British treatment of Boer civilians in articles in the *Freeman’s Journal*. See Marie Coleman, ‘Moore, Maurice George’, *DIB*, (<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5942>), accessed on 18 September 2014.

¹⁶³ ‘Ireland and the War. Letter from Colonel Moore. To the Editor of the *Freeman’s Journal*’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 6 October 1916.

¹⁶⁴ ‘England’s “Angry Tone.” Col. Moore and Conscription (Passed by Censor)’, *Irish Independent*, 19 October 1916.

¹⁶⁵ Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington, *Impressions of Sinn Féin in America: An Account of Eighteen Months’ Irish Propaganda in the United States*. (Dublin: The Davis Publishing Co., 1919).

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

and subject peoples felt united by a common bond of sympathy against their oppressors.’¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, a resolution was sent to President Woodrow Wilson referring to his famous principle of self-determination. In January 1918, Sheehy-Skeffington had an interview with President Wilson, during which she presented a petition from Cumann na mBan to him, seeking the inclusion of Ireland among the small nations for whose freedom the United States was fighting.¹⁶⁸ Tomáš Masaryk, who was also present at the Congress as a representative of the Czechs, was interviewed on the subject of Ireland. He ‘warmly expressed the sympathy of his people for the claims of Ireland. [...] He declared that Ireland had always been a beacon-light to the subject peoples in Austria – our [the Irish people’s] struggle being largely parallel to their own.’¹⁶⁹ Years later in 1934, Sheehy-Skeffington recalled how she encountered Masaryk, ‘then a fugitive from Austria, in 1917, with a price upon his head’, and how they ‘spoke of Ireland, and her aspirations for independence, and how Masaryk paid tribute to the spirit of Sinn Féin as one that had meant much by its inspiration to his then struggling countrymen.’¹⁷⁰ This expression of sympathy seems to be contradicted by Masaryk himself, who, when in Britain after 1916, tried to distinguish himself and his Czechs supporters from the Irish and therefore, he denied any similarity between them and Sinn Féin. Historian Josef Kalvoda, quoting Masaryk’s memorandum to the US State Department, illustrated how the leader of the Czechs urged everybody to understand ‘that an Irish committee, should there be any, cannot be recognized.’¹⁷¹ According to Kalvoda, the ‘statement was typical of Masaryk: while the Czechs had the right to independence, the Irish and many other peoples, including the Ukrainians, did not.’¹⁷² Having to rely on first and foremost British support for their cause, Masaryk could not let any issue undermine his position in London.

In late 1917, a new theme appeared more frequently in the small nations-related propaganda; a more pronounced criticism of the Irish Parliamentary Party, particularly from William O’Brien, Éamon de Valera and Arthur Griffith. As far as Sinn Féin’s rhetoric was concerned, they also included British Labour as a target of their criticism after early 1918. Nonetheless, based on the reports in the *Irish Independent*, it was clear that after the Conscription Crisis in the spring 1918, even the London Labour Party started to point out the hypocrisy of English

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁷⁰ Sheehy-Skeffington, ‘An Exile’s Devotion to Freedom. Dr. Gertrude Kelly’, *Irish Press*, 8 March 1934.

¹⁷¹ Josef Kalvoda, *Genesis of Czechoslovakia* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1986), p. 258.

¹⁷² Ibid.

politics as far as small nations – Ireland included – were concerned. The opinion of the British left echoed the stance of Soviet politician Leon Trotsky. He labelled the Allies hypocritical in relation to their ‘claims that they were fighting to guarantee the freedom of small nations’, referring to the fate of Ireland, Egypt, India, Madagascar and Indochina.¹⁷³ Due to the successful German blitzkrieg of 21 March 1918, Britain was pressed to extend conscription in Ireland (as it had already been in effect in England since 1916), which was met by large-scale opposition. As Sinn Féin were the loudest opponent of conscription, Dublin Castle decided to take steps against them, and had 73 prominent leaders (except Father Flanagan and Harry Boland), including Arthur Griffith, arrested, because of an alleged and suspected ‘German Plot’. This, however, only resulted in even wider public support for Sinn Féin.¹⁷⁴ As a result of these arrests, Irish nationalist politics went through another phase of radicalisation (similarly to the aftermath of the executions after the Easter Rising) as the moderate leaders such as Griffith were in prison.¹⁷⁵ This explained the changed rhetoric of Sinn Féin in 1918, even in terms of their attitude to the independence of small nations.

The central theme in the *Irish Independent* after early 1918 was therefore the conscription crisis, with reports and articles from several different angles. As Patrick Maume has emphasised, the paper joined the anti-conscription campaign despite the private opinion of its owner: William Martin Murphy found conscription acceptable in the event of Ireland being granted dominion status.¹⁷⁶ Besides stressing the importance of editorials, readers’ letters in the *Irish Independent* may also provide great variety for different points of view on small nations and on where Ireland was supposed to stand in the ongoing crisis – occasionally even pro-war letters were also published.¹⁷⁷

Several Irish academics, including the Jesuit writer James MacCaffrey,¹⁷⁸ were very critical of conscription, and cynical about the alleged relevance of the freedom of other European small nations: ‘Ireland, enslaved herself and without hope or promise of liberty, was to be forced to

¹⁷³ Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, p. 38.

¹⁷⁴ Novick, *Conceiving Revolution*, p. 240, and Laffan, *The Resurrection of Ireland*, p. 143.

¹⁷⁵ Laffan, *The Resurrection of Ireland*, p. 143.

¹⁷⁶ Maume, ‘The *Irish Independent* and Empire’, p. 140.

¹⁷⁷ ‘Sinn Féin and Recruiting. To the Editor, “Irish Independent”’, *Irish Independent*, 25 September 1918.

¹⁷⁸ Theologian and historian Monsignor James MacCaffrey was Professor of Ecclesiastical History at St Patrick’s College, Maynooth, and on occasion also contributed to the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*. As he received his doctorate from the University of Freiburg, he was familiar with the challenges facing people in Central Europe, including historical, political, and religious matters. See Bridget Hourican, ‘MacCaffrey, James’, *DIB*, (<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5114>), accessed on 2 November 2014.

send her sons to die that Belgium, Poland and Serbia might be free'.¹⁷⁹ He noticed, however, that the English were not successful in their plans. Instead of 'dividing Ireland', conscription had united Ireland; and instead of enslaving Irishmen, the English 'had taught them to speak and act as free men.'¹⁸⁰

As public opinion changed in favour of Sinn Féin after 1916, so did the general Irish political discourse. Even Joseph Devlin (Nationalist M.P. and former supporter of Redmond's recruitment campaign) was quoted as alluding to the contradiction between Britain posing as the 'champion of rights of small nations' and the enforcement of martial law in Ireland, referring to the British reaction to the Easter Rising.¹⁸¹ Two years later, with the actual Conscription Crisis following the successful German Spring Offensive on the Western Front, Devlin became one of the loudest voices against 'the imposition of a blood-pact' as a price for self-government. He claimed that 'if Great Britain wanted Irish support, she had to 'drop threats in favour of fair treatment.'¹⁸² Labelling conscription as 'blood pact' or 'blood tax' was common in Irish nationalist papers such as the *Freeman's Journal* and the *Irish Independent*.¹⁸³ What linked these articles together was the common cause of 'freedom for small nationalities', referring to other nations such as Bohemian Czechs or the Yugoslavs, all sharing the fight for self-determination.¹⁸⁴

One of the most unexpected uses of the small nations propaganda occurred in May 1918 (again related to the Conscription Crisis), when the 'blame game' turned back on the Irish, The *Irish Independent* published Lloyd George's speech in which he accused some elements in Irish politics with 'tramping down the liberties of small nations in Europe, to stab Britain in the back'.¹⁸⁵ Lloyd George clearly meant this as a criticism for the anti-conscription campaign in Ireland.

The post-war General Election of December 1918 turned out to be the perfect opportunity for Sinn Féin to capitalise on the wave of public sympathy following executions and

¹⁷⁹ Rev. James Canon MacCaffrey, 'The Catholic Church in 1918' in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, vol. xiii, (January – July 1919), p. 101.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ 'Government of Ireland', *Irish Independent*, 19 October 1916.

¹⁸² 'The Blood Tax', *Freeman's Journal*, 13 April 1918.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ 'The Blood Tax', *Freeman's Journal*, 7 May 1918; 'Contrary to Principle. Mr Samuel's Severe Criticism.', *Irish Independent*, 17 May 1918; and 'A People's Peace', *Freeman's Journal*, 21 October 1918.

¹⁸⁵ 'Premier and the Plot', *Irish Independent*, 25 May 1918.

imprisonment since 1916. At this stage, small nations were no longer part of nationalist rhetoric in order to create sympathy; rather, they became a tool for republicans claiming the right to Irish independence. Most curiously, half a year before Sinn Féin's general election campaign which focused on the self-determination of Ireland in comparison with other newly independent small states, John Dillon of the Irish Parliamentary Party used the very same line of argument. Dillon claimed that in order to settle the Irish conflict (which had escalated further with the 1916 Rising), Britain's priority had to be Ireland, instead of wondering about the fate of subject nationalities in Austria-Hungary (such as the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks or the Jugo Slavs). He went even further, demanding to know, 'do you not know that there is an Ulster question in Ireland?':

...Do you think that this is not all followed closely in Ireland? Do you suppose that Irish people do not say to themselves: "What about the Czecho-Slovaks, about whom many of us never heard before?" [...] What about Ireland, who is more ancient than any of them, and whose struggle for nationality has been unquestionably more persistent than that either of the Czecho-Slovaks or even the Poles?¹⁸⁶

In comparison, the wording of Sinn Féin shows remarkable resemblance to Dillon's arguments:

"The Czecho-Slovaks are Demanding Independence."
Nobody is quite sure who the Czecho-Slovaks are. But the whole world knows who the Irish are and would wonder if that ancient race did not demand independence. Cannot you be as true to Ireland as the Czecho-Slovaks to Czecho-Slovakia?¹⁸⁷

Therefore, Dillon's claims coincided almost word-to-word with many of the Sinn Féin election pamphlets when strangely enough, their plans for Ireland's future (writing in 1918) could not have differed more, with the Irish Party proposing Home Rule within the empire, in contrast with Sinn Féin's idea of an independent Irish republic.

Firstly, Griffith's positive attitude towards Austria-Hungary triggered loud opposition from the *Freeman's Journal*. There were references to Germany as well, which alluded to 1916 and some radicals' connection with Germany (for instance, Roger Casement). The paper emphasised that being on good terms with the Central Powers (whose aim was, allegedly, to 'belittle, as far as possible, the rights of small nationalities') might endanger Ireland's future.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, relying on Prussian and Austrian sympathy for Irish claims was also considered foolish as it was seen as 'merely diplomatic and hypocritical', since the Central

¹⁸⁶ 'M. Dillon's Speech. A Crushing Indictment of Government's Attitude', *Freeman's Journal*, 30 July 1918.

¹⁸⁷ 'The Czecho-Slovaks are Demanding Independence', Sinn Féin Pamphlets, December 1918, NLI ILB 300P1, no.75.

¹⁸⁸ 'Dangers of Chaos', *Freeman's Journal*, 18 September 1917.

Powers were claimed to have ‘never had any intention of raising the Irish question seriously with their enemies. Just as Belgium is a pawn in the game so Ireland was to be another.’¹⁸⁹ Secondly, Sinn Féin’s insistence on passive resistance was frequently ridiculed by the Irish Parliamentary Party, especially during the election campaign. Dillon urged his followers to note that Poland, Bohemia and the Jugo Slavs won their liberty and continued to sit in their respective imperial parliaments till the final days of the empire. Should these newly liberated nations listen to Sinn Féin, they were to ‘conclude that the Irish people are lunatics, that they don’t know what they are talking about, and they don’t understand how to govern themselves [...]’.¹⁹⁰ The policy’s impracticability was pointed out on several occasions in the *Freeman’s Journal*, arguing that ‘the policy was tried in Hungary and failed’.¹⁹¹ The paper emphasised that rather than abstentionism, it was the Battle of Sadowa that drove Austria towards the Compromise. In contrast,

...Croats continued to send their representatives to the Hungarian Diet, and continued to protest against their incorporation. The Bohemians did likewise with the Austrian Reichsrath. The Poles, the Jugo Slavs, the Czecho Slovaks, acted similarly. In fact, all the small nations that have now obtained their freedom, and Alsace Lorraine, that has been restored to France, never neglected the weapon of Parliamentary representation and Parliamentary agitation.¹⁹²

Thirdly, Griffith’s imprecision and (lack of) historical knowledge regarding Hungarian issues did not go unnoticed. As early as September 1917, the *Freeman’s Journal* urged Sinn Féin leaders ‘to study history more extensively and apply it more correctly and intelligently.’¹⁹³ At the meeting of the United Irish League in Armagh, P. C. Gallagher used the same argument.¹⁹⁴ He believed it was a serious responsibility for any group to ‘garble historical facts, and try to get our people to misappreciate the real state of affairs.’¹⁹⁵ Consequently, the Hungarian parallel was deemed inappropriate and false on several occasions – and not only by Sinn Féin’s nationalist opposition. Mr Alexander McGill, an Ulster Presbyterian, for instance, rather called for considering the connections between Ireland and Iceland as they were ‘much closer than that of Hungary, to which Mr. Arthur Griffith drew attention.’¹⁹⁶ Similar tone may have been detected in *The Leader* as well, regarding Sinn Féin’s plans regarding the attendance

¹⁸⁹ ‘Austria and Ireland’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 17 July 1918.

¹⁹⁰ ‘Mr. Dillon’s Campaign. Mr Dillon’s Speech. A Path which Led to Victory’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 2 December 1918.

¹⁹¹ ‘Campaign Notes. Some Points for Nationalist Voters’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 10 December 1918.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ ‘Hungarian Policy. Fallacy of Sinn Fein History Exposed (By Ulad)’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 22 September 1917.

¹⁹⁴ The United Irish League focused on land reform, led by John Redmond. After 1918 the party became restricted to the northern counties.

¹⁹⁵ ‘Forces of Division. Responsibility of the Leaders of Easter Week’, *Freeman’s Journal* 24 October 1917.

¹⁹⁶ ‘Ireland and Iceland. A Striking Parallel’, *Irish Independent*, 19 September 1921.

of the post-war peace conference; ‘Oul-Lad’, for instance, writing in January 1918, emphasised how easy it was ‘to prick the “Hungarian bubble”, when discussing the prospect of Sinn Féin presenting Ireland’s case at the peace conference. First and foremost, the journal stressed the ‘absurdity, not to say dishonesty, of the whole campaign carried on by these rainbow-chasers.’¹⁹⁷

In the 1918 December General Election campaign, Sinn Féin fully embraced the case of Irish self-identification as a small nation. The most significant points on the party’s agenda were campaigning for an Irish republic, condemning conscription, and denouncing British oppression.¹⁹⁸ A large number of election pamphlets depicted Ireland as a self-efficient small nation, claiming independence, making comparisons with other small nations on the Continent, regarding territory, population, and national income.¹⁹⁹ Many of them bore titles such as: ‘Can Ireland stand alone?’, detailing the importance of small nations in historical terms.²⁰⁰ Ireland was contrasted with the newly independent small nations of Estonia, Finland, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavs, Poland, Lithuania, as well as Hungary, Russia, Germany, and Austria.²⁰¹ The latter, it was stressed, became a Republic, with its subject peoples made free.²⁰² Therefore, all of these nations, with less glorious histories and less atrocious oppressors than that of Ireland, still had ‘had the courage and intelligence to demand nothing less than Full Freedom’.²⁰³ Ireland, on the other hand, although ‘larger than many and older than most of these named – [had] not been assured of absolute independence because its people have not yet definitely asked for full freedom.’²⁰⁴ According to the party, there was a lot more at stake at the elections than victory. Independence (as opposed to Home Rule – which even the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs were said to have refused) was the first and foremost on this small nation’s political agenda and Sinn Féin urged their voters to vote accordingly.²⁰⁵ What the Irish Parliamentary Party had to offer was not sufficient. Sinn Féin’s pamphlets drew attention to the controversy in the claims of constitutionalists such as John

¹⁹⁷ ‘Parodies. Number I. From “The Fee-man’s Journal”. Notes From Ulster. (By Oul-Lad)’, *The Leader*, 26 January 1918, pp. 612-613.

¹⁹⁸ Laffan, *The Resurrection of Ireland*, p. 163.

¹⁹⁹ ‘The Small Nations’, Sinn Féin pamphlets, 1918, NLI ILB 300 P1, no. 16.

²⁰⁰ ‘Can Ireland Stand Alone?’, Sinn Féin pamphlets, 1918, NLI ILB 300 P1, no. 1.

²⁰¹ ‘Irishmen Look around You’, Sinn Féin pamphlets, 1918, NLI ILB 300 P1, no. 104; ‘The Czecho-Slovaks are To-day as Free as the English’, Sinn Féin pamphlets, 1918, NLI LB 300 P1, no. 87; ‘What will you Vote for?’, Sinn Féin pamphlets, 1918, NLI ILB 300 P1, no. 80.

²⁰² ‘What of Ireland?’, Sinn Féin pamphlets, 1918, NLI ILB 300 P1, no. 79.

²⁰³ ‘Irishmen Look around You’, Sinn Féin pamphlets, 1918, NLI ILB 300 P1, no. 104.

²⁰⁴ ‘What of Ireland?’, Sinn Féin pamphlets, 1918, NLI ILB 300 P1, no. 79.

²⁰⁵ ‘No Home Rule’, Sinn Féin pamphlets, 1918, NLI ILB 300 P1, no. 91.

Dillon, who was criticised for demanding full independence for Poland, Finland, Bohemia, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Roumania, and Alsace-Lorraine, while ‘the only Nation the absolute independence of which [he fought against was] his own Nation – IRELAND.’²⁰⁶ However, Small nations – including the small nation of Ireland – were not always portrayed in the role of victims. Sinn Féin found it crucial to state openly that ‘The Irish Republic Can Pay Its Way’, emphasising their capabilities and self-sufficiency, motivating Irish voters to demand change.²⁰⁷

By the end of 1918, the importance of self-preservation as a small nation was an argument often raised not only in political discourse but also in journals by the Catholic intelligentsia. In general, gaining international recognition as an independent state was the top priority for Irish nationalists. An anonymous author under the pseudonym ‘Dun Cairin’, writing in *Studies*, echoed Sinn Féin’s demands, and emphasised the strong national spirit of Ireland throughout her history and her inalienable right to self-determination.²⁰⁸

The tone of the *Catholic Bulletin* was harsher than that of *Studies* and more in accordance with the fierce claims of some of the Sinn Féin election pamphlets. M. Quinn, compared Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-Slav independence with the Irish claims for freedom, rejected by the great powers.²⁰⁹ The author chose them because, he pointed out sarcastically, they had been ‘selected by the liberators of small nations’ - independence was their national right.²¹⁰ Quinn identified all Czecho-Slovaks as Bohemians, disregarding the complexity of the historic Czech lands, although he did acknowledge that some Czecho-Slovaks lived in Moravia and Silesia as well.²¹¹ He claimed that ‘one of the nations -our own - is much more ancient than Christianity itself’ and ‘more ancient [...] in a definitely organised political and national existence’, suggesting the priority of Irish independence over any others, especially in East-Central Europe.²¹² Similarly, a sarcastic cartoon published in *The Leader* echoed the sentiments of Sinn Féin and the *Catholic Bulletin*, covering almost the whole spectrum of Irish nationalists: ‘Up with the Slovaks: the Balkans, abú!’²¹³ The contributors to *The Leader*

²⁰⁶ ‘Mr. Dillon Wants to See’, Sinn Féin pamphlets, 1918, NLI ILB 300 P1, no. 134.

²⁰⁷ ‘How Ireland is Gagged’, Sinn Féin pamphlets, 1918, NLI ILB300 P4, no. 78.

²⁰⁸ Dun Cairin, ‘The Argument from Irish History’ in *Studies*, vol. vii, no. 28, (December 1918), p. 548.

²⁰⁹ In the article no first name was mentioned.

²¹⁰ M. Quinn, M. ‘Yugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks (a comparison with Ireland)’ in the *Catholic Bulletin*, vol. ix, (January 1919), p. 28.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

²¹³ ‘Czechoslovaks and Ireland’, *The Leader*, 2 November 1918, p. 297.

found the comparison between Bohemia and Ireland regarding the issue of self-determination hardly worthy of mention. As the paper argued, ‘but surely the parallel is a weak one’, alluding to the differences in ethnicity, language and question of autonomy.²¹⁴ The article stressed that Wilson’s idea of self-determination was of races, not religions – therefore it did not help the Irish case. As a matter of fact, references to the weakness of the comparison could be found in *The Leader* as early as February 1916, stating that in Bohemia the native language was not ‘so dead as it is at present in Ireland.’²¹⁵

‘Central European Ulsters’

In late 1918, even before the ceasefire on 11 November, many articles and studies were written and published in Ireland, weighing the possibilities regarding the future of the many nations of the Dual Monarchy. Bohemia was in the centre of Irish attention in many regards, possibly due to the perceived similarity in terms of the minority question, resulting in references to a ‘Bohemian Ulster’. In other words, historically speaking, some Irish writers regarded the rule of German minority in Bohemia over the Czechs as comparable to the position of the Protestant Anglo-Irish Ascendancy, rather than the majority of the Catholic Irish population:

...Bohemia is extremely interesting for Ireland, because you would imagine you were reading Irish history when you were reading the history of Bohemia. The Bohemians were for hundreds of years ground down and horribly oppressed by the Germans. [...] In Bohemia there is also an “Ulster”, consisting of Germans, who claim to be the superior race, and who for generations have dominated and tyrannised over the Bohemians [...].²¹⁶

The words of the *Freeman’s Journal* indicate that in Ireland, not only advanced nationalists but also the mainstream nationalist media drew parallels between Ireland and Bohemia, arguing that the majority of both of their populations had to live under ‘the tyranny of minority’.²¹⁷ Moreover, on occasion, Bohemia’s Ulster question was considered to be ‘in even more aggravated form than Ireland.’²¹⁸ On several occasions, the *Freeman’s Journal* labelled the German-speaking part of Bohemia as ‘A German Ulster’ where its leaders, Bohemia’s ‘Carsonites’, were stated to have kept the majority of the population in subjection.²¹⁹ The

²¹⁴ ‘The Chaos after the War’, *The Leader*, 9 November 1918, pp. 328-329.

²¹⁵ ‘Saving the Irish Language. By Rev. Owen B. Maguire’, *The Leader*, 5 February 1916, p. 642.

²¹⁶ ‘Ulster and National Cause’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 16 August 1918.

²¹⁷ ‘Bohemia and Ireland’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 3 July 1918.

²¹⁸ ‘A People’s Peace’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 21 October 1918.

²¹⁹ ‘A German Ulster. Demand for Severance from the Bohemian Kingdom’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 25 January 1918; and ‘Nationalist Protest: Attitude of the “Carsonite” Faction’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 25 July 1918.

Bohemian nobility was compared to the followers of (Dublin-born) Unionist leader Edward Carson, who, according to his biographers, may be ‘seen as an architect of [...] the partition settlement of 1920’.²²⁰ Curiously enough, it was not always German Bohemians who were compared to Carsonites. In the *Freeman’s Journal* article from 21 October 1918, the Hungarians were cast in the role of the alien minority that ruled over the majority of the population: ‘Austria, like England,’ claimed the paper, ‘has its Carsonites in the Magyars’.²²¹ Therefore, Hungary often perceived in less favourable light than Austria. It was even labelled ‘the savage oppressor of Bohemia’, although Bohemia was part of the empire’s Cisleithanian part which was under Austrian and not Hungarian rule.²²² At times, this aversion to Hungary mirrored moderate nationalists’ criticism of Sinn Féin, especially in the second half of 1918. Then, Bohemia seemed to have become, on occasion, an alternative parallel that the Irish Parliamentary Party could use coming up to the General Election in December 1918. As the *Freeman’s Journal* stressed, Bohemians, ‘an oppressed small nation like our own’ were ‘certainly entitled to more serious attention than the famous “Hungarian policy”’.²²³

In the last months of the war, the *Irish Independent* also appeared to be aware of the problematic nature of the Ulster question, and the possible complications it could cause Ireland at the post-war peace conference. Together with the nationality problem in Bohemia, Finland, and Alsace, Ireland’s own was also unsolved. The paper emphasised one point though; for Ireland, partition was unacceptable.²²⁴

Consequently, both advanced and moderate nationalists used the concept of ‘Bohemian Ulster’ in their arguments. The Irish Parliamentary Party’s T. P. O’Connor²²⁵ likened not only the Bohemian minority problem to the Ulster question, but also the case of Bosnia Herzegovina with its ‘Christian-Mohammedan’ division, that of Alsace-Lorraine, on the

²²⁰ Alvin Jackson, ‘Carson, Edward Henry Baron Carson of Duncairn’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a1514>, accessed 3 May 2015.

²²¹ ‘A People’s Peace’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 21 October 1918.

²²² ‘The Small Nations. Where Coercion of Minorities is not “Unthinkable”’. *Jugoslavia Practical Politics*, *Freeman’s Journal*, 12 November 1918.

²²³ *Ibid.*

²²⁴ ‘Dominion Rule in Ireland’, *Irish Independent*, 8 September 1917.

²²⁵ Thomas Power O’Connor was a journalist and politician from Athlone, co. Westmeath. Although not particularly influential in the Irish Parliamentary Party anymore, his advice ‘was still very important to John Dillon and the Irish party leadership because he was on excellent terms with each successive government, and with Lloyd George in particular.’ By the 1910s ‘he was comfortable with the idea of partition’ and was admired by even the Ulster Unionist leader Sir Edward Carson. He approved of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. See Owen McGee, ‘O’Connor, Thomas Power’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a6618>, accessed on 3 May 2015.

border of France and Germany, and that of Russian Poland.²²⁶ As for Bosnia Herzegovina and the Southern Slavs in general, their unification following the Russian revolution and the collapse of Austria-Hungary was welcomed by the Irish nationalist press. However, even with the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (officially only on 1 December 1918), it was considered ‘not unsafe to predict that no Balkan “Ulster” will be allowed to interfere with the unity and liberation of the Southern Slavs’ eventually.²²⁷

Moreover, Irish nationalists also criticised the British Government for their policy regarding Ulster and it was pointed out that they were ‘aware of the very close parallel that [existed] between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Irish’, yet they only spoke up for the right of Czecho-Slovaks to an independent state.²²⁸ Therefore, the *Freeman’s Journal* regularly published articles in the second half of 1918, wondering why Britain would object to ‘applying a solution along similar lines to the real and original Ulster’ when they had ‘apparently found a solution for Bohemia’s Ulster’.²²⁹ On the other hand, the *Irish Independent* also mentioned that the Austrian Premier had reminded the British Government to ‘sweep before their own door’ before they started pointed to the ‘Austrian Ulster’.²³⁰

The aforementioned Patrick J. Gannon was among the Irish intellectuals who compared Bohemia’s German nobility to that of “‘Ulster” and its alien landlord caste’ in the December 1918 issue of *Studies*.²³¹ Gannon claimed that Czechoslovak independence ‘should have peculiar interest for Irishmen’, referring to the controversial attitude of British statesmen who supported Czech claims but kept Ireland unfree.²³² As Gannon’s article was written before the peace conference, the author could only guess how it was to solve Bohemia’s ‘Ulster’ problem which had ‘a great deal more pith and substance in it than the one we know. What attitude will British diplomacy take up on that point? We must only wait and see.’²³³ He pointed to the uncertain fate of Bohemian Germans after the peace conference, knowing the problematic nature of their own ‘Ulster question’. He saw the solution in breaking up

²²⁶ ‘Self-Determination for Ireland: The “Ulster” Veto. Mr. T. P. O’Connor’s Speech’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 6 November 1918.

²²⁷ ‘The Small Nations. Where Coercion of Minorities is not “Unthinkable”. Jugoslavia Practical Politics’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 12 November 1918.

²²⁸ ‘M. Dillon’s Speech. A Crushing Indictment of Government’s Attitude’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 30 July 1918; and ‘Ulster and National Cause’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 16 August 1918.

²²⁹ ‘England Solves an “Ulster Problem”’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 4 September 1918.

²³⁰ ‘What’s Sauce for Czecho’s?’ *Irish Independent*, 10 October 1918.

²³¹ Gannon, ‘Bohemia and its Ulster Question’, p. 651.

²³² *Ibid.*, p. 645.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 657.

Bohemia's integrity and letting 'the German fringe merge into the German states surrounding it'.²³⁴ If Germans managed to secure their language rights, however, there was to be no obstacle between their becoming true Bohemians.²³⁵ Gannon was hopeful with regard to the attitude of the Czechs, expecting tolerance towards the Germans and Hungarians, due to the existing economic links among them: 'there is every reason to hope that these two peoples, after centuries of differences fostered from without, will find peace in the strong bond of a common love for a common fatherland', he concluded.²³⁶

In addition to Gannon, another Irish nationalist, politician and solicitor John Horgan pointed out the perceived similarity between Ulster and Bohemia, along the lines of M. Quinn and the series of Sinn Féin election pamphlets in 1918. Firstly, in his attack on the principle of passive resistance and abstentionism, Horgan claimed that not only had Ireland sent delegates to the British parliament voluntarily, but so too had the Poles and Bohemians, who then managed to gain independence. Secondly, Ireland offered a greater contribution to the Allied war effort than 'Czecho Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs combined'. Thirdly, having trouble in Ulster was nothing when compared to 'Bohemia with its German "Ulster" population'.²³⁷

As far as Irish interest in specific small nations in Europe was concerned, there were visible changes since the outbreak of the Great War. Belfast-born Presbyterian and Irish nationalist Robert Lynd provided an insight into contemporary northern nationalist Irish political thinking on small or little nations after 1914.²³⁸ According to the assistant literary editor of the *Daily News*, before the Great War,

...by a small nation most people meant not a nation of diminished area so much as a nation of diminished liberties. Their list of nations included not only Belgium, which is hardly bigger than Ulster, but Poland, which is one of the largest countries in Europe. They idealized subject peoples in the mass. [...] The small nations shone in the reflected glory of the ideal of the hour.²³⁹

This was not the first time that Lynd noticed the connection between the curious relationship between 'Irish Nationalists and Ulstermen', while referring to the minorities of 'Bohemia, Poland and Belgium, highlighting how nobody questioned the validity of their claims for

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid., p. 658.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ John J. Horgan, 'The World Policy of President Wilson' in *Studies*, vol. vii, no. 28, (December 1918), p. 562.

²³⁸ Maurice Walsh, *The News from Ireland: Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), p. 67; and Diarmaid Ferriter, 'Lynd, Robert Wilson', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a4962>, accessed on 3 September 2015.

²³⁹ Robert Lynd, *Ireland a Nation* (Charleston: BiblioLife, 2010), p. 276.

nationhood.²⁴⁰ Lynd also elaborated on how even Unionist leader ‘Sir Edward Carson himself became a furious Nationalist – for Serbia.’²⁴¹ Moreover, Lynd discussed why Belgium had attracted such considerable attention from contemporaries and how opinions on small nations in general had changed throughout the war and referred to the role of the press when he stated that newspapers had been ‘urging that small nations have been one of the disappointments of the war.’²⁴² Lynd concluded by pointing out that there was ‘no need to pretend to ourselves that the small nations are nobler than the great nations. They are not.’²⁴³ The curiosity of Lynd’s study lies in the fact that it was written in 1919, before the finalisation of the treaties after the Great War (therefore the Dual Monarchy still existed) and before the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty itself. Also, it illustrates the significance of personal background when investigating Irish perceptions of other small nations.

Conclusion

Irish commentaries on the fate of other small nationalities, specifically in the multi-cultural Austro-Hungarian Empire, contributed to Irish political debates on independence before 1918. Exploring Irish observations regarding the changing loyalties of these peoples sheds light upon the formulation of Irish identity during these years, reflecting the priorities of Irish nationalist commentators. The personal experience of the Irish intelligentsia (mostly from a Catholic, nationalist, middle-class background) in this process was of key importance; this should be viewed as part of the internationalisation of Irish politics and education. Not only did Irish commentators take notice of the growing sense of national feeling among different ethnic groups in Habsburg Central Europe, they also emphasised that the identity of these peoples was shaped by more than one factor. The combination of religious, ethnic, and regional loyalties provided a more realistic picture of the small nationalities in the multi-cultural empire. Within the context of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was only the Bohemian Czechs who identified with being a small nation.

The year 1918 was a watershed in many regards, including the fact that radicalisation of Irish nationalism that followed the Rising culminated in Sinn Féin’s election victory in December

²⁴⁰ ‘British Press Views. Mr. R. Lynd, in the “New Statesman”’, *Irish Independent*, 21 May 1917.

²⁴¹ Lynd, *Ireland a Nation*, p. 277.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 280.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

Irish perceptions of Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918

1918. This, together with the transformation of political order in Central Europe, marked a major change in Irish attitudes towards small nations such as the already independent Czechoslovaks. In order to support their own political objectives, Irish nationalists highlighted the sharp contrast to Ireland, still under British rule, by noting resentfully that the small nationalities of Habsburg Central Europe had already been granted independence by the victorious powers.

2. Irish perceptions of the successor states, 1919-1922

The period from 1919 to 1922 saw the transformation of political order in Ireland, while the right to self-determination and independence remained in the centre of Irish political rhetoric. With the outbreak of the Irish War of Independence and the opening of the First Dáil Éireann in January 1919, the relationship between Ireland and Britain deteriorated. Political changes in Ireland were accompanied by personnel changes in the informal Irish diplomatic service; ‘roaming’ Sinn Féin envoys were entrusted with disseminating propaganda on the Continent and gaining recognition for the independent Irish republic. After the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December 1921, due to opposition to the oath of allegiance required of Dáil members and provisions for ongoing links with Britain, a split occurred in the Irish republican movement. The Irish Free State, separate from Northern Ireland (established by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920), was a dominion within the British Empire, with legislative independence. The Treaty only provided a partial achievement and a full Republic was only declared decades later, gaining full formal sovereignty for twenty-six counties in 1949.¹

The creation of a Boundary Commission was decided in order to amend the border between the Free State and Northern Ireland. As Paul Murray (2011) highlighted, the year the Government of Ireland Act partitioned Ireland, territories in other parts of Europe were also being partitioned. They were assigned to the states that laid claim to them as a result of the post-war treaties that radically redrew the map of Europe.² Therefore, this controversy in relation to boundaries prompted an open attitude toward similar precedents on the Continent as the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire also left border disputes.³

This chapter examines how small states came to symbolise independence and self-sufficiency in Irish political discourse after 1918, and investigates how the transformation of the Dual Monarchy was perceived by Irish diplomats, intellectuals and journalists. Moreover, the present chapter considers how the transformation of political and religious loyalties in

¹ Robert Lynch, *Revolutionary Ireland, 1912-25* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), p. 1, and Howe, *Ireland and Empire*, p. 41.

² Paul Murray, *The Irish Boundary Commission and its Origins 1886-1925* (Dublin: UCD Press, 2011), p. 146.

³ The name of the state had changed on three occasions; between 16 November 1918 and 21 March 1919 it was called ‘Hungarian People’s Republic’ under the leadership of Mihály Károlyi; the ‘Hungarian Soviet Republic’ was in existence under Béla Kun between 22 March and 2 August 1919; this was followed by the short-lived ‘Hungarian People’s Republic’, August 1919-February 1920. Then in February 1920, the monarchy (Hungarian Kingdom) was restored, without electing a King but with Admiral Miklós Horthy serving as Governor.

Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were perceived in Ireland, creating multiple interpretations for the question of ‘national identity’ in the self-declared ‘nation-states’. Rogers Brubaker, among others, noted that while ‘conceived as nation-states’ these were actually heterogeneous ‘nationalising states’.⁴ The present chapter explores Irish reactions to the independence of small states in Central Europe, balancing between revolutionary turmoil and democracy. In addition, the impact of the Versailles treaties on the minority question and on the formulation of ‘national identities’ in the independent successor states was inseparable from the political transformation of Habsburg Central Europe. The discussion also assesses the significance of Catholic ideas and it is emphasised that Catholicism was not merely the subject of Irish investigations.

Small states in Irish political discourse

The socio-political changes that resulted from the redefined borders in Europe after the Great War were inseparable from the formulation of national identities across Europe. Although the circumstances were different in Ireland and in Central Europe, the question of border revisions in the Danube basin sparked Irish interest. When Patrick Keatinge described Ireland as ‘a revisionist small state, both in respect of the constitutional relationship with Britain and of partition [that] gave added edge to the Irish attitude of anti-imperialism in the nineteen-twenties and thirties’, he identified common ground between Ireland and other small states in Central Europe based on the revision of treaties (the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the Versailles Peace Treaties, respectively).⁵ Correspondingly, in more recent historiography, Michael Kennedy has confirmed that interwar Ireland ‘was siding with the “revisionist states”’, urging the revision of the post-war Paris Peace Treaties and constructing Irish foreign policy as part of the post-Versailles world order.⁶

In the light of Sinn Féin’s election material during its campaign for the General Election of December 1918, Irish awareness of the political changes of the wider world and the transformation of Habsburg Europe could not be questioned. Following the meeting of the First Dáil Éireann, the leaders of the Irish Republic were in a difficult position since the great

⁴ Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p. 57, p. 63, and p. 79.

⁵ Keatinge, *A Place among the Nations*, p. 172.

⁶ Michael Kennedy, ‘Chicanery and Candour: The Irish Free State and the Geneva Protocol, 1924-5’ in *Irish Historical Studies*, vol. xxix, no. 115, (May 1995), p. 377 and p. 383.

powers at Versailles refused to hear out Irish claims. Nevertheless, the Irish political leadership had an overall outward-looking attitude, illustrated by the early attempts at making contacts with other states, great and small.

Sinn Féin was often ridiculed by other nationalists such as the Irish-Irelanders of *The Leader* for the false hope they had for President Wilson's Fourteen Points and for the Irish attendance at the post-war peace conference. They tended to link the liberty of small nations to their own agenda and the revival of the Irish language: 'Peace Conference!! Help Small Nations by Learning Your Own Language at the Connaught Irish colleges [...]'.⁷ Similarly, a whole page was devoted to the significance of small nations' national language in a 1916 issue of *The Leader*, advertising the policy of the Gaelic League, signed by Seaghan T. Ó Ceallaigh, later President of the Ireland (1945-1959).⁸ Moreover, in the columns of *The Leader*, the Irish Parliamentary Party was met with similar criticism as Sinn Féin. An article entitled 'Home Rule Humbug' illustrates the papers sentiment: 'we never expected it. The news that we are not to have Home Rule surprised no one over here.'⁹

Wilson was familiar with the heterogeneity of the Dual Monarchy; however, he was not in favour of its disintegration.¹⁰ And even though the Central Powers officially rejected his suggestions in January 1918, the small nationalities of the Dual Monarchy and small nations across Europe (including Ireland) still based their claims on the Fourteen Points at the peace conference a year later. Wilson eventually rejected both the Irish and Hungarian pleas; the winning powers were unwilling to include the Irish questions in discussions at Versailles, or to incorporate Hungarian interests in settling the question of ethnic minorities. Irish contemporaries frequently commented on the fact that the victorious powers discussed Irish independence and the question of borders quite reluctantly after 1918. According to Joep Leerssen, the idea that 'state borders could reflect ethnic population patterns' was extremely problematic, after Versailles.¹¹ After Wilson's Fourteen Points, Irish claims for self-determination also became more frequent. Professor Eoin MacNeill, for instance, declared:

⁷ [Advertisement], *The Leader*, 8 June 1918, p. 411; and 'Small Nationalities. The Surest Mark of Nationality is a National Language', *The Leader*, 26 February 1916, p. 67.

⁸ 'Small Nationalities. The Surest Mark of Nationality is a National Language', *The Leader*, 26 February 1916, p. 67; and Patrick Maume, 'O'Kelly, Seán Thomas (Ó Ceallaigh, Seán Tomás)', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a6840>, accessed on 29 July 2015.

⁹ 'Home Rule Humbug', *The Leader*, 24 August 1918, p. 60; 26 February 1916, p. 67.

¹⁰ Guido Kisch, 'Woodrow Wilson and the Independence of Small Nations in Central Europe' in the *Journal of Modern History*, vol. xix, no. 3, (September 1947), p. 236.

¹¹ Leerssen, *National Thought in Europe*, p. 223.

‘Ireland stands now in a stronger position than at any time since the loss of her independence. Her cause and the cause of the world’s civilisation are now seen to be the same.’¹²

Campaigning for the recognition of Ireland as an independent, sovereign state, Irish envoys Seán T. O’Ceallaigh (who later in 1945 became the second President of Ireland) and George Gavan Duffy (Minister for Foreign Affairs between January and July 1922) had hoped to present a document to the Paris Peace Conference.¹³ This may be one of the first records during the independence struggle referring to the concept of ‘small nations’ as an argument when presented at an international scene:

...No peace can rest securely on political or economic restrictions, meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others. Peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not on the rights of governments - the rights of peoples, great and small, weak or powerful; their equal right to freedom and security and self-government, and to participation, upon fair terms, in the economic opportunities of the world.¹⁴

In an effort to make predictions for the practical implications for Irish independence, Irish nationalist politician and solicitor John J. Horgan highlighted the significance of self-governance in Wilson’s policy.¹⁵ He claimed that ‘the belief that nations must control their own destiny free from the selfish interference of more powerful neighbours. To that principle Ireland now appeals. She demands self-determination--not as a privilege, but as a right.’¹⁶ Nonetheless, a few months prior to this, in a book review, Horgan expressed a pessimistic view of the future peace conference, where ‘the small nationalities who are foolish enough to send in their cards’ were to be ignored by the great powers.¹⁷ Similarly, in June 1919, Irish-American J. C. Walsh remarked pessimistically in *Studies* that ‘there was no door [...] through which Ireland could enter and claim a hearing’ at the peace conference in spite of the fact that

¹² Irish League of Nations, series ‘a’, no. 11, Ireland’s Place among the Nations. Two Articles by Professor Eoin MacNeill. Reprinted from “New Ireland” of 23 February and 2 March, 1918, NLI Ir 94109 p 21.

¹³ Gerard Hogan, ‘Duffy, George Gavan’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2810>, accessed on 29 July 2015, and Maume, ‘O’Kelly, Seán Thomas (Ó Ceallaigh, Seán Tomás)’, *DIB*.

¹⁴ A Statement of Ireland’s Case before the Powers to be Assembled in a Peace Conference: Demanding ‘the Recognition of her Place among the Free Nations of the World’, UCDA P150/1325; Official Memorandum in Support of Ireland’s Demand for Recognition as a Sovereign Independent State. Presented to Georges Clemenceau and the Members of the Paris Peace Conference by Sean T. O’Ceallaigh and George Gavan Duffy, NAI DFA ES Paris 1919, *DIFP* vol. i, no. 13, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1919/Paris-Peace-Conference/13.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹⁵ Bridget Hourican, ‘Horgan, John Joseph’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a4101>, accessed on 2 November 2014.

¹⁶ John J. Horgan, ‘The World Policy of President Wilson’ in *Studies*, vol. vii, no. 28, (December 1918), p. 561.

¹⁷ John J. Horgan (review), ‘Germany’s Annexationist Aims by S. Grumbach’ in *Studies*, vol. vii, no. 26, (June 1918), p. 359.

Ireland had the inalienable 'right to ask that her case be discussed.'¹⁸ An Irish-American Commission sent from America was trying to help this small Irish delegation in their requests but unfortunately, especially 'with reference to the reaction in case their mission' ended in disappointment.¹⁹ In this regard, the Irish experience was comparable to that of other 'peoples who were on the margins of the peace conference'.²⁰ As Patrick Keatinge remarked, even years later, there remained a disillusionment in Ireland regarding international justice 'rejected by the 'Great Powers League' in 1919.'²¹ This disappointment was also illustrated by the *Catholic Bulletin's* 'Note from Rome'; in particular, the report resented Wilson's lack of intervention between Ireland and Britain, while he did so in the case of Italy and the Yugoslavs.²²

With regard to the principle of self-determination, another Irish academic James MacCaffrey, writing in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, demanded that it be 'applied to Ireland in the same way as it was to be applied to other oppressed nationalities; or should Ireland throw herself on the mercy of English statesmen. The results of the elections [December 1918],' claimed MacCaffrey, 'supplied the verdict of the people', referring to Sinn Féin's victory.²³ On a positive note, J. C. Walsh highlighted that 'the new map of Europe had been drawn in terms of nationality' and that there were no 'subject peoples' left; every nationality had been erected into a state.²⁴ While this may be questionable, his other remark about Ireland being the only one excluded from the list of freed countries, was a valid point. The article is dated 6 May 1919, before the finalisation of the peace treaties; this may explain the author's optimistic remarks about borders respecting all ethnicities in Central Europe.

After January 1919, the leaders of the Irish Republic recognised the necessity of gaining external recognition of the newly independent state. Maurice Walsh has emphasised that the 'Message to the Free Nations of the World' that accompanied the Declaration of Independence highlighted the connection between Irish nationhood and 'the sweeping

¹⁸ J. C. Walsh, 'Ireland at the Peace Conference' in *Studies*, vol. viii, no. 30, (June 1919), p. 177; and J. C. Walsh, 'The Peace Conference. Case for Irish Representation. To the Editor of the "Irish Independent"', *Irish Independent*, 6 December 1917.

¹⁹ Walsh, 'Ireland at the Peace Conference', pp. 184-185.

²⁰ Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, p. 6.

²¹ Keatinge, *A Place among the Nations*, p. 75.

²² 'Note from Rome' in the *Catholic Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 227.

²³ Rev. James Canon MacCaffrey, 'The Catholic Church in 1918' in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, vol. xiii, (January – July 1919), p. 102.

²⁴ Walsh, 'Ireland at the Peace Conference', p. 188.

redrawing of the map of Europe [...] even more overtly'.²⁵ Therefore, the need for international recognition of Irish sovereignty 'remained the goal by which true independence would be measured.'²⁶

As the *Freeman's Journal* article from June 1919 illustrates, the birth of independent small states on the former empire's territory was not without difficulties and the Irish media were aware of this: 'these new nations, it would be idle to deny, have not only the tradition of hostility to their old masters, but are fired by fierce mutual rivalries and conflicting ambitions and aspirations.'²⁷ The article was entitled 'The 'Ulsters' of Central Europe', indicating that Irish nationalists paid close attention to region and the potential lessons it could offer for Ireland. By June 1920, most state borders across Europe had been finalized, which gave Irish politicians a clear idea of which countries to approach for support, or approach for formal recognition. The small nations of Austria, Switzerland and Denmark were deemed worthy of attention, while Russia, Germany, France, Spain and Italy as great powers were seen as possible destinations of future Irish diplomatic representatives.²⁸ Therefore, by the summer of 1920, only Catholic Austria was considered immediately as a probable diplomatic partner among the successor states of the Dual Monarchy, despite its previous imperial role.

Michael Kennedy has highlighted that certain factors aggravated the situation of the Irish Foreign Service during the early years: firstly, the lack of trained personnel and secondly, the lack of proper funds to build a comprehensive network of diplomatic posts across Europe and the wider world. By mid-1921, these included eight missions in France, Italy, United States of America, United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, Argentina, and Chile.²⁹ Both of these may be related to the rivalry between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Finance.³⁰ Furthermore, after December 1921, the split between the supporters and opponents of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the consequent civil war in Ireland proved an almost insurmountable obstacle to the establishment of a professional diplomatic service.³¹ Interestingly though, the 'split in the foreign service caused by the Treaty had not occurred

²⁵ Walsh, *The News from Ireland*, p. 60.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

²⁷ 'The "Ulsters" of Central Europe', *Freeman's Journal*, 3 June 1919.

²⁸ Dáil Éireann Report on Foreign Affairs (Copy), Dublin, June 1920, NAI DE 4/1/3, *DIFP* vol. i, no. 37, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1920/Report-on-Foreign-Affairs/37.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

²⁹ Keatinge, *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy*, p. 108.

³⁰ Kennedy, "Civil Servants cannot be Politicians", pp. 100-101.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

during the Civil War', which allowed George Gavan Duffy to create a 'cohesive diplomatic service that lined up behind the Treaty' between January and July 1922.³² Therefore, when Desmond FitzGerald took over the post, he actually 'inherited a small but increasingly centralized and professional diplomatic service', due to the former efforts of Robert Brennan, Arthur Griffith and George Gavan Duffy.³³

During the transition years of 1919-1922, the rights of small nations were closely linked to the struggle for independence and national sovereignty in Irish nationalist discourse. Gaining international recognition for the independent Irish Republic was a priority across Europe in order to 'secure favourable press for Ireland'.³⁴ As far as the successor states in Habsburg Central Europe were concerned, a Dáil Éireann Report in October 1919 pointed out that 'efforts [were] being made to open a propaganda campaign in Austria and the other central European countries, and the prospects of success [were] good.'³⁵ Furthermore, in addition to spreading propaganda and search for recognition, the Irish Government also planned to establish trade communications with Austria.³⁶ In January 1921, when political situation was more stable in Central Europe, de Valera suggested that George Gavan O'Duffy get 'through to the Hungarian Capital and see how things [were] there', highlighting the need to determine the possibility of returning to Czechoslovakia the former Hungarian nationals 'who have been appointed to that country and to Roumania by the Treaty of Versailles'.³⁷ Whether de Valera was looking for a precedent for successfully handling problems of minorities in borderland regions was not mentioned. Nonetheless, he was aware that the situation offered a possible parallel. Although George Gavan Duffy, who was trusted with this mission, never made it to Hungary due to the delay of the above-mentioned letter, he assessed the validity of Hungarian claims based on information provided by the 'authorised representative of Slovaks' in Paris:

³² Ibid., p. 95 and p. 106.

³³ Brennan was Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, February 1921 - January 1922; Griffith after 26 August 1921, followed by Gavan Duffy. See Kennedy, 'Civil Servants', p. 95.

³⁴ Dáil Éireann Report on Foreign Affairs (Copy), Dublin, June 1920, NAI DE 4/1/3, *DIFP* vol. i, no. 37, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1920/Report-on-Foreign-Affairs/37.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³⁵ Dáil Éireann Report on Foreign Affairs presented by Count George Plunkett (Copy), Dublin, 27 October 1919, NAI DE 2/269, *DIFP* vol. i, no. 27, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1919/Report-on-Foreign-Affairs/27.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Extract from a letter from Diarmuid O'Hegarty to George Gavan Duffy (Rome) (Copy), Dublin, 15 January 1921, NAI Gavan Duffy Papers 1125/21, *DIFP* vol. i, no. 54, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1921/European-diplomacy/54.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

Irish perceptions of the successor states, 1919-1922

[...] the 6 subject races under the Czechs are combining to overthrow the Czech rule which they all hate and that they will probably unite with Hungary. The Czechs who run the country are a small minority and mostly Hussites, while the Slovaks and other oppressed races are largely Catholic.³⁸

Therefore, the state-constituting Slovaks were occasionally listed together with the other minorities, especially with regards the question of religion. Since Gavan Duffy did not make it to Hungary in 1921, Sean T. Ó Ceallaigh proposed that alternatively, Switzerland should be used as a centre for Irish propaganda and dissemination of the information to Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Austria.³⁹

Not long after the truce with Britain, in his memorandum of July 1921, Erskine Childers placed the Irish struggle in a wider international context.⁴⁰ He stressed that for all small nations, including Ireland, independence and neutrality were top priorities. Speaking from a republican (Sinn Féin) point of view, he emphasised:

...weak as we are strategically, our free preference is to stand alone, like the vast majority of small nations, with complete independent control of our own territory, [...] neutral in all wars, and devoted to peaceful development.⁴¹

The official correspondence during the Anglo-Irish peace negotiations between June and September 1921 demonstrated the importance of small states for Irish politicians. On several occasions Éamon de Valera compared the Irish right to freedom with that of other small nations in Europe in his letters addressed to Lloyd George. He was convinced that:

...like the small states of Europe, [the Irish people] are prepared to hazard their independence on the basis of moral right, confident that as they would threaten no nation or people they would in turn be free from aggression themselves. This is the policy they have declared for in plebiscite after plebiscite [...].⁴²

³⁸ Extract from a letter from George Gavan Duffy (Rome) to Robert Brennan (Dublin), Rome, 11 March 1921 (received 24 March 1921), NAI DFA ES Box 33 File 232, *DIFP* vol. i, no. 67, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1921/General-foreign-policy/67.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³⁹ Extract from a letter from Sean T. Ó Ceallaigh to Diarmuid O'Hegarty (Dublin), Grand Hotel, Paris, 16 September 1920, NAI DFA ES Paris 1920, *DIFP* vol. i, no. 48, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1920/Italy/48.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

⁴⁰ The significance of Childers is also illustrated by the fact that he had been sent to Paris in July 1919 in order to publicise the Irish cause internationally, and went on to work on the *Irish Bulletin* in late 1919. Moreover, in February 1921, he became director of propaganda, See Hopkinson, 'Childers, (Robert) Erskine', *DIB*.

⁴¹ Memorandum by Erskine Childers on Irish defence as affected by the British proposals of 20 July 1921, July 1921, UCDA P150/1913, *DIFP* vol. i, no. 142, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1921/Anglo-Irish-Treaty/142.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

⁴² Eamon de Valera to Lloyd George, Mansion House, Dublin, 10 August 1921, Reprinted from Official correspondence relating to the peace negotiations June-September 1921, *DIFP* vol. i, no. 147, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1921/Anglo-Irish-Treaty/147.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

Shortly afterwards, in another letter to Lloyd George, de Valera justified his claims by emphasising small nations' rights to sovereignty – Irish as well as other European states' rights. According to de Valera,

...if a small nation's right to independence is forfeit when a more powerful neighbour covets its territory for the military or other advantages it is supposed to confer, there is an end to liberty. No longer can any small nation claim a right to a separate sovereign existence. [...] If nations that have been forcibly annexed to empires lose thereby their title to independence, there can be for them no rebirth to freedom. In Ireland's case, to speak of her seceding from a partnership she has not accepted, or from allegiance which she has not undertaken to render, is fundamentally false, just as the claim to subordinate her independence to British strategy is fundamentally unjust.⁴³

Similarly, in the midst of Anglo-Irish negotiations, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Robert Brennan used the example of small states threatened by their powerful neighbours when arguing in August 1921 that

...we have shown we are willing to consider England's strategic claims even though we consider these claims unjust that we are willing to yield much to the prejudices of N.[orth] E.[east] Ulster though we know that the situation there is an artificial one created in England's interests. But we are not prepared to yield without resistance to an aggression based on claims which, if allowed, would deprive any small nation in Europe of its independence at the hands of an Imperial neighbour.⁴⁴

Therefore, Brennan's argument also focused on the conflicting relationship between small states and great powers – a common argument made not only during the Irish struggle for independence, but also in moderate Irish nationalist discourse during the Great War (most often in reference to Catholic Belgium).

Shortly after signing the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 6 December 1921, George Gavan Duffy highlighted an issue of key importance as far as the connection between the new Irish state and other small nations was concerned, referring to the legitimacy that the Irish Free State had recently gained – a point also highlighted by historian Diarmaid Ferriter in his book *A Nation and Not a Rabble* (2015).⁴⁵ The subtitle of Gavan Duffy's report ('The First of the Small Nations') may be seen as suggesting the imagined Irish path and the role of small nations associated with it, placing the newly-created, internationally recognized and lawful Irish Free State in a transformed international context:

⁴³ Eamon de Valera to David Lloyd George, Mansion House, Dublin, 24 August 1921, Reprinted from Official correspondence relating to the peace negotiations June-September 1921, *DIFP* vol. i, no. 149, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1921/Anglo-Irish-Treaty/149.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

⁴⁴ Robert Brennan to John Chartres (Edward Seaton) (Berlin), Dublin, 25 August 1921, NAI DFA ES Box 33 File 232, *DIFP* vol. i, no. 150, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1921/Anglo-Irish-Treaty/150.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

⁴⁵ Diarmaid Ferriter, *A Nation and Not a Rabble: The Irish Revolution 1913-1923* (London: Profile Books, 2015), p. 1.

“The First of the Small Nations”

No country ever started its international career with better prospects than were ours after the war, for our soldiers had won us warm friends everywhere, and we had no enemies to speak of throughout the Continent of Europe. Ireland had every reason to expect rapidly to become recognised as the First of the Small Nations. It would, however, be idle to gloss over the fact that we have lost our prestige in recent months. [...] If we are to retrieve the splendid position we held, we must take steps at home without delay to prove that we are a Nation and not a rabble.⁴⁶

Irish images of Central European independence

In the immediate post-war period that was characterised by political changes as well as changing loyalties, independence became a common point of reference both in Central Europe and Ireland. Alexander V. Prusin has drawn attention to the fact that in contrast to the Austro-Hungarian Empire that ‘tolerated multiple loyalties of its subjects, the successor-states failed to produce a supranational ideology that could have united their subjects.’ It was this transformation that led to the political radicalisation of borderland areas as well as a shift in Irish perceptions.⁴⁷ Promoting the independence of the Irish Republic became central in the 1920s due to the aforementioned emphasis on self-sufficiency central to advanced nationalist political discourse since 1918.⁴⁸ In addition, Gerard Keown (2000) has emphasised that another ‘important strain in nationalist self-perception was the contribution Ireland could make to the rest of the world’, which had a great impact on the Free State’s international relations.⁴⁹ Most importantly, the ‘forging of a separate foreign policy’, pointed out Keown, ‘formed part of a broader campaign of identity building which the new state engaged in after independence.’⁵⁰

The last few months of 1918 saw the complete transformation of the multi-cultural Habsburg Central Europe, from a Dual Monarchy into a number of independent small states. Stephen Howe has argued that the struggle for Irish independence was comparable to Czechoslovakia

⁴⁶ Dáil Éireann Report on Foreign Affairs, George Gavan Duffy to the Dáil, Dublin, 26 April 1922, NAI DFA ES Box 1 File 13, *DIFP* vol. i, no. 277, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1922/Foreign-Policy-General/277.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

⁴⁷ Alexander V. Prusin, *The Lands Between: Conflict in the East European Borderlands, 1780-1992* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 124.

⁴⁸ Gerard Keown, ‘Creating an Irish Foreign Policy in the 1930s’ in Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly, *Irish Foreign Policy 1919-1966: From Independence to Internationalism* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2000), p. 40.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

and Hungary ‘attaining independence from alien rule’.⁵¹ Furthermore, he has claimed that comparing ‘experiences of conflict, secession and redrawing of boundaries across Europe and beyond’ was worth investigating.⁵² From the end of October 1918, the Irish press provided much coverage of how the Austrian empire was broken up. The Irish dailies were aware of the fact that the now powerless Austrian Government could not stand in the way of Polish, Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav independence.⁵³ By 2 November 1918, the *Irish Independent* announced: ‘the disintegration of the Austrian Empire [might] be said to be complete’.⁵⁴ Granting the independence of northern and southern Slavic people was a touchy subject for Irish nationalists, as their pleas for the same goal were rejected by the great powers late 1918/early 1919. The establishment of an Austrian republic was noticed in Irish journals and newspapers due to the state’s overwhelmingly Catholic traditions. In addition, Irish interest was also apparent in articles regarding the political turmoil in independent Hungary.

Irish reports, diplomatic accounts and journal articles focused on certain themes that were associated with events unfolding in the newly independent successor states. The revolutionary movements that contributed to the fall of the ruling regimes were considered to be inseparable from the rise of communism in the region following the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in October 1917. When it came to socialist and communist agitation, in addition to the daily reports of the Irish press, the reflections of confessional Irish journals such as *Studies*, the *Irish Monthly*, the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* and the *Catholic Bulletin*, provided detailed analyses of political happenings in Central Europe.

As Emmet O’Connor (2014) has argued, the early days of independence have not been thoroughly researched with regards the extent of anti-communism in Ireland. O’Connor emphasised the significance of the international climate, adding that scares primarily served the interests of the Catholic Church.⁵⁵ Before O’Connor, it was Enda Delaney’s ‘Anti-Communism in Mid-Twentieth-Century Ireland’ (2011) that focused on the history of ‘red-

⁵¹ Howe, *Ireland and Empire*, p. 232.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 237.

⁵³ ‘Austrian Empire Broken Up. Emperor’s Manifesto. Four Separate States Decried’, *Irish Independent*, 18 October 1918; ‘Break-Up of Austria’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 18 October 1918.

⁵⁴ ‘Austria’s Complete Break Up. Vienna-Budapest Revolutions. Count Tisza Killed. Bosnia Joins Serbia: New Austro-German State. Fleet Given to Jugo-Slavs’, *Irish Independent*, 2 November 1918.

⁵⁵ Emmet O’Connor, ‘Anti-Communism in Twentieth-Century Ireland’ in *Twentieth Century Communism*, issue 6, (March 2014), pp. 59-60.

scares', concentrating on the campaigns of 1940s-1950s Catholic organisations.⁵⁶ As far as interwar Ireland was concerned, although comments, actions and policies were not associated exclusively with the Catholic Church, admittedly, anti-communism had an overwhelmingly religious character. Nevertheless, whether anti-communism was primarily a religious issue, a political issue, or a social issue, depended on the circumstances as it was associated with a variety of events, groups and parties.

The complexity of Irish left-wing movements was also visible in the fact that there was a tendency among Irish authors not to differentiate between socialism, communism or bolshevism and labour. This may be explained by the fact, argues Bryan Fanning, that in independent Ireland 'debates about socialism often remained abstract or theoretical' without touching on the Irish conditions.⁵⁷ However, more progressive members of the clergy such as Jesuit scholar and Catholic social thinker Father Lambert McKenna, for instance, deserve attention for distinguishing between extreme and moderate socialists as opposed to the majority of the clergy.⁵⁸ Furthermore, Fathers Finlay, Coffey, and MacCaffrey also stood out because of the impact of their European experience.⁵⁹ Since the policies of the Catholic Church in Ireland, including their stance on socialism and communism, reflected international trends, Irish anti-communism should be investigated within a wider the international context.⁶⁰

The birth of the Czechoslovak Republic received considerable attention in Ireland, when comparing the successful claims of the Czechs for self-determination and independence with those of the Irish – as we have seen in Chapter 1. When it came to the Irish perception of the new state's socio-political characteristics, similar themes attracted attention as during the days of the Dual Monarchy. While Irish authors had frequently condemned the nationality policy of the multi-cultural empire, the continued antagonism of the German and Czech population in the self-declared 'nation-state' of Czechoslovakia had not been foreseen. In addition, the transformation of religious life and especially the Catholic Church was also in the forefront of

⁵⁶ Enda Delaney, 'Anti-Communism in Mid-Twentieth-Century Ireland' in the *English Historical Review*, vol. cxxvi, no. 521, (August 2011), pp. 878-903.

⁵⁷ Fanning, *The Quest for Modern Ireland*, p. 76.

⁵⁸ Vincent Morley, 'McKenna, Lambert (Mac Cionnaith, Laimhbheartach)', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5725>, accessed on 10 December 2014; and Joseph A. MacMahon, 'The Catholic Clergy and the Social Question in Ireland, 1891-1916' in *Studies*, vol. lxx, no. 280, (Winter 1981), p. 275.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

⁶⁰ O'Connor, 'Anti-Communism in Twentieth-Century Ireland', p. 60.

Irish discussions, in contrast to reports on revolutionary transformation, which were scarce when compared with those of Austria and Hungary.

Consequently, shortly after the proclamation of the Czechoslovak Republic, reports in Irish newspapers emphasised the absence of disturbances in Prague, while also noting that radical anti-dynastic demands were made by socialists.⁶¹ Historiography has also compared Belfast to Prague (even prior to the war), based on how ‘religious difference became a marker of nation-state identity’.⁶² Stephen Howe has noted that in the Czechoslovak capital, however, ‘divisions were increasingly secularised’.⁶³ Nevertheless, no crisis like those in Vienna and especially Budapest (or Munich) arose. As the *Freeman’s Journal* pointed out in late November 1918, while ‘the Protestant districts’ of Austria-Hungary continued to be the scenes of revolutionary chaos, the young Czechoslovak Republic managed to remain stable, after centuries of oppression.⁶⁴

When the Czechoslovak Republic was founded on 28 October 1918, the Bohemian small nation’s right to self-determination was internationally recognized with the inclusion of the Slovaks, who, together with the Czechs, ‘enjoyed linguistic and other kinds of privileges’ in comparison with other nationalities in the new state.⁶⁵ In ‘supra-national’ Czechoslovakia, the self-image of a small nation still lived on, possibly due to President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk’s successful campaign during the Great War and then the concept’s legitimisation with his presidency after 1918.⁶⁶ As Tara Zahra has pointed out, the Czechoslovak nation-state defined itself based on shared values such as the closeness of the Czech and Slovak languages and racial kinship. This led to the exclusion of Germans, Hungarians, Gypsies, and Poles from the ‘Czechoslovak nation’.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, Cynthia Paces and Nancy M. Wingfield have emphasised that even the ‘Czechs and Slovaks could not agree on the meaning of Czechoslovak identity’.⁶⁸

⁶¹ ‘Situation in Bohemia’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 2 November 1918.

⁶² Howe, *Ireland and Empire*, p. 219.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ ‘German Unrest’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 26 November 1918.

⁶⁵ King, ‘Austria vs. Hungary’, p. 167.

⁶⁶ Zahra, ‘Imagined Noncommunities’, p. 101.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Cynthia Paces and Nancy M. Wingfield, ‘The Sacred and Profane: Religion and Nationalism in the Bohemian Lands, 1880-1920’ in Pieter M. Judson and Marsha L. Rozenblit (eds) *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), p. 122.

Undoubtedly, Irish journals and newspapers considered the Czechoslovak Republic to be the most successful of the successor states, in comparison with the financial troubles of Austria and the series of extreme political crises in Hungary. In the historiography of the Habsburg Empire, scholars like Alan Sked have challenged the view that praised the transformation and the progress of the successor states. Sked has emphasised that these small states were 'even less successful in resolving the problems of East-Central Europe than the Monarchy itself.'⁶⁹ However, in 1923, five years after the declaration of the Czechoslovak Republic, news of the celebrations reached the *Irish Independent* as well. The Czechoslovak Republic was declared to be 'the brightest spot in a troubled and unhappy Central Europe', emphasising Masaryk's role in achieving the 'nation's independence and liberation from the oppressive despotism of Austria.'⁷⁰ When the month before, in October 1923, the *Freeman's Journal* spoke of similar successes, the paper attributed these to 'the genius and the courage' of President Masaryk, the true pioneer of Czechoslovak freedom.⁷¹

The list of social and economic reforms passed by the administration under Masaryk's presidency, in addition to the Constitution passed in 1920, were on the top of the list of democratic achievements to which the *Freeman's Journal* attributed great importance. Interestingly though, the Czechoslovak President himself had declared in November 1919 that official 'Czech policy, freed from the German peril and the Magyar menace, [had] no need to be Chauvinistic in order to be truly national'.⁷² Nonetheless, the remark still indicated a not always so peaceful attitude towards the two main national minorities in the Czechoslovak Republic.

The most significant contribution to the historiography and methodology of national identity in the Carpathian basin has been provided by László Szarka. He has examined the link between ethnic and regional identities throughout the twentieth century, paying close attention to the role of locality, and the minority question.⁷³ As far as primary sources were concerned,

⁶⁹ Alan Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1918* (London: Longman, 1989), p. 296.

⁷⁰ 'New Republic Celebrations. Rejoicing in Prague. Tributes to President Masaryk', *Irish Independent*, 7 November 1923.

⁷¹ 'A Political Realist', *Freeman's Journal*, 17 October 1923, p. 4; 'Czecho-Slovak Republic', *Irish Independent*, 23 October 1923.

⁷² 'Bohemia's Policy. Church and State: Loyalty to Ideas of Freedom', *Freeman's Journal*, 5 November 1919.

⁷³ László Szarka, *A Nemzeti Azonosságtudat Kistérségi Sajátosságai: Az Etnikai és Regionális Identitás Összefüggései [Regional Particularities of National Identity: The Link between Ethnic and Regional Identities]*, available online at <http://kisebbssegkutato.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/archive/380.pdf>, accessed on 25 July 2015; László Szarka, 'Hungarian National Minority Organizations and the Role of Elites between the Two World Wars: Addenda to the History of Minority Nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe' in *Hungarian Historical*

there was a noticeable difference between Irish and Hungarian perceptions of their identities and status as small states; nevertheless, Irish interest in post-war Hungary was still apparent. Irish responses to the political transformation of Hungary reveal the complexity of political, ethnic and religious changes in the successor states. Overall, the series of left-wing revolutions in Hungary (the democratic Aster Revolution 28-31 October 1918 and the communist takeover on 21 March 1919) gained the most publicity in Ireland. The reason given for this, in moderate and radical Catholic organs equally, was the increased threat of communism, taking hold of yet another country in Europe after a series of Russian revolutions in 1917. Even though Irish interest in this transformation was not limited to discussing the perceived threat of left-wing revolutionaries, still, social democrats and communists were at the centre of Irish reports. Comparisons between how the Allies betrayed Ireland and Hungary regarding their promises for granting self-determination for all small nations, for instance, was a common point of reference. The aforementioned Lambert McKenna was one of the best-informed about the literature of revolutionary changes in Hungary.⁷⁴ He was a frequent contributor to *Studies* and the *Irish Monthly* (the latter he edited from 1922 until 1931) and an expert on left-wing developments and revolutions in Russia, Hungary, Bavaria and Mexico. When hoping for a fair post-war settlement, he was openly critical of Hungarians' trust for the Allies:

...they fancied that, if they organised themselves as a thoroughly democratic state on a basis of universal secret suffrage and gave a due measure of autonomy to the Slav races within their borders, the Entente would believe that they had been dragged into the war by Austria and Germany; they expected that in accordance with Wilson's Fourteen Points their realm would be saved from mutilation.⁷⁵

In his article entitled 'The Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary', published in *Studies*, McKenna provided further insights into a Catholic Irish interpretation of left-wing movements in Central Europe.⁷⁶ It was visible from McKenna's remark that independent Hungary's perception of itself differed greatly from that of the Entente's. Hungarian revolutionaries

Review (2013) vol. ii, no. 1–2, pp. 413–448, available online at http://epa.oszk.hu/02400/02460/00005/pdf/EPA02460_hungarian_historical_review_2013_3_413-448.pdf, accessed on 25 July 2015. Also see Nóra Kovács, Anna Osvát, László Szarka (eds) *Etnikai Identitás, Politikai Lojalitás: Nemzeti és Állampolgári Kötődések [Ethnic Identity, Political Loyalty: National and Civic Connections]* (Budapest: MTA, 2005).

⁷⁴ McKenna's sources included Hungarian, German and French authors (Karl Huszár, Hans Eisele, Armand Lebrun, and Jerome Tharau).

⁷⁵ Lambert McKenna, 'The Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary' in *Studies*, vol. xi, no. 44, (December 1922), p. 546.

⁷⁶ Morley, 'McKenna, Lambert (Mac Cionnaith, Laimhbheartach)', *DIB*; Lambert McKenna, 'Character and Development of Post-War Socialism' in *Studies*, vol. ix, no. 34, (June 1920), pp. 177-194; Lambert McKenna, 'The Bolsheviks' in *Studies*, vol. x, no. 38, (June 1921), pp. 218-238; Lambert McKenna, 'The Bolshevik Revolution in Munich' in *Studies*, vol. xii, no. 47, (September 1923), pp. 361-377; and Lambert McKenna, 'The Mexican Imbroglío' in *Studies*, vol. xvii, no. 68, (December 1928), pp. 621-636.

considered themselves as a formerly oppressed, newly liberated nation, while the internationally accepted image of Hungary was that of the oppressor of non-Magyar nationalities. The new Hungarian administration's official manifesto, 'To the peoples of the world', declared that the pacific and victorious revolution in Hungary broke 'the yoke by which it has been oppressed for centuries' and had transformed into a democratic and completely independent State.⁷⁷ The new democratic Hungarian Government ultimately hoped that the territorial integrity of Hungary would be guaranteed by the great powers and later the League of Nations. This remained a central claim of Hungary throughout the interwar years.⁷⁸

When the communists overtook Károlyi's Hungarian Democratic Republic in March 1919, Irish newspapers and journals had been closely following the events in Budapest and formulated several theories as to why and how communism managed to gain ground in the country. The rise of bolshevism in Russia and in Hungary puzzled contemporary scholars across Europe, including McKenna. He noted that the population of Hungary was very conservative and religious in character, stressing that 'the agitation of the Social-Democrats caused less stir in the country than the nationality question.'⁷⁹ McKenna was among the few Irish commentators who made a distinction between the social democrats and the communists. One of his contemporary Hungarian sources deserves attention in its own right; conservative right-wing Hungarian feminist Cécile Tormay's *An outlaw's diary* (1923), which provided a first-hand account of the Aster Revolution and the Bolshevik takeover in Hungary. Tormay, an acclaimed, Nobel-prize nominated author under Admiral Horthy's regime after 1920, was known for her liberal activism for women's rights, and has been an extremely controversial figure since the Second World War due to her openly anti-Semitic and fascist views. Noticeably, McKenna was more fascinated by the subject of the diary rather than its writer. Possibly her Conservative and Catholic morals did not seem out of place for the Jesuit reviewer; or, McKenna's information on Tormay may have been limited to these volumes. Ultimately, it was Tormay's analysis of the 'Hundred Days' of red terror that attracted McKenna's attention since it turned out to be 'of the most terrible episodes in history.'⁸⁰

⁷⁷ 'Disintegration of Austria. Hungarian Statement to the World', *Irish Independent*, 5 November 1918.

⁷⁸ George W. White, *Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in southeastern Europe* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. 77; 'Disintegration of Austria. Hungarian Statement to the World', *Irish Independent*, 5 November 1918.

⁷⁹ McKenna, 'The Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary', p. 541.

⁸⁰ L. McK. (review), 'An Outlaw's Diary. Part I: The Revolution; Part II: The Commune by Cécile Tormay' in *Studies*, vol. xii, no. 48, (December 1923), pp. 673-5.

McKenna was most impressed by *An Outlaw's Diary*, stressing that it was the most enthralling form of history, a moving-picture which, without any philosophic explanations or discussions, tells its story and its lesson.⁸¹

Irish newspaper editorials and journal articles often compared Kun's regime to the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.⁸² McKenna claimed that 'the drama of Budapest Bolshevism, though acted on a smaller stage, [was] darker than that of the Russian revolution'.⁸³ Naturally, the communist regime's anti-religious measures also captured the attention of Catholic Irish commentators. According to the *Irish Independent*, by May 1919 Béla Kun had begun

...a bitter persecution of the Religious Orders; 800 Red Guards are quartered in the Convent of the Sacred Heart. All prayers and religious institutions have been stopped in the schools and the Sisters of Mercy have been expelled from the hospitals. No priests or ministers of any denomination are pencilled to enter hospitals.⁸⁴

By August 1919, the fall of the communist regime and the general confusion that followed the pressure of the White Army and the advancement of Romanian troops, often featured in reports from Hungary. One thing was certain; the 'white terror' in Hungary aimed to serve justice on the former Bolshevik leaders. Moreover, as Robert Gerwarth pointed out, the 'white terror' also 'revealed much of the later chauvinist and racist mood' in Hungary, which was revived in the 1930s with the introduction of anti-Jewish measures.⁸⁵

Irish sources differed in their interpretation of the news about the 'white terror.' The *Freeman's Journal* argued, based on the information of Austrian socialists, that 'nearly all persons of any importance to the Socialist movement in Hungary are being either murdered or imprisoned by "White" Terrorists.'⁸⁶ However, in comparison with reports on the 'red scare', these articles were in a significant minority. One of the few parallels between Hungary and Ireland in this regard was noticed by *Irish Times* journalist (editor after 1934) Robert M. Smyllie. He highlighted the threat the 'white terror' on the Continent, adding that there was 'a

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 675.

⁸² McKenna, 'The Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary', p. 549; 'Doctrinaires' Schemes', *Freeman's Journal*, 9 August 1919.

⁸³ 'Matters of Moment. Situation in Hungary', *Irish Independent*, 12 December 1922, p. 4; L. McK. (review), 'An Outlaw's Diary', p. 675.

⁸⁴ 'Fate of Budapest. Slaughter in Munich', *Irish Independent*, 3 May 1919.

⁸⁵ Robert Gerwarth, 'Fighting the Red Beast: Counter-Revolutionary Violence in the Defeated States of Central Europe' in Robert Gerwarth and John Horne (eds) *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 68.

⁸⁶ "'White' Terror's Work', *Freeman's Journal*, 19 January 1920.

white terror nearer home. There is a white terror in Ireland, and I am amazed to find from statistics the enormous number of outrages which have been committed against the Irish people during the past few years', referring to the atrocities during the War of Independence.⁸⁷ In contrast, although McKenna closely investigated the revolutionary years in Hungary, he did not go into details of the 'white terror', nor did he provide in-depth comparison with the 'red terror' in post-independence Hungary. He was convinced that 'the undeniable and indefensible severity' of the 'white terror' was, 'of course, wildly exaggerated in the International Jewish press' and claimed that communists were still occupying prominent positions in Budapest.⁸⁸

By 1922, declared consolidation under Governor Admiral Miklós Horthy was underway. Despite the fact that the new system 'did not conceal its anti-liberal, authoritarian and dictatorial character', the *Irish Independent* perceived that all parties 'struggling for democracy, peace, and economic reconstruction.'⁸⁹ Following the general elections in May 1922, the reconstruction of Hungary had been trusted to István Bethlen's government. Bethlen served as Prime Minister between 1921 and 1931; in historiography, the decade of his rule has been associated with political consolidation and recovery, both of which he deemed indispensable for Hungary's plans for peaceful revision of Trianon.⁹⁰ McKenna stressed that Bethlen's Unity Party (*Egységes Párt*) had been founded on Christian (both Catholic and Protestant) principles and national traditions.⁹¹ In this case, Irish commentators made no comparisons with or references to the question of Ulster Protestants, in contrast to independent Czechoslovakia, or in relation to the Austrian Christian Social Party. Altogether, although Irish commentators declared political consolidation to be completed by the early 1920s, they seemed aware that aggressively right-wing ideas became embedded in the political spectrum of interwar Hungary. For instance, as early as May 1922, Conservative Nationalist Gyula Gömbös was quoted to declare that he intended 'to act as a dictator', disregarding any significance there was to the election. He considered this to be 'a purely strategic task' that had to get solved. When in 1932, Gömbös became Prime Minister,

⁸⁷ 'The People's Will', *Freeman's Journal*, 14 July, 1920.

⁸⁸ McKenna, 'The Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary', p. 555.

⁸⁹ István Deák, 'The Habsburg Empire' in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (eds) *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Bolder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 131; Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary*, p. 115; 'Matters of Moment. Hungarian Throne', *Irish Independent*, 29 May 1922.

⁹⁰ Bryan Cartledge, *Mihály Károlyi and István Bethlen, Hungary* (London: Haus Histories, 2009), pp. 121-123.

⁹¹ McKenna, 'The Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary', p. 555.

Hungary did indeed develop closer links with Italy, in order to gain support for Hungarian border revisions.⁹²

In addition to journal articles and newspaper editorials, Irish reviews of British writings on Central Europe illustrated the complexity of Irish images of the independent successors of Austria-Hungary. Pádraig de Búrca's review of the British Cecil John Charles Street's *Hungary and Democracy* (1923) for the *Irish Independent* presented an exhaustive account of nationalist Irish perceptions of post-war Hungary – in addition to reflecting their attitude towards Britain and their own nationalism as well.⁹³ It was Street's remarks regarding Irish parallels with Hungary that triggered the strongest criticism from the reviewer of the *Irish Independent*. Moreover, the fact that Street had served as an information officer in Dublin Castle during the War of Independence also attracted the suspicion of the Irish journalist. In addition, the British author's previous book, *Ireland in 1921*, also contributed to the ill-feeling of many Irish nationalists, as it won him 'credit neither for his understanding of the position nor for his sense of fair play as between the people of this country and the minority in their midst.'⁹⁴ The *Irish Independent*'s journalist criticised Street for being a little too harsh on Hungary, portrayed as the 'menace to the peace of Central Europe and to the peace of the world.'⁹⁵ Although admittedly, Hungary 'was never a model of internal happiness or peace' due to their empire's disturbing racial diversity, de Búrca pointed to the fact that the Czechoslovaks, Yugo-Slavs and Romanians were given more territories than they were entitled to.⁹⁶ Moreover, he emphasised that Street's argument was weakened by his prejudice against Hungarians and his fondness for Slavs and Romanians.⁹⁷ The main point of the *Independent*'s review, however, was the reference to the English Government's treatment of Ireland, in parallel with the Magyar Government's treatment of its own nationalities, which indicated that the Irish journalist's hostility to Street did not equal to denying his charges against Hungarian minority policy. Therefore, this was a rare example for finding Irish references to Hungarian irredentism before 1923. 'Here', stressed de Búrca, quoting Street,

...is a touching parallel. "The Magyar irredentists regards Transylvania as the Sinn Fein irredentists regard Ulster; both proclaim the iniquity of partition, regardless of the presence in Transylvania and Ulster, respectively, of large majorities in favour of partitions."⁹⁸

⁹² 'Matters of Moment. Hungarian Throne', *Irish Independent*, 29 May 1922.

⁹³ Cecil J. C. Street, *Hungary and Democracy* (London: T. Fischer Unwin Ltd., 1923).

⁹⁴ 'Hungary and Democracy', *Irish Independent*, 28 May 1923.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

It was this remark that provoked the greatest indignation in the *Irish Independent* since, claimed de Búrca, even James Craig and his followers declared that they had accepted Partition ‘only because it was forced down their throats by the British Government.’⁹⁹

The proclamation of German-Austria as an independent democratic republic in November 1918 attracted less attention in Ireland than the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic or the revolutionary changes in Hungary 1918-1920. Irish confessional journals and diplomats focused with great intensity on the case of Austria’s Christian Social Party (*Christlichsoziale Partei*), and Monsignor Ignaz Seipel, in the late 1920s and 1930s. In post-war Austria, the Christian Social Party played a key role in the restoration of order, although the Social Democratic Workers Party (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs*) under the leadership of Chancellor Karl Renner, won the elections in February 1919. Renner’s party recognised the significance of Catholicism especially for the rural population and therefore ‘did not oppose Catholicism as such’.¹⁰⁰ However, it did call for separating church and state, which was in sharp contrast to the Christian Social Party’s programme.

By October 1921, the Christian Social Party became officially the most dominant force in Austrian politics, and remained in power during the interwar period and up till the Anschluss in March 1938. In interwar Ireland, priest and theologian Ignaz Seipel was openly admired, known for his anti-marxism; however, his anti-Anschluss stance was more divisive. Seipel was also a controversial figure in relation to his stance on anti-Semitism. He denounced racial anti-Semitism in his book *Staat und Nation*, and refused the introduction of the ‘Numerus Clausus’ in Austria after the Great War when at the same time Hungarian Government implemented it. Furthermore, he declared that for him there was no such thing as the ‘Jewish question’ and did not speak up against the Jewry. Nevertheless, he did consider them as a national minority, viewing the ‘struggle of non-Jews against Jews’ as a form of class struggle and he was willing to use anti-Semitism ‘as a weapon against the Social-Democrats.’¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Barbara Jelavich, *Modern Austria: Empire & Republic 1800-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 179.

¹⁰¹ Bruce F. Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-Semitism* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), pp. 163-164; Bruce F. Pauley, ‘Political Antisemitism in Interwar Vienna’ in Ivar Oxaal, Michael Pollak, and Gerhard Botz (eds) *Jews, Antisemitism, and Culture in Vienna* (London: Routledge, 1987), p. 159.

On 2 November 1918, the *Irish Independent* announced that the monarchy was ruled out of Austria under the revolutionary flag. The political changes were not always depicted as peaceful; occasionally Irish newspaper reports analysing the end of the monarchy pointed to demonstrations and a possible revolution, as well as ‘a Soviet in Vienna’.¹⁰² Nonetheless, the Irish press did not focus on comparing the communist threat in Austria with that in Budapest at the turn of 1918-19; the party, organized in November 1918, never produced ‘a clear program, and even more important, it never had a leader of distinction.’¹⁰³ The danger looked more imminent following Kun’s takeover in Budapest in March 1919 and a similar communist coup in Bavaria in April and May. As far as radical para-military forces were concerned, clashes between the nationalist paramilitary group, *Heimwehr* (1920) and the socialist paramilitary organisation, *Schutzbund* (1923) were frequent during the 1920s.¹⁰⁴

Altogether, the influential *Irish Independent* portrayed independent Austria in a positive light (although it was mentioned that the leading Social Democratic Party insisted on state control of all spheres of life). Interestingly, in this case, the Irish nationalist daily praised the social democrats and claimed that it was due to them ‘that the revolution and constitution of the new republic was carried out without any bloodshed’.¹⁰⁵ This was perceived to be in contrast with the aims and goals of the small Communist Party, who demanded the dictatorship of the Proletariat and counted only a few followers, and was therefore ‘in a pretty futile opposition to the official Social Democratic Party’.¹⁰⁶ Also, in April 1919, State Chancellor Renner’s statement was published in the Irish dailies, expressing faith in the future of democratic Austria: ‘I confidently hope that if we are not swept along by the great European revolutions we shall permanently be able to maintain a democratic policy.’¹⁰⁷

On the whole, in the immediate post-war years, it was the grave financial situation that was the most powerful factor in shaping Irish images of the independent Austrian republic. Irish commentators who showed an interest in Austria considered the ongoing economic crisis to be a major impact on the young republic’s self-image and identity.¹⁰⁸ Two years after the end

¹⁰² ‘Outbreak in Vienna. Fleet Handed Over to south Slav Government’, *Irish Independent*, 2 November 1918.

¹⁰³ Jelavich, *Modern Austria*, p. 163.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 164-165.

¹⁰⁵ ‘Austria after the Revolution’, *Irish Independent*, 25 September 1920.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ ‘The panic in Vienna. Minister’s Hope: Question of Union with Germany’, *Freeman’s Journal*, April 8 1919.

¹⁰⁸ ‘Austrians Grave Plight’, *Irish Independent*, 8 June 1922; and ‘No More Bank Notes! Austrian Printers’ Threat’, *Irish Independent*, 7 September 1922.

of the war, the gravity of Austria's overall situation was still regularly highlighted in the Irish press, focusing on the suffering of the people. Recurring topics included the growing rate of unemployment, lack of food and the spread of diseases.¹⁰⁹

Several Irish writers emphasised that it was not until they had seen 'beautiful, starving Vienna' that they 'got the real glimpse of Austria's poverty.'¹¹⁰ In his travel account of 25 August 1921, Irish Slavonicist John J. R. O'Beirne also provided an insight into the monetary crisis in Austria.¹¹¹ O'Beirne was considered to be one of the best-known experts on Southern-Slavonic languages.¹¹² He had published a large number of his contributions in Irish journals and newspapers and was a frequent contributor to the *Irish Monthly*.¹¹³ In his lecture on 'New Lands for Old', he described his impressions of Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and emphasised the overall 'terrible conditions prevailing in those countries'.¹¹⁴ He claimed that 'Vienna was in a much worse position than most of the cities in Austria' in comparison with Czechoslovakia that was 'the only country that was doing pretty well'.¹¹⁵ The *Irish Independent* also published an account of this talk, highlighting that O'Beirne's call for humanitarian aid was questioned in some circles in Ireland.¹¹⁶ In August 1922, several months after the first appeal, another appeal for funds was published in the *Irish Independent*, suggesting worsening conditions in Austria.¹¹⁷ The Austrians themselves also pressed the severity of their situation before the League of Nations, stating that Austria was in

¹⁰⁹ 'Irish Potatoes to Austria', *Irish Independent*, Thursday 3 March 1921; and 'Irish Potatoes for Austria', *Irish Independent*, 24 March 1921.

¹¹⁰ To-day in Central Europe. Interesting Experiences of a Connacht Business-Man. Conditions in Vienna', *Freeman's Journal*, 9 July 1921.

¹¹¹ 'Across Some New Frontiers. An Irishman's Observations during a Visit to the Reconstructed Nations. By John J. R. O'Beirne. (Author of Serbo-Croatian Self-Taught, etc.). IV. Infelix Austria', *Freeman's Journal*, 29 August 1921.

¹¹² Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations*, p. 38.

¹¹³ John J. R. O'Beirne, 'Slávy Dcera (The Daughter of Sláva): A Czech Classic' in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. xlviii, (May 1920), pp. 244-253; John J. R. O'Beirne, 'The Poet-King of the Black Mountain: King Nicholas of Montenegro' in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. xlix, (June 1921), pp. 235-238; John J. R. O'Beirne, 'The Pilgrims of Poland' in the *Irish Monthly*, Vol. XLVIII (December 1920), pp. 621-628; John J. R. O'Beirne, 'Poland's premier novelist: Henryk Sienkiewicz' in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. l, (January 1922), pp. 6-13; John J. R. O'Beirne, 'Diarmuid and Gráinne in Czechoslovakia' in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. l (February 1922), pp. 59-62; John J. R. O'Beirne, 'Belgrade by Night' in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. l, (August 1922), pp. 318-322. Also see Carmen Sylva, 'Tales of the Pelesh: Translated from the Roumanian by John J. R. O'Beirne' in the *Dublin magazine*, vol. i, (July 1924), pp. 1011-1019.

¹¹⁴ 'Where Children Starve. Lecturer Describes Woeful Plight of War Ravaged States', *Freeman's Journal*, 1 February 1922.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ 'Allies and Austria's Plight', *Irish Independent*, 9 February 1922; and 'Dublin and District. "Save the Children" Fund', *Irish Independent*, 1 February 1922.

¹¹⁷ 'Destitute Austrian Clergy. To the Editor "Irish Independent"', *Irish Independent*, 11 August 1922.

dire need of immediate help in order to avoid complete chaos. In Ireland, calls for donations continued in 1922 and 1923.¹¹⁸ Pleas were made along the lines of the following:

...One of the advantages of being a Catholic is that you feel you have brothers and sisters in other lands. The Priests of Austria, who are in such sore distress, look for help to us. They are in want of food, clothing, and necessities of life. Many Ecclesiastical Students cannot continue their studies. Scores of vocations will be lost unless YOU help at once.¹¹⁹

It was at this time, August 1922 that a student of UCD, Celia Shaw, also visited Austria. In her diary, she portrayed Vienna in the same light as did the articles of Irish dailies: empty shops and cafés, hungry-looking and ‘dispirited’ locals, dear and scarce food. On a positive note, she highlighted that the working class population seemed ‘much tidier, cleaner, better groomed and better kept in general than the same classes in England or Ireland.’¹²⁰

Nonetheless, Shaw did not reflect on the political beliefs of the workers or any political trends associated with them – including any references to the social democrats who enjoyed majority support in Vienna after the war.

The settlement of borders

In the early 1920s, Irish partition coincided with the birth of new states in East-Central Europe as a result of the Versailles Peace Treaties after 1918. Although the Paris Peace Treaties were theoretically based on the principles of democracy and national self-determination, the transformation of the political system in East-Central Europe did not proceed without complications.¹²¹ After 1918, Irish commentators focused heavily on these newly drawn borders in Central Europe, including the redistribution of nationalities, which was considered to be a significant factor in the formulation of identities in the newly independent ‘nation-states’. The communist threat and the antagonism between nationalities appeared inseparable; in other words, the newly independent and formerly oppressed neighbours of Hungary feared the spread of bolshevism as well as the restoration of previous Hungarian control over their territories.

¹¹⁸ ‘Poverty amongst Austrian Clergy. (This appeal has received episcopal approval)’, *Irish Independent*, 25 November 1922, and ‘Can You Forget...? (This Appeal Received Episcopal Approval.)’, *Irish Independent*, 16 December 1922, and 18 December 1922; ‘The Austrian Nuns’ Fund. To the Editor “Irish Independent”’, *Irish Independent*, 4 September 1923.

¹¹⁹ ‘A Cry from Catholic Austria’, *Irish Independent*, 14 October 1922.

¹²⁰ Journal of a tour to Austria and Germany including a visit to Vienna and to the Passion play at Oberammergau, Aug.-Sept, 1922, also brief account of a tour to Venice, Aug. 1923, by Celia Shaw, NLI Ms. 23,410. [Unpublished manuscript].

¹²¹ Alan Sharp, ‘Reflections on the Remaking of Europe 1815, 1919, 1945, post-1989: Some Comparative Reflections’ in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. viii, (1997), p. 18.

J. J. Lee, who has compared Irish socio-economic and political developments with the case of other small states in his book *Ireland 1912-1985* (1990), has also pointed out the differences between post-war border disputes in Ireland and Central Europe. Lee has emphasised that after the Great War ‘borders were revised in central and eastern Europe in favour of smaller states. This was precisely what did not happen in Fermanagh and Tyrone.’¹²² Interestingly, Lee has also argued that ‘the Free State enjoyed yet a further advantage. It was not the potential victim of irredentist or imperialist ambitions’, unlike East-Central European states.¹²³ And while the Irish Free State had no Banat, no Silesia, no Slovakia, and no Transylvania, Northern Ireland was still the object of irredentist nationalist claims.¹²⁴ Therefore, irredentism was a key factor in the context of border-related conflicts, both in Ireland and in the successor states. Joep Leerssen has explained this with the fact that irredentism seemed to be the ‘logical and almost unavoidable extension’ of nationalism in post-war Europe.¹²⁵ Similarly, Paul Murray, in a major study of the Irish Boundary Commission, compared the claims of Irish nationalists and Central European irredentists. He concluded that since the 1801 Act of Union was still in effect, in partitioning Ireland,

...the British legislature was establishing a new boundary within part of the United Kingdom over which it exercised the same political control as it did over the other parts. The boundary settlements in Central and Eastern Europe, in contrast, were the result of external interference with the territorial integrity of states which found themselves on the losing side in the First World War.¹²⁶

The struggle between unionists and nationalists over the Home Rule question had been part of political debates before the Great War. However, it was the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 that eventually sought to create two states, Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland, and establish two parliaments (the southern parliament envisaged did not materialise and Home Rule, which was granted to both, took effect only in the north).¹²⁷ The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 brought further legislation to settle the relationship, allowing the recently formed state of Northern Ireland to opt out of the Irish Free State. In the case of the latter, a Boundary Commission would be established to amend the (presently provisional) border between Northern Ireland (still part of the United Kingdom) and the Irish Free State (gained dominion status). The ‘Provisional-Government-sponsored’ North-Eastern Boundary Bureau (NEBB -

¹²² J. J. Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 46.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Leerssen, *National Thought in Europe*, p. 176.

¹²⁶ Murray, *The Irish Boundary Commission*, p. 299.

¹²⁷ Ged Martin, ‘The Origins of Partition’ in Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort, *The Irish Border: History, Politics, Culture* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), p. 67.

October 1922) and then the Boundary Commission (first met in November 1924) were to make a decision ‘in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions.’¹²⁸ First and foremost, before discussing the cases of European boundary commissions, the Memorandum on the European Precedents for the NEBB declared that: ‘it must be remembered that in Ireland a boundary has already been drawn through the disputed areas, such as did not exist in Europe. It seems plain that the wishes of the inhabitants on both sides of it are to be taken into account.’¹²⁹

In order to support their claim with successful precedents, the NEBB investigated similar boundary settlements in post-war Europe. Director Kevin O’Shiel, researcher Bolton C. Waller, secretary Edward Millington Stephens were those most involved in the process.¹³⁰ O’Shiel requested Waller, an expert on European boundary disputes to advise him. Waller, who was in charge of researching international precedents full-time in London, argued that in Ireland a plebiscite was simply unnecessary due to the fact that the wishes of the inhabitants were well known as a result of the elections, stressing that ‘the expense and possible danger of a plebiscite are best avoided.’¹³¹ E. M. Stephens, barrister and civil servant, was also required to study ‘recent European precedents for territorial transfer on the basis of local plebiscites’, and to collect data and to intermeditate between the Dublin government and nationalist officials in the border areas.¹³² Moreover, the Irish trade representative in Berlin at the time, Charles Bewley (later minister to Germany 1933-1939), also furnished the Bureau ‘with certain particulars regarding Boundary Commissions on the Continent.’¹³³ In particular,

¹²⁸ Michael Kennedy, *Division and Consensus: The Politics of Cross-Border Relations in Ireland 1925-1969* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2000), p. 9; and Geoffrey J. Hand, ‘Introduction’ in *Report of the Irish Boundary Commission 1925* (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1969), p. viii.

¹²⁹ Memorandum on the European Precedents for the North Eastern Boundary Bureau, UCDA P35b/132 (28).

¹³⁰ Eda Sagarra, *Kevin O’Shiel: Tyrone Nationalist and Irish State-Builder* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2013), pp. 201-204.

¹³¹ Sagarra, *Kevin O’Shiel*, pp. 201-204; North-Eastern Boundary Bureau Final Report, 26 February 1926, by E. M. Stephens, Secretary, Patrick McGilligan Papers, UCDA P35b/133; Confidential Memorandum by Kevin O’Shiel entitled ‘Procedure at Boundary Commission’, 1922, Eoin MacNeill Papers, UCDA LA1/H/83; Memorandum by Kevin O’Shiel with covering letter relating to political relations between the Irish Free State and the Irish North-Eastern minority, June 1923, Eoin MacNeill Papers, UCDA LA1/H/95; Kevin O’Shiel – ‘Boundary Commission and its precedents’, Eoin MacNeill Papers, UCDA LA1/H/83; and Notes on Procedure of Boundary Commission, Eoin MacNeill Papers, UCDA LA1/H/89.

¹³² Final Report of the North-Eastern Boundary Bureau, E.M. Stephens to Kevin O’Higgins (Dublin), 26 February 1926, NAI DT S4743, *DIFP* vol. ii, no. 380, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1926/Work-of-the-North-Eastern-Boundary-Bureau/716.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015; Andrew Carpenter and Lawrence William White, ‘Stephens, Edward Millington’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a8276>, accessed on 7 August 2015.

¹³³ Letter from E. M. Stephens, Secretary of the NEBB to the Secretary, Department of Finance, 26 January 1923, NAI FIN/1/2168.

Bewley sent reports on the Upper Silesian plebiscite conditions and the Schleswig Commission.

Paul Murray has highlighted the fact that the Bureau had found the settlements of Silesia, Schleswig-Holstein, Klagenfurt and Hungary noteworthy.¹³⁴ In the registry of NEBB documents, there was only one reference to Hungarian boundaries in this context. The file compiled in relation to the northern Hungarian border and the question of the Ruthenian minority was actually a copy of the Czechoslovak memorandum presented at the Paris Peace Conference. Therefore, it reflected the arguments of the Czechoslovak Republic, claiming the territory inhabited by Ruthenians in the north-eastern part of the former Dual Monarchy. The Czechoslovaks emphasised that ‘this solution would best respond to the political reality and to the principles of justice.’¹³⁵ Similarly, other NEBB documents regarding continental precedents such as the case of the territorial disputes about Klagenfurt between Austria and Yugoslavia, the Bohemian Germans or the general territorial demands of Czechoslovakia were all based on the Czech and Yugoslav memoranda, respectively, presented at the peace conference.¹³⁶ In consequence, when it came to Irish claims in relation to the north-eastern boundary, there were very few references to Austrian or Hungarian examples, despite the high number of incidents (including the occasional plebiscites) there. Nevertheless, Sagarra has pointed out that the phrasing of Article 12 of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and its interpretation by the Free State is ‘to be understood in the context of the plebiscitary politics of post-war Central Europe, notably as laid down in the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon’, referring to Silesia, Klagenfurt, Burgenland, North Schleswig, and East Prussia.¹³⁷ As the Austro-Hungarian Empire was defeated in the Great War, their successors’ claims were treated differently by the great powers at and after Versailles than the victorious, newly independent small nations in the region. Therefore, when the Irish commission was looking for a precedent to support Irish nationalist demands, they rather examined the appeals of previously successful small states. Altogether, the very fact that the question of boundaries was in dispute created a greater Irish interest in territorial settlements in Europe.

¹³⁴ Murray, *The Irish Boundary Commission*, p. 146.

¹³⁵ Peace Conference. Czecho-Slovak Delegation, memo no. 6. Problem of the Ruthenians of Hungary. Peace Conference Documents. Czecho-Slovak Delegation, NAI NEBB/2/1/13.

¹³⁶ Ibid.; Peace Conference Document. Jugo-Slav Delegation. The Problem of Celovec (Klagenfurth), NAI NEBB/2/1/12; Peace Conference Documents. Czecho-Slovak Delegation. Problem Touching the Germans in Bohemia, NAI NEBB/2/1/10; The Territorial Claims of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Peace Conference Document. Czecho-Slovak Delegation. Memoire No. 2, NAI NEBB/2/1/11; Memorandum on the European Precedents for the North Eastern Boundary Bureau, Patrick McGilligan Papers, UCDA P35b/132(28).

¹³⁷ Sagarra, *Kevin O’Shiel*, p. 205.

There was no guarantee that the political boundaries were about to reflect ethnic boundaries; indeed, when it came to the boundary issue in Ireland, no plebiscite was held, despite the personal experience of, for instance, F. B. Bourdillon, Secretary of Irish Boundary Commission, former member of the Upper Silesian Commission (1920-22). Bourdillon's interest in the boundary situation on the Continent was well documented; in his letter to E. M. Stephens, dated 15 October 1924, the Irish publicity agent of the Bureau, Hugh A. McCartan, emphasised that Bourdillon 'was much interested in the Upper Silesian precedent.'¹³⁸

According to nationalist Irish commentators, after the birth of the First Czechoslovak Republic, the nationality problem remained one of the main lingering issues in the Czech lands. However, the relationship between the German and Czech populations was not exclusively hostile. Certain communities had multiple loyalties (or, in some cases, there was a lack of one definite national identity).¹³⁹ As far as the Bohemian Lands were concerned, Zahra has maintained that 'bilingualism and fluid national loyalties' remained the norm for many, and others hesitated when it came to determining their national affiliations.¹⁴⁰

After 1918, Irish nationalists continued to compare the independence of Czechoslovakia with the Irish struggle for independence. A few months before the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, for instance, noting on the Czech National Committee's manifesto, the *Irish Independent* stated the main aim of the Czecho-Slovaks to be securing 'Home Rule in an independent democratic Czecho-Slovakian State.'¹⁴¹ By October 1918, only full independence was deemed acceptable, without any links to the former empire. Interestingly, the Irish press not only reported on the independence of the Czechoslovak Republic; it also labelled the new small state 'the Bohemian Republic'.¹⁴² The *Freeman's Journal* emphasised that Bohemians finally achieved nationhood.¹⁴³ Hence, Bohemia was just as often used as a synonym for the new state, echoing previous references to the historical rights of the Bohemian small nation. The best-known supporter of Bohemia in Ireland was still Richard John Kelly, 'an old friend

¹³⁸ Copy of Letter from Hugh A. McCartan to Stephens, 15 October 1924, NAI NEBB/4/5/2.

¹³⁹ Zahra, 'Imagined Noncommunities', p. 103.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ 'By Wire and Despatch', *Irish Independent*, 17 July 1918.

¹⁴² 'The Bohemian Republic', *Freeman's Journal*, 28 December 1918.

¹⁴³ 'Bohemia A Nation. Provisional Government Takes Over the Administration', *Freeman's Journal*, 31 October 1918, and 'Bohemia Rejoices. Soldiers Tear Down the Austrian Colours: Scenes in Prague', *Freeman's Journal*, 1 November 1918.

of Bohemia and a citizen of Prague’, who was among the first to congratulate to Masaryk on his and his countrymen’s achievements. This was also illustrated by the Czechoslovak President’s response, published in the *Freeman’s Journal*:

“Dear Mr Kelly – Hearty thanks for your kind letter. I have to thank many friends in this country. Mr. Kelly, you are one of them. I hope to see you in Prague one day. You will enjoy it to be with your Bohemian friends. Yours sincerely, T. G. Masaryk”¹⁴⁴

Even after the Great War, Kelly continued to publish articles about Bohemia in the *Tuam Herald* and the *Freeman’s Journal*; as a token of gratitude, in 1919 he ‘was awarded the freedom of the city of Prague and a silver medal’.¹⁴⁵ In 1922, he recalled his visits to Bohemia and mentioned how Prague was ‘in the past closely identified with Ireland’ and that he was ‘delighted to trace many points of connection’ there: Hibernia strasse, and the College of the Immaculate Conception, formerly run by Irish Franciscans.¹⁴⁶

Regarding the perceived German-Czech antagonism after 1918, the *Freeman’s Journal* highlighted that the ruling Czechs were in a minority, and that the Germans alone were ‘in much higher proportion, as compared with the Czechs, than the Orange party as compared with the majority in Ireland.’¹⁴⁷ And although the Czechs attracted more Irish attention than the Slovaks, in September 1921, a few months before the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December 1921, the *Irish Independent* discussed the prospect of a Slovak independence movement.¹⁴⁸ The paper predicted that this was going to become ‘as important as the Irish problem. Soon [...] a Slovakian de Valera will arise, demanding from the Prague Government the full independence of the Slovak people’, referring to the influential Slovak politician and Catholic priest, Andrej Hlinka.¹⁴⁹ This was a rare observation as differences of interest between Czechs and Slovaks were rarely noticed by Irish authors until March 1939, when the

¹⁴⁴ ‘The Bohemian Republic’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 28 December 1918.

¹⁴⁵ Patrick Maume, ‘Kelly, Richard’, *DIB*. Biographical information on Richard John Kelly can be found in the *Dictionary of Irish Biography*, under the entry on his father, ‘Kelly, Richard’. [The export citation link at this entry is broken.]

¹⁴⁶ ‘The Irish Franciscans in Prague - Their Literary Labours’, the *Tuam Herald*, April 29 1922.

¹⁴⁷ ‘Minorities’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 18 November 1921.

¹⁴⁸ An interesting case that attracted Irish attention in relation to the birth of Czechoslovakia was the Pittsburgh agreement, where Slovak and Czech emigrés outlined an independent Czechoslovak state in May 1918. Irish diplomats like Charles Bewley referred to it again in 1938-39, after the Munich crisis and the question of Slovak separation. See details further below, in Chapter 4.

¹⁴⁹ For further details on the historiography of the separate development and formation of the Czech and Slovak nations, see Dušan Kováč, ‘Czechs and Slovaks in Modern History’ in Mikuláš Teich (ed) *Bohemia in History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 364-379; and ‘Items of Interest. A Slovakian de Valera’, *Irish Independent*, 15 September 1921.

final split of the First Czechoslovak Republic into the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia occurred and the Nazi client Slovak Republic came into being.

In their articles and studies, Irish newspapers and journals concentrated on the lessons to be found in the German-Czech relationship.¹⁵⁰ Two years after the birth of the Czechoslovak Republic, the *Irish Independent* pointed to the prevailing ‘bitter feeling of distrust’ between the Czechs and the Germans, and compared it to ‘Carsonites in north-east Ulster’.¹⁵¹ Writing in the midst of the Irish War of Independence, the paper placed the emphasis on the fact that the Allies approved of the creation of an independent Czechoslovak Republic, but disregarded the existence of the considerable German minority in Bohemia: ‘Only in Ireland do the British Government discover such difficulties.’¹⁵² Moreover, both the Czechs and Germans admitted that it was in their common interest to ‘work together and make the best of new conditions’ – in contrast to Britain’s handling of the Northern Irish problem.¹⁵³

As argued in Chapter 1, the Hungarians had a bad reputation in Ireland for their treatment of the non-Magyar nationalities of the former empire (as in Britain) since the beginning of the twentieth century. According to Lambert McKenna, before the fall of the empire, ethnic minorities had been treated ‘with contempt, if not with cruelty,’ restricting their languages and customs.¹⁵⁴ Thus Irish commentators were not surprised to hear the news regarding the non-Magyar nationalities to turn against their former Austrian and Hungarian ‘masters’, once the old system had collapsed.

Conflicts between the newly independent small states in Central Europe became an everyday matter shortly after the end of the war, each aiming for favourable border settlement. Border disputes between Hungary and the Slovaks were noted by the nationalist Irish press as early as December 1918.¹⁵⁵ For instance, in January 1919, the London correspondent of the *Irish Independent* compared the ethnic composition of the multi-cultural Pressburg/ Pozsony/ Bratislava to that of Belfast, and the position of the ‘considerable Slovak minority’ living

¹⁵⁰ For details on how the language situation in the First Czechoslovak Republic reflected the clash between the Czech majority and German minority, see Lili Zách, ‘Irish Intellectuals and Independent Czechoslovakia in the Interwar Period: Reflections in Catholic Journals’ in Gerald Power and Ondřej Pilný (eds) *Ireland and the Czech Lands: Contacts and Comparisons in History and Culture* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014), pp. 121-138.

¹⁵¹ ‘Here and There’, *Irish Independent*, 2 September 1920.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ McKenna, ‘Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary’, p. 544.

¹⁵⁵ ‘Hungary and Slovaks’, *Irish Independent*, 7 December 1918.

under the rule of Germans and Jews to nationalists in Belfast.¹⁵⁶ Interestingly, no Hungarian population was mentioned in the *Irish Independent*'s article. This was the first example for listing the Slovaks as one of the 'Continental Ulster Questions' in the Irish press, in addition to the Bohemian Germans.

In Hungary, the insistence of Béla Kun's Bolshevik Government on defending the borders of the historical Hungarian nation was very uncharacteristic of a communist regime that was normally associated with internationalism. According to a Reuters telegram from Budapest, the Bolshevik Government declared that they were 'determined to resist to the last drop of their blood all attempts by the Czecho-Slovak bourgeois and Rumanian clauses and annexationists to overthrow the Hungarian Workers' Revolution.'¹⁵⁷ Months before the communist takeover in March 1919, a military threat had already been visibly posed by the Czechoslovaks and Romanians. Therefore, explaining their attack with communist headway in Hungary was not valid. Undoubtedly, both the neighbouring small states and the Entente viewed Kun's regime with suspicion; in the summer of 1919, all Irish dailies recognised that there was only a faint possibility for fair peace terms.

Due to their reliance on international news agencies such as Reuters or the PA (Press Association), Irish national dailies occasionally published misstatements regarding the political developments in Central Europe. For instance, on 3 May 1919, the *Irish Independent* announced that the Rumanian army had occupied Budapest' when the actual military situation was less extreme; Romanians merely secured their presence east of the River Tisza/Theiss (*Tiszántúl*), still quite a distance from the capital. According to the paper, the advancing Romanian troops met with 'practically no resistance', which was contradicted by contemporary Hungarian accounts.¹⁵⁸ In addition to the reports of the Irish dailies, McKenna also produced a confused account of the Romanian advance on Budapest in August 1919. He emphasised - without naming his source, which made the validity of his claim look questionable - that Romanians were 'welcomed by the populace of the capital with the wildest enthusiasm', despite his remark that, admittedly, 'every Magyar, even the simplest peasant, had always conceived his country as an indivisible whole [...].'¹⁵⁹ Accounts of this kind of

¹⁵⁶ 'Our London Letter. Through Our Private Wire. Continental Ulster Questions', *Irish Independent*, 10 January 1919.

¹⁵⁷ 'Bolshevist Peril Growing. Hungary now in the Throes', *Irish Independent*, 25 March 1919.

¹⁵⁸ 'Fate of Budapest. Slaughter in Munich', *Irish Independent*, 3 May 1919.

¹⁵⁹ McKenna, 'Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary', p. 553.

enthusiasm were contradicted by, among others, an anonymous author in the outspoken *Catholic Bulletin*, who compared the actions of Romanians in Hungary to those of the communists, denouncing them for the aggression and deportations.¹⁶⁰ Eventually, Romania was reported to have evacuated Hungarian territories west of the Danube on 13 October 1919.¹⁶¹

While the Irish press and Catholic intelligentsia tended to emphasise the significance of the ‘red threat’, the question of borders, which was inseparable from these issues, turned out to be extremely controversial, especially after signing the treaties of St Germain and Trianon.¹⁶² Among Irish intellectuals, again, Lambert McKenna presented the most in-depth opinion of the Treaty of Trianon (although only using the generic term ‘Peace of Versailles’). After declaring how Hungary became ‘deprived of [...] of its ancestral land’, he argued that

...such an amputation could not but cause a feverish and morbid spirit. The Magyars realised clearly that the cause of their country’s mutilation was the large proportion of foreign races dwelling within their borders. They were therefore driven to a frenzied assertion of their nationality and a violent hatred of all alien races.¹⁶³

On the whole, the Trianon Peace Treaty, signed on 4 June 1920, went almost unnoticed in Irish journals. This reflects the difference in priorities in the transformed Hungarian state and in Ireland, the latter of which was in the middle of the War of Independence at the time. The Irish papers reported that the Hungarian delegation, led by Count Albert Apponyi, turned down the terms handed to them on 15 January 1920. In Apponyi’s words, ‘if the only choice was between absolute rejection the only question for Hungary was whether she should commit suicide to avoid being killed.’¹⁶⁴ On 10 May, the *Irish Independent* published that the Hungarian Government refused to sign the Treaty. However, when another Hungarian delegation (led by Ágost Bernárd and Alfréd Drasche-Lázár) did eventually sign the final document of the Treaty on 4 June 1920, this was not covered in the Irish daily press.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁰ ‘Untitled’ in the *Catholic Bulletin*, vol. ix, (December 1919), p. 635.

¹⁶¹ ‘Note to Rumania. Allies’ Attitude to the Friedrich Government’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 13 October 1919.

¹⁶² For in-depth historical analyses of the Hungarian delegation at Trianon, see Ferenc Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference: The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942); and Ignác Romsics, *Dismantling of Hungary: The Peace Treaty of Trianon, 1920* (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 2002).

¹⁶³ McKenna, ‘Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary’, p. 554.

¹⁶⁴ ‘News in Brief. Terms for Hungary’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 16 January 1920.

¹⁶⁵ ‘Hungary’s Alternative’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 21 January 1920, and ‘Hungary Won’t Sign it’, *Irish Independent*, 10 May 1920.

That being said, in the months running up to the Treaty of Trianon, a couple of reports about Hungarian insistence on restoring the historical borders of Hungary were indeed reported in Irish papers. The Hungarian Minister of War (former Prime Minister) István Friedrich, for instance, was reported to have declared, 'I will not yield a single square kilometre of Hungary's former territory.'¹⁶⁶ This mind-set remained present in the whole spectrum of Hungarian politics in the interwar period. Consequently, the central position of the post-war treaties was undeniable in independent Austrian and Hungarian self-perception. Irredentism, as a result, became embedded in Hungarian interwar political discourse.¹⁶⁷

Despite the lack of immediate Irish attention given to Trianon, historiography has acknowledged the central position of the boundary issues and the post-war treaties in interwar Austrian and Hungarian self-perceptions. As Lonnie Johnson (1996) has claimed, Austria-Hungary was the biggest loser after the Great War since 'as small states, their national discontent did not have the same political import as did Germany's dissatisfaction.'¹⁶⁸ Therefore, it may be argued that the post-war small nation mind-set, when linked to the losses associated with the treaties, was restrictive as far as their self-images were concerned. Consequently, the post-Versailles territorial changes contributed to the emergence of Hungarian irredentism that characterized the whole interwar period since, as Sally Mark has asserted, 'Hungary neither forgave nor forgot' about her loss and blamed Trianon for all its problems.¹⁶⁹

After the birth of German-Austrian Republic, the question of new borders was bound to stir emotions in the Irish press. Irish nationalists frequently aimed to connect the issue of changing borders and ethnic composition of Austria to actual Irish problems, especially in relation to the question of (greater German) unity. As far as territorial changes were concerned, several German-speaking territories were lost to Austria, despite her claims The South Tyrol was occupied by Italy; the Sudetenland became part of the Czechoslovak

¹⁶⁶ 'Hungarian Ministers' Militant Speech', *Irish Independent*, 15 January 1920.

¹⁶⁷ Central to irredentist arguments was presenting claims for Hungary's historical legitimacy in the Carpathian basin. For further details on the cult of the crown of St Stephen and the principle of *historical integrity* of Hungary, compare Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary*, p. 118; and Wolfgang Maderthaner, 'Utopian Perspectives and Political Restraint: The Austrian Revolution in the Context of Central European Conflicts' in Günter Bischof and Fritz Plasser (eds) *From Empire to Republic: Post-World War I Austria, Contemporary Austrian Studies*, vol. xix, (New Orleans: University of New Orleans Press, 2010), p. 58.

¹⁶⁸ Lonnie Johnson, *Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1996), p. 191.

¹⁶⁹ Sally Marks, *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918-1933* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 21.

Republic; and Austrian Silesia in the southwest of Poland – the latter actually became a source of conflict between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Austria successfully claimed Western Hungary (Burgenland, with the exception of Sopron/Oedenburg), and permitted to occupy these territories on 7 August 1921. In the city of Sopron/Oedenburg a plebiscite decided in favour of staying under the Hungarian state. The plebiscite was attacked by many (non-Magyar) contemporaries, and was later questioned by historians. Throughout the conflict, the Irish press, relying on Reuters cablegrams from Berlin and telegrams from Vienna, echoed the Austrian opinion.¹⁷⁰ In addition, on 20 October 1920 Carinthia, with its mixed population of German and Slovene speakers, voted to stay with Austria.

Months before signing the Treaty of St Germain, German-Austria (and more specifically, the social democrat Chancellor Karl Renner) had already voiced their concerns on several occasions regarding the proposed peace. The *Freeman's Journal* reported that the Czechoslovaks 'appealed to historical frontiers' while they were said to 'trample Lower Austria's historic right under foot', alluding to the German-speaking population in Bohemia.¹⁷¹ As mentioned above, Hungary also built her claims upon her historical rights to maintain the lands of her thousand year-old kingdom. The nationalist Irish press did not care to choose sides in this particular debate.

Similar to the other Versailles treaties, the Treaty of St Germain (signed on 10 September 1919, ratified by the Austrian parliament on 21 October 1919), was received with suspicion by Austrian society.¹⁷² And although peace with Austria was not the priority for the Allies, settling the controversies regarding Habsburg Central Europe was indispensable for ensuring a peaceful future for the region.¹⁷³ One of the most ambiguous issues was to determine the exact status of Austria; whether it was the heir of the Habsburg Empire or a new and independent creation.¹⁷⁴ At the peace conference, the Austrian Delegation emphasised the fact that they only represented the republic established on 12 November 1918 by the German

¹⁷⁰ 'Just another War Front. Hungarians Invade Austria', *Irish Independent*, 7 September 1921; Burgenland Plebiscite. Budapest Claims Big Majority for Hungary in Oedenburg', *Freeman's Journal*, 19 December 1921; 'Austrian Objections. Report that Oedenburg is to Go to Hungary Brings Protest', *Freeman's Journal*, 28 1921; and King, 'Austria versus Hungary', pp. 174-175.

¹⁷¹ 'Terms Would Mean Political and Social Chaos', *Freeman's Journal*, 12 June 1919.

¹⁷² Hanno Scheuch, 'Austria 1918-55: From the First to the Second Republic' in the *Historical Journal*, vol. xxxii, no. 1, (March 1989), p. 181.

¹⁷³ 'Austrian Restiveness under Delays. Austrians Uneasy', *Irish Independent*, 26 May 1919; and Jelavich, *Modern Austria*, pp. 155.

¹⁷⁴ Jelavich, *Modern Austria*, p. 156.

population of the former monarchy. This republic, stated the Austrian note, 'had never been at war with anyone, and which cannot be regarded as the sole successor of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.'¹⁷⁵ Consequently, the self-image of independent Austria reflected the political transformation of Habsburg Central Europe, identifying with the challenging situation that independent small nations found themselves in after the war. More specifically, the Austrian Note asked

...why the smallest and poorest and most peace loving of the States which arose out of the former Monarchy should be made the sole inheritor of its guilt and be expected to bear alone this consequences of the mistakes made by Hungarian, Polish, and Slovene statesmen. [Austria] requests that all stipulations may be removed from the Treaty which are due to the identification of German Austria with the old Dual Monarchy.¹⁷⁶

Despite the Austrian Republic's plea to the Allies, the Treaty of St Germain declared that the rulers of the monarchy deliberately destroyed 'the liberties of small and independent States, which kept alive the vision of liberty among their oppressed brethren'.¹⁷⁷ The Allies also concluded that before signing the treaty, 'Austria was an enemy people' but once the treaty came into effect, the Allies were hoping to maintain 'friendly relations' with her.¹⁷⁸

For a large segment of Austro-German society, another controversial point of the Treaty of St Germain was the prohibition Austria's union with Germany.¹⁷⁹ In addition, the coexistence of Austria's German and Catholic loyalties was another intriguing aspect of independent Austria's identity. The *Catholic Bulletin's* author, 'Laegh', was among the Irish authors who argued that the new republic was in a different position from most newly independent states and had to be viewed, therefore, from a different angle. The author observed that the 'once proud Catholic nation' of post-war Austria deserved special treatment and her desire of unification with Germany also had to be respected.¹⁸⁰ The attitude of the *Freeman's Journal* towards the Anschluss was similarly controversial. It was clearly illustrated by the title of the article the ban on German unification: 'Compulsory Independence'.¹⁸¹ Therefore, when

¹⁷⁵ 'Another Austrian Note', *Irish Independent*, 19 June 1919.

¹⁷⁶ "'Never at War with Anyone". Novel Point for the Paris Conference. "Divide the Indemnity"', *Freeman's Journal*, 19 June 1919.

¹⁷⁷ 'The Austrian Treaty. Economic Concessions', *Irish Independent*, 3 September 1919; and 'An Ascendancy Policy', *Freeman's Journal*, 3 September 1919.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Undoubtedly, Austrian parties and their stance on the Greater German unity has been controversial in historiography. For detailed interpretations, see Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p. 120; and Peter Thaler, 'National History: National Imagery: The Role of History in Postwar Austrian Nation-Building' in *Central European History*, vol. xxxii, no. 3, (1999), p. 289 and p. 294.

¹⁸⁰ 'Laegh', 'Matters of the Moment', p. 335.

¹⁸¹ 'Compulsory Independence', *Freeman's Journal*, 1 September 1919.

discussing the question of Austrian borders and any possible related conflicts, generally a pro-Austrian tone characterized Irish articles.

As for the question of borders, in addition to the conflict with Czechoslovakia, the partition of the Tyrol between Austria and Italy also provoked debates in Ireland. Of course, opinions varied. According to James MacCaffrey, optimistic regarding Catholicism in the Tyrol, the religious future of the region was seen to be in no danger from Italy.¹⁸² In addition, the *Irish Monthly*'s regular correspondent and former resident of the Tyrol, Reverend A. Raybould, emphasised that the region was characterized by a sense of unity that was 'Catholic to the core'.¹⁸³ This unity, however, claimed the not-so-optimistic Raybould in 1921, had 'for the first time been broken', as a result of the Treaty of St Germain. The Tyrol became partitioned; two thirds of its territory, South Tyrol (the larger portion, officially then *Alto Adige*), being allocated to Italy, 'expected to become Italian', while the northern part was left with Austria.¹⁸⁴ The *Irish Monthly*'s contributor was deeply sympathetic towards the population of the South Tyrol, explaining how the political situation was extremely gloomy.¹⁸⁵ Similarly, Irish nationalist dailies published the same view in the press, regarding the Austrian protest against Italian territory gains. The *Irish Independent*, for instance, argued that 'the Tyrolese talk and think in German', explaining Italian hegemony as 'a case of the predominance of the most selfish material considerations.'¹⁸⁶ Therefore, Austria seemed to have been viewed in Ireland in a positive light, as an independent, Catholic small state as opposed to being judged by its imperial legacy.

Religion as a marker of identity

In independent Ireland, Catholicism came to symbolise more than the everyday religion of the majority of the population; it was a crucial element in the formulation of Irish self-identity.

¹⁸² MacCaffrey, 'The Catholic Church in 1918', p. 91.

¹⁸³ In his recent PhD thesis, Mark Phelan emphasised that 'A. Raybould', played an important role in 'awakening Irish consciences to the plight of the German minority in Italy', pointing out that 'despite his frequent literary output, Raybould's biographical background remains elusive.' See Mark Phelan, 'Irish Responses to Fascist Italy, 1919-1932' (PhD Thesis, National University of Ireland, Galway, 2012), p. 72; and A. Raybould, 'The Tyrol: Past and Present' in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. xlix, no. 572, (February 1921), p. 57.

¹⁸⁴ Anny Schweigkofler, 'South Tyrol: Rethinking Ethnolinguistic Vitality' in Stefan Wolff (ed) *German Minorities in Europe: Ethnic Identity and Cultural Belonging* (New York: Berghahn, 2000), p. 65; and A. Raybould, 'The Tyrol: Past and Present' in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. xlix, no. 572, (February 1921), p. 57.

¹⁸⁵ Raybould, 'The Tyrol: Past and Present', p. 63.

¹⁸⁶ 'Present Perils', *Irish Independent*, 5 May 1919.

The idea that ‘Irishness became almost synonymous with catholicity’ also manifested itself in Irish perceptions of national identities elsewhere in the wider world, including in the successors of Austria-Hungary.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, Irish commentators considered it to be important to highlight the fate of Catholics, the changes in church-state relations and most importantly, the impact of the Catholic faith on the national spirit of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

By 1920, the consolidation of the new order had taken place in Central Europe. Therefore, Catholic Irish intellectuals such as Reverend Myles V. Ronan and James MacCaffrey provided an outlook to show how the overall political transformation impacted the Catholic Church in the newly independent successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Not surprisingly, the Irish clergy spoke positively of the role of Catholicism in the Dual Monarchy, even after they lost the war. More specifically, when preaching in Skibbereen, April 1919, Rev. Kelly, Bishop of Ross, emphasised that Austria-Hungary ‘was broken up, but still it was one of the greatest Catholic areas in the world.’¹⁸⁸ It is worth noting that the statement was made a few weeks after the communist takeover in Hungary, but there was no mention of this in the bishop’s speech. As the Pope, in his note to the bishop emphasised, he ‘had nothing to say’ regarding the overall state of Austria-Hungary since ‘so far as he was concerned one form of government was as good as another’.¹⁸⁹

Austria’s Catholic identity, both in the imperial context and after the war, was a primary concern for those Irish authors who investigated Austria from either political or socio-economic perspective. For instance, in November 1918, during the days of the empire’s dissolution, the *Irish Independent* still labelled Austria as ‘being regarded as the outstanding Catholic Power of the world’.¹⁹⁰ James MacCaffrey among those wondering how ‘the downfall of Austria and Germany [were] likely to influence the Church’.¹⁹¹ MacCaffrey was convinced that Catholicism was not likely to become extinct in the former Habsburg territories and that there was ‘no need for alarm about the future of religion, although the principle of self-determination should be applied to the former provinces of the Empire.’¹⁹²

¹⁸⁷ MacMahon, ‘The Catholic Clergy’, p. 279.

¹⁸⁸ ‘Grave Warning by the Bishop of Ross’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 16 April, 1919.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ ‘King Karl, a Pacifist’, *Irish Independent*, 14 November 1918.

¹⁹¹ MacCaffrey, ‘The Catholic Church in 1918’, p. 91.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

Most importantly, as far as this link between the government and the Catholic Church was concerned, the significance of the Christian Social Party and the aforementioned Monsignor Ignaz Seipel attracted the most significant attention in Catholic nationalist circles in Ireland after the Great War. After the general elections for the Austrian National Assembly in October 1923, Seipel's merits were emphasised in the *Freeman's Journal*, and more specifically, 'the recovery which Austria has made under the coalition, of which he [was] the pivot and guide.'¹⁹³ Therefore, the Catholic nature of the Austrian successor state was a topic of priority for Irish scholars and Catholicism hence was deemed inseparable from Austrian national identity. In contrast to the appeals for helping Catholic Austria, pointing to the parallel situation of Catholic Ireland and Catholic Austria after the war, Sean T. Ó Ceallaigh adopted an ironic tone and questioned the validity of claims regarding the aid for suffering Austria: 'Have our Irish bishops ever asked His Holiness to issue a similar appeal in aid of suffering in Ireland? If not it is time they thought about it', argued Ó Ceallaigh in the middle of the Irish War of Independence. He urged Irish bishops to demand a similar declaration from the Pope, bringing Catholics from all the world over to come to the aid of Ireland.¹⁹⁴

Aiming to treat the problem of social inequality and labour issues facing Ireland was a major concern for the Irish left as well as for certain Irish Catholics (both the clergy and Catholic lay intellectuals). As Joseph MacMahon has noted, unfortunately only 'scant interest was shown in the efforts of continental Catholic social reformers.'¹⁹⁵ Nonetheless, the Church did take action in the field of charity, as indicated in their interest in post-war Austria, for instance.¹⁹⁶ Professor of History at National University Galway, Helena Concannon was well informed regarding the cause of Catholic women across Europe, including the successor states of the Dual Monarchy. She did not support feminist claims in politics, but rather emphasised the domestic function of women. Later as a Fianna Fáil deputy, she contributed to the Dáil debates on a regular basis, representing a Conservative stance on social issues as far as the role of women were concerned.¹⁹⁷ She was convinced that 'Austria, poor bankrupt starving

¹⁹³ 'Austrian Elections', *Freeman's Journal*, 22 October 1923.

¹⁹⁴ Extract from a letter from Sean T. Ó Ceallaigh (Paris) to Eamon de Valera (Dublin), Grand Hotel, Paris, 29 January 1921, NAI DFA ES Paris 1921, *DIFP* vol. i, no. 58, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1921/Holy-See/58.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹⁹⁵ MacMahon, 'The Catholic Clergy', p. 264.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

¹⁹⁷ Mary Clancy, 'Aspects of Women's Contribution to the Oireachtas Debate in the Irish Free State, 1922-1937' in Maria Luddy and Cliona Murphy (eds) *Women surviving: studies in Irish women's history in the 19th & 20th centuries* (Swords: Poolbeg, 1990), pp. 206-232.

Austria' had 'the noblest story to tell of the efforts of her - Catholic women'.¹⁹⁸ St Brigid's League and 'Caritas Socialis' (the latter founded by Seipel) won Concannon's admiration and support; therefore, in her articles in the *Irish Monthly* she called for public support and donations to help the above mentioned charities.¹⁹⁹ Accordingly, Catholic charity efforts in Ireland in the early 1920s focused a great deal of their efforts and sympathy on the independent Austrian state, which they perceived to be in grave socio-economic – but never a religious – crisis. On a much smaller scale there were Irish appeals for helping 'famine stricken children' in post-war Hungary as well.²⁰⁰

The headings of readers' letters to the editor of the *Irish Independent* from March 1922 illustrate the feeling among the Catholic Irish public regarding the conditions of the clergy in Central Europe: 'Help the Austrian Priests' and 'Starving Austrian Priests'.²⁰¹ In addition to the references to the serious state of poverty in Austria, Irish papers and their readership also found the state of the Catholic Church and clergy alarming, calling for donations for the Viennese priests.²⁰² What is more, the death of ex-Emperor Karl also saddened some Irish Catholics. Helena Concannon reminded the readers of the *Irish Independent* that the former monarch had 'touched deeply all Irish Catholic hearts', and that the historical and religious connection between Catholic Ireland and Austria should encourage further donations from the similarly distressed and impoverished Irish public. The connection going back to the days of the 'Wild Geese' was a frequently occurring theme in Irish arguments.²⁰³ Difficulties, however, were likely to arise; as another readers' letter (from 'Kilkenny') complained, it was the medium dealing with the transfer of the donations – an 'English agency' – that upset many charitable Irish Catholics.²⁰⁴

Despite the fact that Catholicism was relevant in relation to Austria than to the Czech lands, the birth of the Czechoslovak Republic and its impact on the Catholic Church there also attracted considerable attention in Ireland. As we have seen above, Richard John Kelly

¹⁹⁸ Helena Concannon, 'St. Brigid's League: A Suggestion' in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. li, no. 597, (March 1923), p. 109.

¹⁹⁹ Helena Concannon, 'The "Caritas Socialis" in Austria' in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. li, (April 1923), p. 157 and p. 160.

²⁰⁰ 'Irish Fund for the Famine Stricken', *Irish Independent*, 17 and 21 February 1920.

²⁰¹ 'Help the Austrian Priests. To the Editor "Irish Independent"', *Irish Independent*, 31 March 1922; 'Starving Austrian Priests. To the Editor "Irish Independent"', *Irish Independent*, 5 April 1922; 'The Austrian Franciscans', *Irish Independent*, 8 March 1923.

²⁰² 'Help the Austrian Priests. To the Editor "Irish Independent"', *Irish Independent*, 31 March 1922.

²⁰³ "'The Hapless Hapsburgs'", *Irish Independent*, 5 April 1922.

²⁰⁴ 'Starving Austrian Priests – "Kilkenny"', *Irish Independent*, 3 May 1922.

emphasised the significance of Catholicism in both Ireland and Bohemia, stressing that they were ‘united by many ties of sympathies and of religion we also in Ireland’.²⁰⁵

Traditionally, the Catholic Church in Bohemia was associated with the Bohemian Germans (and therefore Habsburg rule). After 1918, reminders of the multinational state of the past were banished; officially, Czech nationalists no longer tolerated the symbols of Roman Catholicism, which were closely associated with Habsburg suppression.²⁰⁶ Consequently, the dissolution of the empire of the Catholic Habsburgs was not something that was expected to gain support from the Catholic clergy. The aforementioned James MacCaffrey was aware of the difficulty stemming from ‘the presence of a large German-speaking Catholic minority, and also the fact that a large number of the bishops [were] of German origin.’²⁰⁷ Moreover, the *Irish Independent*, quoting Reverend Dr Phelan, Bishop of Sale, also highlighted the fact that the claim of Bohemian Germans was ‘far greater than the claim of the Orangemen of Ulster’.²⁰⁸ Still, argued Phelan, England did not expect that the Catholics of Bohemia would persecute the Germans when at the same time, the conscience of the English proved to be ‘very sensitive on the Ulster question’.²⁰⁹

As we have seen, after the war, Irish intellectuals, journalists and politicians often associated newly independent Czechoslovakia with the name of President Masaryk. However, Masaryk’s attitude towards the Catholic Church attracted some criticism in Ireland, because of his allegedly (but not detailed) ‘violent attacks on Catholicism’ in the new State, as a result of which ‘a campaign against the old faith was [...] in full swing.’²¹⁰ Masaryk’s relationship with the Czech Jewry, although even more ambiguous, did not attract the attention of Irish contemporaries.²¹¹

Practically, Masaryk supported the full separation of church and state; however, the principle was absent from the 1920 Constitution. In the Declaration of Washington (October 1918),

²⁰⁵ ‘The Bohemian Nation’, the *Tuam Herald*, 23 November 1918.

²⁰⁶ Paces and Wingfield, ‘The Sacred and Profane’, p. 108.

²⁰⁷ MacCaffrey, ‘The Catholic Church in 1918’, p. 92.

²⁰⁸ ‘British Hypocrisy’, *Irish Independent*, 23 July 1919.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ Rev. John Ryan, ‘The Church in Czecho-Slovakia’ in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, vol. xx, (July – December 1922), p. 501.

²¹¹ For a more detailed outline of this aspect of Masaryk’s religious and ideological attitudes, see Hillel J. Kieval, *Languages of Community: The Jewish Experience in the Czech Lands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 198-216.

Masaryk stated that he was ‘for the separation of state and church’, based on the American model of church-state separation. It was only later that this was changed into ‘traditional church-state cooperation.’²¹² Jesuit scholar John Ryan seemed to have been aware of this as he declared that the separation of Church and State was underway.²¹³ According to the report of the *Freeman’s Journal* entitled ‘Church and State: Loyalty to Ideas of Freedom’, President Masaryk stressed that this separation of church and state would not result either in an anti-religious policy, or the adoption of communist practices.²¹⁴ This, however, did not change the fact that the Czechoslovak Government separated church from state, an issue criticized by several Irish Catholic intellectuals. Nonetheless, according to George O’Neill, Masaryk’s achievements far outweighed his flaws. O’Neill, writing in *Studies*, was hopeful that Masaryk’s moderate and impartial policy would be able to unify the people of the newly established republic, regardless of their ethnicity or religion.²¹⁵

The success of the national movement in the Czech lands brought about changes affecting all spheres of life, including religious institutions. Therefore, the Catholic Church experienced ‘some anti-establishment feeling’ after the declaration of the Republic in 1918, which led to the foundation of the anti-Roman Czechoslovak Church in January 1920.²¹⁶ Moreover, the Catholic Church also faced a growth of activity on the part of other religious groups, especially the newly-founded Evangelical Church of the Czech Brethren, which followed the Hussite tradition.²¹⁷ Reverend James MacCaffrey interpreted these changes in the Czech lands in a positive manner, arguing that the clergy in Czecho-Slovakia had been ‘in the very forefront of the nationalist movement’, basing his claim on local press declaration from Prague.²¹⁸ However, MacCaffrey was not aware of the conflicting interests of the Vatican and the reformers the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia.²¹⁹ In contrast, Reverend Ryan in his ‘The Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia’ stressed the unfavourable situation of the Catholic Church since 1918, emphasising that Catholic writers were ‘glossing over the difficulties’ of

²¹² Ludvik Nemeč, ‘The Czechoslovak Heresy and Schism: The Emergence of a National Czechoslovak Church’ in *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, new series, lxx, no. 1, (1975), p. 21.

²¹³ Ryan, ‘The Church in Czecho-Slovakia’, p. 501.

²¹⁴ ‘Bohemia’s Policy. Church and State: Loyalty to Ideas of Freedom’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 5 November 1919.

²¹⁵ George O’Neill, ‘Impressions of Czechoslovakia’ in *Studies*, vol. xi, no. 44, (December 1922), p. 620.

²¹⁶ William V. Wallace, *Czechoslovakia* (London: E. Benn, 1977), p. 178; Nemeč, ‘The Czechoslovak Heresy and Schism’, p. 9; Kalvoda, *The Genesis of Czechoslovakia*, p. 34; J. Krajcar, ‘Czech Republic, The Catholic Church in the’ in Berard L. Marthaler (ed) *New Catholic Encyclopedia 4* (Gale: Catholic University of America, 2003), p. 484.

²¹⁷ Kalvoda, *The Genesis of Czechoslovakia*, p. 34; and Krajcar, ‘Czech Republic’, p. 484.

²¹⁸ MacCaffrey, ‘The Catholic Church in 1918’, p. 92.

²¹⁹ Wallace, *Czechoslovakia*, pp. 178-179.

the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia.²²⁰ Among other Irish confessional authors, Ryan's article stood out in terms of precision. Not only did he dwell on the territorial division of the Czech Lands, he examined Moravia and the Slovak territories as well, the latter of which was traditionally left out of analyses due to their subjection to Hungarians.²²¹

Despite J. J. Lee's claim that in interwar Ireland there was no Jewish question, the writings of the Catholic Irish intelligentsia demonstrate that the controversial status of the Jewry on the Continent had featured in political and cultural discussions in Ireland well before anti-Semitism in National Socialist Germany became embedded in the political discourse of the interwar period.²²² Historian István Deák has emphasised that 'the ultimate victims of the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy have undoubtedly been the Jews'.²²³ The position of Jews in the successor states of Austria-Hungary was debated more in Irish newspapers and journals after 1918 than during the days of the Dual Monarchy. Among Irish contemporaries, Lambert McKenna provided the most accurate explanation for the changed perception of Jews in the territory of the former Habsburg Central Europe. He highlighted that the situation of Jews in Hungary before 1848 was more favourable than in the surrounding countries. By 1914, McKenna argued, the Hungarian middle class was mostly Jewish.²²⁴ The increasing Irish interest may be explained with the association of Jews with the emerging communist menace. Many leaders of the Hungarian communists were Jews: for instance, Irish papers also referred to Béla Kun as 'Cohen' and 'Kuhn'.²²⁵ The latter was mentioned in the *Freeman's Journal* on 26 May 1920, quoting *Bilder aus dem kommunistischen Ungarn* (1920) [*Pictures from Communist Hungary*] by Dr Hans Eisele, newspaper editor and first-hand witness of Bolshevik rule.²²⁶

In his aforementioned analysis in *Studies*, Lambert McKenna emphasised that post-revolution, Hungarians blamed the Jews for the rise of socialism in the country; nevertheless, the author, in a balanced tone, stressed that actually it was the Jews who 'suffered

²²⁰ Ryan, 'The Church in Czecho-Slovakia', p. 494.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 496.

²²² Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985*, p. 78.

²²³ Deák, 'The Habsburg Empire', p. 137.

²²⁴ McKenna, 'The Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary', p. 543.

²²⁵ 'Doctrinaires' Schemes', *Freeman's Journal*, 9 August 1919; and 'In Hungary. First Authentic Account', *Freeman's Journal*, 26 May 1920.

²²⁶ The Dr Eisele in question here is not identical with the SS concentration camp doctor and war criminal, known for his experiments on internees.

proportionately more than any other race from Béla Kun's wild experiment.'²²⁷ James MacCaffrey also provided a connection between religion and communism, attempting to suggest a possible way to stop the spread of extreme left-wing movements. In his forward-looking article, he claimed that the real remedy to 'cure' bolshevism was to unite church and state.²²⁸ He was convinced that social anarchy was a possible threat to religion, the state and social order.²²⁹ Moreover, McKenna noted that in Hungary, despite the stabilisation of political power, anti-Jewish feelings deepened. This was also illustrated by, for instance, the establishment of the aggressive nationalist anti-Semitic group called 'League of Awakening Hungarians'. The association was banned by the Bethlen Government in 1923; nonetheless, it remained a significant ideological force throughout the interwar years. The *Freeman's Journal* compared the group to the Fascisti of Italy, hoping to peacefully overthrow the Horthy Government and re-establishing the Hapsburg dynasty.'²³⁰

McKenna found the Jewish problem 'acuter than ever' as the proportion of Jews became greater in independent Hungary than in the empire.²³¹ He proved aware of the fact that the government introduced the 'Numerus Clausus' in September 1920, which, without mentioning Jews *per se*, sought to ensure that the proportion of Jews in universities, schools, banks, factories, and all state offices did not exceed their proportion in the total population.²³² McKenna concluded that Hungary owed much to the Jews; 'indeed she could hardly do without them. They should, therefore, be given full credit for their services and encouraged to continue them.'²³³ This, he predicted, should be successful due to the Christian and national aspect of the government's official policy. Furthermore, the change in the successor states' ethnic composition also resulted in the more visible presence of the Jewry, especially in Hungary. The peculiarity of the situation lay in the fact that the 'disappearance' of ethnicities left the Jews as the only significant minority, which had not been particularly visible prior to 1918. But following the lost war, the 'red terror' (often associated with Jewish leadership) and the lost territories, the presence of Jews 'as a foreign body [...] provoked irritation.'²³⁴

²²⁷ McKenna, 'The Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary', p. 541.

²²⁸ MacCaffrey, 'The Catholic Church in 1918', p. 93.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

²³⁰ 'Reported Move to Restore the Habsburgs in Hungary', *Freeman's Journal*, 12 March 1923; and McKenna, 'The Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary', p. 556.

²³¹ McKenna, 'The Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary', p. 557.

²³² Jörg K. Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary 1867-1994* (New York: Longman, 1996), p. 107; McKenna, 'The Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary', p. 558.

²³³ McKenna, 'The Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary', p. 558.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 554.

As far as Bohemian Jews were concerned, since it was difficult to distinguish between the Jewish and German population on the basis of census returns, the Jewry were viewed as outsiders not because of their own religion but due to the linguistic confusion with the German-speaking minorities.²³⁵ Although the 1921 census allowed Jews to describe their national identity as Jewish, Derek Sayer claims that this was only a fifth of the actual number.²³⁶ Some of them described themselves as Czechoslovak or German; therefore, there were examples for multiple loyalties in the post-war era as well.

In the immediate post-war years, Austria was not perceived by Irish commentators to be much affected by the 'Jewish problem'. The aforementioned John J. R. O'Beirne's first-hand account was a rare one to describe the role of Galician Jews in the economic crisis in Vienna. He elaborated on how the Galician Jews, who had fled to Vienna before or during the war had got back 'on their feet, started making money, then gambling on the exchanges, and they amassed wealth in a few years', adding that they were detested by other Jews in Vienna, as well as hated by Christians.²³⁷ O'Beirne's remark was confirmed by historian Brigitte Hamann, who similarly argued that the Galician Jewish immigrants 'aroused jealousy and hatred' in certain native Viennese, who could not keep up with modern innovations like factories or department stores.²³⁸ Moreover, John W. Mason has highlighted that in the second half of the nineteenth century, the number of the Jewish population had significantly increased, particularly in Vienna due to the influx of Galician Jews.²³⁹ Therefore, it appeared that, similarly to Hungary's downfall due to the influence of the Jewish Béla Kun and Tibor Szamuely, one segment of the Jewish population in Vienna was also seen responsible for the plight of Austria. Since these Jews originated from Galicia, this perception may also be revealing the negative Irish opinion regarding the legacy of the empire's nationality problem.

²³⁵ Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, p. 160.

²³⁶ According to Sayer, 5900 claimed themselves to be Jewish in Prague in 1921, while the actual number of Jews in Prague to be 31,751. See Derek Sayer, 'The Language of Nationality and the Nationality of Language: Prague 1780-1920' in *Past & Present*, no. 153, (November 1996), p. 179.

²³⁷ 'Across Some New Frontiers. An Irishman's Observations during a Visit to the Reconstructed Nations. By John J. R. O'Beirne. (Author of Serbo-Croatian Self-Taught, etc.). "Vienna, the Doomed City"', *Freeman's Journal*, 25 August 1921.

²³⁸ Brigitte Hamann, *Hitler's Vienna: a Dictator's Apprenticeship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 328.

²³⁹ Pauley, 'Political Antisemitism in Interwar Vienna', p. 153; and Mason, *The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire*, p. 21.

Conclusion

It is clear that contemporary Irish intellectuals, politicians and journalists were aware of the transformation of Austria-Hungary after the Great War and also had a genuine interest in the changing identities in Habsburg Central Europe. The primary points of Irish interest were the following: the revolutionary turmoil in the newly independent successor states of the Dual Monarchy; the controversial nature of the border settlements and territorial changes; and the impact of Catholicism on Irish perceptions. Importantly, it was the combination of these issues that characterised Catholic Irish nationalist opinion of Central Europe.

After January 1919, the activities of the 'roaming' Sinn Féin envoys on the Continent added another level of interest in the lands of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Travel accounts also provided interesting insights; those of Jesuit Professor George O'Neill about political and religious developments in Czechoslovakia; University College Dublin student Celia Shaw and Irish Slavonicist John J. R. O'Beirne concerning the poverty in Austria. Moreover, the lasting reputation of Richard John Kelly reached beyond the Great War, highlighting historical connections between the Irish and the Czechs. Furthermore, Irish scholars proved to have exceptional knowledge of the political changes in Central Europe, without having travelled there, like Catholic social thinker Lambert McKenna of left-wing movements and Professor of History at National University Galway, Helena Concannon of the social aspects of Catholicism.

A variety of Irish nationalist sources demonstrated an Irish awareness of an internal 'other' that complicated the minority situation in Central European 'nation-states' after 1918. This was linked to the conflicting interests of ethnic minorities (and, as per Brubaker, their associated 'external homelands'), and the state-forming majorities within these states. The (perceived) antagonism was not always based on ethnic and therefore linguistic lines; religion and local/regional affiliations played a crucial role as well, like the cases of the South Tyrol and Bohemia illustrated. In the latter, there was an odd division between the state majority-forming Czechs and Slovaks as a result of the 'lack of a convincing shared Other.'²⁴⁰ Nancy M. Wingfield has noted that after 1918 for the Czechs, the 'other' was represented by the

²⁴⁰ Nancy M. Wingfield, 'Introduction' in Nancy M. Wingfield (ed) *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), p. 11.

Germans of the Bohemian borderlands. In contrast, for the Slovak nationalists, the Czechs started to replace the former 'other', the Magyars.²⁴¹ Therefore, ethnic and religious heterogeneity in both regions suggested the potential for conflict; this will be detailed in Chapters 3 and 4.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

3. Irish images of Central European identities, 1923-1937

The period between 1923 and 1932 saw the consolidation of Free State politics under the pro-Treaty William T. Cosgrave's Cumann na nGaedheal Government together with the internationalisation of Irish politics, due to Ireland's entry to the League of Nations in September 1923. The Cosgrave administration had high hopes for gaining support and recognition from other small states in the League, in addition to the existing relationship with other dominions within the Commonwealth.¹ Therefore, by 1932, the Free State had 'enjoyed complete freedom of action in the Commonwealth as a result of the Statute of Westminster, which was passed in 1931.'² Although the dominions were 'not entirely free to pursue an independent line in the field of foreign relations', the Irish Free State proved to be creative when exercising its international autonomy, particularly within the League, where the Dominions were represented individually.³ However, under Patrick McGilligan (Minister for External Affairs, 1927-1932), Ireland's diplomatic network had expanded and had identified 'coherent aims and objectives', resulting in the establishment of a 'small, though well-developed, external relations network' by 1929.⁴

The first two decades of the Irish Free State should not be characterised as inward-looking, either in cultural or political terms. As Patricia Clavin has argued, there is a need for challenging 'the typical characterisation of interwar Europe as a period when the forces of nationalism drowned out those of internationalism.'⁵ In order to illustrate Irish openness towards Europe, this chapter starts with a discussion of Irish links with small Central European states in Geneva, followed by the cases of Austrian, Hungarian and Czechoslovak (honorary) consulates in Dublin, highlighting their significance in cultural terms as well. The following sections will be devoted to Irish perceptions of the political instability in the successor states, inseparable from the growing sense of irredentism in the region. Since the

¹ For a detailed discussion on the legal interpretation of Ireland's dominion status and League membership (focusing on the sovereignty of the Irish Free State), see Michael Rynn's doctoral thesis, 'Die völkerrechtliche Stellung Irlands' [The International Legal Position of Ireland] (München: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1930). Rynne, who was legal adviser to the Department of External Affairs after 1936, 'prophesied, among other things, the return of the treaty ports to Ireland, and also envisaged Irish neutrality in the event of another major war.' See Michael Rynne, Joseph McNabb, Michael Kennedy, 'Rynne, Michael Andrew Lysaght', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a7887>, accessed on 21 April 2015.

² Keown, 'Creating an Irish Foreign Policy', p. 26.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Kennedy, *Ireland and the League of Nations*, p. 128.

⁵ Clavin, 'Defining Transnationalism', p. 429.

impact of the challenging socio-political changes was the most visible in the borderland regions, Irish perceptions of the religious and/or ethnic minorities of those areas are also examined.

In the early 1920s, bilateral relations were limited to the United States and Great Britain; the pre-independence missions in Rome and Berlin were closed down in 1923 and 1924, respectively. At that stage, only Washington, London and Geneva remained as diplomatic posts abroad, together with the trade and general offices in Paris and Brussels. Then in 1929, three new missions were opened at the level of Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary in Berlin, Paris and the Vatican.⁶ Dermot Keogh has emphasised that the expansion of the department in 1929 was a ‘hit-and-miss affair’ because due to the lack of experienced senior diplomats, the department had to ‘recruit at ministerial level from outside the civil service.’⁷ This was followed by the opening the legation in Spain in 1935 and Italy in 1938.⁸

By the time Fianna Fáil took over government from Cumann na nGaedheal in 1932, Ireland was already recognised, in the words of former Minister for External Affairs, Patrick McGilligan, ‘as one of the main upholders of the complete independence of the smaller states.’⁹ Admittedly, at the time of the change-over in 1932, ‘if there was any one area where discontinuity was likely to emerge between the policies of Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil it was certain to be in the field of foreign policy’.¹⁰ Nevertheless, continuity was provided by the presence of the Secretary, Joseph P. Walshe, as well as in the attitudes in handling Church-State-relations. The latter had a major impact on Irish links with the wider world, in addition to those with the Vatican.¹¹ Additionally, Ireland’s League policy remained along the same lines after 1932; support for the League was unchallenged, even after ‘the world order changed in favour of the great powers’.¹² Had it not been for the League, argued Seán Lester, the Free State’s Permanent Representative at Geneva, great powers were most likely to ignore

⁶ Kennedy, p. 190; Keogh and O’Driscoll, ‘Ireland’, p. 285; and *DIFP* vol. ii, p. xv; *DIFP* vol. iii, pp. xii-xiv.

⁷ Dermot Keogh, ‘Profile of Joseph Walshe, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 1922-1946’ in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. iii, no. 2, (1990), p. 68.

⁸ *DIFP* vol. v, pp. 520-521.

⁹ Keown, ‘Creating an Irish Foreign Policy’, p. 27.

¹⁰ Keogh, *Ireland and Europe*, p. 35.

¹¹ Dermot Keogh, ‘The Role of the Catholic Church in the Republic of Ireland 1922-1995’ in Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, *Building Trust in Ireland* (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1996), p. 117.

¹² Kennedy, *Ireland and the League of Nations*, p. 190 and p. 223.

the small. Therefore, the League was seen as, according to Lester, the ‘best, if not [the] only platform the Free State had’.¹³

The 1930s saw the strengthening of extreme political movements (both left and right) that had gained ground across the Continent in the aftermath of the Great War. In an era characterised by a growing sense of anti-communism, even Fianna Fáil’s ascent to power in 1932 with the support of Labour was interpreted as the government surrendering to ‘the Irish “Reds”’.¹⁴ As far as the wider European context was concerned, Hitler’s rise to power in Germany in 1933, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and the outbreak on the Spanish Civil War in 1936, had a major impact on the political climate in both Europe and Ireland. These events implied that the League of Nation was losing control and an international military crisis could be imminent.¹⁵ Under de Valera’s leadership, the Free State continued to play an important role in the declining League, up until the Italo-Abyssinian crisis.¹⁶ Not without foundation, the Irish Government, as the champion of small nations’ rights and supporter of collective security, feared that ‘it could well share Ethiopia’s fate’. Therefore, argued Kennedy, ‘the League could no longer inspire confidence to Ireland and the other small states.’¹⁷ In his famous speech of July 1936, de Valera spoke up at Geneva against any aggression that small nations may suffer:

...Despite our judicial equality here, in matters such as European peace, the small States are powerless. As I have already said, peace is dependent upon the will of the great States. All the small States can do, if the statesmen of the greater States fail in their duty, is resolutely to determine that they will not become the tools of any great Power and that they will resist with whatever strength they may possess every attempt to force them into a war against their will.¹⁸

¹³ Letter from Seán Lester to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (S. Gen 1/17) (Confidential), Geneva, 31 March 1933, NAI DFA 26/51, *DIFP* vol. iv, no. 183, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1933/League-of-Nations-policy/1552.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015; Personal Correspondence between de Valera and Seán Lester, League of Nations High Commissioner for Danzig, 2 November 1933, Éamon de Valera Papers, UCDA P150/2785; and Zara Steiner, *The Lights That Failed. European International History 1919-1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 353.

¹⁴ *United Irishman*, 11 March 1933, quoted in McGarry, *Eoin O’Duffy*, p. 200.

¹⁵ For Irish accounts of the changing domestic events in Germany, see Mervyn O’Driscoll, ‘Inter-war Irish-German Diplomacy: Continuity, Ambiguity and Appeasement in Irish Foreign Policy’ in Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly (eds) *Irish Foreign Policy 1919-1966: From Independence to Internationalism* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2000), p. 75.

¹⁶ For a detailed assessment of the impact of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict on Irish League policy and de Valera’s eventual abandonment of the notion of collective security, see Martha Kavanagh, ‘The Irish Free State and Collective Security: 1930-36’ in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. xv, (2004), pp. 103-122.

¹⁷ Kennedy, *Ireland and the League of Nations*, p. 221.

¹⁸ Éamon de Valera’s speech at the Assembly of the League in Geneva on 2 July 1936, Éamon de Valera Papers, UCDA P150/2806 July 1936; and Maurice Moynihan, *Speeches and Statements by Eamon de Valera, 1917-73* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1980), pp. 282-285.

Consequently, after 1935, the role of the League was re-evaluated in Ireland. However, it remained crucial as ‘an international meeting place’ and a source of information for the Irish.¹⁹ From 1936, this involved a commitment to non-intervention, both in relation to the Spanish Civil War, and after the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939.²⁰ This did not mean the decreasing importance of small nations in Irish political discourse, rather a re-interpretation into a different political framework.

Irish links with small states in the League of Nations

During the first decade of independence, the embryonic Irish diplomatic service relied on connections with great powers as well as other small states, which opened new dimensions for Ireland. According to Michael Kennedy, the secret of this success was the fact that the Free State was ‘appealing to each state’s views on the League and Ireland’s past role there, rather than national rivalries and jealousies.’²¹ This attitude distinguished the Irish from the rest of the small states, most of whom, in contrast, chose to form groups within the League to further pursue their interests. Undoubtedly, in interwar Europe, the existence of the League of Nations was of central importance for small states such as the Irish Free State as it aimed to provide collective security to all member states. In addition to Irish delegates Michael MacWhite, Seán Lester and Francis Cremins, other prominent personalities such as John Marcus O’Sullivan also represented Ireland at the League of Nations, contributing to the internationalisation of Irish political discourse. Furthermore, it was not only in Geneva that Irish diplomats made contact with other small nations. In addition to Count Gerard Kelly de Gallagher in Paris and Timothy Smiddy in London, Daniel Binchy, the Irish minister in Berlin, was also ‘well-acquainted with most of those who represent European countries.’²² Therefore, there was a growing sense of interest in Europe, due to ‘Ireland’s past links with the continent, [which] implicitly supported a European-oriented foreign policy’.²³

¹⁹ Kennedy, *Ireland and the League of Nations*, p. 224.

²⁰ Keatinge, *A Place among the Nations*, p. 87.

²¹ Kennedy, *Ireland and the League of Nations*, p. 149.

²² Patrick Maume, ‘O’Sullivan, John Marcus’, *DIB*; and Confidential Report from Daniel A. Binchy to Joseph Walshe (Dublin), Berlin, 27 May 1930, NAI DFA EA 231/4/B *DIFP* vol. iii, no. 373, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1930/General-Report-on-Berlin-Legation/1083.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015; and Nolan, *Joseph Walshe*, p. 34.

²³ Keown, ‘Creating an Irish Foreign Policy’, p. 36.

As we have seen, even prior to joining the League, Irish self-image was closely associated with the concept of ‘small nations’, creating a link between Ireland and other small member states. In an interview with the *Irish Independent*, diplomat Michael MacWhite emphasised that ‘unlike the British Dominions, Ireland [was] a European State, which after a forced absence of several centuries [was] about to take her place again in the comity of nations’.²⁴ At the time of the interview, MacWhite was the Dáil Éireann representative to Switzerland, and after Ireland’s admission to the League of Nations, he became the permanent Irish delegate to the League. He painted a picture of a positive, forward-looking small Irish state, whose priorities lay with Europe and which would undoubtedly be welcomed by the representatives of the League of Nations as ‘most of them in similar crises had the same difficulties in their own countries.’²⁵

After the foundation of the Free State, strengthening Ireland’s international position was of primary importance for the new administration. As the aforementioned Kevin O’Shiel mentioned in a secret and confidential memorandum in February 1923, this was indispensable before Ireland ‘embarked on any such delicate affair as the Boundary issue. For this reason we should certainly take steps to join the League of Nations.’²⁶ Becoming a League member was therefore seen as a great step forward in the Europeanisation of Ireland, in hope of making connections with other small states with boundary issues.²⁷ O’Shiel, while confirming Irish enthusiasm for the young state’s entry especially due to the League’s declared policy of protecting minorities, also warned that other little nations’ greeting ‘was not wholly altruistic’.²⁸ He claimed that little nations saw in the Irish entry merely ‘the prospects of one more vote against the designs and potency of the big powers which have always frightened them and against which they have always been struggling since the formation of the League.’²⁹ Moreover, O’Shiel argued that Britain did not share the enthusiasm of little

²⁴ ‘Friendly Europe. Attitude to Irish Free State’, *Irish Independent*, 19 September 1922.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Memoranda by Kevin O’Shiel, October 1922 – October 1923, Patrick McGilligan Papers, UCDA P35b/132; Kennedy, *Ireland and the League of Nations*, p. 28, and Marie Coleman, ‘O’Shiel, Kevin Roantree Shields’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a7053>, accessed on 27 October 2014; and Kevin O’Shiel, Secret and Confidential memorandum on the Boundary Question sent, to every member of the Executive Council on 10 February 1923, NAI DT S2027, *DIFP* vol. ii, no. 35, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1923/Establishment-of-the-Boundary-Commission/371.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Memorandum by [Kevin O’Shiel] with covering letter, July 1923, Eoin MacNeill Papers, UCDA LA1/95.

²⁹ Memorandum by Kevin O’Shiel on the Boundary Issue and

nations, fearing that the growing influence and number of ‘quite small, numerically weak and economically poor countries’ would lead to Ireland acting more independently than Britain.³⁰

On 10 September 1923, Irish President of the Executive Council William T. Cosgrave announced that Ireland had ‘entered into a new bond of union with her sister nations, great and small’, following the old Irish tradition of creating ‘bonds of culture and of friendly intercourse with every nation’.³¹ The Irish Government and press were enthusiastic about joining the League, and according to the *Freeman’s Journal’s* interviewer in Geneva, so were the representatives of other small states. These delegates (representatives of Norway, Belgium, Finland, and Romania) welcomed Ireland in the League and among the society of small nations, emphasising the importance of parallels and co-operation, the success of which was most visible in the reconstruction of Austria.³² Moreover, the newly founded (31 July 1923) League of Nations Society of Ireland also aimed to draw attention to the importance of Ireland’s League membership and ‘to stimulate interest in the Saorstát Delegation to the Assembly’.³³

In May 1925, Minister for External Affairs Desmond FitzGerald expressed a strong Irish desire for international peace.³⁴ Most importantly, he highlighted that Ireland had ‘no aspirations to territorial aggrandisement’ and was merely interested in the welfare of Irish people.³⁵ He negotiated Irish entry into the League and successfully represented the Free State at the League and at the imperial conferences among other Commonwealth nations in 1923 and 1926.³⁶ This was noteworthy given the date of the statement – only a few months before the expected final decision of the Boundary Commission regarding the border between the

League of Nations Policy, Geneva, 1 September 1923, NAI DT S3332, *DIFP* vol. ii, no. 135, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1923/League-of-Nations-and-the-Boundary-Commission/471.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Speech by William T. Cosgrave to the Assembly of the League of Nations on Ireland’s admission to the League of Nations, Geneva, 10 September 1923, NAI DT S3332, *DIFP* vol. ii, no. 118, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1923/Admission-speech-to-League-of-Nations/454.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³² ‘Ireland’s Place in the League. Interesting Interviews with Representatives of Other Small Nations (By Our Special Representative at Geneva)’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 22 September 1923.

³³ League of Nations Society of Ireland. Statement of policy, NLI Ir 32341 p 74/2.

³⁴ Dáil statement made by Desmond FitzGerald on the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Geneva Protocol), Dublin, 13 May 1925, NAI DFA LN95, *DIFP* vol. ii, no. 315, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1925/Irish-Free-State-position-on-the-Geneva-Protocol/651.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ William Murphy, ‘FitzGerald, (Thomas Joseph) Desmond’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a3136>, accessed on 19 December 2014.

Irish Free State and Northern Ireland. As for the antagonism between small states and great powers, FitzGerald anticipated that sanctions may prove to be effective ‘only when enforced against small states.’³⁷

As far as Irish images of other small nations were concerned, there appeared to have been a sharp contrast in Irish reports. The permanent representative of the Irish Free State at Geneva, Seán Lester, and Eoin MacNeill, who was the Free State’s representative on the Boundary Commission, repeatedly gave voice to their preference for non-aligned small states like Austria or Hungary, in contrast to alliances and groups such as the Little Entente or the Commonwealth. Patrick Keatinge has also highlighted that, as League members, Irish delegations, especially under Valera, always aimed to take an independent attitude and were not ‘adopting some “block” [sic] idea may stand up to further investigation.’³⁸ More specifically, as early as September 1923, MacNeill took note of the fact that ‘the smaller nations in the League [did] not act in concert’, differentiating between an American group; the Baltic group that was leaning toward Great Britain; and a ‘group in loose touch with France’, comprising of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Roumania. Hungary’, emphasised MacNeill, was ‘isolated’.³⁹ Similarly, in 1930, Lester claimed that the Little Entente was ‘the worst type of group in the League, being bounded together more in enmity against Hungary and the other defeated powers than for peaceful co-operative purposes or for the mere purposes of election’.⁴⁰ Therefore, he placed the greatest emphasis on gaining ‘support from other independent, non-group countries like Austria and Hungary’, seeing more in common with the latter two and not necessarily the Commonwealth nations.⁴¹ Nevertheless, Lester emphasised that there was not ‘a Dominions group in the same way as, say, the Little-Entente. [...] If Ireland got elected to the Council he would find that she would act quite independently.’⁴² This distinction remained valid throughout the interwar period,

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Keatinge, *A Place among the Nations*, pp. 75-76.

³⁹ Extract from a report on the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations (September 1923) by Eoin MacNeill, Dublin, 4 October 1923, NAI DT 33332, *DIFP* vol. ii, no. 138, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1923/Fourth-Assembly-of-the-League-of-Nations/474.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

⁴⁰ Letter from Seán Lester to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (X. 12/56), Geneva, 3 September 1930, NAI DFA 26/95, *DIFP* vol. iii, no. 408, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1930/Candidature-for-election-to-League-Council/1117.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

⁴¹ Memorandum from Seán Lester to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (X.12/22), Geneva, 13 May 1930, NAI DFA 26/95, *DIFP* vol. iii, no. 370, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1930/Candidature-for-election-to-League-Council/1080.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

⁴² Ibid.

demonstrating the deepening conflict between the former Central Powers, especially Austria and Hungary, in contrast to the newly independent Poland and the Little Entente.

The general significance of small nations after 1918 was also recognised by the world-travelled journalist and war correspondent Francis McCullagh, who had formerly reported from most of Eastern Europe as well.⁴³ ‘Small nations are more important now than they were before 1914,’ argued McCullagh, writing in 1929, adding that ‘their languages and histories [were] studied with more respect in the great Capitals of Europe.’⁴⁴ As a matter of fact, he referred to the aforementioned British historian, R. W. Seton-Watson’s support for the Czechs as ‘rather annoying’.⁴⁵

Central European representation in Ireland

As mentioned above, the Free State had to rely on a limited network of bilateral relations in the 1920s and links with Central Europe were particularly restricted, reduced to honorary consulates and consulates in Dublin, not employing official diplomats but mostly businessmen who applied voluntarily to fill those positions. Although the young diplomatic service still faced financial problems, primary evidence indicates that the existence of consular links with Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia should not be ignored.

From the mid-1920s, after the transitory period of what Patrick Keatinge termed an ‘administrative vacuum’, Irish representatives were sent to great powers such as Germany and the United States of America, in addition to receiving the representatives of small nations like Austria, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia.⁴⁶ Thus even though the Irish diplomatic presence in Europe was quite small at the time, it was a fact that ‘the major Continental powers kept a consular and diplomatic presence in Dublin.’⁴⁷ The U.S. Consul-General in Dublin, Charles M. Hathaway (1924-1927), also noted the ‘growing number of consul representatives in Ireland’, concluding that ‘the main reason for this regeneration of diplomatic interest in

⁴³ Patrick Maume, ‘McCullagh, Francis’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5634>, accessed on 9 March 2015; and Francis McCullagh, ‘Notes on Linguistic Studies in Paris’ in *Studies*, vol. xviii, no. 69, (March 1929), pp. 111-123.

⁴⁴ McCullagh, ‘Notes on Linguistic Studies in Paris’, p. 111.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁴⁶ Cited in Nolan, *Joseph Walshe*, p. 21.

⁴⁷ Keogh, *Ireland and Europe*, p. 24.

Ireland was the “changed status” of the Irish Free State.⁴⁸ As Aengus Nolan has pointed out, establishing an efficient foreign service was of key importance in order to convince the sceptics at the Department of Finance that the Department of External Affairs was worthy of being ‘an independent administrative entity’ on its own.⁴⁹ The existence of the Irish diplomatic service, therefore, was ‘more than a symbol of independence and sovereignty’.⁵⁰ Among others, Ben Tonra (1999) has noted the crucial role that the Department of External Affairs played in establishing the status of the Free State both within the British Commonwealth and the League of Nations. Undoubtedly, the Department contributed to an early stage of Europeanisation that was fulfilled later in the process of European integration.⁵¹ During the interwar years, Catholicism was a common ground that the Department and the independent Irish Free State wished to count on when establishing further contacts. Certainly, Joseph Walshe’s enthusiasm ‘for Catholic Europe’ was a major contributing factor in this.⁵²

In the early years of independence, the founders of the new state ‘sought to change not only the way the Irish interacted with the outside world, but also the way the rest of the world perceived the Irish.’⁵³ That is to say, by drawing primarily on the Free State’s multiple identities, connections were established with Europe, the Irish diaspora across the globe, and also the Commonwealth. Admittedly, the significance of Britain and the dominions cannot be ignored. For instance, in the context of Central European enquiries as to establishing posts in Ireland, all initial official communications went through the Governor General before 1 May 1927. The press statement by Ernest Blythe, dated 15 December 1927, established that since 1 May of the same year, the Governor General had ‘ceased to be the formal official channel of communication between the Saorstát and British Governments’.⁵⁴ Complications around the post became more visible under de Valera’s term as Minister for External Affairs, who aimed to gradually erode the powers of the Governor General. Finally the office lost its significance

⁴⁸ Nolan, *Joseph Walshe*, p. 28 and p. 345.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁵⁰ Keogh, *Ireland and Europe*, p. 19.

⁵¹ Ben Tonra, ‘The Europeanisation of Irish Foreign Affairs’ in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. x (1999), p. 153.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁵³ Keown, ‘Creating an Irish Foreign Policy’, p. 42.

⁵⁴ Press statement by Ernest Blythe on the appointment and functions of the Governor General, Dublin, 15 December 1927, NAI DFA 4/1, *DIFP* vol. iii, no. 125, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1927/Appointment-and-functions-of-Governor-General/840.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

and was abolished in 1936, as part of de Valera's efforts to remove 'the humiliating legacy of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.'⁵⁵

Irish records indicate that both career consuls and honorary consuls represented the interests of the successor states of Austria-Hungary in interwar Ireland. Essentially, the main functions of consuls included protecting their countrymen's interests in the host country, and 'furthering the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations between the sending State and the receiving State'; dealing with passports; and fulfilling administrative duties.⁵⁶ While career consuls (or professional consuls) were mostly nationals of the sending state without any engagements in private business of any kind, honorary consuls, on the other hand, were residents – most likely businessmen – of the receiving state, who take up an interest in establishing further connections with the appointing country.⁵⁷ Most importantly, honorary consuls were to be of good social standing and reputation in the local community.⁵⁸ Their duties were less politically sensitive than those of consuls; however, cultivating economic and cultural links between the appointing and the receiving states was still significant.

Although the history of Czechoslovak consular representation in the Irish Free State is well documented, its potential has not been fully exploited yet. As pointed out in the Introduction to the present thesis, in his short study entitled *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations 1900-1950* (2009), Daniel Samek has touched upon the issue of Czechoslovak representation in Ireland, relying mostly on files from the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The first step in the official Czech-Irish relationship was taken in January 1924, when the Czechoslovak Government decided to open a consulate in London under the charge of Dr František Pavlásek. Since the Irish Free State was included within the sphere of competence of the Czechoslovak Consul in London, this also meant the beginning of Czechoslovak-Irish diplomatic relations.⁵⁹ First and foremost, this demonstrated that the initiative was taken by

⁵⁵ Nolan, *Joseph Walshe*, p. 66; and Keogh, *Ireland and Europe*, p. 25; Fearghal McGarry, "'Too Damned Tolerant': Republicans and Imperialism in the Irish Free State' in Fearghal McGarry (ed) *Republicanism in Modern Ireland* (Dublin: UCD Press, 2003), p. 80.

⁵⁶ Luke T. Lee and John Quigley, (eds) *Consular Law and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 664.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 567.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 572.

⁵⁹ Letter from J. H. Thomas to the Government General T. M. Healy, 19 January 1924, NAI DFA/318/33/1A, G/Beigh 2/262/29.

the Czechs, aiming to develop trade connections and expanding their foreign markets by establishing economic links with other states.⁶⁰

In February 1925, speculation started regarding the possibility of appointing Czechoslovak honorary consuls in Dublin, Belfast and Cork, as is indicated by a letter of Denis P.

O’Riordan of Dowdall & Co. Ltd. (Steam Ship agents and Brokers). O’Riordan was hopeful that either him or his company director, John Callaghan Foley, got the position, keeping it for his company and ‘not in the hands of any other firm in the town.’⁶¹ As there had been no official communication received by the Irish Government concerning any appointments, and choosing applicants was the responsibility of foreign governments, the secretary of the Department of External Affairs informed O’Riordan that any applications should be addressed to the Czechoslovak Government.⁶² Therefore, even if the correspondence did not lead to an appointment at this stage, it showed that as early as 1925, there was an interest in Irish business circles in establishing connections with Czechoslovakia.

Eventually, in July 1925, the Czechoslovak Government appointed Richard John Kelly as Honorary Consul of Czechoslovakia.⁶³ As shown in Chapter 1, Kelly was not unknown in Czech circles as he visited Bohemia several times before Czechoslovak independence was declared. However, only half year after his appointment as honorary consul, in January 1926, Kelly informed the officials that he was not able to ‘undertake and discharge the duties as Honorary Consul of Czechoslovakia.’⁶⁴ The Czech side was very disillusioned and it certainly did not help Kelly’s position that shortly afterwards he became the Honorary Consul of Estonia.⁶⁵ What is more, he also represented Bolivia and Romania at the same time, and was just about to try his luck with the Honorary Consulate of Austria in Dublin.⁶⁶ After the incident with Kelly, Pavlásek was still keen on appointing honorary consular representatives

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Letter from Denis P. O’Riordan to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cork, 16 February 1925, NAI DFA/318/33/1A, G/Beigh 2/262/29.

⁶² Letter from the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs to Denis P. O’Riordan, Dublin, 17 February 1925, NAI DFA/318/33/1A, G/Beigh 2/262/29.

⁶³ Letter from Jan Masaryk to Austen Chamberlain, London, 14 July, 1925, NAI DFA/318/33/1A, G/Beigh 2/262/29.

⁶⁴ Letter from Dr. V. Braf to Austen Chamberlain, 18 January, 1926, NAI DFA/318/33/1A, G/Beigh 2/262/29. According to Samek, renting an office in Dublin city centre would have been too costly for Kelly and as a result of the miscommunication with the Czechoslovak officials, he gave up the title of Honorary Consul. See Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations*, p. 42.

⁶⁵ Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations*, p. 43.

⁶⁶ Consular representation of Austria in Ireland, London, 12 November 1928, NAI DFA 319/26 Z1.1638.

in Dublin.⁶⁷ Eventually in October 1929, Pavel Růžička was appointed as Consul of the Czechoslovak Republic in Dublin, receiving the King's Exequatur a month later.⁶⁸ It greatly furthered Růžička's case that he was recommended by Jan Masaryk, son of Tomáš Masaryk and Czechoslovak Ambassador to Britain at the time, as 'an old friend' of his.⁶⁹ Růžička's achievements as consul indicate that Czech culture became well known in Dublin. One of the most outstanding diplomatic events took place in October 1930, when the Czech National Day was celebrated at the Czechoslovak Consulate in Dublin. Notably, it was covered in the Irish newspapers and attended by the Governor-General, several members of the Executive Council, members of other legations and others – including Hubert Briscoe or Dr Walter Starkie, both with Hungarian connections.⁷⁰

In his public lectures and speeches, Růžička always stressed the significance of the links between the national language, literature, and independence. His speech of January 1930, presented at the Dublin Writers' Club, was attended by several diplomatic personalities including Joseph Walshe and Hubert Briscoe, the Honorary Consul of Hungary. The talk, entitled 'The Literature of Czecho-Slovakia', touched upon contemporary Czech works as well as the connection between the Czech nation and the Czech language and literature, which were near extinction before the Czech re-awakening.⁷¹ In the subsequent years, the Czech language revival continued to feature in the works of Irish authors just as frequently as before 1918, not in the least thanks to the efforts of Růžička. For instance, Gaelic activist Seán Ó Loingsigh (John J. Lynch), who 'joined the ranks of scholars interested in Czech matters' in 1932, gave a lecture in Irish on the topic of the Czech language revival, based on Růžička's research material.⁷² Two years later, in March 1934, the secretary to the consul for Czechoslovakia, Alec. Hortigova gave a similar lecture, entitled 'The Czechs and Their Language', about which de Valera's *Irish Press* also reported.⁷³ The speech, 'under the

⁶⁷ Letter from the Office of the High Commissioner to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, London, 9 April 1926, DFA/318/33/1A, G/Beigh 2/262/29.

⁶⁸ Letter from F. F. Cremins to the High Commissioner, Dublin, 14 October, 1929, NAI DFA/318/33/1A, G/Beigh 2/262/29; 'Mr. Pavel Ruzicka, the new Czecho-Slovakian Consul in Dublin', *Irish Independent*, 25 November 1929; Letter from Pavel Růžička to the Minister of External Affairs, Dublin, 29 January, 1931, NAI DFA/318/33/1A, G/Beigh 2/262/29; and Letter from the Secretary of the Department of Justice to Seán Murphy, Dublin, 28 February, 1931, NAI DFA/318/33/1A, G/Beigh 2/262/29.

⁶⁹ Handwritten letter from Jan Masaryk to the Czechoslovak Minister in London, 5 October 1929, NAI DFA/318/33/1A, G/Beigh 2/262/29.

⁷⁰ 'Czech National Day. Celebration in Dublin', *Irish Independent*, 29 October 1930.

⁷¹ 'Re-Awakening of the Czechs. Priests and Press', *Irish Independent*, 23 January 1930.

⁷² Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations*, p. 45.

⁷³ 'Government Notices', *Irish Press*, 16 March 1934; and 'Celts and Czechs: Oldtime Links', *Irish Press*, 24 March 1934.

auspices of Conradh na Gaedhilge [sic]', covered many items of common interest such as the Irish college in Prague, founded in the seventeenth century.

Moreover, Czechoslovak business- and tradesmen with Irish interests also found it crucial to emphasise the significance of national language and economic self-sufficiency for small nations like Czechoslovakia and Ireland. Among others, Herr Jan J. Vyslouzil, representative of the Czechoslovak Export Institute (Burgh Quay, Dublin), highlighted this connection in his address at a Rotary Club meeting in March 1937.⁷⁴ As far as economic links were concerned, the Czech contributions to the Irish economy included the foundation of the following sugar processing factories with the contribution of Růžička: Carlow, Mallow, followed by Thurles and Tuam. Furthermore, in the 1940s, the Czech Karel Bačík and Miroslav Havel had a major impact on the revival of the Irish glass industry with the foundation of the Waterford Crystal factory.⁷⁵

As with other cultural manifestations, Růžička made every effort to generate publicity for Czech music in Ireland. On several occasions he appeared on Radio Athlone; among others, he presented a series of broadcasts entitled 'My Great Adventure', based on his experience of the Great War on the Eastern Front.⁷⁶ Růžička also lectured on 'Czecho-Slovak Music' at the Royal Irish Academy of Music, Dublin, and elaborated on how musical revival was due to the 're-awakening of the patriotic instincts of the people.'⁷⁷ The same piece of news was published under 'Czechoslovak Music' in the *Irish Independent*, quoting Růžička who had claimed that 'the Czechoslovak people wished for nothing more than to be left in peace to fulfil the difficult task of rebuilding their State, now that they were once more free to guide their own destiny.'⁷⁸ On the whole, the efforts seemed to have brought the desired effect, as indicated by the reaction of, among others, Grace O'Brien, regular contributor to the *Irish Press*, who penned several articles praising Czechoslovak, Austrian and Hungarian music in the 1930s. Advertising the Prague String Quartet's concert in Dublin in January 1932, she elaborated on the 'value of artistic propaganda' in the struggle for national independence,

⁷⁴ 'They Kept Their Language. Became Independent Nation: The Czechs', *Irish Press*, 23 March 1937.

⁷⁵ 'Sugar from Beet. Interest of Labour in Carlow Factory. Inspection Tour', *Irish Independent*, 15 October 1926; Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations*, pp. 47-48; Daniel Samek, 'The Czech Sokol Gymnastic Programme in Ireland' in Gerald Power and Ondřej Pilný (eds) *Ireland and the Czech Lands: Contact and Comparisons in History and Culture* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014), p. 144.

⁷⁶ 'My Great Adventure. New Broadcast Series Started by Czech Consul', *Irish Press*, 24 February 1936.

⁷⁷ 'Czecho-Slovak Music. Interesting Lecture by Consul', *Irish Press*, 14 January 1935.

⁷⁸ 'Czechoslovak Music', *Irish Independent*, 14 January 1935.

stressing the significance of national music and folk songs ‘as a manifestation of patriotic feeling.’⁷⁹ She highlighted the importance of, among others, Bedřich Smetana and Antonín Dvořák, who were enrolled ‘in the service of national music’.⁸⁰ Articles on nineteenth century artists such as the Smetana and Dvořák were popular subjects in the Irish press, always linking their significance with the successful national movement of the Czechs.

Růžička and his wife were well known and greatly respected in cultural and diplomatic circles in Dublin, as the articles in the *Irish Independent* and the *Irish Press*, published on the occasion of his leaving the Irish capital, illustrated.⁸¹ In September 1936, after Růžička was transferred to Prague, Karel Košťál was appointed as his successor in Dublin.

Similarly to Růžička, Košťál was also music enthusiast and excellent cellist, founding the Karel Kostal Quartet in Chamber Music in Dublin in 1937.⁸² Notable members included Maud Aiken, wife of Frank Aiken, Minister of Defence. In addition to popularising the case of Czechoslovak music, the diversity of Czechoslovak art in Dublin also became noticeable.⁸³ Košťál’s mission in Ireland was successful as not only was he knowledgeable in Irish literature and aware of ‘the similarities of the history of the two countries in their fight for freedom’.⁸⁴ He had been able to take over Růžička’s contacts as well. Most importantly, this included the friendship of the editor of the *Irish Times*, R. M. Smyllie. Knowing the editor’s sympathy towards Czechoslovakia, it was no wonder that the *Irish Times* published a lengthy welcoming article for the new consul on 15 January 1937, highlighting the significant relationship between Ireland and Czechoslovakia.⁸⁵ Both Růžička and Košťál were regularly mentioned in all main national dailies (functions, exhibitions, etc.). Nonetheless, it was the *Irish Times* that paid the most attention to them in detail. Smyllie had already shown his interest in Czechoslovakia when he wrote a series of articles based on his trip to Czechoslovak Republic in 1932. The articles were published under his pen-name ‘Nichevo’,

⁷⁹ ‘Voice of a New-Born Nation. Musical Czecho-Slovakia’, *Irish Press*, 19 January 1932.

⁸⁰ ‘Voice of a New-Born Nation. Musical Czecho-Slovakia’, *Irish Press*, 19 January 1932; ‘Bohemia’s Patriot Composers’, *Irish Press*, 31 May 1934; ‘His Operas were Pages from the History of his Country. National Composer who was “Suspect”’, *Irish Press*, 31 January 1933; and ‘A Musician of Bohemia’, *Irish Press*, 1 May 1933.

⁸¹ ‘Consul-General Leaving. Forthcoming Tribute’, *Irish Independent*, 24 August 1936; and ‘Czech Consul’s Interest in Ireland’s Fight for Freedom’, *Irish Press*, 25 August 1936.

⁸² Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations*, p. 49.

⁸³ ‘Dvorak’s Stabat Mater’, *Irish Press*, 2 March 1937.

⁸⁴ ‘New Czechoslovak Consul Discusses Works of Yeats and Synge. Interest in Ireland’, *Irish Press*, 15 January 1937.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

entitled 'Visit to Central Europe'.⁸⁶ In these he described his travels through Prague, Slovakia, Hungary and Sub-Carpathian Ukraine. He re-visited Czechoslovakia again in late 1937 and published his experiences under the title 'Carpathian Contrasts.' The series earned Smyllie the 'Order of the White Lion' by the president of the Czechoslovak Republic 'in recognition of the contribution he has made to a wider knowledge in Ireland of Czechoslovakia and her people', shortly before the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938.⁸⁷ He started the series with an article devoted to the recently deceased Czechoslovak President, Tomáš Masaryk, and in later issues he focused on the 'impoverished Slovaks and Ruthenians, and also on the situation of the Jews and Gypsies'.⁸⁸

In addition, during the 1930s, due to the efforts of the consuls, and their connections with the Irish press and military/political elite, noticeable progress was made in popularising the Sokol system (Czech gymnastic methods) in Irish military training.⁸⁹ Besides Smyllie, the consul also befriended Irish Minister of Defence Frank Aiken, Lieutenant-General Michael Brennan, and Minister for Education Thomas Derrig.⁹⁰ Košťál 'believed that with a little effort and organisation great results could be achieved in Ireland', which was recognised by Frank Aiken, who argued that 'an almost perfect analogy existed' between the Czech Sokol and the Gaelic Athletic Association in Ireland.⁹¹ Despite the fact that the Sokol was indeed popular in interwar Ireland and the 'interest in Czechoslovakia was rapidly growing', Samek has emphasised that essentially it remained a suspicious, foreign, 'non-Catholic organisation with a significant free-thinking fundament'.⁹²

In addition to the wide-ranging activities of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Dublin, certain Czechoslovak nationals also expressed interest in having Irish representation in Prague; it was businessman Josef Bělský who initiated contact in 1937. In his letter, Bělský introduced himself as a businessman who had previously spent two years in England. At the time of writing he was a captain in the Czech Army, enjoying good reputation in banking and business circles. He was also a member of the Czechoslovak Economical Society, with

⁸⁶ Nichevo, 'A Visit to Central Europe', *Irish Times*, 11 August – 6 September 1932.

⁸⁷ O'Brien, *The Irish Times*, p. 89.

⁸⁸ Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations*, p. 50.

⁸⁹ Richard John Kelly, 'The Sokols of Bohemia', *The Leader* (5 November 1910), pp. 282-284, cited in Samek, 'The Czech Sokol', p. 142.

⁹⁰ Samek, 'The Czech Sokol', p. 145.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁹² Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations*, p. 47.

‘connections with many influential politicians and civil servants’, including Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk in London and George Crosby [sic], the pro-Cumann na nGaedheal newspaper editor (*Cork Examiner*).⁹³ He applied for the post of honorary consul/vice-consul for Ireland at Prague:

...As a friend of your country and as one who has helped to draw closer the ties between Ireland and Czechoslovakia, allow me to draw your attention to the following fact. Nearly all the countries of Europe and many overseas countries, especially North- South- and Central-America are represented in my country by Consuls.⁹⁴

‘These Consuls are of two kinds’, he added, referring to consuls and honorary consuls, suggesting that the Free State should appoint him as honorary consul in Prague since he ‘could do much to extend business’ between Ireland and Czechoslovakia.⁹⁵ In response, Walshe informed Bělský that although ‘the Minister for External Affairs much appreciated the offer’ of his services, the Government of Saorstát Éireann did not intend to make such appointments in the near future, but his name had been noted for future reference.⁹⁶

Nonetheless, there is no record of following up on the case, indicating that Ireland had its priorities elsewhere in the late 1930s. In most cases the impetus for consular contact seems to have come from the Czech side (both government and public) and from the Irish public (especially businessmen), rather than from Irish Governments, whether led by Cumann na nGaedheal or Fianna Fáil.

Despite the fact that official diplomatic contact between Ireland and Hungary was established in the 1970s, Irish archival records indicate that the relationship dates back to the interwar period. Similarly to the Czechoslovak initiative, the Hungarian Kingdom also sought permission to nominate an honorary consul in Dublin in December 1923. Then the Hungarian representative in London enquired at the British Foreign Office if there were any objections to the appointment of a Hungarian consul in Dublin; there were none.⁹⁷ Progress was made in

⁹³ Application for Post as Honorary Consul or Vice-Consul for Saorstat at Prague of Josef Bělský, to the Secretary Department for External Affairs, 11 October 1937, NAI DFA 117/26; and Pauric J. Dempsey, ‘Crosbie, George’, *DIB*,

<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2229>, accessed on 6 March 2015.

⁹⁴ Application for Post as Honorary Consul or Vice-Consul for Saorstat at Prague of Josef Bělský, to the Secretary Department for External Affairs, 11 October 1937, NAI DFA 117/26.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Application for Post as Honorary Consul or Vice-Consul for Saorstat at Prague of Josef Bělský, reply, unsigned, 27 October 1937, NAI DFA 117/26 SM/EBS. 117/26.

⁹⁷ Letter from Devonshire to the Governor General T. M. Healy, Consular Representation of Hungary in Ireland, 20 December 1923, NAI DFA/319/49; Reply from Healy to the Duke ‘Proposed appointment of an [sic] Hungarian Consular Officer at Dublin, Consular Representation of Hungary in Ireland, December 1923, NAI DFA/319/49 S. 3490 28.

1925 when the Hungarian Charge d’Affaires in London, Jenő Nelky checked with Irish High Commissioner James McNeill if Dublin-born stockbroker Hubert Briscoe (suggested by Marquis MacSweeney) was suitable.⁹⁸ The Hungarians expressed a preference for ‘a man who has no strong political affiliations, and for choice a businessman of good standing who would like to supplement a solid civic status with a little consular dignity’, and Briscoe was found to be just ‘the sort of man’ the Charge d’Affaires wanted.⁹⁹ Briscoe, as we have seen in Chapter 1, had travelled extensively before the Great War as a journalist who then became a well-known Dublin stockbroker, also holding the title of ‘government broker’.¹⁰⁰ Hungarian Governor Admiral Miklós Horthy appointed him ‘Honorary Royal Hungarian Consul’ in December 1925, receiving the King’s Exequatur on 10 December 1925.¹⁰¹ During Briscoe’s term, only the title ‘Hungarian Consul’ was used on occasion, not differentiating from ‘Honorary Consul’.¹⁰²

The British connection remained significant throughout the period, which was illustrated by the interest from London-based Hungarians visiting Dublin, for instance, when Baron Iván Rubido-Zichy, Hungarian representative in London, travelled to Ireland. In Dublin, the Hungarian minister met Frederick A. Sterling, American Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Dublin (1927-1934); William T. Cosgrave, President of the Executive Council; Patrick McGilligan, Minister for External Affairs; and Hubert Briscoe, Honorary Consul of Hungary in Ireland.¹⁰³ Despite the success of this trip, records indicate that communication between Briscoe and the Irish Department for External Affairs was troublesome at times. Following the visit of Hungarian delegation (along with 250 other members from the USA, Canada, Europe) for the Inter-Parliamentary Union in July 1930,

⁹⁸ James McNeill was the first High Commissioner of the Irish Free State in London in January 1923, and became Governor General in 1928. Historian Michael Kennedy pointed out that ‘James McNeill always spelled his surname ‘McNeill’ in contrast to his brother Eoin, who adopted the form ‘MacNeill’. See Michael Kennedy, ‘McNeill, James’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5751>, accessed on 16 November 2014.

⁹⁹ Letter from High Commissioner for the Irish Free State, James MacNeill [sic] to Walshe, Consular Representation of Hungary in Ireland, 10 February 1925, NAI DFA/319/49; and Letter from Walshe to McNeill, Consular Representation of Hungary in Ireland, 406/1925, 16 February 1925, NAI DFA/319/49.

¹⁰⁰ Mr. Briscoe’s Optimism’, *Irish Independent*, 9 May 1923; ‘Dublin Stock Exchange. Bank of Ireland Firmer; Railway Ordinaries Again Lower; Calico Printers Issues in Favour’, *Freeman’s Journal*, 6 May 1924; ‘Ireland in Budapest’, *Irish Independent*, 20 July 1937.

¹⁰¹ Letter from Nelky to Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Consular Representation of Hungary in Ireland, NAI DFA/319/49, T. 10355/3471/373 No. 3111; Letter from L. S. Amery to Healy, Consular Representation of Hungary in Ireland, 4 January 1926, NAI DFA/319/49.

¹⁰² Compare ‘Demonstration of Consulate’, *Irish Press*, 12 October 1934; and ‘Funeral of Mr. P. J. Walshe’, *Irish Independent*, 12 January, 1937.

¹⁰³ ‘Hungarian Minister’s First Visit’, *Irish Independent*, 10 August 1928.

Briscoe expressed his disappointment with the Department for not informing him about the arrival of Hungarian visitors in Dublin. The *Irish Independent*'s representative reported that the Hungarians were 'looking with keen interest' to their visit to Ireland.¹⁰⁴ They were also aware of 'Griffith's interest in the Hungarian policy, and the use he made of it in the early days of Sinn Féin.'¹⁰⁵ As for Briscoe, he admitted to having learnt this news from the press, and wished to officially protest that he was not notified of the visit.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, he asked Walshe if it was 'the settled policy of [the] department that the Honorary Consul for Hungary should be ignored when Hungarians came to Dublin under government auspices, or on other kindred occasions. 'If so,' warned Briscoe, 'it will be necessary for me to consider my position.'¹⁰⁷ As no reply had reached him for two weeks, Briscoe repeated the enquiry.¹⁰⁸ As Briscoe's next letter of 14 August indicated, the secretary had eventually settled the matter.¹⁰⁹ Briscoe accepted Walshe's suggestion to 'have a little chat,' after which they were to let the matter rest.¹¹⁰

Another confidential letter from Briscoe to Walshe three years later in 1933 signified that the settlement was not a lasting one. The consul reminded the secretary that he had 'for a long time, been very dissatisfied with the recognition given to Hungary in this country.'¹¹¹ He emphasised that it was his duty to 'see that the honour and prestige of Hungary was maintained, and that [he] should do everything that was possible in Ireland for the advancement of Hungarian interests', stressing that in this, he had 'had no assistance' from the Department of External Affairs.'¹¹² And although he received 'much kindness' from other foreign representatives in Dublin, the Department had completely ignored his consulate,

...and Hungary [had] been left out in the cold on many occasions when she was entitled to be brought into at least the same prominence as other countries of perhaps less international importance. In the circumstances I fear that the only course left open for me is to recommend the Hungarian Government

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ 'M.P.'s [sic] From Many Lands. Visitors to Dublin', *Irish Independent*, 21 July 1930.

¹⁰⁶ Private and Confidential Letter from Briscoe to Walshe, Consular Representation of Hungary in Ireland, 26 July 1930, NAI DFA/319/49.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Letter from Briscoe to Walshe, Consular Representation of Hungary in Ireland, 9 August 1930, NAI DFA/319/49.

¹⁰⁹ The file contained no record of Walshe's reply but Briscoe's reaction to his letter. See Private and Confidential Letter from Briscoe to Walshe, Consular Representation of Hungary in Ireland, 14 August 1930, NAI DFA/319/49.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Confidential Letter from Briscoe to Walshe, Consular Representation of Hungary in Ireland, 16 August 1933, NAI DFA/319/49.

¹¹² Ibid.

to abolish the Consulate in Dublin altogether, but before doing so I would like to know officially what is to be the future attitude of your Department towards it.¹¹³

In Walshe's absence, assistant secretary John Joseph Hearne replied and his 'kind remarks' seemingly convinced Briscoe not to 'proceed any further in the matter'.¹¹⁴

Due to his background in business and finance, Briscoe's priorities as Honorary Consul of Hungary lay with mapping out possible economic contacts between the two states. Despite the low number of archival records in this regard, a few sources suggest the feasibility of extending business connections. For instance, Briscoe introduced John Varga to Walshe for this purpose, the former being Honorary Correspondent of the Royal Hungarian Office for Foreign Trade for the Irish Free State with residence in Dublin.¹¹⁵ And although there was no evidence of follow-up on the Irish Government's side, the meeting showed the eagerness of the Hungarian Government to widen their economic links with the Irish Free State, as well as that of Briscoe to contribute to this.

Under Briscoe's term as Honorary Consul of Hungary, cultural relations were also fostered between Hungary and Ireland; cultural events and meetings were covered widely in Irish newspapers as well. For instance, the Fourth World Jamboree, organised in Hungary in August 1933, minor as it may seem, still offered a great opportunity for both the youth and educational politicians of Ireland and Hungary (and of altogether 46 nations). The *Irish Independent* recognised Catholicism as the main link, highlighting the significance of religious events such as the High Mass. The overall importance of the event was also indicated by the fact that the Chief Scout of Hungary and the Jamboree Camp Chief was Pál Teleki, former Prime Minister (1920-21; 1939-41) and founder of the Christian National Party (*Keresztény Nemzeti Párt*).¹¹⁶ Afterwards, the Commissioner of the Irish Free State Scouts, G. S. Childs, informed the Irish Department of External Affairs of the success of the Irish trip. The Hungarian papers, elaborated Childs, referred to the Irish boys as "the pets of the camp", a tribute which speaks for itself.¹¹⁷ He emphasised that during his conversations with

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Letter from Briscoe to Assistant Secretary John J. Hearne, Consular Representation of Hungary in Ireland, 18/44, 18 August 1933, NAI DFA/319/49.

¹¹⁵ Letter from Briscoe to Walshe, Consular Representation of Hungary in Ireland, No. 18/44, 11 July 1934, NAI DFA/319/49.

¹¹⁶ 'Seventy Scouts Sail. Big Jamboree in Hungary', *Irish Independent*, 31 July 1933.

¹¹⁷ Letter from G. S. Childs, Esq., Co. Wicklow Boy Scouts' Association, to the Minister for External Affairs, Dublin, 30 August 1933, NAI DFA 38/144.

...prominent Hungarians, including Foreign Office officials, deputies, and newspaper men, I was pleased to find that they had a great sympathy with the Irish Free State, and wished our land prosperity and peace. They were of the opinion that Ireland and Hungary were in pre-war days working under similar conditions for the same end, and now that both countries control their own destinies, they were naturally anxious to learn as much about our country as possible. I feel that in their own small way the Irish Scouts materially helped to enhance the good name of our country at this great event...¹¹⁸

In the words of the Lord Mayor of Dublin, ‘the Irish Scouts had enhanced the good name of their country in Hungary and, later, a distinguished Hungarian diplomat informed him that the Scouts had been the finest ambassadors Ireland ever sent to Hungary.’¹¹⁹ Given that the Irish Government did not appoint official representatives in interwar Hungary, the presence of Irish scouts in an international context should not be ignored.

Furthermore, what started as a university exchange programme in 1936 between Irish and Hungarian students, turned eventually into an ‘Irish-Hungarian Friendship Tour’ with the participation of Briscoe and other distinguished Irish personalities. The watershed moment was John Vágó’s (representative of the National Union of Hungarian Students in Great Britain) arrival in Dublin to initiate a series of Irish-Hungarian tours. Vágó followed up the visit of Irish university students to Hungary in summer 1936 and the return visit to Ireland of Susan Kemeny (Budapest University) in December 1936.¹²⁰ Kemeny, representative of the National Union of Hungarian Students in England, was engaged with a peace propaganda tour among the Universities of Europe, including Queen’s University in Belfast. When she arrived in the Free State in December 1936, she took part in a broadcast from Radio Athlone and attended a concert arranged in her honour by Dublin students. The programme was all in Irish and Hungarian and was attended by the Lord Mayor of Dublin.¹²¹ When Kemeny returned to Dublin in May 1937, she was invited to talk at Trinity, where she gave a speech on 3 June and elaborated on how ‘like Ireland, Hungary had her struggles for freedom.’¹²² She also attended a luncheon organised by the League of Nations Society of Ireland, where she introduced Hungary as ‘the last outpost of Christianity and defence of European civilisation in the East’.¹²³ She emphasised the closeness of the Irish and Hungarian nations both ‘in thought and spirit’, with their history ‘filled with the same idea – the striving for independence and the

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ ‘Scouts’ World Jamboree. Free State Contingent’s Gift for Princess Juliana’, *Irish Press*, 30 July 1937.

¹²⁰ ‘Student Envoy from Hungary’, *Irish Press*, 22 February 1937.

¹²¹ For further details, see ‘A Hungarian Visitor’, *Irish Independent*, 11 December 1936; ‘Women in the News’, *Irish Press*, 14 December 1936; and ‘Peace Propagandist’s Visit to U.C.D.’, *Irish Press*, 15 December 1936.

¹²² ‘Diary of Today’, *Irish Press*, 13 May 1937; ‘Talk on Hungary’ *Irish Press*, 2 June 1937; and ‘Woman’s Talk on Hungary’, *Irish Press*, 4 June 1937.

¹²³ ‘Irish Songs Over Radio From Hungary’, *Irish Press*, 12 May 1937.

love of freedom. Both are agricultural countries and in Hungary the Catholic religion of the majority.’¹²⁴ In June 1937 she also addressed the Dublin Rotary Club, representing the Hungarian Congress Bureau, referring to Griffith, and the significance of self-sufficiency for Hungary as well as for Ireland.¹²⁵

The initiative for the Hungarian-Irish Friendship Tour was also supported by Hubert Briscoe, Tomás Ó Faoláin, editor of the *National Student*, independent politician and businessmen Frederick Maurice Summerfield; Lord Mayor of Dublin Alfred Byrne; and violinist and academic, Professor Walter Starkie.¹²⁶ Starkie was professor of Spanish and lecturer in Italian literature at TCD, as well as director of the Abbey Theatre. Based on his experiences in Central Europe, Starkie wrote ‘essayistic travelogues narrated in the first person, rich in literary and cultural allusion’, published under the title *Raggle-Taggle: Adventures with a Fiddle in Hungary and Roumania* (1929).¹²⁷ Starkie expressed admiration for Hungarian culture and music; he did not, however, allude to parallels with Ireland. The only reference to contemporary Ireland was when he mentioned that the owner of the Hotel English Queen did not understand the distinction between being English or Irish as he had not met an Irishman before.¹²⁸ Starkie also noted that as far as the perception of the English was concerned, Lord Rothermere, who advocated the Hungarian case in the *Daily Mail*, was held in the highest esteem in Hungary – while in Ireland, he and his paper were mostly criticised in relation to their support for the Hungarians. He argued that even the ‘hovels of the Gypsies’ echoed from ‘the cry “Lord Rothermere: éljen! Éljen! [Long Live]’.¹²⁹ Lord Rothermere, British newspaper magnate, launched a press campaign in the *Daily Mail* on 27 June 1927 with an article entitled ‘Hungary’s Place under the Sun’, supporting the small state’s irredentist claims.¹³⁰ He also founded the ‘Hungarian Revisionist League’, which Hungarian Prime Minister István Bethlen saw as ‘the wrong kind of revision’, meaning, ethnic revision as

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ ‘Going in Right Direction. Hungarian Visitor on Saorstát’s Policy of Self-Sufficiency’, *Irish Press*, 29 June 1937.

¹²⁶ Ó Faoláin mentioned to the *Irish Press* that Munich, Vienna, Budapest, Venice, Geneva and the Paris were included in the itinerary. See ‘Two Hundred People to Visit Hungary in July’, *Irish Press*, 25 February 1937.

¹²⁷ Eda Sagarra, ‘Starkie, Walter’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a8262>, accessed on 10 November 2014.

¹²⁸ Starkie did not specify the exact location of the hotel. See Walter Starkie, *Raggle-Taggle: Adventures with a Fiddle in Hungary and Roumania* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1933), p. 147.

¹²⁹ ‘Living the Life of a Gipsy [sic]. Dr. Starkie’s Adventures in Hungary and Rumania. The Story of His Wanderings’, *Irish Independent*, 3 October 1929.

¹³⁰ David George Boyce, ‘Harmsworth, Harold Sidney, first viscount Rothermere (1868-1940), newspaper proprietor’, *ODNB*, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33718>, accessed on 20 September 2015.

opposed to the restoration of the historical integrity of St Stephen's nation.¹³¹ Therefore, Rothermere's campaign for revision was more of an embarrassment for the Hungarian Government, although it raised international awareness about the Hungarian cause. As we learn from the recently published memoirs of Hungarian middle-class writer Sándor Márai, however, revisionism was an excuse for the political elites defer land reform and the socio-political transformation of a democratic Hungary.¹³² This view has also been supported in historiography: Robin Okey has described the plans for restoring historic Hungary as 'a convenient distraction from domestic reform'.¹³³

The significance of the Irish-Hungarian Friendship Tour was also illustrated by Vágó's statement that his interest in Ireland stemmed from the fact that 'there was much in common between the two countries in their history of oppression', referring to the impact of Arthur Griffith in Hungary.¹³⁴ Moreover, Vágó's interview with the *Irish Press* on 26 February 1937 provided further insights into Irish opinion of Hungary, and vice versa; "'we two countries must get to know more about one another",' concluded Vágó.¹³⁵ Hungarian sporting success proved to be the centre of common interest in the interview, together with the popularity of soccer in the country. Furthermore, the visits by Hungarian soccer team in Ireland were also quite frequent and well documented. In the late 1930s the teams were often received by dignitaries such as Éamon de Valera, Lord Mayor of Dublin Alfred Byrne, and Honorary Consul of Hungary, Hubert Briscoe.¹³⁶ Great significance was attributed to these matches,

¹³¹ Cartledge, *Mihály Károlyi and István Bethlen*, pp. 124-125; Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary*, p. 121; Gyula Juhász, *Magyarország Külpolitikája*, p. 109; Ormos, *Magyarország a Két Világháború Korában*, p. 111; and Ignác Romsics, *Magyarország Története a XX. Században [The History of Hungary in the 20th Century]* (Budapest: Osiris, 2001), pp. 238-239; and Tibor Frank, 'Treaty Revision and Doublespeak: Hungarian Neutrality, 1939-1941' in Neville Wylie (ed) *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.), p. 156.

¹³² The memoirs were written in 1949-1950, and published in 2013. See Sándor Márai, *Hallgatni Akartam [I wanted to Remain Silent]* (Budapest: Helikon, 2013), p. 76.

¹³³ Okey, *Eastern Europe 1740-1985*, p. 169.

¹³⁴ 'Two Hundred People to Visit Hungary in July', *Irish Press*, 25 February 1937; 'A Hungarian Patriot. Kossuth's Fight for Freedom', *Irish Press*, 30 March 1937.

¹³⁵ 'Meet a Champion Athlete from Hungary. Looking forward to Visit of Irish Soccer Team, Says Mr. Vago', *Irish Press*, 26 February 1937.

¹³⁶ 'Free State Team Defeated. Hungarians' Victory', *Irish Independent*, 17 December 1934; 'Hungary and Ireland. Book by Arthur Griffith Presented to Visiting Soccer Team', *Irish Press*, 17 December 1934; 'Ireland's Team to Meet Hungary', *Irish Independent*, 27 November 1936; 'To-Morrow's Big Match. Hungarian Football Team Tour Dublin', *Irish Press*, 5 December 1936; and 'Footballers Entertained. Minister on Effect of International Matches', *Irish Press*, 7 December 1936; 'Ireland is Hungry to Eat Up Hungary! For the Virtual World's Championship. Ireland's Clash With Stars of Hungary. Our Hardest Task Yet', *Irish Press*, 3 June 1936; 'Visiting Team Honoured', *Irish Press*, 9 December 1935; 'Dinner Reference to Breach in Irish Football', *Irish Press*, 18 March 1936; 'Free State Team Defeated. Hungarians' Victory', *Irish Independent*, 17 December 1934; 'Hungary and Ireland. Book by Arthur Griffith Presented to Visiting Soccer Team', *Irish Press*, 17 December 1934; 'Ireland's Team to Meet Hungary', *Irish Independent*, 27 November 1936; 'To-Morrow's Big

since they added another dimension to existing consular or cultural contact between Ireland and Central Europe. This closer relationship was indicated by Briscoe's speech of 6 December 1936 as well, in which he elaborated on that if 'the problems which beset Hungary came to be adjusted Hungary would have sincere friends in Ireland, just as Ireland would have firm friends in Hungary.'¹³⁷

Led by Briscoe, the Irish-Hungarian Friendship Tour that took place 10-31 July 1937 attracted attention both in Ireland and Hungary. The party of sixty people also included Dr Walter Starkie, Padraig Ó Caoimh, and Professor J. T. Wigham as well.¹³⁸ Given its popularity, a second tour was planned for August 1938: the Lord Mayor of Dublin, Alderman A. Byrne spoke of his intentions to visit Hungary and participate in the Second Irish-Hungarian Friendship Tour on 13 August, as part of a 16-day trip, calling the first one a 'remarkable success'. For the second tour, the plan was to start in Cologne, Germany and reaching Budapest for St Stephen's holiday on 20 August, then on the way back stopping in Vienna, Innsbruck, and Munich. Briscoe was named the patron of the tour again, and enquiries were directed to the Honorary Secretary of the Second Irish-Hungarian Friendship Tour, Suzanne Kemeny.¹³⁹

Notwithstanding the generally positive feedback, Gertrude Gaffney of the *Irish Independent* was less enthusiastic about the tour. She was known for her zealously Catholic, pro-Franco reports on events during the Spanish Civil War, which tended to go off on a tangent.¹⁴⁰ In her article in the *Irish Independent*, she claimed that 'the less you know about other countries and the less contacts you have with other peoples the more likely you are to remain at peace with them.'¹⁴¹ This was due to the fact that she had been disillusioned in her friendships with

Match. Hungarian Football Team Tour Dublin', *Irish Press*, 5 December 1936; and 'Footballers Entertained. Minister on Effect of International Matches', *Irish Press*, 7 December 1936.

¹³⁷ 'Footballers Entertained. Minister on Effect of International Matches', *Irish Press*, 7 December 1936; and 'Full Representation Shortly. Important Statement', *Irish Independent*, 7 December 1936.

¹³⁸ 'Irish Visit to Hungary. Plans Concluded "Friendship Tour"', *Irish Press*, 31 May 1937; and 'Visitors to Hungary', *Irish Press*, 12 July 1937; and 'Irish Visit to Hungary. Plans Concluded "Friendship Tour"', *Irish Press*, 31 May 1937.

¹³⁹ 'Second Irish-Hungarian Friendship Tour', *Connaught Telegraph*, 2 April 1938.

¹⁴⁰ Patrick Maume, 'Gaffney, Gertrude ("Gertie", "Conor Galway")', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a3396>, accessed on 19 July 2015; Pauric Travers, "'There Was Nothing for me there": Irish Female Emigration, 1922-71' in Patrick O'Sullivan (ed) *Irish Women and Irish Migration* (1995), pp. 146-67; and Louise Ryan, *Embodying the Nation: Gender, Identity and the Irish Press 1921-37* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002).

¹⁴¹ 'Leaves From a Woman's Diary by G. G. Spanish Reds' Propaganda Activity', *Irish Independent*, 5 March 1937.

Central Europeans, referring to them as always demanding more than what she could offer.¹⁴² Thus while calling the plan for the friendship tour ‘an admirable idea’, what she objected to was ‘describing it as a reciprocal tour until the Hungarians in equal numbers, or very nearly as many at any rate, have arranged to come here, and I doubt if that will ever come to pass.’¹⁴³ As an alternative, she suggested that efforts rather be put towards attracting American tourists to Ireland.¹⁴⁴ Interestingly though, Gaffney did not seem to be aware of the fact that the whole idea behind the Irish-Hungarian Friendship Tour was initiated by the Hungarian side, following the aforementioned visits of Susan Kemeny to Dublin. Still, apart from Gaffney’s criticism, the general opinion of the Irish relationship with Central European small states, however small in scale, was overwhelmingly positive.

In order to increase the popularity of Hungarian culture in Ireland, several programmes were attributed to Hungarian classical and folk music on the programme of Radio Athlone. Professor Walter Starkie’s contribution was significant in this regard, given his documented interest in Hungarian music and culture in general. ‘A Hungarian Hour’, which aired in May 1937, and included comments from Susan Kemeny and Tomás Ó Faoláin.¹⁴⁵ However, it was Hubert Briscoe who managed to highlight the overarching significance of Hungarian culture and history for Ireland when he

...welcomed the broadcast, because it [was to] give to the Irish people an opportunity of learning something about the country, which he had the privilege of representing. The history of Hungary, like that of Ireland, was one trouble, and there was the same struggle for independence of language, ideas and culture. They in Ireland had much in common with Hungary and much to learn from her, and it was but natural that there should be mutual interests in the developments that had resulted from the pursuance of similar policies. Although she had been dismembered and although she was a kingdom deprived of the right of selecting her king, Hungary held her head high in the Committee of Nations.¹⁴⁶

In 1924, Secretary of State for the Colonies (1922-24), the Duke of Devonshire, enquired from Governor General Timothy Healy as to the appointment of an Austrian Consular Officer. Because of the attempts at the re-establishments of German and Hungarian consulates in Ireland, Austria also expressed its interest in establishing a similar arrangement with Ireland.¹⁴⁷ In August 1925, J. O. Duncan was appointed as Honorary Consul of Austria in

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ ‘A Hungarian Hour’, *Irish Press*, 18 May 1937.

¹⁴⁶ ‘Ireland and Hungary. Have much in Common Says Consul’, *Irish Press*, 19 May 1937.

¹⁴⁷ Letter from Devonshire to the Governor General, T. M. Healy, Appointment of Austrian Consular Officers in British Territory, Consular Representation of Austria in Ireland, 12 January 1924, NAI DFA/319/26 S. 3540; and Letter from the Governor General, T. M. Healy to Devonshire, Appointment of Austrian Consular Officers in British Territory, Consular Representation of Austria in Ireland, 24 January 1924, NAI TSCH/3/S4845.

Dublin and received the Exequatur on 16 September 1925.¹⁴⁸ The Austrian Minister in London, Georg Franckenstein,¹⁴⁹ established that ‘the area of the new Consulate will comprise the City of Dublin and district, and will subordinate to the Austrian Legation in London’.¹⁵⁰ Thus once again the link the British connection played in Irish international relations needs to be highlighted, even when it came to bilateral links with a third country. Duncan proved to have a serious interest in representing small nations from around the world, as, on the occasion of Kevin O’Higgins’ funeral in 1927, he was also listed as being the Bolivian and Latvian Consul.¹⁵¹

Nevertheless, the position of the Honorary Consul of Austria in Dublin became vacant in 1928, when Duncan relocated to London. The Austrian Consulate (more specifically, Franckenstein in London) then started looking for a replacement ‘to represent Austrian interests in the Irish Free State.’¹⁵² Franckenstein informed the Irish Minister for External Affairs, Patrick McGilligan, of the fact that well before his retirement, Duncan had already

...nominated as representative Mr R.J. Kelly [...] who [had] up to now attended to the consular duties thus delegated to him with remarkable assiduity. The Austrian Government would have great pleasure in appointing Mr Kelly Austrian Honorary consul in the place of Mr Duncan were it not for the fact that he is already acting as Consul for Bolivia, Estonia, Roumania. Under the obtaining Austrian regulations it is not considered desirable that a person in charge of Austrian interests should at the same time be representing other countries, and I therefore feel bound to do what I am to find another equally qualified candidate for the post in question.¹⁵³

As the archival records indicate, at different points both Duncan and Kelly had filled the position of the Bolivian representation; most likely, the South American state had no objection to Kelly after Duncan had left – unlike Austria. Furthermore, Franckenstein emphasised that the Austrian government preferred a businessman, echoing the former enquiries from Hungary and Czechoslovakia.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ ‘Austrian Consul in Dublin’, *Irish Independent*, 6 August 1925; and Letter from L. S. Amery to Healy, Consular Representation of Austria in Ireland, 16 September 1925, No. 359, NAI DFA/319/26.

¹⁴⁹ Franckenstein had been a career diplomat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire since before the Great War; his missions included Washington, St. Petersburg, Rome, Japan, India, and London. In 1920 he became the Austrian Minister to the Court of St. James, which he filled until the Anschluss in March 1938. Jérôme aan de Wiel has provided in-depth analysis of his connection with Ireland prior to 1914. See aan de Wiel, *The Irish Factor*, p. 87; and Georg von Franckenstein, *Facts and Features of My Life* (London: Cassell, 1939).

¹⁵⁰ Letter from Franckenstein to Chamberlain, Consular Representation of Austria in Ireland, 8 July 1925, NAI DFA/319/26 Z 1.716.

¹⁵¹ ‘Attendance at the Funeral. Foreign Consuls’, *Irish Independent*, 14 July 1927.

¹⁵² Letter from Franckenstein to Patrick McGilligan, Minister for External Affairs, Consular Representation of Austria in Ireland, London, 12 November 1928, NAI DFA/319/26 Z1.1638.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

Interestingly, as far as Kelly was concerned, there was no mention of his former associations with Czechoslovakia as part of the season why he was not considered suitable. Instead, Franckenstein argued that although Kelly seemed

...to be rather anxious to be appointed himself, it would be highly appreciated if the enquiries could be made in such a way that Mr Kelly should not become aware of their being afoot as I think his feelings might be hurt if he were to hear from an outside source that the appointment of some other person was being contemplated, and also because the Austrian Government might decide to appoint him after all, should no other candidate be forthcoming.¹⁵⁵

The Irish Department of External Affairs was not keen on getting involved in the procedure; primarily because it was 'against the practice of the Irish Free State Government to make any recommendations for consular appointments', adding, however, that the Department was happy to make enquiries about any chosen candidate.¹⁵⁶ A few months later in summer 1929, Arthur Cox was appointed Honorary Consul of Austria.¹⁵⁷

In addition to Dublin where J. O. Duncan and Arthur Cox became Honorary Consuls of Austria, J. C. Foley, President of the Chamber of Commerce of Cork, was appointed to the same position in Cork on 14 May 1926.¹⁵⁸ After Foley had passed away in Cork on 21 May 1933, businessman and politician T. P. Dowdall from Cork expressed interest in the position.¹⁵⁹ Besides being a successful businessman with contacts in the Baltic countries, Dowdall was also a butter exporter as part of Dowdall, O'Mahony, and Co. Ltd., and represented Cork in the Dáil.¹⁶⁰ Walshe repeatedly emphasised that the Free State Government had no say in the matter and that the Austrian Government should initiate making contact with Dowdall should they find him suitable.¹⁶¹ Nonetheless, the enquiry was

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Letter from McGilligan to Franckenstein, Consular Representation of Austria in Ireland, 30 November 1928, NAI DFA/319/26; Letter from the Austrian Legation in London, Franckenstein to McGilligan, Consular Representation of Austria in Ireland, 15 February 1929, NAI DFA/319/26.

¹⁵⁷ Although Cox's appointment in the archival records is dated for 18 July, in the *Irish Independent* he had been listed as Austrian Consul already in June 1929. See Letter from Vienna appointing Cox, Consular Representation of Austria in Ireland, 18 July 1929, NAI DFA/319/26; and 'Great Assembly. Heads of State Attend', *Irish Independent*, 20 June 1929.

¹⁵⁸ Official appointment of Foley by the Minister for External Affairs, Consular Representation of Austria in Ireland, 14 May 1926 NAI DFA/319/26 D. 4845.

¹⁵⁹ Letter from Franckenstein to Sir John Simon, the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Consular Representation of Austria in Ireland, 23 May 1933, Copy No. 2542, NAI DFA/319/26.

¹⁶⁰ Cork Incorporated Chamber of Commerce and Shipping, Council for 1918, available online at http://www.corkpastandpresent.ie/history/corkitstradecommerce/introduction/Pages_22_41.pdf, accessed on 8 March 2015; Dáil Éireann Debate, Wednesday, 15 April 1942. *Vol. 86 No. 4*, Columns 475-476, and Pauric J. Dempsey, 'Dowdall, Thomas Patrick', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2727>, accessed on 8 March 2015.

¹⁶¹ Letter from Walshe to the Secretary of Department of the President, Consular Representation of Austria in Ireland, 5 October 1933, GC/RH 18/41, NAI DFA/319/26.

not followed up and Dowdall did not become honorary consul in Cork. Arthur Cox had filled the position of Austrian Consul until the Anschluss in March 1938, when his duties were taken over by the German Legation.¹⁶² Actually, Walshe's letter marked the beginning of a gap in Irish-Austrian consular relations, as far as documented records were concerned, ending in March 1933. The lack of documentation may be due to the fact that many files were destroyed at de Valera's orders during the Emergency (in 1940, then for the second time in 1954, shortly before Walshe's retirement), in fear of a German invasion. Or else, they were not kept in the first place. Dermot Keogh, for instance, has pointed out 'the apparent difficulty for the historian of having to deal with a subject who did not believe in putting everything on file.'¹⁶³

Political instability in Central Europe

Although far from the centres of conflict on the Continent, to a certain extent interwar Ireland was also exposed to the influence of extreme left and right-wing political movements. Despite the declared commitment of both Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil to Irish independence and democratic principles, the news of the clashes between communist, Nazi and fascist ideologies reached the Irish Free State as well. Overall, the majority of Irish nationalists adopted an uncompromisingly anti-communist stance rooted in the strong Catholic traditions of the state. Irish commentators used the lack of political stability in Central Europe to support their own agenda and remind their readership of the significance of Catholic values and of the dangers of a possible left-wing conspiracy. The connection between bolshevism and the Irish republican movement also provided an explanation for anti-communist attitudes in Ireland. For instance, as Emmet O'Connor argued, 'the Bolsheviks were popular too in the republican movement, for their opposition to the world war and support for national self-determination.'¹⁶⁴ This principle remained so throughout the interwar years – the line between republicanism and socialism, bolshevism, and communism became blurred in relation to organisations like Saor Éire (1931) and the Republican Congress (1934).¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, certain left-wing personalities such as Peadar O'Donnell 'played a

¹⁶² 'Austrian Consul in Ireland', *Irish Press*, 17 March 1938.

¹⁶³ Dermot Keogh, 'Profile of Joseph Walshe, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 1922-1946' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. iii, no. 2, (1990), pp. 60-61.

¹⁶⁴ O'Connor, 'Anti-Communism in Twentieth-Century Ireland', p. 62.

¹⁶⁵ On the establishment and outlawing of Saor Éire, see Donal Ó Drisceoil, 'The "Irregular and Bolshie situation": Republicanism and Communism 1921-36' in Fearghal McGarry (ed) *Republicanism in Modern Ireland* (Dublin: UCD Press, 2003), pp. 50-52; and Keogh, 'The Role of the Catholic Church', p. 117.

central role in forging links between republicans and the revolutionary left (both in Ireland and internationally)'.¹⁶⁶ Labour and the Communist Party of Ireland took different stands with regards the Anglo-Irish Treaty; Labour was 'de facto backing' it, while the Communist Party 'publicly rejected' the Treaty. Therefore, the two left-wing parties became more divided upon political republican issues and not on social questions.¹⁶⁷ Apart from actual communism, Irish anti-communists actually targeted all shades of left-wing activities and groups such as social democrats, Bolsheviks, labour, freemasons, and the Jewry, especially during the Spanish Civil War.¹⁶⁸

Anti-communists, as argued above, also targeted social republicans, which was more to do with the political nationalism rather than class-conscious socialism.

By the late 1930s, the conflict among the anti-Jewish Austrian National Socialists (*Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei*, aiming for unification with Germany), Social Democratic Workers' Party (dreaming of turning Austria into a Socialist Republic), and the governing Austro-fascist Christian Social Party had become irrevocable. Although rarely described as Austro-fascists by their Irish contemporaries, the Christian Social Government under Engelbert Dollfuss did establish a system similar to Mussolini's fascist model or the Spanish Falange. By suspending the parliament in 1933 and establishing an 'ultra-conservative corporative state' with the help of its Fatherland Front, the Christian Social Government managed to outlaw both the Nazis and the social democrats.¹⁶⁹

Respected academic Roger McHugh was among the Irish authors who examined how the growing political tension was manifested in the streets of Vienna throughout the 1930s.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶ Emmet O'Connor, *A Labour History of Ireland, 1824-1960* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1992), p. 127; and Fearghal McGarry, 'O'Donnell, Peadar', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a6700>, accessed on 9 February 2015; and Keogh, 'The Role of the Catholic Church', p. 101.

¹⁶⁷ Donal Ó Drisceoil, *Peadar O'Donnell* (Cork: Cork University Press, 2001), p. 23; and Mike Milotte, *Communism in Modern Ireland: The Pursuit of the Workers' Republic since 1916* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1984)

¹⁶⁸ Fearghal McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War*, p. 135. For further details on Irish involvement in the Spanish Civil War, both in political and military terms, see Maurice Manning, *The Blueshirts* (Dublin, 1987); Robert Stradling, *The Irish and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39: Crusades in Conflict* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); Judith Keene, *Fighting for Franco: International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain during the Spanish Civil War* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2007); Fearghal McGarry, *Eoin O'Duffy: A Self-Made Hero* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Fearghal McGarry, *Frank Ryan* (Dundalk: Dundalgan Press, 2002).

¹⁶⁹ Eoin Bourke, *The Austrian Anschluss in History and Literature* (Galway: Arlen House, 2000), pp. 1-2.

¹⁷⁰ McHugh was lecturer in English Literature in UCD, and author of a biography of Henry Grattan. See Lawrence William White, 'McHugh, Roger Joseph', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5707>, accessed on 11 November 2014.

Austria's prospects looked dim due to both internal and external factors; the interference of great powers had complicated the political clashes even further, foreshadowing the immense threat to the Austria's independence and neutrality.¹⁷¹ The root of the problem was that sadly, 'the rights of small nations', McHugh noted, were 'in inverse ratio to their uses.'¹⁷²

The connection between Nazi Germany and Austria divided Irish commentators. While the link between Germany and Austria was generally acknowledged on an ethno-cultural level, the Nazi German claim to ruling Austria was more controversial. In 1933, diplomat and academic Daniel Binchy, Irish Minister to Germany, examined how Hitler was perceived with regard to Germany's relationship with Austria, in an article that was later criticised by Charles Bewley.¹⁷³ Instead of being attracted to the Pan-German Party of Austria, argued Binchy, Hitler had been more impressed by Karl Lueger, pre-war Christian Social Mayor of Vienna due to his strong social sense and his anti-Semitism. Nonetheless, Binchy also stressed that Lueger was 'not a professional anti-Semite: his opposition to the Jews was neither racial nor religious.'¹⁷⁴ The early link between Austria and the emergence of Nazism was also emphasised by another contributor of *Studies* using the pseudonym 'Germanus', pointing to the fact that 'National Socialism originated in Austria, the native country of Adolf Hitler.'¹⁷⁵ According to 'Germanus', anti-Semitic feeling was 'typically Austrian'.¹⁷⁶

Irish reactions to the union of the Austrian Republic with Germany remained controversial during the interwar years. Irrespective of the restrictions of the Treaty of St Germain prohibiting the Anschluss, the possibility of unification of Germany and Austria attracted considerable attention in Ireland. While the Irish press sympathised with Austria and their striving for German unity in the immediate aftermath of the Great War, by the 1930s Irish attitudes became less straightforward due to the rise of extreme right-wing groups. In July 1928, for instance, the *Irish Independent* highlighted that the demand for the Anschluss came

¹⁷¹ 'Meeting of the Fatherland Front, 8 October' in *Ireland To-day*, vol. ii, no. 11, (November 1937), p. 5.

¹⁷² Roger McHugh, 'A Viennese Medley' in *Ireland to-day*, vol. ii, no. 12, (December 1937), p. 11.

¹⁷³ Thomas Charles- Edwards, Michael Kennedy, 'Binchy, Daniel Anthony', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a0659>, accessed on 2 April 2015.

¹⁷⁴ Daniel A. Binchy, 'Adolf Hitler', *Studies*, vol. xxii, no. 85, (March 1933), p. 35; O'Driscoll, 'Inter-war Irish-German Diplomacy', pp. 79-80; J. P. Duggan, 'An Undiplomatic Diplomat – C. H. Bewley (1888-1969)' in *Studies*, vol. xc, no. 357-360, (2001), p. 209; and Steven Beller, *Vienna and the Jews, 1867-1938: a Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 190.

¹⁷⁵ Germanus, 'The Present Position of Catholics in Germany' in *Studies*, vol. xxiv, no. 94, (June 1935), p. 193.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

‘mainly from Berlin, but it [was] not without an echo in Vienna’.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the paper saw ‘very little prospect that the German dream’ was to come true.¹⁷⁸ Within less than a year, the *Irish Independent* started to see the Anschluss ‘inevitable’ as the overwhelming majority of Austrian population was also claimed to have supported the union.¹⁷⁹ Therefore, it was not considered to be long before it was to become a ‘real issue’.¹⁸⁰ Similarly, when in 1934 the Free State’s representative at Geneva, Francis Cremins argued that Austria had to face most of its problems due to the ‘mutilation [that] left her as an uneconomic unit,’ he named the severest consequence to be the general desire for union with Germany.¹⁸¹ Indeed, the image of Austria as an unsustainable economic unit had been present in the young state’s political rhetoric since the declaration of the republic in the autumn of 1918.¹⁸² Actually, in April 1936, the *Irish Press* doubted whether the ‘union could be prevented much longer. [...] Peace or war?—which would be the consequence? The answer lies in whether Europe has learnt yet that peace built on suppressed nature does not endure.’¹⁸³ Thus by the mid-1930s, Irish commentators considered Austrian independence less and less feasible, partly because of the weak Austrian economy and partly because of the growing (most of time overt) pressure from the neighbouring great powers: Italy and Germany, especially after the establishment of the Berlin-Rome axis.¹⁸⁴

Nonetheless, the idea of the Anschluss was not supported by all political circles in Austria. The *Irish Press* noted that Christian Social Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, was among those who resisted the union, for religious reasons.¹⁸⁵ The paper also argued that had he ‘put himself with the German side, however, and had stood for union on condition of religious liberty, he might have helped the Catholic cause throughout Germany’, making the paper’s

¹⁷⁷ ‘A German Dream’, *Irish Independent*, 25 July 1928.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ ‘Germany’s Aims’, *Irish Independent*, 1 May 1929.

¹⁸⁰ ‘A German Dream’, *Irish Independent*, 25 July 1928.

¹⁸¹ Ormos, *Közép-Európa*, p. 81.

¹⁸² Extract from a letter from Francis T. Cremins to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (Ass. /15) (Confidential) Geneva, 25 August 1934, NAI DFA 26/75, *DIFP* vol. iv, no. 232, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1934/League-of-Nations/1601.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹⁸³ ‘An Issue of Peace – or War! Will Austria Join the German Reich? – asks “Rerum Novarum”’, *Irish Press*, 6 April 1936.

¹⁸⁴ Letter from Michael MacWhite to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (108/52/35), Washington DC, 24 December 1935, NAI DFA 27/132, *DIFP* vol. iv, no. 310, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1935/Italo-Abyssinian-dispute/1679.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015; and ‘The Future of Austria’, *Irish Independent*, 12 August 1937.

¹⁸⁵ ‘An Issue of Peace – or War! Will Austria Join the German Reich? – asks “Rerum Novarum”’, *Irish Press*, 6 April 1936; Ormos, *Közép-Európa*, p. 85; and Mark Allinson, *Germany and Austria 1814-2000. Modern History for Modern Languages* (Routledge, 2002), p. 107.

stance on the issue controversial in the least.¹⁸⁶ The significance of Catholicism in the Austrian context was noted by Irish diplomats as well. Seán Lester from Geneva, for instance, highlighted in 1930 that Irish Government's 'interest in, and sympathy for, Austria, and the common religious ties,' remained visible after independence.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, Lester reported that the Austrian Minister to the League, Mr. Pflügl, also 'laid great emphasis on the bond between two old Catholic countries'.¹⁸⁸

Undoubtedly, the leaders of the Austrian Christian Social Party such as Ignaz Seipel (chancellor 1922-1924; 1926-1929), Engelbert Dollfuss (chancellor 1932-1934) and Kurt Schuschnigg (chancellor 1934-1938) attracted the most attention in Ireland during the interwar years. Since their policies were perceived to be inseparable from Catholic principles, Irish newspapers or contributors to confessional journals like *Studies* or the *Irish Monthly* considered them to be the solution to the series of crises provoked by extreme left- and right-wing groups. The significance of Seipel was unquestionable not only because he served two terms as Federal Chancellor of Austria, but also since his rule was associated with helping the Austrian Republic overcome the severe post-war economic crisis. It was no wonder that the *Irish Independent* called him the 'Modern Richelieu', since he had 'brought the country out of terror and financial chaos towards security and prosperity.'¹⁸⁹ As far as Irish confessional journals were concerned, the most acknowledged Irish author on Seipel and interwar Austria was Reverend Edward J. Coyne, editor of *Studies* and regular contributor to the *Irish Monthly*. Notably, Coyne's articles covered all aspects of Austrian politics, particularly as far as their Christian Social politicians' merits were concerned; this included Austrian book reviews as well.¹⁹⁰ During the 1920s, Coyne spent time in on the Continent, so he had witnessed Austrian socio-political changes first-hand. He had studied theology at the Franz Ferdinand University, Innsbruck, and had also received education in Münster, Westphalia; the Gregorian University in Rome; the Action Populaire and the Sorbonne in Paris.¹⁹¹ First and foremost, as

¹⁸⁶ 'An Issue of Peace – or War! Will Austria Join the German Reich? – asks "Rerum Novarum"', *Irish Press*, 6 April 1936.

¹⁸⁷ Letter from Seán Lester to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (X.12/37) Geneva, 31 July 1930, NAI DFA 26/95, *DIFP* vol. iii, no. 394, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1930/Candidature-for-election-to-League-Council/1104.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ 'A Modern Richelieu', *Irish Independent*, 19 October 1923.

¹⁹⁰ E. J. C. (review), 'Die Diktatur in Oesterreich by Franz Winkler' and 'Dollfuss by Johannes Messner' in *Studies*, vol. xxv, no. 100, (December 1936), pp. 696-698.

¹⁹¹ Anne Dolan, 'Coyne, Edward Joseph', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2135>, accessed on 7 November 2014; and Keogh and O'Driscoll, 'Ireland', pp. 286-287.

he was concerned with ‘offering Catholic alternatives to both socialism and capitalism’, he was a well-known supporter of Catholic vocationalism and corporatism.¹⁹² In relation to Austria, he emphasised that the small state was ‘Catholic in religion and German in race and speech.’¹⁹³ He considered Seipel to be one of the most outstanding politicians in Europe, who simply dwarfed ‘the most prominent statesmen of the “Succession States”’; and even in England, France or Italy there are few who are his equals in statecraft.’¹⁹⁴ It was noteworthy, argued Coyne, that Seipel

...taught Europe how to save itself after the war, and it was he who had the courage to put his own teaching into practice first. Germany, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria and Poland rescued themselves months after Austria by sedulously apeing the policy of Mgr. Seipel.¹⁹⁵

According to Coyne, Seipel saved Austria not only from financial ruin but also from the perceived ill-will of social democrats, comparing their use of obstruction to that of Unionists in the House of Commons before the war.¹⁹⁶ Coyne was convinced that ‘Austrian Socialism was nothing more or less than Russian Bolshevism with the more blood-stained incidents left out’.¹⁹⁷ A few years later he specified the distinction when he argued that ‘in its aims’, Austro-marxism was just as extreme as bolshevism, while in its methods it was ‘more cautious and less bloody’.¹⁹⁸ Most importantly, Coyne interpreted the political contest between Christian Social Party and the Social Democratic Workers Party as ‘a contest between two different civilisations, just as much as was the struggle against the Turk.’¹⁹⁹ Altogether, in his contributions to *Studies*, Coyne unequivocally identified social democrats with Austro-marxists; actually, he made no differentiations when it came to left-wing politics in Austria. Among all the confessional Irish journals, however, it was the outspoken *Catholic Bulletin* that proved to be the most vociferous opponent of socialism, including the Austrian context. As the author under the pseudonym ‘A. Novice’ reported in 1931, quoting Irish priest and scholar Michael Sheehan, the achievements of Austrian socialists were deemed doubtful

¹⁹² Fanning, *The Quest for Modern Ireland*, p. 79. For further details on vocationalism in Ireland, see Kieren Mullarkey, ‘Ireland, the Pope and Vocationalism: The Impact of the Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno’ in Joost Augusteijn (ed) *Ireland in the 1930s: New Perspectives* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1999), pp. 96-116.

¹⁹³ Edward J. Coyne, ‘The Crisis in Austria and Monsignor Seipel’ in *Studies*, vol. xviii, (December 1929), p. 610.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 611.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 614.

¹⁹⁶ E. J. C. (review), ‘Austria of To-day by Victor Wallace Germaines’ in *Studies*, vol. xxi, no. 84, (December 1932), p. 685; Coyne, ‘The Crisis in Austria’, pp. 617-618; Edward J. Coyne, ‘Practical Socialists at Work in Vienna’ in *Studies*, vol. xix, (March 1930), p. 86.

¹⁹⁷ E. J. C. (review), ‘The Social Revolution in Austria by C. A. Macartney’ in *Studies*, vol. xvi, no. 64, (December 1927), p. 724.

¹⁹⁸ Edward J. Coyne, ‘Practical Socialists at Work in Vienna’ in *Studies*, vol. xix, (March 1930), p. 89.

¹⁹⁹ E. J. C. (review), ‘The Social Revolution’, p. 724.

at best.²⁰⁰ Sheehan, who was the Archbishop of Sydney, explained the popularity of the social democrats, whom he described as ‘of an extreme type, complete believers in Karl Marx’, by reminding the readership of post-war Austria’s ‘pitiable condition.’²⁰¹

On his passing in 1932, Seipel was praised across Ireland. The aforementioned A. Raybould also emphasised Seipel’s role as the ‘bulwark against the inroads of Communism, his diplomacy and moderation, [which] created an element of calm in the midst of universal unrest.’²⁰² It appeared that Seipel was seen as ‘Austria’s saviour in a time of pressing need’, and ‘a symbol of hope to many in the midst of the political unrest of Central Europe.’²⁰³ His death was not only seen as a loss for the Austrian Christian Social Government, argued Raybould, but internationally as well due to ‘his deep Christian faith, which was the mainspring of his personality’.²⁰⁴

Similarly, Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss was generally praised in Irish Catholic circles for balancing between Nazi and socialist groups. What showed his significance in the Irish context was the fact that both the *Irish Press* and the openly anti-fascist *Irish Times* portrayed Dollfuss in a positive light and labelled him ‘one of the strongest personalities in Austrian politics’.²⁰⁵ In addition to Coyne, devout Catholic politician Seán T. Ó Ceallaigh, who represented the Free State in Geneva in 1933, also emphasised the significance of Catholic values associated with Dollfuss. Ó Ceallaigh, former Gaelic Leaguer, was also member of the Catholic Truth Society, together with several prominent public and political figures associated with Central European small states.²⁰⁶ He argued that the Austrian Chancellor was one of the

²⁰⁰ Sheehan studied at Oxford, Rome, Greifswald and Bonn (the last two in Germany), and was also a noted Irish language enthusiast. He wrote articles for the *Catholic Bulletin* and the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*. See Maurice Cronin, ‘Sheehan, Michael’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a8021>, accessed on 12 November 2014.

²⁰¹ A. Novice, ‘Gleanings (on Archbishop Sheehan’s lecture on Austria and Russia and the Church’s attitude on Socialism)’ in the *Catholic Bulletin*, vol. xxi, (April 1931), p. 336.

²⁰² A. Raybould, ‘The Passing of a Great Catholic Statesman’ in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. lx, (October 1932) p. 585.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 589.

²⁰⁵ ‘Austria’s Plight’, *Irish Times*, 18 October 1935; ‘Meteoric Rise to World Fame’, *Irish Press*, 26 July 1934; and ‘An Issue of Peace – or War! Will Austria Join the German Reich? – asks “Rerum Novarum”’, *Irish Press*, 6 April 1936.

²⁰⁶ Maume, ‘O’Kelly, Seán Thomas (Ó Ceallaigh, Seán Tomás)’, *DIB*. For further details on the Catholic Truth Society, which ‘was one of the most important influences on the whole issue of censorship’ between 1922 and 1939, see Peter Martin, *Censorship in the Two Irelands 1922-1939* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006), p. 229; and Keogh, ‘The Role of the Catholic Church’, p. 108.

few statesmen ‘inspired by the principles set forth by the Pope.’²⁰⁷ Ó Ceallaigh pointed out that there was one other government that was ‘inspired in its every administrative action by Catholic principles and Catholic doctrine’.²⁰⁸ That government was none other but that of the Irish Free State, added Ó Ceallaigh, comparing the plans of the Fianna Fáil Government to those carried out by Dollfuss in Austria – based on the ‘same Catholic principles’.²⁰⁹ Moreover, the authoritative nature of Dollfuss’ rule was thoroughly supported by several prominent Irish academics such as James Hogan, Michael Tierney. They both advocated the realisation of a corporate state based on the Italian and particularly Dollfuss’ Austrian model. In his biography of Eoin O’Duffy, the leader of the proto-fascist Blueshirts, Fearghal McGarry has stressed that the outlook of the above-mentioned thinkers ‘was typical of many right-wing Catholic intellectuals in inter-war Europe.’²¹⁰

Berlin-based diplomats Leo T. McCauley and Charles Bewley also touched upon the characteristics of Dollfuss’ Austria in 1933-1934. Of course, Bewley’s perspective, having been a supporter of Nazi Germany, differed from public perceptions.²¹¹ By 1933, the year in which Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, Austria had noticeably become troublesome for Germany, partly because of internal issues (resistance to adopting Nazi ideology and policies) but also due to external factors (fascist Italian influence). In May 1933, Leo T. McCauley hinted at Nazi speeches aiming at ‘a possible coup d’état in Austria in order to bring ‘the whole German race “under one roof”’.²¹² Describing the Austro-German relationship as somewhat strained, McCauley’s overall attitude towards Austria was considerably more balanced than his successor, Bewley, who described Austria ‘as German as any part of Hitler’s realm.’²¹³ This view remained persistent in Bewley’s reports to Dublin until his dismissal in September 1939. Certainly, Bewley provided a different angle on Dollfuss’s assassination in July 1934 as well, due to his own Nazi sympathies. He argued, for

²⁰⁷ ‘Towards a Christian Order. Advances Made in Free State. Irish Delegate Gives Outline to Geneva Gathering’, *Irish Press*, 10 October 1933.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ McGarry, *Eoin O’Duffy*, pp. 205-206.

²¹¹ O’Driscoll has highlighted Michael Kennedy’s argument that the historiography of Bewley ‘gloss over his complexity’. See O’Driscoll, ‘Inter-war Irish-German Diplomacy’, pp. 86-87 and p. 93; Kennedy, ‘Our Men in Berlin’, pp. 9-39.

²¹² ‘New Dollfuss-Mussolini Discussions: Position of Austria’, *Irish Press*, 3 July 1934; and Memorandum by Leo T. McCauley for Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) on the general political situation in Germany (43/31) Berlin, 11 May 1933, NAI DFA 34/125, *DIFP* vol. iv, no. 192, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1933/Political-situation-in-Germany/1561.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

²¹³ ‘An Issue of Peace – or War! Will Austria Join the German Reich? – asks “Rerum Novarum”’, *Irish Press*, 6 April 1936.

instance, that there was no proof for Nazi German involvement in the attempted coup d'état, based on the information provided by the German press.²¹⁴ He disapproved of the original reaction of newspapers describing the insurgents in Austria as 'rebels', and calling the shooting of Dollfuss 'a murder'.²¹⁵ It was no wonder, concluded Bewley, 'that the average German has come to distrust the Press and to wonder how far the attacks of foreign newspapers are justified.'²¹⁶ For most Irish commentators, however, it was clear that Dollfuss was not willing to compromise on Austrian independence. De Valera's *Irish Press* was among those who reminded the Irish readership of the essence of Austrian identity: 'German in race and language and Catholic in religion', while stressing that the majority of the Austrian people were against Nazi claims, insisting on their 'independence and democratic institutions', which were defended by Dollfuss's government.²¹⁷ Therefore, on several occasions, the *Irish Press* emphasised that the clashes between Austria and Germany were 'of interest to the Irish people'. This was, argued the *Press*, due to the fact that the German pressure on Austria was more than merely comparable to British statesmen's policy regarding Ireland.²¹⁸

Similar to Seipel and Dollfuss, their successor, Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg was noted in Catholic Irish circles as 'one of the leading Catholic laymen interested in social reform on Catholic lines'.²¹⁹ Likewise, even the *Irish Times* described Schuschnigg as 'a devout Catholic,' and emphasised that as such, he could not 'have very much love for the Fascist philosophy', nor 'Hitlerism'.²²⁰ As far as Bewley was concerned, he was convinced that 'the differences between the Governments of Hitler and Schuschnigg [were indeed] very grave ones', which also explained why it was seen as impossible 'to continue cultural, though not political, propaganda' about Austria and Germany.²²¹

²¹⁴ Confidential report from Charles Bewley to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (43/33), Berlin, 3 August 1934, NAI DFA 19/50, *DIFP* vol. iv, no. 227, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1934/German-political-situation/1596.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷ 'Austria and Germany', *Irish Press*, 6 February 1934.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

²¹⁹ Brendan Lawler, 'Dollfuss and his Work' in *Studies*, vol. xxvi, (March 1937), p. 84. On the changing nature of German-Austrian relations under Schuschnigg between 1934 and 1937, see István Diószegi, *Két Világháború Árnýékában: Nemzetközi Kapcsolatok Története 1919-1939 [In the Shadow of Two World Wars. History of International Relations 1919-1939]* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1974), p. 266.

²²⁰ 'Austria's Hope', *Irish Times*, 15 May 1936.

²²¹ Extract from a confidential report from Charles Bewley to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (43/33), Berlin, 10 July 1936, NAI DFA 19/50A, *DIFP* vol. iv, no. 351, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1936/German-foreign-policy/1720.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

While the 1920s were marked by political consolidation and economic recovery under István Bethlen's Unity Party (*Egységes Párt*), greatly facilitated by Hungary's admittance to the League in 1922, Irish attention in the interwar years focused on the impact of Hungarian extreme political groups. The legacy of the 1918-1919 revolutionary movements remained visible; the short-lived rule of communist Béla Kun was a frequent target of Irish anti-communist authors who aimed to illustrate the long-lasting dangers of the communist threat. Therefore, reports on the 'red terror' that took place in Budapest in 1919 were brought up more and more often in the 1930s. This anti-communist propaganda was significantly reinforced especially after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. Essentially, the *Irish Independent*, which was the most avid supporter of General Franco due to his perceived connection with the Catholic Church, used any argument they could to support their case; this included publishing stories like Lia [Cornelia] Clarke's 'When Red Terror Gripped Hungary. Bela Kun's Five Months' Dictatorship. A Tale of Tyranny, Disruption and Eventual Collapse'.²²² Clarke had visited Hungary before the war, and emphasised the survival of feudal socio-economic practices there. And although she called Mihály Károlyi 'weak and vain', she added that at least he was 'still a Hungarian', unlike Kun, that 'Galician Jew'.²²³ Károlyi was mostly blamed for the armistice and the Trianon Treaty as well, as a result of which Hungary was treated by the great powers as 'the hunted stag'.²²⁴ Clarke concluded with the remark 'he is now in Spain', even though the rumour surrounding Kun's presence in Spain during the Civil War turned out to be unfounded.²²⁵

As we have seen in Chapter 2, one of the most significant aspects of Irish anti-communism was that the left threat was generally associated with the Jewish people. For instance, when referring to the establishment of 'a Socialist Government' in Budapest after the Great War, conservative right-wing Jesuit lecturer Edward Cahill emphasised that destruction was carried

²²² 'When Red Terror Gripped Hungary. Bela Kun's Five Months' Dictatorship. A Tale of Tyranny, Disruption and Eventual Collapse', *Irish Independent*, 20 August 1936.

²²³ Kun's father was from Galicia but the family lived in Lele, which was situated in the 'Partium' (County Szatmár), the geographic region between the later post-Trianon Hungary and Transylvania in Romania; hence the most succinct description would be to describe him as 'of Transylvanian origin'. Neither of his parents was a practising Jew; Kun, for instance, attended a Calvinist secondary school in Kolozsvár/Cluj.

²²⁴ 'When Red Terror Gripped Hungary. Bela Kun's Five Months' Dictatorship. A Tale of Tyranny, Disruption and Eventual Collapse', *Irish Independent*, 20 August 1936.

²²⁵ 'Hungary Backs Gen. Franco', *Irish Independent*, 10 November 1937.

out under Béla Kun and other ‘Jewish Revolutionary leaders’.²²⁶ Cahill was a Jesuit lecturer, contributor to the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, the *Irish Monthly*, and the *Irish Messenger*. Co-founder of An Ríogacht (League of the Kingship of Christ) in 1926. Keogh and O’Driscoll have stressed the fact that the ‘extremism and radical confessionism’ of Cahill was not approved by his religious superiors. Nevertheless, he worked closely with de Valera on the 1937 Constitution.²²⁷ Cahill was convinced that socialists had less chance of success in Italy and Spain due to the strength of ‘the new Fascist and Catholic reactions’, which he deemed more favourable in terms of government.²²⁸ In view of the fact that Cahill was ‘heavily influenced by right-wing Catholic ideas prevalent in France after the First World War’ and that he ‘devoted himself to the exposure of alleged Jewish-Freemason-Communist conspiracies in Ireland’, his reaction fits into the wider context of visibly growing anti-communist feeling in certain Catholic Irish circles at the time. Jesuit bibliographer Stephen J. Brown also alluded to the fact that Jews played a prominent part in the bolshevist revolutions of Russia and Hungary.²²⁹ Consequently, the position of Jews and anti-Semitism in Hungary were rarely viewed outside the context of anti-communism (readers’ letters were particularly concerned with the alleged part Jews played in communist movements).²³⁰ Tibor Frank has emphasised that anti-communism in inter-war Hungary enjoyed priority; this, together with the obsession with revising Trianon, were major factors in Hungary becoming a German satellite and joining the war on the German side later in 1941.²³¹ Therefore, interwar Hungarian priorities lay with anti-communism, providing common ground for Catholic Irish commentators in confessional journals.

Irish commentators did not find the role of religion as a marker of Hungarian identity as articulated as, for instance, in relation to Austria. Nevertheless, the political associations of Protestants and Catholics in Hungary did attract the attention of the aforementioned Mary M. Macken. She reviewed *Hungary* (1934), written by British academic Carlile Aylmer

²²⁶ E. Cahill, ‘Notes on Christian Sociology. The Soviet Form of Government (Continued)’ in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. lvi, no. 659, (May 1928), p. 274

²²⁷ C. J. Woods, ‘Cahill, Edward’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a1364>, accessed on 31 March 2015; and Dermot Keogh and Finín O’Driscoll, ‘Ireland’ in Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (eds) *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918-1965* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 281-283.

²²⁸ The military dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera in Spain lasted from 1923 until January 1930. In Italy, Benito Mussolini was in power October 1922-1943. Cahill, ‘Notes on Christian Sociology’, p. 274.

²²⁹ S. J. B (review), ‘Judaism by A. Vincent’ in *Studies*, vol. xxiii, no. 92, (December 1934), p. 725.

²³⁰ ‘Topics of the Day. Readers’ Opinions. Jews and Communism. To the Editor “Irish Independent”’, *Irish Independent*, 7 April 1934 and 18 April 1934.

²³¹ Frank, ‘Treaty Revision and Doublespeak’, p. 173.

Macartney, who contributed to the scholarship of Hungarian and Central European history during the interwar years. Macartney's works were accessible to the Irish readership as well. Many of them were discussed in journals and newspapers, as illustrated by Edward J. Coyne's above mentioned review and Macken's present article.²³² Macken criticised the British historian's description of Protestantism as 'most national to the Magyar soul' and Catholicism as 'an importation from the West designed to efface the memory of ancient freedom'.²³³ Nonetheless, leading Hungarian politicians of the inter-war period, like Horthy and Bethlen, were indeed Calvinists.²³⁴ And even though, Jörg K. Hoensch has argued, Catholicism 'was no longer the established religion, the Catholic Church and the clergy [...] stood solidly behind the policies of the Horthy regime and had no reservations about supporting its revisionist policies.'²³⁵ Nevertheless, Hungarian Catholicism became less politicised in the 1930s, while the social and public aspects of Catholicism became more prominent, due to the effect of Pope Pius XI's encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*.²³⁶ In fact, the term 'Christian' would be the most accurate to use in the context of interwar Hungary as it covered different segments of society. Among these groups, the conservative ruling class placed a large emphasis on 'Christianity', as it expressed their stance against 'godless Bolsheviks' and 'atheist Jews'. As Paul Hanebrink (2005) has observed, by doing so, the Hungarian political elite was consciously 're-establishing Hungary as a Christian nation' in order to restore Hungary culturally and politically after the post-war revolutionary turmoil. The purpose was to fit into a wider, Christian European context.

The Irish press rarely criticised Hungarian Conservatives openly in relation to the Jewish question; on the contrary. Among others, the *Irish Independent*'s Gertrude Gaffney pointed to the strong anti-Semitic feeling in Hungary that had existed strongly before the war. However,

²³² Mary M. Macken (review), 'Hungary by C. A. Macartney' in *Studies*, vol. xxiv, no. xciv (June 1935), p. 333; and E. J. C. (review), 'The Social Revolution in Austria by C. A. Macartney' in *Studies*, vol. xvi, no. 64, (December 1927), p. 724.

²³³ Macken (review), 'Hungary', p. 335.

²³⁴ The proportion of Catholics was 65%, (1920, 1941) that of Calvinists 27.8 % (Romsics argues for 21% Calvinists and 6% Evangelicals so Hoensch's 27.8% is more of a general category of Protestants), that of the Jewry 5-6%. As for the members of the Calvinist Church, details Paul Hanebrink, they were nearly 98% ethnic Hungarians. See Mária Ormos, *Magyarország a Két Világháború Korában 1914-1945 [Hungary in the Age of the Two World Wars]* (Debrecen: Csokonai Kiadó, 2006), p. 105; Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary*, p. 123; Romsics, *Magyarország Története*, p. 189; and Paul Hanebrink, "'Christian Europe" and National Identity in Interwar Hungary' in Pieter M. Judson and Marsha L. Rozenblit (eds) *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), p. 198.

²³⁵ Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary*, p. 123.

²³⁶ Csaba Fazekas, 'Collaborating with Horthy: Political Catholicism and Christian Political Organizations in Hungary' in Wolfram Kaiser and Helmut Wohnout (eds) *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-1945*, vol. i, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 172.

the controversial and strongly anti-Zionist correspondent also claimed that at the same time, the Hungarians were ‘too good-hearted and easy-going a people to emulate Germany’s fanaticism and cruelty.’²³⁷ On the other hand, the *Catholic Bulletin* spoke rather openly but protectively of Nationalist and Anti-Semitic Secret Societies in Hungary. According to the outspoken journal, these secret societies had suffered unfair treatment in the *Irish Independent*’s article of 5 September 1930, which ignored Bolshevik secret societies and only singled out a right-wing conservative group associated with Gyula Gömbös.²³⁸ The Hungarian politician had been associated with anti-Semitic tendencies since the early 1920s. Nevertheless, Mária Ormos has pointed out that it is hard to pinpoint Gömbös’ actual stance on anti-Semitism and examine changes in his opinion during his four years in power. It is a fact, though, that between 1932 and 1936 he did not negotiate anti-Semitic propaganda nor did he bring anti-Jewish legislations. Occasionally, in Irish news reports portrayed him in a positive light; for instance, when he removed the Budapest City Council for having shown ‘a strong anti-Jewish attitude’.²³⁹

Undeniably, Gömbös’ term as Prime Minister of Hungary (1932-1936) as the head of the Party of National Unity (*Nemzeti Egység Pártja*) marked the radicalisation of the Hungarian Government both in terms of internal and foreign policy. He aimed to transform Hungary into a fascist, corporate state and focused on the cooperation within the ‘framework of an “axis of fascist states”’²⁴⁰ in order to restore the historical unity of St Stephen’s Crown. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that Hungarian rapprochement towards Italy started under Bethlen and was marked by the signing of the Hungarian-Italian Treaty of 1927 on Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration. Irish newspaper reports noted that in contrast with István Bethlen’s plans for peaceful revision, Gömbös moved further and looked at Germany and Italy as allies for the readjustment of borders, possibly even by military means.²⁴¹ Thus Gömbös’s rule was seen inseparable from Hungarian revisionism since he was aimed at regaining its historic frontiers

²³⁷ ‘In Hungary To-Day. The Jewish Problem’, *Irish Independent*, 7 January 1936.

²³⁸ ‘Matters about which the Press is Silent’ in the *Catholic Bulletin* (February 1931), pp. 144-145.

²³⁹ Ormos, *Magyarország a Két Világháború Korában*, p. 192; and ‘Jews in Hungary’, *Irish Press*, 18 January 1934.

²⁴⁰ Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary*, p. 127 and p. 134.

²⁴¹ Cartledge, *Mihály Károlyi and István Bethlen*, p. 123; János Sáringer, *A Két Világháború közötti Magyar Külpolitika Történetírásunkban [Foreign Policy of Interwar Hungary in Hungarian Historiography]* (Szeged, 2011), pp. 12-13 and p. 137; Ormos, *Magyarország a Két Világháború Korában*, pp. 100-101; Hanebrink, ‘“Christian Europe”’, p. 193; and R. W. Seton-Watson (review), ‘Magyariens Schuld, Ungarns Sühne by Oszkár Jászi’ in the *Slavonic Review*, vol. i, no. 3, (March 1923), p. 676.

with the help of great powers.²⁴² Therefore, Irish commentators associated the strength of the Hungarian right, and its links with fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in the mid-1930s with the ‘nationality question’. The impact of Italian help was highlighted in terms of Austria and Hungary’s improvement, thanks to the Roman Protocol of March 1934, which, in addition to economic support, also involved Italian ‘determination to maintain the independence of Austria and Hungary.’²⁴³ This was noted in the Irish newspapers and journals mainly due to the latter, such as with regard to the originally economic cooperation among Italy, Austria and Hungary.²⁴⁴ Hence when the economy started to recover in the mid-late 1930s, years after the 1929 Depression, the successor states of Austria-Hungary still experienced political problems, and faced new challenges, due to the advance of political extremism. As Patricia Clavin has noted, the ‘growing intolerance towards Jews, Gypsies, Communists and other so-called “non-nationals” that permeated the nationalist “war” for recovery was especially troubling.’²⁴⁵

In the twenty years of its existence (1918-1938), Irish commentators considered the democracy in the First Czechoslovak Republic to be the most secure point in Central Europe, in spite of the fact that the ‘impact of the Depression encouraged political extremism among Czechoslovakia’s disaffected minorities’ as well.²⁴⁶ It is also noteworthy that in recent historiography, revisionist works like Mary Heimann’s *Czechoslovakia: The State That Failed* (2011), claiming that ‘Czechoslovakia’s brief period of democracy, however good it may look when compared with German Nazism or Italian fascism, was seriously flawed from the first’, have attracted considerable criticism by traditional historians.²⁴⁷ The stability was undoubtedly associated with the long Presidency of Tomáš G. Masaryk.²⁴⁸ In spite of the prevailing tension between the state-forming Czech majority and the other minorities, Irish newspapers generally perceived Masaryk as having ‘brought his country to safety through many difficulties and produced a condition of stability which [was] a model in Central Europe.’²⁴⁹

²⁴² Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary*, p. 127 and p. 131.

²⁴³ ‘Recovery in Middle Europe’, *Irish Independent*, 3 December 1937; Patricia Clavin, *The Great Depression in Europe, 1929-1939* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), p. 181; and Juhász, *Magyarország Külpolitikája*, pp. 145-46.

²⁴⁴ ‘Customs Conference in Rome?’, *Irish Press*, 19 February, 1934; ‘Dollfuss in Rome’, *Irish Press*, 14 March 1934; and ‘Danube Pact Signed’, *Irish Press*, 19 March 1934.

²⁴⁵ Clavin, *The Great Depression in Europe*, p. 182.

²⁴⁶ Peter Neville, *Eduard Beneš and Tomáš Masaryk: Czechoslovakia* (London: Haus Histories, 2010), p. 107.

²⁴⁷ Mary Heimann, *Czechoslovakia: The State That Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 49.

²⁴⁸ ‘How Masaryk Led the Czeks [sic] to Freedom’, *Irish Press*, 24 May 1934.

²⁴⁹ ‘Czecho-Slovak Republic’, *Irish Independent*, 23 October 1923.

The democratic profile of Masaryk was enriched by the fact that, as Daniel Samek has reminded us, the Czechoslovak President was also ‘a world-renowned defender of women’s rights’.²⁵⁰ In this capacity he met feminist and republican Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington, who visited Prague in 1929 to attend the International Peace Congress of Women.²⁵¹ Writing in the *Irish Press* in 1935, Sheehy-Skeffington recalled this meeting and that Masaryk spoke

...sympathetically and with knowledge of Ireland, dealing particularly with the growth of the Sinn Féin movement and with the language revival, both themes close to the heart of the Czech leader. He declared that our movement had been an inspiration and a beacon to his people.²⁵²

Based on her experiences in Prague, she gave a lecture in Cork; however, her articles, Samek has warned, ‘contained frequent misunderstandings and errors.’²⁵³ Consul Růžička made an effort ‘to see the disseminated nonsense corrected’ but since she continued to reiterate her mistakes, Růžička gave up eventually.²⁵⁴

Zara Steiner has claimed that Masaryk’s conception of the Czech nation ignored the ‘Catholicism of much of the population and distinguished Czechs from Germans and Slovaks.’²⁵⁵ Author of several articles on Czech culture in the *Irish Press*, Grace O’Brien, was among those Irish writers who stressed Masaryk’s ‘far reaching influence’ and significance even in an Irish context. Although O’Brien’s article was overall positive, it contained references to the anti-Catholic feeling that ‘prevailed’ in Masaryk’s, referring to the former link between Austrian rule and the Catholic Church. Most importantly, O’Brien acknowledged Masaryk’s lecture entitled “The Problem of Small Nations”, which signified the centrality of the cause of Central European small nations in his political outlook. In relation to this, she quoted the President’s awareness of the parallel Irish cause:

...Had there been time, I should have been glad to visit Ireland for I knew the political and literary sides of the Irish movement, and our people had long sympathised with the Irish. The question that interested me most was how and to what extent the Irish character expressed itself in Irishmen who no longer speak the Irish language. Can people live if its language is dead?²⁵⁶

‘Fortunately the language is not dead,’ concluded O’Brien.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁰ ‘People and Places. Masaryk. A Personal Impression’, *Irish Press*, 7 December 1935; and Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations*, p. 45.

²⁵¹ Biographical Note. Hanna Sheehy Skeffington, Collection List No. 47, Sheehy Skeffington Papers, NLI MSS 33,603-33,635, p. 11.

²⁵² ‘People and Places. Masaryk. A Personal Impression’, *Irish Press*, 7 December 1935.

²⁵³ Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations*, p. 46.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ Steiner, *The Lights that Failed*, p. 264.

²⁵⁶ ‘Great Figures of To-day. Masaryk-Maker of Czecho-Slovakia by Grace O’Brien’, *Irish Press*, 7 April 1932.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

O'Brien saw the strength of democracy as the main political characteristic of the Czechoslovak system. Successfully keeping the young republic on 'a middle course between Bolshevism and Fascism' was considered to be the biggest achievement of Masaryk, who 'had no desire to become a Dictator. Democracy was his ideal.'²⁵⁸ Similarly, Irish Catholic nationalist Aodh de Blacam (Hugh Saunders Blackham) also noted that 'the happiest thing to record is, that Czecho-Slovakia has maintained democracy, when all surrounding lands have fallen to dictatorships.'²⁵⁹ Nonetheless, in contrast to the majority of Irish commentators who focused on the achievements of Masaryk, de Blacam (who wrote mostly under the pseudonym 'Roddy the Rover'), appeared to be more critical of Masaryk – or indeed of Czechoslovakia itself. De Blacam was an efficient propagandist; Susannah Riordan has stressed that his Catholicism was 'ardent, ultramontane, clericalist and profoundly grounded in Catholic social theory.'²⁶⁰ Mark O'Brien described him as 'a close friend of de Valera'; this may explain his frequent articles in the *Irish Press* – however, he worked as a 'book reviewer and leader writer on the *Irish Times*' and the *Irish Independent* as well. He also 'wrote extensively for catholic periodicals' such as the *Irish Rosary* and the *Irish Monthly*.²⁶¹ De Blacam, who at the time was known for his vehemently extreme opinions, described Masaryk as 'a veteran statesman who built a nation and broke an empire.'²⁶² He reviewed Masaryk's philosophic works in a critical tone, calling them 'strange' and 'destructive', naming Masaryk's actually 'remarkable work' to be the 'breaking up' of Austria-Hungary. Still, reviving the culture of (the Protestant) Hus was the focus of Irish criticism; 'no Belfast extremist has said more bitter things against Rome than cluster in his books', argued de Blacam. He pointed out that Masaryk's 'chief motive in opposition to Austria was enmity to the religion of which Austria seemed to him a bulwark', calling Masaryk's attitude outright

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ 'Nation-Builder and Empire-Breaker. What Masaryk Achieved for Better or Worse', *Irish Press*, 5 December 1935.

²⁶⁰ Patrick Maume, 'De Blacam, Aodh (Hugh Saunders Blackham, Aodh Sandrach de Blacam)', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2455>, accessed on 22 November 2014; and Susannah Riordan, 'Popularizing Spanish Literature in 1930s Ireland: Aodh de Blacam and the *Irish Monthly*' in Declan M. Downey and Julio Crespo MacLennan (eds.), *Spanish-Irish Relations Through the Ages* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008), p. 176.

²⁶¹ O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, p. 25; 'Obituary: Mr. Aodh de Blacam', *Irish Times*, 15 January 1951; and 'Seen, Heard, and Noted. A Nation of Detectives? My Problem Puzzled No One', *Irish Press*, 11 July 1933.

²⁶² 'Nation-Builder and Empire-Breaker. What Masaryk Achieved for Better or Worse', *Irish Press*, 5 December 1935.

‘Orange-like’.²⁶³ As far as Masaryk’s political impact was concerned, de Blacam spoke critically of his role in the post-war settlement of Central Europe, writing in December 1935:

...To-day, the Allies are struggling to keep Austria from Germany; and they have Masaryk’s plan to thank for it. The Austrian system, then, was broken up according to the racial map, as well as that could be done, and States were set up with racial, instead of historic, names, as if men were species in a human “zoo.” Most of the new States are unstable, lacking historic roots.²⁶⁴

He concluded by establishing that Masaryk’s rule could be deemed ‘highly successful’ due to the fact that Czecho-Slovakia had made ‘better material progress than any other part of middle Europe, although mostly on high capitalist lines.’²⁶⁵ ‘Whether Masaryk’s work was good, or will last,’ stressed de Blacam, ‘time will judge’.²⁶⁶ The tone of the article together with the sharp religious criticism triggered the response of Pavel Růžička. The Czechoslovak Consul pointed out several ‘essential errors’ the writer had committed, starting with the title ‘nation-builder’. He emphasised that the ‘Czechoslovak nation was in a thriving condition, both spiritually and economically, long before the war and only lacked political independence.’²⁶⁷ Secondly, Růžička identified a misunderstanding regarding Masaryk’s alleged revolt against Catholicism ‘and the statement that “Masaryk’s chief motif of opposition to Austria was enmity to the Catholic religion”’, emphasising the liberty of faith that characterised the monarchy (including the Czech lands) after 1881. Moreover, Růžička denied all charges against Masaryk’s alleged marxism and regarding Masaryk’s works being destructive. The consul concluded by stressing that ‘the term “Czechoslovakia” [signified] the union between Bohemia and Slovakia, the name Czech being synonymous with Bohemian.’²⁶⁸

When Masaryk passed away two years later in October 1937, his achievements symbolised the successes of democratic Czechoslovakia in Ireland. Despite the perceivably overall democratic profile of the new republic, Patricia Clavin has pointed out that in interwar Czechoslovak politics, in times of crisis, ‘religious and ethnic questions were every bit as pressing as economic ones’.²⁶⁹ Then, in order to preserve the power of the governing elite, economic issues were used to ‘trade against religious or ethnic issues’.²⁷⁰ Journals and

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ ‘Men who Led his Nation in Struggle against Oppression’, *Irish Press*, 7 December 1935.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Clavin, *The Great Depression in Europe*, p. 25.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

newspapers, some better informed than others, pointed in unity to Masaryk's role in making the Czechoslovak Republic 'the main stronghold of democracy in Central-Europe'. For instance, *Ireland To-Day* stated that Masaryk 'joined Czechs and Slovenes [sic] to form a republic' – seemingly not considering the difference between Slovenes or Slovaks.²⁷¹ The *Catholic Bulletin*, on the other hand, was not concentrating on Masaryk's virtues and merits only but rather expressed doubt as far as his legacy was concerned: 'he changed the map of Europe. Was it for the better?'²⁷² While admitting that the dissolution of the empire 'was a good purpose in so far as it sprang from patriotism', the author stressed that 'it went with deadly hatred of the traditions of Austria, good and bad alike.'²⁷³ From the point of view of the *Catholic Bulletin* this was problematic since the principles of the Dual Monarchy were inseparable from Catholicism and 'Masaryk's work was to shatter that large complex of old, Catholic Europe which was the Empire'.²⁷⁴ Moreover, in addition to the late Czechoslovak President's 'glorification of Protestantism', his links with Britain were at the centre of the Irish journal's criticism as it was, argued the author, because of his enthusiasm 'for English Liberal ideas that he had no use for traditional Europe'.²⁷⁵ As for the prospects of the Czechoslovak Republic in late 1937, the *Catholic Bulletin* highlighted how the republic was 'in acute peril, between the grindstones of great fanatical Powers which owe their might very largely to Masaryk's policy of destroying Austria. A terrible punishment seems likely to be brought upon his people.'²⁷⁶ Indeed, the Munich Conference in September 1938 brought an end to the territorial integrity of the first Czechoslovak Republic.

The minority problem in borderland regions

During the interwar years, the possibility of treaty revisions was a frequently discussed topic across Europe, including in Ireland. It was visible that 'the Treaty of Versailles was not a heaven-sent document, to be regarded forever as rigid and inviolable. On the contrary,' argued the *Irish Press*, 'it was – like the "Treaty" forced on us – a settlement based on compulsion and an attempt to perpetuate the spoils system in its delimitation of frontiers.'²⁷⁷

²⁷¹ (Untitled) in *Ireland To-day*, vol. ii, no. 10, (October 1937), p. 8.

²⁷² 'From the Hill Tops. Masaryk and Three Spanish Leaders' in the *Catholic Bulletin*, vol. xxvii, (November 1937), p. 830.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 831.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ 'Europe's Problems', *Irish Press*, 26 September 1935, p. 6.

Echoing de Valera's agenda and ideas about 'peaceful revision', placing the Irish question in parallel with other European small nations, the paper claimed:

... We in Ireland have more than an academic interest in this question. Ireland is one of the small nations which for centuries has endured oppression at the hands of powerful neighbouring State. [...] Revision and readjustment must come, if there is to be lasting peace in the world [...]. There must be provision for changing international treaties or conditions that bear within themselves the seeds of future wars.²⁷⁸

Therefore, Irish newspapers regularly pointed to the Versailles treaties when discussing the prevailing 'minorities question' in Central Europe, in parallel with the legacy of the Irish border settlement. The Free State's disappointment with regards the Boundary Commission was undeniable; eventually the existing borders were confirmed on 3 December 1925, after the British Conservative *Morning Post* leaked the planned transfers on 7 November 1925. The report of the Boundary Commission was suppressed and not published until 1969.

Rogers Brubaker has noted that after the Great War, national conflicts in Central Europe became 'internationalised'. Brubaker has relied on the terminology of Jeremy King, who examined how Czech, German and Hungarian nationhood became ethnically and geographically more homogenised.²⁷⁹ Brubaker has emphasised that the post-war treaties did not contain references to the concept of 'national self-determination', nor did they recognise national minorities as communities, but only on a personal level.²⁸⁰ For small states, like the Free State, a crucial aspect of League membership was the organisation's declared role as protecting ethnic and religious minorities. Therefore, when expecting the support of other small nations, it was not surprising when diplomats like the Irish High Commissioner in London, Timothy Smiddy, articulated the view that the Irish Free State could be regarded as 'a champion of the national interests of small States, as also of minorities'.²⁸¹ Economist, academic, and diplomat Timothy Smiddy was, at the time of writing, the Irish High Commissioner in London (5 February 1929-14 December 1930). His time as High Commissioner was not without all complications. The Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Joseph Walshe was insulted by the fact that Smiddy's correspondence with the Minister for External Affairs Patrick McGilligan bypassed him. Walshe favoured direct

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ King, 'Austria versus Hungary', pp. 175-176.

²⁸⁰ Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics*, p. 49.

²⁸¹ Michael Kennedy, 'Smiddy, Timothy Anthony', *DIB*,

<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a8130>, accessed on 16 December 2014; and Nolan, *Joseph Walshe*, p. 38.

communication between British and Irish departments without the involvement of the high commissioner, and ‘pointed out that before 1927 all official communication passed through the office of the Governor General, leading to an element of “apparent subordination.”’²⁸²

The Irish dissatisfaction with the borders in the early 1920s resulted in an active participation in the League, which was expected to see to the protection of, among others, the northern Irish Catholic minority. This was crucial for the Free State under both Cosgrave and de Valera. Interestingly, Gerard Keown has pointed out that although during the interwar years the Irish External Affairs took a close interest in minority problems at Geneva, at the same time the Department was also keen on adhering to a non-partitionist attitude in relation to Ireland.²⁸³

One of the most vocal commentators discussing minority rights within the framework of the League was John Marcus O’Sullivan, Minister of Education and Professor of History at UCD. In his article in *Studies*, he expressed the view that ‘when we envisage the problem of minorities, especially as presented in Eastern Europe, we may be permitted to doubt if anything, even the principle, has been won by the complete destruction of the Habsburg Empire.’²⁸⁴ Undoubtedly, self-determination had played a central role in Irish political discourse. O’Sullivan argued: ‘the nation shall be a unit; and the nation need not of course coincide with any already existing state’.²⁸⁵ He discussed the cases where natural, political, historical, and national frontiers did not coincide, emphasising the significance of territorial unity – on the eve of the final decision of the Boundary Commission (or the lack, thereof).²⁸⁶ Although O’Sullivan was referring to the Irish case, his ideas were of relevance for all small nations within the League. ‘A glance at Eastern Europe,’ continued O’Sullivan, might suggest that there was a danger of misinterpreting the principle of self-determination.²⁸⁷ Above all, O’Sullivan linked together the question of religion, nationalism and the principle of self-

²⁸² Timothy A. Smiddy (London) to J.P. Walshe (Dublin), Candidature for election to League Council, London, 12 May 1930, NAI DFA 26/95 LN 80, *DIFP* vol. iii, no. 369, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1930/Candidature-for-election-to-League-Council/1079.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

²⁸³ Keown, ‘Creating an Irish Foreign Policy’, p. 38.

²⁸⁴ John M. O’Sullivan, ‘Nationality as a Claim to Sovereignty’ in *Studies*, vol. xiv, no. 56, (December 1925), p. 639.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 643.

²⁸⁶ Notes of a conference with the Irish Boundary Commission held in Stanley Baldwin’s Room, House of Commons (Secret) (C.P.503(25)), London, 5.15 pm, 3 December 1925, NAI DT S4720A, *DIFP* vol. ii, no. 367, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1925/Suppression-of-the-report-of-the-Irish-Boundary-Commission/703.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

²⁸⁷ Typescript [for *Studies*] with corrections, Marcus O’Sullivan Papers, UCDA LA60/9, December 1925, p. 17.

determination, and argued that the Church ought to be able incorporate the rules of nationality into its own laws.²⁸⁸

The problematic nature of the minority question was highlighted by Bolton C. Waller. In addition to his role as researcher in the NEBB, Waller was also involved in the application procedure of the Free State's admission to the League. He took note of the fact that simultaneous requests were made by Iceland, Latvia, Finland, Lithuania and Hungary as well.²⁸⁹ Later he became the President of the League of Nations Society of Ireland.²⁹⁰ His potential was illustrated by the fact that his essay on 'how to restore peace in Europe through international co-operation' won the best prize offered by E. Flene, U.S.A. In the winning article, Waller focused on the role of the League in keeping up peace and suggested, among others, to implement 'improved safeguards for minorities'.²⁹¹ As early as 1922-1923, he claimed that certain segments of the Versailles treaties that redrew boundaries across Europe could be adopted in relation to the Irish boundary as well.²⁹² Writing in 1925, he argued that it was unworthy of Ireland as a small nation and 'out of accord with our traditions and temperament, being as we are a roaming and restless people', to avoid 'all entanglements with the rest of the world'.²⁹³ He explained this with the fact that 'throughout our history we have been concerned with the spread of ideas, and have had an influence out of all proportion to our size or strength'.²⁹⁴ Therefore, argued Waller, the League provided the best opportunity for small nations like Ireland to play a part in the world.²⁹⁵

One of the main tasks of the League, Waller found, was to supervise the protection of minority rights.²⁹⁶ This proved to be problematic, as demonstrated by his article of March

²⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 22.

²⁸⁹ Typescript report by B.C. Waller on the application of the Irish Free State for admission to the League of Nations, Eoin MacNeill Papers, UCDA LA1/H/61; Bolton C. Waller, *Ireland and the League of Nations* (Dublin: Talbot Press, 1925); Bolton C. Waller, *Paths to World Peace* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1926); and Bolton C. Waller, *Hibernia, or, The Future of Ireland* (London: Dutton, 1928).

²⁹⁰ Kennedy, *Ireland and the League of Nations*, p. 28.

²⁹¹ 'European Peace. Irishman's Prize Essay', *Irish Independent*, 16 September 1924; and Kevin O'Higgins to each member of the Executive Council, enclosing a memorandum on the Boundary Question (C.1987/24) (Confidential), Dublin, 25 September 1924, NAI DT S4084, *DIFP* vol. ii, no. 272, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1924/Boundary-Commission:-possible-offer-to-Northern-Ireland/608.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

²⁹² Typescript memorandum by B.C. Waller on "European precedents for the North-Eastern Boundary Bureau", 1922-1923, Eoin MacNeill Papers, UCDA LA1/H/89.

²⁹³ Waller, *Ireland and the League of Nations*, p. 18.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 66.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 37.

1929 in the *Independent*, where Waller declared that the Council faced its ‘least successful’ challenge up to date; dealing with the ‘complaints and petitions’ of certain ‘aggrieved minorities’ including Finland, Romania, Hungary, and the German minority in Upper Silesia.²⁹⁷ ‘The problem of minorities in Europe is real and threatening’, emphasised Waller, most likely leading to war.²⁹⁸ The *Cork Examiner* named a possible reason for the negligence of the question to be the fact that ‘very few older members of the League could honestly declare that they themselves invariably treated their minorities in accordance with the spirit of the guaranteeing Treaty.’²⁹⁹ Indeed, the ethno-linguistic and religious divisions, such as the cases observed by the *Cork Examiner*, were so deeply embedded in certain societies that the presence of the League of could not remedy the situation.³⁰⁰

Irish perceptions of the regional minorities in the borderlands, ‘*outside* the imagined’ newly independent nation-states, illustrate the complexity of Central European identities in the face of extreme political changes.³⁰¹ The troubling nature of minority issues was frequently discussed in the Irish press in the interwar years. This was visible in Irish comments on the Sudeten Germans in the Czechoslovak State; the formerly Austrian Catholics in the South Tyrol; and Hungarians along the frontiers of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia.

The parallels between the ‘minority problem’ in Bohemia and North-Eastern Ireland remained in the centre of nationalist Irish attention during the interwar years. The combination of religion and language as markers of the main identity of the population alternately featured in Irish comparisons; particularly frequent were the historical interpretations of the role of the Czech language.

As we have seen in the previous chapters, the perceived antagonism between the German-speaking and the Czech population of Bohemia had partly centred on the question of ‘national language’ in the region, while there were examples for more religious themed investigations as well, depending on the background of the Irish commentators. Indeed, Gearóid Ó Tuathaigh has emphasised that in Ireland, language and religion had been always central to

²⁹⁷ ‘Dangers that Threaten World Peace’, *Irish Independent*, 6 March 1929.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁹ ‘Protection of Minorities’, *Cork Examiner*, 3 July 1930.

³⁰⁰ Steiner, *The Lights that Failed*, p. 364.

³⁰¹ Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics*, p. 46.

the question of ‘Irish culture, community and identity.’³⁰² In July 1924, Seaghan P. Mac Enrí, professor of linguistics and lecturer in Modern Irish at University College Galway, elaborated in the *Irish Independent* on how Bohemia had ‘many parallels with Ireland’.³⁰³ He visited the Czech lands before the war, during the days of the Empire, and referred to Bohemia’s

...German-speaking minority of about one-third of its population, and this minority, like ours, is bitterly opposed to the national language and aspirations. Like Ireland, Bohemia, once free, came several hundred years ago under foreign domination, being annexed to the Crown of Austria. As England sought to Anglicise Ireland, so Austria sought to Germanise Bohemia [...].³⁰⁴

Mac Enrí was dedicated to Irish language revival; he was regular contributor to *An Claidreamh Solais* as well as author of a number of books, such as *A Handbook of Modern Irish*.³⁰⁵ He considered the Czech language revival, which had been considered ‘a hopeless task’ by many, similar to the Gaelic League’s mission. He concluded by arguing: ‘what Bohemia did Ireland can do if its Government and people have a real feeling of nationality.’³⁰⁶ Thus the revival the national language was, according to the professor of linguistics, inseparable from national self-determination.

Similarly, in his *Lessons from Modern Language Movements* (1926), Catholic Irish writer and language activist Liam Pádraig Ó Riain (William Patrick Ryan) demonstrated the significance of other European national movements (Bohemia, Hungary, the Balkans, Portugal, the Baltic States, Denmark, Norway, Poland and others) as a lesson for Ireland.³⁰⁷ Moreover, he highlighted the special connection between the national language and religion as well.³⁰⁸ As Daniel Samek has emphasised, in Ireland, ‘the image of the Czech language revival was absolutely essential as a model for the defenders of Irish Gaelic in this period’.³⁰⁹ Importantly, Ó Riain highlighted that there was no necessary contradiction between the motto ‘Sinn Féin

³⁰² Gearóid Ó Tuathaigh, ‘Cultural Visions and the New State: Embedding and Embalming’ in Gabriel Doherty and Dermot Keogh (eds) *De Valera’s Irelands* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2003), p. 167.

³⁰³ ‘Fight for the Czech Language’, *Irish Independent*, 9 July 1924.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ ‘An Doctúir Seaghan Mac Énrí Papers’, available online at http://archives.library.nuigalway.ie/col_level.php?col=A8, accessed on 19 November 2014; ‘Fight for the Czech Language’, *Irish Independent*, 9 July 1924.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Liam Pádraig Ó Riain, *Lessons from Modern Language Movements* (Dublin: Conradh na Gaedhilge, 1926).

³⁰⁸ The impact of Ó Riain’s *Lessons from Modern Language Movements* was noteworthy in intellectual circles; however, despite his efforts (as he was convinced that there was a need for strengthening the role of Irish language education), it was not included in the primary school curriculum. See Letters from the Office of National Education, Pádraic Ó Dubhthaigh to William Patrick Ryan, 14 September 1925, William Patrick Ryan Papers, UCDA LA11/131.

³⁰⁹ For his correspondence with Seaghan MacEnrí regarding the state of languages before and after independence in European small nations such as Poland Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, see Letter from Seaghan MacEnrí, 18 August 1920, William Patrick Ryan Papers, UCDA LA11/70.

amháin’ and opening up to influences from the wider world as it was ‘heartening to note how others like us have worked, endured, and won. Our People have always loved stories, especially about the world.’³¹⁰ Nonetheless, after his initial support, Ó Riain ended up rejecting Sinn Féin.³¹¹ The revival of the Czech language, therefore, was seen as a major marker of identity across the Czech lands, including the areas with considerable German population. The personal experience of other Irish authors pointed to the same conclusion. In 1929, writing for the *Irish Independent*, Siobhán Nic Siothaig [sic] called the efforts of the Czech revivalists ‘a language miracle’, highlighting ‘how an ancient language, ruthlessly driven under, can be not only fully restored to its former pride of place as dominant tongue, but can completely obliterate its erstwhile supplanter.’³¹² She detailed the shift from the days when German was the only recognised and official tongue, to the current situation of what she identified as nothing short of a miracle, highlighting, however, the ‘slight absurdity’ the transformation led to in some cases.³¹³

Therefore, references to historical parallels between the Czech and Irish revivals ran throughout the interwar years. On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Czechoslovak independence, the *Irish Press* reminded its readers to the fact that Czechoslovak

...history has been somewhat akin to our own. [...] As in Ireland, repression strengthened what it sought to destroy. A quite unexpected national revival set in. [...] With the Nation alive to its own real existence it remained only to await a political opportunity to give effect to a national independence already possessed in word and thought.³¹⁴

It was emphasised that what eventually

...saved them from being submerged during the three centuries of subjugation was their separate language and the separate thought and culture enshrined in it. So long as the Czech speech lived the Czech nation could not die. To us this fifteenth anniversary, in the celebration of which we share in sentiment, is a reminder of the task we must accomplish before the foundations on which we are building our separate nationhood can be called in any wise secure. In our language, too, lies the one sure hope of national survival.³¹⁵

Nevertheless, parallels with the Czechs were not unanimously supported in Ireland. In its 19 November 1926 issue, the *Irish Independent* adopted a very different perspective. It pointed to the dissimilarities between Ireland and Czechoslovakia, particularly to the existence of

³¹⁰ Ó Riain, *Lessons from Modern Language Movements*, p. 3.

³¹¹ James H. Murphy, ‘Ryan, William Patrick’, *DIB*,

<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a7881>, accessed on 16 September 2014.

³¹² ‘A Language Miracle. Compulsory Czech’, *Irish Independent*, 1 October 1929.

³¹³ *Ibid.*

³¹⁴ ‘The Czech Triumph’, *Irish Press*, 28 October 1933.

³¹⁵ ‘A Language Miracle. Compulsory Czech’, *Irish Independent*, 1 October 1929.

three distinct nationalities and languages: German, Czech and Slovak.³¹⁶ Some Czechs denied the separate existence of a Slovak race or a Slovak language', argued the *Irish Independent*, while the Slovaks maintained their 'separate nationality and language'.³¹⁷ Another outstanding example for the awareness of the Slovak language was the Smyllie's aforementioned series, 'Carpathian Contrasts' in the *Irish Times*, which provided the Irish readership with background information on how before the Great War, 'everything possible was done to kill the native language.'³¹⁸ Smyllie also highlighted how priests preached in the Slovak language; this was the key to success in pre-war times: 'The Hungarian methods of repression were far more brutal, as well as more subtle, than the English methods were in this country. How did the Slovaks succeed and the Irish failed?'³¹⁹ The significance of these articles lies in the fact that differences between the two state-forming nationalities rarely featured in Irish articles; hence, although on a small scale but there was a sense of Irish awareness of the distinction.

Likewise, in 1927 Michael Tierney, professor of Greek at UCD, argued that 'analogies with Flemish, Czech, or the Baltic languages are all misleading'.³²⁰ He claimed that while European movements aimed at restoring a peasant language, Irish Irelanders, on the other hand, aimed to revive the language that the majority of the population had ceased to speak.³²¹ Very similar in tone was the *Irish Press*'s argument in January 1936, stressing that 'it was easy for the Flamands, the Finns, the Czechs and the others to infuse new life into their national languages, because these languages had never ceased to be spoken by masses of the people.'³²² This was not the case in Ireland, the paper emphasised, urging the readers to learn from 'the mistakes and successes of other countries where old languages were revived or new languages acquired by the masses of people.'³²³

The transformation of Irish perceptions of the Sudetenland, including the use of the term 'Sudeten German' instead of 'Bohemian German', became visible in the 1930s, when 'the

³¹⁶ 'Nationality in Czechoslovakia', *Irish Independent*, 19 November 1926.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*

³¹⁸ 'Carpathian Contrasts. Mountain Climbing a la Mode: A Tinker's Watch. How the Slovak Language was Saved', *Irish Times*, 19 November 1937.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

³²⁰ Michael Tierney, Richard Mulcahy, Risteard Ua Maolchatha, Patrick Browne, Osborn Bergin, and Liam Ó Briain, 'The Revival of the Irish Language [with Comments]' in *Studies*, vol. xvi, no. 61, (March 1927), p. 5.

³²¹ *Ibid.*

³²² 'Language Lessons for Ireland', *Irish Press*, 10 January 1936.

³²³ *Ibid.*

networks and relations of Sudeten Germans' were substantially reconstructed.³²⁴ Rogers Brubaker has stressed that this included the reorientation of external ties from German Austria towards the German Reich, with the latter taking over 'the multifaceted role of external national homeland for Sudeten Germans.'³²⁵ Especially after Hitler's rise to power in 1933, stronger claims were made about the border between Germany and Czechoslovakia. As Jeremy King has observed, the national conflict in the Bohemian lands took the form of a 'triadic structure' again, this time, with the inclusion of Germany in the struggle.³²⁶ Ethno-political affiliations became the main marker identity in Irish comments: focusing on Nazi Germans (and not German-speaking Austrians) versus the Czechs. As far as the direct Bohemian-Irish parallel was concerned in terms of the boundary question, Paul Murray has called attention to the fact that the example of boundary drawing between Germany and Czechoslovakia resulted in 'disastrous political consequences' later for the Czechs, similarly to the Irish case.³²⁷ Murray has considered the situation in the Sudetenland tenuous than in Ulster, due to the fact that in Bohemia around one-third of the population was comprised of Germans, many of whom were Jewish.³²⁸ This eventually turned out to be fatal for the latter group.

Therefore, the year 1933 marked the growing influence of Nazi ideology on the German communities in the neighbouring Central European states, including Czechoslovakia. In 1933, the Irish minister in Berlin, Leo T. McCauley, also noted that 'the "national resurgence" of Germany had "reinfected" the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia.'³²⁹ Therefore, Czechoslovak hopes of 'completely conciliating the German population within its borders have been shattered.'³³⁰ And although *Ireland To-Day* claimed that, until 1937, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia had managed to fend off Nazi advance, Czecho-Slovakia was said to be 'terrified' due to the fact that it was 'not guiltless of the interests of the three million isolated Germans within her frontiers.'³³¹

³²⁴ Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p. 133.

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*, p. 169.

³²⁷ Murray, *The Irish Boundary Commission*, p. 258.

³²⁸ Earls, 'The Coast of Bohemia'.

³²⁹ Mervyn O'Driscoll, *Ireland, Germany and the Nazis: Politics and Diplomacy, 1919-1939* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), p. 93.

³³⁰ Memorandum by Leo T. McCauley for Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) on the general political situation in Germany (43/31), Berlin, 11 May 1933, NAI DFA 34/125, *DIFP* vol. iv, no. 192, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1933/Political-situation-in-Germany/1561.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³³¹ (untitled) in *Ireland To-day*, vol. ii, no 12, (December 1937), p. 5.

Throughout the interwar period, Irish ecclesiastic writers found the South Tyrol worthy of attention and on many occasions parallels were provided with Ireland. As we have seen, the transformation of the region stemmed from Treaty of Versailles, which was deemed fatal for the geographical, historical, cultural and political unity of the Tyrol.³³² From the mid-1920s, the influence of fascist Italy became inseparable from Irish discussions. When Mussolini spoke out against German unification with Austria, in response to the charges of Bavarian Prime Minister Heinrich Held concerning the Italianisation of the South Tyrol, his speech attracted significant attention in both diplomatic circles and the international press. The speech of 7 February 1926 ‘raised important issues’, as the Secretary of State for the Dominions informed the Irish Department of External Affairs in a telegram.³³³ Gustav Stresemann denied German intentions of ‘creating a Germania Irredenta in South Tyrol’, declaring, however, that ‘the Germans had a natural right to be interested in the welfare of their blood-brothers.’³³⁴ Therefore, the line between the interests of Germans from an ethno-linguistic point of view, and the interests of the German-speaking states of Germany and Austria in a political sense were blurred. However, Germany emphasised that the situation in the South Tyrol was an ‘Austrian and not a German question’, adding that after all it was the question of Austrian union with Germany that was in the centre of conflict.³³⁵ Nevertheless, when Ignaz Seipel commented on the case in the Austrian parliament, the Italian press and political leadership (Mussolini) was outraged, notwithstanding the strikingly cautious nature of the Austrian statement.³³⁶ Similarly, when two years later in 1928, the Tyrolese Diet called upon Seipel to discuss the ill-treatment of its German minority at the League, Seipel disappointed the South Tyrolese as instead of interfering in internal Italian affairs, he merely appealed to ‘an international sense of morality. This seems moderate and pacific enough,’ commented the *Irish Independent*, ‘but the Italian Government regarded Dr Seipel’s speech as an endorsement of the wild charges which had been made by other speakers.’³³⁷ Naturally,

³³² A. Raybould, ‘Fascism in the Tyrol’ in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. liv, (August 1926), p. 407.

³³³ ‘Signor Mussolini’s Speech’, *Irish Independent*, 10 February 1926, p. 12; and South Tyrol 1926, Telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, forwarded by Governor General Timothy Healy, (Secret), Sent 11.15 a.m. 11 February 1926, NAI TSCH/3/S4831A.

³³⁴ Stresemann was Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic, 1923-1929. See South Tyrol 1926, Telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, forwarded by Governor General Timothy Healy, (Secret), Sent 11.15 a.m. 11 February 1926, NAI TSCH/3/S4831A.

³³⁵ South Tyrol 1926, Telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, forwarded by Governor General Timothy Healy, (Secret), Sent 11.15 a.m. 11 February 1926, NAI TSCH/3/S4831A.

³³⁶ Phelan, *Irish Responses to Fascist Italy*, pp. 69-70.

³³⁷ ‘Minorities’ Badge’, *Irish Independent*, 5 March 1928.

Mussolini denied all charges and focused on the friendship between Austria and Italy but added the threat ‘this is the last time I shall speak on the subject. The next time I shall make acts speak’.³³⁸ In spite of its threatening tone, the article was, like the general tone of the *Irish Independent*, clearly pro-Mussolini (labelling him ‘great statesman’). In Raybould’s article from the same year, Seipel was, oddly enough, portrayed in a less positive light due to his failure to denounce ‘the action of the Fascist Government in matters of religion’ and not bringing the matter in front of the League of Nations.³³⁹

Characteristically, the religious interpretation of the Tyrol-problem was the most frequent in confessional journals like the *Irish Monthly*, *Studies*, and the weekly *Irish Catholic*. In addition, the anti-fascist daily, the *Irish Times* was also consistently pro-minority regarding the South Tyrol controversy, stressing the longevity and severity of the question and the fact that the Italians had ‘behaved very badly towards these unfortunate people’.³⁴⁰ On the other hand, as Mark Phelan has pointed out, the more outspoken confessional journals, the *Catholic Bulletin* and the *Irish Rosary*, remained uncritical of their praise for Mussolini regardless of the growing plight of Tyrolese Catholics.³⁴¹ Similarly, in February 1928, the author of the article ‘Italy and Austria’ in the *Irish Independent* referred to the ill-treatment of the local population but dismissed Tyrolese complaints as ‘greatly exaggerated’.³⁴² This was a rare stance in Catholic Irish circles on the issue, and may also be interpreted as general support for Mussolini’s Italy.

Nonetheless, the influential Catholic weekly under Patrick J. Fogarty, the *Irish Catholic*, did not hide its concerns and emphasised the significance of all liberties, but especially of religious liberty through the example of the South Tyrol, where ‘a fine people [were] being outraged in their religious and national feelings.’³⁴³ By all means, Raybould remained the most avid supporter of the cause of the Catholic and German-tongued South Tyrol. Consistently with his early arguments, when he labelled the political situation in the Tyrol extremely gloomy, in August 1926, again in the *Irish Monthly*, Raybould went on to detail

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ A. Raybould, ‘Religious Aspect of the Tyrolese Question’ in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. lvi, (August 1928), p. 425.

³⁴⁰ ‘Italy’s Policy’, *Irish Times*, 12 November 1936.

³⁴¹ Phelan, *Irish Responses to Fascist Italy*, p. 76.

³⁴² ‘Italy and Austria’, *Irish Independent*, 28 February 1928.

³⁴³ The quote was re-published in the *Irish Independent*. See ‘Oppressing a Fine People’, *Irish Independent*, 12 August 1926.

how fascist rule added to the troubles of the local South Tyrolese. Raybould appealed to his readers to

...look on and see this once so happy country condemned to every injustice and cruelty, while Fascist terrorism is robbing its people of their laws, their land, their language, their customs, their education, even their religion. For Mussolini, who boasts of his protection of the Church in Italy, is giving all power to the Freemasons and Socialists in Trent to pursue what policy they like with regard to the Tyrol.³⁴⁴

The region was, according to Raybould, the ‘very core of the German race’.³⁴⁵ Therefore, Raybould perceived the ongoing socio-political crisis in the Tyrol to be a ‘disgrace to civilised Europe. Its language is forbidden, its religion persecuted, its industries destroyed, its traditions set at nought’.³⁴⁶

In another article entitled ‘Catholic Covenanters’, published similarly in the *Irish Monthly*, Raybould examined the existing parallels between Ireland and the Tyrol even further, stating that as ‘Ireland stands for a spiritual force, a power opposed to materialism; so in all German speaking lands, the Tyrol stands [...] for a certain romance of religion and nationalism’.³⁴⁷ All religious and national questions were found to be ‘of interest at the present moment in Ireland,’ where, argued Raybould, ‘devotion, though not so openly expressed as in the Tyrol [was] even more deeply rooted in the hearts of the people.’³⁴⁸ Alfred O’Rahilly, academic and zealous promoter of Catholic ethos, also pointed to the parallel between the sufferings of the South Tyrolese German population and the Irish.³⁴⁹ As editor of the Cork-based *Irish Tribune*, he devoted considerable attention to the threat Mussolini and fascist Italian imperialism posed to the people of the South Tyrol.³⁵⁰ As a critic of Mussolini’s ‘ethnic and foreign policies’, O’Rahilly was rather optimistic about the system of international justice and ‘heavily involved in League affairs’.³⁵¹

³⁴⁴ Raybould, ‘Fascism in the Tyrol’, p. 416.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 409.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁷ A. Raybould, ‘Catholic Covenanters’ in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. lv, no. 645, (March 1927), p. 150.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

³⁴⁹ John A. Murphy, ‘O’Rahilly, Alfred’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a6973>, accessed on 24 March 2015.

³⁵⁰ O’Rahilly’s experience was also illustrated by the fact that upon the foundation of *Studies*, he was one of its co-founders. For a detailed assessment of O’Rahilly in this regard, see Phelan, *Irish Responses to Fascist Italy*, p. 71; and Denis Gwynn, ‘Monsignor Alfred O’Rahilly (1884-1969)’ in *Studies*, vol. lviii, no. 232, (Winter 1969), p. 375.

³⁵¹ Phelan, *Irish Responses to Fascist Italy*, p. 71.

By 1928, the South Tyrol question had already been perceived as a threat ‘to become an international one’.³⁵² The fate of the German minority was investigated in the *Irish Independent* in a wider context, together with the similar problems noticed in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania.³⁵³ Then the 1930s saw the radicalisation of political as well as ethno-political para-military organisations in the Tyrol. Atrocities became more and more common, as suggested by the reports published in the *Irish Press*, according to which unknown vandals smashed crucifixes and confessional pictures and painted swastika on the walls of the churches.³⁵⁴ In 1935, O. MacNamara, contributor to the *Catholic Bulletin*, rightfully noted that that the ‘Süd-Tyrol problem’ was noticeable to even the foreign eye.³⁵⁵ As a matter of fact, MacNamara stressed the significance of a separate Tyrolese identity. Furthermore, he claimed that they were rather German than Austrian, highlighting the growing popularity of the Greater Germany idea in the Tyrol.³⁵⁶ Nevertheless, noted MacNamara, the Austrians were ‘too civilised to care for the Pagan Paradise of the Swastika’.³⁵⁷ When MacNamara penned his experience in the Tyrol, he mostly focused on the scenery and the atmosphere of the land. Positive expressions of admiration of the South Tyrol had also been noted by Professor Wm. Magennis in January 1933. The President of Dublin Literary Society, whose lecture was entitled ‘Innsbruck and Lake Constance,’ focused on the national traditions of culture and religion in the Tyrol.³⁵⁸

Notably, irredentism in interwar Hungary was deeply imbedded not only in the political rhetoric but in all spheres of everyday life, with people ‘united in their hope for eventual revision’.³⁵⁹ Despite the lack of strong Irish reactions to the Treaty of Trianon at the time of the decision, the 1920s and especially the 1930s saw Irish journalists, intellectuals and politicians taking a closer interest in Hungarian borders and minorities. As early as 1924, for instance, in relation to the Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1924 (Berne, Switzerland), the *Irish Independent*’s J. T. O’Farrell raised the possibility of a parallel between the Irish ‘Boundary “puzzle”’ and the way the Hungarian border had been drawn. According to the report published in the *Irish Independent*, the speech given by Hungarian

³⁵² Raybould, ‘Religious Aspect of the Tyrolese Question’, p. 422.

³⁵³ ‘Minorities’ Badge’, *Irish Independent*, 5 March 1928.

³⁵⁴ ‘Church Outrage’, *Irish Press*, 31 December 1934.

³⁵⁵ O. MacNamara, ‘Onlooker’s Notebook: Austria (Spring 1935), Italy (Summer 1935)’ in the *Catholic Bulletin*, vol. xxv, (October 1935), p. 823.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 824.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁸ ‘Literary Society Lecture’, *Irish Press*, 7 January 1933.

³⁵⁹ Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics*, p. 74.

delegate Dr Albert de Berzeviczy about the challenges Hungarian minorities faced outside the border greatly 'interested the Irish delegates.'³⁶⁰ Berzeviczy was originally from the northern region of Hungary that became part of Czechoslovakia after the war (Upper Region/*Felvidék*) and served as Minister of Religion and Education in Hungary (1903-1905).³⁶¹

The most visible sign of Irish enthusiasm was the growing number of visits to Hungary and the neighbouring areas. Newspaper series entitled 'Across the Balkans' by Martin MacLoughlin in the *Irish Independent*, John Brown's article 'What I Saw. I: In Hungary Today' in the *Irish Monthly*, and the aforementioned Walter Starkie's book *Raggle-Taggle* (1933) were all based on first-hand travel experiences. In 'Across the Balkans', MacLoughlin depicted Hungary as serving as the keeper of the 'gate of western civilisation' both against the Turks in the seventeenth century and the bolshevism in the twentieth century.³⁶² Similarly, Mary M. Macken, Professor of German at UCD, labelled the story of post-war Hungary 'an epic in which heroic figures emerge – it is the drama of the guardians of the European gate'.³⁶³ Therefore, it was these authors' Catholic and anti-communist stance that determined their conclusions about interwar Hungary.

In terms of the 'minority question', MacLoughlin expressed sympathy for the territorial losses of Hungary ('No country lost more in the war than Hungary'), while admitting that 'certainly there was a great deal in the old Hungary which was not Hungarian'.³⁶⁴ As a result of the post-war settlement, Czechs, Croats, Slovaks and Slovenes 'found the freedom from an alien yoke', argued MacLoughlin, while Hungary had been 'all but bled to death under a major operation badly performed'.³⁶⁵ MacLoughlin stressed that Hungary's situation 'would have been far worse but for the faith and resistant powers of the people'.³⁶⁶ He added, 'for the first of these qualities the Church, for the second, Mother Nature must be thanked'.³⁶⁷ Most importantly, in Hungary, the author 'found the greatest sympathy with Ireland', referring to

³⁶⁰ 'Inter-Parliamentary Union. Irish Delegate's Impressions', *Irish Independent*, 1 September 1924.

³⁶¹ Anonym, 'Berzeviczy Albert' in Ágnes Kenyeres (ed) *Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon 1000-1990*, available online at <http://mek.niif.hu/00300/00355/html/index.html>, accessed on 27 November 2014.

³⁶² 'Across the Balkans. Hungary an Attenuated Nation. Grace and Dignity of its People. (From Our Special Correspondent)', *Irish Independent*, 25 April 1930.

³⁶³ Macken (review), 'Hungary', p. 334.

³⁶⁴ 'Across the Balkans. Hungary an Attenuated Nation. Grace and Dignity of its People. (From Our Special Correspondent)', *Irish Independent*, 25 April 1930.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

the impact of Arthur Griffith's appreciation of Hungarian patriots on Irish nationalism. As for political, ethnic and religious antagonism, the 'hooliganism' of the 'the Jewish-led mob' was highlighted, as well as the fact that Communists were hated, and Romanians were despised in Hungary, which had also to do with the Romanians 'plundering' Budapest in 1919.³⁶⁸

Likewise, John Brown, author of 'What I Saw. I: In Hungary To-day' based his opinion of interwar Hungary on first-hand experience. According to Brown, persisting aristocratic traditions, feudal privileges still seemed to determine socio-economic conditions, even after the series of post-war revolutions.³⁶⁹ What he noted as the foundation of Hungarian society was that all Hungarians were 'united in demanding treaty revision'.³⁷⁰ 'In many Budapest shops', explained Brown, there were

...large maps showing Hungary as she was before the war and after the Treaty of Trianon. Until I saw these I had not realised that more than two-thirds of the old Hungary had been torn away by the victorious allies. It is this fact that gives the rugged Admiral Regent his main support. Horthy came into power after the Bela Kun Communist dictatorship, which spread disaster everywhere, and was more than anything else responsible for the severity of the peace terms. Throughout his sixteen years of office has encouraged revisionist propaganda, [...] with the result that Magyar patriotism is stronger to-day than ever it was under the Habsburgs.³⁷¹

In addition to first-hand travel experience, the works of Hungarian writers or politicians, reviewed and published in Irish newspapers and journals, also provided insights into Irish opinion about the question of borders and nationalities. Therefore, Irish reactions to Hungarian political changes were determined by the Irish opinion about the British press and political groups. In June 1928, the *Cork Examiner* reviewed *The Tragedy of Trianon* (1928) by British author Sir Robert Donald. The Scottish reporter was editor of the *Daily Chronicle*, who in 1916 joined the secret War Propaganda Bureau at the request of David Lloyd George. He had visited Hungary and the neighbouring territories on several occasions.³⁷² The *Cork Examiner* argued that the successor states did not honour their undertakings laid down in the Treaty of Trianon, therefore, the transferred Hungarian populations suffered due to their 'race, religion or language'.³⁷³ The paper took notice of the preface written by Lord Rothermere describing Czecho-Slovakia as 'the powder-magazine of Europe to-day. He may be right,' added the *Cork Examiner*, but a 'protest nine years ago might have had more effect than it is

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ John Brown, 'What I Saw. I: In Hungary To-day' in the *Irish Monthly*, vol. lxiv, no. 761 (November 1936), p. 734.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ Ibid., p. 737.

³⁷² 'How Peace Treaties were Bungled', *Cork Examiner*, 7 June 1928.

³⁷³ Ibid.

likely to have now.’³⁷⁴ *The Tragedy of Trianon* was also reviewed by R. W. Seton-Watson, who thoroughly criticised both Rothermere and the *Daily Mail*, as well as the Donald’s lack of awareness of the causes of Trianon.³⁷⁵

In contrast, the reviewer of former Hungarian Prime Minister Count Bethlen’s *The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace* (1934) highlighted that the post-war settlement and the Hungarian plea for revision did indeed determine the future of Central Europe. Although the reviewer under the pseudonym ‘W. J. W.’ called Bethlen’s plea ‘obviously sincere’, at the same time he labelled this trust in international justice ‘somewhat pathetic and misplaced’, and his claims and arguments of ‘doubtful validity’.³⁷⁶ Speaking of ‘justice’ in the Hungarian context had a more literal interpretation as well, meaning the propaganda item entitled *Justice for Hungary: The Cruel Errors of Trianon*, privately published in 1930. As we learn from the private secretary to the Department of the President, a copy was sent by the editor of Budapest paper *Pesti Hírlap* to the Irish Government as well. No comment was made on the content of the book, only a suggestion by the secretary ‘to request that the reply should take the form of a gracious acknowledgement of the receipt of the book.’³⁷⁷ On the whole, besides some expression of pity towards Bethlen, the article rather served as a criticism of the aforementioned British circles – Lord Rothermere and the *Daily Mail* in particular, through their association with Hungary. Bethlen was well known in Britain as he visited the United Kingdom and gave lectures in London and Cambridge in 1930 to publicise the cause of recreating ‘historic Hungary’.³⁷⁸ Later in 1936, a Nationalist South Fermanagh MP, Cahir Healy also brought attention to a reader’s letter that addressed the editor of the *Daily Mail*.³⁷⁹ He spoke up in favour of justice be done to partitioned Hungary’.³⁸⁰ Healy urged the editor and the readership to realise that

...justice ought to be done to another nation much nearer home, viz., Ireland, which was mutilated by one of those after-war forced settlements, which Mr Lloyd George, their author, now admits cannot

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ R. W. Seton-Watson, ‘Review of The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace’ in the *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, vol. vii, no. 4, (July 1928), pp. 271-275.

³⁷⁶ ‘Danubian Basin and World Peace. Future of Empire of St Stephen’, *Irish Independent*, 16 October 1934; and Gyula Juhász, *Magyarország Külföldpolitikája 1919-1945 [Hungary’s Foreign Policy 1919-1945]* (Budapest: Kossuth Kiadó, 1988), p. 112.

³⁷⁷ “Justice for Hungary” request by Editor of Budapest paper *Pesti Hírlap* for observations on subject of above book, 11 and 16 October 1930, NAI DFA GR/1462.

³⁷⁸ Cartledge, *Mihály Károlyi and István Bethlen*, p. 129.

³⁷⁹ Healy was one of the twelve founding members of Sinn Féin and after 1922 he represented ‘Fermanagh and Tyrone’ as a Nationalist Party MP. See Irish Archives Resource, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Cahir Healy Papers, available online at <http://www.iar.ie/Archive.shtml?GB%200255%20PRONI/D2991>, accessed on 21 November 2014.

³⁸⁰ ‘Readers’ Views. “Justice for Hungary”’, *Irish Press*, 4 November 1936.

stand. When England presses for the restoration to Hungary of her severed territory, will not the other interested European parties tell her to set her own house in order first?³⁸¹

In the mid-1930s, of all the Danubian states, argued the *Cork Examiner*, Hungary seemed to be discontented. Therefore, in order to gain support for its revisionist claims, the Hungarian state turned to propaganda

...to put her case before the outside world, particularly the English-speaking world. Unquestionably, a special effort is made to secure the goodwill of the British public, and apparently the Hungarians also remember that Ireland was always renowned for expressing its sympathies towards all other peoples with grievances. Hence the publications which are primarily intended to find their way into the hands of our British neighbours, come to Ireland as well.³⁸²

The Hungarian discontent with the political 'status quo' was seen as highly dangerous, should the differences between Germany and France develop further due to the prospect of German support for Hungary.³⁸³ Therefore, due to the perceived necessity for external support for border revision, the Irish press often presented Hungarian irredentism in its international context, referring to the neighbouring Little Entente or the involvement of great powers.³⁸⁴ Apparently, this dimension did not only include fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, who supported 'the coordination of interests in the Danube basin' but also France due to its links with the Little Entente, who feared Hungarian revisionism the most.³⁸⁵ This tension was noted in Irish newspaper reports in the 1930s, including international agencies' cables and the opinions of private correspondents (particularly authors of columns like 'Matters of Moment' in the *Irish Independent*).

Irish awareness of the borderland problems of interwar Hungary was most visible in references to League of Nations petitions and discussions of boundary issues. The majority of disputes regarding Hungarian frontiers appeared as claims of primarily economic nature, about land possession or economic sustainability, but represented a heavily politicised question, rooted in the socio-political status quo before the war. Many former Hungarian landowners in the borderlands who lost their lands were 'strong irredentists who looked to

³⁸¹ Ibid.

³⁸² 'The Danube again', *Cork Examiner*, 21 March 1935.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ 'War on the Air', *Irish Independent*, 22 December 1933.

³⁸⁵ 'Matters of Moment. Germany and Russia', *Irish Independent*, 28 September 1935; 'Hungary Demands Equality', *Irish Press*, 29 March 1935, And 'Matters of Moment. Austria Rearms', *Irish Independent*, 2 April 1936; 'Mussolini Speech Stirs Nations', *Irish Independent*, 2 November 1936; 'Riding for a Fall', *Irish Times*, 3 November 1936; and 'Hungarian Premier. Sharp Reply to French Foreign Minister', *Cork Examiner*, 27 June 1934.

Budapest.³⁸⁶ In addition, Rogers Brubaker has also pointed out the coincidence of ‘ethnonational and socioeconomic divisions’ in the reassigned territories, visible in the case of former Hungarian, now ‘alien’ landlords. In the reassigned borderlands, therefore, generally the landowners were Hungarian and the peasantry belonged to the other ethnicities (Romanians in Transylvania; Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, respectively). With independence, the power relations among the small states had changed and Hungarian landowners found themselves in a peculiar position, with four separate boundary commissions assigned on each border to settle matters. Selling or abandoning properties was the most favoured option of the new authorities.³⁸⁷

The assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou on 9 October 1934 in Marseilles was a watershed in Irish perceptions of the Yugoslav-Hungarian boundary debates. Since the regicide was possibly the most significant international scandal associated with interwar Hungary, it received extensive publicity in the Irish press and also sparked the interest of the Department of External Affairs in Dublin. The correspondence between Francis Cremins in Geneva and Frederick H. Boland of the Department of External Affairs commenced with the discussion of frontier incidents between Yugoslavia and Hungary in May 1934, and revealed that de Valera expressed a considerable interest in the matter.³⁸⁸ Ironically, four months before the tragedy, in June 1934, the Louis Barthou had dismissed the Hungarian petition concerning the complaints of Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier zone as ‘no matter of urgency’.³⁸⁹ While recognising the palpability of Hungarian irredentist intentions, Cremins admitted that:

...I do not think that there is anything in the suggestion that Hungary in this matter desired to embarrass the League. She might no doubt desire to keep the frontier question in the foreground of international politics, but the Hungarian representative here tells me that the question immediately at issue is for Hungary a purely economic one.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁶ Steiner, *The Lights that Failed*, p. 266.

³⁸⁷ For further details, see Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics*, p. 70; and Frank N. Schubert, *Hungarian Borderlands: From the Habsburg Empire to the Axis Alliance, the Warsaw Pact, and the European Union* (London: Continuum International Publishing, 2011), pp. 14-15.

³⁸⁸ Letter from Francis Cremins (Geneva), to Secretary of the DFA (Dublin), Relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia – Frontier Incidents – Alleged Complicity of Hungary in Association of King of Yugoslavia, 14 May 1934, NAI DFA 27/80; Letter from the Secretary of the DFA (Dublin), to Francis Cremins (Geneva), Relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia – Frontier Incidents – Alleged Complicity of Hungary in Association of King of Yugoslavia, 28 May 1934, NAI DFA 27/80.

³⁸⁹ Confidential Letter from Francis Cremins (Geneva) to Dublin, Secretary of DFA, Relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia – Frontier Incidents – Alleged Complicity of Hungary in Association of King of Yugoslavia, 6 June 1934, NAI DFA 27/80.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

Czechoslovakia's and Romania's physical support for Yugoslavia was visible in the debate; according to Cremins, who was present at the meeting discussing the case in December 1934, the atmosphere was 'tense and it was evident that all the parties were suffering from strain. The representatives of the Balkan Entente and of the Little Entente sat in a group at one end of the horse-shoe, the Hungarian representative sitting alone at the other.'³⁹¹ The meeting was also reported in the daily Irish press; the anti-fascist *Irish Times*, understandably, focused on the Hungarian delegate Tibor Eckhardt's association with right-wing irredentist circles as the head of the Race-Protecting Party (*Fajvédő Párt*). The paper also elaborated on the charges of Romania's permanent delegate to the League, Nicolae Titulescu, against Hungary.³⁹² The author of the article 'Danubian States' in the *Irish Times* emphasised that nobody could deny that the South Slavs had 'good cause to distrust the Magyars. Memories are long and bitter in the valley of the Danube.'³⁹³

Cremins notified Boland that although the British Anthony Eden as a mediator had already reached a deal at the League that left out Italy and required Hungarian officials to carry out investigations, the Yugoslav Government was not quite satisfied with the steps taken by the Hungarian Government.³⁹⁴ On the whole, the 'prestige' of the Hungarian Government suffered greatly in the international press campaign.³⁹⁵ The entire public opinion of Hungary, however, reported the *Cork Examiner*, supported the government throughout the scandal.³⁹⁶

³⁹¹ Confidential letter from Francis Cremins (Geneva) to Secretary of DFA, Dublin, Relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia – Frontier Incidents – Alleged Complicity of Hungary in Association of King of Yugoslavia, 11 December 1934, NAI DFA 27/80.

³⁹² 'Document of 58 pages', *Irish Times*, 29 November 1934; 'Dissatisfied with Frontiers. "A Very Small Minority"', *Irish Times*, 11 December 1934; and 'The Danube States', *Irish Times*, 12 December 1934.

³⁹³ 'The Danube States', *Irish Times*, 12 December 1934.

³⁹⁴ Request of the Yugoslav Government under Article 11, Paragraph 2, of the Covenant and Communication from the Hungarian Government, Relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia – Frontier Incidents – Alleged Complicity of Hungary in Association of King of Yugoslavia, 16th January 1935, NAI DFA 27/80; and Letter from Francis Cremins to the Secretary of DFA, Dublin, 11 June 1935, Relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia – Frontier Incidents – Alleged Complicity of Hungary in Association of King of Yugoslavia, NAI DFA 27/80.

³⁹⁵ For further interpretations as to the responsibility for the assassination, see Ormos, *Magyarország a két világháború korában*, p. 201; Magda Ádám, *Magyarország és a Kisantant a Harmincas Években [Hungary and the Little Entente in the 1930s]* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1968), pp. 65-67; Sőregi Zoltán, 'Adalékok a marseille-i merénylet háttéréhez' ['Data for the Study of the Marseilles Assassination'] in *XX. századi történelmi források*, xiii. évfolyam, 4. szám, (2013), available online at http://www.archivnet.hu/hadtortenet/adalekok_a_marseillei_merenylet_hatterehez.html, accessed on 9 August 2015; and Peter Wilby, *Eden* (London: Haus Publishing, 2006), p. 18

³⁹⁶ 'A League Victory', *Cork Examiner*, 26 November 1934.

The case was eventually closed at a Council meeting in June 1935, hindering war between Yugoslavia and Hungary because of the multi-faceted frontier problem between the two.³⁹⁷

By the end of the 1920s, the members of the League had generally agreed that there was a need for more efficient protection for minorities in order to ‘remove sources of irritation which if allowed to develop might well have constituted a serious menace to Peace.’³⁹⁸ Therefore, at Geneva, several encounters took place when Irish delegates witnessed controversial claims of different minorities in Central Europe. In 1930, for instance, Minister for External Affairs Patrick McGilligan was part of the Committee that was appointed to investigate the claim of Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia concerning the circumstances of the 1930 Census. Géza Szűllő, landowner, politician, and spokesperson of the Hungarian minority of Czechoslovakia in the League during the interwar years, submitted a petition regarding the fate of ‘racial, religious and linguistic minorities’.³⁹⁹ Szűllő was the co-leader (together with János Esterházy) of the United Hungarian Party (*Egyesült Magyar Párt*), representing the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia between 1936 and 1940, and an outstanding figure of the Hungarian Czechoslovak Branch of the League of Nations prior to that. The latter group had been noted to be outspoken about the treatment of nationalities in the Czechoslovak Republic since the 1921 census. They were convinced that in the new Czechoslovak state, in order to ‘diminish the numerical proportion of the Hungarians, new nationalities were invented’, leading to the creation of a separate Jewish nationality. This excluded Hungarian and German Jews from declaring themselves Hungarians or Germans; they were instead registered as being of Jewish nationality.⁴⁰⁰ Slovak Jews, however, were claimed to have been registered as Slovaks. The same treatment was applied in case of the gypsy population of Czechoslovakia. Finally, it was established that the petitioners had no case since ‘the number of officials belonging to the minority [...] was a fair proportion of the

³⁹⁷ Letter from Cremins to the Secretary, DFA, Relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia – Frontier Incidents – Alleged Complicity of Hungary in Association of King of Yugoslavia, 11 June 1935, NAI DFA 27/80.

³⁹⁸ Letter from Francis Cremins to the Secretary of DFA, Dublin, enclosing copy of the speech by Patrick McGilligan to the 10th Assembly of League of Nations, Geneva, 11 September 1929, NAI DFA LN 1/9, *DIFP* vol. iii, no. 256, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1929/Statement-at-League-of-Nations-Assembly/970.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³⁹⁹ ‘Danubian Problems’, *Cork Examiner*, 7 December 1933; Memorandum regarding the 1930 Census in Czechoslovakia Minority Petition of Dr Szűllő Géza, 16 May 1931, Geneva, NAI DFA 2/24/2; and Ádám, *Magyarország és a Kisantant*, p. 210.

⁴⁰⁰ Tamás Gusztáv Filep, ‘Hungarian Jews of Upper Hungary in Hungarian Public Life in Czechoslovakia (1919/19-1938)’ in Levente Salat (eds) *Between Minority and Majority: Hungarian and Jewish/Israeli Ethnical and Cultural Experiences in Recent Centuries* (Budapest: Balassi Intézet, 2014), p. 168.

total number.⁴⁰¹ Therefore, although the Irish Minister for External Affairs became aware of the controversial nature of the minority question in Czechoslovakia, he did not appear to have commended the claim of the Hungarian minority. Nonetheless, this case demonstrated Irish awareness of the conflicts regarding minorities in the successor states, even if to a limited degree. Among the groups of Hungarian, those in the former Upper Region/*Felvidék* gained the least publicity in the Irish press. This may have been due to the generally positive opinion of Czechoslovak democracy, and the active participation of Czechoslovak consuls in Irish cultural life. The latter is also demonstrated by Pavel Růžička's reader's letter to the editor of the *Cork Examiner* in January 1935, requesting corrections regarding the

...accusations of Hungary against Czechoslovakia in respect of the treatment of Magyar minorities in our country. No doubt they consider it an abuse to be obliged to take a secondary place in a province which they once governed as overlords. But as regards every-day life in Slovakia, the Magyars are protected and governed by minority laws such as the Slovaks never dreamed of in pre-war days.⁴⁰²

Růžička argued that the Hungarians had nothing to complain of, dismissing their claims at Geneva as exaggerations which had 'never been substantiated,' referring to the above mentioned petition (and its counterparts) that had been submitted to the League. Indeed, historian Gyula Juhász has emphasised that the Hungarian Government's minority policy in the interwar years did not mean more than constant agitation against Trianon by producing surveys of complaints and presenting them at Geneva.⁴⁰³ In 1933, the *Cork Examiner* repeatedly expressed sympathy for Hungarian efforts at Geneva, highlighting that the minorities in the reassigned territories were known to have 'flooded' the League with their complaints and quite extensive propaganda had been conducted, referring to the English edition of Hungarian Revision League pamphlets, which had reached Ireland as well.⁴⁰⁴ Therefore, due to their failure to win recognition and support, Hungarians considered the League of Nations minority policy and petitions ineffective, while the Little Entente, including Romania, claimed they were 'unjustifiably intrusive'.⁴⁰⁵

During the interwar years, the Hungarian minority in Romania, argued Zara Steiner, was considered to be the 'most openly dissatisfied minority' since the Hungarian landowners lost the ownership over their lands and therefore appealed to the League of Nations under the

⁴⁰¹ Memorandum by Frederick H. Boland, 24/2, 1930 Census in Czechoslovakia Minority Petition of Dr Szüllő Géza, Dublin, 14 October 1931, NAI DFA2/24/2.

⁴⁰² 'Letters to the Editor. The Danube', *Cork Examiner*, 29 January 1935.

⁴⁰³ Juhász, *Magyarország Külpolitikája*, p. 134.

⁴⁰⁴ 'Danubian Problems', *Cork Examiner*, 7 December 1933.

⁴⁰⁵ Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics*, p. 75.

minority treaties. Nonetheless, as we have seen, these ‘could not mount a real challenge’.⁴⁰⁶ The Hungarian petition that caught the attention of the Irish Department for External Affairs was submitted to the League in May 1930 by Dr. Pál Gábor and Dr. László Dezső, concerning the land ownership of certain Szekler (*Székely*) communes in Transylvania, resulting in a peaceful financial settlement for the loss of forests and pastures.⁴⁰⁷ The case attracted attention in the Dáil Éireann as well, regarding the position of the Saorstát in relation to ‘the grievances of minorities’.⁴⁰⁸ Patrick McGilligan stressed that it was his ‘intention, while representing the Saorstát on the Council of the League of Nations, to advocate the fairest possible treatment for all the minorities whose grievances the Council may, from time to time, have to consider.’⁴⁰⁹ Therefore, the symbolic role of the League in protecting the rights of these minorities was still a primary concern in interwar Ireland. The Irish press, with the exception of the *Irish Times*, sympathised with the territorial losses of Hungary. For instance, in October 1934, the *Cork Examiner* asserted that ‘the chief offender in the eyes of Hungary’ was Romania as it ‘got away with 50,000 square miles of territory, including some of the most valuable land in Europe.’⁴¹⁰

The validity of using the Transylvania as an example for a ‘historically multi-ethnic and polyreligious’ borderland has been already confirmed by Rogers Brubaker (2006). He argued, drawing on the concept of Benedict Anderson, that the nation as an ‘imagined community’ is very much applicable in East-Central Europe, including Transylvania.⁴¹¹ As Zoltán Szász has emphasised, the ethnic map of Transylvania was complicated by the fact that ‘the various nations lived mingled together.’⁴¹²

After 1920, the regional, ‘distinctively Transylvanian’ identity of Hungarians gained noticeably more emphasis in Irish comments.⁴¹³ As far as the ‘racial problem’ in Transylvania

⁴⁰⁶ Steiner, *The Lights that Failed*, p. 268.

⁴⁰⁷ League of Nations Papers, Minorities in Romania, Minority Petition relating to Szekler Communes of Transylvania: 28 May 1930 – 16 January 1933, NAI DFA 24/5; and Ferenc Deák, *The Rumanian-Hungarian Dispute before the Council of the League of Nations* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1928).

⁴⁰⁸ *Dáil debates*, vol. 36, no. 1, column 22, p. 22, 19 November 1930.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁰ ‘A Lesson in Geography’, *Cork Examiner*, 24 October 1934.

⁴¹¹ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 14, p. 45, p. 75, p. 361.

⁴¹² Zoltán Szász, ‘Gyulafehérvár, Alba Iulia, 1918: Transylvania’s Union with Romania’ in Ferenc Glatz (ed) *Hungarians and their Neighbours in Modern Times* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 125.

⁴¹³ For a historical survey of the self-image and national identity of Romanian Transylvanians, see Sorin Mitu, *National Identity of Romanians in Transylvania* (Budapest: Central European Press, 2001).

was concerned, the aforementioned Martin MacLoughlin drew a parallel between the existence of the German and Hungarian minorities and the status quo in Northern Ireland. He found the situation complicated as a result of the fact that different ethnicities were intermixed, stressing that it was ‘not even as simple as in County Derry.’⁴¹⁴ He stated that most of the Catholics were Hungarians; their feelings for Ireland were ‘apparent and very dear’, while admitting that an obvious ‘patchwork of race and religion’ characterised the region.⁴¹⁵ As a local explained to him, ‘the Rumanians and Hungarians were as disagreeable to one other as the English and the Irish’, although expressing hope that nature would ‘prove successful where the League of Nations [had] failed.’⁴¹⁶ Nonetheless, he did not put the blame only on the Rumanians for the challenges it faced as they were inexperienced as a new country’ and actually the whole of post-war Europe faced similar economic difficulties.⁴¹⁷ In contrast, the *Irish Times* was sharply opposed to the claim of Hungarian irredentists, stressing that

...Hungarians do not deserve a great deal of sympathy. They always have regarded themselves as a *Herrenvolk*, destined to rule inferior races. [...] To attempt to tinker with the frontiers of Central Europe at present would be lunacy. It would spread throughout the continent, and for that reason those persons who are encouraging the Hungarians are doing an ill-service to the cause of peace.⁴¹⁸

Moreover, when in September 1936, the *Irish Times* declared that Transylvania was ‘which historically was Rumanian soil, but had been under Magyar rule for ages’, it left no doubt as to the paper’s stance on the boundary issue between Hungary and Romania.⁴¹⁹

The fact that ethnicity and religion were so ‘closely correlated in Transylvania’ undoubtedly attracted the attention of the Irish dailies. More specifically, the Romanians were overwhelmingly Orthodox or Greek Catholic, the Hungarians Calvinists or Roman Catholics.⁴²⁰ In particular, the position of the Transylvanian Jewry was discussed by Irish newspapers due to their identification as Hungarians, in addition to their ‘substantial and increasingly vibrant presence’ in cities like Cluj/Kolozsvár.⁴²¹ Brubaker has stressed that

⁴¹⁴ ‘Across the Balkans. Transylvania and its Problems. Undeveloped Natural Wealth’, *Irish Independent*, 26 April 1930.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁷ ‘Across the Balkans. Rumania’s Racial and Other Difficulties. Peasant Party’s Programme (From Our Special Correspondent.)’, *Irish Independent*, 28 April 1930, p. 5.

⁴¹⁸ ‘A New Recruit’, *Irish Times*, 24 April 1936.

⁴¹⁹ ‘Hungary’s Turn’, *Irish Times*, 2 September 1936.

⁴²⁰ Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics*, p. 3.

⁴²¹ For further details, see Ezra Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe between the Two World Wars* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983); Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics*, p. 17.

between the two World Wars, ‘the national question was intertwined with the “Jewish question”’, pointing out that anti-Semitism became more noticeable, especially with the advance of the extreme right.⁴²² Even in Hungary, Brubaker has argued, where ‘Jews had been considered –and had considered themselves – Hungarian, they were now excluded from the imagined community of the nation.’⁴²³ For instance, when the *Cork Examiner* and the *Irish Independent* reported on the atrocities related to the riots and anti-Semitic demonstrations in December 1927 at Grosswardin/Nagyvárad/Oradea, they argued that ‘at first the demonstrations were directed against the Jews, but in the end they became anti-Magyar in character.’⁴²⁴ Ezra Mendelsohn has highlighted that Transylvanian Jewish students were targeted because of, firstly, their overrepresentation at universities and secondly due to the fact that they were considered Hungarians.⁴²⁵ The event, as seen from Irish reports, demonstrated the inseparability of the questions of nationality, borders, anti-Semitism and political extremism in the successor states.

Conclusion

The interwar years in Ireland were marked by the widening of international relations following the newly independent state’s entry to the League of Nations; this provided opportunities to interact with other newly independent European small states as well. In the mid-1920s, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria all started building relations through their diplomats in Britain. On the Irish side, even confidential archival records do not reveal much of the Department’s attitude towards these efforts, which remained symbolic throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Irish businessmen, on the other hand, were more than eager to get acquainted with the newly independent small states from Central Europe – some of them, like R. J. Kelly and Hubert Briscoe, had an interest in Central Europe that went beyond the years of the Great War, while the others sought new opportunities that they hoped would benefit the emerging young Irish economy as well as their own private businesses. Irish cultural connections with and references to Central Europe provided an additional dimension to the formulation of Irish cultural nationalism, highlighting its awareness of the wider world.

⁴²² Ibid., p. 50.

⁴²³ Ibid.

⁴²⁴ Grosswardin (German), Transylvania, Romania, was formerly part of Hungary, known as Nagyvárad (Hungarian); after 1920 known as Oradea in Romanian. See ‘Rumanian Demonstrations against Hungary’, *Cork Examiner*, 8 December 1927; and ‘Bloody Conflicts. Riots on Hungarian-Rumanian Frontier’, *Irish Independent*, 7 December 1927.

⁴²⁵ Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe*, pp. 186-187.

As for the impact of extreme political changes on the Irish perceptions of identities, news was still presented through a Catholic lens, although from multiple sources. It was not only the Ireland-based intelligentsia that expressed interest in the growing communist menace or the advance right-wing ideologies in Central Europe, but so did Irish diplomats based in Geneva, Rome, Berlin or Paris. Furthermore, the 1930s were characterised by a strong wave of anti-communism in Ireland, which also had an impact on how the 'red scare' was presented in relation to the successor states. Hungary, still described as the guardian of Christianity more than a decade after Béla Kun's communist takeover of Budapest, and Austria, where only the Christian Social Party could challenge the impact of the Social Democrats, stood in sharp contrast to Irish perceptions of Czechoslovak democracy. Emmet O'Connor has highlighted that these references served the same purpose; the interests of the Catholic Church.⁴²⁶

In the Czechoslovak borderlands, the Sudeten German issue remained in the centre of Irish attention, after 1933 discussed within the context of Nazi ideology.⁴²⁷ In the South Tyrol, troubles became widely discussed in Irish confessional journals, highlighting the multiple layers of identity in the region (Germanness and Catholicism in addition to the strong regional loyalties). Since irredentist Hungary focused on restoring the historical borders of St Stephen, the fate of Hungarian minorities on the other side of the Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, and the Romanian borders was of general concern, inseparable from the radicalisation of conservative right-wing politics in Hungary. Therefore, due to the close association between fascist Italy and irredentist Hungary, it was only the *Irish Times* that consistently condemned Hungarian claims regarding the plight of their minorities across the borders, stressing that the Magyars were 'accomplished propagandists, and everything that they say about their neighbours must not be taken *au pied de la lettre*.'⁴²⁸ However, the events of the year 1938, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, proved the paper wrong.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ 'Matters of Moment. Czechs and Germans', *Irish Independent*, 30 May 1935.

⁴²⁸ 'A Powder Mine', *Irish Times*, 10 December 1934.

4. Irish perceptions of the successor states, 1938-1945

Undeniably, the year 1938 constituted a watershed in the history of Central Europe; the Anschluss in March, the Munich Conference in September, and the First Vienna Award in November demonstrated the immense headway Hitler's Germany had made in the region, both directly (in the case of Austria and the Sudetenland) and indirectly (by supporting Hungarian demands for revision). As these events were directly related to the subsequent war, they had a profound influence on war-time Irish images of the transformed successor states and their nationality questions.

The potential for conflict between small states and great powers had been apparent to Irish diplomats and intellectuals still in the 1930s, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. Historian Ronan Fanning has emphasised the strategic significance of the small state's geographic location in determining its relationship with its (not always large) neighbours, both in time of peace and war.¹ Naturally, this concerned Ireland as well, during the 'Emergency'; after September 1939, the Irish Government adhered to the policy of neutrality. De Valera believed this to be an essential trait of small states in the shadow of neighbouring great powers after the League failed to guarantee the safety and sovereignty of small states in the aftermath of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis.

Following a discussion of historiographical debates on Irish neutrality during the Emergency (1939-1945), this chapter focuses on Irish reactions to the changes associated with statehood and borders in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, throughout the years 1938-1945. This is followed by examining Irish images of Central European exiles, highlighting the controversies relating to Jewish refugees in Ireland. Moreover, as the visits of alien intellectuals came to represent diplomatic complications for Ireland, the ambiguous nature of these scholarly and diplomatic encounters is also explored. The chapter concludes by considering changing perceptions of small states in Irish intellectual and political discourse during the Second World War.

¹ Fanning, 'Small States, Large Neighbours', p. 21.

Irish neutrality and the Central European connection

Following the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, the Irish government adopted a policy of neutrality. This policy, albeit seen by the government as the most efficient way to guarantee Irish sovereignty, was to have a serious impact on relations with Central Europe, among other areas. One of the most fundamental difficulties regarding Irish neutrality has to be the problem of terminology, as the expert of the field, Ronan Fanning has pointed out while placing the question into a wider historical context.² There is still no consensus about Irish neutrality during the Emergency: it has variously been seen as mere isolation, non-belligerence, non-alignment, friendly neutrality or phoney neutrality – just to mention a few.³

According to Clair Wills (2007) and J. J. Lee, by choosing neutrality, the Irish Government ‘aligned itself’ with smaller states on the Continent.⁴ De Valera and Walshe agreed that it was ‘the most appropriate policy for Ireland’ and the ‘very essence of Irish independence’.⁵

Walshe was uncompromising about Irish neutrality; he stressed that it was ‘based on the fundamental and universal will’ of Irish people, with the government determined to defend it ‘against all invaders to the bitter end.’⁶ This was challenging as during the war-years Walshe was ‘burdened by outwardly proclaiming strict Irish neutrality while inwardly compromising that policy.’⁷ As Lee has noted, the policy proved to be more like a mind-set than a consistent and definite plan.⁸ The Irish Government was insistent on a semblance of neutrality though it is known that it was covertly helpful to Britain – hence the term ‘unneutral neutral’ or ‘friendly neutral’ has been used by, among others, Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald (1981-1982; 1982-1987) and historian Daniel Leach, respectively. Leach, for instance, has highlighted the fact that, despite the unquestionable strategic and economic link between Ireland and Britain during the Emergency, Irish neutrality was never actually ‘guaranteed by the Allies’.⁹ The

² Fanning, ‘Irish Neutrality’, pp. 27-38.

³ For a legal interpretation of Irish ‘non-alignment’ during and after World War Two, see Dennis Driscoll, ‘Is Ireland really “Neutral”?’ in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. ii, no. 1, (1982), pp. 55-61.

⁴ Clair Wills, *That Neutral Island: A History of Ireland during the Second World War* (London: Faber and Faber, 2007), p. 47.

⁵ Nolan, *Joseph Walshe*, p. 136.

⁶ Code telegram from Joseph P. Walshe to Robert Brennan (Washington) (No. 97) (Personal) (Most Secret) (Copy), Dublin, 21 July 1940, NAI DFA Secretary’s Files P2, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 234, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1940/Explaining-Ireland+s-neutrality-in-the-USA/3234.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

⁷ Nolan, *Joseph Walshe*, p. 148.

⁸ Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985*, p. 263.

⁹ Daniel Leach, *Fugitive Ireland: European Minority Nationalists and Irish Political Asylum, 1937-2008* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2009), p. 17; Garret Fitzgerald, ‘The Origins, Development and Present Status of

main opponent of the ‘unneutral neutral myth’, Karen Devine, has argued that ‘Ireland was, in some respects, arguably more neutral’ than traditional neutrals.¹⁰

At the outbreak of the Second World War, deciding if defending national sovereignty or ending partition was the main priority. As a result of ‘de Valera’s consuming obsession’ with Irish sovereignty instead of Irish unity, neutrality came to symbolise Irish independence, which was to be maintained at all cost.¹¹ Although Brian Girvin (2006) has claimed that Irish neutrality had ‘little to do with national interest and everything to do with ideology’, there was an undoubtedly practical side to Irish neutrality.¹² Moreover, John Horgan has argued that during the Emergency, neutrality ‘became virtually a touchstone of Irishness in the minds of some of its defenders.’¹³ Participation on either belligerent side would have sharply divided Irish public opinion.

The Emergency Powers Act, 1939, which came into effect on 3 September 1939, gave power to the Irish Government to

...authorize and provide for the censorship, restriction, control, or partial or complete suspension of communication by means of all or one or more of the services maintained or controlled by the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs or by any other means, whether public or private, specified or indicated in such emergency order.¹⁴

The regulation that Irish officials found most useful was the section stating that the Irish Government may

... (i) make provision for preserving and safeguarding the secrecy of official documents and information and for controlling the publication or spreading of subversive statements and propaganda, and authorize and provide for the control and censorship of newspapers and periodicals;
(j) authorize and provide for the prohibition, restriction, or control of the entry or departure of persons into or out of the State and the movements of persons within the State’¹⁵

Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Michael Rynne, highlighted the link between neutrality and censorship adopted in Ireland shortly after the outbreak of the war and established that ‘keeping our newspapers and periodicals more or less “neutral” in tone, was

Irish “Neutrality”, *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. ix, (1997), pp. 11-20; and Garret FitzGerald, ‘Myth of Irish Neutrality not Borne out by Historical Fact’, *Irish Times*, 24 April 1999.

¹⁰ Devine, *The Myth of ‘the Myth of Irish Neutrality’*; and Devine, *A Comparative Critique*.

¹¹ Fanning, ‘Irish Neutrality’, p. 31.

¹² Brian Girvin, *The Emergency: Neutral Ireland 1939-45* (London: Macmillan, 2006), p. 324.

¹³ John Horgan, ‘Irish Foreign Policy, Northern Ireland, Neutrality and the Commonwealth: The Historical Roots of a Current Controversy’ in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. x, (1999), p. 136.

¹⁴ ‘Emergency Powers Act, 1939, Number 28 of 1939’ in *Irish Statute Book*, available online at <http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1939/act/28/enacted/en/print>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

anticipated by the Government and dealt with summarily in appropriate Emergency Orders.¹⁶ Therefore, in order to preserve stability in everyday public life, the Irish Government introduced strict censorship; however, as Lee has argued, ‘at the level of objective reality [there was] no necessity for the severity of Irish censorship’.¹⁷ The Department of External Affairs sometimes openly controlled the spread of propaganda, as a result of which the former Cumann na nGaedheal Minister for External Affairs, Patrick McGilligan sharply remarked that by 1944, the government had ‘wandered a great deal from’ its original mission to censor ‘news and not views.’¹⁸ Censorship had an impact on news from Central Europe as well. After September 1939, the number of editorial comments regarding the region noticeably decreased in comparison with the earlier period. International agencies such as Reuters (whose news were distributed by the PA outside London) provided Irish papers with most of their news from the Continent, hence the frequent, almost word for word overlap between the articles of the *Irish Times*, the *Irish Press* and the *Irish Independent*.

Irish neutrality was attacked by both belligerent sides. The German Minister in Dublin, Eduard Hempel criticised Irish neutrality similarly to British and American diplomats.¹⁹ Hempel’s complaints focused on the *Irish Press*, which, according to him, despite the official neutrality, was openly ‘voicing in some way the views of the Government’, adding that the *Irish Times* was ‘very much worse’, though he acknowledged that the latter was not controlled by the government.²⁰ Naturally, Walshe explained to the German Minister that the Irish Government had ‘nothing to do with the writing of the leader in the “Irish Press”’, suggesting that Hempel informed his government ‘that the *Press* was only a mild reflection of what the people felt.’²¹ The Italian Minister in Dublin, Vincenzo Berardis, brought similar charges against the *Irish Press*, claiming that the headlines were exclusively from British and Greek sources, presented as facts, while the Italian version of the news was merely printed at

¹⁶ Memorandum from Michael Rynne to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (Copy), Dublin, 26 September 1939, NAI DFA Legal Adviser’s Papers, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 39, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/Proposed-statement-by-de-Valera-in-Dail/3039.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹⁷ Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985*, p. 266; and Nolan, *Joseph Walshe*, p. 195.

¹⁸ *Dáil debates*, vol. 95, no. 6, column 926, p. 69, 9 November, 1944.

¹⁹ For a detailed study on the role and activities of Hempel in Dublin, see John P. Duggan, *Herr Hempel at the German Legation in Dublin 1937-1945* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2003).

²⁰ Memorandum by Joseph P. Walshe on the dropping of bombs on Irish territory by German aircraft (Secret), Dublin, 4 January 1941, NAI DFA 221/147A, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 382, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1941/Bombing-by-German-aircraft-of-Irish-territory/3382.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

²¹ *Ibid.*

the bottom of the column.²² The third main daily, the *Irish Independent*, did not hesitate to openly criticise the practice of censorship either; the paper declared in its issue of 5 December 1940 that ‘the experience of our journal has been that the censorship [was] needlessly vexatious, harassing and inequitable.’²³ Nonetheless, Mark O’Brien has pointed out that after the war broke out in September 1939, even Smyllie was willing to officially ‘recognise the wisdom of Mr de Valera’s decision’ and ensured him of the ‘loyal support’ of the *Irish Times*.²⁴

The Irish Government relied heavily on the reports of military intelligence in order to maintain a semblance of neutrality and report possible threats from belligerents. Irish diplomats abroad were involved in gathering information, as well as the actual staff of Irish Military Intelligence (G2).²⁵ The G2 was extremely active during the Emergency; they did not fail to notice the growing effort on the side of Axis/German intelligence and espionage work in Ireland.²⁶ In addition, the Department of Justice and the Gardaí also co-operated closely with the Department of External Affairs, especially in connection with aliens in Ireland.

To regard neutrality as isolation is not unprecedented in Irish historiography. Robert Fisk (1983), for instance, has interpreted Irish neutrality during the Emergency as de Valera joining the ‘isolationist camp.’²⁷ Moreover, Lee and Girvin have argued that the intellectual isolation of war-time Ireland was not brought along by the Emergency, but rather that the country ‘had already intellectually isolated herself in large measure since independence’, which became consolidated by Fianna Fáil during the 1930s.²⁸ Historian Mick McCarthy (2006) has also emphasised that due to the Emergency Powers Legislation, the intellectual isolation in interwar Ireland became chronic ‘because of the draconian legislation that was put

²² Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Thomas J. Coyne (Dublin) (Copy), Dublin, 13 January 1941, NAI DFA 205/84, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 395, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1941/Attitude-to-Italian-Minister-towards-Irish-press/3395.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

²³ ‘The Censorship’, *Irish Independent*, 5 December 1940.

²⁴ O’Brien, *The Irish Times*, p. 99 and p. 101; and ‘Commonwealth at War’, *Irish Times*, 6 September.

²⁵ Nolan, *Joseph Walshe*, p. 187.

²⁶ For details, see Mark M. Hull, ‘The Irish Interlude: German Intelligence in Ireland, 1939-1943’ in the *Journal of Military History*, vol. lxvi, no. 3, (July 2002), pp. 695-717; Mark M. Hull, *Irish Secrets: German Espionage in Ireland 1939-1945* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2003); R. M. Douglas, ‘The Pro-Axis Underground in Ireland, 1939-1942’ in the *Historical Journal*, vol. xlix, no. 4, (2006), pp. 1155-1185; Eunan O’Halpin, *Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies since 1922* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 225-253; and C. J. Carter, *The Shamrock and the Swastika: German Espionage in Ireland in World War II* (Palo Alto: Pacific Books, 1977).

²⁷ Robert Fisk, *In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality 1939-1945* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983), p. 58.

²⁸ Girvin, *The Emergency*, p. 329.

in place.²⁹ Similarly, Susannah Riordan has pointed out that the intellectual and cultural isolation of independent Ireland has been accepted as a fact in Irish historiography.³⁰ Irish historiography has actually been divided on the question of Irish isolationism since independence. Stephen Barcroft, writing in 1979, argued that de Valera's ideal of an isolated Ireland was 'incompatible with any real commitment to an international order'.³¹ Neutrality, however, was not 'forged in isolation' in an inward-looking state but rather the Emergency took place in 'a period of interaction with the world system through neutrality'.³² Moreover, Brian Fallon has also emphasised the de Valera was not an isolationist and therefore Irish neutrality was 'far from being a passive or purely isolationist policy.'³³

Maintaining relations with representatives of other small nations was an integral part of Irish foreign policy during the war years. Thus the findings of this thesis suggest that the case of Irish isolationism is overstated. Irish commentary on the political changes in Central Europe, in addition to the presence of foreign lecturers in Ireland, the existence of groups such as the Irish Institute of International Affairs (IIIA), and most importantly, the Irish press coverage and therefore the Irish public awareness of these issues indicate that Irish intellectual life was far from being isolated from the wider world, even if it was officially 'guarded by' censorship or military intelligence during the war-years. Official records point to the fact that the Department for External Affairs was greatly concerned with the question of 'Visits of Foreign Officials to Ireland'.³⁴

After September 1939, Irish diplomats 'remained posted to belligerent states' on the Continent.³⁵ Correspondence regarding Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary was received in Dublin from Michael MacWhite in Rome; Charles Bewley, then William Warnock and Con Cremin in Berlin; Francis Cremins in Geneva, and Seán Murphy from France. Niall Keogh (2006) has highlighted the fact that 'Irish diplomats in Berlin were in an unenviable position

²⁹ Mick McCarthy, *International Affairs at Home: The Story of the Irish Institute of International Affairs* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2006), p. 59.

³⁰ Riordan, 'The Unpopular Front', p. 99; and Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985*, p. 260.

³¹ Stephen Barcroft, 'Irish Foreign Policy and the League of Nations 1929-1936' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. i, no 1, (1979), pp. 20-21 and p. 29.

³² Michael Kennedy, "'Plato's Cave'?: Ireland's Wartime Neutrality Reassessed' in *History Ireland* vol. xix, no. 1, (2011), p. 48.

³³ Brian Fallon, *Age of Innocence* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1998), p. 212 and p. 216.

³⁴ Memorandum from Joseph Walshe to Eamon de Valera, Visits of Foreign Officials to Ireland, Dublin, 23 March 1943, NAI DFA 202/1688.

³⁵ *DIFP* vol. vi, p. xiii.

in that they had to appear to be neutral and were unable to be officially critical of the Nazis' Jewish policy.'³⁶ However, he has drawn attention to Con Cremin's 'absence of prejudice and his professionalism', in contrast with Bewley's prior activities and comments.³⁷ These ministers, together with the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Joseph P. Walshe and Assistant Secretary Frederick H. Boland in Dublin, frequently discussed the fate of Central European small nations and the changing power relations in the region between 1938 and 1945.

Responses to the Anschluss

As we have seen, the possibility of German unification with Austria had been a controversial topic since the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in late 1918, not only in Austria but in Ireland as well. Irish journalists, together with intellectuals and diplomats discussed the prospect of the Anschluss throughout the interwar years. The political scene shifted towards the extremes – in the case of Austria, this meant the rise of fascism and Nazism in neighbouring Italy and Germany, respectively. Irish commentators also took notice of the internal political antagonism, in addition to the external pressure on Austria. Therefore, Catholic Irish intellectuals portrayed Austria bound up in the political and/or para-military struggle between right-wing (Austrian Nazis) and left-wing extreme groups (Austro-marxists and the Schutzbund) in the mid-1930s, seeing the Christian Social Government as the solution for the ongoing political crisis. Michael MacWhite, writing from his post in Washington, predicted Hitler's moves in Central Europe when, as early as 1935, he referred to the fact that it was 'well known that German strategy [envisaged] the Anschluss with Austria sooner or later and afterwards a march over Czecho-slovakia [sic] into Ukraine and Russia.'³⁸ By March 1938, there was nothing that Chancellor Schuschnigg's government could do in order to avoid German occupation.

A month before the Anschluss, in February 1938, when the *Irish Press* reported on the secret meeting between Hitler and Schuschnigg, the paper called the relationship between the two states 'increasingly bad in recent months' as the Austrian Government proved to be consistent

³⁶ Keogh, *Con Cremin*, p. 74.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Letter from Michael MacWhite to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (108/52/35), Washington DC, 24 December 1935, NAI DFA 27/132, *DIFP* vol. iv, no. 310, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1935/Italo-Abyssinian-dispute/1679.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

in standing up for the small state's independence.³⁹ Dublin-based Dutch journalist Kees van Hoek, pointed to the fact that the Anschluss was 'favoured by the whole people, who saw no future in the dark days of the aftermath – but the victorious Allies forbade it.'⁴⁰ Van Hoek was knowledgeable regarding foreign diplomats in Ireland. He was the 'feature writer' for the *Irish Independent* during the Emergency, then after the war he joined the *Irish Times*.⁴¹ Writing in the *Irish Independent* on 1 March 1938, he emphasised the role of Catholicism in the independent Austrian republic as to Austrians it was their 'birthright' which eventually turned them away from the 'anti-Christian' Nazis.⁴² According to van Hoek, Dollfuss's martyrdom and his establishment of a Christian Social State 'gave Austria back her soul, her faith in her own mission, in the right of her own existence, in herself alone.'⁴³ Similarly, Schuschnigg's Catholicism was inseparable from the profile of Austria under his Chancellery; for him, Austria was 'a German State – but equally a Christian State.'⁴⁴

As for a connection with Ireland, van Hoek stressed that Austria and Ireland shared 'the political phenomena that the inevitable never happens and the unexpected always turns up.'⁴⁵ He concluded by arguing, 'more than ever before, Europe stands in need of an independent, liberal-minded buffer State to keep the great Germanic, Romanic and Slavonic races at bay, which converge round its very heart.'⁴⁶ Two weeks later, the proposed Austrian plebiscite on independence/unity was cancelled by the government. On 11 March 1938 Schuschnigg and his administration resigned (with the exception of Arthur Seyss-Inqart. The day after the German army crossed the Austrian border, meeting no open political or military confrontation. The Irish representative at Geneva, Francis Cremins, placed the plebiscite into a larger international context when he argued that the drastic German move had 'hardly been a surprise, however reprehensible it may be.'⁴⁷ The main headline on the front page of the

³⁹ 'The Secret Interview', *Irish Press*, 14 February 1938.

⁴⁰ 'Future of Austria is Safe. Stands for Faith and Nationality. Her Trusted Leader', *Irish Independent*, 1 March 1938

⁴¹ Kees Van Hoek, *Diplomats in Dublin: A Series of Portraits* (Dublin: Browne and Nolan, 1943); Kees van Hoek, *People and Places* (London: Longman, 1944); 'Letters to Kees Van Hoek', NLI Ms 33,688/D; and Oram, *The Newspaper Book*, p. 219.

⁴² 'Future of Austria is Safe. Stands for Faith and Nationality. Her Trusted Leader', *Irish Independent*, 1 March 1938

⁴³ *Ibid.*.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Jelavich, *Modern Austria*, pp. 222-223; and Confidential report from Francis T. Cremins to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (S. 7/36) (Confidential), Geneva, 12 March 1938, NAI DFA 227/7, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 150, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1938/Austria--Anschluss/2296.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

Irish Press declared, 'Hitler Tightens His Grip. Austria Merged in German Reich'.⁴⁸ By proclaiming the Greater German Reich, Hitler claimed to have fulfilled the wishes of German people on both sides of the border in the name of self-determination, 'rectifying the injustice' of Versailles and St Germain of 1919.⁴⁹ As a result, Austrian President Wilhelm Miklas, 'refusing to accept the union', resigned and Austrian Nazi minister Arthur Seyss-Inquart succeeded Schuschnigg as chancellor (for two days, 11-13 March).⁵⁰ It is noteworthy that Seyss-Inquart was not a member of the Austrian National Socialist Party from the start but became associated with the Party after March 1938. He did not remain in position for long; eventually Hitler took over as Führer and Reich Chancellor of both Germany and Austria.⁵¹

In Ireland, military intelligence reported that the Anschluss marked the beginning of 'an unprecedented period of upheaval and readjustment in European diplomacy and politics. The birth of Greater Germany required every European nation to reassess its interests, alliances and treaties.'⁵² It was convinced that the Anschluss was first and foremost a 'strategic revolution' since Vienna was the centre of communications of Habsburg Central Europe and Nazi control over it ensured 'strategic and economic control of the whole of south-eastern Europe.'⁵³ The *Irish Press* and the *Irish Independent*, on the other hand, emphasised the religious side of the changes, stressing that 'Catholic Austria, it is felt, will now be subjected to the paganising influences against which Catholics in Germany are struggling'. It pointed to the distress of the Vatican at the 'fall of the last stronghold of Catholicism in the German world'.⁵⁴ Interestingly, on the eve of the Anschluss, the Austrian population, together with the clergy, had been more concerned with the menace of Marxism than the threat posed by National Socialism.⁵⁵

Naturally, the role and the position of the Catholic Church and clergy were of great concern to Irish commentators. Austrian Cardinal Innitzer's visit to the Vatican regarding the Austrian

⁴⁸ 'Hitler Tightens his Grip. Austria Merged in German Reich', *Irish Press*, 14 March 1938.

⁴⁹ Johnson, *Central Europe*, p. 209.

⁵⁰ Jelavich, *Modern Austria*, p. 223.

⁵¹ Note the slogan of the Nazi Party (NSDAP - *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*): 'Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer.'

⁵² O'Driscoll, *Ireland, Germany and the Nazis*, p. 222.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

⁵⁴ 'Hitler Makes Himself Ruler of Austria. President Miklas is "Asked" to Resign. German Troops Continue their Invasion. Italy Backs New Policy', *Irish Independent*, 14 March 1938; and 'Hitler Tightens his Grip. Austria Merged in German Reich', *Irish Press*, 14 March 1938.

⁵⁵ Evan Burr Bukey, *Hitler's Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 95.

clergy's support for the Anschluss was the most controversial aspect of the Austrian crisis in the Irish press.⁵⁶ Cardinal Theodor Innitzer of Vienna was a Sudeten-born pan-German, who originally supported the Anschluss but after the secularising activities of the German Nazis in Austria, he turned against them.⁵⁷ The plebiscite was announced for 10 April 1938; the Nazi leadership did everything to win over the socialists as well as the Catholic Church – successfully. This was due to Hitler's 'assurances on the questions of education and other matters that the church wished.' Tragically, Innitzer 'failed to grasp the nature of an antireligious drive being orchestrated by the Führer himself.'⁵⁸

Austrian and German residents in Ireland voted as well. The *Irish Press* estimated their number to be approximately 300, though later the *Irish Independent* mentioned 160 who were entitled to vote, 'of whom 140 are Germans from the old Reich and 20 from Austria.'⁵⁹ The situation seemed to have been settled in July 1938, when a truce was concluded between the Nazis and the Catholic Church in Austria.⁶⁰ In September 1938, Professor Mary M. Macken summarized the ambiguity regarding Cardinal Innitzer quite accurately:

...Does the acceptance of National Socialism by Cardinal Innitzer and the Austrian Bishops imply a cessation of hostilities which is a prelude to peace? Were real guarantees of liberty for the Church to pursue her work and to fill her place in the life of her children given? Are they being observed? Or is it only a repetition of the Concordat, which has been rather a screen for attack than a protection? There seems to be as yet no answer to these questions. The future alone can tell.⁶¹

As a matter of fact, the Austrian population's support for the Anschluss had been a question of key importance since the declaration of the republic in the autumn of 1918. Political parties were divided on the question of German unity. Social democrats were initially supporters of German unity; this changed after the Nazi takeover in Germany. The Christian Social Party, as explained above, resisted it most persistently. Mary M. Macken also highlighted that among others, Schuschnigg had 'faith in the Austrian idea' which meant having a separate

⁵⁶ 'Cardinal in Rome. To Explain Action to the Pope To-day', *Irish Press*, 6 April 1938, p. 1; 'Cardinal Innitzer in Rome', *Irish Independent*, 6 April 1938; and 'Cardinal Explains his Advice to Austrian Catholics. Long Audience with Pope', *Irish Independent*, 7 April 1938.

⁵⁷ Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution*, pp. 298-299.

⁵⁸ Jelavich, *Modern Austria*, p. 224; and Bukey, *Hitler's Austria*, p. 100.

⁵⁹ 'Ship as Polling Booth. Voting on Anschluss outside Dublin Harbour', *Irish Press*, 14 April 1938; and '100 Per Cent. "Yes". Germans in Eire', *Irish Independent*, 16 April 1938.

⁶⁰ 'Truce in Austria. Nazi Attitude to Church', *Irish Independent*, 9 July 1938; and 'Catholic-Nazi Conference', *Irish Press*, 9 July 1938.

⁶¹ Mary M. Macken, 'The New Kulturkampf in Germany' in *Studies*, vol. xxvii, no. 107, (September 1938), p. 414.

Austrian state: ‘Austria is for him an independent nation – “without equivocation, without compromise, unconditionally.”’⁶²

As for the general population of Austria, Barbara Jelavich has pointed out, there seem to have been a preference for *Zusammenschluss*, a mutual coming together of the two autonomous states, instead of a German annexation.⁶³ However, in the very close aftermath of the Anschluss, foreign commentators noticed the lack of opposition or resistance to the German invasion and found this to be one of the most striking characteristics in post-Anschluss Vienna. According to Mrs Mary Ormerod, speaking in various Dublin venues as secretary of the Co-Ordinating Committee for Refugees, this was due to the fact that ‘all the leading Catholic aristocratic families, all the officials of the Schuschnigg Government, and the heads of all the leading Jewish families “disappeared”’.⁶⁴ Ormerod, who spoke on ‘Viennese in Trouble’ at the League of Nations Society of Ireland luncheon in Dublin, referred to the establishment of concentration camps, imprisonment of Jewish suspects, which contributed to the growing disillusionment with the Nazi takeover and thus also to the growing number of suicides as well.⁶⁵ Commenting on her lecture entitled ‘Distress in Austria’, the *Irish Independent* highlighted her claim that the introduction of Nazi policies was not merely a question of racial persecution, but ‘almost equally a question of racial and religious persecution.’⁶⁶ And although the paper did not mention that Ormerod was a Quaker, it noted that she was an Englishwoman who ‘made no attempt to condone the actions of her own country in the past’.⁶⁷ The reign of terror under Hitler in Germany and Austria was something that caught the attention of the *Irish Independent*’s special correspondent, Gertrude Gaffney as well. This was closely associated with the extensive system of espionage which ensured that the success of National Socialism.⁶⁸ Espionage on the Church had also ‘been perfected since the Anschluss’, argued Gaffney, in the first part of her eight-piece report series, ‘Putting the Searchlight on Europe’.⁶⁹ Gaffney’s remark in the final article summed up her view of the

⁶² Mary M. Macken, ‘The Passing of Austria’ in *Studies*, vol. xxvii, (June 1938), p. 218.

⁶³ Jelavich, *Modern Austria*, p. 215.

⁶⁴ ‘Dublin and District. Metropolitan News. Distress in Austria’, *Irish Independent*, 14 May 1938; ‘Why Austria did not Resist. Events of German Invasion’, *Irish Independent*, 17 May 1938; and ‘Woman Lecturer on New Vienna’, *Irish Press*, 18 May 1938.

⁶⁵ ‘Why Austria did not Resist. Events of German Invasion’, *Irish Independent*, 17 May 1938.

⁶⁶ ‘Woman Lecturer on New Vienna’, *Irish Press*, 18 May 1938; and ‘Why Austria did not Resist. Events of German Invasion’, *Irish Independent*, 17 May 1938.

⁶⁷ ‘Why Austria did not Resist. Events of German Invasion’, *Irish Independent*, 17 May 1938.

⁶⁸ ‘Putting the Searchlight on Europe: German People are: Afraid to Talk’, *Irish Independent*, 14 July 1938.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

Austrian-German relationship: ‘the person who declared Austria to be lying heavily in Hitler’s stomach underestimated the consequences of swallowing a country at a gulp; it is giving Hitler acute indigestion.’⁷⁰ On the whole, in the summer of 1938, the *Irish Independent* and the *Irish Press* placed equal emphasis on the growing disillusionment among Austrian Nazis; their resentment was all the greater due to the fact that their positions had been filled by German Nazis and they had ‘not been rewarded according to the amount of spade-work they did for the Anschluss.’⁷¹ Naturally, the German News Agency denied the allegations.⁷² As Mervyn O’Driscoll has pointed out, ‘Hitler used intimidation and deception to unite Austria with Germany by marching into Vienna on 12 March 1938’ and the Irish press seemed aware of this.⁷³ Interestingly, the Anschluss also had an impact on the ongoing Anglo-Irish negotiations and made de Valera re-consider ‘breaking off negotiations on the issue of partition’, fearing that Ireland “would suffer a fate similar to Austria” implying gratitude for Ireland’s peripheral location and the fact that Britain, rather than Germany, was Ireland’s neighbour.’⁷⁴

A few days after the Anschluss took place, the Irish Government recognised the union despite the restrictions of the Treaty of St Germain. As a result, Irish officials re-imposed ‘visa requirements for holders of German and Austrian passports’.⁷⁵ In spite of the official recognition of the Anschluss, there was considerable unease in Ireland about Germany’s action, even within the Department of External Affairs. Joseph Walshe, for instance, pointed to the further international ramifications of the union. He noted that ‘the dangerous element in the occupation of Austria is not the occupation itself but the fact that the Germans have used 200,000 men for a task which could easily have been accomplished by 10,000. A further advance from Austria within a short time seems indicated.’⁷⁶ In addition, the reports of the Irish delegate at Geneva also provided valuable insights into the international reception of the Anschluss. For instance, Francis Cremins was surprised to note that shortly after the news

⁷⁰ ‘Putting the Searchlight on Europe. Hitler’s Swift Blow was a Big Shock for Mussolini’, *Irish Independent*, 22 July 1938.

⁷¹ ‘Austria Disillusioned’, *Irish Independent*, 27 June 1938; and ‘Austrian Discontent’, *Irish Press*, 27 June 1938.

⁷² ‘Rumours of Trouble Denied’, *Irish Independent*, 28 June 1938.

⁷³ O’Driscoll, *Ireland, Germany and the Nazis*, p. 219.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁷⁶ Letter from Joseph P. Walshe to Eamon de Valera (Dublin) (Secret), London, 15 March 1938, UCDA P150/2183, *DIFP* vol. v, no. 157, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1938/Report-from-London/2303.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

became public in Geneva, nobody at the League headquarters ‘had made any move in the matter’, despite the previous objection of the French and British Governments.⁷⁷ The international situation had, however, considerably changed in the late 1930s. ‘For one thing’, continued Cremins,

...Germany is rearmed, and the axe - not to mention the triangle - exists, which alone will make the Western Powers pause before taking any dangerous steps. Secondly, the League is known to be too weak to bring into play on behalf of Austria the system of collective security. And Italy’s interest in the independence of Austria is overshadowed at the moment by her greater interests elsewhere. [...] The situation is admittedly dangerous, and the time may come soon when the Western Powers may seriously question Germany’s proceedings in Central Europe, but that time does not seem to have yet arrived.⁷⁸

The significance of the European political context was noted by the Irish intelligentsia as well; Professor Mary M. Macken, who had visited Austria in 1924 and 1934, also emphasised that

...Europe has, despite the hopes of many good Austrians, not interfered to save the young state. It has accepted the inevitable logic of facts. Some countries may even have sighed with relief that the German-Austrian, tension of the last five years was over. They are, no doubt, preparing now to face up to the new situation.⁷⁹

Furthermore, Macken admitted that the Austrian Corporate State that was associated with Dollfuss and Schuschnigg in the mid-1930s had ‘one overwhelming disadvantage – it was dependent upon the backing of ancient enemies, notably Italy’, who was also ‘keeping South Tyrol in subjection.’⁸⁰ The question of South Tyrol, therefore, was still discussed among Irish intellectuals in the summer of 1938. Nonetheless, since after the Anschluss, Hitler guaranteed to respect Austria’s Brenner frontier with Italy, Mussolini had therefore no interest in restoring Austrian independence, abandoning ‘all claim to the German-speaking South Tyrol’.⁸¹ The fate of the region seemingly lost its significance as Hitler ‘sacrificed’ it for the Italian friendship.⁸² Curiously enough, Austria itself became a borderland (illustrated by its official Nazi name, *Ostmark*) in the greater German Reich. A year later, in July 1939, however, Germany and Italy discussed the possibility of evacuating the German population in the ‘Italian Tyrol into Greater Germany’, instead of ‘re-drawing the border around them’.⁸³

⁷⁷ Confidential report from Francis T. Cremins to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (S. 7/36) (Confidential), Geneva, 12 March 1938, NAI DFA 227/7, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 150, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1940/Trade-discussions-with-Britain/3150.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Macken, ‘The Passing of Austria’, p. 222 and p. 213.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

⁸¹ ‘Pledge to Italy. French Proposal Rejected’, *Irish Independent*, 14 March 1938; and ‘Italy Reassured’, *Irish Press*, 14 March 1938.

⁸² Jelavich, *Modern Austria*, p. 226.

⁸³ ‘Hitler’s Gesture. Evacuation of Germans From Italian Tyrol’, *Cork Examiner*, 5 July 1939; ‘South Tyrol Migration’, *Cork Examiner*, 5 July 1939; ‘Foreigners to Leave South Tyrol’, *Irish Press*, 11 July 1939;

According to the *Cork Examiner*, this involved 200,000 Austrians, 5-6000 of whom had already returned to the Reich. Parallel to this accord, in July 1939, an expulsion order was issued, affecting British, French, Dutch and Swiss residents in the South Tyrol. The settlement regarding the Germans in the South Tyrol was concluded in July 1939, then modified in August to state that those who were loyal to Italy could remain. A plebiscite in March 1940 took place when the Germans in the South Tyrol decided between returning to the Reich or becoming Italian citizens (adopting Italian language and culture). This divided the population of the South Tyrol as 81 per cent of them preferred to leave their homelands rather than to be Italianised. Nonetheless, Jelavich claims that due to 'wartime disruptions, comparatively few transfers were actually completed.'⁸⁴ Due to the changed status quo in the Second World War, especially after the Allied invasion of Italy mid-1943, Germany declared a few months later in October 1943 that the South Tyrol had been re-incorporated into the Greater German Reich.⁸⁵

In spite of the fact that there was a protest organised against the Anschluss in front of the German Legation in Dublin on 16 March 1938, the union was not a major concern for all Irishmen.⁸⁶ This was indicated by a reader's letter, published in the *Irish Independent* only a few days after the annexation. The author was Alasdair Mac Caba, teacher, revolutionary and politician.⁸⁷ He was a member of the proto-fascist Blueshirts in the 1930s, interned during the Second World War due to his pro-German sympathies. He asked,

...What on earth has Austria to do with Irish unity, anyhow? There is no parallel, in any sense of the term, between the two cases; and the Austrians neither need nor ask for our sympathy. Instead of minding our own business, here we are, interfering in the internal affairs of a great nation, alienating sympathy which we may badly need in our own struggle for national unity later on.⁸⁸

Correspondingly, another reader, J. N. R. MacNamara emphasised that 'only those blinded by anti-German sentiment can deny that the vast majority of Austrians welcome the union of the Germanic peoples', expressing hope that the inclusion of Catholic Austria was to alleviate

'Foreigners to be Banned in Italian Frontier District', *Irish Press*, 12 July 1939; 'Expulsions from Italy. Resented by Four Nations', *Irish Independent*, 12 July 1939; 'Why Aliens are Leaving South Tyrol', *Irish Press*, 17 July 1939; 'Loyalty to Italy. Compromise on South Tyrol Expulsions', *Cork Examiner*, 8 August 1939; 'The Duce on the Axis. "Historic Events" Outcome. Brenner Frontier', *Cork Examiner*, 22 March 1940; 'Austrian Tyrol', *Irish Independent*, 1 October 1945; and Schweigkofler, 'South Tyrol', p. 65.

⁸⁴ Jelavich, *Modern Austria*, p. 226.

⁸⁵ 'Diplomacy's Compromise', *Irish Independent*, 12 October 1943.

⁸⁶ O'Driscoll, *Ireland, Germany and the Nazis*, p. 222.

⁸⁷ Marie Coleman, 'Mac Caba (McCabe), Alasdair ("Alec")', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a4995>, accessed on 27 September 2015.

⁸⁸ 'Austria. To the Editor "Irish Independent"', *Irish Independent*, 18 March 1938.

anti-Catholic sentiments in Germany.⁸⁹ MacNamara likened the stance of the *Irish Independent* in the matter to the “pink” Labour Press of England’, urging the editor and the readers alike to notice that ‘the only real enemies of Christianity and civilisation [were] the Communists.’⁹⁰ Likewise, the reviewer in the *Dublin Magazine*, Grattan Freyer, argued that the majority of Austrians were ‘better off than they were before the Anschluss’, referring to the economic boost, including the stabilisation in currency, better employment rates and higher wages that followed the union.⁹¹ Therefore, Irish opinions were mixed at best.

As early as 14 March 1938, newspaper reports started to circulate expecting Czechoslovakia to be the next victim of Hitler’s Germany, pointing out that after Austria, ‘similar solution could be given to the Czechoslovak problem.’⁹² Therefore, the settlement of the ‘Czechoslovak problem’ started to concern Irish diplomats across Europe shortly after the Anschluss. For instance, in May 1938, Francis Cremins in Geneva stressed the growing international anxiety surrounding the ‘German-Czechoslovakian situation’.⁹³ Similarly, the G2 identified Czechoslovakia as being ‘most affected by the termination of Austria’s independence’ due to its geographical position and the presence of the over three million ethnic Germans in its south-western region.⁹⁴ This came as no surprise to the Department of External Affairs since Bewley had also highlighted that ‘Nazi racial theory underpinned the regime’s international policy, particularly its aim to unify all German-speaking populations’, which focused on integrating the German populations of the neighbouring states into the German Reich.⁹⁵

Reactions to the break-up of Czechoslovakia

The Munich Conference (29-30 September 1938) and the final, ‘full-scale invasion of Czechoslovakia’ in March 1939 had a powerful impact on Irish images of Czechoslovaks on the eve of the Second World War. Parallels between Irish and Czech borderlands, which had

⁸⁹ ‘Germany and Austria. To the Editor “Irish Independent”, *Irish Independent*, 31 March 1938.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Grattan Freyer (review), ‘Austria and After by Franz Borkenau’ in the *Dublin Magazine*, vol. xiii, no. 4, (October – December 1938), pp. 62-64.

⁹² ‘Hitler Tightens his Grip. Austria Merged in German Reich’, *Irish Press*, 14 March 1938.

⁹³ Confidential report from Francis T. Cremins to JPW (D) (S. 7/27) (Confidential), Geneva, 24 May 1938, NAI DFA 127/116, *DIFP* vol. v, no. 187, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1938/German-Czechoslovakian-situation/2333.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

⁹⁴ O’Driscoll, *Ireland, Germany and the Nazis*, p. 223.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

been present for over 20 years, remained significant in the late 1930s as well. Newspaper reports, editorials and readers' letters showed considerable diversity of opinions about the perceived relationship and links between the two small nations. In August 1938, for instance, the aforementioned Gertrude Gaffney's five-piece series in the *Irish Independent* foreshadowed the conflict in the Sudetenland. She pointed to 'the problems of Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten Germans', repeatedly providing parallels between Ireland and Bohemia, in relation to their national aspirations.⁹⁶ Furthermore, she emphasised that 'the bitterness of a national resentment does not lessen through the ages.'⁹⁷ Likewise, the *Irish Press*, quoting the Frankfurt-based *Boersen Zeitung*, highlighted that using the Irish example may be the only efficient way to convince Britain to provide 'the Sudeten Ulster its right of self-determination'.⁹⁸ In contrast, in its article 'Hibernia Irredenta' from August 1938, the *Irish Press* expressed the opinion that the situation in the Sudetenland was not comparable to that of Ireland since 'the Sudeten provinces [had] not been torn away from Germany.'⁹⁹ Similarly, on 2 September, the *Irish Press*' reporter stressed that 'actually there [was] little or no analogy between the two cases':

...Czechoslovakia, an amalgam of many racial groups and with no natural boundaries, is not a nation in the sense in which Ireland demonstrably is: the Sudeten Germans who demand autonomy in the territory they inhabit are not Czechs. Racially and historically, the so-called Unionists in Ulster are as Irish as the people in any other part of Ireland. They never made any claim for autonomy. They opposed Irish independence because they wanted to maintain their sectarian ascendancy over the majority of their countrymen [...]. It was Britain that insisted on cutting off six of the nine counties of Ulster from the rest of Ireland [...].¹⁰⁰

The article concluded by summing up; 'that is what is happening under British rule, while British statesmen are busily engaged in righting wrongs at the other side of Europe.'¹⁰¹

Eventually, half a year after annexing Austria, Adolf Hitler's Germany looked towards the east and at Western Czechoslovakia - more specifically, the Sudetenland, whose 'ultimate loyalties continued to be German', as Maurice Earls has duly noted.¹⁰² According to Jürgen Tampke (2003), German plans for invasion dated from 17 December 1938, when Hitler gave

⁹⁶ 'Czechs Fear for Frontiers', *Irish Independent*, 8 August 1938; 'Enemies at the Doors of the Republic', *Irish Independent*, 9 August 1938; 'Germans Have Real Grievances', *Irish Independent*, 1 August 1938; 'Tension in the Sudeten Land', *Irish Independent*, 11 August 1938; and 'Do Sudetens Really Desire Union with the Reich?', *Irish Independent*, 12 August 1938.

⁹⁷ 'Czechs Fear for Frontiers', *Irish Independent*, 8 August 1938.

⁹⁸ 'German Views', *Irish Press*, 27 April 1938.

⁹⁹ 'Hibernia Irredenta', *Irish Press*, 24 August 1938.

¹⁰⁰ 'The Irish "Parallel"', *Irish Press*, 2 September 1938.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Earls, *The Coast of Bohemia*.

instructions to ‘begin preparations to march into Bohemia and Moravia.’¹⁰³ In order to avoid a European war, a settlement was reached (and became known as the Munich Agreement) on 30 September 1938, as a result of the ‘appeasement policy’ of Great Britain and France, and with the participation of Italy and Germany but without the concerned Czechoslovakia. Jeremy King has emphasised that ‘to this day, the term “Munich” is synonymous, for good reason, with appeasement and dishonour.’¹⁰⁴ This appeasement was frequently interpreted as a betrayal of the Czechs since it ‘permitted the Nazis to annex the Sudetenland and in the process to undermine Czechoslovakia as a viable state.’¹⁰⁵ Nazi Germany annexed the Sudetenland, an act followed by Polish and Hungarian claims for borderland areas, on their respective sides of the Czechoslovak frontier.¹⁰⁶

When informing Desmond FitzGerald about the Munich Agreement and the changes that followed in Central Europe, his wife, Mabel, pointed out that the Irish press published a considerable amount of speeches and letters

...demanding that the British should apply the same solution to the Free State Sudetens in the North as they insisted on the Czechs agreeing to. There [had] been conferences and meetings and manifestos in the North too. There has been criticism of de Valera for not taking the opportunity to come out publicly in the matter.¹⁰⁷

For instance, in an *Irish Press* article entitled ‘Peoples and Frontiers’, dated 4 October 1938, the fate of Sudeten Germans was compared again with Ireland, finding it doubtful whether the Sudeten Germans had been ‘badly treated’ by the Czechoslovak Government. Nonetheless, records indicate that the Czech population in the ceded territories ‘did not fare well’; they were ‘stripped of most civil rights and all Czech political and cultural associations were outlawed.’¹⁰⁸ The author pointed to the origins of the border settlement in Ireland, emphasising that the inhabitants were not consulted when drawing the final border, which was ‘drawn solely for the purpose of maintaining the ascendancy of an obscure political caucus [...]’.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, the author overlooked subsequent consultations during the operation of the ill-fated Boundary Commission in 1924-1925. In conclusion, Ireland was

¹⁰³ Jürgen Tampke, *Czech-German Relations and the Politics of Central Europe: From Bohemia to the EU* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 62.

¹⁰⁴ King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*, p. 175.

¹⁰⁵ Earls, *The Coast of Bohemia*.

¹⁰⁶ Alice Teichova, ‘The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (1939-1945): The Economic Dimension’ in Mikuláš Teich (ed) *Bohemia in History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 268-269.

¹⁰⁷ Letters from Mabel FitzGerald to her husband lecturing at Notre Dame University, Indiana, 9 October 1938, Desmond and Mabel FitzGerald Papers, UCDA P80/1416.

¹⁰⁸ Tampke, *Czech-German Relations*, p. 59; and ‘Peoples and Frontiers’, *Irish Press*, 4 October 1938.

¹⁰⁹ ‘Peoples and Frontiers’, *Irish Press*, 4 October 1938.

found a proper field for investigating the principle of self-determination the rights of minorities.¹¹⁰

Irish reactions to the Sudetenland crisis were therefore confused at best. Mervyn O'Driscoll has claimed that to Irish eyes, Czechoslovakia 'appeared to be an unneutral polyglot state', and that Czech claims in 1938 'received little consideration in Ireland or Britain'. These were certainly overstatements, given the overwhelmingly positive attention given to interwar Czechoslovakia, as seen above. Nonetheless, on an official level, O'Driscoll's point that 'Irish adherence to the nationalist principle' did actually permit Irish policymakers to 'accept uncritically Hitler's case for the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Greater Germany', may have reflected the immediate reaction of de Valera and Walshe.¹¹¹ On 15 September 1938 in Berchtesgaden, Chamberlain agreed to the transfer of Sudeten Germans; then on 19 September the Czechoslovak Government accepted the proposal. However, on 22 September Hitler already insisted on the occupation of the Sudetenland instead.¹¹² De Valera's personal message to Chamberlain, *en route* to see Hitler at Berchtesgaden demonstrated de Valera's faith in British appeasement: 'I merely want to tell you that one person at least is completely [sic] satisfied that you are doing the right thing no matter what the result. I believe you will be successful [...].'¹¹³ Deirdre McMahon has identified the main reason for de Valera's support in a statement of his at Geneva: "'we must face up to the necessity of doing something to meet those Polish and Hungarian claims which can be regarded as having a similar basis to the German claims. Otherwise the solution will stand out not as an attempt to secure justice, but as a surrender.'"¹¹⁴ The sentiment has left its trace on historiography; Patrick Keatinge has emphasised that de Valera supported Chamberlain's policy because of his "'deep belief in the inherent justice of the Sudeten case', based on an analogy with northern nationalists."¹¹⁵ Likewise, Robert Fisk has highlighted that de Valera 'reasoned that if Britain could accept the secession of the Czech Sudetenland, then she could also meet his own irredentist claims upon Northern Ireland.'¹¹⁶ T. Ryle Dwyer has also argued that de Valera was convinced that 'Dublin had its own Sudeten Germans in Northern Ireland'; therefore, Hitler seemed to have

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ O'Driscoll, *Ireland, Germany and the Nazis*, p. 225.

¹¹² Heimann, *Czechoslovakia*, pp. 79-80.

¹¹³ File on de Valera's attendance at the 19th Assembly of the League of Nations in September 1938, 15 September 1938, Éamon de Valera Papers, UCDA P150/2809.

¹¹⁴ Deirdre McMahon, 'Ireland and the Dominions and the Munich Crisis' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. i, no. 1, (1979), p. 31.

¹¹⁵ Keatinge, *A Place among the Nations*, p. 108.

¹¹⁶ Fisk, *In Time of War*, p. 65.

‘a valid claim because the Versailles Treaty had cut off the German minority in the Sudetenland from Germany without regard for the principle of self-determination.’¹¹⁷ In the words of Deirdre McMahon, ‘the aftermath of Munich left its mark on some of the most important questions in Anglo-Irish relations’: on defence and partition.¹¹⁸

Nevertheless, this was not a general sentiment among all Irish diplomats. More specifically, two months after the Munich Conference, Michael MacWhite in Rome had a firmer stance on the issue of the Czechoslovak border; he expressed to Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Ciano that

...the Irish people were deeply interested in the rectification of the Czecho-Slovak frontier for we, too, had a boundary problem [sic] which had international repercussions, due to the fact that an integral part of the Irish nation consisting of six of its thirty-two counties were cut off politically from the rest of the country by an Act of the British Parliament for which no Irish member, either from the North or the South, voted.’¹¹⁹

Less than a week after the Munich Conference, independent Senator Frank MacDermot also linked the Czechoslovak crisis to the question of partition. He found that it was justified by its advocates on much the same grounds as those on which [...] it is maintained in Ireland.’¹²⁰ According to Kyran FitzGerald, MacDermot was convinced that ‘Irish unity could be achieved by the consent of both communities on either side of the border.’¹²¹

Mervyn O’Driscoll has revealed that senior Nazi officials such as Adolf Hitler or Hermann Göring also used ‘crude parallels between the Anglo-Irish situation and German post-Versailles revisionism in central Europe until March 1939 to bolster German demands.’¹²² For instance, Hitler compared his ‘own pacific methods of achieving valid German nationalist aims in east-central Europe with what he characterized as traditional English military coercion, or the “Ulster method”.’¹²³ Nonetheless, as O’Driscoll has pointed out, ‘the Irish

¹¹⁷ T. Ryle Dwyer, *Behind the Green Curtain: Ireland’s Phoney Neutrality during World War II* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2009), p. 8.

¹¹⁸ McMahon, ‘Ireland and the Dominions and the Munich Crisis’, p. 30 and p. 34.

¹¹⁹ Confidential report from Michael MacWhite to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (Copy), Rome, 16 November 1938, UCDA P194/536, *DIFP* vol. v, no. 241, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1938/Meeting-with-Ciano/2387.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹²⁰ The text printed in the two dailies was identical. See ‘Our Readers’ Views on Topics Of The Day. The Czechs and Ourselves’, *Irish Independent*, 4 October 1938; and ‘The Czechs and Ourselves. To The Editor, The Irish Press’, *Irish Press*, 4 October 1938.

¹²¹ Kyran FitzGerald, ‘MacDermot, Francis Charles (“Frank”)', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5150>, accessed on 25 April 2015.

¹²² O’Driscoll, *Ireland, Germany and the Nazis*, p. 219.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

analogy served as a tactical tool to deflect criticism from Germany.’¹²⁴ In April 1939, Charles Bewley took note of this; in May 1939, he claimed that there had been ‘considerable interest’ in the Irish Partition question after Hitler’s speech. According to Bewley, Hitler argued that ‘England [had] no more right to interfere with German proceedings in Bohemia and Moravia than Germany would have to interfere with English measures in Northern Ireland.’¹²⁵

Interestingly, Mary M. Macken, Professor of German at UCD, in her article ‘Bohemia: Czechs and Germans’ welcomed the changes that followed the partition of Bohemia after the Munich Conference in September 1938. She declared the Czech crisis to be over right at the beginning of her article, suggesting that this was a natural and inevitable outcome as the state had been so ‘newly compounded’ that no wonder it proved to be powerless in an international conflict.¹²⁶ She stressed that the Czechs had ‘fallen a victim to disruptive nationalistic forces’ after independence, and the ideas of the League of Nations that the state had allegedly been built upon got simply forgotten.¹²⁷ She analysed the list of allegedly missed opportunities and mistakes made by the newly independent Czechoslovak Republic after 1918, dictated by ‘hate, fear and revenge.’¹²⁸ Interestingly, Macken also claimed Hussitism to have had great significance in the failure of the young state as its leaders were convinced ‘that Czechoslovakia was the fulfilment of the Czech destiny and of those Czech aspirations which were to be found embodied in the beliefs, the ethos and the politics of Hussitism.’¹²⁹

In November 1938, the Czechoslovak border was redrawn again, due to the decrees of the First Vienna Award in November 1938; then Hungary was awarded southern Slovakia and southern Subcarpathian Ruthenia.¹³⁰ Then in March 1939, the First Czechoslovak Republic ceased to exist: its territory became divided between the Reich-controlled Bohemian-Moravian Protectorate and the clerico-fascist puppet Slovak Republic under Monsignor Jozef

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Confidential report from Charles Bewley to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (43/33) (Copy), Berlin, 29 April 1939, NAI DFA 219/4, *DIFP* vol. v, no. 312, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/Reaction-to-Hitler+s-speech/2458.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015; and Confidential report from Charles Bewley to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (43/33), Berlin, 4 May 1939, NAI DFA 219/4, *DIFP* vol. v, no. 320, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/German-views-on-Ireland/2466.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹²⁶ Mary M. Macken, ‘Bohemia: Czechs and Germans’ in *Studies*, vol. xxvii, (December 1938), p. 605.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 607.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 608.

¹³⁰ For further details on the fate of the Transcarpathian borderland (also known as Subcarpathian Ruthenia or *Kárpátalja*) in the aftermath of the Munich Agreement and the First Vienna Award, see Prusin, *The Lands Between*, pp. 121-123.

Tiso. Lonnie R. Johnson defined the leadership of the Slovak Republic as a ‘concoction of clericalism, fascism, nationalism, corporatism, and anti-Semitism embodied by its leader, Jozef Tiso, a Catholic priest’.¹³¹ The eastern part of former Czechoslovakia, which had been independent since October 1938 as Carpathian Ruthenia, faced Hungarian occupation. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, Lonnie Johnson has argued, ‘was truly an international affair, and it merely demonstrated to what extent Hitler managed to exploit to his advantage Western European reticence and post-World War I Central European antipathies.’¹³²

These developments and the significance of the international political context were noted by Irish newspapers as well. Drawing on German sources, the *Irish Independent* reported on 14 March 1939 that ‘it was the wish of Herr Hitler that the Slovak people should themselves decide their fate and he did not mind what the decision was, as long as it was taken without outside pressure.’¹³³ Within a couple of days, Bewley prepared a report for Dublin with the details of the events that, according to him, led to the birth of the Protectorate and the separate Slovak Republic in place of the Czechoslovak Republic, stressing the importance of the Pittsburgh Agreement, and the continuous ‘refusal of the Czechs to fulfil their promise that Slovakia should enjoy full autonomy’ associated with it.¹³⁴ In 1918, Tomáš Masaryk signed an agreement at Pittsburgh (USA) with American Slovaks, agreeing to Slovak autonomy within the future Czechoslovak state. After the declaration of the Czechoslovak Republic, however, a centralised government came to power and the Slovaks did not gain their political autonomy. And by the time the Czech Government agreed to ‘abide by the Pittsburgh Agreement, which it had disregarded for 20 years’, argued Bewley, it was too late.¹³⁵ Therefore, a couple of days before Bewley’s report, on 11 March 1939, the Slovak parliament, under the lead of Tiso and the support of Hitler, ‘unanimously declared Slovakia an independent republic. In his declaration, Tiso has emphasised the Catholic character of his government, and announced the introduction of new legislation dealing with the Jewish problem on German lines.’¹³⁶ Similarly, the Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, under the Czech President Dr Emil Hácha, also placed ‘the fate of the Czech people and land

¹³¹ Johnson, *Central Europe*, p. 210.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ ‘Fateful Interview’, *Irish Independent*, Tuesday 14 March 1939.

¹³⁴ Confidential report from Charles Bewley to Joseph Walshe (Dublin) (43/33), Berlin, 15 March 1939, NAI DFA 219/4, *DIFP* vol. v, no. 282, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/Events-in-Czechoslovakia/2428.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

confidently in the hands of the leader of the German Reich'.¹³⁷ In conclusion, Bewley repeatedly criticised Western democracies, especially Britain, for proving 'that democracy as a political system can only lead to weakness and eventually disaster.'¹³⁸

Unsurprisingly, a month after the establishment of the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Bewley presented the political changes concerning the Czechs from a considerably different angle than other Irish diplomats. Firstly, he blamed the 'completely Masonic character of the Czechoslovak regime' for failing to 'find a modus vivendi with Germany' ever since the end of the Great War.¹³⁹ Secondly, he placed great emphasis on the influence of Western Powers for having forced Czechoslovakia to carry out their 'Franco-British anti-German policy.'¹⁴⁰ He justified the establishment of the German Protectorate by the pointing out the Czech hostility towards Germans and Slovaks, denying the latter their independence which they had promised them in 1918 and again in 1938. Only one outcome was possible,' argued Bewley,

...the establishment of a German Protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia, and the complete independence of Slovakia, which had experienced a persecution for 20 years from the anti-Catholic Czech Government, and now had formed a Catholic Government under Monsignor Tiso under the protection of the German State.¹⁴¹

Disturbances frequently broke out in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Shortly before the Second World War broke out, William Warnock replaced Charles Bewley as the head of the Irish legation in Berlin. Bewley was recalled to Dublin in the summer of 1939 and eventually resigned from the Irish diplomatic service on 1 August 1939.¹⁴² According to his less biased successor in Berlin, William Warnock, it was 'almost impossible in Berlin to get any reliable news about the Protectorate, as permission for entry into or exit from the Protectorate [was] rarely given.'¹⁴³ He added, however, that while he had had no opportunity

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Confidential report from Charles Bewley to Joseph Walshe (Dublin) (43/33), Berlin, 11 April 1939, NAI DFA 219/4, *DIFP* vol. v, no. 296, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/European-situation/2442.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Kennedy, 'Bewley, Charles Henry', *DIB*.

¹⁴³ Confidential report from William Warnock to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (43/33), Berlin, 21 November 1939, NAI DFA 219/4, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 75, http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/German-propaganda_events-in-Poland_Austria_Bohemia-and-Moravia/3075.htm, accessed on 23 September 2015.

to go there himself, ‘an Irishman who passed through Prague early in September told [him] that he had seen cases of Germans being jostled in the streets’, adding that he felt

...quite sure that the Germans [had] the situation well in hand from the military point of view. It is obvious that a revolt would have no chance of success. No doubt the Czech nationalists are well aware of this. The occasional outbursts are intended to keep national feeling alive, and to prevent peaceful penetration by Germany.¹⁴⁴

During the war years, Irish diplomatic sources emphasised the responsibility of British and French policy-makers for their false promises, especially in relation to the German invasion of Czechoslovakia after September 1938.¹⁴⁵ William Warnock, for instance, listed Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Norway and Holland as the ‘victims of French and English promises’.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, Seán Murphy from the Embassy in Paris stressed Great Britain’s responsibility in the German occupation of Czechoslovakia back in 1938.¹⁴⁷

Notably, the establishment of an independent Slovak Republic in March 1939 posed a challenge for the Irish Government. Problems occurred when the Slovak Government aimed to appoint a separate Slovak Consul in Dublin in October 1939. As Frederick Boland noted, the situation had the potential to complicate the relationship between the Irish and the British Governments, and could have been therefore seen as breaching Irish neutrality, because of the close connection between Slovakia and belligerent Germany.¹⁴⁸ De Valera urged Boland to avoid providing a definite reply to the Slovak Minister’s request, and suggested that Boland just inform him that the establishment of a Slovak Consulate in Dublin would not have been consistent with Ireland’s ‘attitude of strict neutrality.’¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Confidential report from William Warnock to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (43/33), Berlin, 18 May 1940, NAI DFA 219/4, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 179, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1940/German-opinion-is-that-war-has-finally-begun/3179.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015; and Confidential report from Sean Murphy to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (Copy), La Bourboule, 8 July 1940, NAI DFA Paris Embassy 19/34A, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 218, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1940/France+s-international-position-past-present-and-future/3218.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹⁴⁶ Confidential report from William Warnock to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (43/33), Berlin, 18 May 1940, NAI DFA 219/4, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 179, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1940/German-opinion-is-that-war-has-finally-begun/3179.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹⁴⁷ Confidential report from Sean Murphy to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (Copy), La Bourboule, 8 July 1940, NAI DFA Paris Embassy 19/34A, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 218, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1940/France+s-international-position-past-present-and-future/3218.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹⁴⁸ Minute from Frederick H. Boland to Sheila Murphy (Dublin), Dublin, 26 October 1939, NAI 227/23, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 62, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/Appointment-of-Slovak-Consul-to-Ireland/3062.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹⁴⁹ Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Michael MacWhite (Rome) (227/23) (Copy), Dublin, 13 December 1939, NAI DFA 227/23, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 91, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/Appointment-of-Slovak-Consul-in-Dublin/3091.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

Furthermore, after the German annexation of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939, even deeper complications appeared between the Czech Consul and the Department of External Affairs. In March 1939, Košťál decided to terminate his activities; however, shortly afterwards he informed the Department that he was going to continue to serve as the Czechoslovak representative.¹⁵⁰ The issue became a nuisance for the Irish Government in connection with the visit of Czech Foreign Minister in exile, Jan Masaryk, to Dublin in November 1944, to give a lecture on the role of small nations in the post-war era. In his biography of Jan Masaryk, Bruce Lockhart has emphasised that Masaryk was pessimistic about the future of small nations. Nonetheless, he regarded them as ‘the best people on earth and consoled himself that the mammoths had died out, but the ants had lasted from the beginning of history.’¹⁵¹ The existence of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Dublin was a delicate subject for the Irish Government during the war due to the fact that neutral Ireland still maintained diplomatic contact with belligerents including Germany and Italy.¹⁵² According to Samek, even though Ireland still recognized the consulate, despite Košťál’s resignation in March 1939, the consul’s name was not allowed to appear in print, however, the Irish Government still granted Košťál diplomatic amenities without recognising him officially as consul.¹⁵³ Košťál’s personal file, however, contradicts Samek’s information as it stated that after the German invasion of Prague in March 1939, Košťál closed the consulate in Dublin and ‘handed over the greater portion of his official documents and property to the German Minister here. With that action, he ceased to be Czechoslovakian [sic] Consul and the other foreign representatives ceased to recognise him as such.’¹⁵⁴ This only worked in theory as several war-time newspaper articles referred to Košťál as Czechoslovak Consul, attending functions and giving dinners himself.¹⁵⁵ The Irish Government restored full recognition of Košťál as Consul of Czechoslovakia in Ireland in early November 1944. Curiously enough, this was not mentioned in other diplomatic or press reports, but in his personal file.¹⁵⁶ Undoubtedly this must be related to the Masaryk’s visit to Dublin just a few days beforehand.

¹⁵⁰ Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations*, p. 51.

¹⁵¹ Bruce Lockhart, *Jan Masaryk: A Personal Memoir* (Norwich: Jarrold and Sons Ltd., 1956), pp. viii-ix.

¹⁵² For an in-depth study of Irish-Italian contact and diplomatic representation during the Second World War, within the context of Irish neutrality, see Paolo Ottonello, ‘Irish-Italian Diplomatic Relations in World War II: The Irish Perspective’ in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. x, (1998), pp. 91-103.

¹⁵³ Samek, *Czech-Irish Cultural Relations*, p. 51.

¹⁵⁴ Present Position, Dr. Karel Kostal, Consul for Czechoslovakia. Personal file, Dublin, 26 January 1943, NAI PRES1/P383.

¹⁵⁵ Exchange of Christmas Cards 1943, Dr. Karel Kostal, Consul for Czechoslovakia. Personal file, Dublin, 18 December 1943, NAI PRES1/P383.

¹⁵⁶ Recognition as Consul, November 1944, Dr Karel Kostal, Consul for Czechoslovakia. Personal File, Dublin, 6 November 1944, NAI PRES1/P383.

The fact that the Irish Government tolerated the presence of Košťál as Czechoslovak Consul during the Emergency when his country was under German rule, led the German Minister in Dublin, Eduard Hempel, actually to question Irish neutrality.¹⁵⁷ Walshe tried to explain to Hempel that the Irish had gone through the stage of being an oppressed nation and had experienced the difficulties of obtaining recognition for their struggle for independence. ‘As a small country’, argued Walshe, ‘we could not but support the cause of all small countries, no matter where they were situated. We should be false to our principles if we did not do so.’¹⁵⁸ Walshe’s words naturally coincided with de Valera’s well-known stance on defending the rights of small nations in the League of Nations in the 1930s. Nonetheless, Hempel claimed that the German-Czech relationship was not comparable to the one between Ireland and Britain.¹⁵⁹

Following Masaryk’s visit to Dublin in late 1944, after the confrontation with Hempel, Boland reminded Walshe of the fact that after the entry of German troops into Czechoslovakia, the aim of the Department of External Affairs was to ‘avoid being drawn to one side or the other.’¹⁶⁰ While having recognised German annexation of the Sudetenland, they ‘certainly did not recognise the German Protectorate or the new state of Slovakia *de jure*.’¹⁶¹ Therefore, even six years after the First Czechoslovak Republic ceased to exist, the events that led up to its termination still had an effect on Irish-Czech diplomatic relations.

Perceptions of Hungarian border revisions

Undoubtedly, the Irish image of interwar Hungary had been shaped by several factors including, most importantly, the Catholic perspective of the majority of commentators and the critical attitude to British policies regarding Ireland. In the late 1930s, it became more and more regular to have Hungarian voices heard in Ireland – whether on the programme of Radio Éireann, on the pages of major Irish dailies, or in person at different scenes of Dublin social,

¹⁵⁷ Memorandum from Joseph P. Walshe to Eamon de Valera (Dublin) regarding Jan Masaryk’s visit to Dublin, Dublin, 24 November 1944, NAI DFA Secretary’s Files A2, *DIFP* vol. vii, no. 514, p. 483.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ Memorandum from Frederick H. Boland to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) regarding Jan Masaryk’s visit to Dublin, Dublin, 12 December 1944, NAI DFA 365/2, *DIFP* vol. vii, no. 521, p. 487.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

intellectual, and religious life.¹⁶² For instance, Suzanne Kemeny, who was, stressed the *Irish Independent*, 'well known in Dublin', spoke as part of a special broadcast from Radio Éireann regarding the Eucharistic Congress.¹⁶³

The impact of Catholicism on Irish perceptions had not faded by any means by 1938, especially in view of the fact that the 34th Eucharistic Congress took place then in Budapest.¹⁶⁴ Eugenio Pacelli (later Pope Pius XII), served as papal legate at Budapest and offered the admonition at the Eucharistic Congress. Similarly to the theme of many Catholic Irish writers at the time, he praised the strength of Hungarians defending the Christian civilisation. In 1938, this could stand for opposition against Nazism or, even more so, communism.¹⁶⁵ The peculiarity of the Eucharistic Congress is indicated by the fact that it was organised only a few months after the Austrian Anschluss (March 1938) and before the Munich Agreement (September 1938) and the First Vienna Award (November 1938), all of which contributed to the total transformation of the political status quo in Central Europe.

The Hungarian Eucharistic Congress, held 25-29 May 1938, was attended by, among others, an Irish delegation of 110 members, organised by the Irish Catholic Truth Society.¹⁶⁶ 'Hungary has close affinities with Ireland', explained the organisation; 'it is Catholic through and through and, like Ireland, wrested its independence from the invader.'¹⁶⁷ And although the Irish delegation was small, it represented, claimed the Catholic Truth Society, 'a gesture of brotherhood with the people of Hungary.'¹⁶⁸ The Irish Government was represented by An Tánaiste Sean T. O'Kelly (Seán T. Ó Ceallaigh).¹⁶⁹ Baron Zsigmond Perényi, Steward of the Holy Crown of St Stephen, was quoted as saying that 'Hungarians felt warm sympathy with Ireland, because they had so many things in common,' for they had both kept the faith for centuries and had also suffered greatly for it, adding that the Wild Geese were among those who fought for the liberation of Buda from the Turks in 1686.¹⁷⁰ Most importantly, the paper drew a comparison between Hungary's mission in 1686 and that of 1919, when 'Hungarians

¹⁶² 'Hungary- by a Hungarian', *Irish Press*, 28 September 1938.

¹⁶³ 'Radio Eireann Broadcast', *Irish Independent*, 27 May 1938; and *Sunday Independent*, 29 May 1938.

¹⁶⁴ For a detailed account of the 1938 Eucharistic Congress, see Jenő Gergely, *Eucharisztikus Világkongresszus Budapesten – 1938 [Eucharistic Congress in Budapest - 1938]* (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1988).

¹⁶⁵ 'Rain Mars Procession', *Irish Press*, 30 May 1938.

¹⁶⁶ 'Budapest Visitor. Preparations for Congress', *Irish Independent*, 26 January 1938.

¹⁶⁷ 'Irish Delegation to Eucharistic Congress', *Irish Press*, 5 March 1938.

¹⁶⁸ 'The Pope's Congress', *Irish Press*, 30 May 1938.

¹⁶⁹ 'Cardinal Told the Tanaiste of Election', *Irish Press*, 6 June 1938.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

were again called upon to protect Christian Europe from a peril even worse than the Turks – the Bolsheviks.¹⁷¹ The Special Correspondent of the *Irish Independent*, Gertrude Gaffney was in Budapest for the duration of the whole event to report on the Eucharistic Congress. She pointed to the disappointment of the Hungarian organisers that no visitors were arriving from Germany or Austria, ‘both big Catholic populations.’¹⁷² A month before the Eucharistic Congress took place in Budapest, the aforementioned John Vágó, representative of the Universities’ Sub-Committee of the Congress, had visited the offices of the Irish Catholic Truth Society. Among others, Vágó discussed with an *Irish Press* reporter whether Hitler was to permit Austrian Catholics to attend the Congress, which was officially barred to German Catholics.¹⁷³ In her article, Gaffney quoted the Mayor of Budapest, ‘Dr C. Szenoy’ [Károly Szendy], speaking of ‘the strong ties between Ireland and Hungary, and of the similarity between’ Irish and Hungarian history.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, Michael Nash, also writing for the *Irish Independent* a week prior to the event, had pointed to a number of issues Ireland and Hungary were perceived to have in common. He directed the readers’ attention to the ‘grievances as well as sympathies’ in relation to fighting for nationhood, emphasising that ‘both [had] suffered severely from religious persecution, and both are still struggling, with increasing success, to maintain the heritage of their national traditions and language’.¹⁷⁵ As far as post-war Hungary was concerned, Nash pointed to the loss of border provinces and as a result, the strength of irredentism in the everyday life of ‘truncated modern Hungary’, an image used frequently to characterise post-Partition Ulster as well, within the Irish context.¹⁷⁶

Half a year later, Irish attention was directed to Hungary for other than religious reasons; the Vienna Awards raised the question of borders and minorities. Unlike the Munich Agreement, which had the German Reich as the beneficiary of the Czechoslovak territorial change, the First and Second Vienna Awards (2 November 1938 and 16-24 August 1940), although arbitrated by Germany and Italy, resulted in the small state of Hungary seizing territories from neighbouring Czechoslovakia and Romania. Annexing a portion of Ruthenia as part of the Vienna Award of November 1938 was therefore followed by Hungary taking ‘the rest of the

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² ‘Ready for Congress’, *Irish Independent*, 24 May 1938.

¹⁷³ ‘Several Irish Bishops to Attend Eucharistic Congress’, *Irish Press*, 5 April 1938.

¹⁷⁴ ‘Irish Pilgrims Welcomed in Budapest’, *Irish Independent*, 27 May 1938.

¹⁷⁵ ‘Hungary – Land that does not Know the Word NEVER’, *Irish Independent*, 14 May 1938.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

province in March 1939 when rump-Czechoslovakia disappeared from the map.¹⁷⁷ Obstacles, however, also were created by the award, argued historian Betty Jo Winchester (1973), pointing out that ‘after the Vienna Award, the tactics adopted by the Hungarian Government in regard to Ruthenia were modelled rather closely on those Hitler had used to make Czechoslovakia an international issue.’¹⁷⁸ Also, the *Irish Independent* noted that as a result of the Vienna Award, Hungary again became a country with a minority problem: ‘Of a population numbering approximately 14,000,000, about 2,500,000 comprise Rumanian, German, Slovak, and Ruthenian minorities. Nearly half a million Germans, will be under Hungarian rule.’¹⁷⁹ On the other hand, the *Irish Press*, citing a PA telegram, reported that the purpose of the First Vienna Award ‘was to create conditions in which different nationalities could live peacefully together’ – the declaration of which illustrates the efficiency of the Axis propaganda even in Ireland.¹⁸⁰

Despite the apparent influence of the Axis Powers, the outbreak of the Second World War saw Hungary among the neutral states, ‘balancing between three powers.’¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, the potential for conflict was still perceived in Ireland, with regards the frontiers. As Mary M. Macken pointed out in December 1939:

...Hungary is and has been a much discussed political problem. Arthur Griffith familiarised us with it long before the World War. Since the Peace Treaties the World Press has been busy with its pros and cons. The Hungarians themselves have seen to that. They are excellent propagandists. Their anti-partition work could give us many headlines.¹⁸²

The ‘peaceful’ [as declared by contemporary Hungarian politicians and press] revision of Hungary’s Treaty of Trianon, the state’s ‘*raison d’être*’, was completed in August 1940.¹⁸³ With the two Vienna Awards, Hungary recovered 80,000 square kilometres and 5 million

¹⁷⁷ Milan Hauner, “‘We Must Push Eastwards!’” The Challenges and Dilemmas of President Beneš after Munich’ in the *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. xlv, no. 4, (October 2009), p. 639.

¹⁷⁸ Betty Jo Winchester, ‘Hungary and the “Third Europe” in 1938’ in the *Slavic Review*, vol. xxxii, no. 4, (December 1973), p. 753.

¹⁷⁹ ‘Hungary’s New Problem’, *Irish Independent*, 3 September 1940.

¹⁸⁰ Vienna Award is Final, Says Berlin’, *Irish Press*, 29 December 1938.

¹⁸¹ Letter from Michael MacWhite to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (Confidential) (Copy), Rome, 20 October 1938, UCDA P194/536, *DIFP* vol. v, no. 236, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1938/Political-situation-in-Rome--Situation-in-Europe/2382.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015; Confidential report from Seán Murphy to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (P. 19/34) (Copy) (Confidential), Paris, 20 March 1939, NAI DFA Paris Embassy 19/34, *DIFP* vol. v, no. 284, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/International-situation/2430.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015; and Frank, ‘Treaty revision and doublespeak’, p. 150.

¹⁸² Mary M. Macken (review), ‘Regent of Hungary by Owen Rutter’ in *Studies*, vol. xxviii, no. 112, (December 1939), p. 675.

¹⁸³ ‘Hungary Thanks Axis Leaders’, *Irish Independent*, 3 September, 1940; and Frank, ‘Treaty Revision and Doublespeak’, p. 152.

inhabitants, 2 million of whom were Hungarians. As Hoensch has pointed out, the Hungarian administration failed to learn from its pre-World War One mistakes and ‘implemented new measures of coercion and magyarisation against the national minorities’, leading to opposition of the local populations.¹⁸⁴ Then Romania ceded northern Transylvania as part of the Second Vienna Award, the final ‘Axis-sponsored settlement’, as the *Irish Press* labelled it.¹⁸⁵ The other major Irish daily, the *Irish Independent* also frequently reported on Central European border changes. While most of the time it published the telegrams from Reuters through the PA without adding comments that could possibly compromise Irish neutrality, on 5 September 1940 the *Irish Independent* expressed sympathy towards Romania by stating that they ‘have little choice but to accept the decision [...]. With the example of what happened in Poland, they cannot afford to give any outsider an excuse for restoring order.’¹⁸⁶ Consequently, without stating it directly, the paper acknowledged the irreversible growth of German influence in the region. This turned out to be fatal for the Jewish population of northern Transylvania (approximately 160,000). Although most Jews ‘welcomed the change of regime’ and the return of northern Transylvania to Hungary, the new administration was ‘systematically depriving them of their rights.’¹⁸⁷ This culminated after the Nazi takeover in Budapest in March 1944, opening the way for Ghettoisation in Transylvania over a week later and ultimately for deportations to Auschwitz after 25 May 1944.¹⁸⁸ The ghettoisation of Kolozsvár/Cluj, commencing on 3 May 1944, was of central importance. As for deportation, approximately 16,000 Jews were deported to Auschwitz from northern Transylvania.¹⁸⁹

Besides the apparent minority problem, the *Irish Independent* also took note of the riots and demonstrations that followed the transfers of territory, especially after the Second Vienna Award.¹⁹⁰ Disturbances were reported on both the Romanian and the Hungarian sides. The Romanian population objected to the new settlement, while their government attempted to

¹⁸⁴ Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary*, pp. 152-153; and Alan Warwick Palmer, *The Lands Between: A History of East-Central Europe since the Congress of Vienna* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), p. 261.

¹⁸⁵ ‘Rumanian Riots Open New Crisis. Hungary Threatens as Cession is Opposed’, *Irish Press*, 2 September 1940;

¹⁸⁶ ‘Repercussions of the War’, *Irish Independent*, 5 September 1940.

¹⁸⁷ Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics*, p. 79.

¹⁸⁸ Although the Nazi takeover took place in March 1944, anti-Jewish laws had been passed by the Hungarian Parliament well in advance: the ‘Numerus Clausus’ in 1920; the First Anti-Jewish Law in May 1938; the Second Anti-Jewish Law in May 1939; and the Third Anti-Jewish Law in August 1941, the latter one going as far as prohibiting intermarriage and sexual relations between non-Jews and Jews.

¹⁸⁹ Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics*, p. 105. For further details on Jews in Transylvania and Hungary, see Randolph L. Braham, *The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary* (New York: Rosenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies, 1994), p. 634 and pp. 780-92.

¹⁹⁰ ‘Rumania’s New Problems’, *Irish Independent*, 3 September, 1940.

‘force the people into quiet acceptance of the Vienna award fearing German threats of military occupation of the whole country’.¹⁹¹ Therefore, the Romanian Government banned all demonstrations and, such as in the case of the city of Brasov/Brassó, even Swastika banners were destroyed, ‘despite vehement protests by German officials.’¹⁹² Riots also led to, in some cases, attacks on the local Hungarian population in northern Transylvania, to which the Hungarian Government and press loudly objected. As the *Irish Independent* noted, the problem was rooted in the fact that it was in the ceded part of Transylvania, ‘farthest from Hungary’s borders, that the bulk of Hungarians [lived]’.¹⁹³ Therefore, this ‘settlement’ just added to the existing conflicts in the region. The most significant of these was the aforementioned fear of a German invasion. In addition, Irish newspapers also devoted attention to reports on the ill-treatment of the Romanian population.¹⁹⁴

As far as Irish-Hungarian diplomatic links were concerned on the eve of the Second World War, there was a similar request to the aforementioned Czechoslovak Josef Bělský’s application for the post of Honorary Consul of Ireland in Prague, regarding a diplomatic post in Budapest. The letter addressed to the Irish Minister for External Affairs was written in French by a Lucien Delorme. Delorme had been resident in Ireland for 3 years, and owned a perfume factory in Budapest, hence his interest in furthering links between Ireland and Hungary in Budapest.¹⁹⁵ In his reply, Walshe informed Delorme that it was not the practice of the Irish Government to appoint honorary consuls abroad, adding that his name and address had been noted ‘should any change be made in this decision.’¹⁹⁶ Therefore, the Department appeared to concentrate their efforts on other developments. As Delorme applied at a time when trouble was brewing in East-Central Europe, not long before the Munich Agreement (30 September) and the First Vienna Award (2 November 1938), the Department’s response indicated that Central Europe may not have been the most favourable diplomatic or trading post for Ireland at the time. Not having an Irish consulate did indeed cause complications after

¹⁹¹ ‘Hungarians March into Rumania. Fatal Crashes on the Frontier’, *Irish Press*, 3 September 1940.

¹⁹² ‘German Flags Destroyed’, *Irish Independent*, 3 September 1940.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴ ‘Hungary’s Reprisals on Rumanians’, *Irish Press*, 10 October 1940, and ‘Rumania Prepares Defence. Demarche to Hungary’, *Irish Independent*, 11 October 1940.

¹⁹⁵ Application of Lucien Delorme of Budapest for Post of Irish Consul for Hungary, 27 August 1938, NAI DFA 117/56.

¹⁹⁶ Letter from Walshe in English to Delorme Application of Lucien Delorme of Budapest for Post of Irish Consul for Hungary’, Dublin, 9 September 1938, NAI DFA 117/56, JAB/LL 117/56.

Hungary entered the war in 1941, with regards the protection of Irish nationals in Hungary.¹⁹⁷ In relation to renewing Irish visas in Hungary, Walshe (as 'Estero') reminded Francis Cremins, Irish Chargé d'Affaires at Berne, that Ireland had not asked the Swiss or any other country to protect Irish interests in Hungary.¹⁹⁸ The issue was officially settled in May 1942, when Walshe declared that Irish citizens in Budapest should communicate directly with the Irish Legation in Berne, without the involvement of the Swiss Legation in Budapest.¹⁹⁹ The question of protecting Irish nationals in Hungary was brought up again after the German invasion (*Operation Margarethe*) of Hungary in March 1944. The Irish Minister in Berlin, Con Cremin, pointed out that 'theoretically', Hungary was not under German control and relations between Germany and Hungary continued to be 'conducted through their respective Legations'; however, all positions were filled by persons 'well known for their anti-Semitic tendencies'.²⁰⁰

As a matter of fact, the impact of the Vienna Awards and Hungary joining the Axis powers in the war was much more straightforward than in the case of the Czechoslovaks. As we have seen, since 1926, the Dublin Catholic stockbroker and former journalist Hubert Briscoe filled the position of Honorary Consul of Hungary in Ireland, a key figure for promoting economic and cultural links between the two states, as the *Irish Times* had claimed.²⁰¹ Despite the growing influence of the Axis powers on Hungary in the late 1930s, and even the Hungarian aggression towards her neighbouring small states, the outbreak of the World War did not result in any trouble regarding Irish-Hungarian relations. What is more, in December 1939, the Hungarian Consulate in Dublin was 'raised to the status of Consulate-General, and Mr. Hubert Briscoe, Honorary Consul, has been appointed Consul-General.'²⁰² The *Cork*

¹⁹⁷ Telegram from Cremins, Berne, to Estero, Dublin, Diplomatic Protection of Irish Citizens in Hungary, 1 May 1942, NAI DFA 202/1722, 202/1688A.

¹⁹⁸ In his recent doctoral thesis, Barry Whelan has highlighted how during the years of the Emergency, all communications were coded. Walshe's concerns for maintaining secrecy, pointed out Whelan, were demonstrated by 'the increased use of the term "Estero"', meaning the Department of External Affairs, in his direct communications with Leopold Kerney, using the name "Hibernia". See Barry Whelan, 'Ireland and Spain, 1939-55: Cultural, Economic and Political Relations from Neutrality in the Second World War to Joint Membership of the United Nations' (PhD Thesis, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2012), p. 124; and Telegram from Estero, Dublin, to Cremins, Berne, Diplomatic Protection of Irish Citizens in Hungary, 6 May 1942, NAI DFA 202/1722, 202/1688A.

¹⁹⁹ Telegram from Cremins, Berne, to Estero, Dublin, Diplomatic Protection of Irish Citizens in Hungary, 27 May 1942, NAI DFA 202/1722202/1688A.

²⁰⁰ Telegram from Cremin, Berlin, to the Secretary of the DFA, Dublin, Diplomatic Protection of Irish Citizens in Hungary, 21 June 1944, NAI DFA 202/1722.

²⁰¹ 'Mr Hubert Briscoe', *Irish Times*, 29 December 1939.

²⁰² 'Hungarian Consul-General', *Irish Independent*, 20 December 1939; and 'Hungarian Consul Becomes Consul-General', *Irish Press*, 19 December 1939.

Examiner added that Briscoe, being ‘a keen traveller,’ knew Hungary very well due to the fact that he had paid an annual visit to Hungary.²⁰³ The British Government broke off relations with Hungary in April 1941; this, however, did not affect Irish-Hungarian links at this stage. In his letter to Walshe, dated 23 April 1941, Briscoe wrote, ‘I presume there is no need for me to do anything at this juncture.’²⁰⁴ It was only after the British declaration of war on Hungary on 7 December 1941 that Briscoe resigned from his post, due to the irreconcilability of the declaration of war with his business interests in Britain. Communications were then carried through the Swedish Legation in London, who were in charge of Hungarian interests regarding Ireland.²⁰⁵ The position was not filled for almost half a century and diplomatic connections were not established again until the 1970s.

Central European aliens in Ireland

As a result of the grave political changes, the number of both academic exiles and ordinary people fleeing Central Europe and arriving in Ireland rose after 1933, the year Hitler became Chancellor of Germany.²⁰⁶ This included both Jewish and non-Jewish populations. And even though the movement of people from Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to Ireland was documented throughout the 1930s, data regarding exiles was more significant during the Second World War.²⁰⁷

The presence of a Jewish community in Ireland is a significant element to consider when studying the overall development of Irish national identity in the post-independence period. As a minority community and representatives of the ‘other’, the Jewish population was excluded from the imagined community of the dominant Catholic Irish-Ireland.²⁰⁸ Cormac Ó Gráda has pointed to the early experience of the Jewish community in Ireland for explanation;

²⁰³ ‘Hungarian Consul’, *Cork Examiner*, 6 January 1940.

²⁰⁴ Letter from Briscoe to Walshe, 23 April 1941, NAI DFA 227/99.

²⁰⁵ Copy of telegram to the Hungarian Consul-General, Dublin, 8 April 1941, NAI DFA 227/99.

²⁰⁶ For a detailed study of German-speaking exiles in Ireland, see Gisela Holfter (ed) *German-Speaking Exiles in Ireland 1933-1945* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006).

²⁰⁷ According to Eilís Ward, the number of aliens/non-nationals in 1939 totalled 2,610 (Dermot Keogh has claimed that the number was 2,354). For details on the political framework established in 1935 (The Nationality and Citizens Act and the Aliens Act) in relation to non-nationals, see Eilís Ward, ‘Ireland and refugees/asylum seekers: 1922 – 1966’ in Ronit Lentin (ed) *The Expanding Nation: Towards a Multi-Ethnic Ireland. Proceedings of a Conference Held in Trinity College Dublin, 22-24 September 1998*, vol. i, p. 41, available online at https://www.tcd.ie/sociology/ethnicracialstudies/assets/documents/expanding_nation.pdf, accessed on 17 September 2014; and Dermot Keogh, *Jews in Twentieth Century Ireland* (Cork: Cork University Press, 1998), p. 120.

²⁰⁸ Fanning, *Racism and Social Change*, p. 30.

in the late nineteenth century, due to their experience in Eastern Europe, in Jewish minds, nationalism was linked with anti-Semitism.²⁰⁹ While Jewish settlement in Ireland had remained sporadic until the 1880s, the end of the century saw a significant wave of Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe.²¹⁰ The best-known and earliest example of anti-Semitism was the 1904 pogrom in Limerick, which was influenced by Catholic anti-Semitic ideology in France, particularly in the aftermath of the Dreyfuss affair.²¹¹ In spite of the fact that Zionism ‘was an integral part of the rise of nationalism’ all over Europe, Irish comments on Jewish nationalism remained extremely limited after the World Congress of Zionists in Basel (1897) and throughout the first half of the twentieth century.²¹² Even though Budapest-born Theodor Herzl, the ‘father of political Zionism’, saw himself as ‘the Parnell of the Jews’, comparisons between Irish nationalism and Jewish nationalism were not reciprocated in Ireland at the time.²¹³

Although ‘a mild variety’ of anti-Semitism was present in Ireland in the first half of the twentieth century, also lingering in government, explicitly anti-Semitic state policies were only implemented after 1938, in order to regulate the influx of Jewish immigrants into Ireland.²¹⁴ This, as Bryan Fanning (2002) has emphasised, was rather ‘a response to an imagined Jewish problem’ as opposed to a perceived threat to the existing social order.²¹⁵ International events such as the German annexation of Austria, and the Conference in Evian that took place shortly afterwards in July 1938 had shaped initial Irish responses and later official immigration policies.²¹⁶

²⁰⁹ Cormac Ó Gráda, *Jewish Ireland in the Age of Joyce: A Socioeconomic History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 189

²¹⁰ Natalie Wynn, ‘Irish-Jewish Constructs of Tsarist Eastern Europe’ in Aidan O’Malley and Eve Patten (eds) *Ireland, West to East: Irish Cultural Connections with Central and Eastern Europe* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014), p. 70; and Bryan Fanning, *Racism and Social Change in the Republic of Ireland* (Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 43.

²¹¹ Ó Gráda, *Jewish Ireland*, pp. 191-192.

²¹² Theodor Herzl, *The Jews’ State: A Critical English Translation by Henk Overberg* (Lanham, Maryland: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc, 2012), p. 42.

²¹³ Norman Rose, *‘A Senseless, Squalid War’: Voices from Palestine; 1890s-1948* (London: Pimlico, 2010), pp. 12-13; Francis Malino, ‘Robert Briscoe, Jewish Lord Mayor of Dublin: Revisiting the Irish-Jewish Connection’ in ChaeRan Y. Freeze, Sylvia Fuks Fried, and Eugene R. Sheppard (Eds), *The Individual in History: Essays in Honour of Jehuda Reinharz* (Waltham, Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press, 2015), p. 101; and Shulamit Eliash, *The Harp and the Shield of David: Ireland, Zionism and the State of Israel* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007), p. 6.

²¹⁴ Ó Gráda, *Jewish Ireland*, p. 191 and p. 210; and Fanning, *Racism and Social Change*, p. 54 and p. 59.

²¹⁵ Fanning, *Racism and Social Change*, p. 61.

²¹⁶ The Conference at Evian in July 1938 was attended by a small Irish delegation led by Francis Cremins.

Undoubtedly, the Irish Government indeed exercised its right to control the entry of aliens (based on the terminology of the Aliens Act, 1935) into Ireland, even that of influential members of foreign governments.²¹⁷ Not only ‘public comment on Irish neutrality or on the wartime affairs of the belligerent states’, but any communication between ‘foreign representatives in Dublin and their headquarters’ was seen as a potential threat.²¹⁸ As far as refugees were concerned, official efforts were ‘limited to offering asylum, possibly sending food aid and –arguably – publicising persecution’.²¹⁹ In addition, the lack of preparation on the part of senior officials in the Department of Justice furthered the Irish inefficiency in dealing with the refugee question.

As far as the distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish aliens were concerned, Dermot Keogh has argued that although the Department of Justice did not officially record their religion, the ‘Irish authorities knew when an alien was Jewish. It made a difference too.’²²⁰ Brian Fallon has also commented on the debate in Irish historiography as to the exact data, or the lack thereof, concerning Jewish refugees in Ireland. He stressed the pre-war importance of Irish Jews in the arts.²²¹

The year 1938 was a watershed in the course of immigration into Ireland as after the Anschluss and the occupation of the Sudetenland, many Jews tried to flee from Austria and Czechoslovakia, respectively, and apply for visas and/or working permits. At the time of the German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, approximately 117,000 Jews lived in the region, many of whom were applying for refuge in Ireland.²²² The role of the Irish envoy in Berlin was central in the process as the visas allocated to German and formerly Austrian/Czechoslovak individuals had to be directed to him. On all accounts, the anti-Semitic Charles Bewley emphasised the dangers of granting visas to ‘Jews or German Communists who may come to Ireland from the part of Czechoslovakia’ due to the low probability of these refugees to return to Czechoslovakia.²²³ In view of the fact that he was in total control of deciding over those applying for refugee status in Germany before mid-1939,

²¹⁷ The number of aliens allowed to enter Ireland 1939-1945 was 588. See Ward, ‘Ireland and refugees/asylum seekers’, p. 41.

²¹⁸ Nolan, *Joseph Walshe*, p. 189.

²¹⁹ Keogh, *Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland*, p. 159; and Wills, *That Neutral Island*, p. 395.

²²⁰ Keogh, *Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland*, p. 128.

²²¹ Fallon, *Age of Innocence*, pp. 222-223.

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 129.

²²³ Letter from Charles Bewley to the Joseph Walshe, 6 October 1938, NAI D/J 69/4109.

the chance that those fleeing Central Europe were gaining permission to enter Ireland was reduced considerably. Keogh has stressed that only the visas of ‘those seeking to work or setting up industries in Ireland’ had to be referred to Dublin.²²⁴

Therefore, the most common reason for rejection by the Irish authorities was the alleged overcrowding of professions, especially after 1938, when ‘the number of applications for visas grew and Ireland’s immigration policy was adapted to keep refugees out, especially Jewish refugees.’²²⁵ In a letter to the President of UCD, Denis J. Coffey, regarding the fate of Austrian students, the Secretary of the Department of Justice, Stephen A. Roche established that while sympathising with the cause of the refugees, ‘Ireland remained a country of emigration’.²²⁶ This made the small state unable to contribute to the resettlement of refugees due to the ‘existing problem of overcrowding’ in certain professions.²²⁷ Roche mentioned that the Minister for Justice, P. J. Ruttledge, preferred ‘that no publicity should be given to the decision of the Governing Body’.²²⁸ The fear of the Department of Industry and Commerce (more specifically, the secretary, S. A. Roche) regarding the ‘tendency of certain classes of aliens who have already gained admittance to this state to press for the admission of their relatives and friends who are still in Central Europe’ was not unfounded.²²⁹ The case of Albert Hitschmann, a Prague resident, was an interesting example to demonstrate the complications that occurred when Central Europeans applied for a working permit in Ireland.

Correspondence between the Secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce, John Leydons, and the Department of External Affairs started in November 1938, a month after the Munich Agreement. Hitschmann was described as a ‘German national residing in Prague’, which did not reveal the fact that he was from the Sudetenland and the status quo changed considerably after the German annexation. As the directors of the requesting Irish company Plunder and Pollak (Ireland) Ltd. Carrick-on-Suir, were Albert Hitschmann’s brothers, ‘Richard Hitschmann, Czechoslovakian, and Fritz Hitschmann, German’, it did not help

²²⁴ Keogh, *Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland*, p. 136.

²²⁵ Birte Schulz, ‘Overcoming Boundaries? The Problem of Identity in the Experience of German-Speaking Exiles in Ireland 1933-1945’, in Gisela Holfter (ed) *German-speaking Exiles in Ireland 1933-1945* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), p. 121.

²²⁶ William Murphy, ‘Roche, Stephen Anselm’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a7752>, accessed on 20 April 2015.

²²⁷ Letter from Stephen A. Roche to Denis J. Coffey1 (Dublin) (69/3070), Dublin, 20 August 1938, NAI DT S11007A, *DIFP* vol. v, no. 211, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1938/Austrian-students-attending-University-College-Dublin/2357.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

²²⁹ Letter from S. A. Roche to John Leydon, Dublin, 19 October 1938, NAI D/J 69/4109.

Albert's case to have other aliens running the operations. Due to the recent 'political changes in Central Europe' Richard and Fritz aimed to bring over and employ Albert, who, they hoped, was to 'be a valuable assistant in the development' of Plunder and Pollak /Ireland/ Ltd.²³⁰ Complications arose once Bewley was notified about the case, as he did not hesitate long to veto Hitschmann's claim in January 1939. Bewley stated that Hitschmann did 'not appear in any sense of the word to be an expert.'²³¹ Nonetheless, the official documents from the parent company in Czechoslovakia, Plunder and Pollak Akc. Spol. Litomerice, and from the Hochschule für Welthandel in Wien, testified for the qualifications and experience of Albert Hitschmann. Bewley successfully slowed down the application process, as the Department of Justice 'preferred to rely on Mr. Bewley's views in this matter as, being on the spot, he must be in the best position to judge.'²³² The permit was still not awarded in July 1939 when John Belton informed Sean Nunan, First Secretary at the High Commissioner's Office, London, about the matter being 'one of great urgency', alluding to the complete German takeover of the Czech lands in March 1939.²³³ It certainly did not come as a surprise when on 29 July 1939 the Department of External Affairs was notified that Albert Hitschmann had relocated to Bolivia.²³⁴ The case was not closed yet; further complications occurred in November 1939, when James Patrick Beddy, (The Industrial Credit Company Limited) notified the Department of Industry and Commerce that 'Mr. Hitschmann' (not specified whether Richard or Fritz), director of Plunder & Pollak (Ireland) Ltd., an Austrian citizen, had his passport cancelled after the German union with Austria and as he was a Jew, he had 'not been able to obtain either the passport or a refusal to issue one'.²³⁵ On 18 December Frederick Boland from the Department of External Affairs clarified that 'Mr. Hitschmann would now appear to be Stateless', residing in Ireland with the permission of the

²³⁰ Letter from the Secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce to the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Albert Hitschmann, German: employment permit application, 14 November 1938, NAI DFA 4/202/27.

²³¹ Letter from Charles Bewley to the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs (Dublin), Albert Hitschmann, German: employment permit application, Berlin, 28 January 1939, NAI DFA 4/202/27.

²³² Letter from the Secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce to the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Dublin, Albert Hitschmann, German: employment permit application, 23 February 1939, NAI DFA 4/202/27.

²³³ Letter from John Belton to Sean Nunan, Dublin, Albert Hitschmann, German: employment permit application, 4 July 1939, NAI DFA 4/202/27.

²³⁴ Letter from Sean Nunan, High Commissioner's Office, London, to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs Albert Hitschmann, German: employment permit application, London, 29 July 1939, NAI DFA 4/202/27.

²³⁵ Letter from J. P. Beddy to the Secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce, Albert Hitschmann, German: employment permit application', Dublin, 13 November 1939, NAI DFA 4/202/27.

Irish Government.²³⁶ Boland also referred to the changed political situation in Czechoslovakia and added that the parent company Plunder & Pollak in Litomerice had been seized by the German authorities.²³⁷ In summary, the case of the Hitschmann family demonstrates the following: firstly, that aliens who had been resident and employed in Ireland before 1938 enjoyed the protection of the Irish Government during the Emergency; secondly, that there was a general confusion among Irish officials as to the complexity of ethnic and religious identities of Central European aliens, whether they were Germans, Czechoslovaks, Austrians, or Jews; and thirdly, that although being a Jew was not officially indicated on the Irish application form, Charles Bewley in Berlin successfully halted or slowed down many of these applications. In January 1939, Bewley officially denied the charges against him:

I should much regret if it were thought that I was in any way lacking in sympathy towards Jews desirous of leaving Central Europe. I cannot however help feeling that [...] it is my duty, as it is that of all persons concerned, to subordinate all feelings of personal sympathy to the protection of Irish interests.²³⁸

In addition to the activities of the Irish Government, philanthropists and (especially religious) charities made an effort to alleviate 'the plight of Jewish refugees'.²³⁹ The work of the Irish Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees was possibly the most significant, due to the efforts of its secretary Professor T.W.T. Dillon. The Committee focused their efforts on Christians with Jewish blood, therefore, the situation of practicing Jews was not particularly relieved.²⁴⁰ In addition to his activities in the Committee, Dillon's efforts included publishing articles in *Studies*, highlighting urgency of the refugee problem in the aftermath of the invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia, as well as the overall German attitude towards the Jews.²⁴¹ Dillon stressed that no people were 'more fitted than the Irish by their past history and present circumstances to undertake this kind of relief work', pointing to the historical link between

²³⁶ Letter from the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs to the Secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce, Albert Hitschmann, German: employment permit application, Dublin, 18 December 1939, NAI DFA 4/202/27.

²³⁷ For details of Germanisation and anti-Jewish economic legislations (starting with the Order of 21 March 1939) directed against both the Jewish and Czech enterprises in Bohemia, see Teichova, 'The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia', p. 289.

²³⁸ Dermot Keogh, 'Irish Refugee Policy, Anti-Semitism and Nazism at the Approach of World War Two' in Gisela Holfter (ed) *German-Speaking Exiles in Ireland 1933-1945* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), p. 48; and Report from Charles Bewley to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (32/33D), Berlin, 25 January 1939, NAI DFA 243/9, *DIFP* vol. v. no. 260, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/Admission-of-Jews-to-Ireland/2406.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

²³⁹ Katrina Goldstone, 'Benevolent Helpfulness'? Ireland and the Internal Reaction to Jewish Refugees, 1933-9' in Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly (eds) *Irish Foreign Policy 1919-1966: From Independence to Internationalism* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2000), p. 128.

²⁴⁰ Siobhán O'Connor, 'The Obliviousness of the Fortunate', in Gisela Holfter (ed) *German-Speaking Exiles in Ireland 1933-1945* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), pp. 96-97.

²⁴¹ T.W.T. Dillon, 'The Refugee Problem' in *Studies*, vol. xxviii, no. 111, (September 1939), p. 402 and p. 414.

Austria and those Irishmen who found refuge in the Austrian Empire centuries before, and were ‘received with genuine Christian charity.’²⁴² In his efforts, Dillon was supported by Éamon de Valera and Frank Fahy, Ceann Comhairle (chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee) as well. The contribution of the Taoiseach, argued Wolfgang Muchitsch (2006), was what finally ‘broke the resistance of the Department of Justice’.²⁴³ In addition, the efforts of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) and the Jewish Refugee Aid Committee of Eire were noteworthy.²⁴⁴ On an individual level, the success of Mary M. Macken in rescuing refugee children deserves attention, together with Protestant intellectual Hubert Butler’s involvement in the Kagran Group in Vienna.²⁴⁵ Butler, an Anglo-Irish nationalist, was also worthy of notice due to his first-hand experience in pre-war and post-war Central Europe. That provided him with an insight into matters related to the religious and ethnic divisions in the region.²⁴⁶ The Vienna-based Quaker organisation helped ‘Jewish converts to Christianity who intended forming an agricultural community abroad’.²⁴⁷ Éilis Ward has argued that on the whole, ‘not only did Ireland reject many asylum requests, many of which were supported personally by well-known individuals within the state, it went out of its way to discourage Jews from applying for refuge.’²⁴⁸ Although Ward has claimed that antisemitism was well documented amongst officials in the Department of External Affairs, Bryan Fanning, on the other hand, has stressed that the Department of External Affairs was ‘perhaps the most open and progressive’ departmentment that was entrusted with visa applications.²⁴⁹

The number of Jews arriving to Ireland from Hungary rose after the German invasion of the state in March 1944. The gravity of the event is highlighted by the fact that ‘the invasion and

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Wolfgang Muchitsch, ‘Austrian Refugees in Ireland 1938-1945’, in Gisela Holfter (ed) *German-Speaking Exiles in Ireland 1933-1945* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), p. 79.

²⁴⁴ Keogh, ‘Irish Refugee Policy’, pp. 52-53.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 56.

²⁴⁶ Hubert Butler, *In the Land of Nod* (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1996), p. xiii. Although post-1945 Croatia/Yugoslavia and Carpatho-Russia are outside the scope of the present thesis chronologically, geographically and thematically, it is worth noting the significance of Butler’s interest in East-Central Europe indicated by the articles ‘Ireland and Croatia’ (1948; 1988), ‘Maria Pasquinelli and the Dissolution of the Ego’ (1947; 1979), ‘Report on Yugoslavia’ (1947), ‘Memorandum on the Struggle between Communism and Christianity’ (1949), and ‘A Three Day Nation’ (1990).

²⁴⁷ Keogh, ‘Irish Refugee Policy’, p. 56; Keogh, *Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland*, p. 141; Wills, *That Neutral Island*, p. 59; Michael McAteer, ‘From Ireland to Croatia: Hubert Butler and Alojzije Stepinac’ in Aidan O’Malley and Eve Patten (eds) *Ireland, West to East: Irish Cultural Connections with Central and Eastern Europe* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014), p. 209.

²⁴⁸ Ward, ‘Ireland and Refugees/Asylum Seekers’, p. 41; and Éilis Ward, ‘“A Big Show-Off to What We Can Do” – Ireland and the Hungarian Refugee Crisis of 1956’, *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. vii, (1996), p. 133.

²⁴⁹ Fanning, *Racism and Social Change*, p. 74.

occupation of Hungary resulted in the transport and murder of the last bastion of the European Jews.²⁵⁰ This, as Dermot Keogh has pointed out, also ‘became the focus of Irish diplomatic concern’.²⁵¹ The expression ‘diplomatic concern’ may be quite ambiguous; while correspondence did show awareness and interest in the proceedings, the Department (Walshe) was by no means active in initiating solutions. Walshe’s telegram to the Irish envoy to the Holy See, Thomas J. Kiernan, was quite telling: ‘Official action is not considered feasible but you might take the occasion of informal conversation with the Hungarian Minister to tell him of the concern aroused here by the press reports and to ask what is the present position’.²⁵² Kiernan was actively involved in providing information regarding Jews in Hungary and Slovakia (since due to the Vienna Awards, Hungary claimed the southern regions of Slovakia). Altogether approximately 750,000 Hungarian Jews faced deportation, which began on 15 April 1944. The first trains, confirmed Romsics, left Hungary on 15 May 1944 via Kassa/Košice. By the end of June, the majority of the rural Jewry, approximately 440,000 people, had been deported. Indeed, as Keogh has stressed; ‘Kiernan had been seriously misinformed by the Vatican.’²⁵³

On 15 July 1944 even the national Irish dailies reported on the mass extermination of Hungarian Jews. A week later, Kiernan informed Walshe that based on the information of the papal nuncio in Budapest, 400,000 Jews out of the 1,000,000 were without passports.²⁵⁴ At the same time Kiernan declared that the anti-Jewish laws were applied with ‘very great humanity’ and ‘no Jews have been executed.’²⁵⁵ On 3 December 1944, however, Kiernan notified Walshe that the Vatican understood that Hungarian Government was ‘prepared to deport Jews’.²⁵⁶ Therefore, in December 1944, Kiernan was notified that there were still about 100,000 Jews in Budapest defending themselves in their houses and firing on the Germans, who were ‘gunning the houses. In this way the Jews are resisting deportation as they did in

²⁵⁰ Keogh, *Con Cremin*, p. 68.

²⁵¹ Telegram from Estero to Hibernia, Political Reports and Correspondence 1933-1945, between the Embassy of Ireland to the Holy See and the Secretary of DFA, Dublin, 15 July, 1944, NAI DFA 2009/22/25.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Keogh, *Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland*, p. 185; Keogh, *Ireland and the Vatican*, p. 189; and Romsics, *Magyarország Története*, p. 263.

²⁵⁴ The correct figure for the total number of Jews was closer to 800,000. See Romsics, *Magyarország Története*, p. 263.

²⁵⁵ Letter from Kiernan to Walshe, 23 July 1944, NAI DFA 419/44; and Telegram from Hibernia to Estero, Political Reports and Correspondence 1933-1945, between the Embassy of Ireland to the Holy See and the Secretary of DFA, Dublin, 22 July 1944, NAI DFA 2009/22/25.

²⁵⁶ Telegram Hibernia to Estero, Political Reports and Correspondence 1933-1945, between the Embassy of Ireland to the Holy See and the Secretary of DFA, Dublin, 3 December 1944, NAI DFA 2009/22/25.

Warsaw.²⁵⁷ Intervention was deemed ‘useless as all of the Jews except those hiding have already been deported to Germany, leaving about 20,000 Jews hiding.’²⁵⁸ Eventually approximately half of the total 200,000 Jewish population of Budapest were murdered.²⁵⁹ In spite of the death toll, in February 1945 the chief rabbi of Rome, Prof. Israel Zolli, who had recently converted to Catholicism, claimed that the Jews in Budapest ‘owed a great debt of gratitude’ to the Holy Father and to Mr. de Valera’s government ‘for the sympathy and help extended to them’, without specifying what help they were eventually offered or provided with.²⁶⁰ As the Irish Government did not introduce ‘extraordinary measures to rescue Jews’, Irish policy remained ‘reactive rather than proactive’ during the war-years.²⁶¹ Indeed, the Irish officials were far from flexible when investigating claims about refugees or, in the case of the inquiry of Marquis H. Pallavicini (Monaco), about the procedure for naturalising Austrian citizens. The Department of Justice did not accept exceptions about applicants who did not reside in Ireland, as they needed to have proven to have ‘rendered distinguished service to the Irish nation.’²⁶² One notable example was Catholic Austrian scholar of Jewish ancestry, Julius Pokorny, the outstanding Celtic scholar. Thanks to his acquaintance with Douglas Hyde, an Irish visa was issued to him at the Irish Legation in Berlin in 1940, allowing him to enter Switzerland in 1943.²⁶³ This was possible only after the dismissal of Charles Bewley, who had previously advised de Valera against intervening on Pokorny’s behalf.

At the end of the Second World War, a memorandum by the Department of Justice established that it was their policy ‘to restrict the immigration of Jews’ as Jews had gathered considerable wealth but did not assimilate with the native population; therefore, there was ‘a danger that any big increase in their numbers might create a social problem.’²⁶⁴

²⁵⁷ Telegram from Hibernia to Estero, Political Reports and Correspondence 1933-1945, between the Embassy of Ireland to the Holy See and the Secretary of DFA, Dublin, 14 December, 1944, NAI DFA 2009/22/25.

²⁵⁸ Telegram from Hibernia to Estero, Political Reports and Correspondence 1933-1945, between the Embassy of Ireland to the Holy See and the Secretary of DFA, Dublin, 20 December, 1944, NAI DFA 2009/22/25.

²⁵⁹ Romsics, *Magyarország Története*, p. 264.

²⁶⁰ Typed letter from Hibernia to Estero, Political Reports and Correspondence 1933-1945, between the Embassy of Ireland to the Holy See and the Secretary of DFA, Dublin, 14 February, 1945, NAI DFA 2009/22/25.

²⁶¹ Keogh, *Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland*, p. 191.

²⁶² Reply of Stephen Roche, Secretary of the Department of Justice to the letter of enquiry from Marquis H. Pallavicini, Monaco, about the procedure for naturalising Austrian citizens, 30 June 1938 and 8 July 1938, NAI TSCH/3/S10749.

²⁶³ Pól Ó Dochartaigh, *Julius Pokorny, 1887-1970: Germans, Celts and Nationalism* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), p. 17; and Pól Ó Dochartaigh, ‘Julius Pokorny: An Outsider between Nationalism and Anti-Semitism, Ethnicity and Celticism’ in Ian Wallace (ed) *Fractured Biographies* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003), p. 101.

²⁶⁴ Memorandum, ‘Future Policy’, 24 September 1945, NAI TSCH S11007/B1.

As a result of the Emergency Powers Act, the travel restrictions introduced in Ireland also exerted a major impact on the country's intellectual life, making it harder for foreign lecturers to contribute to academic debates in 'neutral' Ireland. The most successful Central European exile in Ireland was possibly Austrian quantum physicist Erwin Schrödinger. A well-known opponent of Nazism, he fled Austria in August 1938 and met de Valera, then President of the Assembly of the League, in Geneva, who offered him a position on the planned Institute for Advanced Studies.²⁶⁵ The advertisements of Schrödinger's lectures on 'Elementary Introduction to Wave Mechanics' at University College Dublin in November 1939 that were published in the *Irish Press* did not specify his nationality, only the fact that he was a Nobel Laureate.²⁶⁶ In comparison, the *Irish Independent* (in its Saturday issue, which may explain the fact that the censor may have missed the reference to one of the belligerents) introduced him as 'Prof. Erwin Schrodinger, Nobel Prize winner, who formerly held an academic chair in Vienna, and who stated he was dismissed from his post by the Nazis, began a course of lectures on the latest form of Quantum Theory'.²⁶⁷ The following year though, when he received an honorary degree from the Senate of the National University of Ireland in July 1940, Dr Arthur Conway, President, UCD, introduced him by mentioning, 'he had, by an ill wind, come to our shores.'²⁶⁸ After de Valera founded the Dublin Institute of Advanced Studies in 1940, Schrödinger became a Council member and Senior Professor of the School of Theoretical Physics. Other prominent members included former Irish minister in Berlin, Daniel A. Binchy (School of Celtic Studies) as well.

The visiting foreign speakers' nationality or religion often complicated the granting of visas in addition to the proposed topic of the lectures. Debating international relations in Ireland was risky as – especially in the case of the Irish Institute of International Affairs – the government could not afford to let the discussion of foreign policy out of official control. For de Valera, neutrality was the priority.

As opposed to Catholic applicants, records indicate that Jewish lecturers planning to visit Ireland were not as successful as their Catholic colleagues. Professor F. Lom of the Agricultural College and Economic Institution in Brno and Prof. Salamoun of Prague, for

²⁶⁵ Walter J. Moore, *Schrödinger: Life and Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 353.

²⁶⁶ 'University College Dublin', *Irish Press*, 30 October 1939.

²⁶⁷ 'Former Professor in Vienna. Lectures in Dublin', *Irish Independent*, 4 November 1939.

²⁶⁸ 'Honoured by University', *Irish Press*, 12 July 1940.

instance, were planning a visit to study agriculture in Great Britain and Ireland. Their enquiry was sent to the Secretary of Department of Agriculture via Košťál in January 1939. The timing was crucial due to the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. When on 8 May 1939 the Department of Agriculture pointed out to Walshe that ‘no communication has been made by Lom/Salamoun, therefore it was ‘assumed that in the circumstance the visit not now will take place’, it should have been clear to the Irish officials that the Czechoslovak Jewish Professors had encountered difficulties beyond their control.²⁶⁹

Records from the Irish Department of External Affairs demonstrate that the Irish Government paid great attention to those diplomats-in-exile who had obvious connections with Britain. Even though there was a connection between Ireland and prominent Catholic aliens such as the Czechoslovak Monsignor Hála, the fact that he was a London-based exile made him suspicious in the eyes of the G2. Successful applicants include a Polish national, Count Jan Balinski and a Yugoslav Orthodox Priest, Father Ristanovich. Other cases became more problematic, such as the application of the Czechoslovak Monsignor Hála; the Spanish scholar Salvador de Madariaga; the Yugoslav Catholic Priest Father Aloysius Kuhar; or, curiously enough, the third application by Count Balinski, which was eventually turned down.²⁷⁰ Notably, debates at University College Dublin, Trinity College Dublin and at the Catholic Association of International Relations (CAIR) were the most popular destinations for visiting lecturers, the latter for those from a Catholic background.²⁷¹ The main purpose of the CAIR was to ‘create Catholic public opinion which shall be a power for international justice and peace. Study and contacts are to be used in developing informed and earnest international morality.’²⁷² The papers presented at war-time meetings focused on the role of Catholicism in international affairs.²⁷³ The significance of the organisation is also shown by the fact that Cardinal MacRory agreed to be their patron in December 1938.²⁷⁴ Nonetheless, the records of the Department of External Affairs only mention these sparingly, as their invitations tended to cause less complications than those of the Irish Institute of International Affairs (IIA).

²⁶⁹ Visit of Professors Lom and Salamoun of Czechoslovakia to Ireland for Inspection of Agricultural colleges etc., Dublin, 23 January 1939-8 May 1939, NAI DFA 232/14.

²⁷⁰ Admission of aliens for purpose of giving lectures on foreign affairs in Ireland, Dublin, 3 February 1942 – 16 February 1944, NAI DFA 202/1688.

²⁷¹ Articles about the association can be found in the *Irish Independent*, on 30 December 1938; on 28 March 1939; and in the *Irish Press*, 16 December 1939.

²⁷² ‘Notes in Brief’ in *World Affairs*, vol. cii, no. 2, (June 1939), pp. 116-119.

²⁷³ Michael de la Bedoyere, ‘The Catholic Citizen in the Post-War World’ in *Studies*, vol. xxxi, no. 124, (December 1942), pp. 467-476.

²⁷⁴ ‘New Associations for Catholics’, *Irish Independent*, 30 December 1938.

Although the significance of the IIIA has not been often commented upon in Irish historiography, the records of the Department of External Affairs and the Dáil debates show its importance in connection with Irish neutrality during the Second World War. The IIIA was founded in April 1937 (the *Irish Press* reported on its first annual meeting in October 1937), then known as the Irish Society for the Study of International Affairs (ISSIA).²⁷⁵ The Society, which was ‘strictly non-political’, was dedicated to discuss and debate current international problems, ‘in particular problems that have a direct bearing on Ireland.’²⁷⁶ The timing for the founding of the group coincided with the decline of the League of Nations and therefore that of the League of Nations Society of Ireland as well. This also explains the overlap of membership between the two groups. Another body worthy of mention was the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. The connection between the Irish and the Royal Institute was undeniable; however, it was not as direct as the opponents of the group (particularly the Irish Government) emphasised it. The founders of the Irish Institute emphasised that the model they followed was loosely based on the one set up throughout the Commonwealth, rather than having a direct link with London.²⁷⁷ Despite this fact, ‘active contact was maintained with London throughout the winter of 1937’ and also, the society was renamed IIIA in May 1938, sounding more similar to the Royal Institute itself.²⁷⁸

As for the membership of the Institute, its officers were mostly from a pro-Treaty background, some representing the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy.²⁷⁹ They included TDs, academics such as professors from mostly Dublin-based colleges and even some retired British army-officers.²⁸⁰ The outbreak of the war did not cause a decline of attendance or interest in the group, on the contrary. According to Mick McCarthy, who compiled a unique

²⁷⁵ ‘New Study Group Formed’, *Irish Press*, 30 October 1937.

²⁷⁶ ‘New Dublin Society’, *Irish Press*, 18 June 1937.

²⁷⁷ ‘Cruiskeen Lawn. By Myles na gCopaleen’, *Irish Times*, 15 November 1944.

²⁷⁸ McCarthy, *International Affairs at Home*, p. 23.

²⁷⁹ The Institute’s Secretary was Colum Gavan Duffy, solicitor and librarian by profession, and older son of George Gavan Duffy, former Minister for Foreign Affairs (January-July 1922). For Colum Gavan Duffy’s correspondence with former Irish minister to France and Belgium, Art Ó Briain, in relation to the government’s charges against the IIIA, see Art Ó Briain Papers. Documents, letters and newspaper-cuttings relating to the ‘Irish Institute For [the study of] International Affairs’, 1936-1944, NLI MS 8460/22. For further biographical details see Margaret Byrne, ‘Colum Gavan Duffy’ in *Judicial Studies Institute Journal* 2:2 (2002), available online at

http://www.jsijournal.ie/html/Volume%202%20No.%202/2%5B2%5D_Gavan%20Duffy_George%20Gavan%20Duffy.pdf, accessed on 6 April 2013; and McCarthy, *International Affairs at Home*, p. 27.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

study of the Institute, 'the escalation in hostilities throughout Europe meant that numerous international situations and topics presented themselves for its lecture programme.'²⁸¹

As far as the Department of External Affairs' file on foreign lecturers is concerned, the line of complicated applications started with the case of Monsignor Frantisek Hála. This well-known Czechoslovak priest was the private secretary to Monsignor Jan Šrámek, Prime Minister of the 'Czechoslovak Refugee Government in London.'²⁸² His proposed lecture was to deal with Czechoslovakia's position and outlook in relation to the war, we learn from Košťál's letter.²⁸³ The consul informed the Department about the IIIA's invitation on 20 March 1942, which turned out to be problematic because the Institute had sent the invitation without consulting the Department of External Affairs first. Walshe was quick to point out to de Valera that the Institute had put the Irish Government

...in a position of having to choose between refusing a visa to this distinguished Catholic Priest and seemingly to lend out official co-operation to an effort in unneutral propaganda. Perhaps our best course in the circumstances would be to tell Mr. K. Kostal that Monsignor Hala is at liberty to come over here on the understanding that, while here, he will respect our neutrality and abstain from anything in the nature of war propaganda.²⁸⁴

By 'unneutral propaganda', the Department of External Affairs meant basically everything related to the IIIA, speaking at their forum. This note suggested that no official refusal would be issued to Hála's application; however, no official correspondence was recorded between the Department of External Affairs and the Czechoslovak Consul until later on that year. Then Košťál got in touch with Walshe again, enquiring about any objections to the visit of Monsignor Hála and Reverend Antonin Veselý, who intended to come to Dublin on 25 November 1942.²⁸⁵ Although no reply was recorded on the part of Walshe, there was no objection to Hála's speaking at the Catholic Association for International Relations (CAIR) on 30 November; at the IIIA on 3 December; and to visit Reverend Michael Browne, Bishop of Galway. The lecture at the Institute meeting actually consisted of Veselý reading Hála's paper on 'Church and State in Czechoslovakia.'²⁸⁶ The only explanation for this can be found in Daniel Samek's study on Czech-Irish Cultural Relations. In Samek's words, Veselý gave a lecture

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 59.

²⁸² Letter from the Czechoslovak Consul in Dublin to the Department of External Affairs, Dublin, 24 March 1942, NAI DFA 202/1688. FH3/LL.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Letter from Walshe to de Valera, 24 March 1942, NAI DFA 202/1688.

²⁸⁵ Kostal to Walshe, 13 November 1942, NAI DFA 202/1688. No.798.

²⁸⁶ McCarthy, *International Affairs at Home*, p. 236.

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...on the subject of the relation between the state and the church in Czechoslovakia at the Irish Institute of International Affairs in Dublin. The occasion was to have involved another speaker as well, minister of the exile government Monsignore František Hála (1893-1952), who however fractured his leg on the stairs of the Consulate; his contribution was consequently read out by Veselý.²⁸⁷

Interestingly, Samek has not provided the source of his statement, but it is most likely from the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry's records, on which he heavily relied in his study. The speech at the Institute was reported in the national Irish press as well, as the relevant issues of the *Irish Independent* and *Irish Press* illustrate this.²⁸⁸ In these articles, Hála is introduced as the member of the Czechoslovakian State Council in Britain; and Jesuit priest J. Veselý, as Chaplain to the Czech Airforce in Britain, on their way to address a meeting at the CAIR. After the war, Hála held the position of secretary general of the Czechoslovak Popular (Catholic) Party and also became Czechoslovak Minister of Post. What the Irish Government did not foresee at the time of his visit, was his future connection with Czechoslovak communists.

In addition to Monsignor Hála and Reverend Veselý, Czechoslovak nationals invited to speak at the IIIA included the Czechoslovak Consul Karel Košťál, who elaborated on 'The future of Czechoslovakia' in March 1941. Moreover, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister-in-exile, Jan Masaryk, was also invited. However, his lecture at the IIIA was eventually cancelled three days after his speech at Trinity College Dublin, where he attended a debate on 'The Position of the Small State in relation to World Organisation', along with an Taoiseach Éamon de Valera.²⁸⁹

Arrangements for Masaryk's visit to Dublin began on 21 July 1944, when Košťál's informed the Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Frederick Boland about the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister's invitation to attend the inaugural meeting of the Historical Society at Trinity College Dublin.²⁹⁰ Masaryk was invited by Michael Butler Yeats, the Auditor of the College Historical Society and son of William Butler Yeats, along with Eamon de Valera and Professor Denis W. Brogan from the University of Cambridge. As de Valera

²⁸⁷ Samek, *Czech-Irish cultural Relations*, p. 52

²⁸⁸ 'Czech Priest Visitors', *Irish Independent*, 30 November; 'Mass for Czechs. Mass for Compatriots and Friends', *Irish Independent*, 9 December 1942; and 'People and Places', *Irish Press*, 30 November 1942.

²⁸⁹ For further details of Masaryk's visit, see Lili Zách, 'Ireland, Czechoslovakia and the Question of Small Nations in the Context of Ireland's Wartime Neutrality' in Aidan O'Malley and Eve Patten (eds) *Ireland, West to East: Irish Cultural Connections with Central and Eastern Europe* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014), pp. 47-68.

²⁹⁰ Minute from Frederick H. Boland to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin), Proposed visit to Ireland of Mr Jan Masaryk (Czech Foreign Minister), Dublin, 2 August 1944, NAI DFA 235/144, *DIFP* vol. vii, no. 462, p. 444.

had been considering to make a public statement regarding Irish attitude regarding small nations, he found that the Trinity meeting was ‘as good an opportunity as any.’²⁹¹ Therefore, the Department had no objection to issuing Dr Masaryk’s visa.

On the whole, the inaugural meeting itself was a great success and was well covered in the Irish press in the following few days. In contrast, Masaryk’s IIIA lecture entitled ‘Czechoslovakia During and After the War’, scheduled for 3 November at the Shelbourne Hotel in Dublin, attracted even more attention from Irish politicians and the press due to the circumstances of its cancellation.²⁹² Despite the fact that Masaryk had agreed to lecture, the day before Masaryk’s arrival, on 31 October, the Department of External Affairs presented their objection. Officially, the Irish Government was not informed about Masaryk’s IIIA lecture, which he would have attended as a representative of a belligerent state in neutral Ireland. Ordering Masaryk to confine himself to the Trinity lecture was unprecedented for the Irish Government as the IIIA meeting was a private function, without the press being at present.²⁹³ The meeting itself was not cancelled, only held without Masaryk and with fewer participants, approx. ‘one-third of the number expected’.²⁹⁴

Undoubtedly, censorship was crucial in controlling press reports about the conflict. The roles of the chief wartime censor Thomas J. Coyne and the press censor Michael Knightly were particularly important.²⁹⁵ As for the censored articles that got published, during the Dáil debates de Valera referred to three articles in the *Irish Times* which were, in his words, ‘deleted by the Censor, because they contained halftruths and other matters calculated to create misunderstandings between this country and a friendly State.’ The censored articles included Masaryk’s interviews about the significance of intellectual freedom in Czechoslovakia; the position of the Church in Czechoslovakia; the future of small nations; and oddly enough, an article about Masaryk’s Horse Show memories from Ballsbridge.²⁹⁶

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Amongst the invited were Patrick McGilligan, Dr and Mrs Košťál, Seán T. Ó Ceallaigh, and Frederick H. Boland. See McCarthy, *International Affairs at Home*, p. 95.

²⁹³ McCarthy, *International Affairs at Home*, p. 95.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 92 and p. 100.

²⁹⁵ Donal Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland, 1939-45* (Cork: Cork University Press, 1996), p. 148 and p. 169.

²⁹⁶ Letter from Michael Knightley to Joseph P. Walshe, Proposed visit to Ireland of Mr. Jan Masaryk (Czech Foreign Minister), Dublin, 9 November 1944, NAI DFA 235/144.

The only discussion of the case appeared in the papers was the Dáil debate on the subject.²⁹⁷ It was not until 9 November 1944 that there was an open and public confrontation in the Dáil between the Fianna Fáil Government and the supporters of the Institute. De Valera argued that the IIIA had no legal or official recognition, confronting Fine Gael deputies and Institute members James Dillon, Richard Mulcahy, and former Minister for External Affairs Patrick McGilligan.²⁹⁸ De Valera admitted that the confrontation arose because the IIIA had invited members of foreign governments and officials to attend meetings in Ireland, ‘attacking the Government of this country and the policy adopted by the Irish people.’²⁹⁹

The peculiarity of the debate lies in its complexity; the main concern was neither the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, nor other visiting speakers who were refused visas to Ireland, but rather – as the government saw it – a possible threat to Irish neutrality. The fact that Masaryk had close ties with the Allies also shows the significance of his visit to Ireland, especially in the light of British dissatisfaction with Irish neutrality. Masaryk had been ambassador to Britain between 1925 and 1938, and from 1940 he served there as the official foreign minister of the Czechoslovak Government in exile. He also had personal ties with the United States, as his mother was American. In addition, he had spent several years there, between 1919 and 1922, as Chargé d’Affaires to the Czechoslovak Legation in the US.³⁰⁰ As we have seen, during the Emergency, the Irish Government was most suspicious of invitations sent to foreign exiles such as Masaryk in London, since they had no guarantee that foreign visitors who were closely associated with Britain would refrain from criticising Irish neutrality. That is why the Irish Government’s memorandum stressed that

...no member of a foreign Government, now residing in London could come to Ireland without the permission of both the British Foreign Office and the British Ministry of Information. It is, therefore, beyond doubt that Senator Douglas,³⁰¹ who runs the so-called ‘Irish Institute of International Affairs’, has been in direct touch with the British Government and has deliberately excluded his own Government from any knowledge of these talks. Such a procedure is unheard of in any other States, and would, of course, be regarded as little short of treason.³⁰²

²⁹⁷ ‘An Taoiseach with Dr. Jan Masaryk’, *Irish Press*, 2 November 1944.

²⁹⁸ *Dáil debates*, vol. 95, no. 6, column 928, p. 69, 9 November, 1944.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁰ Robert Powell, ‘Jan Masaryk’ in the *Slavonic and East European Review* vol. xxviii, no. 71, (1950), p. 333.

³⁰¹ Senator James Green Douglas was committed to the discussion of Ireland’s international relations on public platforms. His presidency of the League of Nations Society of Ireland and then his membership of the Irish Institute of International Affairs exemplify this commitment. See McCarthy, *International Affairs at Home*, p. 12 and p. 22; and Gaughan, (ed) *Memoirs of Senator James G. Douglas*.

³⁰² Memorandum from Joseph Walshe to Eamon de Valera, Visits of Foreign Officials to Ireland, Dublin, 23 March 1943, NAI DFA 202/1688.

The 'official' charges against the Institute included having a 'propagandist and anti-Irish attitude', which, knowing the government's official stance on propaganda during the Emergency, was not to be forgiven easily, especially knowing how much effort de Valera's government put into maintaining Irish neutrality. The issue of visiting lecturers to Ireland could be viewed as an additional chapter in the history of war-time neutrality as well as Anglo-Irish relations after all, since it sheds light upon a lesser known, more indirect connection between Britain and Ireland.

Small states in Irish political discourse

In the aftermath of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis of 1935, the fate of small nations was viewed with fear in the Irish press and political circles. Therefore, when the Anschluss took place in March 1938, it was no wonder the *Irish Press* remarked that there was no small state which did 'not feel that their security, if not their very existence, [was] threatened.'³⁰³ When analysing what led to German unification and the significance of the post-war settlement at Versailles and St Germain, journalist Michael J. MacManus emphasised that at the Paris Peace Conference, 'Austria was cut up like a fish on a slab and parcelled out with the most cynical disregard of both the laws of international morality and of the lessons of history.'³⁰⁴ As a result, the empire was 'reduced by the stroke of a pen to a small State', which in the long-run, was not able to stand up against its powerful neighbours.³⁰⁵ The German annexation on 11 March 1938 demonstrated this, foreshadowing the difficulties small states in East-Central Europe came to encounter in the following years.

In May 1938 the fate of small states became entangled in the election campaign of Fianna Fáil thanks to de Valera, who had previously spoken up in the defence of small nations at the League of Nations. 'We are moving in a strange world,' argued de Valera, 'and we would be very foolish not to have ourselves the insurance that other small States have for the protection

³⁰³ 'Annexation of Austria', *Irish Press*, 14 March 1938.

³⁰⁴ The journalist, author and humourist Michael J. MacManus contributed to several newspapers and journals including *The Leader*, *The Irishman*, the *Catholic Bulletin*, the *Irish Statesman*, and the hereby quoted *Irish Press*. See Carmel Doyle, Lawrence William White, 'MacManus, Michael Joseph (M. J.)', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5266>, accessed on 22 April 2015; and 'The Tragedy of Vienna', *Irish Press*, 18 March 1938.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

of their freedom.’³⁰⁶ The recently concluded Anglo-Irish Agreements and the transfer of the Treaty Ports (April 1938) had served just that purpose.

In August 1938, on the eve of the Munich Conference that decided the Czechoslovak Republic’s fate, Francis Cremins in Geneva noticed ‘the serious situation in Central Europe’ and placed the question in the framework of small nations, where he assigned the ultimate responsibility to smaller states for preserving the balance in Europe by going ‘to the utmost limits to remove all reasonable causes of serious dispute with its neighbours.’³⁰⁷ Allowing the peaceful revision of the post-war treaties in the case of Hungary, argued Cremins, might contribute to preserving the peace in Europe, adding that ‘a reference to the settlement of all but one of the serious matters in dispute between Ireland and Great Britain could also if desired be added.’³⁰⁸ He did not deny the responsibility of the League for failing to prevent international conflicts but he was convinced that it was ‘the Peace Treaties rather than the League which have not worked.’³⁰⁹ Most significantly, five years later, in the middle of the war, in November 1943, de Valera alluded to the fate of small nations in the post-war world order when he argued that ‘some great central organisation would be essential’, whether to League or another international body, but nonetheless, ‘it would be unwise for a small State like ours to abandon the League at present.’³¹⁰ A year later in November 1944, de Valera made another speech on similar grounds at the Inaugural Meeting of the Historical Society, Trinity College, discussed above. Nevertheless, on 15 June 1945, the *Irish Press* announced the plans regarding the winding up of the League, to be taken place in September 1945.³¹¹

The Munich Agreement, which sealed the fate of the first Czechoslovak Republic, was the next stage in the history of small states. The news about this Central European small state, as we have seen, resonated with the Irish public and press on many levels. On the eve of the conflict over the Sudetenland, Michael J. MacManus was among those who devoted considerable attention to ‘The World’s Storm-Centre’, from the perspective of ‘smaller States of Central Europe’. He discussed the birth of the Republic in 1918, through the restoration

³⁰⁶ ‘Fianna Fail. Position Would Be Intolerable’, *Irish Independent*, 30 May 1938.

³⁰⁷ Memorandum on the Nineteenth Assembly of the League of Nations from Francis T. Cremins to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (Ass./19), Geneva, 29 August 1938, NAI DFA 126/73, *DIFP* vol. v, no. 214, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1938/19th-Assembly-League-of-Nations/2360.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

³¹⁰ ‘The League of Nations’, *Irish Press*, 17 November 1943.

³¹¹ ‘The Tragedy of the League’, *Irish Press*, 15 June 1945.

attempts of the Habsburgs, to the irreconcilability of German and Czech population in Bohemia, stressing that the Bohemian Germans had never belonged to the German Reich – a rare comment from Irish contemporaries.³¹²

At any rate, the *Irish Press* did not hide its disappointment in relation to the Franco-British plans for appeasement at Munich: ‘the big Powers confer, decide, act. Small States are given no voice in the matter. They are forced to accept.’³¹³ Since the Czechoslovaks were merely observers at Munich and the agreement was not available in Czech, the paper had a valid point.³¹⁴

The international unrest and the fate of small states in the aftermath of Munich concerned many intellectuals in Ireland; among others, John Marcus O’Sullivan gave a lecture on ‘Some Elements of International Disorder’ at UCD (at the request of CAIR) to provide explanations for the potential causes of the conflict. On the one hand, he blamed the ‘failure to recognise the reasonable claims of nationalism’, while on the other, stood the ‘exaggeration and exacerbation of that spirit.’³¹⁵ On the whole, O’Sullivan aimed to highlight how the answer lay in the coexistence of morality and religion as they expressed ‘the essence of the National Soul.’³¹⁶ Nonetheless, he concluded that with the Munich Conference, ‘the days when small States felt secure, possessed of a full sense of independence, were gone.’³¹⁷

When the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic ceased to exist in March 1939, Chamberlain, whose policy of appeasement actually had led to the Munich Conference half a year before, could not help but wonder: “‘Is this the last attack upon a small State, or is it to be followed by others? Is this, in fact, a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force?’”³¹⁸ The invasion of Poland six months later provided the final answer. Writing in April 1939 regarding the possibility of a European war, the *Irish Independent* sarcastically remarked that no nation was ‘less likely to be deceived than ours by a pretence that any of the

³¹² ‘The World’s Storm-Centre. Some Facts about Czechoslovakia’, *Irish Press*, 15 September 1938.

³¹³ ‘Ends and Means’, *Irish Press*, 22 September 1938.

³¹⁴ Heimann, *Czechoslovakia*, p. 80.

³¹⁵ ‘Threats to World Peace. Discussed in U.C.D. Lecture’, *Irish Independent*, 25 February 1939.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*

³¹⁸ ‘Chamberlain Prophecy. He Accuses Hitler of Breaking his Word’, *Irish Independent*, 18 March 1939.

rivals troubled about the freedom of small nations’, pointing to the certainty of Irish neutrality, should the conflict get more serious.³¹⁹

The invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 was viewed in the *Irish Press* as the ‘testing time for the Irish people’.³²⁰ In reply to the criticism against his policy of neutrality, de Valera established: ‘we are living in a time when nations that had their freedom lost it, in a time in which small States have great difficulty in maintaining their existence’ - reminding his audience to how long it took Ireland to establish its current status.³²¹ Safeguarding this position therefore was crucial, according to the Irish Government. Naturally, references to the significance of small nations and comparisons with the situation in 1914 were unavoidable. Professor Michael Tierney was among those who reminded the readership of *Studies* that similarly to the Great War that had been fought for the rights of small nations (except of Ireland), the Second World War also saw many references to their fates.³²² Moreover, in relation to the question of nationality, Tierney argued that the lessons to be learned from Hungary were not all positive as they highlighted ‘the negative side of nationalism’, referring to the question of borders and nationalities.³²³ And as far as the Irish Government was concerned, a memorandum of Maurice Moynihan, Secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach, revealed that de Valera was also aware of the significance of investigating neutrality the precedents of the ongoing war.³²⁴ More specifically, the Taoiseach wanted to focus on ‘problems that arise in preserving our neutrality as a relatively small country while powerful neighbouring States are at war.’³²⁵

After the outbreak of the war in early September 1939, Francis Cremins in Geneva expressed his fears that a crisis was imminent not only in Central Europe but in the West as well, resulting in a situation that could be ‘serious for small countries at the ends of the Maginot

³¹⁹ ‘Neutrality’, *Irish Independent*, 17 April 1939.

³²⁰ ‘A Testing time’, *Irish Press*, 4 September 1939.

³²¹ ‘Mr. de Valera Replies’, *Irish Independent*, 30 September 1939.

³²² Michael Tierney, ‘Nationalism and Revolution’ in *Studies*, vol. xxviii, no. 111, (September 1939), p. 361.

³²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 370-1, p. 374.

³²⁴ Memorandum from Maurice Moynihan to General Peadar MacMahon (Dublin) copied to the Department of External Affairs (Copy), Dublin, 21 September 1939, NAI DFA Legal Adviser’s Papers, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 31, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/Matters-arising-from-neutrality/3031.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015. For the significance of Moynihan and the role he filled as the principal private secretary to the Taoiseach, see Deirdre McMahon, ‘Maurice Moynihan (1902- 1999): Irish Civil Servant. – *An Appreciation*’ in *Studies*, vol. 89, no. 353-6, (2000), pp. 71-117.

³²⁵ Memorandum from Maurice Moynihan to General Peadar MacMahon (Dublin) copied to the Department of External Affairs (Copy), Dublin, 21 September 1939, NAI DFA Legal Adviser’s Papers, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 31, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/Matters-arising-from-neutrality/3031.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

line.³²⁶ Later the same month, legal adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Michael Rynne emphasised that the Irish Government was committed to keeping its policy of neutrality in line with ‘that of such small States as Belgium, Holland and Denmark.’³²⁷ He also mentioned, however, that Ireland’s position was somewhat easier than other neutral countries on the Continent who were surrounded by belligerents.

The Irish press was aware of the challenges facing the small states of Northern Europe as well; most importantly, Finnish neutrality attracted considerable attention as it was seen as the ‘only way in which small States can preserve their existence’.³²⁸ Therefore, it was not without any foundation that at end of October 1939, the *Irish Press* declared:

...As a small nation with a long history of oppression, Ireland is watching with sympathetic interest those other small nations whose destinies are in danger of being affected by circumstances arising out of the present war. Of these Finland is one. A tiny nation, from the point of view of population if not of territory, it is at present engaged in bargaining with a mighty neighbouring Power.³²⁹

Apparently, Irish newspapers were more than sympathetic to the cause of the Finnish small nation:

...The spectacle of a small nation standing up to a great Power is one that never fails to win the sympathy of the peoples of the world. The small nation is seldom, if ever, in the wrong. It has no imperial ambitions nor does it seek to infringe the territorial integrity of its bigger neighbour. That is Finland’s position at the present moment. The people of that industrious and progressive State have no other desire than to live in peace with all nations. Yet a dispute, not of their seeking, has been forced upon them. The neighbouring Great power, Russia, has faced them with demands which they find themselves unable to accept without endangering both their independence and their status as a neutral.³³⁰

Another shadow of the Great War in relation to small nations emerged again in November 1939 when Walshe highlighted that in Ireland “Britain’s propaganda about small nations [was] received with scepticism and, as you know, always will be in this country until her new leaf has been turned over a little more completely.”³³¹ Furthermore, as for the internationally

³²⁶ Confidential report from Francis T. Cremins to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (S.Gen. 1/1) (Confidential), Geneva, 11 September 1939, NAI DFA 219/7, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 17, p. 21.

³²⁷ Joseph McNabb, Michael Kennedy, ‘Rynne, Michael Andrew Lysaght’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a7887>, accessed on 21 April 2015; Memorandum from Michael Rynne to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (Copy), Dublin, 26 September 1939, NAI DFA Legal Adviser’s Papers, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 39, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/Proposed-statement-by-de-Valera-in-Dail/3039.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015; and Memorandum by Michael Rynne entitled ‘Neutrality’ (Copy), Dublin, undated, NAI DFA Legal Adviser’s Papers, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 40, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/Basis-of-Irish-neutrality/3040.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³²⁸ ‘Finland’s Neutrality’, *Irish Press*, 10 October 1939.

³²⁹ ‘Russian Imperialism’, *Irish Press*, 31 October 1939.

³³⁰ ‘Finland’s Stand’, *Irish Press*, 21 November 1939.

³³¹ Letter from Joseph P. Walshe to John J. Hearne (Ottawa) (Secret) (Copy), Dublin, 29 November 1939, NAI DFA 219/49, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 78, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/Overview-of-Irish-foreign-policy-with-instructions-for-action-in-Canada/3078.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015; and Aide mémoire from John J.

perceived ‘hypocrisy’ of the Western Powers, we may learn from William Warnock, that the German Press did not fail to pay attention to expose such British policies in relation to Ireland, with regards the freedom of small nations.³³²

Soon after the *Irish Press* claimed in early May 1940 that the independence of small nations was vanishing as a result of the actions of their powerful neighbours, the situation became more serious indeed for the small states in Western Europe.³³³ Undoubtedly, the German invasion of Belgium, France, Luxemburg and the Netherlands on 10 May 1940 was a watershed in the history of the Second World War in a military sense. However, it also marked a major shift in British politics since Winston Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister, hence influencing the relationship between Ireland and the United Kingdom as well. The question of Irish neutrality was still on the agenda in May 1940, when Walshe, a few days before the aforementioned events, discussed the question of Irish unity with the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. In his report to de Valera, labelled ‘Most Secret’, Walshe established that similarly to 1914, the English, after all, ‘were fighting for small nations and public opinion could not oppose a measure which was so strictly in accordance with the ideals they were fighting for.’³³⁴ A month later, in June 1940, the initial, allegedly mutual relationship between Britain and the small nations on the Continent turned noticeably uneasy; according to Walshe, ‘all the smaller States in Europe on which [Britain] was relying for incidental support [had] grown cold and are abandoning her’, pointing to Romania as an example.³³⁵

The neutrality of small states in wartime was the cornerstone of Irish neutrality as well, as illustrated by the records of the Department of External Affairs. In July 1940, Walshe

Hearne to Dr. Oscar D. Skelton (Ottawa) (Copy) Ottawa, 22 December 1939, NAI DFA Ottawa Embassy File 850, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 98, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/Explanation-of-neutrality-policy/3098.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³³² Extracts from a confidential report from William Warnock to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (43/33), Berlin, 8 February 1940, NAI DFA 219/4 P. 155, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 126, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1940/Executions-of-Barnes-and-Richards/3126.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³³³ ‘In Defence of Liberty’, *Irish Press*, 7 May 1940.

³³⁴ Report from Joseph P. Walshe to Eamon de Valera (Dublin) (Most Secret), London, 6 May 1940, UCDA P150/2571, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 169, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1940/Meeting-with-Eden-on-British-Irish-relations/3169.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³³⁵ Memorandum from Joseph P. Walshe to Eamon de Valera, Dublin, 21 June 1940, NAI DFA Secretary’s Files A2, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 196, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1940/+Britain+s-inevitable-defeat+/3196.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

compared the fate of small countries in the Great War with the ongoing one.³³⁶ He pointed out that ‘neutrality kept three of the small States concerned out of the last war’, ensuring the sympathy and good will of other nations in their efforts to regain their independence.³³⁷ And although he mentioned that for continental small states it was risky to avoid military alliances, by doing so, they attempted ‘to safeguard their ultimate national existence. An alliance with either great power, in their view, would only have brought earlier disaster upon them’.³³⁸

Finally, in March 1945, great powers and small states alike alluded to the possible post-war order they imagined. The *Irish Press*, for instance, published an article entitled ‘No Bullying of Small States, Says Mr. Eden’, which indicated the desired direction of British (and undoubtedly Irish) foreign policy.³³⁹ Moreover, Austria regained its independence, returning to its 1937 frontiers, being separated from Germany on 8 August 1945. Hungary signed an armistice on 20 January 1945, declared war on Germany and started to evacuate the Slovak borderlands as the Vienna Awards were ‘declared null and void’.³⁴⁰ Furthermore, Hungary agreed to accord protection and security to displaced persons and refugees in Hungary. As far as Czechoslovakia was concerned, the Potsdam Conference in July-August 1945 ordered that the Sudetenland belonged to Czechoslovakia and at the same time ordered to transfer the Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to Germany. The expulsion of Germans and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia was confirmed by President Beneš in October 1945.³⁴¹

Conclusion

As we have seen, the reaction of Irish diplomats to the Anschluss, the Munich Agreement and the Vienna Awards, through which Germany ‘reframed national conflicts in Central Europe’, highlighted the complexity of international relations.³⁴² Ireland’s ability to develop relations

³³⁶ By July 1940, Belgium and Holland (10 May 1940), as well as Denmark and Norway (9 April 1940) had already been invaded by Germany.

³³⁷ Memorandum by Joseph P. Walshe to Eamon de Valera (Dublin) (Copy), Dublin, 11 July 1940, NAI DFA Secretary’s Files A2, *DIFP* vol. vi, no. 221, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1940/Neutrality-and-Ireland+s-international-position/3221.htm>, accessed on 23 September 2015.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*

³³⁹ ‘No Bullying of Small States, Says Mr. Eden’, *Irish Press*, 22 March 1945.

³⁴⁰ ‘“Provisional Government” of Hungary Signs Armistice with Allies’, *Cork Examiner*, 22 January 1945; and ‘Hungary to Pay £75,000,000 Reparations’, *Irish Press*, 22 January 1945.

³⁴¹ ‘Hungary to Pay £75,000,000 Reparations’, *Irish Press*, 22 January 1945; ‘An Evil Legacy’, *Irish Press*, 13 July 1945; ‘Problem of the Sudeten Germans’, *Irish Independent*, 2 August 1945; ‘A Grave Problem’, *Irish Independent*, 13 August 1945; and ‘Sudetens Must Go Benes Says’, *Irish Press*, 29 October 1945.

³⁴² King, ‘Austria versus Hungary’, p. 177.

with small states was, as we have seen, very much limited by the need to maintain a semblance of neutrality at a time when power struggles on the Continent directly affected small states. A desire to avoid offending belligerents limited potential Irish relations with the affected states. Nevertheless, the Irish perception of the successor states in time of war adds to the existing interpretations of Irish neutrality, by showing that there was a continuity of Irish interest in the fate of small countries even during war time.

In spite of the fact that, as Joseph Walshe acknowledged, the Irish were only building up their Department until the end of the Second World War, Irish interest in Central European was demonstrated by letters to newspapers, visits to Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary, as well as records from Irish diplomatic posts in Geneva, Rome, Berlin, London and Paris.³⁴³ The late 1930s and the war years demonstrated the difficulties small states across Europe had to face, stemming from the conflict of interests between them and their neighbours. The political changes and the unavoidable pressure from great powers had an unquestionable impact on the national identities of Central European small states. Identities were, as the case of the South Tyrol and the Sudetenland demonstrated, reduced to a bare ethnic level as a result of German pressure. One thing was definitely clear: small states and their borderlands had no chance for survival when facing their powerful neighbours.

War-time Irish perceptions were complex due to, firstly, the fact that images of aliens were distorted as a result of censorship and war-time diplomatic nuances; and secondly because of many different kind of encounters took place in Ireland. There were few cultural exchanges or visits, such as those discussed in Chapter 3, but many more Central European exiles, both Jewish and non-Jewish, arrived in Ireland after 1938. As Daniel Leach has pointed out, the official Irish attitude towards the admission of exiles, both pre- and post-Emergency, was ‘determined by Irish *raisons d’état*: national security, sovereignty, and Catholic anti-communism.’³⁴⁴ In addition to these, even pre-war Irish sources point to the possibility that integrating Jews was another deciding factor regarding the admission of exiles. Religion was, therefore, one of the most significant markers of Irish identity throughout the first half of the twentieth century, together with independence and self-determination, both of which came to symbolise Irish neutrality during the war.

³⁴³ Memorandum from Joseph P. Walshe to Eamon de Valera (Dublin), Dublin, 9 March 1945, NAI DFA Secretary’s Files A2, *DIFP* vol. vii, no. 552, p. 510.

³⁴⁴ Leach, *Fugitive Ireland*, p. 221.

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Conclusion

This thesis aimed to provide a more complex understanding of Irish images of East-Central European identities and, by extension, how independent Ireland set out to define its relationship with the wider world, seeking recognition, and developing diplomatic relations. It was argued that insights into Irish perceptions of other small states in Central Europe may add to our current understanding of Irish nationalism and Irish foreign policy before 1945. A variety of Irish nationalist perceptions of the small successor states confirmed Michael Cronin's argument (1999) that there was 'no single nationalism in Ireland, but several nationalisms. Irish nationalism is constantly transforming and there can never been any closure or end to Irish nationalism.'¹ And although comparisons between Austria-Hungary and Ireland predate 1914, as illustrated by Arthur Griffith's *The Resurrection of Hungary* (1904), the Great War, the interwar years and the Emergency provided more opportunities for Irish intellectuals, journalists and politicians to discuss potential parallels between Ireland and the small successor states of the Dual Monarchy.

After 1918, the birth of independent small states was a common point of reference in Ireland. Multiple loyalties relating to religion, language and local/regional affiliations often provided a sharp contrast between the self-image of Austria-Hungary's successor states and the impression formed by Irish nationalists. Austria and Hungary resented their status as small states, which was in sharp contrast with that of the pride of the Czech small nation, and, after 1918, that of the Czechoslovak small state. The image of 'truncated Hungary' became the synonym for the Hungarian small state, fixating on the involuntary loss of national territories. The revision of the Treaty of Trianon echoed the trauma of 'truncated Ulster' that was present in nationalist Irish rhetoric in the same period. Similarly, the self-image of the independent Austrian small state was associated with its losses, especially its economic losses and its exclusion from the otherwise united German lands. Furthermore, the long tradition of Catholicism was also inseparable from the Austrian small state's national identity. Standing up against 'the advance of eastern barbarism' provided independent Austria with a distinct mission in post-war Central Europe, frequently highlighted by Irish contemporaries as well.²

¹ Mike Cronin, *Sport and Nationalism in Ireland: Gaelic Games, Soccer and Irish Identity since 1884* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1999), p. 23.

² Gernot Heiss, 'Pan-Germans, Better Germans, Austrians: Austrian Historians on National Identity from the First to the Second Republic' in *German Studies Review*, vol. xvi, no. 3, (October 1993) p. 418.

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Therefore, Catholicism and ‘Germanness’, were of key importance when determining Irish perceptions of Austrian loyalties.³

The emergence of ‘imagined political communities’, as Benedict Anderson has defined modern nations, was mirrored in Ireland with the development of Irish nationalist discourse.⁴ Cultural nationalists, in particular, viewed the Irish nation ‘a distinctive historical *community*’ which was continuously evolving and, instead of being constructed from above, it was ‘imagined by its members’ and hence ‘re-animated from below.’⁵ Similarly to the constructed nature of the Irish nationalist self-image, Irish images of other small nations were also constructed, with the purpose of reflecting Irish national identity. The views of the Irish intelligentsia regarding other small nations were of central importance.

Irish images of the independent successor states before the end of World War Two have revealed that continuity in perceptions was of key importance. Certain themes, such as small nations’ right to self-determination, or the issue of boundaries, closely associated with the ‘minority problem’ in Habsburg Central Europe, for instance, persistently defined relationships and political changes in the region, according to Irish commentators. Therefore, the renewed conflicts between the state-forming nationalities and the national minorities in the self-declared ‘nation-states’ remained at the centre of Irish attention after 1918. During the interwar years the ‘minority problem’ was delegated to the League of Nations, up until the Second World War, when borders in the region were redrawn again (Anschluss, Munich Agreement, Vienna Awards) due to the decisions of great powers.

Looking at other nations for inspiration was a common thread in Irish accounts, especially in relation to the political rhetoric on the quest for national independence. The success of the Czechs or Hungarians remained a common point of reference for Irish cultural nationalists throughout the interwar years in cultural terms, as the Irish language revival had yet to be fulfilled. It was only when the Gaelic League ‘added the Irish language to the identification marks of Irish Catholic nationalism’ that the language became politicized.⁶ Nonetheless, as R.

³ John W. Boyer, ‘Some Reflections on the Problem of Austria, Germany, and Mitteleuropa’ in *Central European History*, vol. xxii, no. 3/4, (September – December 1989), p. 307.

⁴ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 6

⁵ Hutchinson, ‘Cultural Nationalism’ (2002), pp. 587-606, and pp. 591-592; and Cronin, *Sport and Nationalism in Ireland*, p. 32.

⁶ R. V. Comerford, ‘Nation, Nationalism, and the Irish Language’ in Thomas E. Hachey and Lawrence J. McCaffrey (eds) *Perspectives on Irish Nationalism* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1989), p. 21.

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V. Comerford (1989) has pointed out, ‘land and religion were obvious obsessions of the Irish Catholics; the Irish language was not. This is not to say that linguistic considerations were of no significance to them.’⁷ Discussing Central European boundary issues in parallel with the ‘Ulster problem’ remained a recurring theme in Irish accounts after the final settlement of the Irish border in 1925. As we have seen, during the Great War, Irish journals and newspapers started publishing articles on the perceived similarities with Central European nations who had been living under the rule of an ‘alien minority’, the ‘ascendancy’, matching the political agenda of different groups of Irish nationalists. Furthermore, these Irish parallels were frequently associated with the concept of self-determination as an inalienable right of small nations. References to the existence of ‘Central European Ulsters’, therefore, may add to our current understanding not only of the nationality question of the Dual Monarchy, but they also provide insight into the role of propaganda and Irish political rhetoric at a time of change.

The transformation of identities and minority issues in the independent successor states, particularly in the borderland regions, took on a new meaning with the emergence of totalitarian political groups. Even during the war, Irish commentators were aware of the complexity of identities in these regions, although to a lesser degree, due to the efficiency of censorship. Irish accounts, both first-hand and second-hand, indicated awareness of the presence of multiple loyalties, among which ‘national identity’ was merely one of the many identities. As Nancy M. Wingfield and Peter Loewenberg have pointed out, ‘national identity is constructed in a variety of ways’, depending on cultural, psychological and historical contexts, ‘consisting of a different shade and shape’ in different places.⁸ In Irish nationalist accounts, the significance of Catholicism, the national language, regional loyalties, and independence proved to be the most important signifiers of Central European identity. The complexity of these markers has also been highlighted by Maurice Earls who has stressed that curiously, ‘the Czech failure to revive Protestantism in the twentieth century [had] many parallels with the intense but unavailing efforts of the Irish to revive their ancient tongue.’⁹

Catholicism in Central Europe was not merely the subject of Irish investigations; it was a lens through which Irish authors analysed the controversial questions of ethnicity and nationhood.

⁷ Ibid., p. 31.

⁸ Wingfield, ‘Introduction’, p. 14; and Peter Loewenberg, ‘The Psychology of Creating the Other’ in Nancy M. Wingfield (ed) *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), p. 246.

⁹ Earls, *The Coast of Bohemia*.

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Within the Irish discourse on nationalism and Catholicism, these were consistently compared with other small states in Central Europe, sharing the same struggles for independence and self-determination. Thus the role of the Catholic Church in the formulation of ‘national character and identity’ was unquestionable in independent Ireland.¹⁰ Moreover, Catholicism was an important marker of identity for the majority of the Irish population. However, on an official level, both William Cosgrave and Éamon de Valera recognised that ‘being Irish and being Catholic were not synonymous.’¹¹ As far as the Catholic perceptions of Central Europe were concerned, Irish intellectuals, journalists and diplomats never failed to emphasise the role of clergymen in bringing stability into post-war Central Europe. In Austria, the significance of the Christian Social Chancellor, Monsignor Ignaz Seipel was stressed. His successors, Engelbert Dollfuss and Kurt Schuschnigg were perceived in the same light and praised for successfully manoeuvring between Austro-marxists and Nazi propagandists. Therefore, interwar Austria’s lead in their adherence to Catholic principles in all spheres of life, was a recurring theme in Irish articles, often presented with references to this Catholic connection between the Irish and the Austrians.

The articles in the *Irish Independent*, the *Irish Press*, the *Cork Examiner*, and the *Irish Times* did not greatly differ in their choices of topics about the successor states; the only contrast in the daily reports they received from Reuter or the Press Association was mostly the chosen headline for the articles. Nonetheless, letters to the editor, columns like ‘Matters of Moment’ in the *Irish Independent*, and travel series like John J. R. O’Beirne’s ‘Across Some New Frontiers’ (1921); Smyllie’s ‘Carpathian Contrasts’ (1937); or Gaffney’s ‘Putting the Searchlight on Europe’ (1938) all revealed a deeper interest in the transformation of Habsburg Central Europe during the interwar years. Given the ethos of the *Irish Independent*, Catholic interests were in the forefront of reports while, on the other hand, Smyllie’s *Irish Times* was characterised by an unequivocally anti-fascist stance. Similarly to the *Irish Independent*, journals like *Studies* or the *Irish Monthly* presented Catholicism as the champion against both extreme right- and left-wing threats. Other periodicals associated with Catholic populism, such as the *Catholic Bulletin*, were even more extreme; their fears of the conspiracy of communists, freemasons and Jews became a recurring theme in the 1930s.¹² Characteristically, the indisputable anti-communist stance of the Catholic Church and

¹⁰ Keogh, ‘The Role of the Catholic Church’, p. 105 and p. 118.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 119.

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Catholic Irish authors was reflected in their references to the ‘red menace’, present in Central Europe after the revolutionary turmoil of 1918-1919. Curiously, the struggle against the Turk symbolised resistance against the communist threat, both in the case of Austria and Hungary. These priorities had a major impact on how Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were perceived in the above-mentioned dailies and periodicals. In borderland regions, conflicts were magnified due to the growing impact of the totalitarian great powers. For instance, in the South Tyrol, Irish commentators saw the strength of Catholicism and the persistence of German language use to be the main markers of South Tyrolese identity in the face of the Italian fascist menace. Since the division within Irish Catholicism was similar to that in Irish nationalism, there were multiple Catholic interpretations of Central European issues; the *Irish Independent* represented a different, pro-Mussolini stance in relation to the South Tyrol.¹³ In stark contrast, the *Irish Times* categorically opposed fascist policy, whether in the South Tyrol or in irredentist Hungarian foreign policy.

The complexity of Irish perceptions was illustrated by the fact that in addition to the early Irish expectations of co-operation with other small states after independence, the relationship with great powers still played a huge role shaping Irish in perceptions. The presence of the Empire, in addition to the unavoidable influence of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy were in the foreground of nationalist Irish accounts. More specifically, Irish opinions of Central Europe often reflected Irish criticism of certain British policies (such as defending Irish neutrality during World War II in the face of British pressure) or influential personalities (such as Lord Rothermere and the *Daily Mail*) and their stance on the ‘Irish question’, rather than direct Irish perceptions of Hungary, Austria or Czechoslovakia.

In the first half of the twentieth century, contact between Ireland and the small successor states was present at many levels; personal encounters (diplomatic, academic and cultural) were of relevance both on the Continent and in Dublin itself. It should be noted that many of these personalities had personal experiences of Austria, Czechoslovakia or Hungary, either in the successor states themselves, or at the League of Nations. Irish connections with other small states in Geneva indicated the main directions in the young Free State’s independent foreign policy. In spite of Dermot Keogh’s statement that ‘the diplomatic opportunities to advance Irish interests at Geneva were not taken due to lack of staff at headquarters’, archival

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 105 and p. 118.

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records demonstrate that those few Irish diplomats were actively seeking contact within the League and that there was an awareness of other small states because of their shared concerns.¹⁴ Certainly, the images presented by Irish commentators reflected their own political agendas and were therefore often deliberately idealistic. Nonetheless, they served a specific purpose as they were meant to further the newly independent Irish Free State's interest on the international stage.

The thesis has aimed to show how Dublin became significant as a meeting point with Central European small states in the mid-1920s. The foundation of the Czechoslovak Consulate and the Honorary Consulates of Austria and Hungary in Dublin served as examples for the interest in widening economic relations as well as furthering cultural connections with Central Europe, even if they fulfilled mostly symbolic purposes. Irish connections with Habsburg Central Europe, as well as the continuing interest, were best demonstrated by the fact that both Richard John Kelly and Hubert Briscoe, who had pre-war experience in Habsburg Central Europe, ended up as the honorary consuls of the successor states in the 1920s: the former for Austria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Lithuania, and the latter for Hungary. Conversely, we have seen that interest was expressed in many segments of Irish society in addition to official circles such as consuls, diplomats and businessmen, scholars, and public figures with cultural affiliations all showed awareness of the successors of Habsburg Central Europe, more than the Irish Government had initiated. Naturally, the experiences of Irish journalists, such as Gertrude Gaffney (*Irish Independent*) and Robert M. Smyllie (*Irish Times*), among others, were crucial in shaping public opinion regarding the small states in Central Europe. At the outbreak of the Second World War, due to 'de Valera's consuming obsession' with Irish sovereignty, censorship and other measures were introduced to maintain neutrality.¹⁵ Complications occurred after the Austrian and first Czechoslovak Republic officially had ceased to exist in 1938. As states both were officially under the rule of a belligerent power, the Irish Government saw the presence or visit of Central European representatives in exile like Jan Masaryk as potential dangers to Irish neutrality, underlining the fact that in addition to great powers, small states also had an impact on Irish foreign policy and political discourse before 1945. Since many Central European aliens, Jews and non-Jews, also expressed an interest in Ireland, some permanently, others as visitors, the

¹⁴ Keogh, *Ireland and Europe*, p. 23.

¹⁵ Fanning, 'Irish Neutrality', p. 31.

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thesis examined this new dimension of encounters in order to illustrate the complexity and challenging nature of Irish neutrality.

This thesis has illustrated that the many-faceted relationship between Ireland and the successor states was not restricted to references to Arthur Griffith's *The Resurrection of Hungary*. Confirming the conclusions of Healy and Zarka in relation to pre-war Irish opinions of the East-Central European 'other', it was the continuity and the changing nature of Irish interest, depending on the domestic Irish political context that determined Irish images of the small successor states.¹⁶ Irish nationalist opinions of these small states could be summarised by the following: Catholic Austria; democratic Czechoslovakia; and irredentist Hungary. Whether in confessional journals, national dailies, or diplomatic records, most Irish analyses seem to have had fallen between those lines. Admittedly, the weaknesses of these small states were also visible. Ironically, Catholicism, which became the symbol of interwar Austria in Ireland, was inseparable from the historical legacy of the Habsburgs despite the claims of the independent republic. Nonetheless, some Irish commentators ignored Austria's imperial past when enthusiastically identifying with their Catholicism. Moreover, the negative aspects of the Czechoslovak minority situation with regards the Bohemian Germans were also in the forefront of Irish accounts throughout the first half of the century. This may explain the subsequent ease with which some Irish commentators seem to have accepted the disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939. Lastly, despite the richness of Irish references to Hungarian borders and plans to restore the historical borders of St Stephen in the 1930s, the lack of Irish comparisons at the time of the Treaty of Trianon and its immediate aftermath was particularly interesting despite the room for parallels given the Irish concerns with boundaries in the early 1920s.

Consequently, in the first two decades of independence, Ireland had not been as isolated as has been previously argued. Since transnational history may serve as 'a means to challenge impressions of national uniqueness and exceptionalism', investigating Irish images of the successor states of Austria-Hungary was a worthwhile undertaking within the framework of transnational history, complementing the narratives of national histories.¹⁷ The Irish

¹⁶ Healy, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, p. 117; and Zarka, *Images and Perceptions of Hungary*, p. 306.

¹⁷ Whelehan, 'Introduction', p. 1; and Clavin, 'Time, Manner, Place', p. 632.

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awareness of Central European parallels therefore serves to shed light on hitherto less explored aspects of Irish nationalist discourse, especially on the level of personal encounters.

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