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Title	Chinese policy towards UN intervention and peacekeeping: a case study
Author(s)	Yang, Bochao
Publication Date	2016-03-15
Item record	http://hdl.handle.net/10379/5621

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Chinese Policy Towards UN Intervention and Peacekeeping: A Case Study

by

Bochao Yang

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

Supervisor

Prof. Ray Murphy

Irish Centre for Human Rights

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January 2016

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Declaration of Originality

I, Bochao YANG, do hereby declare that the work submitted for examination is my own and that due credit has been given to all sources of information contained herein. With this declaration, I certify that I have not obtained a degree at National University of Ireland, Galway or elsewhere on the basis of this work. I acknowledge that I have read and understood the Code of Practice dealing with Plagiarism and the University Code of Conduct of the National University of Ireland, Galway and that I am bound by them.

Signature: Bochao Yang

Date: _____ 15 February 2016 _____

Acknowledgements

I would like to offer my deepest gratitude to my Supervisor, Professor Ray Murphy. Without his encouragement, support, and patient I would neither complete my PhD nor reach this achievement on my academic career. Prof. Murphy is also a knowledgeable scholar. His wise counsel in UN peacekeeping and international human rights legal system made me never lost. Many thanks to Professor Murphy for believing in my work.

I would also like to convey my particular thanks to the Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland, Galway. The Centre provides me great opportunities learning from world-leading scholars. People in the Centre, no matter teachers and students, are kindness, helpfulness, hard work and open mindedness. I am thankful for having a PhD study experience in the Centre. In addition, my thanks would like to give to China Scholarship Council (CSC) and the Chinese Ministry of Education for the financial support during the PhD study.

It would not possible to present this research without those kind souls who helped me through my way of writing. Thanks to those potential outstanding scholars: Heping Dang, Jia Wang, Josh Curtis, Cian Moran, and Tanja Florath.

My dear beloved parents, Wenyue YANG and Xiaoqi Li never lose their confident to me. I thank them for their understanding and love during the PhD study. Honestly, the love, support and help from family through the years warmed me deeply and encouraged me to carry on, especially those hard times.

A special word of thanks is owned to Ms. Miying ZHAN. Thanks for coming to my side with love. She may not realise it, there has had an indelible influence she made on the process of this project. The support and love that she extended to me are something precious in my future life. In this regard, it is my honour to dedicate this research work to her.

1. Introduction

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as China) in 1949, Chinese foreign policy has undergone significant revision, and it evolved from a strict “closed-door policy” to the “open-door policy”.¹ At the domestic level, China’s foreign policy is principally outlined in various official announcements and position papers, which are presented both at the United Nations (UN) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (和平共处五项原则)”,² “Keeping a Low Profile (韬光养晦)”,³ “Peace and Development (和平与发展)”,⁴ the “Harmonious World (和谐世界)”,⁵ and “Striving

¹ The “closed-door” policy and the “open-door” policy can be used to describe the direction of China’s economic policy reform. Under the “closed-door” policy, China did not permit any foreign contacts into the country, and refused to cooperate with foreign businesses. The purpose of the policy was to avoid any potential risks from outside of the country. The “open-door” policy was adopted by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 aiming to promote economic development by opening the Chinese domestic market to foreign businesses. In 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed the view that China shall consistently advocate a reform agenda intended to continue the economic revitalization, which was proposed by Deng. See, Joshua Eisenman, ‘Closed Door Policy’ *Foreign Affairs* (New York, 24 September 2014) < <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-09-24/closed-door-policy> > accessed 18 March 2015; Swee-Hock and John Wong, ‘An Overview’ in Saw Swee-Hock and John Wong (eds), *Regional Economic Development in China* (ISEAS Publishing, 2009) 1-2; Li Jingzhi and Pu Ping, *Reconstructing China: The Peaceful Development, Economic Growth, and International Role of an Emerging Super Power* (McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing, 2014) 183.

² The “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” were articulated on 28 June 1954 in a joint statement, which was signed between Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The joint statement recognized peaceful coexistence and friendly relations between states with different political and social systems. These five principles were also raised and widely accepted at the Bandung Conference in 1955. See, Russell H. Fifield, ‘The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence’ (1958) 3/52 *The American Journal of International Law* 504-510; ‘China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence’ (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 March 2009) < http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18053.shtml > accessed 16 June 2014.

³ “Keeping a Low Profile” was a conclusion based on a series of foreign policies proposed by Deng Xiaoping, a former leader of China, from 1990-1991. The key points of this policy can be interpreted as: being moderate and cautious, never seeking leadership, raising no banners, searching for no expansion, not seeking hegemony and being consistent with the idea of peaceful development. See, Wu Jingcai and Li Jing, ‘吴建民述中国外交六十年变化：韬光养晦仍要管一百年 [Wu Jianmin Explains the History of Chinese Diplomacy of Sixty Years: Keeping a Low Profile Should Be Guideline for Another One-hundred Years]’ (*China News*, 1 June 2009) < <http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/06-01/1713676.shtml> > accessed 15 June 2014; Dai Bingguo, ‘坚持走和平发展道路 [Sincere in Purchasing Peaceful Development]’ (*China News*, 7 December 2010) < <http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2010/12-07/2704985.shtml> > accessed 16 June 2014; Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Volume III (1982-1992)* (Beijing Foreign Language Press 1994) 350.

⁴ “Peace and Development” was China’s international strategy that was encapsulated by Deng Xiaoping based on current international environment. It was publicly announced at the 14th Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party in 1987. Subsequently, China began to adopt an ‘opening-up policy’ and also intended to develop peacefully. Therefore, the central goal of China’s diplomacy is to create a peaceful and stable international environment for its development while diminishing the negative efforts based on the “China threat theory”. In the meantime, China strives to make its due contribution to world peace and development. See, Information Office of the State Council, *China’s Peaceful Development (White Paper, September 2011)*.

for Achievement (奋发有为)”⁶. Indeed, regarding the development of China’s international course and the background to the adoption of policies, two essential questions were taken into consideration by the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). First, how could China create a stable international environment for sustaining State-directed development and safeguarding policy reforms? Second, how could China explore a path to allow her voice to be heard within a Western-dominated international hierarchy, or establish an alternative world order that China could participate in as a key decision maker?

In terms of China’s development in a modern historical context, it may be stated that an exhausted China struggled for independent status in the aftermath of the Opium War (1839).⁷ After successfully expelling the Japanese invaders, China’s foreign policy was closely associated with creating a stable international environment for national development (the period of “planned economy” policy). However, China continuously faces significant challenges including human rights abuses and territorial claims, such as the Tiananmen incident, the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, and territorial disputes in districts such as Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan. Such turmoil makes China reluctant to participate in international activities as it is afraid of being the subject of international intervention. In this regard, in the context of Chinese foreign policy, respect of state sovereignty and non-interference has historically been at the core for how China develops foreign relations.⁸ In addition, China has presented itself

⁵ <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-09/06/c_131102329.htm> accessed 19 July 2014

⁵ The concept of “Harmonious World” was raised by former Chinese Chairman Hu Jintao on 15 September 2005 at the summit for the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the UN. By the end of 2015, China placed building a harmonious world as the ‘lofty goal’ of China in taking the “road of peaceful development”. See, Hu Jintao, ‘努力建设持久和平：共同繁荣的和谐世界 [Strive to Build a Harmonious World – Making Efforts to Realise Permanent Peace and Common Prosperity]’ (*Xinhua News*, 16 September 2005) <http://news3.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-09/16/content_3496858.htm> accessed 20 December 2013; Chen Xulong and Wang Qiang, ‘Long-term Implications of Building a Harmonious World and Global Governance for Policy-makers and the General Public’ in Thomas Fues and Liu Youfa (eds), *Global Governance and Building a Harmonious World* (German Development Institute, 2011) 73-83.

⁶ “Striving for Achievement” (English Interpreted by Prof. Yan Xuetong) was a concept introduced by the Chinese President Xi Jinping at the foreign affairs conference of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on 24 October 2013. See, Yan Xuetong, ‘From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement’ (2014) 2/7 *The Chinese Journal of Chinese Politics* 153-184.

⁷ The year 1839 has been considered as a date that distinguished the ancient history and modern history. See, Immanuel Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China* (6th edn, OUP, 1999) 12.

⁸ These principles are enshrined in the Chinese domestic law: Article 65 of The Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defence adopted on 14 March 1997 stipulates that “The People’s Republic of China adheres to the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, including mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality

to the international community as a “peace-loving” State and has endeavoured to establish the image of “responsible power” by participating in a range of UN peacekeeping operations in order to minimise the impact of what is termed the “China threat theory”.⁹ Nevertheless, existing Chinese foreign policy has been criticised as an increasing numbers of States prioritise human rights protection over the principle of state sovereignty. In examining this situation, the present research raises the question *whether China should be involved in UN intervention actions or whether it should remain consistent with its traditional non-interference policy in foreign affairs and refrain from such engagement. This research analyses China’s status and policies towards UN peacekeeping operations as a case study.*

1.1 Background of the Research

A number of hypotheses which were based on China’s evolving approach to the UN and the further trajectory of Chinese foreign policy have raised controversial issues among scholars.¹⁰

1.1.1 Relations between China and the UN

Both Chinese and international scholars are predominately concerned with the relationship between China and the UN. Their research attempts to anticipate the further development of Chinese foreign policy by offering a historical overview of Chinese policy since 1949. For instance, Chinese scholars Li Tiecheng and Zheng Qirong’s study came from the aspect of history that exhibited the relationship between China and the UN.¹¹ Another group of researchers, Zhang Lili, Wang Yizhou, Li

and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, independently handles its military relations with other countries, and conducts military exchanges and cooperation”. See, The Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defence, Article 65.

⁹ The definition of the “China threat theory” centres on the strategic impacts of China’s rise in power. This concept has been proposed by both China’s neighbour states, such as Japan and Philippines, and the US. According to the US scholar, the “China threat theory” has three dimensions: military, economic, and cultural-ideological. See, Emma V Broomfield, ‘Perceptions of danger: the China Threat Theory’ (2003) 12/3 Journal of Contemporary China 265-284; Ge Yang, ‘China’s Rise: Threat or not?’ (1995) 30 January – 5 February 1995 Beijing Review 23-25; Zhang Mingming, ‘解释中国威胁论 [Explaining the “China Threat Theory”]’ (2003) 21 Theory Frontiers 18-22.

¹⁰ Bates Gill, *Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy* (The Brookings Institution Press, 2011); Pobzeb Vang, *Five Principles of Chinese Foreign Policies* (Author House, 2008); David Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* (Stanford University Press, 2001); Zhu Liqun, *China’s Foreign Policy Debates Chaillet Papers* (Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2010); Robert Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War* (Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2008).

¹¹ Chen Luzhi and Li Tiecheng, 联合国与世界秩序 [*The United Nations and the World Order*]

Yiwen and Ma Fengshu catalogue three steps in the progress of Chinese interaction with the UN.¹² They suggested the first stage spanned the period from 1949 to 1970, which was marked by China's struggle to restore its legitimate seat in the UN. The second stage ranged from 1971 to 1978. In the period, after returning its status as a permanent member in the Security Council, China began to develop its relationship with the UN. The third stage is from 1979 onward, where China strengthened and extended its cooperation with the UN; guided by the “opening-up” policy. Xie Zihai categorised four stages regarding the progress of Chinese engagement with the UN. According to Xie, after encountering political and economic isolation from the West following the Tiananmen incident in 1989, China's policy towards the UN underwent a positive change.¹³ In this regard, he pinpointed 1989 as a turning point in the progress of Chinese engagement with the UN.

International scholars have also demonstrated enthusiasm in researching the relationship between China and international organisations. In this regard, the Chinese policy towards the UN has attracted extensive attention.¹⁴ The vast majority of Chinese foreign policy studies come from the social science¹⁵ and political science

(Beijing Language Institute 1993); Zheng Qirong and Li Tiecheng, *联合国大事编年 1945-1996 [The Chronicle of the United Nations]* (Beijing Language Institute 1998); Li Tiecheng, *联合国里的中国人 1945-2003 [Chinese at the United Nations 1945-2003]* (The People's Press 2004).

¹² Zhang Lili, *中国与国际组织关系的发展 [The Development of the Relationship between China and International Organisations]* (China Social Science Press, 1989) 12; Ma Fengshu and Li Yiwen, *当代国际组织与国际关系 [Contemporary International Organisation and International Relationship]* (Tianjin People's Press 2002) 18.

¹³ Xie Zihai, ‘The Rise of China and Its Growing Role in International Organisations’ (2011) 1/4 ICCS Journal of Modern Chinese Studies 86-88; Song Rui also holds the same opinion, see, Song Rui, ‘新中国成立以来中国与国际组织关系演变 [The Evolution of the Relationship between China and International Organisation Since 1949]’ (2012) 1/32 Journal of Zhengzhou Institute of Aeronautical Industry Management 48-51.

¹⁴ Wei-chin Lee, ‘With Open Arms? China and Human Rights in the United Nations’ (1990) 1/2 Pacifica 16-36; Samuel S Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order* (Princeton University Press, 1979); Samuel S Kim, ‘China's International Organisation Behaviour’, in Thomas W Robison and David Shambaugh (eds), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Clarendon Press, 1995); Ann Kent, *China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992); Suzanne Xiao Yang, *China in UN Security Council Decision-Making on Iraq: Conflicting Understandings, Competing Preferences* (Routledge, 2012); Yeshi Choedon, *China and the United Nations* (South Asia Books, 1990).

¹⁵ Gerald Chen, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis* (Macmillan, 1999); David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (OUP, 2013); Orville Schell, *Wealth and Power: China's Long March to the Twenty-first Century* (Random House Trade, 2014); Evan Osnos, *Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China* (Straus and Giroux, 2014); Robert S. Ross and Alastair Iain Johnston (eds), *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy* (Stanford University Press, 2006); Jing Men, ‘Changing Ideology in China and Its Impact on Chinese Foreign Policy’ in Sujian Guo and Shiping Hua (eds), *New Dimension of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009).

disciplines¹⁶. By examining China's interaction with leading international organisations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF)¹⁷, the World Trade Organisation (WTO)¹⁸, and the World Health Organisation (WHO)¹⁹, one conclusion has been made that China's engagement with multilateral systems reflects the need to pursue its national profile. It is, therefore, argued that domestic demands motivate China's participation in international economic institutions.²⁰ As noted by Ivan Tselichtchev, "economic development has become a core foundation for China enhancing its competitiveness in the system of multipolarisation".²¹

In summary, there are two trends relating to the study of the relationship between China and international organisations: first, research has focused on regulating and controlling China's behaviour after joining international organisations; second, scholars have been willing to analyse the progress of China's policy reform and its engagement with international organisations.

¹⁶ Thomas Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict: 1947-1958* (Princeton University Press, 1996); Qin Yaqing, 'Why There Is No Chinese-International Relations Theory' in Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (eds), *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On And Beyond Asia* (Routledge, 2010) 26-50; Hao Yufan, CX George Wei, and Lowell Dittmer (eds), *Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the Next World Power* (The University Press of Kentucky, 2009); Marc Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction* (2ndedn, Routledge, 2013); Robert G Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War* (3rdedn, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012); Robert G. Sutter, *Foreign Relations of the PRC: The Legacies and Constraints of China's International Politics since 1949* (Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2013); June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Political System* (9th end, Pearson, 2014); William A Joseph, *Politics in China: An Introduction* (2ndedn, OUP, 2014); Bruce Elleman, Stephen Kotkin, and Clive Schofield (eds), *Beijing's Power and China's Borders: Twenty Neighbours in Asia* (Routledge, 2012); Zhiqun Zhu, *China's New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance* (Ashgate Pub Co, 2013); Pobzeb Vang, *Five Principles of Chinese Foreign Policies* (Author House, 2008).

¹⁷ Steven Barnett and Ray Brooks, *China: Does Government Health and Education Spending Boost Consumption?* (International Monetary Fund, 2010); Benjamin Barton and Jing Men, *China and the European Union in Africa: Partners or Competitors?* (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011).

¹⁸ Nicolas R Blancher and Thomas Rumbaugh, *China: International Trade and WTO Accession* (International Monetary Fund, 2002); Gerald Chan, 'China and the WTO: The Theory and Practice of Compliance' (2004) 1/4 International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 47-72.

¹⁹ Pak K Lee and Gerald Chan, 'Rethinking Global Governance: A China Model in the Making?' (2008) 1/14 Contemporary Politics 3-19; Pak K Lee and Gerald Chan, 'China Engages Global Health Governance: Processes and Dilemmas' (2009) 1/4 Global Public Health 1-30.

²⁰ Harold Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg, *China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT* (The University of Michigan Press, 1990); Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg (eds), *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects* (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998); Alastair Iain Johnston, 'International Structure and Chinese Foreign Policy' in Samuel Kim (eds), *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium* (Westview Press 1998).

²¹ Ivan Tselichtchev, 'China Versus the West: The Global Power Shift of the 21st Century' (2015) 2/21 Asia Pacific Business Review 277.

It is undeniable that China is attempting to enhance its influence at the UN as well as at other international organisations, although scholars hold different opinions on the direction of China's approach to the UN. As the *People's Daily* pointed out, China is now fully aware of the importance of international organisations and has endeavoured to actively engage with international organisations.²² However, scholars in the discussion of Chinese foreign policy have acknowledged that the non-intervention principle is the dominant element in adopting Chinese foreign policy, but to date, no systematic analysis of the issue has been undertaken.

1.1.2 China's Peacekeeping Approach: Non-Intervention and Motivations

Among Chinese foreign policy studies, enhancing the national economy and protecting sovereign security are two concepts widely utilised in discussions on the Chinese incentive to adopt conservative foreign policies.²³ In fact, there is a plethora of literature challenging Chinese foreign policy in relation to non-intervention mainly by criticising the acceptance of humanitarian intervention. For instance, Wang Jianwei argued that with respect to the non-intervention principle, Beijing has been described as one the strongest defenders of state sovereignty in international affairs.²⁴

It is noteworthy that China's policy of non-intervention has been most scrutinised in relation to the obstacles China faces in gaining an international reputation due to its consistent non-intervention principle. In this connection, Sarah Teitt has offered a study on the interplay between the emerging concept of "the responsibility to protect" and China's non-intervention policy in relation to peacekeeping operations. This study suggests that China should adeptly manage to avoid obstructing the UN effort to prevent and respond to atrocities.²⁵ Moreover, Bates Gill has published a series of

²² Li Dongyan, '中国定位国际组织新角色 [China Defines Its New Role in International Organisations]', *People's Daily*, (Beijing, 8 November 2010) A3.

²³ Robert Ash (eds), *China's Integration in Asia: Economic and Security Issues* (Routledge, 2001); Barnett, Doak, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process* (Westview Press, 1985); MS Bhattacharjeaam and MiraSinha, 'China's Strategy for the Determination and Consolidation of Its Territorial Boundaries: A Preliminary Investigation' (1987) 4/23 China Report 397-420; M. Taylor Fravel, *Strong Boarders Secure Nation* (Princeton University Press, 2008).

²⁴ Jianwei Wang, 'Managing Conflict: Chinese Perspectives on Multilateral Diplomacy and Collective Security' in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (eds), *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World* (Rowman& Littlefield 1999) 73-95; Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 26; Samuel S. Kim, "China's International Organizational Behaviour," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Clarendon, 1995) 413-414.

²⁵ Sarah Teitt, 'The Responsibility to Protect and China's Peacekeeping Policy' (2011) 3/18

articles on China's peacekeeping contributions.²⁶ By exploring Beijing's decision-making process on UN peacekeeping issues, Gill discovered initial signs of a new Chinese flexibility at the end of 1999. He also subsequently found the importance to China of reaching a peace agreement through political negotiations.²⁷ The Chinese Ambassador to the UN Li Zhaoxing exemplified China's position on the Case of Mozambique in this regard.²⁸ Gill reached the conclusion that the key factor encouraging China expanding its engagement in UN peacekeeping operations is to raise China's international profile since the 1990s.²⁹ After taking an overview of the deployment of existing Chinese peacekeeping missions, Gill and Huang listed recommendations to enhance China's participation in UN peacekeeping activities.³⁰

In addition, China's motivations for its positive participation in UN peacekeeping have also been discussed by scholars. Stefan Staehle researched two aspects that motivated China to change its policy towards UN peacekeeping operations based on its voting behaviour in the Security Council. On the one hand, after its experience with wider peacekeeping in the 1990s, the Chinese leadership became convinced of the necessity for robust peacekeeping in certain cases to restore peace and security in conflict areas. On the other hand, China was pleased to accept UN peacekeeping when it became more involved in the mandate-drafting process; also, China gained confidence with UN peacekeeping when the *Brahimi Report* recommended key reforms to promote UN peacekeeping capabilities. He also found that China's

International Peacekeeping 298-312.

²⁶ Bates Gill and James Reilly, 'Sovereignty, intervention and peacekeeping: the view from Beijing' (2000) 3/42 *Survival* 41-59; Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, 'China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping' (2009) 25 SIPRI Policy Paper 1-34; Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, 'Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power' (2006) 2/48 *Survival* 17-36; Bates Gill, *Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy* (Brookings Institution Press, 2010); Bates Gill, 'Discussion of China: A Responsible Great Power' (2001) 10/26 *Journal of Contemporary China* 27-32.

²⁷ Bates Gill and James Reilly, 'Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: the View from Beijing' (2000) 3/42 *Survival* 47.

²⁸ Li expressed that "whether the peace process in Mozambique will be successful depends on the people of Mozambique themselves. The international community can only help promote the process." Cited in M Taylor Fravel, 'China's Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Operations Since 1989' (1996) 11/36 *Asian Survey* 1108.

²⁹ Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, 'China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping' (2009) 25 SIPRI Policy Paper 4-6.

³⁰ Policy recommendations for China are to establish a formal interagency to better promote and coordinate China's approach to peacekeeping; increase financial and military contributions to UN peacekeeping operations; increase the cooperation among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of National Security; and provide funding to Chinese universities and research academies to carry policy research relating to peacekeeping. See, Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, 'Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power' (2006) 2/48 *Survival* 17-36.

enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping was driven by the requirements of Chinese foreign policy and the evolving concept of UN peacekeeping.³¹ Bernardo Mariani posited two models to explain the motivations in China's policy changing towards peacekeeping taking two case studies on the Congo and Sudan. From a political perspective, Mariani argued that China's engagement in peacekeeping demonstrated its image as a constructive and responsible power. Additionally, peacekeepers serve China's economic interests, especially in those countries whose resources are indispensable for meeting China's energy needs.³²

In terms of the benefits of Chinese engagement in UN peacekeeping, Zhao found that participating in peacekeeping missions brought significant opportunities for the Chinese military to bolster cooperation with other national militaries.³³ Also, Zhao and Jiang both reached similar conclusions that China has substantially increased engagement in peace building and is ready to play a wider role in such missions.³⁴

Most of the discussions, however, are not focused on identifying China's peacekeeping issues in the context of Chinese domestic policies. Instead, in the earlier studies, they conducted separate analyses on the subject of UN peacekeeping itself and the trajectory of China's evolving approach to UN peacekeeping operations.³⁵ For instance, Sheng Hongsheng, from the Chinese perspective, highlights six principles

³¹ Stefan Staehle, 'China's Shifting Attitude towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' (2008) 195 *The China Quarterly* 631-655.

³² Bernardo Mariani, *Starting to Build? China's Role in UN Peacekeeping Operations* (Policy Paper, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 2/2011) 1-9.

³³ Zhao Lei, 'Two Pillars of China's Global Peace Engagement Strategy: UN Peacekeeping Operations and International Peacebuilding Operations' (2011) 3/18 *International Peacekeeping* 347-356.

³⁴ Jiang Zhenxi, 'China's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa' (Conference Paper Presented at the *China-Africa Civil Society Forum on Peace and Development*, Beijing 2-4 June 2010, cited in *China's Growing Role in African Peace and Security* (Saferworld, 2011) 72.

³⁵ Pang Zhongying has offered a valuable study on the Chinese approach to peacekeeping. He argued that China extended its role in maintaining international peace and security. He found that, as China intends to protect and promote its security interest and enhance its international reputation, the policy-makers in Beijing treat the principle of non-intervention more flexible than ever before. Moreover, after concluding experiences from previous peacekeeping operations by the Brahimi Report, China has demonstrated a positive policy towards UN peacekeeping. See, Pang Zhongying, 'China's Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping' (2005) 1/12 *International Peacekeeping* 87-104; Qu Zhiwen and Li Chunzeng, '论中国维和警察培训与国际接轨的途径 [Ways of adapting the training of China's peacekeeping police to international standards]', (2003) 19/2 *Journal of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force Academy* 64; Zhang Huiyu, '中国对联合国维和行动的贡献 [China's contribution to UN peacekeeping operations]', (2004) 20/5 *Journal of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force Academy* 32; Zhao Yu, '论中国民事警察参与联合国维和行动的意义 [On the importance of participating in UN peacekeeping operations for China's civilian police]', (2004) 109/3 *Journal of Chinese People's Public Security University* 149-150.

based on international law that suggests putting UN peacekeeping operations back on the right path.³⁶ These principles comprise state sovereignty and equality, non-use of force or threat of use of force; peaceful resolution of disputes, strict neutrality, non-interference in domestic affairs, and preventing a minority of states' attempting by force to impose their will on other states using UN peacekeeping as pretext for military intervention.³⁷

Yin He's research was based on a historical overview that illustrated China's changing policy towards UN peacekeeping operations since 1971. He adopted four categories to clarify China's evolving approach to UN peacekeeping, and attached summarised case analyses in respect of China's peacekeeping missions in Iraq, Cambodia, Somalia, East Timor and Haiti.³⁸ Zhang Zongli posited three reasons for China's involvement in peacekeeping, which are linked to Chinese traditional ideology: first, the norm of “和 [harmony]” has dominated Chinese foreign policy.³⁹ It could also be interpreted as the foundation of the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*; second, China has treated UN peacekeeping as a platform to demonstrate its sense of responsibility. Shen Guofang, China's Assistant Foreign Minister, made a detailed expression on China's motivation to cooperate with UN peacekeeping operations. Shen stated that China's support and participation in UN peacekeeping operations based on the image of a responsible great power;⁴⁰ third, from a pragmatic perspective, Zhang found that by creating a peaceful international environment, China's participation in UN

³⁶ Sheng Hongsheng, ‘论联合国维持和平行动与现代国际法 [Studies on UN Peacekeeping Operations and Contemporary International Law]’ (1996) 4 Journal of Wuhan University 68-74.

³⁷ Sheng Hongsheng, ‘论联合国维持和平行动与现代国际法 [Studies on UN Peacekeeping Operations and Contemporary International Law]’ (1996) 4 Journal of Wuhan University 68-74; Nie Jun, ‘论联合国维和机制的缺点 [On the flaws of the UN peacekeeping regime]’ (2004) 6/25 Journal of Xiangfan University 28–32; Zhang Lu, ‘论当代联合国维和行动的异化: 对第二代联合国维和行动的思考 [On the differentiation of contemporary UN peacekeeping operations: pondering about problems facing the second generation of UN peacekeeping operations]’ (2004) 2 Pacific Journal 74–75.

³⁸ Yin He categorised four stages to explain the trajectory of China's shifting position on UN peacekeeping. 1971-1980 An Inactive Policy; 1981-1987 A Change in Attitude; 1988-1998 A Rising Profile and Challenges; 1999-present A New Era of Participation. See, Yin He, ‘China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations’ Asia Paper July 2007, Institute for Security and Development Policy 1-72.

³⁹ Zongli Zhang, ‘What Reasons Lie Behind the Decision to Work in a PKO?’ in Andrea de Guttry, Emanuele Sommario, and Lijiang Zhu (eds), *China's and Italy's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Lexington Books 2014) 67-75

⁴⁰ Shen Guofang, ‘We Come for Peace’, statement addressed at the 56th Session of the General Assembly, (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China, 10 November 2004) < <http://www.china-un.org/eng/smhwj/wangnian/fy01/t29183.htm> > accessed 15 January 2014.

peacekeeping plays a significant role in the development of its national economy (a view shared with Ivan Tselichtchev).⁴¹

International scholars have also endeavoured to classify China's peacekeeping behaviour. Yesi Choedon analysed the direction of China's evolving approach to UN peacekeeping operations since the 1980s and pointed out that China is generally reluctant to support peacekeeping mandates with regard to the authorisation to use all necessary means to deliver humanitarian assistance, although such mandates were accepted by the host state and the Security Council.⁴² Jing-dong Yuan concluded that China has adopted a contradictory policy towards international peacekeeping and multilateral intervention.⁴³ He found the reason for China demonstrating a reluctant position towards the implications of expanded UN peacekeeping activities can be fundamentally traced to the protection of state sovereignty and the maintenance of its existing domestic socio-political system.

Based on these reviews, it is noted that China has limited its support for UN peacekeeping operations due to its reservations regarding mandates with perceived coercive measures. However, in an increasing number of cases with respect to peace enforcement operations, China now faces a range of challenges in attempting to balance its foreign policy objectives while taking into account the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, principles which China has traditionally emphasised. In this regard, this research proposes the adoption of certain strategies to further Chinese engagement in UN peacekeeping operations and practice.

1.2 Methodology and Research Operationlisation

1.2.1 Methodology

The primary methodology adopted by this study is document analysis and archival research of UN mechanisms. This research focuses on the period 1949-2015 and deals

⁴¹ Zongli Zhang, 'What Reasons Lie Behind the Decision to Work in a PKO?' in Andrea de Guttry, Emanuele Sommario, and Lijiang Zhu (eds), *China's and Italy's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Lexington Books, 2014) 67-75; Ivan Tselichtchev, 'China Versus the West: The Global Power Shift of the 21st Century' (2015) 2/21 Asia Pacific Business Review 277.

⁴² Yesi Choedon, 'China's Stand on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Changing Priorities of Foreign Policy' (2005) 41/1 China Report 39-57.

⁴³ Jing-dong Yuan, 'Multilateral Intervention and State Sovereignty: Chinese Views on UN Peacekeeping Operations' (1998) 2/49 Political Science 275-295.

with Chinese policy towards intervention under the UN framework using peacekeeping as a case study.

The research examines the question: Is China a *status quo* or a revisionist power with respect to imposing interventions under the UN framework? In answering this question, this study re-examines the following two sets of indicators: official policy announcements and official action at the UN respectively. The former is measured by the official release of China's policy with regard to the principle of non-intervention in third-party affairs. The latter involves the increasing number of Chinese military contributions to a range of UN peacekeeping operations while, simultaneously intending to pursue an enhanced international reputation at the UN. The aim of the research is to establish a correlation between policy and action, and to explain discrepancies, should any exist, between the two. In fact, non-intervention has been the mainstay of Chinese security policy since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949. However, the necessities of global economic integration may make this principle obsolete, or subject to considered revision. In this regard, the research question can thus be refined as, if China intends to pursue an international reputation with an image of wielding responsible power, is a strict non-intervention principle a controversial foreign policy for China in international relations.

Four hypotheses can be derived from this question:

- 1) The continuation of contributing to international peacekeeping demonstrates China's image as a "responsible" non-hegemonic power;
- 2) Presenting a non-intervention principle in international relations could secure China's national interests in territorial integrity challenges, such as Taiwan and Tibet;
- 3) Participating in UN peacekeeping helps China secures advantages and balance with other international powers;
- 4) The way of interpreting the principle of non-intervention reflects China's national interest.

1.2.2 Research Operationalization

Hypothesis 1 Peacekeeping and China's image

This section uses publically available data in the form of surveys to identify the trend of global public opinion regarding China since 1989. These exercises will establish a correlation between Chinese policy pronouncements, policy implementation and world public opinion as an indicator of “image”. Taking into account China’s coherent policy towards the principle of non-intervention, this research shows that there is a discrepancy between rhetoric and action for China in relation to peacekeeping.

Hypothesis 2 Non-intervention and territorial integrity

This hypothesis presumes that non-intervention and dispute resolution (over Taiwan and Tibet) are positively correlated. Content analysis of the official policies regarding the Taiwanese and Tibetan cases reveal that the non-intervention principle has reduced the potential risk that China will become the subject of intervention by other states. In this regard, China tentatively discovered a new way of using its status as the Permanent Member State of the Security Council to protect its own territorial integrity. For instance, China no longer just simply vetoed Security Council resolutions with regard to peacekeeping deployments to those countries which had diplomatic ties with Taiwan. In the case of Haiti, for example, China threatened to exercise its veto power, on the one hand, and contributed its first police unit to the UN mission, on the other hand.

Hypothesis 3 Peacekeeping, foreign policy advantages, and balancing

Foreign policy advantages are defined as the non-internationalisation of the disputes over Taiwan and Tibet. Indicators for the attainment of advantages are demonstrated by the number of votes at the Security Council, and incidences when China has successfully avoided having these issues brought up for consideration. “Balancing” behaviour is measured by the number of Security Council vetoes levelled against initiatives detrimental to Chinese interests. The influence of non-intervention can be further measured by the relative risk to identified key adversaries, especially the US.

An analysis of China's formal foreign policy in the case of Syria provides further evidence of this hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4 Interpreting the principle of non-intervention

This hypothesis suggests that hegemonic tendencies can prompt Beijing to “generate” third party requests for intervention. This would be evidence of revisionism. However, it may also be a manifestation of China’s new found legitimacy and acceptance as a major power. Occurrences of the number of times and manner in which China has contributed to UN peace operations is a potent indicator of that change. From the Chinese perspective, the principle of non-intervention could only be waived upon a request from a receiving or host party and with the consent of the Security Council.

The research is based on the following two methodologies: first, case study is selected focusing on Chinese policy towards certain activity in the UN. Cases in this thesis concern UN authorised sanctions and peacekeeping operations from 1949 to 2014; second, literature-based research is core to this thesis. After collating extensive objective data, the author intends to illustrate the trend of China’s developments on foreign policy; based on particular expressions, such as non-intervention, condemnation, international responsibility, and the world order. This research draws special attention to the following words and phrases in literature: intervention, security, the use of force, co-operation and development, and responsibility.

The following sources will be used:

- 1) Peacekeeping contributions database of the Peace Support Operations official website (1990-2015);
- 2) Security Council Resolutions and Reports by the UN Secretary-General pertaining to Mainland China, Taiwan and Tibet for the period 1949-2015;
- 3) Pew Research Council Surveys on Global Attitudes towards China (1989-2015);
- 4) Official policy document from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese official statement record at the UN regarding peacekeeping and non-intervention principle (1949-2015);
- 5) Interviews of Chinese officials and legal scholars whose research is based on peacekeeping and China’s foreign policy under the UN framework.

1.3 China's Position on the UN Intervention Regime

The Chinese context of sovereignty is a gateway to understanding its diplomacy in UN intervention. Given its allegations and practices in the UN, China's policy in regard to the UN intervention regime is consistent with the principle of non-intervention adhering to traditional sovereignty. From a historical perspective, China's extensive history of invasion from external forces made it extremely sensitive to issues relating to its sovereignty. Events such as the history of the anti-Japanese War before 1949 and the fight against United States (US) isolation in international relations from 1949-1979 added to this. Thus, although China has admitted that the UN has an indispensable role in the maintenance of the international peace and security, it considers that the UN nevertheless has no authority to intervene in the internal affairs of Member States based on its non-super national nature.⁴⁴ Since the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence were launched in 1950, mutual non-interference in another's internal affairs was the main guide and basic principle in Chinese diplomacy; this is still the case today.

After the end of the Cold War, the concept of sovereignty was consistent with China's traditional definition:

According to international relations principle, sovereignty has the supreme feature in national state. As a core of sovereignty principle, national government ruling citizens in particular territory has the biggest authority to determine internal and external affairs, which also has exclusive jurisdiction regulating the constitution of government and foreign policy as well as exercising legal violence within the nation's territory.⁴⁵

This is a kind of opinion underpinned by Chinese academics that the UN could be consistent with an international governmental organisation without becoming an international government.⁴⁶ With regard to UN-led intervention, China not only recalls the principle of non-interference, but also maintains that such intervention should be imposed only under the auspices of the Security Council.⁴⁷ Theoretically,

⁴⁴ Guo Longlong and Yu Guanmin, *联合国新论* [New Theory of the United Nations] (Shanghai Education Press 1995) 11.

⁴⁵ Ibid. pp. 14-15.

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 17.

⁴⁷ Allen Carlson, 'Protecting Sovereignty, Accepting Intervention: The Dilemma of Chinese Foreign Relations in the 1990s' (2002) 18 China Policy Series 3.

China achieved two steps against the US-led “new world order” in the post-Gulf War era: First, to emphasise the UN’s leading role in international affairs, such as peacekeeping operations and anti-terrorist operations; second, to emphasise respect for state sovereignty in the UN. Given its voting behaviour in the Security Council, China uses voting abstentions to demonstrate its position against enforcement action. For instance, in 1999, when the Security Council considered establishing the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, China abstained.

In contrast to the theoretical argument, China has indicated a flexible policy towards UN intervention. In this regard, China seems to recognise that UN-led intervention has become an integral part of world order in the post-Cold War era.⁴⁸

1.3.1 International Judicial Bodies

1. China’s policy towards UN judicial organs

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal legal organ of the UN system. The ICJ has the important function of deciding cases that are submitted to it by States in accordance with international law.⁴⁹ It also has the obligation to deliver Advisory Opinions when called upon to do so in accordance with Article 96 of the UN Charter.⁵⁰ Since 1978, influenced by the “opening-up” policy, China has recognised the jurisdiction of the ICJ and Shi Jiuyong has been nominated as a judge of the Court.⁵¹ However, due to the reservation in respect of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, China has yet to submit a case.⁵²

In the post-Cold War era, the UN established two *Ad hoc* international criminal tribunals.⁵³ They are the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

⁴⁸ Allen Carlson, ‘More Than Just Saying No: China’s Evolving Approach to Sovereignty and Intervention since Tiananmen’ in Alastair Lain Johnston and Robert S Ross (eds), *New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy* (Stanford University Press, 2006) 224-227.

⁴⁹ Robert Kolb, *The International Court of Justice* (Hart Publishing 2013) 59.

⁵⁰ For detailed analysis, see Monika Stachonova (eds), *The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo* (International Courts Association 2014).

⁵¹ Shi Jiuyong, ‘专访国际法院副院长史久镛法官 [Interview with Shi Jiuyong the Deputy Director of ICJ]’ (*UN Broadcasting*, 12 February 2003) <<http://www.un.org/chinese/av/radio/transcript/china021029.htm>> accessed 2 May 2014.

⁵² Wang Tieya, *国际法 [The International Law]* (Law Press, 1995) 613.

⁵³ Five tribunals were established in the post-Cold War era: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone,

(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). As a response to UN resolutions that set up the criminal tribunals, China supported the majority of resolutions establishing the UN based international criminal courts and tribunals, albeit that it proposed reservations after the votes. From the statements of China's representative to the UN, reservations were based on three concerns. First, China does not advocate the adoption of resolutions under Chapter VII. China maintained that Chapter VII of the Charter can be invoked only in response to situations that seriously threaten international peace and security. This view is highlighted frequently by Chinese ambassadors in the UN. For instance, in 1992 in the case of Bosnia, when the Security Council considered adopting sanctions with coercive measures, Li Daoyu stated that it was inappropriate to invoke Chapter VII to authorise this resolution and that its invocation should not constitute a precedent.⁵⁴ In 1994, Li Zhaoxing, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained China's abstention on Resolution 955 that authorised the establishment of the ICTR:

The establishment of an international criminal tribunal is only a supplement to domestic criminal jurisdiction and the current exercise of universal jurisdiction over certain international crimes. China is not in favour of invoking at will Chapter VII of the Charter to establish an international tribunal through the adoption of a Security Council resolution.⁵⁵

Li Zhaoxing's remarks indicated that China's position towards the establishment of the ICTY remained unchanged. In the case of the Hariri's killing, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1636, threatening the imposition of sanctions against the Syrian government.⁵⁶ Li emphasised that no arbitrary use or threat of sanctions should be allowed in international relations.⁵⁷ Also, he argued that sanctions would not contribute to resolving a conflict and instead might lead to new destabilising factors in an already complex situation in the Middle East.⁵⁸ When the Security Council requested the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon under the auspices of Resolution 1757, China noted that the establishment of the tribunal would have the

the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. In East Timor, there was no international court established by the UN, instead the Transitional Administration founded the Serious Crime Units in accordance with Resolution 1272.

⁵⁴ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3106th Meeting, 13 August 1992, S/PV. 3106, p. 50.

⁵⁵ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3453rd Meeting, 8 November 1994, S/PV. 3453, p. 11.

⁵⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1636, S/RES/1636, 31 October 2005, pp. 4-5.

⁵⁷ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5297th Meeting, S/PV. 5297, 31 October 2005, p. 8.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

potential to interfere in Lebanon's own internal affairs.⁵⁹ The invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter overrode Lebanon's legislative organs, and created a precedent for the Security Council's interfering in the domestic affairs and legislative independence of a sovereign State.⁶⁰ China has consistently used these arguments to present its opposition to Chapter VII of the Charter being invoked.

Second, China explicitly supports the establishment of an international tribunal by way of a treaty. In 1993, China explained its position in regards to the systematic violations of international humanitarian law, whilst the Security Council reviewed the particular circumstances in the former Yugoslavia.⁶¹ Besides advocating criminals acting against humanity should be brought to justice, China therefore proposed a principal position that international tribunals should be established by treaty under the UN framework.⁶² With regard to the existing tribunal in former Yugoslavia, China requested that the establishment of this tribunal shall not constitute a precedent.⁶³

Third, China emphasised that the jurisdiction of international tribunals should be in compliance with the principle of State judicial sovereignty. China's statements with respect to the establishment of an international tribunal in Rwanda also exemplified its concerns.⁶⁴ In the case of Rwanda, China voted in favour of Resolution 978, but maintained that the entire external efforts should be delivered with the consent of the Rwandan government.⁶⁵ In addition, in the case of the Khmer Rouge judgment, China's most influential newspaper the *People's Daily* quoted the comments of China's spokesman, being that the way of dealing with the leaders of Khmer Rouge was an internal matter for Cambodia and the international community should respect the choice of the Cambodian people and the government.⁶⁶

⁵⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 1757, S/RES/1757, 30 May 2007, pp. 4-5.

⁶⁰ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5685th Meeting, S/PV. 5685, 30 May 2007, p. 4.

⁶¹ UN Security Council Resolution 827, S/RES/827, 25 May 1993, p. 2.

⁶² UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3217th Meeting, S/PV. 3217, 25 May 1993, p. 33.

⁶³ Ibid. p. 34.

⁶⁴ China opposed the adoption of the Statute of the International Tribunal by the Security Council through a resolution by invoking Chapter VII. UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3453rd Meeting, S/PV. 3453, 8 November 1994, p. 11.

⁶⁵ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3504th Meeting, S/PV. 3504, 27 February 1995, p. 2.

⁶⁶ '外交部发言人谈如何对待前红色高棉领导人是柬内政 [How to Trial the Former Leaders of Khmer Rouge Was an Internal Affair to Cambodia]' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 10 March 1999) 6.

2. China's policy towards the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is not an organ of the UN.⁶⁷ In response to General Assembly Resolution 260,⁶⁸ the international community was motivated in part by the resolution and decided to establish the ICC by a way of concluding an international treaty. However, in 1998, China voted against the Rome Statute as it maintained that definitions with regard to the War Crimes and the Crime against Humanity went explicitly beyond the range of the customary international law and the written law.⁶⁹ In addition, the dynamic of the opposition represented a significant departure from Chinese concerns on the principle of non-intervention. In this regard, China alleged that articles in the Statute had the potential to violate the sovereignty of judicial systems: First, Article 12 (1) of the Rome Statute stipulates the Court's compulsory jurisdiction over the Party States with respect to the crimes referred to in Article 5.⁷⁰ China has objected to the Rome Statute on the grounds that the Statute would interfere with state sovereignty.⁷¹ Second, China opposed the Court's jurisdiction in respect of non-international armed conflicts.⁷² As no clear explanation for this was proffered, the author considers that the use of force to realise China's territorial claim over Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet is inevitable, the ICC has the potential to claim jurisdiction in respect of the leaders of the Chinese government. Third, China deemed that the existing restraining mechanism to limit the Prosecutor's right to conduct investigations was inadequate.⁷³ Fourth, China maintained that the adoption of the Statute of the Court should be based on consensus rather than a voting

⁶⁷ This research would not go detail to this path, for detailed information, see, William A Schabas, *An Introduction to the International Criminal Court* (4thedn, CUP, 2011).

⁶⁸ In the resolution, the General Assembly invited the International Law Commission to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes. See, UN General Assembly Resolution 260, adopted at 179th Plenary Meeting, 9 December 1948, Section B.

⁶⁹ This research will not detailed go down to this path, for a detail discussion of the relationship between China and the ICC, see Zhang Lei, *China and the ICC* (PhD thesis, Jilin University) 104-126; Bing BingJia, 'China and the International Criminal Court: Current Situation' (2006) 10 Singapore Year Book of International Law and Contribution 1-11.

⁷⁰ Article 5 clarifies that the Court has jurisdiction with respect to the following crimes: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.

⁷¹ Article 13 of the Rome Statute; Interview with Wang Guangya, the Assistant Foreign Minister, in 1998, cited from Zhang Lei, *中国与国际刑事法院 [China and the International Criminal Court]* (Chinese People's Public Security University Press 2009) 104.

⁷² Wang Guangya, 'The Statute of the International Criminal Court' *Legal Daily* (Beijing, 29 July 1998) 4.

⁷³ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'China and the International Criminal Court', (*Chinese MOFA*, 28 October 2003) <<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfl/2626/2627/t15473.htm>> accessed 28 March 2014.

system.⁷⁴

It is noted that China's position towards the Court is similar to that of the US.⁷⁵ However, China holds additional concerns, which are based on internal political issues, such as Tibet, Taiwan and the Falun Gong movement. China considered that the ICC might be used as a potential judicial weapon, which would interfere with China's sovereignty. Chinese scholars have criticised the actions taken in the case of Sudan, where the ICC prosecutor brought a case against the President of Sudan, which it was alleged overrode the existing international legal order.⁷⁶

1.3.2 Sanctions

There are two categories in the framework of sanctions under the Charter of the UN.⁷⁷ On the one hand, sanctions concern the voting power and status of a country in the UN, that are regulated by Articles 4, 5, 19, and 94 (1) (2); on the other hand, sanctions are enforcement measures that are endorsed under Chapter VII (Articles 39, 40, 41, and 42) of the Charter.

In 1963, the Security Council imposed sanctions for the first time on the apartheid regime of South Africa.⁷⁸ In the post-Cold War era, in reaction to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its alleged development of weapons of mass destruction⁷⁹ and during the

⁷⁴ UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Ninth Plenary Meeting, UN Document A/CONF.183/SR.9, 17 July 1998, pp. 123-124.

⁷⁵ The US suggests reasons why it voted against the Statute of the ICC: First, the ICC undermines the role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. Second, the Rome Statute creates a prosecutorial system that is effectively unchecked power. Third, the ICC asserts jurisdiction over citizens of states that have not ratified the treaty that is a threat to US sovereignty. Fourth, the ICC may, as an Institution, be open to exploitation and politically motivated prosecutions. Marc Grossman, 'American Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court' (*US Department of State*, 6 May 2002) <<http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/9949.htm>> accessed 8 April 2014.

⁷⁶ Tan Shigui, '中国与国际刑事法院关系初探 [Research to the Relations between China and the International Criminal Court]' in Zhao Bingzhi (eds) 国际刑事法院专论 [*Symposium on the International Criminal Court*] (the People's Court Press 2003) 65-68.

⁷⁷ Practically, economic sanctions are considered as a conceptual bridge between diplomacy and force for ensuring compliance with UN demands. The purpose to those sanctions is to eradicate factors that constitute potential threats to international peace and security. However, the concept of sanctions in international law has faced a certain amount of controversy and has been the source of some confusion. The challenges focus on two aspects: the conflict between international human rights conventions and imposing sanctions; a double standard occurs in the implementation of sanctions. See, Vera Gowlland Debbas, 'Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility' (1994) 1/43 Int'l & Comparative LQ 59.

⁷⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 418, S/RES/418, 4 November 1977, p. 2.

⁷⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 661, S/RES/661, 6 August 1990, p. 2; UN Security Council Resolution 687, S/RES/687, 3 April 1991, p. 2.

break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions on both countries.⁸⁰ However, as coercive economic sanctions have led to unexpected harm to civilians, they have also been criticised as the phenomenon of “political gain and civilian pain”.⁸¹ In this regard, sanctions receive a certain amount of criticism throughout the UN, especially when looking for “smarter” alternatives to comprehensive sanctions that target leaders or regimes rather than peoples.⁸² In the UN, China is a standard-bearer in its opposition to sanctions, particularly concerning sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. Officially, China’s policy towards sanctions can be found in its presidential statement on UN reforms in 2005.⁸³

First, China has always maintained that sanctions should be applied with prudence on the precondition that all peaceful means have been exhausted. Second, China is in favour of improving the sanctions mechanism of the UN, setting strict criteria, making it well focused, setting explicit time limits and minimizing the possibility of a humanitarian crisis arising from sanctions and their impact on the third country. The committees involved in sanctions should regularly evaluate the humanitarian impact of sanctions. Third, the international community should help developing countries build the capacity for the implementation of sanctions.⁸⁴ Hu Jintao, the former president of China, delivered a speech at the UN Summit in 2005 that encouraged settling international disputes peacefully through consultations and negotiations. Hu’s words explicitly indicated that China opposed any encroachment on a country’s sovereignty and forceful interference in a country’s internal affairs.⁸⁵

Despite voting in favour of the majority of resolutions authorising sanctions, China has exercised a conservative policy. In the cases of Zimbabwe, Portugal and South

⁸⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 757, S/RES/757, 30 May 1992, p. 2.

⁸¹ Thomas G Weiss and David Cortright (eds), *Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1997).

⁸² Ramesh Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect*, (CUP 2006) 135.

⁸³ Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms, 7 June 2005, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, < <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/zzhgg/t199101.htm> >Section 6.

⁸⁴ Shen Guofang, ‘Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms’ (*Xinhua News*, 8 June 2005) < <http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/131308.htm> > accessed 15 May 2013.

⁸⁵ Hu Jintiao, ‘努力建设持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐世界 [Strive to Build a Harmonious World – Making Efforts to Realise Permanent Peace and Common Prosperity]’ (*Xinhua News*, 15 September 2005) < www.news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-01/20/content_7455216.htm > accessed 15 March 2014.

Africa, China explained that its support for the imposition of sanctions was in order to back the anti-hegemonic struggle of the local people.⁸⁶ In contrast to the number of active votes, in the twenty-first century, China adopted a position of abstention whenever the Security Council authorised sanctions against the North Korea, Iran, Sudan and Myanmar. In terms of the statements of the Chinese ambassador, China was alarmed that the non-interference principle could potentially be infringed by the wilful use of force, especially by unilateral actions taken without the Council's authorization.⁸⁷

1.3.3 Peacekeeping Operations

As an integral part of the UN intervention regime, UN peacekeeping plays a significant role in preventing and terminating conflict.⁸⁸ China, as one out of five permanent Member States of the Security Council, not only supports but also participates in UN peacekeeping operations. This is in spite of China's controversial policy in relation to the UN. Over the course of the sixty-four years of the UN, since the first UN peacekeeping mission was launched in 1947, Chinese policy has evolved from one of condemnation and suspicion to that of active participation, such as China's contributions to the UN mission in East Timor and Sudan. With regard to the development of Chinese policy towards peacekeeping, this shares a similar foundation with that of China's relations to the UN in general, which are also driven by its national concerns. In this regard, there are three stages to the evolution of Chinese policy.

First, before the assumption by the People's Republic of China of a permanent seat at the Security Council in 1971, China went through a policy of condemnation. In response to the North Korea conflict, China believed that UN peacekeepers were tools for the expansion of Western hegemony, and UN peacekeeping operations were portrayed as "Western-sponsored" operations interfering with another state's internal

⁸⁶ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 1907th Meeting, S/PV.1907, 6 April 1976, paras 122, 124; UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 2037th Meeting, S/PV. 2037, 25 October 1977, para 36.

⁸⁷ In the case of Iraq, China abstained from voting at the draft resolution that authorised imposing sanctions against Iraq (military actions – e.g. No-fly zone). UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 4084th Meeting, S/PV. 4084, 17 December 1999, p. 11.

⁸⁸ '中国申请加入联合国维和特别行动委员会 [China Applies for a Membership in the Special Committee of UN Peacekeeping Operations]' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 30 September 1988) 4.

affairs.⁸⁹ The *People's Daily* criticised the establishment of the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was seen as a manifestation of American neo-colonialism that took over from British colonialism.⁹⁰

Second, from 1971 to the end of the Cold War in 1991, China's policy on peacekeeping evolved from condemnation to tentative participation. Compared with Chinese foreign policy of the time, China revised moderately its policy towards the UN and began to cooperate with the UN in economic and security aspects due to undertaking a policy of "opening-up". Li Qing, ambassador to the UN, outlined China's stance on peacekeeping, admitting the significance of UN peacekeeping operations for the maintenance of international peace and security.⁹¹

Third, in the post-Cold War era, by realising the importance of UN peacekeeping, China actively participated in such operations. In fact, peacekeeping is the only category of UN intervention that China is substantially involved in. Thus, when the UN discussed reforms, China stated its policy towards peacekeeping, being that UN peacekeeping operations should comply with the UN Charter and established principles, including impartiality, consent of parties and non-use of force except for self-defence.⁹² In this way, China's stance on peacekeeping demonstrated its adherence to a non-intervention principle.

1.4 China's Enthusiasm for Peacekeeping

Since the 1989 Tiananmen uprising, pressure has been mounting on China, both from within and externally. Western powers, spearheaded by the US, have imposed conditions for China's integration in the world economic system based on her ability to liberalise and democratise her society.⁹³ China has only responded to such

⁸⁹ Allen Carlson, 'Helping to Keep the Peace: China's Recent Stance on Sovereignty and Multilateral Intervention' (2004) 1/77 *Pacific Affairs* 10.

⁹⁰ '联合国不能再容许以色列拖延撤军 [Israel's Delaying Withdrawn Cannot Be Tolerated by the UN]' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 5 February 1957) 6.

⁹¹ Ling Qing, '改革开放初期的中国与联合国 [The Relationship Between China and the UN at the Early Stage of Opening-up]' (2005) 4 *History of the Communist Party of China* 19.

⁹² Qin Yaqing, 'Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms' (*Xinhua News*, 8 June 2005) < <http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/131308.htm> > accessed 15 May 2013.

⁹³ Qiu Zhaolin, 'The Evolution on the Relationship between China and the United States' (1989) 19/4 *American Studies* 34-35; Liang Zhenggang, 欧盟对中国武器禁运 [*The European Union Imposes Arms Embargo against China*] (Xiu Wei Press 2011) 23.

pressures gradually, achieving some degree of international liberalisation and external integration into the world economy (namely by the participation in the World Trade Organisation). This process has propelled China to the rank of great power, and as an essential actor in world's trade system.⁹⁴

In fact, China is a country with several external and domestic challenges; its proximity to nearly a dozen neighbouring states, ranging from Afghanistan to Russia, requires a flexible foreign policy. Domestically, China has the largest population on earth, which is eager for social, political and economic advancement. In addition, China is not monolithic; her population is distributed among fifty-six nations which, the Chinese leadership fears, may be attracted by notions of emancipation from Beijing and the Communist Party, much like Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet.⁹⁵

According to Suzanna Xiao Yang's research, China has proposed four main objectives in international relations, including 1) Protecting sovereignty; 2) Maintaining geostrategic balance and national security; 3) cultivating a favourable international image and status as a responsible member of the international community and a great power (international reputation seeker); 4) promoting China's economic and political interest.⁹⁶ In this regard, UN peacekeeping is deployed based on three principles which were established by the then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and China tends to treat UN peacekeeping as a minimum risk affecting its consistent principle of non-intervention. Moreover, UN peacekeeping operation should not be viewed as purely military operation; instead, civilian personnel are always dispatched to carry out essential political or administrative functions across peacekeeping roles, for instance, operations in the Congo or in the independence process in Namibia.⁹⁷ More specific reasons for China's enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping are set out below.

From **sovereignty and national security** perspectives, since 1971, the Chinese policy towards peacekeeping has witnessed a substantive change. In other words,

⁹⁴ Ruchir Sharma, 'The Ever-Emerging Markets' (2014) 1/93 Foreign Affairs 52-57.

⁹⁵ John James Kennedy, 'Rural China: Reform and Resistance' in William A Joseph (eds), *Politics in China: An Introduction* (OUP 2010) 227.

⁹⁶ Suzanna Xiao Yang, *China in the UN Security Council Decision-Making on Iraq: Conflicting, Understanding and Competing Preferences* (Routledge 2013) 61.

⁹⁷ Li Zhiwei, 'Chinese Peacekeepers in the Congo Mission' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 21 August 2015) 3; Miwa Hiroko and Marc Lanteigne, 'Introduction: China and UN Peacekeeping' in Miwa Hiroko and Marc Lanteigne (eds), *China's Evolving Approach to Peacekeeping* (Routledge 2012) 1.

peacekeeping is a representative platform to be utilised when analysing to what extent China supports the principle of sovereignty. In recent cases at the UN, China no longer expresses absolute support for the principle of sovereignty in all circumstances, as it did over the last two decades. Given its growing integration into the world economy, China is embracing globalisation and becoming involved in global governance under the UN framework. Meanwhile, China has accepted that the principle of sovereignty could be waived when regional stability is challenged. For example, nuclear threats are a core concern for China and thus it has recognised that a nuclear arms race in the Middle East would contribute to insecurity across the whole region.⁹⁸ However, in terms of the authorisation for the use of force, China believes that such coercive measures can lead to potential accusations of partiality, even against peacekeepers explicitly claiming to be acting on behalf of the international community through the UN.⁹⁹ Although certain crises have caused substantial casualties, the Chinese diplomats hold that diplomatic negotiations should be pursued as a standard position until reaching an acceptable solution based on consensus.¹⁰⁰

Nevertheless China is willing to see the role of the Security Council enhanced.¹⁰¹ It has been partly involved in regional organisations such as the African Union, when deciding whether a particular situation represents a threat to international peace and security. Given that the permanent members of the Security Council are industrialised, Western countries, rather than developing countries where most peacekeeping operations take place, China was reluctant to concede sole adjudication power to the Security Council.¹⁰² Moreover, China's self-image in the international community has not changed, despite dramatic advances in economic growth in the past thirty years. For instance, China considers itself the only permanent state in the Security Council that represents and supports the concerns of the developing world (also called the

⁹⁸ Interview with senior Chinese diplomats, cited from Joel Wuthnow, *Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council: Beyond the Veto* (Routledge, 2012) 87-88.

⁹⁹ Li Ming, '联合国安理会授权使用武力问题探究 [Study on the Authorisation of the Use of Force by the Security Council]' (2002) 3 Law Review 66-73.

¹⁰⁰ Zhao Jinsong, 'Analysis on the Chinese Endeavour to the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes' (2006) 1 Science of Law 98.

¹⁰¹ Zhang Yishan, 'Position Paper of China at the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly' (*Permanent Mission of the P.R. China to the UN*, 5 August 2004) < <http://www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/ldhy/previousga/ld59/t162152.htm> > accessed 26 May 2014.

¹⁰² European Parliament, *The Position of Russia and China and the UN Security Council in the light of Recent Crises* (Policy Department of Directorate-General for External Policies 2013) Document Serial Number EP/EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2009-01/Lot1/43+44, p. 15.

third world in accordance with Mao's lexicon).¹⁰³ This may help to understand why China opposed any military intervention in the case of Libya and Syria, even if it opposed the deployment of coalition peacekeepers with the approval of the Security Council.¹⁰⁴

In terms of achieving an **international image** as a great power, China has adopted a paradoxical policy towards interventions that are aimed at the maintenance of international peace and security. While demonstrating its enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping contributions, there exists a gap between the Chinese capacity to dispatch peacekeepers and the increasing demand from the UN calling for more Chinese contributions.

On the one hand, with regard to its serious concerns on sovereignty, the Chinese policy and discourse reveals that China is reluctant to take part in forcible measures, such as military intervention under Chapter VII.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, as referred to by Chinese officials, from a long-term strategic perspective, more participation in peace operations is necessary in order to meet the expectations of the international community.¹⁰⁶ In this connection, China perceived that if operations conducted by the UN are not intended to compel parties to a conflict to comply with a certain conditions or enforce to change, these operations will not be considered coercive. In this sense, since peacekeeping requires the "consent of the conflict parties, impartiality, and resort to arms only in self-defence",¹⁰⁷ it may be regarded as a non-coercive military action. It is accepted that the consent of the legitimate government is a primary element in overcoming the prohibition of intervention, other than the

¹⁰³ Li Jiulin, '毛泽东与第三世界 [Mao Zedong's and the Third World Theory]' (25 December 2003) *Mao Zedong and the Modern China* 1312.

¹⁰⁴ When reviewing Security Council Resolution 1937 which authorised NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, China threatened to use its veto. However, as expressed by the Chinese representative to the UN, China did not block the action in consideration of the wishes of the Arab League and the African Union. This has been referred to explicitly by the Chinese Ambassador. See, UN Security Council, 'Security Council Approves No-Fly Zone over Libya' (17 March 2011) Press Release SC/10200.

¹⁰⁵ Wang Jianwei, 'China's Evolving Attitudes and Approaches towards UN Collective Security' in G John Ikenberry and Zhu Feng (eds), *America, China and the Struggle for World Order* (Palgrave 2015) 121.

¹⁰⁶ Guo Xiaomei, 'Remarks at the Security Council Meeting on UN Peacekeeping Operations' (*Permanent Mission of the P.R. China to the UN*, 12 December 2012) < <http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t998334.htm> > accessed 18 March 2014.

¹⁰⁷ These principles were proposed by Hammarskjold, the Secretary-General of the Security Council. See, Esref Aksu, *The United Nations, Intra-State Peacekeeping and Normative Change* (Manchester University Press 2003) 18.

exception provided in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.¹⁰⁸

It is noteworthy that amongst China's policy, such as "Keeping a Low Profile" and "peace and development", its policy towards peacekeeping is its only stance that could be considered as a positive change by Chinese decision makers. However, China's strong adherence to the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention presents a hurdle to China's increased involvement in peacekeeping.

1.5 Outline of the Study

This study commences with a review of the sources of the non-intervention principle in international law and the development of this principle in the UN. This will be accompanied by the relevant Chinese responses between 1949 and 2014. Chapter 1 begins by presenting the research questions and also illustrates the original contribution offered and methodology utilised by the study. In order to set coherent and convincing analysis in subsequent chapters, the introductory part illustrates China's policies towards international judicial bodies, sanctions and peacekeeping operations. The research undertaken examines China's policy towards UN peacekeeping in order to demonstrate the contradictions between its non-intervention policies and the promotion of the image of a "responsible power".

Chapter 2 lays the foundation of the study. In order to put the issues raised in context, the background to the establishment of the non-intervention principle (which originates from traditional sovereign theory), is offered. In the UN, the progress of China's non-intervention policy is subject to controversy. Since China was authorised to take over Taiwan's permanent seat at the Security Council, Beijing has introduced a "no interference in other State's internal affairs" policy as a basic principle in international relations. However, although China has opposed UN interventions, it has acquiesced to sanctions and Chapter VII-based peacekeeping operations. This phenomenon may indicate that China is shifting its policy on intervention whilst pursuing a national profile. In order to clearly explain the change, the author compares China's voting behaviour at the Security Council, from official records of the UN, and China's stance on the role of the UN from China's most influential

¹⁰⁸ Huang Yao, '从使用武力法看保护的责任理论 [A Review of the Responsibility to Protect from the View of the Law on the Use of Force]' (2012) 3 Chinese Journal of Law 201.

newspaper, *People's Daily*. After the comparison, this research intends to achieve two conclusions: first, Chinese foreign policy is driven by its national goals; second, to identify the different stages of China's approach to the non-intervention principle and to provide pre-conditions for the following systematic analysis of Chinese foreign policy.

Chapter 3 and 4 provide evidence of the foregoing hypotheses, based on the stages categorised in the previous chapter. Four stages are outlined to illustrate Chinese policy towards a non-intervention principle in the UN: 1) 1949-1980, China adopted the “stand-aside” and “three-denied” policies toward the UN, that condemned all UN-sponsored activities; 2) 1980-1990, China decided to engage with the UN and intended to take advantage of its Member State status to promote economic growth pursuant to the “opening-up” policy. During this period, China treated the UN as a tool to bolster its economy and there was no substantive change in Chinese policy. 3) 1990-2000, in post-Cold War era, the UN played a significant role in international relations, especially the maintenance of international peace and security. China approved the model of international cooperation under the UN regime, but still opposed interventions for the prevention of conflicts. However, Beijing’s unprecedented position in the case of Iraq demonstrated that China’s consistent policy towards non-intervention might be undermined, although the support for the authorisation to use force was intended to divert the world’s attention from the civil unrest in 1989. 4) Since 2000, in pursuing the image of a “responsible power”, China intensified its interaction with the UN, which was a manifestation of an increased status. Despite not participating in sanctions, China enlarged its contributions to UN peacekeeping operations and deployed the first contingent of peacekeeping civilian police in 2000.

Chapter 5 focuses on China’s incentives for peacekeeping missions. The study in this section provides a detailed analysis of the extent to which core concerns, such as energy interests and territorial claims, have driven the Chinese government to shift its policy on non-intervention and territorial claims. In addressing this, four cases are selected to examine China’s incentives for supporting UN peacekeeping missions. First, in dispatching its first riot police unit to the UN mission in East Timor, China attempted to consolidate its influence in that nation. In addition, the case of East

Timor also illustrates that Chinese diplomatic strategy in the Third World is motivated by the goal of securing its energy resources. Second, the case of Haiti witnessed a new demonstration of the “One-China” doctrine when China withdrew its simple isolation policy towards those countries that support Taiwan’s independence at the UN. Third, the case of Darfur illustrates that China is becoming more assertive in developing its “soft power”¹⁰⁹. Finally, the right to veto is given particular attention in order to illustrate China’s more assertive policy in international relations. China’s policy on the issue is primarily motivated by preventing the establishment of a legal precedent for military intervention against a sovereign state, on the one hand. On the other hand, China attempts to prevent Western powers’ expansion in the Middle East region by using its special status as one of the Permanent Member States of the Security Council.

Based on the findings of the case studies, Chapter 6 outlines the challenges that China faces in current international relations. The puzzle is that State practice in recent years is not consistent with the foreign policy objective of non-intervention. At the same time, Chinese consistency on the non-intervention principle and support for state sovereignty has led to confrontation with international human rights law. It is noted that China has realised the importance of protecting civilians, which is the reason for China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations. However, the traditional policy of non-intervention hinders China’s adoption of a more progressive and constructive policy in relation to the UN. It is necessary for China to develop its policy in regards to intervention, but it should emphasise that UN activities must be in accordance with the UN Charter and the principles of international law.

Chapter 7 summarises the main conclusions of the research project. The research identifies conflicts between the policy of non-interference and that of promoting the

¹⁰⁹ “Soft power” is a concept developed by Joseph Nye to describe the ability to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction. A defining feature of soft power is that it is non-coercive; the currency of soft power is culture, political values, and foreign policies. See, Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (Public Affairs, the United States, 2005). In 2014, Xi Jinping, the President of China announced, “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative and better communicate China’s message to the world”. Cited from David Shambaugh, ‘China’s Soft Power Push’ *Foreign Affairs* (New York, July/August 2015) <<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-06-16/china-s-soft-power-push>> accessed 15 September 2015.

image of the responsible power. Concerns are raised with regard to how an assertive foreign policy can be constructed in practice.

2. Non-Intervention Principle and the Chinese Response

The doctrine of non-intervention in internal affairs is a frequent concern in today's society due to its close link to the concept of domestic jurisdiction.¹¹⁰ During 90 years development, the principle today has been established and overseen by the UN Charter, which includes, but is not limited to, the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.¹¹¹ From an international relations perspective, normative guidance on the application of non-intervention is being used by states when condemning the acts of other states intervening in their internal affairs. For example, in 2007, China presented an official protest against the Congress of the US when the Dalai Lama was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honour.¹¹² The Chinese spokesperson stated that, "it seriously violates the norm of international relations and interferes with China's internal affairs".¹¹³ In addition, the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, was requested to apologise for comments he made, which were alleged to constitute interference in Iraq's internal affairs.¹¹⁴ Most recently, in 2013, China condemned the US intervention in its internal affairs by concluding an arms sale agreement with Taiwan.¹¹⁵ Theoretically, the principle of non-intervention is a corollary of every state's right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁰ The French first introduced this principle in its French Republic Constitution in 1793. Article 119 states that "it does not interfere with the affairs of government of other nations. It suffers no interference of other nations with its own". See, French Republic Constitution of 1793, Article 119, available at <<http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1793-french-republic-constitution-of-1793>> accessed 15 May 2013; On 2 December 1823, the US President James Monroe proclaimed that 'the United States would not intervene in European affairs unless its interests were directly affected'. See, Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, and Andreas Paulus, *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary* (3rd end, OUP 2012) Volume II, p. 1926; Ernest May, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine* (Harvard University Press, 1975) 1-306.

¹¹¹ The first international treaty providing for a non-interference principle was Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of the Nations, which was adopted in Paris in 1919. Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter. See, Bruno Simma, *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary* (3rd end, OUP, 2012) 135.

¹¹² John D Dingell, 'Congratulating the Dalai Lama Upon Being Awarded the Congressional Gold Medal' (22 October 2007) 153 Extensions of Remarks 27881.

¹¹³ Qin Gang, '外交部发言人就美国国会向达赖“颁奖”事发表讲话 [The Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Delivers Speech on Dalai]' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 19 October 2007) 4.

¹¹⁴ 'The French Foreign Minister Apologised for His Words on the Iraqi Prime Minister' *Xinhua News* (Beijing, 28 August 2007).

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-08/28/content_6613059.htm> accessed 18 March 2014.

¹¹⁵ Shang Xi, '中国外交部坚决反对美国对台军售 [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strongly Opposed the US Arms Sale to Taiwan]' *Jinghua Times* (Beijing, 22 November 2013) 2.

¹¹⁶ R Y Jennings and A D Watts, *Oppenheim's International Law* (9th edn, OUP 2008) 428.

In short, as a principle of international law, non-intervention is traditionally pursued as part of the principle of state sovereignty.¹¹⁷ From the Chinese perspective, reference is often made to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, proclaimed by the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in the Bandung Conference (1955).¹¹⁸ Indeed, Zhou's statement in Bandung was the first time that China introduced, in context, its non-intervention policy to the world.¹¹⁹ Also, "mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs" became the third element among Zhou's five principles.¹²⁰ However, when the term "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) was introduced in 2001 and subsequently endorsed in 2005, the traditional view of sovereignty underwent a formal challenge.¹²¹ In this context, the focus of this chapter is twofold: First, in order to provide a background for further discussion, an overview of the non-intervention principle in the international legal system is presented. Second, an examination of the Chinese voting behaviour in line with non-intervention is conducted. Attention is given to topics including: sources of the principle of non-intervention in the international legal system, and a study of the Chinese response to international intervention.

2.1 Non-Intervention Principle on the International Law

2.1.1 The Peace of Westphalia

The Peace of Westphalia¹²², concluded in 1648, is regarded as a milestone in the development of sovereign states.¹²³ Within the context of the Westphalian Peace,

¹¹⁷ Muge Kmacioglu, 'The Principle of Non-intervention at the United Nations: The Charter Framework and the Legal Debate' (Summer 2005) *Perceptions* 15.

¹¹⁸ *Joint Communique of Bandung Conference* (Survey of the China Mainland Press, 23 April 1955) 16-17.

¹¹⁹ Pei Yuanying, '和平共处五项原则与中国新时期外交理论与实践 [The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the Theory and Practice in China's Foreign Policy]' (2004) 4 *International Studies* 3-7.

¹²⁰ Xu Jian, '论和平共处五项原则的理论与实践 [Theory and Practice in the Five Principle of Peaceful Co-existence]' (2005) 1 *International Studies* 15-17.

¹²¹ The concept of the "Responsibility to Protect" was formally raised at the 2005 World Summit Report, 'In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All'. UN Document A/59/2005/Add.3, 26 May 2005; Pang Zhongying examined the Chinese response to the R2P in detail. See, Zhongying Pang, 'China's Non-intervention Question' (2009) 2/1 *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 238-252.

¹²² The treaties of "Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their respective Allies (Treaty of Munster)" and "Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Queen of Sweden and their respective Allies (Treaty of Osnabrück)" together make up the Peace of Westphalia.

¹²³ Derek Croxton, 'The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty' (1999) 21/3 *The International History Review* 569.

several concepts were raised, including peaceful coexistence, equality of sovereign States, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force, balance of power, mutual security guarantees, and collective sanctions.¹²⁴ In fact, jurists have identified three principles, which were extracted from the Peace of Westphalia, as core principles in modern international law. They are as follows: 1) the principle of legal equality between states. The theory behind this principle was explained by its leading exponent, Emer de Vattel, “Since men are by nature equal, and their individual rights and obligations the same, as coming equally from nature, Nations, which are composed of men and may be regarded as so many free persons living together in a state of nature, are by nature equal and hold from nature the same obligations and the same rights”.¹²⁵ 2) the principle of sovereignty of states and the fundamental right of political self-determination. Article 64 of the Treaty of Munster stipulates that “every one of the Electors, Princes and States of the Roman Empire, are confirmed in their ancient Rights, Liberties, Privileges, and free exercise of Territorial Right”.¹²⁶ 3) the principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another state. Under Article LXIV of the Treaty of Munster, parties to the Holy Roman Emperor considered that “their ancient rights never can or ought to be molested therein by any whomsoever upon any manner of pretence”.¹²⁷ Almost ten years after the Peace of Westphalia entered into force, Christian Wolff made the first argument for the non-intervention principle.¹²⁸ He wrote, “the rights and obligations of all nations are by nature the same; the rights and obligations of a nation are defined by its sovereignty which is originally absolute but can be limited by laws of nations which impose restrictions equally on every state; And the community of states has a right to coerce any state to comply with the law of nations”.¹²⁹

¹²⁴ This research does not go further in examining the entire field. For detailed information, see, Ove Bring, ‘The Westphalian Peace Tradition in International Law’ (2000) 75 US Naval War College International Law Studies 69.

¹²⁵ Emer de Vattel, *The Law of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereignty* (translated by Charles G Fenwick, William S Hein & Co. 1916) 7.

¹²⁶ Article 64 of the Peace of Westphalia (Treaty of Munster 1648), cited from Clive Parry, *Consolidated Treaty Series Volume I* (Ocean Publication 1969) 337.

¹²⁷ Article LXIV of the Treaty of Munster, cited from Jeremy Moses, *Sovereignty and Responsibility: Power, Norms and Intervention in International Relations* (Macmillan 2014) 46.

¹²⁸ Christian Wolff, *Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum* (1979), cited from Charles R Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton University Press 1979).

¹²⁹ Ibid. p. 75.

However, in the post-Westphalian era, both diplomats and international scholars have come to the conclusion that the Peace of Westphalia could be considered an obstacle to a legal approach to international intervention. For instance, in 1999, British Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that as a consequence of globalisation the Westphalian system has been rendered anachronistic.¹³⁰ In addition, the then NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana expressed the view that the Westphalian system had its limits.¹³¹ In this context, the protection of state sovereignty, which was established by the Westphalian Peace has been challenged by the emerging concept of R2P.¹³²

2.1.2 International Treaties

Article 38 (1) of the *Statute of the International Court of Justice* outlines the following sources of international law: a) international conventions; b) international custom; c) the general principles of law recognised by civilized nations.¹³³

International treaties are the primary sources of the principle of non-intervention. From the perspective of regional organisations, the non-intervention principle has been adopted by the Charter of the Organisation of American States (Article 3 and 19),¹³⁴ the Treaty on European Union (Article 1),¹³⁵ the Constitutive Act of the African Union (Article 4),¹³⁶ and other regional organisation treaties.¹³⁷ Moreover, multilateral and bilateral conventions contain provisions prohibiting intervention. For

¹³⁰ Blair set out a new, post-Westphalian, “doctrine of the international community”. See, Alex J Bellamy, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (2nd edn, Polity Press, 2010) 37.

¹³¹ Javier Solana, ‘Securing Peace in Europe’ (*NATO*, 12 November 1998) <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981112a.htm>> accessed 19 March 2015.

¹³² Jayabrata Sarkar, ‘Debating a Post-Westphalian International Order’ (2015) LIII/15 Mainstream <<http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article5577.html>> accessed 26 August 2015.

¹³³ Statutes of the International Court of Justice, Article 38 (1). Bruno Simma, *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary* (2nd edn OUP, 2002) 1142.

¹³⁴ The OAS Charter was preceded in the region by the Montevideo Convention and its Additional Protocol in 1933 and 1936 respectively. Also, in the case of *Nicaragua*, Schwebel in his dissenting opinion refers to the comprehensive and categorical injunctions of the OAS Charter against intervention, and the much narrower but significant rules of non-intervention in customary international law. *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US)* [1986] ICJ Rep 14 [202].

¹³⁵ This treaty was originally signed in Maastricht 1992. If the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) enters into force, the preceding treaty would be amended.

¹³⁶ The Constitutional Act entered into force on 11 July 2000, and was amended by the Protocol on Amendment of the Constitutive Act of 3 February 2003. Also, on 9 July 2002, the Protocol connecting with the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union provides that “non-interference by any Member States in the internal affairs of another will be a principle of the Union”.

¹³⁷ The provisions of other regional organisations refer to the non-intervention principle, including Article 2 (2) of the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference of March 2008.

example, Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations specifically sets out the principle of non-intervention on diplomats – the duty placed on all persons enjoying privileges and immunities not to interfere in the internal affairs of the receiving state.¹³⁸

Within the UN framework, the principle of non-intervention is interpreted as part of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations, as set forth in the UN Charter (Article 2.4). This article is the most important manifestation of the principle of non-intervention. However, the Charter provides legal enforcement measures when such measures are taken or authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, and do not contravene the prohibition on the use of force or the principle of non-intervention. In other conditions, Georg Nolte maintained that dispatching foreign troops to impose limited operations at the invitation of a government is not prohibited by the principle of non-intervention.¹³⁹ Article 2.7 of the UN Charter prevents the UN from becoming a subject imposing intervention. However, in recent cases the significance of non-intervention is now considerably reduced by the emerging concept of “humanitarian intervention” and R2P.¹⁴⁰

2.1.3 Customary International Law

The principle of non-intervention has been reaffirmed in a number of judgments of the ICJ. In 1949, the *Corfu Channel Case* was the first case brought to the ICJ. The Court refused to support the claim of the United Kingdom regarding the right to intervene to secure evidence.¹⁴¹ Twenty years later, the Court confirmed again the principle of non-intervention as a rule customary international law in its 1986 *Nicaragua* judgment:

The principle of non-intervention forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or

¹³⁸ The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), UN Treaty Series, Volume 500, p. 95. Eileen Denza, *Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* (3rd edn OUP, 2008) 460–472.

¹³⁹ Nolte pointed out that interventions by invitation must not lead to the removal of the political control of the inviting government. Detailed discussion refers to Georg Nolte, ‘Intervention by Invitation’ (2010) Max Plank Encyclopaedia of Public International Law <<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1702?rskey=UZxXqA&result=2&prd=EPIL>> accessed 10 May 2014.

¹⁴⁰ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Report of the ICSS, 2001) paras 2.8–2.9.

¹⁴¹ *The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania)* [1949] ICJ Rep 9 [35].

indirectly in the internal or external affairs of other States.¹⁴²

The Court also expanded on the principle in the verdict that:

The Principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference; though examples of trespass against this principle are not infrequent, the Court considers that it is part and parcel of customary international law and [...] international law requires political integrity should be respected.¹⁴³

The Court noted that states that had acted contrary to this principle “had not sought to justify their conduct by reference to a new right of intervention or a new exception to the principle of its prohibition”.¹⁴⁴ In the most recent case of *DRC v. Uganda*, the Court confirmed “Uganda had violated the sovereignty and also the territorial integrity of the DRC”.¹⁴⁵ At the same time, the Court recalled that in the *Nicaragua* case, “it had made it clear that the principle of non-intervention prohibits a State to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of an internal opposition in another State.”¹⁴⁶ A series of decisions issued by the ICJ highlighted that non-intervention principle has been affirmed as constituting customary international law.

2.2 China’s Position on Non-Intervention

The issue of whether the protection of human rights can override the principle of sovereignty is still under discussion.¹⁴⁷ It is accepted that human rights obligations are required to be met in all fields, including UN activities. General Assembly Resolution 63/197 has confirmed that human rights are guiding principles of the UN and this

¹⁴² *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US)* [1986] ICJ Rep 14 [205].

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda)* [2005] ICJ Rep 168 [165].

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ Richard Falk, *Human Rights and State Sovereignty* (Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1981); Jost Delbrueck, ‘International Protection of Human Rights and State Sovereignty’ in Frederick E Snyder (ed), *Third World Attitudes Towards International Law: An Introduction* (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) 263-274; Thomas G Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action* (Polity Press, 2007); Nicholas J Wheeler, ‘The Humanitarian Responsibility of Sovereignty’ and Jennifer M Welsh, ‘Taking Consequences Seriously: Objections to Humanitarian Intervention’ in Jennifer M Welsh (ed), *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations* (OUP, 2006) 29-51, 52-69.

applies to all UN bodies in the fulfilment of their mandates.¹⁴⁸ Also, in 2006, the Secretary-General noted “all UN agencies and programmes must further support the development of policies, directives and guidelines to integrate human rights into all aspects of UN work”.¹⁴⁹ In the area of peacekeeping, the Security Council has authorised several operations involving coalitions willing to use force in order to implement humanitarian relief. For example, in the case of Somalia, the Security Council deployed the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and authorised the use of “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia” and invoked Chapter VII of the Charter.¹⁵⁰ In addition, with respect to international intervention particularly, elites from the West have proclaimed to set limits on state sovereignty subsequent to the increasing significance of the protection on human rights.¹⁵¹ However, the western perspective of emphasising the core of human rights protection was not shared by China. In this regard, China maintained that all Member States of the UN should remain steadfast in upholding the spirit of the Charter of the UN.¹⁵² In China’s view, no country in the world is entitled to impose its will on others or to topple the legitimate governments of other countries.¹⁵³ Pursuant to this spirit, it is easier to understand why China advocates UN peacekeeping operations instead of supporting coercive sanctions and UN approved peace operations.

It should be noted that although human rights protection has shaped and evolved at the international level, humanitarian based intervention still arouses serious concern among sovereign states. In this respect, China’s position on UN intervention exemplifies its opposition to imposing intervention under a humanitarian-flag. The formulation of the Chinese military policy reflects its position. For example, the *Chinese White Paper on Defence* (2010) demonstrated Chinese advocacy of the peaceful settlements of disputes, which adheres to the traditional ideology of Mo Zi

¹⁴⁸ UN General Assembly Resolution, adopted at 63rd Session, A/RES/63/197, 6 March 2009, pp. 3-4.

¹⁴⁹ UN General Assembly ‘Note by the Secretary-General’, A/61/583, 26 November 2006, p. 38.

¹⁵⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 794, S/RES/794, 2 December 1992, p. 2.

¹⁵¹ In 1982, Delbruck discussed the relationship between human rights implication and the role of the sovereign state. See, Jost Delbruck, ‘International Protection of Human Rights and State Sovereignty’ (1982) 4/57 Indiana Law Journal 567-578; Father Robert Araujo, ‘Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Self-Determination: The Meaning of International Law’ (2000) 5/24 Fordham International Law Journal 1477-1532.

¹⁵² UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 7389th Meeting, S/PV. 7389, 23 February 2015, p. 4.

¹⁵³ Ibid. p. 5.

(墨子).¹⁵⁴ Mo Zi, who is an influential philosopher has commented widely about humanities and defined the Chinese character “military (武, Wu)”. This character has two components comprising “prevent” and “military” that represents China’s passive position on the use of force.¹⁵⁵ In practice however, China is slightly shifting its position on intervention as it realises that the protection of individual rights is increasingly accepted as a new norm in the international community.¹⁵⁶

2.2.1 Voting Behaviour towards UN Activities Invoking Chapter VII

It is noteworthy that there is a marked trend towards international intervention being accepted by the Chinese government.¹⁵⁷ When reviewing Chinese practice, its leaders have committed to a series of endeavours in multilateral practice that have gradually modified China’s traditional stance on intervention and a sovereign’s role in Chinese diplomacy. Yesi Choedon, a leading expert in foreign policy studies, explains the Chinese progress towards UN peacekeeping as “significant examples of China’s active participation in the UN”.¹⁵⁸ This trend is also reflected by the Chinese voting behaviour at the Security Council. As indicated in Table 2.1, from 1994 to 2014, the Security Council adopted thirty-six resolutions out of thirty-seven proposals that were intended to authorise the establishment of peacekeeping operations (China vetoed one draft regarding the case of Guatemala). Among these resolutions, China voted in favour of twenty-nine without reservation and supported another six with reservations. Also, China abstained once (see Table 2.1).

In order to present the extent to which the principle of non-intervention may influence China’s voting behaviour in relation to UN peacekeeping activities at the Security Council, this section introduces three terms for analytical purpose: First, “Matching” represents that China’s vote is consistent with the non-intervention principle which it

¹⁵⁴ The Ministry of National Defence, *China’s National Defence in 2010* (White Paper, 2010) available at < http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-03-31/content_4249942.htm > accessed 9 November 2012.

¹⁵⁵ Cai Shangsi, *中国古代学术思想史论 [The Ancient China’s Intellectual History]* (Guangdong People’s Press 1990) 170-171.

¹⁵⁶ Michael Mandelbaum, ‘The Reluctance to Intervene’ (1994) 95 Foreign Policy 14.

¹⁵⁷ Jing-dong Yuan, ‘Multilateral Intervention and State Sovereignty: Chinese Views on UN Peacekeeping Operations’ (1998) 2/49 Political Science 276.

¹⁵⁸ Yesi Choedon, ‘China’s Stand on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Changing Priorities of Foreign Policy’ (2005) 1/41 China Report 41; Samuel Kim also reaches a similar conclusion, and he added that Beijing is demonstrating its desire and willingness to boost its international role and reputation. See, Samuel S Kim, ‘China’s Path to Great Power Status in the Globalisation Era’ (2003) 1/27 Asian Perspective 70.

alleged (China opposed those peacekeeping mandates which were authorised by Chapter VII of the UN Charter). Second, “Negative” means China did not fully support those resolutions that did not invoke Chapter VII. Third, “Positive” formulates that China neither blocked the action of the Security Council with a negative vote nor added any reservation to those resolutions approving coercive measures under Chapter VII.

Table 2.1 China’s Voting Records at the Security Council
Regarding the Establishment of UN Peacekeeping Missions from 1994 to 2014*

Mission Name	Resolutions Referring to Chapter VII	China’s Voting Behaviour	Assessment
United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group	–	In Favour of	Matching
United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	–	In Favour of	Matching
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III	–	In Favour of	Matching
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	Yes	In Favour with Reservations	Matching
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force	Yes	In Favour with Reservations	Matching
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	–	In Favour of	Matching
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	Yes	In Favour with Reservations	Matching
United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	–	In Favour of	Matching
United Nations Support Mission in Haiti	–	In Favour with Reservations	Negative
United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	–	In Favour of	Matching
United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	–	In Favour with Reservations	Negative
United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti	–	In Favour with Reservations	Negative
United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	–	In Favour of	Matching
UN Civilian Police Support Group	–	In Favour of	Matching
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic	–	In Favour of	Matching
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	–	In Favour of	Matching
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	Yes	Abstention	Matching

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	-	In Favour of	Matching
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	-	In Favour of	Matching
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
United Nations Mission in Liberia	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
United Nations Operation in Burundi	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
United Nations Mission in the Sudan	-	In Favour of	Matching
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	-	In Favour of	Matching
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria	-	In Favour of	Matching
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic	Yes	In Favour of	Positive
		Matching: 19	
		Positive: 14	
		Negative: 3	

* The figures come from UN Security Council verbatim record, available at:

< <http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/> >

Analysis on the Chinese Voting Behaviour

First, the *Matching Votes*: as indicated by Table 2.1, China voted in favour of fifteen resolutions which did not invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In addition, China supported three of these resolutions with reservations, which established peacekeeping forces with coercive measures. They are the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO – 1995),¹⁵⁹ the United Nations Preventive

¹⁵⁹ UNCRO was authorised by the Security Council Resolution 981. The mandates of UNCRO focus on the security protection and freedom of movement of UN peacekeepers in the Former Yugoslavia.

Deployment Force (UNPREDEP – 1995),¹⁶⁰ and the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES – 1996)¹⁶¹. China also abstained when the Security Council considered deploying the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK – 1999).

In March 1995, the government of China decided to vote in favour of Resolutions 981 and 983 regarding the case of the former Yugoslavia, considering that “the establishment of UNPROFOR was requested by the parties concerned and the Secretary-General has offered revisions to their mandates”.¹⁶² However, Wang Xuexian, the Chinese representative to the UN, proclaimed after voting on Resolution 983 that the Chinese delegation “has reservations about taking enforcement action and about the use of force in peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII of the Charter”.¹⁶³ Wang also suggested “UN peacekeeping operations should conform strictly to the purposes and principles of the Charter”.¹⁶⁴ Qin Huasun and Wang Xuexian, the Chinese Ambassadors to the UN, also alleged similar concerns in 1996 and 1997.¹⁶⁵ Qin stated that China always emphasised respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia and it was not necessary to invoke Chapter VII in the authorisation due to parties in the conflict in Croatia explicitly pledging their cooperation.¹⁶⁶ According to Qin’s speech, China attempted not only to find an appropriate and lasting solution to the conflict by peaceful negotiations, but also to reiterate its reservations on peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII of the Charter.

While China has voted in favour of the majority of resolutions that authorise

UN Security Council Resolution 981, S/RES/981, 31 March 1995, p. 2.

¹⁶⁰ UNPREDEP was authorised by Security Council Resolution 983. UN Security Council Resolution 983, S/RES/ 983, 31 March 1995, p. 2.

¹⁶¹ UNTAES was authorised by the Security Council Resolution 1037, mandating to ensure security and to protect the local transitional authority. UN Security Council Resolution 1037 S/RES/1037, 15 January 1996, p. 3.

¹⁶² UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3512th Meeting, S/PV. 3512, 31 March 1995, p. 28.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ It is noted that although resolution 1118 did not clearly invoke Chapter VII, China expressed its reservations to certain functions that might potentially infringe sovereignty. Wang Xuexian argued that “as a principle, the UN Security Council should not get involved in matters that fall within the terms of reference of other United Nations bodies and China reserved on provisions of the resolution, such as the transformation of UNITA into a political party and the transformation of the UNITA radio station into a non-partisan broadcasting facility.” See, UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3795th Meeting, S/PV. 3795, 30 June 1997, p. 31.

¹⁶⁶ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3619th Meeting, S/PV. 3619, 15 January 1996, p.13.

peacekeeping with coercive measures, it still occasionally introduced its position in respect to non-interference. In June 1999, based on the fact that UNMIK had been established, China declared its opposition, using the *Declaration on Group Eight Minister of Foreign Affairs* as a basis.¹⁶⁷ China abstained in the vote and Shen Guofang, Chinese vice-representative to the UN, explained China's abstention at the general debate, noting that the "draft resolution has failed to fully reflect the principle of non-intervention and mutual respect for sovereignty; it has also failed to impose necessary restrictions on the invoking of Chapter VII of the UN Charter; China, therefore, has great difficulty to vote in favour of the draft resolution."¹⁶⁸

The "Matching" vote, in total, accounted for 80 percent of all the twenty votes between 1994 and 2014. This result demonstrates that the principle of non-intervention is still pivotal in Chinese policy towards UN interventions.

Second, in the *Negative Voting Behaviour*: from 1994 to 2014, China presented opposition to three UN resolutions, none of which invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter or imposed a coercive sanction: They are as follows: 1) In 1996, China voted in favour of Resolution 1063 that authorised the dispatch of the United Nations Support Mission (UNSMIH), but with reservations;¹⁶⁹ 2) In 1997, China vetoed the draft resolution concerning the deployment of a military observer group in Guatemala;¹⁷⁰ 3) In 1997, China also supported, with reservations, Resolution 1123 that was intended to establish the United Nations Transitional Mission in Haiti (1996).¹⁷¹

In the case of Haiti, China opposed a Security Council mandate, which authorised to deploy a new peacekeeping mission replacing the preceding one. The Chinese representative to the UN subsequently proclaimed that there was no need for the Security Council to maintain military personnel in Haiti as the peacekeepers had

¹⁶⁷ This declaration contained peace-enforcement measures, that were determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution; acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UN Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999.

¹⁶⁸ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 4011th Meeting, S/PV. 4011, 10 June 1999, pp. 13-14.

¹⁶⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 1063, S/RES/1063, 28 June 1996, p. 2.

¹⁷⁰ UN Document S/1997/18, vetoed by China, 10 January 1997.

¹⁷¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1123, S/RES/1123, 30 July 1997, p. 2.

successfully concluded their mission.¹⁷² Nevertheless, any possible connection in relation to China's negative voting behaviour in regards to the principle of non-intervention is by no means clear. It therefore can be assumed that China's decision to veto resolutions regarding sending peacekeepers to Guatemala and the threatened veto of the Security Council's attempt to dispatch peacekeepers to Haiti was motivated by its territorial claim on Taiwan.¹⁷³ As Shen Guofang has observed, "Guatemala cannot expect on the one hand to do something that harms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China while on the other hand requesting China to cooperate in peacekeeping".¹⁷⁴

Third, in the *Positive Voting Behaviour*: from 1994 to 2014, China voted in favour of fourteen resolutions without reservation (Table 2.1). Table 2.1 illustrates that since 1998, China has fully agreed to Security Council resolutions concerning the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the Kosovo case being the only exception, although these resolutions had frequently invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In light of the development of peacekeeping, Kofi Annan acknowledged the trend towards invoking Chapter VII in the Security Council when establishing UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁷⁵ This evolution, nevertheless, demonstrated the significance of the protection of civilians, which has been accepted by the international community. Thus, China perceived the necessity of making a compromise by shifting its long-lasting policy on the principle of non-intervention. The research will analyse China's policy towards UN interventions and subsequently categorise the stages of its policy change, whilst reviewing related articles from the *People's Daily*.

2.2.2 Stages of the Chinese Involvement in the UN

As the most influential newspaper in China, the *People's Daily* is selected to deliver

¹⁷² UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3676th Meeting, S/PV. 3676, 28 June 1996, p.9.

¹⁷³ International scholars' research provided evidence on this assumption. See, Richard Butler, 'Bewitched, Bothered, and Bewildered' (1996) 5/78 Foreign Affairs 9-10; Butler asserted that China prevented minor peacekeeping operations from proceeding in Guatemala and threatened to do the same in Haiti, merely because those countries had dealt with Taiwan.

¹⁷⁴ Sheng's remarks were carried by the New China News Agency. Cited from: Patrick E Tyler, 'China Asserts Taiwan's Ties To Guatemala Led to Veto' *The New York Times* (New York, 12 January 1997) <<http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/12/world/china-asserts-taiwan-s-ties-to-guatemala-led-to-veto.html>> accessed 30 March 2013.

¹⁷⁵ UN Secretary-General, 'Secretary-General Reflects on Promise Realities of His Role in World Affairs' (19 January 1999) Press Release SG/SM/6865.

the voice of the Communist Party of China to the Chinese population and to the world. This newspaper is also a way to explore China's position and policy in relation to international affairs. Thus, for analytical purposes, this research has selected articles between 1949 and 2004, relating to the UN, which were published in the *People's Daily*. Relying on these articles, this section endeavours to categorise stages in the development of Chinese policy towards the UN. In short, the direction and extent of China's participation in the UN was significantly influenced by concerns regarding respect for the principle of state sovereignty.

1949-1980: Condemnation and Confrontation

After the foundation of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, the Chinese government underwent a period of limited interaction with the UN.¹⁷⁶ From 1949 to 1971, 830 articles in the *People's Daily* criticised and condemned UN approved forces,¹⁷⁷ which accounted for 38.18 per cent of the total political articles in relation to the UN. This is because China maintained both political and economic isolation from the West while it struggled for the territorial integrity. In other words, the relationship between China and the UN was hostile due to a weak domestic economy and a tense relationship with the US.¹⁷⁸ However, despite published articles condemning the UN's activities, China rhetorically expressed its aspiration to resuming power at the UN. For instance, China argued that the UN would remain problematic without the participation of the country with the second-largest population of the world.¹⁷⁹

It is noteworthy to concentrate on the Chinese position during the Korean armed

¹⁷⁶ China's condemnation of the UN reached its peak in 1965. China considered UN peacekeeping operations as a tool to guarantee the profile of imperialism that would consequently undermine endeavours of people from states struggling for independence and freedom. See, (1965) 10 Beijing Review 11 (neither author's name nor article title was indicated on the journal).

¹⁷⁷ The Chinese government judged the functions of the UN negatively, such as 'the UN failed to comply with its duties' and 'the UN was a coercive tool for superpowers against people's revolution'. See, 'The UN Fails to Play A Significant Role in the Peace Consolidation and in the Security Protection' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 20 September 1959) 5; 'The United Nations Has Become A Tool for the US and the Soviet Union Suppressing People's Revolution' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 14 June 1967) 6.

¹⁷⁸ Zhao Lei, 建构和平: 中国对联合国外交行为的演进 [Constructing Peace: The Involving Approach towards the United Nations] (Jiuzhou Press, 2007) 22-23.

¹⁷⁹ '美国在联合国的勾当 [The US Business at the United Nations]' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 28 September 1959) 7; '美帝操纵联合国剥夺中国代表权损害不了中国, 中国在全世界的威望越来越高 [China's Influence in the World is Increasing]' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 30 November 1967) 6.

conflict (1950-1953). China expressed fewer criticisms of the UN, compared with the number of condemnations made prior to the conflict.¹⁸⁰ This phenomenon presents the controversial nature of Chinese policy towards the so-called “peacekeeping forces”. On the one hand, China considered that the UN had lost its legitimacy when it began supporting the aggressive policy of US hegemony.¹⁸¹ On the other hand, China expected that the UN could act impartially and impose punishment against an aggressor (particularly the US).¹⁸² China also believed that UN resolutions relating to the conflict were illegal, as it felt the US had coerced the UN into adopting them.¹⁸³ However, China was disappointed in the UN, in particular following the adoption of a series of resolutions against China's territorial claims. For instance, in 1955 New Zealand submitted a proposal to the Security Council that the situation in Taiwan and mainland China was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁸⁴

In fact, during the first three decades after 1949, China's opposition to the military interventions carried out by Western states under the authorisation of the UN has been long acknowledged. As early as 1959, China described peacekeeping forces in pejorative terms, such as “aggressor”,¹⁸⁵ “devil”¹⁸⁶ and “committed numerous crimes”.¹⁸⁷ Articles in the *People's Daily* indicate Chinese opposition to “illegal”

¹⁸⁰ Zhao Lei, 建构和平：中国对联合国外交行为的演进 [Constructing Peace: The Involving Approach towards The United Nations] (Jiuzhou Press, 2007) 24.

¹⁸¹ ‘美帝继续玷污联合国 [The US Hegemony is Discrediting the UN]’ *People's Daily* (Beijing, 11 July 1950) 4; ‘联合国大厦只剩一块招牌 [The UN is more in Name than Reality]’ *People's Daily* (Beijing, 21 July 1950) 4.

¹⁸² ‘京市总工会等七人民团体致电联合国安理会，要求制裁美国侵略 [The Beijing Trade Union and other Six Unions Request the UN Security Council Imposing Sanction Against the US]’ *People's Daily* (Beijing, 3 September 1950) 2.

¹⁸³ ‘向联合国抗议美帝侵朝，国际群众组织函电纷飞 [Non-international Organisations Protest the US Invading North Korea]’ *People's Daily* (Beijing, 4 September 1950) 4; ‘北京人民继续抗议美帝暴行，劳动模范代表电安理会，要求制裁美国侵略 [Protests Continue: Model Worker Representatives Called the US Punishing the US]’ *People's Daily* (Beijing, 8 September 1950) 4.

¹⁸⁴ Article 35, Repertory, Supplement 1, volume I (1954-1955), para 15-16

< http://legal.un.org/repertory/art35/english/rep_supp1_voll-art35_e.pdf > accessed 12 June 2014; Mao Zedong, ‘关于恢复中国在联合国的合法席位问题 [To Restore the Legitimate Seat to the UN]’ in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (eds), 毛泽东外交文选 [*Mao's Selected Works on Diplomacy*] (Central Literary Contributions Publishing Bureau 1994) 263.

¹⁸⁵ ‘联合国当局不迫使比利时军队撤走却破坏刚果主权 [The UN Infringes the Congolese Sovereignty]’ *People's Daily* (Beijing, 22 August 1960) 6.

¹⁸⁶ ‘卢蒙巴总理指出应拒绝联合国的“服务” [Premier Lumumba Urged to Refuse UN's Operations in the Congo]’ *People's Daily* (Beijing, 8 August 1960) 5.

¹⁸⁷ ‘联合国军在刚果四年侵略罪行 [Coalition Forces' Four Years Crimes in the Congo]’ *People's Daily* (Beijing, 2 July 1964) 4.

peacekeeping operations.¹⁸⁸ China's objections were also raised to the inclusion of UN approved peacekeeping operations owing to the invasion of Syria¹⁸⁹ and intervention against the revolution in Hungary¹⁹⁰ (1996 and 1956, respectively).¹⁹¹

The year 1971, however, witnessed a dramatic change in Chinese foreign policy towards the UN. The change could be portrayed as shifting from confrontation to cooperation.¹⁹² When taking an overview of articles published in the *People's Daily* in 1971, articles critical of the UN accounted for a mere 3.13 percent of the total articles, far lower than the percentage in 1969.¹⁹³ Based upon such findings, it might be concluded that the reason for the Chinese policy revision was because of the restoration of what it considered its lawful rights in the UN.¹⁹⁴ However, due to inadequate preparation in joining the UN, China was reluctant to participate in UN activities. In this regard, in February 1974 Mao Zedong therefore submitted that in the struggle against hegemony, it was necessary for China to ally with countries in the Third World.¹⁹⁵ Two months later, the policy was developed and interpreted by Deng

¹⁸⁸ 'The United Nation's Forces Illegally Use military Against the Katangese Residence' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 26 November 1960) 4; "The United Nation's Forces Are Swagging Stanleyville" *People's Daily* (Beijing, 3 September 1961) 5, 'The UN Has No Authorisation to Intervene in the Indo-Chinese Situation' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 24 August 1964) 4; 'Coalition Force Committed Crimes in the Congo' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 2 July 1964) 4; 'The UN Has Done Sorts of Evil in Cambodia' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 6 January 1966) 3; 'The UN As Not Allowed to Intervene in the North Korea' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 24 December 1966) 3; 'The UN – Reactionary Forces from the Case in the Middle East' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 14 June 1967) 4.

¹⁸⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 228, S/RES/228, 25 November 1966, p. 3.

¹⁹⁰ UN General Assembly Resolution 1004 (ES-II), A/3355, 4 November 1956, p. 2.

¹⁹¹ '尼赫鲁揭露英法以蓄意违反联合国决议，指出由联合国干涉叙利亚选举是侵犯国家主权 [Nehru Pointed Out that the UN has no Authority Interfering the Referendum in Hungary]' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 18 November 1956) 6; '联合国无权派观察员到匈牙利去 [Deploying Observer Groups to Hungary is beyond the UN's Authorisation]' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 10 December 1956) 5.

¹⁹² Mu Xuequan, 'China Highlights Four "Dos", "Don'ts" in Developing International Relations' (*Xinhua News Agency*, 24 February 2015) < http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2015-02/24/c_127512990.htm > accessed 15 March 2015.

¹⁹³ In 1969, the number of articles addressed criticism on the UN accounted for 71.43 percent of the total articles published in the *People's Daily*. See, Zhao Lei, 建构和平：中国对联合国外交行为的演进 [Constructing Peace: The Involving Approach towards The United Nations] (Jiuzhou Press, 2007) 27.

¹⁹⁴ UN General Assembly Resolution adopted at 1976th Plenary Meeting, A/RSE/2758 (XXVI), 25 October 1971, p. 2.

¹⁹⁵ The Three Worlds Theory, developed by Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong, posited that international relations comprise three politico-economic worlds: the first world consisting of superpowers, the second world of lesser powers, and the third world of exploited nations. Notably, Chairman Mao included the US and the Soviet Union in the First World group of countries which, respectively, engaged in imperialism and social imperialism. Japan, Europe, and Canada comprised the Second World under this theory as developed Northern countries while the whole of Asia (except Japan, Africa, and Latin America) formed the Third World. See, '毛泽东提出划分三个世界理论 [Chairman Mao Proposed the Theory of the Three World]' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 22 February 1974) 5.

Xiaoping, Mao's successor, at the Sixth Special Committee of the UN and confirmed that being a developing country and belonging to the Third World were two fundamental policies in China's diplomacy.¹⁹⁶

In addition, the protection of state sovereignty was another core concern of the Chinese government when participating in UN activities. For instance, Deng's speech at the UN claimed:

The continuation of arms races between two superpowers has threatened the independence and security of all nations. The superpower, which flaunts the label of socialism has dispatched its armed forces to occupy its "ally" Czechoslovakia and instigated the war to dismember Pakistan.¹⁹⁷

In short, as there were few interactions between China and the UN in the first decade after 1971, it is easy to evaluate this relationship. However, compared to the entire criticisms of the UN in the 1950s and 1960s, China gradually realised the significant role of the UN in promoting its national interests in the 1970s.¹⁹⁸ In order to increase integration with the global economy, China participated in eight UN affiliated international institutions.¹⁹⁹

1980-1990: Economic Cooperation

From 1980 to 1990, after undergoing three decades (1949-1979) of antagonistic relations with the UN, China began to tentatively cooperate with the UN. The motivation behind this was the Chinese "opening-up" policy, which was first proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. As Pang Sen observes, "the progress of China's

¹⁹⁶ Deng Xiaoping, 'Speech by Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Teng Hsiao-Ping, At the Special Session of the UN General Assembly', 10 April 1974, The Commercial Press 4-8.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 8-9.

¹⁹⁸ Madelyn C Ross, 'China's International Economic Behaviour' in Thomas W Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Clarendon Press, 1998) 435.

¹⁹⁹ The eight institutions are: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). For further detail, see Wang Yizhou, *中国外交六十年 1949-2009 [An Historical Overview on Sixty Years Chinese Foreign Affairs 1949-2009]* (China Social Science Press, 2009) 43; Gerald Chan, *China's Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection, Human Rights* (World Scientific Publishing, 2005) 51.

integration into the UN regime was accelerating” after it adopted such a policy in December 1978.²⁰⁰

According to Deng’s ideology, territorial solidarity and a peaceful international environment are two preconditions that need to be accomplished in order to develop the Chinese economy.²⁰¹ Therefore, China realised the significance of cooperating with the UN. Accordingly, in March 1986, Premier Zhao Ziyang referred to the UN Charter for the first time in his expression of Chinese foreign policy. He mentioned that China would not only advocate the principles of the UN Charter, but also support all UN activities based on the spirit of the Charter.²⁰² If read literally, it may give the impression that China was ready to cooperate with the UN in all aspects, however, opposition was still raised due to the lack of political trust China had in the UN. In this regard, it could be concluded that the progress of China’s interaction with the UN is merely a focus on economic co-operation.²⁰³

In the aspect of the maintenance of world peace and security, although China had no substantive involvement, there was also a noteworthy trend towards undertaking obligations in peacekeeping operations. For example, in December 1981 China voted in favour of Resolution 495 for the first time which extended the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).²⁰⁴ Since 1982, China agreed to pay the annual financial contribution towards peacekeeping.²⁰⁵ In 1988, China was accepted unanimously as a

²⁰⁰ Pang Sen, ‘改革开放与中国的多边政策 [China’s Opening-up Policy and Its Multilateral Diplomacy]’ (2008) 11 *World Economics and Politics* 44.

²⁰¹ Deng Xiaoping, 邓小平文选第三卷 [*Selected Works of Deng Xiao Ping Volume III*] (People’s Press 1993) 228.

²⁰² Zhao Ziyang, ‘Government Work Report of the People’s Republic of China 1986’ Section 4, para 14 (16 February 2006), < http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_200850.htm > accessed 16 June 2013.

²⁰³ In 1975, 1977 and 1978, China Co-hosting with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that commenced lessons for acupuncture, freshwater fish farming, flood forecasting, and desert investigation. In 1979, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) organised a workshop concerning the technique skills of post-grain harvests in Shanghai. In April, May and June 1980, China was entrusted to undertake three workshops entitled “Methane Skills” (hosted in Chengdu City), “Technology on Forestry Remote Sensing” (Harbin City), and “Technology on Grain Storage” (Beijing). See, Ma Youxiang, China’s Cooperation with the FAO (Chinese Agriculture Press, 2007) 1-10; Xie Qimei, *China and the UN* (World Affairs Press, 1997) 283-197.

²⁰⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 495, S/RES/495, 14 December 1981, p. 2.

²⁰⁵ James holds the opposite opinion that China was afraid of being deprived the right to vote based on Article 19 of the UN Charter. See, Alan James, ‘The Security Council: Paying for Peacekeeping’ in David P Forsythe (eds), *The UN in the World Political Economy: Essays in Honour of Leon Gordenker* (Macmillan, 1988) 25.

member of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.²⁰⁶

In summary, during the 1980s, China intensified cooperation with the UN in respect to agriculture, disease prevention, physical education,²⁰⁷ and peace and security. It is evident that Deng's "opening up" policy persuaded the Chinese leadership to adopt a positive policy in interacting with the UN. However, owing to the continuous influence of the "Three Worlds Theory", China utilised the UN as a necessary economic tool on the one hand, but cautiously cooperated with the UN in the maintenance of peace and security.²⁰⁸

1990-Present: Intensified Cooperation on International Peace and Security

Since 1990, China has developed closer relationships with the UN and engaged in substantive cooperation regarding politics, the economy, and international peace and security.²⁰⁹ China has subsequently acknowledged the significant role of the UN and has interacted with the organisation, not only requesting support for its domestic requirements from the UN, but also in delivering assistance to the rest of the world. The dynamics of China's policy towards international institutions are twofold: First, from the international relations perspective, China and the US have adopted a positive policy towards each other in order to increase co-operation since 1990. In this regard, the new partnership between two states creates an opportunity to promote China's

²⁰⁶ UN General Assembly Resolution adopted at 71st Meeting of 43rd Session, A/RES/43/59, 6 December 1988.

²⁰⁷ In 1985, Yuan Longping, a Chinese scientist, was awarded a gold medal for the prominent inventor of the world (WIPO). In 1987, Li Peng, former Primer of China, awarded United Nations Environment Programme gold medal. In 1989, China was selected as an A-level Council Members of International Maritime Organisation (IMO) indicating that China has become the one out of eight biggest marine transport countries. The other seven countries are Norway, Japan, Greece, the US, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Italy.

²⁰⁸ 我国代表团出席联合国有关会议文件集 [*Collected Documents for the Chinese Delegation to the UNJ (July-December 1979)*] (World Affairs Press 1980) 1-17; '联合国秘书长对中国记者发表讲话 [UN Secretary-General Delivers Speech to the Chinese Journalist]' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 21 September 1985) 6.

²⁰⁹ The number of international organisations China took part in could exemplify the trend. In 1977, the number of China's participation in international organisations accounted for twenty-five, thirty, and seventy percent of the total number in the US, India, and world average participation. However, in 1996, these three numbers reached seventy percent, eighty percent, and one hundred eighty percent respectively. Iain Johnston, professor in World Affairs in Harvard University, indicated that the manifestation demonstrated China beginning to consider more profit request, such as peace and security other than economic growth. See, Alastair Iain Johnston, '中国参与国际体制的若干思考 [Some Thoughts on China's Participation in International Institutions]' (1999) 7 *World Economics and Politics* 4-10.

engagement with international institutions.²¹⁰ Second, China's enthusiastic participation in international institutions was driven by economic considerations. Elizabeth Economy explained that China's policy on international institutions has evolved from idealism to practicality and from ideology to economic rationality.²¹¹

2.3 Conclusion

In the post-Westphalian era, the principle of non-intervention has been endorsed by a number of international and regional instruments as well as sovereign states' constitutions.²¹² Despite a worldwide acceptance of the R2P concept, Chinese scholars still argued that the imposition of coercive interventions in response to humanitarian related violations goes against the spirit of Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter.²¹³ In addition, Wang Huhua explained the Chinese view that the principle of non-intervention is a cornerstone of international relations, despite the fact that the Security Council authorised Member States to implement civilian protection operations.²¹⁴ In response to China's voting behaviour at the Security Council, its policy on the question of whether the imposition of the R2P based international interventions is legal, has undergone revision.²¹⁵ In this context, an analysis of China's evolving approach to UN peacekeeping and its policy revision on the principle of non-intervention will be provided in the following chapters.

²¹⁰ Wang Fan, '中美竞争相互依存关系探析 [Study on the Interdependence between China and the US]' (2008) 3 *World Economics and Politics* 25-32.

²¹¹ Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, *China Joins the World* (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999) 26.

²¹² Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood, 'The Principle of Non-intervention' (2009) 22/2 *Leiden Journal of International Law* 345-381.

²¹³ Zhang Chun and Pan Yaling, '有关人道主义干涉的思考 [Thoughts on Humanitarian Intervention]' (2000) 7 *World Economic and Politics* 71.

²¹⁴ Wang Huhua, '人道主义干涉的国际法学批判 [Legal Critics on Humanitarian Intervention]' (2002) 3 *Law and Social Development* 16-17.

²¹⁵ Shi Yinhong and Shen Zhixiong, '论人道主义干涉及其严格限制 [The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention and Strict Limitations]' (2001) 8 *Contemporary International Relations* 56-61.

3. China's Stance on Peace Operations (1949-1990)

Although China paid its respective share of the cost of UN peacekeeping operations since 1982,²¹⁶ it contributed no military personnel to such missions prior to 1990. During the 1950s and 1980s, China criticised UN peacekeeping operations for two reasons. First, China would not consent to the deployment of a UN force which did not contribute to the promotion of the peaceful settlement of relevant disputes. For instance, Qin Huasun concluded that all thirteen peacekeeping operations, which were established between 1945 and 1988, have gained recognition from the international community, except the UN Commission on Korea and the UN Operations in the Congo.²¹⁷ Second, China condemned UN peacekeeping as a form of superpower intervention that was part of hegemonic states' competition for regional influence and control.²¹⁸ In short, China's stance on UN-approved peacekeeping was that the use of force is inconsistent with the principle of non-interference as stipulated in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. In addition, China's policy towards political settlement of international conflicts remained unchanged till 1990.

In this context, this chapter explores the direction of China's peacekeeping participation between 1949 and 1990. In addition, an overview of the two instances when China vetoed UN resolutions regarding Guatemala and Macedonia are presented, which demonstrated its territorial claim over Taiwan.

3.1 No Participation (1949-1980)

3.1.1 “Standing Aside” (1949-1970)

During this period, relations between China and the UN could be described as antagonistic. With no permanent seat on the Security Council, China could only judge the UN by indirect experience. After the opposition to the Korean War (1950-1953)

²¹⁶ Ling Qing, ‘Position Paper Submitted to the Security Council with regard to Financial Share towards UN Peacekeeping Operations’ in *中国代表团联合国文件集 1981.7-12 [Selected Documents of the Chinese Delegations to the UN: August- December 1981]* (World Affairs Press, 1982) 130.

²¹⁷ Qin Huasun, ‘The Importance of Observing UN Peacekeeping Norms’ (1996) 3 *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 36.

²¹⁸ A commentary published in *Peking Review* argued that negotiations between the Soviet Union and the US in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations as aimed at establishing “an imperialist-revisionist international gendarmerie”. *Peking Review*, 23 April 1965, 28-28, cited from Jing-dong Yuan, ‘Multilateral Intervention and State Sovereignty: Chinese View on UN Peacekeeping Operations’ (1998) 2/49 *Political Science* 277.

and the deployment of the UN force in the Congo (1960-1965), China perceived that UN authorised military operations were deployed as initiatives of the superpowers under a UN flag.²¹⁹ Thus, China was highly sceptical of the efforts of UN peacekeeping due to a lack of trust in the UN. However, China's opposition to UN peacekeeping²²⁰ is contrasted with peacekeeping developments during the same period.²²¹

It is noted that the tensions between China and the UN mainly focused on the principles of non-interference and respect for state sovereignty. This can be demonstrated by the following reference to the Congo situation. China asserted that the UN's action in the Congo (Congo-Léopoldville) was a "US-controlled crime to strangle the Congolese national liberation movement, and those coalition forces with blue helmets in the name of maintaining peace seriously interfered with Congo's internal affairs."²²² Additionally, in the case of Cyprus (1964), the *People's Daily* stated that the US "dispatched military troops through the instrumentality of the Security Council to suppress and stamp out the revolutionary struggles of anti-imperialism" and therefore it concluded that during these two decades, struggle with superpowers was the norm in China's foreign diplomacy.²²³ China also held the opinion that the UN had become a US-manipulated organisation to realise its own national goals.²²⁴

Meanwhile, UN resolutions condemned China's behaviour in international affairs. For instance, after deploying the contingent referred to as "Voluntary Army"²²⁵ to North

²¹⁹ Pang Zhongying, 'China's Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping' (2005) 1/12 International Peacekeeping 89.

²²⁰ China repeatedly condemned the UN and UN peacekeeping operations, and warned that UN peacekeeping operations were a provocation to sovereign states. In 1965, China condemned the UN operation in the Congo as "protected the interests of imperialism and undermined the efforts of the peoples to win freedom and independence". See, 'UN forces in the Congo' (1965) 10 Beijing Review 15.

²²¹ During 1948 to 1990, the Security Council deployed 18 new peacekeeping operations. See, List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948-2011, <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf>> accessed 15 March 2014.

²²² '联合国在刚果利四年侵略罪行 [UN Force's Four-Year Crime on the Aggression of Congo (Leopoldville)]' *People's Daily*, (Beijing, 2 July 1964) 2.

²²³ '联合国在亚非地区的罪恶记录 [The Crime Records on Afro-Asia of the United Nations]' *People's Daily*, (Beijing, 19 November 1965) 3.

²²⁴ Yin He, 'China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations' (July 2007) Institute for Security and Development Policy (ASIA Paper) 16-17.

²²⁵ After the coalition force involvement in the conflict between North and South Korea, the Chinese

Korea, China was labelled an “aggressor” by a General Assembly resolution.²²⁶ Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister argued that:

[The] United Nations has long been controlled by the US and has today become a place where two big powers, the US and the Soviet Union, conduct political transactions. This state of affairs has not changed although dozens of Afro-Asian and peace loving countries have made no small amount of efforts in the United Nations. China need not take part in such a “United Nations”.²²⁷

After the ceasefire in Korea, China was left with feelings of resentment, which resulted in a radical judgment regarding UN actions. The condemnation and criticisms delivered, especially to UN peacekeeping operations, lasted from 1949 to 1964. Jing Ye stated that it was always an imperialist operation under a UN flag and that the operations “open a convenient door to imperialist intervention in the new independent sovereign nations in the name of the UN”.²²⁸ Huang Hua, the first Chinese ambassador to the UN, also argued that UN operations in this period were “launched by superpowers in the name of the UN against the UN Charter”.²²⁹ In fact, anti-imperialism and opposition to hegemony were primary objectives in China’s strategy. In reality, China opposed any potential interference in its own internal affairs and any attempt to split its territory, such as in the case of the Taiwan and Xinjiang issue.²³⁰

3.1.2 “Three Denied Policies” (1971-1980)

Since the late 1970s and the whole of the 1980s, China’s strict non-intervention stance in the context of state sovereignty was a barrier to Beijing playing a substantial role in the UN.

government dispatched a contingent to support North Korea. However, there was no official declaration of this to the Coalition Forces and China called the contingent the ‘Voluntary Army’. Also China’s military action in North Korea was known as ‘Kang Mei Yuan Chao [helping North Korea people fight against American invaders] (English translated by the author)’. Regarding the fact that military action was not officially declared, China used the name ‘voluntary army’ instead of ‘the People’s Liberation Army’, which shows the army was organised by volunteers not by the government. See, Mao Zedong, *建国以来毛泽东文稿 [Mao’s Manuscript since New China Established]* (CCCP Party Literature Research Office 1987) 539-540.

²²⁶ Intervention of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea [1951] UN General Assembly Resolution adopted at 327th Meeting, A/RES/498 (V), 1 February 1951, p. 1.

²²⁷ Chen Yi, ‘Chen Yi condemns the UN’ (1965) 3 Beijing Review 11-12.

²²⁸ Those operations included the UN Emergency Force (‘UNEF’), the UN Observation Group to Lebanon (‘UNOGIL’), and the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC). See, Jing Ye, ‘蓝盔部队-联合国维持和平部队 [Blue Helmets-the UN Peacekeeping Forces]’ (1988) 21, World Affairs 26.

²²⁹ Huang Shuhai, ‘联合国为美好世界而奋斗 [The UN Is Fighting for A Better World: Interview with Huang Hua]’ (1985) 19 World Affairs 2.

²³⁰ China’s policy is reflected by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

3.1.2.1 Policies towards UN Peacekeeping

As a response to General Assembly Resolution 1668, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 that recognised the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate representatives of China at the UN.²³¹ However, as described in the previous section, in the first decade since 1971, China's policy towards the Security Council, and thus to UN peacekeeping operations, remained unchanged. Beijing demonstrated its dissociation from peacekeeping activities by adopting what is termed the "three denied" policies. The policies were as follows: 1) China would boycott voting on all resolutions concerning UN peacekeeping operations;²³² 2) China would not participate in any Security Council debate on peacekeeping;²³³ 3) China refused to accept any financial burden and fulfil its obligations to peacekeeping operations.²³⁴

To this extent, China judged UN peacekeeping operations as a temporary ceasefire mission without solving the basic problem that generated the armed conflict.²³⁵ In the case of Lebanon in 1978, Lai Yanli, China's representative to the UN, stated:

[The] Chinese delegation has studied the draft resolution submitted by the US contained in document S/12610. We deem it necessary to point out that in the first place the draft fails to condemn the Israeli armed aggression against Lebanon and to support the just struggle of the Arab and Palestinian people. China has always held a different position in principle on the question of sending United Nations forces, because such a practice may pave the way for super-power interference. China therefore expresses its reservation and has decided not to participate in the voting on the draft.²³⁶

The statement identified that China was anxious about the abuse of power. It also demonstrated a lack of confidence in UN peacekeeping operations.

²³¹ UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, adopted at 1976th Meeting, A/RES/2758 (XXVI) 25 October 1971.

²³² 'Zhuang Yan's Statement on the Establishment of the UNDOF' *Collected Documents on the Chinese Delegation to the UN* (People's Press, 1974) 38-39.

²³³ Wang Jie, 联合国行使否决权纪实 [Veto Power at the UN] (Morden World Press, 1998) 447.

²³⁴ 'Xing Songhe's Statement on 1973 UN Financial Budget' *Collected Documents on the Chinese Delegation to the UN 1973* (People's Press, 1973) 173.

²³⁵ Zhang Huiyu, 'The Analysis on the Influence of China's Participation on UN Peacekeeping Operations' (2009) 5/11 International Forum 25.

²³⁶ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 2074th Meeting, S/PV. 2074, 19 March 1978, pp. 33-34.

Furthermore, in 1972, when the Fifth Committee considered the financial issues of UN peacekeeping, vice-representative to the UN Xing Songhe stated:

[The] financial shortages of the UN were mainly caused by deploying so called ‘UN forces’ under the control of the U.S. (together with other Western capitalist powers) and the Soviet Union.²³⁷

In 1973, China expressed its objection to the dispatch of UN forces to the Middle East and consequently refused to pay the expenses for the UN Emergency Force (UNEF).²³⁸

However, China did not make its position clear in the Security Council in the 1970s, except for one occasion. This was the first time that China confronted the superpowers in the course of the Security Council debate on the establishment of UNEF II on 25 October 1973. Huang Hua’s polemics during the debate partly revealed the reason for China’s policy. To the Chinese, Huang said, “dispatched emergency forces would bring the Arab people and the UN endless trouble... [And] China had always been opposed to the dispatch of UN peacekeeping forces”.²³⁹ From a legal perspective, it is noted that as a veto-pledged Permanent Member State, China declined to veto the authorising resolution for UNEF II. And from 1971 to 1981, compared to the opposition to contributing peacekeeping, China rarely used its veto power to block the adoption of resolutions for peacekeeping deployments. For example, in this period, the UN was able to deploy three peacekeeping forces into the Middle East without any Chinese hindrance.²⁴⁰ In this respect, an explanation of the contradiction between China’s rhetoric and practice in the interpretation and implementation of the non-intervention principle is important.

3.1.2.2 Chinese Foreign Policy Initiatives

The reasons for the adoption of the “three denied” policies is twofold. First, China was unfamiliar with the operational system of the UN and the ghost of the Korean

²³⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 中国代表出席联合国文件 [*The Documents of China’s UN Delegations*] (People’s Press 1973) 175.

²³⁸ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 1752nd Meeting, S/PV. 1752, 27 October 1973, p. 1.

²³⁹ ‘The UN Emergency Force to the Middle East’, *People’s Daily*, (Beijing, 27 October 1973) 4; UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 1750th Meeting, S/PV. 1750, 25 October 1973, p. 6.

²⁴⁰ They are: the UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II), the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

police action allowed China to suspect the sincerity of the UN's impartiality. Second, the break out of the Culture Revolution led the Chinese leaders to adopt unbalanced foreign policies.

From the Chinese perspective, the two superpowers (the U.S. and the Soviet Union) interfered in other countries' internal affairs through instruments camouflaged as UN peacekeeping operations. Under the "Left (radical)" deviation ideology, China judged the functions of the UN with prejudice.²⁴¹ In this circumstance, a limited number of Chinese scholars published separate opinions that confirmed the UN's crucial role in the maintenance of world peace. Ling Qing, for example, made a positive statement when he analysed the relationship between China and the UN in the early stage of the opening-up and reform policy. Ling argued that UN peacekeeping forces played an important and effective role with respect to serious armed conflicts within states, thus indicating that the UN was not exclusively serving the interests of superpowers.²⁴²

The year 1978 provided a possibility for China to conduct a more positive foreign policy. According to the "opening-up" policy, the target of Chinese foreign policies would be determined in accordance with the rule that:

China's new tenets aimed at expanding rural income and incentives, encouraging experiments in enterprise autonomy, reducing central planning, and establishing direct foreign investment in Mainland China. Also, it is important for China to accelerate the pace of legal reform.²⁴³

Pursuant to these aims, the "Ten-year Plan" drafted by Mao's successor, Hua Guofeng, in early 1978 was abandoned on the ground that China had neither financial expenditure nor the technical expertise to carry it out.²⁴⁴ Instead, a more modest

²⁴¹ The "Left Deviation" reflects pessimism on Chinese foreign affairs and the further of China. See, Michael Yahuda, 'Chinese Foreign Policy After 1963: The Maoist Phases' (1968) 36 *The China Quarterly* 108; Shi Yinhong, '中国的变迁与中国外交战略分析 [Analysis of Chinese Foreign Strategies Based On the Transition of China]' (2006) 1 *International Politic Studies* 37.

²⁴² Ling Qing, '改革开放初期的中国与联合国[China and the UN, in the Early Years of Reform and Opening-up]' (2005) 14 *General Review of the Communist Party of China* 19.

²⁴³ Deng Xiaoping emphasised economic development at the pivotal Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Congress, which opened on 22 December 1978. Deng's reform policies were summed by the Four Modernisation, including the modernisation of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and military. See, CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, 邓小平年谱 1975-1997 [*Chronological Biography of Deng Xiaoping 1975-1997*] (CCCP's Literature Press 2004) 495.

²⁴⁴ Huang's "Ten-year Plan" was significantly influenced by the "Lift Deviation", which requested the country to complete a series of impractical plan. See, 'We, Should Unite and Strive to Build A Modern

“Five-year Plan” was established in pursuit of light industry and consumer production.²⁴⁵ In this regard, China seemed to formulate strategies to promote its economic level and this led to it seeking an opportunity to integrate into and be accepted by the international community. Unfortunately, China could not revise its role at the UN and become a major participant. There were a number of reasons for this state of affairs:

First, as previously discussed, China still held certain limitations in its approach to the UN due to adverse impressions formed on several occasions during the Mao era. This situation has been well demonstrated within the UN system, which identified China as a human rights offender. For instance, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defined citizens in Tibet and Macao as the “Tibet Refugees and Macao Refugees” and sought to provide remedies for them.²⁴⁶ In this regard, China refused to accept any multilateral aid from the UN. Meanwhile, the lack of coordination between China and UN at the international level made China believe that UN humanitarian relief operations were an intervention in its internal affairs.²⁴⁷ On the other hand, as a newly emerged socialist state, China was not capable of voicing its opinions within the UN as other Permanent Member States could do. Therefore, the Chinese leaders decided to unite those countries that belonged to the Third World.²⁴⁸ This policy later became an enduring basic principle of China’s diplomatic policy. As Deng Xiaoping declared “China is a developing nation, and it belongs to the Third World. The Chinese Government and its people firmly supported all the oppressed peoples and nations in their just struggles.”²⁴⁹

Powerful Socialist Country’ The Government Report on the 1st Plenary Meeting of the Fifth National People’s Congress (26 February 1978), published on the People’s Daily (Beijing, 7 March 1978) 1, paras 38-40.

²⁴⁵ Fang Weizhong, ‘The Commentary to the Fifth “Five-Year Plan”’ (1983) 5 The Planned Economy 5-6.

²⁴⁶ Jin Tian, *China in the UN: Co-operation to Establishing Better World* (World Affairs Press 1999) 120.

²⁴⁷ Li Dongyan, ‘The Relationship between China and the UN Becoming Mature’ *People’s Daily* (Beijing, 24 October 2011) 23.

²⁴⁸ Foreign Ministry of China, ‘Chairman Mao Zedong’s Theory on the Division of the Three World and the Strategy of Forming an Alliance against an Opponent’ (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001) < http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18008.shtml > accessed 31 October 2011.

²⁴⁹ Deng Xiaoping pointed out that after the protracted trial of strength and struggles, the various types of political forces were currently undergoing drastic division and realignment. He said, “From the perspective of the changes that have taken place in international relations, the world today in fact have three sides or three worlds in existence which are mutually related as well as contradictory. See, Xiaoping Deng, ‘Speech by Chairman of the Delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Deng

Second, due to the domestic political chaos, it was not possible for China to take part in any international activity. In May 1966, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, which lasted until his death in 1976.²⁵⁰ This revolution imposed a socialist orthodoxy vowing “to rebel is justified (造反有理)” and was intended to rid China of “old elements” in order to enhance political purification.²⁵¹ Daily life involved shouting slogans and reciting Mao quotations.²⁵² Consequently, China nearly suspended normal progress in science and technology development for a decade. Education and public infrastructure almost came to a complete halt.²⁵³

Third, in regard of national security concerns, China was swamped with security threats from the nations with geographical proximity, such as the border disputes with the Soviet Union, India and Burma.²⁵⁴ Also, China continuously struggled with the West. After the armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the US adopted a containment strategy in the Asia-Pacific region targeting China by forming bilateral alliances and implementing an economic blockade.²⁵⁵ Yet, the vulnerable Sino-US relations were also the result of the growth of the US military threat across the Taiwan Strait. In fact, this situation lasted until 1972, when the first “*Sino-U.S. Joint Communique*” was concluded at Shanghai, that a starting symbol was provided, which

Xiaoping, at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly’, cited from <<http://marxists.org/reference/archive/deng-xiaoping/1974/04/10.htm>> accessed 31 October 2012.

²⁵⁰ Xi Xuan and Jin Chunming, 文化大革命简史 [*The General History of the Cultural Revolution*] (2ndedns, History of the Communist Party of China Press 2005) 3.

²⁵¹ Old Elements, also named Four Olds, comprised a) Old Customs, b) Old Culture, c) Old Habits, and d) Old Ideas. See, Xi Xuan and Jin Chunming, 文化大革命简史 [*The General History of the Cultural Revolution*] (2ndedns, History of the Communist Party of China Press 2005) 65-67.

²⁵² An estimated death toll of between 750,000 and 1.5 million, a similar number of people permanently injured, and 36 million who suffered some form of political persecution. The vast majority of these casualties occurred from 1968 to 1971, after the end of the period of popular rebellion and factional conflict and the establishment of provisional organs of local state power. See, Andrew G Walder and Yang Su, ‘The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Scope, Timing and Human Impact’ (2003) 173 *The China Quarterly* 74-75.

²⁵³ Political events were concentrated near urban areas and along transportation links. As Richard Baum observed and noted, China’s villages were “effectively insulated from all but the most cursory information concerning the occurrence of events elsewhere.” See, Richard Baum, ‘The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Anatomy of a Limited Rebellion’ in Thomas W. Robison (eds) *The Cultural Revolution in China* (University of California Press 1971) 367.

²⁵⁴ Border disputes among China, India and Burma originated from disputes regarding the legitimacy of the McMahon Line. The McMahon Line is regarded by the government of India as legal national border based on the *Simla Agreement*. However, China rejects the Simla Accord by maintaining that the Tibetan government was not a sovereign state and therefore did not have the power to conclude a treaty. See, Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War* (Pantheon, 1970) 46-56.

²⁵⁵ M Taylor Fravel, *Strong Borders Secure Nation* (Princeton University Press 2008) 71.

began to ease the tension between China and the US.²⁵⁶ Later, China and the US concluded two more *Joint Communiques* in 1978 and 1982 that envisaged a new partnership between the two countries.²⁵⁷ These three *Communiques* marked the move that China was making towards being a part of a “strategic triangle”, with the US and the Soviet Union.²⁵⁸ However, as the only developing state in the triangle, China was subject to more pressure from the other two leading partners. In the 1970s, as the consequence of the “Great Leap Forward (大跃进)”, the Sino-Soviet relations underwent a rapid deterioration.²⁵⁹ In addition, as the confrontation in respect to understanding the communist ideology, the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev decided to rescind the economic and infrastructure construction aid, and withdrew around 1390 Soviet experts and technicians from China, leading to the subsequent cancellation of more than 200 scientific projects.²⁶⁰

In summary, the combined effects of events at an international and national level could be seen as an explanation for China’s foreign policy throughout the 1970s. Although the relationship between China and the UN entered a new phase, China’s commencement of participation in UN issues was really only as a bystander. It was, unfortunately, China’s lack of knowledge, resources and experience that hindered its involvement in international organisations, especially the UN. China was also unfamiliar with the complex operating system of the UN, with the voting procedures, the structures and the political environment.²⁶¹ Moreover, the Cultural Revolution took place from 1966 to 1976 and was aimed at enforcing socialism into the country by removing capitalist, traditional and cultural elements from Chinese society.²⁶² The

²⁵⁶ ‘中美联合公报在上海发表 [Sino-U.S. Joint Communique concluded in Shanghai, China]’ *People’s Daily* (Beijing, 28 February 1972) 1.

²⁵⁷ In the second *Joint Communique*, 1978, China and the US officially established diplomatic relationship and exchange ambassadors.

²⁵⁸ Ma Fengshu and Li Shufeng, ‘从中美苏战略三角到中美俄战略三角 [Transfer from the Strategic Triangle of China, the US and the Soviet Union to China, the US and Russia]’ (2003) 5 *Journal of Shandong University* 115, 116.

²⁵⁹ The impact of the “Great Leap Forward” and Chinese economic depression, see Xizhe Peng, ‘Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China’s Provinces’ (1987) 13/4 *Population and Development Review* 639-670; Shige Song, ‘Mortality Consequences of the 1959-1961 Great Leap Forward Famine in China’ (2010) 71/3 *Social Science & Medicine* 551-558.

²⁶⁰ Luan Jinghe, ‘Studies on the Causes of the Sino-Soviet Split’ (2007) 6/14 *Contemporary China History Studies* 40-41.

²⁶¹ Yin He, ‘China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations’ *Asia Paper* July 2007, Institute for Security and Development Policy 19.

²⁶² Zhao Lei, ‘中国对联合国维持和平行动的态度 [China’s Attitude towards UN Peacekeeping Operations]’ (2006) 90 *Foreign Affairs Review* 82.

revolution also imposed Maoist orthodoxy on the Communist Party of China. In a decade, China suffered from this movement, which was intended to solve all contradictions among the Chinese people. This resulted in a situation where China was isolated from the world and was left with a lack of human and material resources.²⁶³ Thirdly, China emphasised the significance of uniting countries in the Third World. This proclamation unveiled China's purpose in joining the UN; being to establish legitimately its leadership in Third World countries.²⁶⁴ Fourthly, anti-imperialism was still a core duty of a Chinese diplomat.²⁶⁵ In this regard, China adopted a policy of refusing to recognise, embagoing and containing the US led capitalist camp while opposing the UN as the instrument of the US.²⁶⁶

3.2 Tentative Participation (1981-1990)

In the 1980s, as China's policy was instructed by the "opening-up" policy, it decided to adopt a more supportive policy towards the UN, which included increased positive participation in UN peacekeeping operations. According to Ling Qing, "China changed images to the UN after reform and opening up policy and promoted co-operation between China and the UN."²⁶⁷ In this regard, China adopted a flexible approach to peacekeeping since 1978. For instance, in November 1981, China officially agreed to contribute to the financial budget on peacekeeping operations from 1 January 1982.²⁶⁸ In December 1981, China voted in favour of Resolution 495 at the Security Council, extending the duration of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), marking the first ever recorded positive Chinese vote.²⁶⁹ This unprecedented voting behaviour indicated that China would actively consider whether

²⁶³ Evans S Medeiros and M Taylor Fravel, 'China's New Diplomacy' (2003) 82/6 Foreign Affairs 19.

²⁶⁴ Wei Liu, *China in the United Nations* (World Century Publishing, 2014) 114.

²⁶⁵ Huang Hua, a former Foreign Minister, proclaimed at the UN General Assembly that China insisted on the Mao's Three World theory and unified all countries, which were interfered, controlled and invaded by super powers against hegemony. See, *中国代表团出席联合国有关会议文件集/ Documents Collection on China's Participation in Relevant Meeting at the UN* (The World Affairs Press 1978) 11.

²⁶⁶ 'Against the US-led Capitalist Camp' *The People's Daily* (Beijing, 30 August 1974) 6.

²⁶⁷ Ling Qing, 'China and the UN: In the Early Years of Reform and Opening-up' (2005) 4 General Review of the Communist Party of China 18.

²⁶⁸ China's Ambassador to the UN Ling Qing's speech at the Fifth Committee of the United Nations on 27 November 1981. Cited from Zhou Qi, 'China's Attitude to the UN Peacekeeping Operation: Changes and Causes', (*China Human Rights*, 10 April 2010) <http://www.chinahumanrights.org/CSHRS/Magazine/Text/t20100521_593977.htm> accessed 3 November 2013.

²⁶⁹ The mission in Cyprus is the US's longest-running peacekeeping operation. It began in 1964. See, Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: the First Fifty Years* (Atlantic Monthly, 1995) 157; UN Document S/RES/495, adopted in 2313th Meeting, 14 December 1981, p.2.

peacekeeping operations complied with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. As the *People's Daily* noted, China recognised the function of UN peacekeeping operations in maintaining international peace and security but only up to a point, if it was “within the competence of the Security Council’s authorisation”.²⁷⁰ In October 1984, Liang Yufan, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, raised preconditions for Chinese support for peacekeeping by stating that:

As UN peacekeeping operation is an effective measure to maintain international peace and security, strengthening UN peacekeeping is a universal requirement. [...] However, peacekeeping forces must be deployed under the principles of the UN Charter. China was making endeavour to strengthen the role of the UN.²⁷¹

In 1988, after becoming a member of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Ambassador Yu Mengjia confirmed the role of peacekeeping as an “effective mechanism” for the political settlement of regional conflicts.²⁷² In May 1989, China for the first time accepted an invitation from the UN, and subsequently dispatched twenty military observers to the United Nations Transitional Assistant Group (UNTAG) to help monitor elections in Namibia.²⁷³ In April 1990, as part of a group to carry out an on-the-spot investigation in the Middle East, China deployed five military observers to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO).²⁷⁴

²⁷⁰ ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations: Images and Impressions’, *People's Daily*, (Beijing, 17 October 1984.) 23. Ling Qing also stated that “From now on, the Chinese Government will actively consider and support such United Nations peace-keeping operations as are conducive to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the preservation of the sovereignty and independence of the States concerned, in strict conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter”. UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 2313th Meeting, S/PV. 2313, 14 December 1981, para 9.

²⁷¹ Liang outlined seven principles in regard to UN peacekeeping operations: 1. China supports UN peacekeeping operations under the Charter of the United Nations; 2. UN peacekeeping forces should be dispatched with the consent of the host nations; 3. Countries or parties should co-operate with peacekeeping operations and make use of the time gained and favourable conditions created from such operations to seek political settlements of the issues in question as quickly as possible; 4. Every peacekeeping mission should have a clearly mandate; 5. UN Security Council authorises UN peacekeeping operations; 6. The expenses for peacekeeping should be fairly distributed; 7. It is necessary to formulate guidelines and to take practical measures. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations should improve its work in those two aspects. Ling delivered the speech on 15 October 1984 at the UN Special Political Session. Cited from Zhao Lei, ‘China’s Attitude on UN Peacekeeping Operations’ (2006) 4 Foreign Affairs Review 83.

²⁷² Yu Mengjia’s speech in April 1989, cited from Samuel S. Kim, ‘China’s International Organisational Behaviour’ in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (OUP, 1995) 422.

²⁷³ ‘联合国维持和平行动 [UN Peacekeeping Operations]’ (*Xinhua News*, 2 April 2003) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-04/02/content_810710_5.htm> accessed 15 February 2012.

²⁷⁴ Xing Qu, *中国外交五十年 [The 50 Years of China Diplomacy]* (Jiangsu People’s Press2000) 323.

With respect to China's incentives for supporting peacekeeping, one can say that supporting peacekeeping is seen as a method of advocating multilateral, rather than unilateral solutions to measures intended to maintain international peace and security.²⁷⁵ Its purpose is to ensure that China is not only heard, but is also heeded when deciding whether a UN intervention is legitimate. Moreover, China's involvement in peacekeeping also stems from the progress of its domestic legal system. In September 1982, China adopted a new constitution in place of the 1978 document, which emphasised foreign assistance in modernising and developing the country.²⁷⁶ This version rejected the Maoist self-reliance of the 1975 and 1978 constitutions.²⁷⁷ In this regard, the 1982 Constitution is prescribed as a symbolic sign for China shaking off the impact of the Cultural Revolution.²⁷⁸

In fact, China's policy reform in the 1980s also facilitated a change in China's foreign policy in relation to UN peacekeeping operations, which evolved from "boycotting from voting; refusing to pay expenses; and no participation" to "dealing with different circumstances in different ways".²⁷⁹ Unlike Mao (Mao's theory focused on using ideologically surcharged and confrontational terms defining international political situations), Deng's policy came to realise that a certain degree of cooperation between countries was required, although "localised conflicts were not ruled out".²⁸⁰ In 1982, China declared its "independent foreign policy for peace (独立自主的和平外交政策)", marking the abandonment of its struggle with the West in the context of ideology and prioritising the common interests of peoples of all the countries in the

²⁷⁵ International Crisis Group, *China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping* (Asia Report 166, 17 April 2009) 8.

²⁷⁶ The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Preamble, para 12.

²⁷⁷ Constitutions established in 1975 and 1978 fully reflected Maoist ideology, which were created from the Cultural Revolution. The rationale for adopting these two constitutions was the "Left Deviation". The 1978 Constitution illustrates: "The general task for the people of the whole country in this new period is: to persevere in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and carry forward the great revolutionary movements of class struggle". In this respect, the Chinese citizens enjoy the rights to "air their view fully, hold great debates and write big-character posters". See, the Preamble Chapter of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China 1978 (hereinafter: the 1978 Constitution), para 4; Article 45 of the 1978 Constitution; Fan Yi, 'Analysis of the Chinese Constitutional Doctrines from the 1960s and the 1970s' (2009) 4 Shandong Social Science 8-11.

²⁷⁸ Shen Xinwang, 'Open the Gate to Establish the Constitutional Government' *iNewsweek* (4 July 2011) 75.

²⁷⁹ Li Dongyan, 'The Relationship between China and the UN' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 24 October 2011) 23.

²⁸⁰ Prashant Kumar Singh, 'China's 'Military Diplomacy': Investigating PLA's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations' (2012) 5/35 Strategic Analysis 797.

world.²⁸¹ Moreover, as noted by a China analyst, this policy strengthens China's non-intervention position.²⁸²

For some, China uses UN peace operations in order to increase its strategic presence in the Third World countries. As Tieh noted, the shift in China's attitude resulted from "tactical and situational adaptation" rather than "normative conversion".²⁸³ Samuel Kim also stated that China's desire to balance growing American power by developing closer ties with the Third World was the main motivation for the change.²⁸⁴ When considering the adoption of the Three Worlds theory and the repeated realist practice of balancing power throughout Chinese history, this reason is compelling. During the Cold War, China's foreign policy was driven by geopolitical changes, which led China to seek to cooperate or ally itself with the weaker side against the stronger power. For instance, in the 1970s, the development of Sino-American relations was largely dictated by the technological achievements of the Soviet Union in the 1960s.²⁸⁵ Nevertheless, in the 1980s, Sino-Soviet relations recovered while the power of the Soviet Union was in decline.²⁸⁶ Thus, creating closer ties with the Third World via the UN was consistent with China's long-term foreign policy, as many Third World nations supported the function of the UN and its peacekeeping operations.²⁸⁷

²⁸¹ This policy was adopted by the National People's Congress at its twelfth session. Also, the term "Independent Foreign Policy of Peace" has six main principles, they are: a) China has all along adhered to the principle of independence. Nor does China establish military groups with other countries, or engage in arms race and military expansion; b) China opposes hegemony and preserves world peace; c) China actively facilitates the establishment of a new international political and economic order that is fair and rational; d) [indispensable principle] China is ready to establish and develop friendly relations of cooperation with all the countries on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence; e) China pursues a policy of all-dimensional opening up to the outside; f) China takes an active part in multilateral diplomatic activities and is a staunch force in preserving world peace and facilitating common development. See, Yang Jianying, 'The Independent Foreign Policy for Peace in the New Era' (1999) 4 Journal of University of International Relations 33.

²⁸² Xia Liping argued that China began to formulate its foreign policy by considering whether it is beneficial to international and regional peace rather than pursuing military superiority. See, Xia Liping, 'China: A Responsible Great Power' (2001) 10/26 Journal of Contemporary China 18.

²⁸³ Susan Tieh, 'China in the UN: United with Other Nations?' (2004) 4/1 Stanford Journal of East Asia Affairs 22.

²⁸⁴ Samuel S. Kim, 'China and the Third World in the Changing World Order' in Samuel S. Kim (eds), *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era* (Westview, 1994) 141.

²⁸⁵ The Soviet Union mastered nuclear parity in the 1960s and registered technological superiority by its launch of the first man-made satellite, *Sputnik*. See, Wu Qian, 'Reasons for the Development of Sino-American Relations in 1972' (2013) 11 Youth World 266.

²⁸⁶ H. Lynn Miller's lecture at Stanford University, 2 May 2003, cited from Susan Tieh, 'China in the UN: United with Other Nations?' (2004) 4/1 Stanford Journal of East Asia Affairs 22.

²⁸⁷ M. Taylor Fravel, 'China's Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Operations Since 1989' (1996) 36/11

In addition, domestic reasons have always been cited when analysing the motivation for China's revised positive approach to peacekeeping. As concluded by the International Crisis Group, China's engagement with UN peacekeeping is to assist in creating "a favourable international environment for its economic development".²⁸⁸ It re-evaluated what role the UN plays in China's foreign policy and reached the conclusion that China would benefit from participating in global and regional institutions. Despite not contributing peacekeepers for another decade after 1981, China began to play a limited role in peacekeeping and joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The statement of General Secretary of the CCP Hu Yaobang explained the reason why China was wary of participation in UN peacekeeping: "[i]t will prevent China from resisting the wrongs of others, and may even provide opportunities for some countries attacking China's friends. We had learnt this lesson in the past decades, and it is the long-term policy supported by the Chinese people".²⁸⁹ However, as Taylor Fravel notes, due to the fact that there were no more peacekeeping set up until 1988, China's new cooperation and positive policy on peacekeeping carried almost no political risk and little financial cost.²⁹⁰

3.3 Vetoes for Territorial Claims

As noted earlier in this chapter, Beijing has long considered state sovereignty and territorial integrity as the supreme principles when conducting both its internal and external affairs. In other words, China treats state sovereignty as indivisible, non-shareable, and non-transferable.²⁹¹ In this regard, here the fundamental issue that leads the confrontation between China and the UN is whether the principle of non-intervention could waive its priority when encountering a serious human rights

Asia Survey 1104.

²⁸⁸ International Crisis Group, *China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping* (Asia Report 166, 17 April 2009) 5.

²⁸⁹ 'Independence Is the Basic Canon' (1985) 1 Peking Review 18.

²⁹⁰ The UN nevertheless was paralysed by a series of confrontations between the East and West groups. In terms of UN peacekeeping, because of enmities towards the United States and the Soviet Union, it had faced stagnation for more than ten years from 1973 to 1987. During these ten years, the UN only deployed three new peacekeeping operations. They were: United Nations Emergency Force, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. See, M. Taylor Fravel, 'China's Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Operations Since 1989' (1996) 36/11 Asia Survey 1104.

²⁹¹ Jiang An and Li Quan, 'Post-Cold War Economics, Politics, and State Sovereignty' 152 Journal of North-eastern Normal University 34-42.

violation.²⁹² In order to provide further explanation of the question, it is helpful to review China's veto records since 1971, which offer a brief reflection of its territorial claims.

Since 1971, when compared to Russia (and its predecessor, the Soviet Union) which has cast the most vetoes (126), China cast only eleven vetoes throughout its membership.²⁹³ Since 1981, China has used its veto twice in cases associated with Taiwan. On 9 January 1997, China vetoed a Security Council resolution that attempted to authorise a group of 155 military observers and requisite medical personnel to Guatemala.²⁹⁴ Criticising the Guatemalan authorities for risking interfering in Chinese internal affairs towards Taiwan, the Chinese Ambassador Qin Huasun declared:

The question of Taiwan is a major question of principle that bears upon China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the cause of national reunification. However, the Government of Guatemala has, for four consecutive, unscrupulously supported activities aimed at splitting China at the United Nations.²⁹⁵

Whilst condemning the Government of Guatemala for violating the principles of the UN Charter and contravening General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), China sought to persuade the Guatemala authorities to withdraw their support for Taiwan and stated:

If the Government of Guatemala is indeed sincere, values its peace process and moves to remove the obstacles, the Chinese delegation may reconsider the authorisation of the deployment of military observers in Guatemala by the Security Council.²⁹⁶

Similarly, in 1999, owing to the negative vote of China, the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution authorising an extension of the mandate of UNPREDEP in

²⁹² For details of the argument regarding the legality of imposing international interventions, see, Michael Walzer, *Just, and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (4th edn, Basic Books 2006) Chapter 6 "Intervention", 95-130.

²⁹³ The US has used its veto 83 times, while Britain has used it 32 times and France 18 times. See, 'Security Council Veto List' (1946-2014). Data from 1946-2004 were taken from the official list of vetoes contained in document A/58/47, Annex III. < <http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick> > accessed 15 December 2014.

²⁹⁴ UN Document S/1997/18, 9 January 1997, para 6.

²⁹⁵ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3730th Meeting, S/PV. 3730, 10 January 1997, p. 20.

²⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 20.

Macedonia.²⁹⁷ Although the Chinese Ambassador stated that the veto was due to the financial difficulties of the UN, scholars still argued that China's decision was based on the diplomatic ties between Macedonia and Taiwan.²⁹⁸ As a matter of fact, in the 1970s and 1980s, Beijing's "One-China" doctrine had a significant impact on its decisions to support peacekeeping missions. As noted by Hu Jiaxiang, "the only peacekeeping-related vetoes that China has exercised at the Security Council have been against the establishment and extension of UN peacekeeping missions in states that had diplomatic relations with Taiwan".²⁹⁹

In fact, China's policy towards countries that had diplomatic relations with Taiwan could change, as evidenced by the peacekeeping contribution to Liberia. After Liberia recognised China's territorial integrity in 2003, China deployed its largest peacekeeping contingent in Africa to support the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).³⁰⁰ In addition, in 1997, China nevertheless withdrew its veto and voted in favour of Resolution 1094 when Guatemala terminated foreign relations with Taiwan and promised not to support Taiwan's independence any longer.³⁰¹ However, in the recent case of Haiti, it appears that China is no longer adhering to a strict policy based on territorial integrity considerations. Based on this understanding, the following parts of the study will examine selected cases in line with China's non-intervention policy.

3.4 Conclusion

It is noteworthy that the direction of Chinese participation in peacekeeping from the 1970s and the 1980s more or less reflects the progress of peacekeeping operations at that time. During the two decades, the UN had made progress in developing principles in approving peacekeeping missions based on the principle of neutrality.³⁰² During to

²⁹⁷ UN Document S/1999/201, 25 February 1999, para 9.

²⁹⁸ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3982nd Meeting, S/PV. 3982, 25 February 1999, p. 7; Michael J. Glennon, "Why the Security Council Failed" (2003) 82/3 Foreign Affairs 16.

²⁹⁹ Hu Jiaxiang, 'China's Participation in PKOs: Figures and Trends' in Andrea de Gutty, Emanuele Sommariva, and Lijiang Zhu (eds), *China's and Italy's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Lexington 2014) 49.

³⁰⁰ Safeworld, *China's Growing Role in African Peace and Security* (January 2011) 76.

³⁰¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1094, S/RES/1094, 20 January 1997, para 9; UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3732nd Meeting, S/PV. 3732, 20 January 1997, p. 3.

³⁰² Ray Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo* (CUP 2007) 3-7; In 1988, UN peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Meanwhile, the Nobel Committee cited 'the Peacekeeping Forces through their efforts have made important contributions towards the realization of one of the fundamental tenets of the United Nations. Thus, the world organization has come to play a more central part in world affairs and has been invested with increasing trust'. See, 'The Early Years'

the early 1980s, the first Reagan administration (1981-1985) pursued a policy of containment towards other nations and adopted a policy against socialist and communist governments.³⁰³ Owing to the confrontation between the West and the East, UN peacekeeping entered a dormant period, relating to the lack of effective cooperation with regional organisations.³⁰⁴ From the Chinese perspective, due to the Maoist theory of “Just War”, China treated peacekeeping as a pretext to justify superpower’s intervention in the internal affairs of weaker states.³⁰⁵ As noted earlier in this chapter, in the first decade after joining the UN, China refused to participate in the voting process to approve peacekeeping operations and it did not pay its annual peacekeeping assessment. Instead, its rhetoric criticised peacekeeping sharply. Samuel Kim describes this stage as principled opposition or non-participation.³⁰⁶ In contrast to the period of no cooperation with the UN in the 1970s, China’s membership in the UN during the later period can be characterised as an era of tentative support/participation.³⁰⁷ At this stage, China participated in the Security Council voting, although in most cases, it abstained. In this context, some international experts have concluded that China’s policy at this stage was one of “tacit cooperation” with the UN, which led to no interruptions in the authorisation and implementation processes.³⁰⁸

(UN Peacekeeping) < <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/early.shtml> > accessed 1 December 2013.

³⁰³ Felix K. Chang, ‘Reagan Turns One Hundred: Foreign Policy Lessons’ (2011) *The National Interest*, < <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/ronnie-turns-one-hundred-4829?page=1> >, accessed 12 February, 2013.

³⁰⁴ From 1948 to 1988, despite serious conflicts and crises arising in the Middle East, the UN only deployed five peacekeeping operations including UNTSO, UNEF I and II, UNDOF and UNIFIL List of Peacekeeping Operations 1978-2011, UN Peacekeeping Official Website.

³⁰⁵ Mao Zedong, ‘毛泽东论正义战争 [Mao’s Theory on Justice War]’ (the People’s Press 1990) 468-469.

³⁰⁶ Samuel S Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order* (Princeton University Press, 1979) 53.

³⁰⁷ According to Samuel Kim’s framework, this period of support/participation extended from 1982 until 1989. However, as lack of substantive participation in UN peacekeeping, the author concludes this period as “tentative participation”.

³⁰⁸ Suzanne Xiao Yang, *China in UN Security Council Decision-Making on Iraq* (Routledge 2013) 67.

4. China's Stance on Peace Operations (1990-2015)

The discussion in this chapter has both a theoretical and practical basis. This study is undertaken in order to explore the turning points or the core policies of China's position with regard to UN peacekeeping operations. It also attempts to discover the statistical history and the international context describing the number of personnel that China contributed to UN peacekeeping operations. In fact, since 1990, China's policy towards UN peacekeeping has undergone a positive change, despite this policy remaining wary of peacekeepers being authorised to use force other than in self-defence.³⁰⁹ In response to China's policy change, Samuel Kim states China's decision to support peacekeeping as a strategy to improve its international reputation.³¹⁰ Also, a number of Chinese scholars have expressed a similar opinion.³¹¹ Yet, many factors are involved in the change in China's policy, beyond those pertaining to external perceptions. The essential fact that peacekeeping itself underwent a major transformation in this period cannot be ignored. This chapter, therefore, is intended to discuss China's evolving approach to UN intervention on the basis of case analysis, and to identify the main factors influencing Chinese policy-makers. Moreover, combined with explaining China's practice in respect to UN intervention (Chapter VII), specific proposals are made to improve the normalisation of China's participation in UN peacekeeping operations and to enhance China's role as a "responsible power" in the future.

Arguably, China's current positive policy towards UN peacekeeping operations is not only consistent with international expectations, but also fulfils its short-term diplomatic strategy.³¹² By contrast, establishing the image of a "responsible power" is a long-term goal for China. However, it is inadequate to merely introduce a

³⁰⁹ Zhang Yishan, 'Statement by Ambassador Zhang Yishan on the Comprehensive Review of UN Peacekeeping Operations at the Fourth Committee' (16 October 2003, UN General Assembly 58th Session) < <http://www.china-un.org/chn/zgylhg/jjalh/alhzh/whxd/t40386.htm> > accessed 20 March 2014.

³¹⁰ Samuel S. Kim, 'China and the Third World in the Changing World Order' in Samuel S. Kim (ed), *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era* (Westview 1994) 141.

³¹¹ For example, Li Yizhong, '维和行动的制度化缺失问题研究 [The Problem of Lacking Systematization of UN peacekeeping Operations]' (2001) 2 Forum of World Economy and Politics 55-58; Xu Weidi, '摇摆与彷徨中的探索 [Exploration in Vacillation and Hesitation: The Difficulties and Challenges of UN Peacekeeping Operations]', (2005) 5 World Economics and Politics 7-13.

³¹² Pang Zhongying, 'China's Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping' (2007) 1/12 International Peacekeeping 87.

propagandistic slogan for China pursuing the goal. As a permanent member state of the Security Council and a regional power, China must focus on practical matters. In this regard, scholars suggested peacekeeping under the UN framework as a gateway for China to achieve this.³¹³

4.1 Positive Participation (1990-1999)

Over time, Chinese practice concerning the use of force and the non-intervention principle has undergone a shift. For instance, in the case of the 1990 Gulf War, China voted in favour of Resolution 660 condemning Iraq and requesting an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.³¹⁴ Samuel Kim asserted that China's acquiescence to UN-authorised use of force followed its economic and political isolation, which was a result of the student-led incident at Tiananmen in 1989.³¹⁵

Since 1988, peacekeeping operations themselves have changed from their original limited ceasefire function to multidimensional missions.³¹⁶ In the post-Cold War era, the Member States of the Security Council enhanced cooperation and this provided an environment in which to expand peacekeeping operations' mandates. The development of UN sanctions also exemplified the UN's expanding role in international affairs. For instance, the Security Council could dispatch peacekeepers to address a variety of conflicts, such as civil wars, communal conflicts, and humanitarian crises.³¹⁷ However, in practice, the content of second-generation peacekeeping operations has nevertheless led China to occasionally oppose the establishment of such operations that departed from the traditional peacekeeping model.³¹⁸

³¹³ Courtney J Richardson, 'A Responsible Power? China and the UN Peacekeeping Regime' (2011) 18/3 International Peacekeeping 287; Bonny Ling, 'China's Peacekeeping Diplomacy' (2007) 1 China Rights Forum 47; He Wenping, '达尔富尔问题与中国的作用 [China's Efforts in Solving Darfur Issue]' (2007) 11 West Asia and Africa 6-7.

³¹⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 660, S/RES/660, 2 August 1990, p. 2.

³¹⁵ Samuel Kim, 'China's International Organisation Behaviour' in Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds) *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Clarendon 1995) 422.

³¹⁶ Kai Michael Kenkel, 'Five Generations of Peace Operations: from the "Thin Blue Line" to "Painting a Country Blue"' (2013) 56/1 Rev. Bras. Political International 127.

³¹⁷ For example, the successes of UN peacekeeping in Burundi, Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti, Sudan and East Timor create a vibrant account of the resilience exhibited by the "multidimensional peacekeeping operations". See, Lise Morjé Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (CUP 2007) 299.

³¹⁸ Qian Qichen, 'Interview with Chinese Foreign Minister' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 13 March 1992) 3.

4.1.1 An Overview: Normative Principles and Incentives

By 1998, China had contributed 437 military observers in 32 groups to six UN peacekeeping operations, including the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East, United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).³¹⁹ Among those six missions, the case of Cambodia may best describe China's enthusiasm for peacekeeping due to the number of personnel contributed to the mission.³²⁰ Samuel Kim concluded that China's policy at this stage was "tacit style cooperation with international organisations".³²¹

After joining the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 1988, China's ambassador to the UN, Yu Mengjia, declared that not only China, but also the international community, had to contribute to establishing a peaceful and secure world, whilst also providing significant support to UN peacekeeping operations.³²² Accordingly, China began to support UN peacekeeping, not only voting in favour of such operations but also participating in missions.

Another reason for the change of policy was to promote national economic growth by cooperating with the international community.³²³ In order to strengthen its diplomatic power, China decided to participate in international activities, *inter alia*, the activities in the UN. Its new policy of "opening-up" to the world resulted in China's voice being heard, and enhanced its international image.³²⁴ The experience of participation

³¹⁹ The Ministry of National Defence of P.R. China, *China's National Defence 1998* (White Paper, 1998) <<http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/5.4.htm#4>> Chapter 4.

³²⁰ China praised UNTAC as "making useful contributions to the successful operations of the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Cambodia". See, Zhang Huiyu, 'China's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations', (2004) 5/20 Journal of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force Academy 17.

³²¹ Samuel S. Kim, 'International Organisations in Chinese Foreign Policy' in Thomas W. Robinson (ed.), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Clarendon 1995) 415.

³²² UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 2867th Meeting, S/PV. 2867, 9 June 1989, pp. 21-22.

³²³ Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, *China Joins the World* (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999) 26.

³²⁴ For detailed research with regard to enhancing China's international image and reputation, see Li Zhengguo, *国家形象的构建 [Building the International Image of State]* (Press of the Communication University of China, 2006); Hongying Wang, 'National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy' (2003) 1/1 China: An International Journal 46-73.

in UN peacekeeping in the Middle East provided an alternative way for China to demonstrate its policy vividly to the world other than by simply making statements.³²⁵ It also enhanced China's confidence to interact with the UN. However, the US and the Soviet Union were anxious about China's rise due to its potential capacity for rapid economic development. For instance, by the mid-1990s, the "China threat" theory was disseminated to warn the world, which created obstacles to China's development.³²⁶ This might explain why the US has never accepted China as a trusted or equal partner in global or even regional affairs. Furthermore, China had become subject to condemnation for its human rights record following the "Tiananmen Square incident" in 1989.³²⁷ Owing to this, China decided to re-emphasise the idea of "rising peacefully" and recalled the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" for its participation in international affairs.³²⁸ These principles were intended to diminish hostility and explain the benefit of China's development to the world. Besides propagandising its policy, China consequently promoted cooperation with the UN and "embraced the idea of the UN".³²⁹

In May 1997, the Chinese government decided that in principle, China should take part in the UN Standby Arrangements (UNSAS).³³⁰ As a result, China prepared to

³²⁵ Tang Yongsheng, 'China and UN Peacekeeping Operations' (2002) 9 *The World Economy and Politics* 40-42.

³²⁶ The theory operates on two levels: military and ideological. On the military level, the idea of "China threat" has been inherent to US government policies after being first expressed in a 1992 Pentagon document called the Defence Planning Guidance (DPG). At the time, DPG was considered a master blueprint for America's global dominance in the post-Cold War era. Prepared under the supervision of Paul Wolfowitz, the then US Under-Secretary of Defence, DPG called for concerted efforts to prevent the rise of any military competitor to the US. On the ideological level, the US was a benign onlooker when the Chinese economy began growing in the 1980s and 1990s. As time went by, the US began realising that not only would China maintain its socialist political system, based on its own principles of democracy, but also the State leadership would play its guiding role in the economy. See, Ross Grainger, 'What is China Threat Theory', *China Daily* (Beijing, 9 September 2010) 9.

³²⁷ Tony Saich, 'When Worlds Collide: The Beijing People's Movement of 1989' in Tony Saich (ed), *The Chinese People's Movement: Perspectives on Spring 1989* (An East Gate Book, 1990) 25.

³²⁸ Ding Zhi and Wang Dan (eds), 'In the Fifty Years Anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence Adoption' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 25 June 2004) 1.

³²⁹ Prashant Kumar Singh, 'China's "Military Diplomacy": Investigating PLA's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations', (2012) 5/35 Strategic Analysis 797.

³³⁰ The Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), currently in place for potential government, providing military, police and civilian expertise has yet to become a dependable supply of resources. After 2000, in response to recommendations on the use and improvement of the UNSAS conducted by the Panel on UN Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809), the General Assembly has endorsed a requirement to establish a traditional peacekeeping mission with 30 days and a complex mission within 90 days after receiving a mandate of the Security Council. In this regard therefore, the UNSAS provides the initial consultation process by giving clues to mission planners on what the Member State may contribute. See Military Division Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Standby Arrangement System Military Handbook* (16 April 2003). In May 1997, the Chinese government

provide future designated military observers, civilian police, and engineering, medical, transportation and other logistic service teams to UN peacekeeping operations.³³¹ In the following year, China elaborated its position towards UN peacekeeping operations officially in the 1998 *White Paper on National Defence*.³³²

First, the peacekeeping operations must adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Second, the approach to solve international dispute should consist of peaceful measures. Third, double standards should be opposed. Fourth, obtaining agreement from the country concerned beforehand, strictly observing impartiality and prohibiting the use of force except for self-defence. Fifth, be practical and the participation in UN peacekeeping operations should be consistent with China's abilities.³³³

These principles in the field of peacekeeping were published and confirmed by the Chinese government department for the first time. In the author's view, such principles reflected that China's participation in peacekeeping had become a systematic policy, on the one hand. On the other hand, by referring to these principles it may be easier to understand China's position on other UN interventions. One fact was indicated from the statement that China's primary concerns in dealing with international affairs were the protection of sovereignty and internal affairs. In addition, the Chinese government insisted that peacekeeping operations must be undertaken under the guidance of the principles of the UN Charter; the core principle being to solve international disputes and regional flashpoint issues through peaceful measures.³³⁴ China also opposed resorting to the threat or use of force, acts of aggression and expansion, as well as hegemony and power politics in any form.³³⁵

decided in principle to take part in the UNSAS. In January 2002, China formally joined the Class-A standby arrangements system, and is ready to provide the UN peacekeeping force with engineering, medical, transport and other logistical support teams when called upon. See, 'China Plays Part in UN Peacekeeping Operations' *China Daily* (Beijing, 25 January 2003) <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200301/25/eng20030125_110722.shtml>, (accessed 8 November 2011).

³³¹ Chen Jing, '中国将更积极参加维和行动 [China Will In-depth Participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations]' *China Youth Daily* (Beijing, 5 December 2013) 4.

³³² The Ministry of National Defence of P.R. China, 'China's National Defence (White Paper)', (The National Defence of P.R. China, 1998, [electronic version], <<http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/5.4.htm#4>> accessed 18 January 2014.

³³³ The fifth principle could be explained, as "a peacekeeping operation should not be undertaken when conditions are not yet ripe, nor should a peacekeeping force become a party to a conflict, which would be a deviation from the fundamental purpose of peacekeeping operations". See, The Ministry of Public Security, *China's National Defence 1998* (White Paper, 1998) [Chinese Version] Chapter 4.

³³⁴ Mu Yaping and Chen Xiaohua, 'Rethinking UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Post-Cold War Era' (2001) 6 *Law Review* 69-70.

³³⁵ The Ministry of National Defence of P.R. China, 'China's National Defence (White Paper)', (The

Following the principle of the non-use of force, China reserved, abstained, or on one occasion cast a veto in respect to resolutions under the authorisation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. China maintained that authority did not exist for any other institutions other than the UN to pursue their interests under the authorisation of UN peacekeeping.³³⁶

The 1998 *White Paper on National Defence* also recommended that the international community adopt a more reasonable approach to solve conflicts, holding that the application of political negotiation would “achieve more than the use of force”.³³⁷ This principle was reflected in China’s history, which was a successive series of struggles attempting to defend China’s sovereignty and territory. In feudal society, people resorted to force in order to replace a dynasty in China as well as to resist aggression. In the nineteenth century, the last feudal empire, the Qing dynasty resisted European aggression that gravely weakened the Qing’s domestic power.³³⁸ In 1900, the invading troops of the “Eight-Nation Alliance (八国联军)” occupied Beijing city and the Summer Palace for over a year.³³⁹ Consequently, China was forced to ratify over two hundred unequal treaties’ with fifty countries, which ceded territory and forced concessions from China.³⁴⁰ In attempting to enhance national power and resist invasion by Western countries, Qing’s central government decided to develop the “Self-strengthening Movement (洋务运动)” in order to acquire advanced technologies from Western states.³⁴¹ Unfortunately, although the policy included several reforms of the military and the government structure, it yielded almost no

National Defence of P.R. China, 1998, [electronic version], < <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/5.4.htm#4> >, Chapter Two, accessed 18 January 2014.

³³⁶ Qiao Weibing, ‘The UN Is Receiving Pressure from NATO and G8’ (2000) 3 *World Economics and Politics* 13-17.

³³⁷ Shao Shaping and Zhao Jinsong, ‘The Influence of Iraq War on the International Rule of Law’ (2003) 18/3 *Legal Forum* 9-10.

³³⁸ Jonathan D Spence, ‘The Once and Future China’ (2005) 146 *Foreign Policy* 45.

³³⁹ The Eight-Nation Alliance was an alliance of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States whose military forces intervened in China to suppress the anti-foreign Boxers and relieve the siege of the diplomatic legations in Peking (Beijing). See, Benjamin R Beede, *The War of 1898, and US Interventions, 1898-1934: An Encyclopaedia* (Garland publishing, 1994) 46.

³⁴⁰ Those treaties include: the Treaty of Nanjing (Nanking, 29 August 1842), the Treaties of Tianjin (Tianjin, 1858), and the Beijing Convention (1860). See, Tian Tao, 清朝条约全集 [*Collections of Treaties Signed in the Qing Dynasty*] (Heilongjiang People’s Press, 1999) 1-10.

³⁴¹ Wei Yuan, (the Qing Dynasty), 海国图志 [*Seaside/World Geography Records*] (first published in 1852, Yuelu Publishing, Reprinted in 2011) Preamble 1.

results.³⁴² By concentrating mainly on weapons for defence, the movement virtually ignored the need for reform of China's obsolescent political and economic institutions.³⁴³

On 4 May 1919, after the overthrow of the Qing dynasty, progressive students gathered in Tiananmen Square with the aim of establishing a more democratic and powerful society.³⁴⁴ Hu Shi, a Chinese influential philosopher, essayist and diplomat, ranked the “New Culture and May Fourth Movements (新文化与五四运动)” as significant turning points, along with the abolition of the civil service system in 1905 and the overthrow of the monarchy in 1911.³⁴⁵ In 1945, as soon as China defeated the Japanese invaders, two parties, named the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang launched the Chinese Civil War, which exhausted the country.³⁴⁶ In this regard, it is understandable that in international relations, Chinese leaders have pursued the achievement of a respectable and independent international order. In pursuit of the goal, China has formulated its ideology in international relations based on the principle of non-intervention and the peaceful settlement in international disputes.³⁴⁷ In 1999, when the US bombed the Chinese embassy in the Former Yugoslavian capital of Belgrade, the opposition to the use of force reached a peak and China subsequently adopted a more conservative policy in regard to UN approved operations with coercive mandates.³⁴⁸

In addition to the historical reasons outlined, the revolution in UN peacekeeping itself may also be taken into consideration when interpreting China's position on the principle of non-intervention. In 1991, when the Security Council intended to authorise the United Nation Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM),³⁴⁹ China

³⁴² Xie Shicheng, ‘晚晴吏治的腐败与洋务运动的失败 [The Corruption of the Qing Empire and the Failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement]’ (2001) 6 *Journal of Nanjing Normal University* 45-46.

³⁴³ Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China* (4thedn, Oxford University Press 1990) 10.

³⁴⁴ This gathering movement is named the “May Fourth Movement”. See, Edward Wang, ‘The May Fourth Movement: Ninety Years After’ (2010) 43/4 *Chinese Studies in History* 3-5.

³⁴⁵ Hu Shi, ‘*The Chinese Renaissance*’ (Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press 2001) 79-85.

³⁴⁶ Niu Jun, ‘论 1945 年至 1955 年中国外交的内向性 [Study on the Introversion of China's Foreign Policy between 1945 and 1955]’ (1999) 4 *International Studies* 26-27.

³⁴⁷ Jing Men, ‘Changing Ideology in China and Its Impact on Chinese Foreign Policy’ in Sujian Guo and Shiping Hua (eds), *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Lexington Books, 2009) 7-8.

³⁴⁸ Feng Huang News, ‘Ten Years after the China’s Embassy Bombing in the Former Yugoslavia’, Internet (Chinese Version) < <http://news.ifeng.com/history/special/nlmshiguan10years/>>, accessed 14 February 2013.

³⁴⁹ Resolution 689 adopted at this meeting that initially authorised peacekeeping under Chapter VII.

in fact opposed the peacekeeping mandate invoking Chapter VII, maintaining the authorisation to the use of force may serve as the precondition for intervention.³⁵⁰ As Tang Jiaxuan noted, NATO countries might have the possibility to exercise jurisdiction beyond their own territories and consequently establish a dangerous precedent, granting international groups other than the UN the authority to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states.³⁵¹

In the early 1990s, regardless of its progressive involvement in and contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, the Chinese government was reluctant to entirely support those missions with coercive measures, such as peace-enforcement missions under Chapter VII of the Charter.³⁵² Combined with national security concerns, China maintained that fully supported Chapter VII-based missions might incite the UN to imperil China's sovereignty through the issues in the South China Sea, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan.³⁵³ China's voting behaviour on peacekeeping in respect to the Former Yugoslavia exemplified its policy towards Chapter VII (Table 4.1).

UN Security Council Resolution 689, S/RES/689, 9 April 1991.

³⁵⁰ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 2893rd Meeting, S/PV. 2893, p. 9 April 1991; Xinhua News Agency, 'The MOF Emphasizes UN's Role in Avoiding Armed Conflict' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 8 March 2003) 4.

³⁵¹ Tang Jiaxuan, 'Tang Jiaxuan's Presentation at the UN General Assembly Fifty-Fourth Session' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 September 1999) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjb_602314/zzjg_602420/xws_603710/xgxw_603712/t8975.shtml> accessed 9 December 2013.

³⁵² UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 2963rd Meeting, S/PV. 2963, 29 November 1990, pp. 61-63.

³⁵³ Ren Weidong, 'Be Careful of the Trap of Interfering in Other States' Internal Affairs' *People's Daily Overseas Edition* (Beijing, 14 June 2013) 1; Mathieu Duchatel, Oliver Brauner, and Zhou Hang, 'Protecting China's Overseas Interests' (2014) No. 41 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 7.

Table 4.1 Relevant Resolutions Regarding Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia*

Acronym of Peacekeeping Mission	In Favour of (Resolution Doc No.)	In Favour of with Reservations	Abstentions
UNPROFOR	844, 847, 869, 870, 947, 987, 1026,	807, 815, 836, 871, 900, 908, 914, 958, 982, 1004, 1031 (Reservations concerning the applicability of Chapter VII of the UN Charter)	770 (Acting under Chapter VII to deliver humanitarian assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina) 998 (the ambiguity in the mandate of UNPROFOR will increase peacekeeping expenditure)
UNCRO	990, 994,	981, 1025 (Reservations about taking enforcement action and the use of force in peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII)	N/A
UNMIBH	1247, 1305, 1357, 1418, 1420, 1421, 1423,	1088 (Reservations were conducted on the following issues: 1. the applicability of Chapter VII; 2. Chapter VII should not apply to part III of the resolution; ³⁵⁴ 3. the multinational Stabilisation Force (SFOR) should accept the political leadership of the Security Council), 1174 (Reservations about the invocation of Chapter VII)	N/A
UNTAES	1079, 1120,	1037 (Opposition of the enforcement action under Chapter VII)	N/A
UNMIK	N/A	N/A	1244 (China opposed the imposition of external intervention. However, as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia accepted the peace proposal, China did not veto the resolution)

³⁵⁴ Part III of Resolution 1088 decided to extend the mandate of UNMIBH and also decided that the UN Police Task Force (IPTF) shall continue to be entrusted with the tasks set out in Annex 11 of the Peace Agreement. UN Security Council Resolution 1088, S/RES/1088, 12 December 1996, p. 6-7.

* Voting records available on Security Council Website: < <http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/> >; See also, Daniel Bethlehem and Marc Weller (eds), *The "Yugoslav" Crisis in International Law: General Issues (Part I)* (Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Considering these facts, it is not appropriate to draw the conclusion that China's foreign policy in the 1990s was fully based on the principle of non-intervention.³⁵⁵ In short, it is advisable that when analysing China's foreign policies, one should refer to the object and purpose of Chinese national strategy.

On the one hand, China intends to reduce confrontation with the US. In this context, it becomes clear that the abstention vote for the use of force in Iraq reflects China's political goodwill towards the US.³⁵⁶ On the other hand, it is also eager to persuade the international community to adopt a positive perception of China's development. For instance, China offered support to UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia.³⁵⁷ To reduce international tensions, China outlined five principles (indicated in the 1998 *White Paper on National Defence*) in the context of peacekeeping that demonstrated that it had no ambition to become a superpower. Indeed, China intended to eliminate the need for international vigilance, thus gaining adequate time for economic development.³⁵⁸

4.1.2 A Remarkable Contribution to Cambodia

China contributed the largest contingent of peacekeepers to Cambodia throughout 1990-1998.³⁵⁹ In fact, China's engagement in the UN mission in UNTAC was driven by its grand strategy, which was announced as part of the Government Report in 1990. The report pointed out the "need to create an independent economic and political policy" was recognised and should be taken into account.³⁶⁰ In this regard, it is

³⁵⁵ Chu Shulong, 'China, Asia and Issues of Sovereignty and Intervention' (2001) 2/1 Pugwash Occasional Papers 6.

³⁵⁶ John Calabrese, 'Peaceful or Dangerous: China's Relations with the Gulf Countries' (1992) 65/4 Pacific Affairs 478.

³⁵⁷ 'Facts and Figures of UNTAC' (UN Peacekeeping Website) < <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacfacts.html> > accessed 18 January 2013.

³⁵⁸ Robert G Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations* (3rd edn, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012) 19-20.

³⁵⁹ China dispatched two contingents to Cambodia mission, and each contingent contained 400 troops. See, The Ministry of Public Security, *China's National Defence 1998* (White Paper, 1998) [Chinese Version] Chapter 4.

³⁶⁰ The State Council, *The Government Report of the People's Republic of China in 1990* (Government Report, 20 March 1990) < http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2008-03/19/content_13027270.htm > accessed 18 March 2013, p.3; Joint Economic Committee, *China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s*

submitted that the political dynamic of China's participation in UNTAC was to protect China's existing profile and partnership with Cambodia.³⁶¹

4.1.2.1 Background

Since 1990, with the escalation of conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia, the UN began to seek solutions to restore peace.³⁶² In this respect, an international conference was held in Paris that intended to find and pursue an effective way of reconciliation.³⁶³ The UN, as the most influential international organisation, was subsequently invited into the discussions. During more than a decade of negotiation, the last meeting of the Paris Conference on Cambodia saw all parties concluding four agreements, which are referred to as the Paris Peace Accords (23 October 1991).³⁶⁴ The Accords were signed by the four contending Cambodian factions³⁶⁵ and by the Permanent Five (plus twelve other states involved in the Paris Conference).³⁶⁶ In response to an Australian proposal, the UN imposed its authority over Cambodia during the transitional period until the formation of a new government occurred.³⁶⁷ According to the Accords, the peace process in Cambodia had two pillars: the recognition of the Supreme National Council (SNC) and the establishment of UNTAC.³⁶⁸ On 31 August 1991, the Security Council confirmed and adopted a

(Congress of the United States, 1993) 723.

³⁶¹ Trevoy Findlay, 'Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC' (1995) No. 9 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 106.

³⁶² UN General Assembly Resolution at 30th Plenary Meeting, A/RES/45/3, 15 October 1990.

³⁶³ The first session spanned from 30 July to 30 August 1989, and the second ranged from 21 to 23 October 1991. See, the UN, Department of Public Information, *Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict: Paris*, (UN Press Centre, 23 October 1991), 1-6.

³⁶⁴ (a) the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia; (b) the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict; (c) the Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia; and (d) the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia. The whole Accord was an attachment to the UN document A/46/608, S/23177, 30 October 1991.

³⁶⁵ The four Cambodian factions are People's Revolution Party of Kampuchea (SOC), United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK). See, the UN, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1992* (United Nations 1993) 241; Timothy Carney and Tan LianChoo, *Whither Cambodia? Beyond the Election* (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 1994) 4.

³⁶⁶ Australia, Brunei, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam and Yugoslavia which has replaced Zimbabwe as the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement

³⁶⁷ Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement, Article 6, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Website, 'Cambodia UNTAC Background' <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html>>, accessed 9 November 2011.

³⁶⁸ Steven R. Ratner, 'The Cambodia Settlement Agreements' (1993) 87/1 American Journal of International Law 8.

further detailed process in order to implement the requirements stipulated by the Accords.³⁶⁹

On 28 February 1992, China voted in favour of Resolution 745 that authorised the Security Council to deploy peacekeeping forces to Cambodia.³⁷⁰ The Council further decided that the mandate for UNTAC would last no longer than eighteen months with the intention of holding elections no later than May 1993.³⁷¹ As explained by the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Li Daoyu, China's enthusiasm for UNTAC was due to the new attempt of the UN in the process towards the comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian question.³⁷² In 1991, China held an official meeting with the leader of Vietnam, which intended to set a favourable foundation for the final peaceful settlement of the conflict in Cambodia.³⁷³

4.1.2.2 Motivations and Impacts

While the size of the Chinese military contribution to UNTAC is not noteworthy, an analysis of China's first decision to support the UN mission in this way is required. In the case of Cambodia, China undoubtedly delivered a positive image to the world. Under a non-offensive policy Chinese peacekeepers were unarmed during the mission and consequently enhanced their reputation as peacekeepers.³⁷⁴ As Miwa Hiroko observed, China's peacekeeping is an important component of its "charm offensive" aimed at enhancing its image in host countries.³⁷⁵ Li Zhaoxing, foreign minister of China, proclaimed that the Chinese government adopted a "paradoxical policy in relation to the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia".³⁷⁶ However, contradictions

³⁶⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 718, S/RES/718, 31 October 1991, p. 2.

³⁷⁰ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3057th Meeting, S/PV. 3057, 28 February 1992, p. 6.

³⁷¹ UN Security Council Resolution 745, S/RES/745, 28 February 1992, p.2.

³⁷² UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3057th Meeting, S/PV. 3057, 28 February 1992, p. 19.

³⁷³ Li Jiazhong, 'The Story for the Sino-Vietnamese Relations Normalized', (2008) 11 The Party's History 35.

³⁷⁴ During the progress of UNTAC, two Chinese soldiers lost their lives in May 1993. Chinese soldiers relied upon the protection of local police and a group of armed villagers. See, Miwa Hiroko, 'China's Charm Offensive and Peacekeeping: The Lessons of Cambodia: What Now for Sudan?' (2011) 3/18 International Peacekeeping 328; Zhao Yishen, 'Two Chinese Soldiers Dedicated Their Lives in Cambodia Peacekeeping Mission' (*Xinhua News*, 9 April 2012) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-04/09/c_111755853.htm> accessed 5 December 2013.

³⁷⁵ Miwa Hiroko, 'China's Charm Offensive and Peacekeeping: The Lessons of Cambodia: What Now for Sudan?' in Marc Lanteigne and Miwa Hiroko (eds) *China's Involving Approach to Peacekeeping* (Rougledge 2012) 86.

³⁷⁶ In May 1993, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing highly praised the achievements of UNTAC as a successful example in reducing regional conflicts through peaceful means, on the one hand, which gave UNTAC an exemption from 'intervention' in political measures; Also he stressed that "*outside forces should not*

exist between Chinese and international scholars when China's policy towards Cambodia is reviewed. For instance, Chinese scholars maintained that China's support to UNTAC helped the peacekeeping mission be successful and subsequently enhanced its international reputation.³⁷⁷ In contrast to this positive evaluation, international scholars were keen on analysing the relations between the Chinese government and parties in Cambodia. For instance, with regard to its close relation with the Khmer Rouge, which was accused of the crimes against humanity and genocide, China was perceived as a supporter of the dictatorial regime.³⁷⁸

Prior to the development of the UNTAC, China intended to create a stable international environment for its economic development. As the only third-world country amongst the five permanent Member States in the Security Council, China resisted pressure from the West and required an enhancement of its influence in international affairs.³⁷⁹ Since 1990, in order to enhance its international influence and as a counter-balance US influence, China established a foreign policy namely "peripheral diplomacy (周边外交)", which attempted to unite the countries with geographical proximity to China.³⁸⁰ In this context, it was logical for China's national defence to develop a close relationship with Cambodia, which had an important geographic and strategic location in the Southeast.³⁸¹ It is noteworthy that China

interfere in the internal affairs of Cambodia' because they would prevent the creation of an independent peaceful, unified and territorially integrated state." See, Xu Shishuan, 'China as the Monthly President of the Security Council', <<http://dlib.zslib.com.cn/qklw/rdzl/B133/RD053205>>, (accessed 13 November 2011).

³⁷⁷ Tang Yongsheng, '中国与联合国维和行动 [China and UN Peacekeeping Operations]' (2002) 9 World Economy and Politics 42.

³⁷⁸ The Khmer Rouge were responsible for the deaths of more than 1.5 million people, no less than a fifth of the Cambodian population, and the regime forced many others into hard labour. See, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, *Cambodia 1975-2005 Journey Through the Night* (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2006) 1.

³⁷⁹ Jiang an, 'Political Concerns of Mao Zedong's "Three-World" Theory' (2012) 1 Chinese Social Sciences 5-6.

³⁸⁰ The development of positive relations with China's neighbours has been a core element of Beijing's foreign policy since the 1990s. The concept of "peripheral diplomacy" was first officially formulated at the 16th Party Congress in 2002 by the President Hu Jintao. See, Michael D Swaine, 'China Views and Commentary on Peripheral Diplomacy' (2014) 44 China Leadership Monitor 2. For a detailed discussion in this connection, see Pei Guangjiang and Wang Di, 'Steadfastly Take the Path of Peace and Development, Create A Good International Environment for Chinese Nation's Great Rejuvenation' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 22 November 2013) 1; Bonnie Glaser and Deep Pal, 'China's Periphery Diplomacy Initiative: Implications for China Neighbours and the United States' (*China-US Focus*, 7 November 2013 <<http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinas-periphery-diplomacy-initiative-implications-for-china-neighbors-and-the-united-states/>> accessed 15 March 2014; Hu Jintao, 'Boao Forum 2011 Opening Ceremony Speech: Advancing Common Development and Together Building a Harmonious Asia' *Liberation Army Daily* (Beijing, 16 April 2011) 1.

³⁸¹ Cambodia is a country in South-eastern Asia, bordering the Gulf of Thailand, between Thailand, Vietnam and Laos. Its 2,572 km border is split among Vietnam (1,228 km), Thailand (803 km) and

undertook dual political support to two conflicting factions in Cambodia, namely the Khmer Rouge and Prince Sihanouk.³⁸² For instance, China abstained when the Security Council approved sanctions against the Khmer Rouge by Resolution 783 in November 1992.³⁸³ It could be suggested that China's political support for both parties in Cambodia was based on the requirements of its national interest in the country.³⁸⁴

In summary, under the direction of the “peripheral diplomatic” policy, China has increased its political influence in the countries of Southeast Asia. As Tyler Marshal stated, South East Asia experienced a transfer of power between the US and China, “when the U.S. woke up one day, Southeast Asia has been changed through peaceful evolution already”.³⁸⁵ In this regard, Chinese leaders were anxious about losing support from the Third World countries. However, China had severed relations with the Khmer Rouge by May 1993. According to Meas Tuok, the reason for the China's withdrawal of assistance was because of the fact that Khmer Rouge offered no apology to China after it killed two Chinese peacekeepers and injured four at Skun village on 21 May 1993.³⁸⁶

When participating in UNTAC, China endeavoured to revise the negative international perceptions, which it had labelled “partner in crime” during the period in

Laos (541 km), as well as 443 km of coastline. Cambodia covers 181,040 square kilometres in the Southwest part of the Indochina peninsula. China needs the full support of Cambodia in foreign policy, as well as needing to keep the country in check for Thailand and Vietnam. See, Wang Guangzhou, ‘*试析中国周边外交政策的转变 [The Development of China's Peripheral Diplomacy]*’ (2007) 3 *Foreign Affairs Review* 38-39.

³⁸² To the Khmer Rouge, China sent political, economic and military support for nearly two decades from the early 1970s to the end of the 1980s. When Sihanouk lost power in Cambodia, as a refugee in Beijing, Sihanouk established a government in exile with the permission of the Chinese central government. See, Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975* (The University of North Carolina Press 2000) 263; Sophie Richardson, *China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence* (Columbia University Press 2010) 89-106.

³⁸³ Among the fifteen members of the UN Security Council, China was the only country abstained in the vote. UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3143rd Meeting, S/PV. 3143, 30 November 1992, p. 4.

³⁸⁴ According to the spokesperson in Cambodia, in Siemreab, Kampong Thom and Preah Vihear Province there are more than seventeen oil blocks covering 6, 500 square kilometres. Wang Lin, ‘*Cambodia: A Country Enriches Oil and Gas?*’ (*Xinhua News*, 15 February 2012) < http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-02/15/c_122705677.htm > accessed 10 December 2013.

³⁸⁵ Tyler Marshal, ‘*Southeast Asia’s New Best Friend? Los Angeles Times*, (LA, 17 June 2006) 5.

³⁸⁶ Interview with Meas Tuok, the Chief of the Department of Chheng Prey District, Kampong Cham Province Cambodia, on 11 September 2009. Cited from Miwa Hirono, ‘*China’s Charm Offensive and Peacekeeping: The Lessons of Cambodia: What Now for Sudan?*’ in Marc Lanteigne and Miwa Hirono (eds) *China’s Involving Approach to Peacekeeping* (Rougledge 2012) 91.

which the Khmer Rouge committed genocide and crimes against humanity.³⁸⁷ By 1992, China had dispatched two battalions of 400 engineering troops (totalling 800).³⁸⁸ Owing mainly to their diligent work ethic, Chinese peacekeepers were acknowledged as being favourably disposed towards Cambodians.³⁸⁹ As not all UN peacekeepers were able to behave properly, Chinese peacekeepers were praised by the local people because “they fixed the road very well and worked effectively and diligently”.³⁹⁰ Therefore, Cambodians tended to maintain a positive view of China, despite the fact that China stood in line with the Khmer Rouge historically. Miwa Hirono’s survey exemplified this change: When Cambodians were asked to select the reason for China dispatching peacekeeping forces to Cambodia, the overwhelming majority (91.3 percent) thought that China’s contribution was based on the close relations to Sihanouk and 47.8 percent considered that China’s contribution had an altruistic motive.³⁹¹

Another hypothesis raised by Fravel regarding China’s participation in UNTAC was that China sought to improve its international reputation, which had been severely damaged by the Tiananmen Square incident.³⁹² This reason is also helpful in explaining China’s voting behaviour in the case of Iraq that will be discussed later in this chapter.

Although China’s participation in the UNTAC mission revealed a positive position in respect to the maintenance of peace and security under the UN framework, there were

³⁸⁷ Steven J Hood, ‘Beijing’s Cambodia Gamble and the Prospects for Peace in Indochina: The Khmer Rouge or Sihanouk?’ (1990) 30/10 Asian Survey 989-991.

³⁸⁸ ‘Troops and Police Contributors Archive (1990-2014)’ United Nations Peacekeeping <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml> accessed 20 March 2015.

³⁸⁹ Wang Anmin, Huang Jun and Pan Honghua, ‘China’s Peacekeepers and UNTAC’ (2004) 9 Small Arms 43.

³⁹⁰ The Bulgarians, for example, were cited as major offenders, as some of them were reportedly very rude towards local Cambodians. See, Sandra Whitworth, ‘Gender, Race and the Politics of Peacekeeping’ in Edward Moxon-Browne (eds), *A Future for Peacekeeping?* (Macmillan 1998) 180.

³⁹¹ The survey by Miwa Hirono questioned six possible reasons for the PRC to have contributed its troops to UNTAC: 1. An altruistic view of Cambodia’s development and stability; 2. To make amends or apologies for what it had done to Cambodia in the past; 3. To use the opportunity to make economic inroads into Cambodia; 4. Because of close relations with the King Father Sihanouk; 5. because of Western pressure after Tiananmen Square in June 1989; 6. Some other reason. The overwhelming majority (91.3 per cent) chose option 4. See, Miwa Hirono, ‘China’s Charm Offensive and Peacekeeping: The Lessons of Cambodia-What Now for Sudan?’ (2011) 18/3 International Peacekeeping 335.

³⁹² M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1989’ (1996) 36/11 Asian Survey 1102-1121.

still those who criticised China's misconduct in regard to the case of Cambodia. Besides being a principal foreign supporter of the Khmer Rouge,³⁹³ China's consistent non-interference policy had also been challenged when participating in UNTAC. For instance, as UNTAC was judged the most ambitious operation in the history of UN peacekeeping,³⁹⁴ China's positive contribution to UNTAC has been described as "interference in Cambodian internal affairs" and became a sign that Beijing had made an initial step away from its opposition to interfering in issues of national sovereignty.³⁹⁵

4.1.3 National Profile vs. Non-Intervention: the Case of Iraq

Regardless of its positive policy toward peacekeeping in the 1990s, China continued to argue that the principle of non-interference should be respected in foreign relations. An example of this is China's threatening to veto the UN's initiative to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.³⁹⁶ The Chinese formally expressed the view that this was an unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of Iraq.³⁹⁷ As Samuel Kim notes, "the Gulf War in the 1990s was the first litmus test of China's policy towards UN peacekeeping operations".³⁹⁸

In 1991, apart from voting in favour of the ten resolutions in the case of Iraq, China abstained from voting on Resolution 678, which authorised Member States to use "all necessary measures" to restore peace and security in Kuwait.³⁹⁹ Qian Qichen, Chinese

³⁹³ A pamphlet published in Cambodia, exemplified the systematic criticism of China. It was argued that "China was actually behind the genocide" and maintained that China was held accountable for the mass killing. A pamphlet entitled 'Crime of Beijing Chinese Hegemony Enlargement and Servants Pol Pot' cited from Kerry Brown, 'Review Work: *China, Cambodia and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence* by Sophie Richardson' (2010) 64 The Chinese Journal 278; UN Document A/RES/52/135, 27 February 1998.

³⁹⁴ As noted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the UNTAC operation is better described as a mixture of a peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building. In its complexity and comprehensiveness it remains the epitome of what have become known as "second generation" multinational operations. For a discussion of the problem of characterizing and categorizing UNTAC, see Trevor Findlay, *Multilateral Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution*, SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (OUP 1994) 14-19; John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, 'Second Generation Multinational Operations', (1992) 15/3 Washington Quarterly 113-131.

³⁹⁵ Yeshi Choedon, 'China's Stand on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Changing Priorities of Foreign Policy' (2005) 41 China Report 45.

³⁹⁶ US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *China's View of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control* (Hearing, Law Com No 109-108, 2008) p. 14.

³⁹⁷ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 2963rd Meeting, S/PV. 2963, 29 November 1990, p. 62.

³⁹⁸ Samuel S. Kim, 'International Organisations in Chinese Foreign Policy', in Thomas W. Robinson (ed), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Clarendon Press 1995) 425.

³⁹⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 678, S/RES/678, 29 November 1990, p. 2.

Ambassador to the UN, subsequently expressed opposition to the use of force by some Member States.⁴⁰⁰ He also emphasised that political endeavours should not be neglected when attempting to solve international conflict.⁴⁰¹

Despite strong opposition to the “use of force” provision, it was decidedly in China’s national interest to abstain. In order to rescue its international image after the Tiananmen Square incident, China was very reluctant to veto the UN’s initiative in the case of Iraq.⁴⁰² China, however, intended to leverage its veto power to resume high-level official contacts with the US, which were cut off after Tiananmen.⁴⁰³ In this regard, in November 1990, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met with US Secretary of State James Baker. This was the first such meeting since 4 June 1990 that a Chinese senior official had been invited on an official visit to the US.⁴⁰⁴ Subsequently, as a political exchange, the US agreed to support China’s loans from the World Bank, which had been suspended in 1989.⁴⁰⁵ Such tactical agreement indicated political compromise in the Sino-US relations and persuaded China to relax its policy in relation to military intervention. As Yeshi Choedon observed, the US’s policy towards China after 1991 reflected its real interest in breaking the international isolation of China in the post-Tiananmen era and showed that America had acknowledged the importance of China in the world’s strategic development.⁴⁰⁶

Overall, China demonstrated its importance on the Security Council throughout the Gulf crisis and successfully diverted the world’s attention away from the Tiananmen Square incident (as well as the resultant international criticism of its human rights regime).⁴⁰⁷ In addition, China’s behaviour could subsequently be defined as exhibiting two core principles; respect for state sovereignty while supporting a political solution

⁴⁰⁰ Qian Qichen, ‘Interview with Qian Qichen Explained His Opinion on the Security Council Resolution 678’ *People’s Daily* (Beijing, 17 December 1990) 7.

⁴⁰¹ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 2963rd Meeting, S/PV. 2963, 29 November 1990, p. 63.

⁴⁰² Susan Tieh, ‘China in the UN: United with Other Nations’ (2004) 4/1 Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 26.

⁴⁰³ Qian Xuewen, ‘National Interests in Chinese Foreign Policy toward Iraq’ (2010) 2 Arab World Studies 12.

⁴⁰⁴ Seth Faison, ‘Visit Announcement’ *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong, 28 November 1990) 1.

⁴⁰⁵ M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1989’, (*No.36 Asian Survey* 1996) 1108.

⁴⁰⁶ Yeshi Choedon, ‘China’s Stand on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Changing Priorities of Foreign Policy’, (*No. 41 China Report*, 2005) 44.

⁴⁰⁷ Samuel S Kim, ‘China’s International Organisational Behaviour’ in Thomas W Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Clarendon Press, 1994) 422.

to the international conflict within the UN framework, and pursuing its own national interests. For instance, even while reiterating the importance of the UN, Qian Qichen endeavoured to persuade the Arab countries to solve the Gulf crisis on their own.⁴⁰⁸ Moreover, China actively joined the UN-held consultations and peacekeeping operations endorsed by the Security Council.⁴⁰⁹ In the post-Gulf War era, China made a substantial contribution to UN peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Kuwait. In 1991, after sending twenty military observers to serve in UNIKOM, China contributed a total of 164 observers to the border of Iraq and Kuwait until the termination of the mandate.⁴¹⁰ This action demonstrated that a new strategic cooperative partnership between China and the US had emerged after the Gulf crisis.

Furthermore, national interest was recognised as another feature dominating China's policy towards Iraq. For instance, China gave a friendly signal to the US by abstaining Resolution 688 instead of vetoing it. The resolution condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilians in Kurdish-populated areas.⁴¹¹ On the other hand, such behaviour consequently incurred a financial loss in respect to Sino-Iraqi arms sale. As a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Li Junhua, noted, China lost approximately two billion US dollars in arms exports because of the sanctions.⁴¹² In this connection, in order to avoid a permanent rupture of bilateral relations, China engaged several concrete steps to resolve the crisis, such as encouraging regional solutions to break the impasses, as mentioned previously.⁴¹³

The abstention also provided "space" to China in interpreting its consistent principle of non-intervention. For instance, Qian Qichen stated that the Security Council should "act with great caution and avoid taking hasty action on such a major question as authorising some Member States to take military action against another Member

⁴⁰⁸ Qian Qichen, 'Text of Qian Qichen Speech at the UN' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 29 September 1990) 1.

⁴⁰⁹ Xue Lei, 'China as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council' (2014) Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 12.

⁴¹⁰ Statistics of Troop and Police Contributors Archive 1991, (*UN Peacekeeping Website*) < http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml > accessed 30 January 2013.

⁴¹¹ UN Security Council Resolution 688, S/RES/688, 5 April 1991, para 9.

⁴¹² John Calabrese, 'Peaceful or Dangerous Collaborators? China's Relations with the Gulf Countries' (Winter 1992-3) 65/4 Pacific Affairs 477.

⁴¹³ Qian Qichen, 'Meeting with Baker Viewed' *Hsin Wan Pao* (Heilongjiang, 23 November 1990) 2.

State.”⁴¹⁴ The abstention indicated that China continuously supported efforts to work out a peaceful solution within the Arab world without external, especially Western, intervention.⁴¹⁵

4.1.4 Conclusion

From 1988, due to a dramatic improvement in terms of the international political environment, China’s policy towards the UN was more moderate than at any other period in the 1980s. With regards to UN peacekeeping operations, China not only dispatched the first military contingent to Cambodia, but also began to vote positively on draft resolutions concerning peacekeeping. China came to accept, as Henry Wiseman observed, that “all nations should recognise that peacekeeping operations deployed in a normative way are an effective instrument in the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.”⁴¹⁶

In 1989, the Tiananmen Square incident was a turning point in China’s passive policy towards UN peacekeeping operations.⁴¹⁷ The diversification in the international environment and economic growth had led to a controversial change regarding China’s voting behaviour in the 1990s. In contrast, despite supporting UN resolutions on intervention for the most part, China has continuously opposed the authorisation of the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Domestically, as a result of the “opening-up” policy, Chinese culture has been deeply influenced by Western ideologies, which alerted the Chinese-leaders to the need to prevent the country being

⁴¹⁴ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 2963rd Meeting, S/PV. 2963, 29 November 1990, p. 62.

⁴¹⁵ Yitzhak Shichor, ‘China and the Middle East since Tiananmen’, (1992) 519 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 93.

⁴¹⁶ Henry Wiseman (ed), *Peacekeeping – Appraisals & Proposals* (Pergamon Press 1983) 230.

⁴¹⁷ The Tiananmen Square protests damaged the reputation of China internationally, particularly in the West. There was a significant negative impact on the Chinese economy after the incident. Foreign loans to China were suspended by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and foreign governments; tourism revenue decreased from US\$2.2 billion to US\$1.8 billion; foreign direct investment commitments were cancelled and there was a rise in defence spending from 8.6 percent in 1986, to 15.5 percent in 1990, reversing a previous 10 year decline. Chinese Premier Li Peng took an official visit to the UNSC on 31 January 1992 and argued that the economic and arms embargoes on China were a violation of China’s national sovereignty. See, Kelley, N. L. and Shenkar, *International Business in China* (Routledge 1993) 120-122; W. C. Gordon *The United Nations at the Crossroads of Reform* (M. E. Sharpe 1994) 167.

a target of the West under “peaceful evolution”.⁴¹⁸ On these bases, two limitations existed in relation to the UN in the following areas.

First, China supports traditional peacekeeping and struggles with multi-dimensional peacekeeping. Prior to 1990, the form of peacekeeping was generally referred to as traditional peacekeeping, which is best exemplified by the first peacekeeping mission devised by the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in 1956 in response to the Suez crisis.⁴¹⁹ In the post-Cold War era, although conflicts between states were still a significant reason for breaches of international peace, newly emergent conflicts, such as racial conflict and regional militants, were also considered dramatic threats to peace and security.⁴²⁰ Hence, the UN was required to take more responsibility in preventing damage to the world’s peace and security. In June 1992, *The Agenda for Peace* was published by the then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. It recommended adopting a broad UN mandate, including preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, peace enforcement under Chapter VII, and peace building.⁴²¹

The mandates were “well beyond the simple idea of interposition of troops between opposing forces” and it was seen that “the time has come for Chapter VIII”.⁴²² These two key elements characterised the second-generation peacekeeping operations.⁴²³ There is no doubt that this context provided new opportunities for peacekeeping operations.⁴²⁴ In fact, China was reluctant to accept the new direction of peacekeeping and the looser interpretation of sovereignty. Its voting records demonstrate that China was in favour of all missions that carried out traditional peacekeeping tasks during the 1990s but opposed peacekeeping with wider mandates.⁴²⁵ As Qian Qichen stated:

⁴¹⁸ Jia Xuyang, ‘The Adolescent as the Element in the Peaceful Evolution Strategy by the West’ (*CCP News*, 9 February 2010) < <http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/10959901.html> >, accessed 15 November 2011.

⁴¹⁹ D. W. Bowett, *United Nations Forces: A Legal Study* (Frederick A. Praeger Publishers 1964) 99-102.

⁴²⁰ Zheng Qirong, ‘联合国面向二十一世纪 [UN Peacekeeping Operations in the 21st Century]’ *People’s Daily* (Beijing, 17 August 2000) 4.

⁴²¹ Secretary-General ‘UN Congress of International Law’ (17 March 1995) Press Release SG/SM 5583, p. 1.

⁴²² Ibid. p. 2.

⁴²³ Ibid. p. 6.

⁴²⁴ The UN moved from five operations in 1988 to sixteen in December 1994; the military contributions increased from approximately 9,000 to about 70,000 personnel; and from a budget of approximately 230,000,000 US dollars to about 3,600,000,000 US dollars. See, Michael Doyle, ‘UN Peacekeeping: An Early Reckoning of the Second General’ (1995) Proceedings of the 89th Annual Meeting ASIL, p. 275.

⁴²⁵ See Table 2.1: China’s voting behaviour.

Peacekeeping operations should strictly conform to the principles of the UN Charter and the norms of international relations. Such operations should be undertaken only with the consent and cooperation of the parties concerned. [...] No peacekeeping operations or humanitarian aid programmes should be permitted to interfere in the internal affairs of any country.⁴²⁶

With respect to the failed peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, China maintained that if peacekeepers are authorised to use force to fulfil their mandate, it would offer a pretext for states to carry out unjustified military intervention.⁴²⁷ In the case of Mozambique, China made specific reference to the extent of the use of force. Chen Jian, China's representative to the UN, stated that peacekeeping forces must maintain a passive influence after the parties to the conflict concluded a peaceful agreement.⁴²⁸ In addition, China has resented any interference in internal affairs utilising peacekeeping operations. Chen also stated that China did not subscribe to a resolution in which the Security Council handled matters which were essentially internal affairs of a Member State, nor did it approve of resorting to such mandatory measures as sanctions by the Council.⁴²⁹ Another major reason for China's adherence to a strict respect for sovereignty is China's fear of independence movements (such as separatist groups in Xin Jiang and Tibet regions) within its own territory.⁴³⁰ In addition, China fears that any looser definitions of sovereignty may allow foreign interference in the Taiwan issue. As analysed in the previous chapter, China vetoed two proposed peacekeeping missions to Guatemala and Macedonia in 1997 and 1999, respectively, due to their diplomatic ties with the Taiwanese government.⁴³¹

However, China adopted an exceptional policy in the case of Cambodia, which was based on the pursuit of national interest. It is noted that China's pursuance of national interests played a pivotal role in the mission. Meanwhile, the mandates of UNTAC have been clearly stipulated by both the Security Council resolution and the

⁴²⁶ 'China's Statement in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping', UN Document A/SPC/SR. 17, 6 June 1991, para 5.

⁴²⁷ Hu Yumin, 'UN's Role in a New World Order' (10-16 June, 1991) Beijing Review 14.

⁴²⁸ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3375th Meeting, S/PV. 3375, May 5 1994, p. 15.

⁴²⁹ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3238th Meeting, S/PV. 3238, 16 June 1993, p. 21.

⁴³⁰ For more details on China's policy toward Xin Jiang and Tibet, see William A Joseph (ed), *Politics in China: An Introduction* (Oxford University Press, 2014) 401-427, 428-451.

⁴³¹ Catherine Toups, 'China Threatens Veto on Haiti Peace Force: Move Hits UN's Taiwan Supporters' *Washington Times* (Washington, 29 February 1996).

*Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict.*⁴³² In terms of military force, (that is, its military mandate) single-task and peacekeeping forces were deployed with the aim of monitoring the implementation of a ceasefire agreement.⁴³³

In addition, from a Chinese perspective, it was feared that the extended scope of UN peacekeeping operations might adversely impact the application of the principle of impartiality.⁴³⁴ In the case of Somalia, China was reluctant to support the US-led coalition force.⁴³⁵ With reference to the failure of the mission in Somalia, China adhered to its position of opposition to Chapter VII based peacekeeping. Whilst China voted in favour of the resolution, its ambassador to the UN explained that China's vote was an exceptional act concerning the unique and serious situation in Somalia.⁴³⁶ China's representative, Li Daoyu, noted that the authorisation of military action may "adversely affect" the collective role of the UN.⁴³⁷ For example, UNOSMO II was the first real test of UN-mandated nation-building in the post-Cold War era, which brought deep concern to scholars and officers in peacekeeping.⁴³⁸ With regards to multi-dimensional peacekeeping in Somalia, Ray Murphy has argued that in UNOSOM II the UN was involved in a nation-building operation, which was perceived as a failure by the organisation and the international community as a whole.⁴³⁹ Chinese scholars criticised this peacekeeping operation and stated that the internal affairs of a country should be solved only by the people of that country.⁴⁴⁰ As Xu Weidi observed, the failure in Somalia indicated that delivering humanitarian aid

⁴³² The United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping* (3rd edn, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996) 456-458.

⁴³³ UN Security Council Resolution 745, S/RES/745, 28 February 1992, p. 2.

⁴³⁴ 'Peacekeeping Operations of the UN' (*Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN*, 15 October 2003) < <http://www.china-un.org/eng/zghlhg/hphaq/whxd/t29393> > accessed 15 March 2013.

⁴³⁵ The United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) were deployed in April 1992 with mandates to monitor a ceasefire between parties to the conflict and to provide humanitarian assistance. Regarding the requirements of Member States and protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the Security Council decided to authorise a peacekeeping mission under Chapter VII. In December 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 794, which dispatched a US-led coalition forces named "the Unified Task Force (UNITAF)" to supplant UNOSOM I. See, UN Security Council Resolution 794, S/RES/794, 3 December 1992, p. 2.

⁴³⁶ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3145th Meeting, S/PV. 3145, 3 December 1992, p. 3

⁴³⁷ Ibid. p. 4.

⁴³⁸ Ray Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia, and Kosovo* (CUP, 2007) 25.

⁴³⁹ Ibid. p. 187.

⁴⁴⁰ Nie Jun, *The Elements Leading the Successful of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations*, (World Affairs Press 2011) 113.

in conflict areas under Chapter VII could face constraints.⁴⁴¹ China's former Foreign Minister, Li Zhaoxing, therefore reiterated the necessity and effectiveness of political measures in solving the Somalia crisis.⁴⁴² China asserted that UN peacekeeping must be deployed with the consent and co-operation of all parties and that it be conducted strictly in accordance with the UN Charter.⁴⁴³

Similarly, in the case of Rwanda, China abstained from voting because Member States were authorised by the Security Council to conduct the operation, with the authority to use "all necessary measures".⁴⁴⁴ Notwithstanding the emphasis on the "impartial and neutral" and "strictly humanitarian character" of such measures in the resolution, China stated that the operation lacked the consent of all parties in Rwanda and resorting to force would only worsen the situation.⁴⁴⁵

However, despite the resistance to interventions in international affairs in general, China can moderate its approach. In the case of Bosnia and Croatia, China's policy towards Chapter VII was seemingly subject to change. Although China was very reluctant to agree to the deployment of peacekeepers to these two countries, it still voted in favour of the Chapter VII based resolution that authorised the establishment of UNPROFOR (1992).⁴⁴⁶ On 30 June 1992, China supported the mandate extension of UNPROFOR including the establishment of Pink Zones to shelter ethnic Croats in Bosnia.⁴⁴⁷ In 1995, a mandate to include the replacement of UNPROFOR by IFOR was adopted unanimously by the permanent Member States of the Security Council.⁴⁴⁸ China's representative to the UN argued that China's vote was in accordance with the urgent wishes of the parties in Bosnia. In the extraordinary circumstances, and in carrying out its task, IFOR was required to maintain neutrality

⁴⁴¹ Xu Weidi, 'Challenges and Obstacles in UN Peacekeeping Operations' (2005) 5 *World Economics and Politics* 8; Xiong Hao, 'Challenges to International Humanitarian Intervention in the case of Somalia' (2007) 5/6 *Economic and Social Development* 42.

⁴⁴² UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3334th Meeting, S/PV. 3334, 4 February 1994, p. 4.

⁴⁴³ 'Peacekeeping Operations of the UN' (*Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations*, 15 October 2003) < <http://www.china-un.org/eng/zghlhg/hphaq/whxd/t29393> > accessed 15 March 2013.

⁴⁴⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 929, S/RES/929, 22 June 1994, p. 2.

⁴⁴⁵ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3392nd Meeting, S/PV. 3392, 22 June 1994, p. 4.

⁴⁴⁶ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3055th Meeting, S/PV. 3055, 21 February 1992; UN Security Council Resolution 743, S/RES/743, 21 February 1992, p. 2.

⁴⁴⁷ Resolution 762 (1992) enlarged the mandate of UNPROFOR and authorized UNPROFOR to undertake monitoring functions in the "pink zones". UN Security Council Resolution 762, S/RES/762, 30 June 1992, p. 2.

⁴⁴⁸ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3607th Meeting, S/PV. 3607, 15 December 1995, p. 13.

and impartiality and avoid wanton use of force.⁴⁴⁹ In short, despite the flexible voting behaviour during the 1990s, China's approach to UN peacekeeping operations did not reflect a decrease in concern about state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. On the other hand, as a prelude to a more positive policy, China tentatively exercised a softer policy towards Chapter VII based peacekeeping operations, as well as the second-generation peacekeeping of the 1990s.

In this context, even though China often abstains, it moved from no involvement to “complete formal participation” in the field of UN peacekeeping.⁴⁵⁰ As of 2000, China has sent more than 1,450 officers, soldiers, and military observers to participate in UN peacekeeping operations.⁴⁵¹ The trend of the Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping indicates that China became a more active member of the UN from 1971 to 1999. It also presents China's growing acceptance of the UN's role in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is noteworthy that during the 1990s, China's positive participation has also been encouraged by the UN's move away from second-generation peacekeeping and its return to the traditional model, given failures and difficulties in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia.⁴⁵² In this regard, in the mid-1990s, the UN has subsequently adopted more traditional missions, which offer China more opportunities to participate while still upholding its vision of sovereignty.⁴⁵³

In the 1990s, it appears that China was in fact much more supportive of UN peacekeeping operations than it was in the 1980s.⁴⁵⁴ Moreover, China contributed peacekeepers to countries that have supported those agitating for independence from China. For instance, notwithstanding the Haitian government formally recognising Taiwan's independence, China voted in favour of Resolution 867 to authorise the

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 14.

⁴⁵⁰ M Taylor Fravel, ‘China's Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Operations Since 1989’ (1996) 11/36 Asian Survey 1120.

⁴⁵¹ Xinhua News Agency, ‘China's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations’ (*Xinhua News*, 14 February 2003) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-02/14/content_729097.htm> accessed 20 June 2013.

⁴⁵² John Hillen, ‘Picking Up UN Peacekeeping’s Pieces’ (1998) 77/4 Foreign Affairs 97.

⁴⁵³ Susan Tieh, ‘China in the UN: United with Other Nations?’ (2004) 4/1 Stanford Journal of East Asia Affairs 25.

⁴⁵⁴ ‘Troops and Other Personnel Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations: 2001’ (Global Policy Forum) <<https://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/data/pko01-1.htm>> accessed 23 July 2014.

establishment of UNMIH in 1993.⁴⁵⁵ Three years later, China supported Resolution 1048, which authorised the extension of the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).⁴⁵⁶ In 2004, China voted in favour of the UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and dispatched its “formed police units (FPUs)” to the mission.⁴⁵⁷

However, two questions remain: Does China’s contribution in Haiti demonstrate a wavering of its traditional policy on the question of territorial integrity?⁴⁵⁸ And is the increase in Chinese support the result of the acceptance of international norms of humanitarian intervention and international cooperation with respect to the maintenance of peace and security?

4.2 Flexible Participation (2000-2015)

4.2.1 An Overview

After 2000, China’s policy towards UN intervention underwent further progressive development as it increased the number and types of contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.⁴⁵⁹ It has been noted that the year 2000 was a turning point for Chinese participation in peacekeeping. On the other hand, it was also a turning point in the reform of UN peacekeeping operations.

Despite multiple successful experiences, the failures of UN peacekeeping deserve to be better remembered. Frustrated by the failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, UN peacekeeping operations faced a crisis of confidence, and the Member States declined to approve major peacekeeping initiatives.⁴⁶⁰ Hence, in order to review peacekeeping and make recommendations for its improvement, Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed Chair of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in 2000.⁴⁶¹ The Panel was

⁴⁵⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 867, S/RES/867, 23 September 1993, p. 2.

⁴⁵⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1048, S/RES/1048, 29 February 1996, p. 2.

⁴⁵⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1542, S/RES/1542, 30 April 2004, pp. 2-5.

⁴⁵⁸ Samuel Kim, ‘China’s Path to Great Powers Status in the Globalization Era’ (2003) 1/27 Asian Perspective 35-75.

⁴⁵⁹ Krister Karlsson, *China and Peacekeeping: Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations from 2000-2010 and the Theory of Offensive Realism* (Minor Field Study Report Uppsala University, 2011) 9.

⁴⁶⁰ Parliamentary Hearing at the United Nations, *The Challenges of Peacekeeping in the 21st Century* (19-20 October 2004) p. 1; UN Report on Somalia, UN Document S/1994/643, p. 41.

⁴⁶¹ UN Press Briefing ‘Press Briefing on United Nations Peace Operations Study’ (7 March 2000) <

mandated to conduct an extensive review of peacekeeping and make recommendations. In August 2000, the *Brahimi Report* made recommendations relating to conflict prevention, peacekeeping doctrine, peace-building strategy, extensive restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, a new information and strategic analysis service, an integrated task force at Headquarters to plan and support each peacekeeping mission from its inception, and more systematic use of information technology.⁴⁶² The *Brahimi Report* was a central feature of the Millennium Summit of the Security Council on September 2000.⁴⁶³ However, many of the recommendations relating to peacekeeping that were made in the report were not original. The Panel followed earlier calls for the policy reform by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping and relevant reports from the Secretary-General.⁴⁶⁴ One reason for wide consideration of the report was because the UN often found it easier to introduce major changes on the basis of reports by an outside body rather than on the basis of internal reports.⁴⁶⁵ Although all permanent members declared their support for peacekeeping reform at the time, there were subsequent indications of divergent views on the content of peacekeeping. Unlike the US, China stressed the need to reaffirm the traditional model of UN peacekeeping and that all peace operations must be deployed under the principles of the UN Charter (Table 4.2.1).

<http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000307.brahimibrf.doc.html> > accessed 6 June 2014.

⁴⁶² On 21 August 2000, the Brahimi Report (Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations), introduced new concepts and the reform for peacekeeping operations became more effective. After the report, the “New Era” came to the UNPKO. See, UN General Assembly, the 55th Session, *Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects* (A/55/305-S/2000/809), 21 August 2000, paras 202, 247.

⁴⁶³ ‘Declaration on Ensuring an Effective Role for the Security Council in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, Particularly in Africa’, Attached to Security Council Resolution 1318, S/RES/1318, 7 September 2000.

⁴⁶⁴ UN General Assembly ‘Special Committee on Peacekeeping Adopts Report on Brahimi Recommendations’ (4 December 2000) Press Release GA/PK/169.

⁴⁶⁵ Christine Gray, ‘Peacekeeping After the *Brahimi Report*: Is There a Crisis of Credibility for the UN?’ (2001) 6/2 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 268.

Table 4.2.1 Statements Based on the *Brahimi Report**

Countries	Proposals
The US (P-5)	The USA strongly endorsed the Report but justified the US participation in international peacekeeping on the ground that it served its national security interests.
China (P-5)	China stressed the need to observe the principles of the Charter and reaffirmed the traditional model of UN peacekeeping.
The UK (P-5)	The UK offered support for the conclusions of the Report and pledged commitment to its implementation. It suggested that there was room for further initiatives and a clear framework for intervention should be established.
France (P-5)	France agreed with a number of the conclusions in the Report.
Russia (P-5)	Russia broadly supported the Report and stressed the need to preserve the position of the Security Council.
India	India demonstrated its opposition to the Report, which was the sole state attack on the <i>Brahimi Report</i> .

*Sources: The Provisional Verbatim Record at the 4194th Meeting, S/PV. 4194, 7 September 2000; UN Press Release, GA/SPD/200, 9 November 2000; Fact Sheet Released by the Office of the Spokesman U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/www/issues/fs-peacekp_reform_000823.html, 23 August 2000, (accessed 10 December 2013); The Provisional Verbatim Record at the 4223rd Meeting, S/PV. 4223, 9 November 2000.

As recommended by the *Brahimi Report*, the Chinese government has expanded its participation and become involved in more UN peacekeeping activities.⁴⁶⁶ For instance, on 12 January 2000, China dispatched (for the first time) fifteen civilians as a contingent for the UN peacekeeping mission in East Timor. It is noteworthy that the Chinese contribution to UN peacekeeping operations after 2000 could help to project a positive and constructive perception of its rising prominence on the global stage.⁴⁶⁷ Meanwhile, in pursuit of a positive international image and global reputation, China indicated its intention to be more responsive to international expectations, minimise tensions and conflict, and make a tangible contribution to international peace and security, all of which made peacekeeping an important priority for China.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁶ ‘Reform of Peacekeeping: Brahimi Report’ (UN Peacekeeping Website) <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/reform.shtml>> accessed 30 July 2014; In response to the recommendation in respect to increase the capacity of the Civilian Police Division, see William J Dorsch, Victoria K Holt, Caroline R Earle and Moira K Shanahan, *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations* (Henry L Stimson Center, 2003) 83-90.

⁴⁶⁷ Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, ‘The People’s Republic of China’ in Alex J Bellamy and Paul D Williams (eds), *Providing Peacekeepers* (OUP 2013) 144.

⁴⁶⁸ Hu Jintao, ‘Hu Jintao Says China Committed to Peaceful Development’ (*Xinhua News Agency*, 8 November 2012).

4.2.2 China's Expanding Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations

4.2.2.1 Enlarging Personnel Contributions to Peacekeeping

As of December 2014, 2,720 Chinese peacekeepers, comprising troops from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and civilian police, served in eleven UN peacekeeping missions, whilst China ranked as the sixteenth contributor of personnel to UN missions among all members of the UN.⁴⁶⁹ Since 2000, China's personnel deployments including troops, military observers and police (civilian and riot police) have increased, which is in contrast with the deployments of UN peacekeepers from Russia, the United Kingdom and the US (Figure 4.2.2). According to Chinese foreign policy, image and reputation have become the most effective methods of enlarging China's influence in the world.⁴⁷⁰ Thus, the core duties of China's troops in UN peacekeeping operations were engineering, de-mining, and medical support, as opposed to direct involvement.⁴⁷¹ The central reason for avoiding the dispatch of combat units to UN peacekeeping operations was explained by Kathrin Hille: "China was anxious not to be seen to move towards support for the use of force in conflict settlement".⁴⁷² In this regard, China nevertheless needed to actively advocate the principle of non-use of force in order to establish its credentials as a "responsible power" and a "peace-loving state".⁴⁷³

In accordance with official reports on *China's White Paper on Defence*, by December 2012 China had deployed 218 troops to the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), 515 troops to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 335 troops to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 435 troops to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and 315 troops to the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

< http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/08/c_131959478.htm > accessed 20 March 2013.

⁴⁶⁹ Qiu Jianmin, 'Chinese Peacekeepers Demonstrated the Image of Responsible Power' (2015) 8 Seeking Knowledge 32.

⁴⁷⁰ Jin Zhengkun and Xu Qingchao, 'Establishing National Image: A New Topic for Chinese Foreign Policy' (2010) 2 Journal of Renmin University of China 124-6.

⁴⁷¹ Bates Gill and Chi-Hao Huang, 'China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping' (2009) SIPRI Policy Paper no. 25, p. 12.


⁴⁷² Kathrin Hille, 'China Commits Combat Troops to Mali' (*Financial Times*, 27 June 2013) < <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e46f3e42-defe-11e2-881f-00144feab7de.html#axzz3eHPEKwF0> > accessed 19 July 2014.

⁴⁷³ Qin Yaqing, 'National Identity, Strategic Culture and Security Interest' (2003) 1 World Economics and Politics 11.

(UNAMID).⁴⁷⁴ Regarding reconstruction and engineering projects, China's peacekeepers have built and repaired over 8,700 kilometres of roads and 270 bridges, cleared over 8,900 mines and various explosive devices, transported over 600,000 tons of cargo across a total distance of 9.3 million km, and treated 79,000 patients.⁴⁷⁵

Civilian police have also played an important role in UN peacekeeping. In response to the requests from the UN, China decided to deploy its first civilian police to East Timor in 2000, which showed that China had indeed become more involved in peacekeeping during the new millennium. Concerning the composition of China's peacekeeping forces, since 2000, China's contribution to UN peacekeeping operations has not only experienced a quantitative increase but also changed in qualitative terms. From 2000 to 2008, the size of the Chinese police contribution to UN peacekeeping operations experienced a 24 percent increase and reached its peak in 2008 (Figure 4.2.2, 2003 as an exception). Clearly, the more diverse China's peacekeeping contribution (troops, military observers and civilian police) is, the more opportunities there are to expand its military diplomacy.

Figure 4.2.2 China's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Personnel from 2000 to 2014




Source: UN peacekeeping operations official website, 'Monthly Summary of Contributions', <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpkp/contributors/>, as of December 2014

⁴⁷⁴ The Ministry of National Defence of China, 'China's National Defence White Paper (2012)', available on line at < http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-01/07/content_4249944.htm > accessed 18 March 2015 p. 200.

⁴⁷⁵ Ministry of National Defence of P.R. China, 'China's National Defence White Paper (2008)', available on line at < http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-01/07/content_4249944.htm >, accessed 10 December 2014.

Indeed, in accordance with international needs, China doubled its contributions of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations in 2008 (2,177), when compared with its contributions in 2004 (1,051). By the end of 2011, China had dispatched troops, military observers and civilian police to twelve peacekeeping missions.⁴⁷⁶ Between 1999 and 2011, within the total Chinese personnel contributions the share of troops increased from nil to 92.7 percent. However, the share of Chinese military observers decreased on average from 43.9 percent to 2.8 percent between 2000 and 2011, whereas the share of Chinese police participating surged from nil to 4.5 percent (Figure 4.2.3). The significant increase in troops contributions reflects a change in China's policies. China's contributions to UNPKO were almost exclusively in the field of military observers until 1999, and at the end of 2000 over half of China's peacekeepers were civilian police. As of December 2014, China deployed more troops than military observers to the UN peacekeeping missions, (Figure 4.2.3). This demonstrates that China is shaping its peacekeeping contribution in line with international demand and Beijing is playing its role as a responsible power in international peacekeeping.

Figure 4.2.3 Share of China's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping per Year*
Data Shown in Percentage**



⁴⁷⁶ They are: MINURSO, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNAMID UNFICYP, UNIFIL, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNMIT, UNOCI, UNTSO, and UNAMA. UNAMA is a peace operation for political purpose directed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; China also participated in the mission. See, ‘Country Contributions Detailed by Mission’ (*UN Peacekeeping Website*) < http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml > accessed 30 March 2013.

* Source: China's National Defense Official Website: <http://www.mod.gov.cn/reports/>; UNPKO Contributors Archive:

< http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml >.

** Percentage=China's Personnel Contribution/China's Total Contribution.

Although China experienced a rapid increase in the number of peacekeepers participating in UN peacekeeping operations, the intensity of its peacekeeping engagement still varied. In the Afghanistan and Bosnia missions, China contributed three and twenty policemen, respectively (Figure 4.2.4).

Figure 4.2.4 The Total Number of Chinese Peacekeepers Contributed to a Certain UN Peacekeeping Operations (Calculated by person-time)^{*}

MISSION	1990-2014			TOTAL
	TROOPS	UNMO	CIVPOL	
UNMIL	6138	87	117	6342
UNMIS	3045	130	80	3255
MONUC/MONUSCO	2616	133	0	2749
UNIFIL	2235	0	0	2235
UNAMID	1284	2	1	1287
MINUSTAH	0	0	1090	1090
UNTAC	800	97	0	897
MINURSO	1	337	0	338
UNIKOM	1	164	0	165
UNMISSET	0	0	147	147
UNTSO	0	99	0	99
UNMIT	0	11	75	86
UNMIK	0	1	73	74
UNTAET	0	0	60	60
UNMEE	0	49	0	49
UNOCI	0	46	0	46
UNAMSIL	0	37	0	37
UNOMIL	0	33	0	33
UNMIBH	0	20	0	20
ONUMOZ	0	20	0	20
ONUB	0	6	0	6
UNAMA	0	0	3	3
UNSMA	0	2	0	2
TOTAL	16, 120	1, 274	1, 646	19, 040

* Source: China's National Defence Official Website: <http://www.mod.gov.cn/reports/>; UNPKO Contributors Archive:
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml>.

In summary, China has dispatched a larger contingent to certain missions. Most of China's peacekeepers were deployed in Liberia, Sudan, Congo, Lebanon, Darfur and Cambodia. Regarding the deployment of civilian police, 78.8 percent of China's police were sent to Haiti and East Timor (Figure 4.2.4).

4.2.2.2 Enhancing Peacekeeper Training with International Participation

In order to improve the PLA's professional training and to create a high-calibre Chinese peacekeeping contingent, China established the Peacekeeping Affairs Office in 2001 that is under the authority of the Chinese Ministry of National Defence.⁴⁷⁷ After taking part in the UN Standby Arrangement in 1997, China has formally participated in the Class-A Stand-by Arrangement in UN peacekeeping operations since January 2002. The Arrangement requires China to provide a regular contingent to support UN peacekeeping operations with engineering, medical, transportation and other logistical transport teams at appropriate times.⁴⁷⁸ To date, China has provided a designation to peacekeeping forces in the PLA's unit and has prepared one standard battalion for UN peacekeeping.⁴⁷⁹ That includes one UN standard medical team and two UN standard transportation companies.⁴⁸⁰ Such arrangements indicate that China's peacekeeping is moving in a more coherent and systematic direction with respect to international practice.

However, according to Lieutenant General Zhang Qinsheng, the main difficulty confronting China's peacekeeping capabilities is how to strengthen the peacekeeping ranks.⁴⁸¹ In an effort to overcome this challenge, China launched two independent

⁴⁷⁷ China's Ministry of National Defence, 'Chronology of the Chinese Peacekeeping' (29 May 2015) <http://www.mod.gov.cn/photo/2015-05/29/content_4587334_5.htm> accessed 1 October 2015.

⁴⁷⁸ China's Military on Public Security, 'Ten-year Anniversary for China's Peacekeeping Policemen' <<http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n983040/n1372264/n1372546/2330980.html>> accessed 17 November 2011.

⁴⁷⁹ Pang Sen, 'A New Stage in the Development of China-UN Relations' in Wang Yizhou (ed), *Transformation of Foreign Affairs and International Relations in China 1978-2008* (Brill, 2011) 160.

⁴⁸⁰ Xiaohuan Su and Xiaozheng Zhou, 'China's Peacekeeping Force Leave Asia for the First Time' (2003) China Focus: 2002-2003, p. 30.

⁴⁸¹ Zhang Qinsheng, '中国的军事外交 [China's Military Foreign Diplomacy]' *Study Times* (Beijing 14 May 2007) 3.

training centres for civilian police and troops in 2000 and 2009, which are intended to complete a rule-based peacekeeping training system.⁴⁸² The Ministry of National Defence Peacekeeping Training Centre for troops in Huairou (located in Beijing's suburbs) was already in operation to train the Chinese military corps. It also became the main venue for organising international peacekeeping exchanges and foreign peacekeeper training.⁴⁸³ The Civilian Police Peacekeeping Training Centre is located in Langfang city, Hubei Province. Under the direction of the Ministry of Public Security, the training centre is responsible for selecting and training civilian and uniformed police, who are going to be deployed to peacekeeping missions.⁴⁸⁴ In short, the training programs that are organised in those two training centres are designed to take into account the requirements of certain UN peacekeeping missions.⁴⁸⁵ Huairou and Langfang centres are also taking responsibility for the promotion of international cooperation in the peacekeeping field. For instance, in 2011, co-sponsored by China's Ministry of National Defence and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, an international training course for instructors on peacekeeping operations was conducted in Beijing.⁴⁸⁶ This was the first time that China and the UN co-operated in delivering a peacekeeping instructor training programme,⁴⁸⁷ which was seen as a necessary step to enhance and further institutionalise peacekeeper training in China. As Wu Xue and Lv Desheng noted, the joint educational programme will help to improve the PLA's three-level training system.⁴⁸⁸

⁴⁸² Wang Yan, 'A Significant Revise on Chinese Foreign Policy' (2013) 22 Phoenix Weekly 45-46.

⁴⁸³ PLA Peacekeeping Training Centre offers a three month training course organized by the Ministry of National Defence. The course covers a) general knowledge and background on UN peacekeeping; b) practical English proficiency; c) general principles of international law, including the UN Charter, DPKO protocols, host country's domestic law, and international humanitarian law; d) foreign peacekeepers training and exchanges; e) physical training; f) developing theoretical research on UN peacekeeping.

⁴⁸⁴ Huang Jun, Zheng Zhenyu and Zheng Shuangyan, 'An Interview with the Director of CIVIPOL Training Centre, Langfang City' (2006) 1 Small Arms 38-9.

⁴⁸⁵ The courses in Langfang Civilian Police Training Centre including map reading, handling of weapons, radio communication, conducting arrests, law enforcement, tactical languages and order maintenance. See, Peking University, 'Report of the Investigation to the Langfang Peacekeeping Training Centre', (2011) 10 New Thinking 46-7.

⁴⁸⁶ A total of 33 instructors from fourteen countries participated in the training comprising China, Russia, Japan and Canada. See, Marc Lanteigne, 'Red and Blue: China's Evolving United Nations Peacekeeping Policies and Soft Power Development' in Chiyuki Aoi and Yee-KuangHeng (eds), *Asia-Pacific Nations in International Peace Support and Stability Missions* (Macmillan 2014) 131.

⁴⁸⁷ Wu Xu and Lv Desheng, 'PLA's Three-level Peacekeeping Training System Takes Shape' *PLA Daily* (Beijing, 2 April 2011) 1.

⁴⁸⁸ The three-level peacekeeping trainings are: junior, intermediate and senior. Junior peacekeeping training is based on military institutions, which focuses on regular courses, including language training. Intermediate and senior training courses are organised by the Ministry of National Defence, which concentrate on peacekeeping commanders and backbone training. See, Wu Xu and LvDesheng, 'PLA's

Despite achieving such goals in training peacekeepers, certain draw backs still exist. Due to the relatively low internationalisation and deficiencies in the training faculty, the author proposes the following three recommendations. First, in terms of interaction with foreign countries, China must adopt a positive policy towards foreign peacekeeping training schools, whilst also deepening exchanges. For instance, in order to further expand foreign exchange, Qu Zhiwen suggests that online video conferences could be utilised.⁴⁸⁹ This may well cut costs and strengthen the effectiveness of communication. Second, in order to recruit teachers with peacekeeping expertise, training centres should cooperate with universities and research institutes. Chinese peacekeepers' training currently relies on full-time faculties in the training centres only; a situation that cannot satisfy the teaching demand. Conversely, in Norway, full-time faculties and university researchers share responsibilities for training courses, as a ratio of 60 percent and 40 percent respectively.⁴⁹⁰ China could learn from these experiences and strengthen cooperation between peacekeeping training centres and universities or institutes.⁴⁹¹ Third, a lack of co-operation and interaction between the two training centres should be addressed. In order to maximise the potential gains, there should be a link between troop and civilian police and encouragement for cooperative engagements in UN peacekeeping missions.

4.2.2.3 Strengthening China's Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Operations

Following its increasing experience and knowledge of UN peace operations, China has not only begun to contribute administrative personnel and senior officers to a certain number of missions, but also the professionalism of its peacekeepers was recognised by the UN. Pang Bo, a civilian police officer in Guangdong Provence, was appointed associate director of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) in 2002. Pang Bo was also appointed a vice-director in the UN

Three-level Peacekeeping Training System Takes Shape' *PLA's Daily* (Beijing, 2 April 2011) 3.

⁴⁸⁹ Qu Zhiwen and Li Chunzeng, 'The Avenue of Bringing China's Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training in line with International Practice' (2003) 19/2 Journal of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force Academy 65.

⁴⁹⁰ Wang Xin, 'An Overview of Foreign Peacekeeping Police Training' (2010) Study on Police Practice 90.

⁴⁹¹ Such as Peking University, Institute for International Strategic Studies of the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCPS), College of International Relations, Renmin University, China Foreign Affairs University and Chinese People's Public Security University.

Stabilization Mission in Haiti, which is the most senior position that a Chinese civilian police officer has ever held in UN peacekeeping operations.⁴⁹² In 2007, Major General Zhao Jingmin, was appointed force commander of the United Nations mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).⁴⁹³ Zhao attributed his posts to the UN's recognition of China's outstanding contributions to international peacekeeping efforts. Despite achieving positive results, he stated that "even though there are more Chinese officers in middle-and high-ranking posts for UN missions, the ratio is still lower than those from other major world powers".⁴⁹⁴ This indicates that China's contribution to peacekeeping operations were not equivalent to its actual capacity.

In February 2011, the UN Secretary-General appointed Major General Liu Chao, military attaché of the Chinese Embassy in India, as the head of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).⁴⁹⁵ Liu's position was the most senior position yet to be held by China in peacekeeping.⁴⁹⁶ Nevertheless, if China intends to claim more posts in UN peacekeeping, Chinese peacekeepers should enhance their competitiveness, particularly with respect to communication and professional skills.

Given its growing engagement in peacekeeping, certain international experts, however, believe that China is actually focused on protecting its own interests by using the UN system for leverage to advance its national geostrategic, political, and economic interests.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹² Wang Pu and Zhang Xiaofang, 'Pang Bo was Appointed as the Candidate of China's Ten Outstanding Young Persons' *Yangcheng Evening News* (Guangzhou, 18 October 2006) A02G.

⁴⁹³ Secretary-General Biographical Note, 'Secretary-General Appoints Major General Zhao Jingmin of China as Force Commander for West Sahara Mission', SG/A/1089, BIO/3918, 28 August 2007.

⁴⁹⁴ Xinhua News, 'China's Top Brass Shines With UN Peacekeeping Force' *China Daily* (Beijing, 21 December 2007) 20.

⁴⁹⁵ Secretary-General 'Secretary-General Appoints Major General Chao Liu of China to Head United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus', (13 January 2011) Press Release SG/A/1274-BIO/4263-PKO/261, para. 1-3.

⁴⁹⁶ Peter Apps, 'Chinese General Leads Troops in Cyprus as Beijing Embraces UN Role' (*Reuters*, 27 March 2013) < <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/27/us-cyprus-china-peacekeeping-idUSBRE92Q0OU20130327> > accessed 27 December 2013.

⁴⁹⁷ European Parliamentary Research Service, *China's Role in UN Peacekeeping Operations* (EPRS Library, 22 April 2013), para 3.

4.2.3 Pragmatic Motivations and Their Interaction with UN Peacekeeping

Since 2000, China has formulated a new position in relation to the UN that was driven by four factors. First, a positive participation in UN peacekeeping operations is consistent with China's commitment to the UN and substantially contributes to the creation of the image of a responsible power.⁴⁹⁸ As Ambassador Wang Min noted in 2011, China supports UN efforts to improve the speed and efficiency of peacekeeping missions' deployment and China will continue, within its means and capacities, to actively participate in UN peacekeeping operations as well as make its contribution to world peace.⁴⁹⁹

In order to pursue a more normative engagement in UN peacekeeping operations, for instance, the Central Committee of the PLA convened two internal meetings on peacekeeping in 2007 and 2009. In this regard, the PLA's headquarters, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Public Security, gathered to discuss further ways in which to develop China's capabilities in peacekeeping and encourage revision of its policy on peacekeeping.⁵⁰⁰ This could be seen as a response to an opinion expressed by China's former President Hu Jintao. Hu noted that peace is the fundamental premise for mankind's development. As a result, it is necessary to uphold multilateralism to realise common security.⁵⁰¹ In this connection, the meeting came to the conclusion that China not only officially

⁴⁹⁸ China's commitment to UN peacekeeping operation has been noted at the Security Council Open Debate on UN peacekeeping operations. By December 2012, China has addressed twenty-three statements at the Security Council regarding peacekeeping operations. For Detail and the specific statement, see The Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, <<http://www.china-un.org/chn/zgylhg/jjalh/alhzh/whxd/>> accessed 26 June 2013.

⁴⁹⁹ Wang Min, 'Statement by Ambassador Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, at the Security Council Meeting on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' (*Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN*, 27 July 2011)

<<http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/thematicissues/peacekeeping/t849987.htm>> accessed 18 July 2013.

⁵⁰⁰ In 2009, before launching the second peacekeeping work conference, Chen Bingde unveiled the Peacekeeping Centre founded by the Ministry of National Defence. Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of general staff of the PLA, Liu Yahong, deputy commander of the Shenyang Military Area Command (MAC), Huang Haibiao, deputy commander of the Beijing MAC, Zhao Jianzhong, deputy commander of the Lanzhou MAC, Zhang Hetian, deputy commander of the Jinan MAC, and Li Zuocheng, deputy commander of the Chengdu MAC, were present at the conference. 'PLA Peacekeeping Work Conference Held in Beijing' (*the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 26 June 2009) <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Peacekeeping/2009-06/26/content_4003674.htm>, accessed 1 November 2012.

⁵⁰¹ Hu Jintao, 'Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity', At the UN Summit, High Level Plenary Meeting of the 60th General Assembly Session, New York, 15 September 2005.

recognised the significance of maintaining international peace and security, but also decided to deploy more contingents to UN peacekeeping activities.

An interesting case that exemplifies China's flexibility on peacekeeping matters is the Taiwan issue. Unlike its obstructionist positions at the Security Council in the past in voting on peacekeeping missions in countries that diplomatically recognise Taiwan, in 2004 China contributed Formed Police Units (FPUs) to the MINUSTAH, even though Haiti held diplomatic ties with Taiwan at the date of the resolution adoption.⁵⁰² A Chinese spokesperson held that, "China's active involvement in UN peacekeeping missions in Haiti, which has not set up a diplomatic relationship with China, fully exhibits a peace-loving and responsible image of the country".⁵⁰³ Indeed, in the case of Haiti, the author holds that China has followed a policy of persuasion and enticement that was intended to persuade the Haitian government to join China's diplomatic camp.⁵⁰⁴

Second, peacekeeping is in line with a Chinese emphasis on "new historic missions".⁵⁰⁵ Zhang Qinsheng noted that the PLA must constantly enhance peacekeeping work in order to accomplish President Hu Jintao's call to perform various types of military operations other than war.⁵⁰⁶ In 2004, he opined that the Chinese military needed to undergo a transformation in order to fulfil diverse mission requirements.⁵⁰⁷ In fact, after more than twenty years' experience in UN peacekeeping, China is not satisfied with only participating in UN peacekeeping operations, but also

⁵⁰² UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 4961st Meeting, S/PV. 4961, 30 April 2004, p. 2; R. Evan Ellis, 'Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study' (2011) 60 Report of the National Defence University Washington DC 88.

⁵⁰³ Liu Jianchao, 'Foreign Journalists Interview with Riot Peacekeepers for Haiti' (*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 29 September 2004) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/gjhdq_603914/gj_603916/bmz_607664/1206_608062/1206x2_608082/t445353.shtml> accessed 2 March 2013.

⁵⁰⁴ Apparently, China continues to use the threat of curtailing MINUSTAH's mandate to warn Haiti off any high-profile diplomatic activity in support of Taiwan. See, William M Reilly, 'Analysis: UN Refocuses Haiti Mission' (2007) United Press International, paras. 2-4. China's behaviour on Haiti will be examined by detail in the following chapter of this thesis.

⁵⁰⁵ China's increased peacekeeping activity helps to perform "new historic missions", as phrased by President Hu Jintao in 2004. See, James Mulvenon, 'Hoover Institution: Chairman Hu and the PLA's New Historic Missions' (2009) 27 China Leadership Monitor 1.

⁵⁰⁶ Dong Guozheng and LvDesheng, 'The First PLA Peacekeeping Work Conference Held in Beijing' *PLA Daily* (Beijing, 19 June 2007) 1.

⁵⁰⁷ Li Zhen, '全面履行党和人民赋予的新阶段历史使命[Hu Jintao Urges Army to Perform 'Historical Mission']' (*Xinhua News*, 14 January 2008) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-01/14/content_7416535.htm> accessed 10 January 2014.

wishes and has begun to expand its role in other military operations, other than war, such as disaster rescue, counter-piracy and humanitarian relief.⁵⁰⁸ In accordance with Hu's words, China has prepared for possible military struggles and enhanced its capabilities to cope with crises, safeguard peace, prevent wars and to win any likely war that it may face.⁵⁰⁹

Third, there is a strong overlap between peacekeeping contributions and economic interest, given a historical overview of the Chinese peacekeeping involvement over the past decades. As noted by the International Crisis Group, economic investment comes before intervention rather than vice versa, indicating that economic interest prompts a reaction rather than underpinning a strategic approach from the outset.⁵¹⁰ Chinese personnel contribution from 2000 to 2009 could provide evidence in support of this allegation. Within the six UN peacekeeping missions to which China contributed personnel, four were located in African countries that shared substantial trade and development ties with China.⁵¹¹

Although China's peacekeeping contribution is delimited by a commitment to the principle of non-intervention, China demonstrated enthusiasm for deploying peacekeepers to countries where significant economic investments already existed. China explained that the deployment is only justified under serious circumstances in certain conflicts.⁵¹² For example, one half of China's peacekeeping contributions during the 2000s have been deployed in South Sudan and the Darfur region.⁵¹³ In this context, China's personnel contributions and political endeavour in Sudan provides further evidence of the importance of economic and foreign policy interests within the context of peace operations. This case is discussed further below.

⁵⁰⁸ Cynthia Watson, 'The Chinese Armed Forces and Non-Traditional Missions: A Growing Tool of Statecraft' (2009) 9/4 China Brief 9-12.

⁵⁰⁹ Zhang Tiejian, 'Entirely Fulfils the PLA's Historic Missions' (2007) 8/6 Theoretical Studies on PLA Political Work 5.

⁵¹⁰ International Crisis Group, *China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping* (Asia Report 166, 17 April 2009) 15.

⁵¹¹ Krister Karlsson, *China and Peacekeeping: Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations from 2000-2010 and the Theory of Offensive Realism* (Minor Field Study Report Uppsala University, 2011) 16.

⁵¹² Dan Large, *China's Role in the Mediation and Resolution of Conflict in Africa* (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2008) 36-7.

⁵¹³ Li Xuanliang and Ren Ke, 'China Positively Participated in UN Peacekeeping Operations' (*Xinhua News*, 16 April 2013) < http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2013-04/16/c_124587062.htm > accessed 15 October 2013, p. 7.

Fourth, participation in UN peacekeeping can bring benefits for enhancing China's military capabilities. According to a spokesperson from the China Peacekeeping Cipol Training Centre, although the two training schools have conducted joint programmes, such as with Britain, and are in principle open to international trainees, as of late 2012 there were no international students enrolled in standard pre-deployment peacekeeping training classes.⁵¹⁴ As Singh suggested, actual deployment of Chinese forces abroad also acts as a form of training, given the previous lack of experience in foreign operations. This holds especially true for the PLA, which has not operated under wartime conditions since the less-than-successful Sino-Vietnamese conflict of 1979. In this regard, when participating in peacekeeping activity, it is possible to test the Chinese military's professional skills and equipment, revealing deficiencies in information and management, as well as other problems related to operating far from the homeland.⁵¹⁵ China, unlike the US and other NATO members has had far fewer opportunities to send military forces on multilateral missions and therefore has had to play catch-up in learning how to coordinate with foreign forces. In addition, in-country training has also included more opportunities for interactions between the military and civilian components of missions on the ground, including with peacekeeping personnel from many different countries.⁵¹⁶

4.3 Conclusion

Similar to other powers, China's contribution to peace operations is consistent with self-interested power-seeking behaviour. As John Mearsheimer notes, major powers today are willing to use international institutions and peace operations to improve their relative position of power and influence, as well as to protect specific state interests.⁵¹⁷ In this connection, contributing personnel to peace operations has allowed China to engage with the international community, enhance its reputation as a responsible power and secure its position in the world. In fact, China's diplomacy

⁵¹⁴ Comments by CPCTC spokesperson, Langfang City, China, November 2012, cited from Marc Lanteigne, 'Red and Blue: China's Evolving United Nations Peacekeeping Policies and Soft Power Development' on Chiyuki Aoi and Yee-Kuang Heng (eds), *Asia-Pacific Nations in International Peace Support and Stability Missions* (Macmillan 2014) 131.

⁵¹⁵ Prashant Kumar Singh, 'China's Military Diplomacy: Investigating PLA's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations' (2011) 35/5 Strategic Analysis 801-3.

⁵¹⁶ Bonny Ling, 'China's Peacekeeping Diplomacy' (2007) 1 China Rights Forum 47-9.

⁵¹⁷ John J Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions' (1995) 19/3 International Security 7.

primarily serves two functions. First, it fulfils aforementioned ideologies, such as “Peaceful Rise”, “Harmonious World Order”, “The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and “Striving for Achievements”. Second, it intends to extend China’s influence. As an integral part of globalisation, when the “China threat” theory first came into circulation, China realised that in order to obtain a peaceful environment for its development, it was necessary to establish a peace-loving state image and diminish the influence of the threat theory. However, concerning the unchanged traditional sovereign concept, UN peacekeeping operations are a useful way for China to create favourable constituencies in foreign countries, win friends and reduce the chances of confrontation.⁵¹⁸

In spite of achieving a reputation in peacekeeping, China still confronts a number of domestic dilemmas. First, the growth in the PLA’s participation in peacekeeping operations has prompted calls for clarification of the legislative framework regulating overseas deployment. Given the weakness of present regulations on practical issues (such as the administration of the exit and entry of weapons and military personnel, responsibility for compensation, insurance issues, military actions funds guarantees and the jurisdiction of military personnel involved in non-military actions abroad), the development of peacekeeping may be disrupted by an absence of normative legislation. Second, China adheres to a traditional concept of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. According to China’s voting record at the Security Council, China cast nine vetoes based on the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs and the principle of state sovereignty (Table 4.3). As discussed on Chapter 3, in 2007 and 2008, China also opposed the imposition of sanctions against Myanmar and Zimbabwe.⁵¹⁹

⁵¹⁸ Prashant Kumar Singh, ‘China’s Military Diplomacy: Investigating PLA’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations’ (2011) 5/35 Strategic Analysis 794.

⁵¹⁹ China subsequently explained that its vote was based on the following two concerns. First, China could not support any intervention against the will of the host government. Second, the competing jurisdiction occurred between the AU and the UNSC. As the AU had already adopted a resolution in respect of Zimbabwe, it was not necessary for the Security Council to adopt a resolution in respect to the same situation. Chris Buckley, ‘China Defends Veto of Zimbabwe Resolution’, (*Reuters*, 12 July 2008) < <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/12/us-china-zimbabwe-idUSPEK14214420080712> >, accessed 6 November 2012; Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect’ [2008] Myanmar Briefing, 2-3.

Table 4.3 China's Veto Record at the Security Council (1990-2014)⁵²⁰

Date	Draft Resolutions Proposed to the Security Council	Agenda Item
25 August 1972	S/10771	Admission of new Members Bangladesh.
10 January 1997	S/1997/18	Central America: efforts towards peace.
25 February 1999	S/1999/201	The situation in the occupied Arab territories.
12 January 2007	S/2007/14	The situation in Myanmar.
11 July 2008	S/2008/447	Peace and Security – Africa (Zimbabwe).
4 October 2011	S/2011/612	Middle East – Syria.
4 February 2012	S/2012/77	Middle East – Syria.
19 July 2012	S/2012/538	Middle East – Syria.
22 May 2014	S/2014/348	Middle East – Syria.

Source: Security Council Voting Record 1990-2014, <http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick>.

In terms of UN peacekeeping, it is noteworthy that although China demonstrated its enthusiasm towards participation in UN peacekeeping operations during the 2000s, it has consistently expressed reservations on peace-enforcement measures. This might be explained by the regular Chinese emphasis on political settlement of disputes at the UN.⁵²¹ However, findings in recent cases indicate that in pursuit of a role as a responsible world leader, China has been forced to reconcile traditional principles of sovereignty and non-intervention with a more positive position. In this regard, China's flexible behaviour has rendered it vulnerable to criticism of adopting double standards with respect to the principle of non-intervention.

Further discussion will be guided by two central questions: First, how does China find a proper balance between its position on traditional international norms and the demands of contemporary responsibilities?⁵²² Second, whether China uses its participation in UN peacekeeping operations primarily to improve its influence in the world or to protect its national interests abroad.

⁵²⁰ The substantial discussion of China's voting behaviour at the UN is allocated in the following chapter.

⁵²¹ Yang Jieshi, 'The Libyan Crisis Should Be Solved By Political Measures' (*Sina News*, 11 April 2011) <<http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-04-22/143222341091.shtml>> accessed 19 March 2014.

⁵²² Brian Spegele, the Obama administration's former Director of National Intelligence, declared that "Now, Beijing is taking a more mature, sophisticated view of what its interests are". See, Brian Spegele, 'China takes new tack in Libya vote', *The Wall Street Journal*, 20 March 2011, <<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703292304576212431833887422.html>>, accessed 7 November 2012.

5. China's Incentives for Peacekeeping Missions

A good explanation of China's positive policy towards UN peacekeeping operations can be found in its support not only for the extension of the mandates of existing peacekeeping missions, but also for the creation of new missions. When examining the cases of East Timor, Haiti, Sudan and Syria, the progress of China's policy change is evident. Since the case of East Timor in 2000 (the first time that China dispatched its civil police to a UN mission), China has become gradually, but selectively, more involved in a number of missions. As Jian Sanqiang observed in respect to this change, "China was prepared to assume a more active role in global/regional affairs. Also, when making decisions, the Chinese leaders consider more about the country's interests and intend to enhance China's influence in certain regions/states".⁵²³ In this connection, China's behaviour in the case of Sudan presented the notion that China is gradually promoting its national interest and utilising its political influence in certain countries and regions. This reflects the Chinese President Hu Jintao's call in 2009 for the political endeavour to solve international disputes.⁵²⁴ He declared that all nations should encourage and support efforts to peacefully settle international disputes or conflicts through consultations and negotiations, and that China thus opposes acts of encroachment on other countries' sovereignty, forceful interference in a country's internal affairs, and wilful use or threat of military force.⁵²⁵

While China has become a positive contributor to UN peacekeeping operations since the late 1990s, China's principled stand has remained consistent. At the UN, China's reservations are expressed with regard to particular issues such as state sovereignty, consent of the parties, impartiality, and the legitimate use of force. For instance, at the opening debate of the Fiftieth Session of the UN General Assembly in November 1995, Qian Qichen explained a number of principles on UN peacekeeping operations, including the emphasis on the principle of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.⁵²⁶ In fact, China's primary

⁵²³ Jian Sanqiang, *Foreign Policy Restructuring as Adaptive Behaviour: China's Independent Foreign Policy 1982-1989* (University Press of America 1996) 3-10.

⁵²⁴ Hu Jintao, '同舟共济共创未来 [Unite as One and Work for a Bright Future]', General Debate of the 64th Session, GA/10860, 23 September 2009, New York.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

⁵²⁶ Qian also argued that peacekeeping operations should always obtain prior consent from the parties concerned, observe strict neutrality and non-use of force except for self-defence, refrain from resorting

concerns on the principle of non-intervention are reflected in its policy with regard to the Syrian crisis. From 2011 to 2014, China and Russia both cast their vetoes against four proposed Security Council resolutions that attempted to impose sanctions against the Syrian government.⁵²⁷ China believed that the resolutions uneven content was intended to put pressure on one party only and would aggravate the turmoil, thus causing the violence to spill over into other countries in that region.⁵²⁸

This chapter examines China's policies towards the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations and the imposition of Member State-led sanctions against sovereign countries in order to reflect the aforementioned hypotheses outlined in the Introduction chapter.

5.1 The Case of East Timor: An Expanding Role

Human rights violations in East Timor attracted widespread attention from across the world.⁵²⁹ As early as 1960, the General Assembly, by way of Resolution 1542 (XV), endorsed Portugal's authority over East Timor and the affiliated islands.⁵³⁰ However, the situation underwent a significant change in 1974, which led to military conflict between Portugal, Indonesia and the three-party coalition within East Timor.⁵³¹ The General Assembly adopted a general resolution as a consequence, calling for Indonesia's immediate withdrawal and requiring that all parties respect the sovereign integrity and self-determination of East Timor.⁵³²

to mandatory actions, oppose double standards and the imposition of one's view or policies on the Security Council, and limit the scope and duration of operations to the UN's resource capability. See Qian Qichen, 'Speech at the 50th Session of the UN General Assembly on 27 September 1995' (16-22 October 1995) *Beijing Review* 20.

⁵²⁷ UN Documents S/2011/612, 4 October 2011; S/2012/77, 4 February 2012; S/2012/538, 19 July 2012; S/2014/348, 22 May 2014.

⁵²⁸ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 6627th Meeting, S/PV. 6627, 4 October 2011, p. 5.

⁵²⁹ David Connery, *Crisis Policymaking* (ANU Press 2010) 1-29; United States Congress House, 'The Humanitarian Crisis in East Timor', One Hundred Sixth Congress, first session, Thursday, 30 September 1999, Volumes 8-16; Human Rights Watch, 'Indonesia/East Timor: Forced Expulsions to West Timor and the Refugee Crisis' (1999) 11/7 Human Rights Watch; Michael Brecher and Jonathan Vilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (the University of Michigan 1997) 65-659; Mecheal Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds), *The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond* (Lynne Rienner 2004).

⁵³⁰ UN General Assembly Resolution 1542 (XV), adopted at the Fifteenth Session, GA/RES/1542 (XV), 15 December 1960.

⁵³¹ The three parties are: the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (Fretilin), and the Popular Democratic Association of Timor (APODETI); John Taylor, *East Timor: The Price of Freedom* (Zed Books 1999) 27.

⁵³² UN General Assembly Resolution 3458 (XXX), adopted at the Thirtieth Session, GA/RES/3458 (XXX), 12 December 1975.

Declaring that the crisis threatened international peace and security and violated the human rights of the East Timorese people, the UN Security Council embarked on the establishment of a United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in terms of Resolution 1246 on 11 June 1999. The mandate of the mission was adopted and, according to the *Fifth of May Agreement*, concluded in New York between Indonesia and Portugal. UNAMET was authorised to oversee elections and the transition period pending implementation of the outcome.⁵³³ Later, the Security Council authorised the Australian government to set up a multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The mission was mandated to protect staff and other officials and international and national humanitarian personnel, which were subject to security threats.⁵³⁴ The Chinese government, however, voted in favour of Resolution 1246 and 1264, which mandated peacekeeping forces under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.⁵³⁵ On the other hand, China also dispatched civilian police units to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) from 1999 to 2002 for the first time.⁵³⁶

Historically, Chinese support for East Timor's struggle for independence is in line with Mao Zedong's policy of supporting independence and revolutionary movements in the third world as a way to weaken Western imperialists.⁵³⁷ However, after Mao's death in 1976, as economic development became China's first priority. Chinese leaders adopted a moderate foreign policy, which was primarily motivated by the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" and that of "Keeping a Low Profile".⁵³⁸ In this regard, China not only decided to decrease confrontations with the US, but also endeavoured to persuade the international community to provide space for political negotiation and adjustment. Meanwhile, China has formulated its policy towards the

⁵³³ UN Security Council Resolution 1239, S/RES/1239, 7 May 1999; UN Security Council Resolution 1246, S/RES/1246, 11 June 1999.

⁵³⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1264, S/RES/1264, 15 September 1999, p. 2.

⁵³⁵ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 4013th Meeting, S/PV. 4013, 11 June 1999; UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 4045, S/PV. 4045, 15 September 1999.

⁵³⁶ 'Summary of Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations' (*UN Peacekeeping Website*) <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml> accessed 30 March 2015.

⁵³⁷ James Dunn, *East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence* (Longueville 2003) 92-3.

⁵³⁸ Ian Storey, 'China and East Timor: Good, But Not Best Friends' (2006) 6/14 China Brief <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31843&no_cache=1#.Va4v3fViko> accessed 16 May 2013, para 3.

UN based on the principle of non-intervention and the respect of state sovereignty.⁵³⁹ In September 1999, as East Timor was ruled by Indonesia, China voted in favour of the mandate of INTERFET based on the consent of the Indonesian government.⁵⁴⁰

In fact, since 1999 China has engaged in four out of six peacekeeping operations in East Timor, including UNTAET, UNMISSET, UNOTIL and UNMIT.⁵⁴¹ Subsequently, after the Indonesian withdrawal and the completed UN mission to monitor the referendum in East Timor in 2000, China dispatched its first civilian police contingent to the newly emerged independent state.⁵⁴² China's contribution to the UN mission in East Timor demonstrated a willingness to be a positive contributor in UN peacekeeping operations.⁵⁴³ However, China's policy towards the case of East Timor cannot be entirely interpreted as a policy concession to the principle of sovereignty. As Peter van Walsum observed, China was among the most reluctant of the five Permanent Members to authorise the launching of the INTERFET, as it feared that Timor would create a precedent for similar interventions in its own domestic issues such as Tibet and Taiwan.⁵⁴⁴ In this context, one conclusion might be reached that China could only accept intervention in East Timor if the mandate was authorised by

⁵³⁹ Bai Yunzhen, ‘新中国外交制度的演变与创新 [The Evolution and Innovation of the Chinese Foreign Policy after 1949]’ (2009) 9 *World Economics and Politics* 45-46.

⁵⁴⁰ China supported the adoption of the resolution also presented its endeavour to restore relationship with the Indonesian government. China and Indonesia had suspended diplomatic relations until 1990. After the visit of Premier Li Peng to Indonesia, China adopted policy towards Indonesia as China would never interfere in Indonesia's internal affairs. Shen Guofang, Vice-Representative to the UN, stated that multinational force should only be deployed with the consent of the host country. In this case, he said Indonesia's approval met the consent condition. This could explain the positive Chinese vote. See UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 4013th Meeting, S/PV. 4013, 15 September 1999, p. 2; ‘China Voted in Favour of the Resolution Dispatching Multinational Peacekeeping Force to East Timor’ *People’s Daily* (Beijing, 15 September 1999) 1; Press Release, ‘Security Council Authorises Multinational Force in East Timor’, SC/6727, <<http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990915.sc6727.doc.html>> accessed 19 May 2013; Press Release, ‘Secretary-General Welcomes Indonesia’s Acceptance of International Assistance in East Timor’, SG/SM/7128 <<http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990913.sgsm7128.doc.html>> accessed 19 May 2013; Qin Huasun, ‘China Welcomes Indonesia’s Decision for Accepting International Peacekeeping Force in East Timor’ *People’s Daily* (Beijing, 15 September 1999) 5.

⁵⁴¹ UNAMET and INTERFET were two peacekeeping operations to which China has not contributed any peacekeeper. See Facts and Figures, UNTAET, <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetF.htm>> accessed 18 March 2014; Hugh White, ‘The Road to INTERFET: Reflections on Australian Strategic Decisions Concerning East Timor December 1998-September 1999’ (2008) 4/1 *Security Challenges* 69-71.

⁵⁴² Wang Pan, ‘Chinese Civilian Police in East Timor’ (*Xinhua News*, 11 September 2001) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-06/23/content_720434.htm> accessed 18 May 2013.

⁵⁴³ Bates Gill, *Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy* (Brookings Institution Press, 2010) 119.

⁵⁴⁴ Peter van Walsum was served as United Nations Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for West Sahara. Cited from Loro Horta, ‘Timor-Leste: The Dragon’s Newest Friend’ (2009) 4 *Irasec’s Discussion Papers* 3.

the UN and with the consent of the Timorese government.⁵⁴⁵ For instance, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN Qin Huasun declared that “China strongly opposed such an act blatantly violating the principles of the Charter, as well as international law, and challenging the Council’s authority. China opposed the use of or threat of use of force in international affairs, and interference in the internal affairs of other States under whatever pretext or in whatever form”.⁵⁴⁶ In this regard, international intervention such as that in Kosovo during 1999, which was dominated by NATO without either the consent of the target state or the authorisation of the UN, was not supported by China.⁵⁴⁷

In fact, China’s support for UN peacekeeping missions in East Timor has, nevertheless, offered evidence of the two hypotheses regarding the “responsible power image” and “secure advantage”, which is explained as follows.

Military and Energy Benefit

China developed foreign relations with East Timor in 20 May 2002, when East Timor was recognised as a fully independent state.⁵⁴⁸ In pursuit of the nation’s territorial integrity, China hastily opened diplomatic relations with East Timor to prevent the Taiwanese government from requesting recognition for the newly emerged state. There is no doubt that China’s recognition was well received in East Timor. Xianana Gusmao, the President of East Timor, referred to China as a “reliable friend”, and subsequently committed East Timor to the “One-China” policy.⁵⁴⁹ As the fastest growing economy in Asia, China is an attractive partner for East Timor, which was expecting a high level of international engagement. This could explain the rapid development of Sino-East Timorese relations. According to Su Jian, China and East Timor had been developing and consolidating their relations on the basis of sincerity,

⁵⁴⁵ Wan Xia, ‘Legal Study on UN Peacekeeping Operations in the post-Cold War Era’ (2005) 3 Foreign Affairs Review 47-48.

⁵⁴⁶ UN Security Council ‘Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of Use of Force Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ (26 March 1999) Press Release SC/6659.

⁵⁴⁷ China abstained on resolution 678, which authorised “member states to use all necessary means to uphold and implement the previous resolution demanding immediate Iraqi withdrawal and surrender”. UN Security Council Resolution 678, S/RES/678, 29 November 1990, p. 1.


⁵⁴⁸ ‘Timetable of the Diplomatic Relations’ (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter referred to as MOFA China)*, 31 July 2011) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliaozhongguo/611306/2193_611376/> accessed 25 March 2013.

⁵⁴⁹ Ian Storey, ‘China and East Timor good but not the Best Friends’ (*China Brief*, 15 August 2006) <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3961&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=196&no_cache=1#.VEvN_vldVkA> accessed 27 March 2013.

friendship, equality, mutual support and common development, which steered the development of bilateral relations in a healthy and stable direction.⁵⁵⁰ Since 2002, the Chinese government has provided East Timor with a number of supplies, including food, edible oil, farm machinery, seeds and medications. Moreover, in accordance with their bilateral agreement, China and East Timor have organised exchange activities at both governmental and non-governmental levels.⁵⁵¹ These economic and political co-operations were intended to enhance China's influence in East Timor.

China's peacekeeping-based aid has enhanced its influence in East Timor, and the form it takes also serves to indicate China's primary interests. First, the aim is to expand Beijing's influence in Southeast Asia. Given East Timor's geographical location (see map of East Timor), Beijing intends to develop close ties with Dili in order to lessen the influence of other powers, such as the US, Australia and Japan.⁵⁵²

Map of East Timor



Second, China's actions on East Timor are based on the protection of state sovereignty. The Taiwanese government usually offers financial aid to small countries with poor economic conditions for the purpose of political exchange.⁵⁵³ Thus, Beijing's positive

⁵⁵⁰ Su Jian was the Chinese Ambassador to East Timor. Damien Kingsbury, 'China's Interests in East Timor' (*Deakin Speaking*, 10 August 2012) < <http://communities.deakin.edu.au/deakin-speaking/node/348> > accessed 27 March 2013.

⁵⁵¹ Over 700 Timorese civil servants and technical personnel have participated in training course in China. By December 2004, China provided US\$3 700 000 in grant aid to East Timor. In terms of infrastructure, China donated the Presidential Palace, foreign affairs building and barracks at Dili. For details, see Fu Yuancong, 'Longstanding Relationship between China and Timor-Leste' (*the Chinese Embassy in the DR Timor-Leste*, 7 January 2011)

< <http://tl.chineseembassy.org/eng/is/t784186.htm> > accessed 27 March 2013.

⁵⁵² Loro Horta, 'Timor-Leste The Dragon's Newest Friend' (2009) 4 Irasec's Discussion Papers 13-16.

⁵⁵³ Suisheng Zhao, 'Changing Leadership Perceptions' in Suisheng Zhao (ed), *Across the Taiwan Strait:*

policy towards newly emerging states in southern Europe, Africa and Asia has played a part and has subsequently put pressure on Taiwan's foreign relations. In fact, from the author's view, Beijing intends to ensure that an independent, but bankrupt East Timor will commit itself to recognising the "One-China" policy. In other words, Beijing assumes that a close relationship with East Timor might limit Taiwan's economic and political influence in the region.⁵⁵⁴ Thirdly, given the rich natural resources of East Timor, such as petroleum and gas, developing a friendship with East Timor is consistent with China's energy strategy. Access to East Timor's energy resources would boost China's energy security and provide additional opportunities to diversify its reserves.

China has apparently been successful in advancing its interests in the region, having become the third largest trading partner with East Timor.⁵⁵⁵ In terms of political benefits, it has cultivated and consolidated close ties with the Timorese leaders. Taur Matan Ruak, the President of Timor-Leste, asserted that China and East Timor had established a good partnership in terms of economic co-operation, and the co-operation between their governments had been intense and fruitful.⁵⁵⁶ From 2000 to 2014, China Petro, one of China's largest state-owned energy corporations, had invested 1.6 million US Dollars in petroleum and gas exploration in Timor-Leste.⁵⁵⁷ As Fu Yuancong observed, China uses peacekeeping and subsequent economic co-operation as a gateway to its energy resource requirements.⁵⁵⁸

Redirecting Chinese Peacekeeping in East Timor

In terms of Chinese relations with East Timor, although China has treated East Timor as a strategic partner in Southeast Asia and leveraged economic ties, there are still

Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis (Routledge, 1999) 114.

⁵⁵⁴ J Mohan Malik, 'Why Beijing is cooperating with the Timor Action' *New York Times* (New York, 8 October 1999) 5.

⁵⁵⁵ Fu Yuancong, 'Longstanding Relationship between China and Timor-Leste' (*Embassy of the PR-China in the DR Timor-Leste*, 7 January 2011) < <http://tl.chineseembassy.org/eng/is/t784186.htm> > accessed 27 March 2013.

⁵⁵⁶ Bai Jie, '李源潮会见东帝汶前总统 [Chinese Vice-President Li Yuanchao met Former President of Timor-Leste]' (*The Xinhua News*, 16 October 2014) < http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-10/16/c_1112858081.htm > accessed 17 October 2014.

⁵⁵⁷ The Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 对外投资合作国别指南 [*The Guideline to Foreign Investments*] (2014) The ChineseMinistry of Commerce 13.

⁵⁵⁸ Fu Yuancong, 'Longstanding Relationship between China and Timor-Leste' (*Embassy of the PR-China in the DR Timor-Leste*, 7 January 2011) < <http://tl.chineseembassy.org/eng/is/t784186.htm> > accessed 27 March 2013.

limits to Beijing's influence. East Timor's leadership appreciates China's support for their independence, but disagrees with China playing a major part in the country's foreign policy. For instance, in 2002 the Foreign Minister of East Timor, Jose Ramos Horta, denied that China was East Timor's closest ally, but indicated that Dili had decided to develop the closest possible relationship with China.⁵⁵⁹

With respect to the political and geographical proximity to East Timor, China's increasing influence has alerted the US and Australia. For example, China's activities in East Timor have been brought into sharp focus by Australia's security concerns. In 2011, Timor-Leste rejected China's proposal to build and operate a surveillance radar facility on the north coast near the Wetar Strait after considering the strong opposition from Australia, a country who has a close geographical proximity to Timor-Leste.⁵⁶⁰ According to the *Sydney Morning Herald*, the Australian defence intelligence agency commented that the Chinese proposal was another part of China's growing intelligence activity throughout Asia and beyond.⁵⁶¹ As the radar facilities were to be operated by Chinese technicians, the US became concerned that the radar might be used for monitoring US and Taiwanese military deployment.⁵⁶²

China's policy towards developing countries, its policy has been judged as dangling the carrot of economic, military and diplomatic support (such as in the case of Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand) to realise its "charm offensive" policy.⁵⁶³ On the question of whether providing economic or military support to other countries will secure China's international interest, East Timor appears to be a good example of China not fully achieving its goals despite delivering aid and military support. One

⁵⁵⁹ 'Who is important to East Timor?' Media Release, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 12 July 2002, cited in Ian Storey, 'China and East Timor Good but not Best Friends' (*China Brief*, 15 August 2006) <<http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2920.html>> accessed 15 May 2013.

⁵⁶⁰ Yang Xiaohui, '澳大利亚海军政策与实力及其对中国的影响 [The Power of the Australian Navy and Its Influence to China]' (2013) 4 *Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University* 37.

⁵⁶¹ Philip Dorling, 'Timor Rejected Chinese Spy Offer' (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 May 2011) <<http://www.smh.com.au/world/timor-rejected-chinese-spy-offer-20110509-1efv1.html>> accessed 2 April 2013.

⁵⁶² According to Guterres, 'the radars could be used for purposes other than those touted by the Chinese, and these facilities could instead be used to extend China's radar-based intelligence perimeter deep into South-East Asia.' Cited in Dorling's article (Timor Rejected Chinese Spy Offer) published in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 May 2011 <<http://www.smh.com.au/world/timor-rejected-chinese-spy-offer-20110509-1efv1.html>> accessed on 20 June 2014.

⁵⁶³ J Mohan Malik, 'Why Beijing is Co-operating with the Timor Action' (*New York Times*, 8 October 1999) <<http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/08/opinion/08ihitedmalik.t.html>> accessed 28 March 2013.

eminent Chinese scholar has therefore suggested that China should follow a multidimensional foreign policy that doesn't only rely on monetary ties.⁵⁶⁴ From the author's point of view, a solely money-based foreign policy could not be sustainable long term; instead China's political influence in the UN and an attractive economic market has to be considered by the Chinese decision-makers when adopting foreign policy in the future. As a response to this hypothesis, the cases of Sudan and Syria can be considered as new attempts to present China's power and international status.

5.2 The Case of Haiti: a Responsible Power or a New Form of Territorial Claim?

5.2.1 Background

From 1993 to 2012, the Security Council deployed six peacekeeping forces, including one coalition force, in Haiti.⁵⁶⁵ In September 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) with the mandate to deliver assistance to a new police force there.⁵⁶⁶ This was the first UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti. However, as no effective co-operation was forthcoming from the Haitian military authorities, the full deployment of UNMIH was delayed.⁵⁶⁷ In order to resume the functions of UNMIH, the Security Council authorised a US-led multinational force on July 1994 to use all necessary means to facilitate departure from Haiti of the military leadership and to provide a secure environment for UNMIH.⁵⁶⁸ In June 1996, the Security Council authorised the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) and replaced the UNMIH without invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter.⁵⁶⁹ In 1997, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH).⁵⁷⁰ On 16 March 2000, the General Assembly approved the establishment of the

⁵⁶⁴ Zhao Kejin, '解读中国特色的大国外交 [Explains the Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics]' *Study Times* (Beijing, 8 July 2013) 2.

⁵⁶⁵ MINUSTAH is the on-going mission, and the past five missions are: UNMIH, UNSMIH, UNTMIH, MIPONUH and one multinational force. See, *Haiti Peacekeeping Background*, UN Peacekeeping Operations, <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml>> accessed 19 March 2013.

⁵⁶⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 867, S/RES/867, 23 September 1993, p. 2.

⁵⁶⁷ 'Mandates to the United Nations Mission in Haiti' (UNPKO, 2003)

<<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihmandate.html>> accessed 10 May 2013.

⁵⁶⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 940, S/RES/940, 31 July 1993, p. 2-3.

⁵⁶⁹ UNSMIH intended to support Haitian national police force training and promoting institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation. UN Security Council Resolution 1063, S/RES/1063, 28 June 1996, p. 2.

⁵⁷⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 1123 (UNTMIH), S/RES/1123, 30 July 1997; UN Security Council Resolution 1141 (MIPONUH), S/RES/1141, 28 November 1997.

International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH).⁵⁷¹ For consolidating the results achieved by MIPONUH and its predecessor mission the UNMIH, MICAH innovatively introduced the Organisation of American States (OAS) to promote respect for human rights in Haiti based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.⁵⁷² Co-operation between the UN and the regional organisation continued with the succeeding mission (United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH) established by the Security Council. The mandates of MINUSTAH were to facilitate the international community's dialogue with political and social actors and to co-ordinate international electoral assistance to Haiti.⁵⁷³

China voted in favour of Resolution 867 in 1993, but abstained from voting in the Security Council on Resolution 940, which authorised the deployment of a coalition force under Chapter VII.⁵⁷⁴ China treated the use of force by a particular group of states conservatively, concerned that the coercive measure might create a dangerous precedent for peace operations.⁵⁷⁵ Among the five UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti, China only contributed peacekeepers to MINUSTAH.⁵⁷⁶ In contrast to its abstention on Resolution 940, in May 2004 China contributed a police unit to MINUSTAH and subsequently dispatched thirty and ninety-five riot police in September and October 2004, respectively.⁵⁷⁷ As a self-contained police force, the unit was armed with riot control equipment including batons, shields, pepper spray, and sniper rifles.⁵⁷⁸ According to Blasko, despite the rising level of tension between the Mainland China and Taiwan, China displayed more flexibility on peacekeeping issue.⁵⁷⁹

⁵⁷¹ UN General Assembly Resolution 54/193, A/54/193, 17 December 1999, p. 2.

⁵⁷² Ibid. pp. 2-3.

⁵⁷³ UN Security Council Resolution 1542, S/RES/1542, 30 April 2004; the mandates of MINUSTAH have been modified by the following Security Council resolutions, including 1608 (22 June 2005), 1702 (15 August 2006), 1943 (13 October 2007), 1780 (15 October 2007), and 1840 (9 October 2008).

⁵⁷⁴ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3413th Meeting, S/PV. 3413, 31 July 1994.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ China does not demonstrate enthusiasm to coalition forces and coercive peacekeeping missions under the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

⁵⁷⁷ '向海地任务区派出维和警察情况 [The Statistics of Chinese Police Contributions to Haiti]' (*The Ministry of Public Security*, 16 October 2010) <<http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n983040/n1372264/2291797.html>> accessed 18 May 2013.

⁵⁷⁸ 'A General Introduction to the First Peacekeeping Police Contingent in Haiti' (*The Ministry of Public Security of PR China*, 16 October 2010) <<http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n983040/n1372264/n1372546/1501033.html>> accessed 18 May 2013.

⁵⁷⁹ Dennis J Blasko, *The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century* (2nd edn, Routledge, 2012) 220.

5.2.2 The Logic of Chinese Perspectives

Two main factors have driven China's policy towards Haiti. First, China opposed the deployment of coalition force in the conflict region and persuaded the UN to formulate political solutions in solving conflicts. Its behaviour in Haiti is consistent with the aforementioned hypothesis (referring to Hypothesis 2 in the Introduction). Second, China's growing engagement with Haiti is part of its strategy to limit Taiwan's influence in the fledgling state. Moreover, China's first riot police unit contribution to the UN mission in Haiti was made on the basis of the "One-China" doctrine. As Stefan Stahle observed, China regards its engagement in UN peacekeeping operations as an effective instrument to increase pressure on former or current allies of Taiwan.⁵⁸⁰

Opposition to UN Approved Operations– Abstention on Resolution 940

China abstained from the vote to authorise US-led military intervention in Haiti. When the Security Council considered deploying a multinational force there, China was afraid that the precedent might affect existing principles of UN peacekeeping.⁵⁸¹ For instance, Li Zhaoxing, the Chinese representative to the UN, argued that China advocated a peaceful solution to any international dispute or conflict through patient negotiations. He said that China did not agree with the adoption of any solution based on the resort to pressure or the use of force.⁵⁸² In addition, Li emphasised that China had consistently held that dialogue and negotiation were the only appropriate and effective means of resolving various international issues.⁵⁸³ Li's words fully reflected China's policy regarding the use of force. Chinese ideology has long maintained that the use of force does not contribute to achieving a fundamental solution to political crises.

When the UN Security Council authorised the strengthening of an advance team of the UN mission in Haiti in November 1994, China sought to explain its position. By voting in favour of Resolution 964, the Chinese ambassador to the UN highlighted China's consistency with regard to respecting the principle of non-intervention:

⁵⁸⁰ Stefan Stahle, 'China's Shifting Attitude towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' (2008) 195 *The China Quarterly* 653.

⁵⁸¹ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3413th Meeting, S/PV. 3413, 31 July 1994, p. 10.

⁵⁸² *Ibid.* p. 10, para 5.

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.* p. 10, para 6.

China has opposed interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the use or threatened use of force in international relations consistently. We [China] expounded this position when the Council adopted Resolution 940 (1994), which authorised military action in Haiti. Still less should Resolution 964 (1994), which has just been adopted, be understood as an affirmation of this so-called formula.⁵⁸⁴

It can be noted that China's efforts to provide alternative feasible solutions to the conflict were influenced by the security concerns within its own territory.⁵⁸⁵ However, the question remains whether political negotiation is effective when the situation poses a threat to peace and security in underdeveloped countries. With respect to the establishment of a US-led coalition force, China consequently expressed its opposition to such deployment, although the coalition force achieved results, which created conditions for UNMIH to resume all its functions.⁵⁸⁶ The opposition to coercive measures was adherence to the principle of non-intervention. In this regard, China's conservative policy was in contrast to the US's radical position in the case of Haiti. The confrontation between Chinese political efforts and American military intervention opened the discussion regarding which is the more effective way to restore peace and security in the target state. In this connection, Madeleine Albright, the then US representative to the UN, declared that:

The purpose to set up a US-led coalition force is not to impinge upon the sovereignty of Haiti, but to restore the power to exercise that sovereignty to those who rightfully possess it. Our purpose is to enable Haiti, in the words of the United Nations Charter, to pursue social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. Our choice is to allow Haiti to build a future more free, more secure and more prosperous than its past.⁵⁸⁷

Indeed, the intervention operation restored ousted Haitian President Jan-Bertrand Aristide, who served as the first democratically elected leader.⁵⁸⁸ Based on the theory

⁵⁸⁴ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at the 3470th Meeting, S/PV.3470, 29 November 1994, p. 5, para 3.

⁵⁸⁵ Zhao Lei, 'Analysis of China's Peacekeeping Operations in Africa' (2007) 94 Foreign Policy Commentary 34-35.

⁵⁸⁶ The coalition force followed the mandates to restore legitimate authority to Haiti and provide an appropriate environment for UNMIH. On 31 March 1995, UNMIH assumed the full range of its functions. See, Background of UNMIH, UN Peacekeeping Operations, <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihbackgr2.html>> accessed 20 June 2013.

⁵⁸⁷ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3413th Meeting, S/PV.3413, 31 July 1994, p. 12, para 9.

⁵⁸⁸ Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 'Haiti: Impact of September 1991 Coup' (1992) 2/4 International Refugee Law 217.

of military intervention, it may be concluded that human rights take priority over all other international principles, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁵⁸⁹ The question then arose as to whether the forcible acceptance of human rights was a new form of dictatorship or imperialism.⁵⁹⁰ In the case of Haiti, when the Security Council legalised action by a coalition force against the rebels who opposed Aristide's policies, China's position on political settlement of conflicts was nevertheless in line with the opinion of Richard Falk, who held that political negotiation concerning all parties' requirements was a better and preferable measure to restore peace.⁵⁹¹

Contributions to MINUSTAH – A New Form of “One-China” Doctrine

In the Haitian context, it is noteworthy that the first riot police contributions to MINUSTAH had an intended consequence in that China began to deliberately expand its diplomatic influence overseas. Through peacekeeping, the author believes that China could demonstrate to the international community its progress toward “responsible power” rather than threatening the international system. In addition, increased involvement in UN peacekeeping provides a venue for China to shape its global norm and to realise its territorial claim over Taiwan.

Compared to two earlier precedents in the case of Macedonia and Guatemala,⁵⁹² China's contribution to the UN mission in Haiti would exemplify the question: to what extent is the “One-China” policy in line with China's policy towards peacekeeping operations? As Pang Zhongying observed, “the conflict of interests in defending sovereignty rights and pushing for the state's foreign policy priorities had resulted in friction”.⁵⁹³ In this regard, as achieving a positive international reputation has been a defined priority in its foreign policy, China may face challenges when

⁵⁸⁹ Thomas Cushman, ‘The Human Rights Case for the War in Iraq: A Consequentialist View’ in Richard Wilson (ed), *Human Rights in the “War on Terror”* (CUP, 2005) 80-81; Alan J Kuperman, ‘Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene’ (September 2013) Belfer Centre Policy Brief 3.

⁵⁹⁰ Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, UN Document A/67/327, 22 August 2012, paras 41-42.

⁵⁹¹ With regard to the 1994 Haitian conflict, Falk argued that the deployment of a US-led coalition force under Security Council's mandate violated the principle of state sovereignty and self-determination. See Richard Falk, ‘The Haitian Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for the United Nations’ (1995) 2/36 Harvard International Law Journal 352-354.

⁵⁹² On prior votes involving peacekeeping operations in the Security Council, China had consistently adopted obstructionist positions towards countries that supported Taiwan's independence. See, SC/6311 Draft Resolution S/1997/18, 9 January 1997 and SC/6648 Draft Resolution S/1999/201, 25 February 1999 were vetoed by China.

⁵⁹³ Pang Zhongying, ‘China's Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping’ (2005) 1/12 International Peacekeeping 100.

attempting to obstruct the adoption of resolutions in regard to peacekeeping.

Interestingly, despite an official diplomatic tie between Haiti and Taiwan, China's support for the authorisation of a UN mission to Haiti has been widely discussed. For instance, the International Crisis Group (ICG) considered China's police contribution as a good example of China using its power as a permanent member of the Security Council to make decisions regarding UN peacekeeping activities in accordance with its own power-seeking interests.⁵⁹⁴ Arguably, as the first time China dispatched a riot police unit serving a peacekeeping mission to a state that has diplomatic ties with Taiwan, China's consistent strong policy on territorial claims underwent a significant change. The reasons for this are as follows: First, China defines itself as a "responsible power" and helps to curb conflict in the world (reflecting on Hypothesis 1). Wang Guangya, *inter alia*, attempted to explain the vote for Security Council Resolution 1743 on Haiti, "Although a number of important elements were not reflected in the text, China, in order to show the maximum flexibility, agreed to put aside a number of pending issues and did its best to facilitate consensus".⁵⁹⁵ Moreover, after the Haitian earthquake in January 2010, China sent a rescue team to Haiti which also presented a more significant consideration than simply isolating Taiwan in the case of Haiti, and thus avoided a negative impact on China's image as a "responsible power".⁵⁹⁶

Second, China is using its international influence to secure the underlying issues of sovereignty and diplomatic recognition.⁵⁹⁷ For instance, after Liberia withdrew its diplomatic recognition in respect of Taiwan in 2003, China dispatched a contingent of 500 peacekeepers to support the UNMIL peacekeeping force, along with a generous aid package.⁵⁹⁸ In this connection, on the basis of an International Crisis Group's interview with Chinese officials, the purpose of China's participation in peacekeeping

⁵⁹⁴ International Crisis Group, *China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping* (Asia Report 166, 17 April 2009) 18.

⁵⁹⁵ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5631st Meeting, S/PV.5631, 15 February 2007, p. 3, para 9.

⁵⁹⁶ Wen Xian and Wang Jinping, '中国紧急救援海地 [China Dispatched A Rescue Team to Haiti]' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 16 January 2010) 3.

⁵⁹⁷ Derek Mitchell and Carola McGiffert, 'Expanding the Strategic Periphery: A History of China's Interaction with the Developing World' in Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginsbotham and Derek Mitchell (eds), *China and the Developing World* (Routledge, 2007) 18.

⁵⁹⁸ The Central Military Commission, 'China's Peacekeeping Forces Leave for Liberia' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 10 December 2003) 5.

is to develop a positive relationship with post-conflict governments, which may give Taiwan “less room to breathe”.⁵⁹⁹ Another example was in 2007, when the Security Council considered the one-year extension of the mandate in the case of MINUSTAH, China raised objections to the proposal. Two amendments in respect to the mandate extending the mission were proposed by China before the draft resolution opened for voting: 1) that a six months extension instead of twelve months should be authorised.⁶⁰⁰ 2) China requested the Secretary-General to carry out a comprehensive assessment that could assist the Council to determine the overall functions of the mission and to set up a long-term strategy for both Haiti and the UN.⁶⁰¹ Wang Guangya, the Chinese representative to the UN, stated that as the security environment continued to be relatively stable in accordance with the report of the Secretary-General,⁶⁰² there was no need for the Security Council to extend the mission in Haiti for twelve months.⁶⁰³

These two proposals could be seen as evidence of China’s growing confidence and ambitions with respect to peacekeeping operations. As noted by Michael Lu, Taiwan’s “Foreign Ministry” spokesman, the Chinese position towards Haiti is one in which China intended to take the opportunity of interfering in Haiti’s internal affairs. Lu also stated that China opposed the extension because Haiti supported Taiwan’s joining the UN, and its president was scheduled to visit Taiwan in July 2005.⁶⁰⁴ Indeed, China has also induced countries that had diplomatic relations with Taiwan to switch recognition back to China from Taiwan by offering financial aid and providing opportunities for economic co-operation. For instance, in 2008 trade between Haiti and China saw a 100.4 percent increase.⁶⁰⁵ In 2005, Haiti withdrew its support for Taiwan joining the UN as it considered economic relations with China and was worried China would

⁵⁹⁹ International Crisis Group, *China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping* (Asia Report 166, 17 April 2009) 18.

⁶⁰⁰ China maintained that six months’ extension is a general practice related to UN peacekeeping operations. UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5631st Meeting, S/PV.5631, p. 3.

⁶⁰¹ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5631st Meeting, S/PV. 5631, 15 February 2007, p. 3.

⁶⁰² UN Document S/2006/1003, 19 December 2006, para 10-12.

⁶⁰³ Wang Guangya, ‘Explanation of Vote by Wang Guangya at the Security Council on Haiti’, (*Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN*, 15 February 2007), <<http://www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/smhwj/2007/t298160.htm>>, para 4, accessed 30 March 2014.

⁶⁰⁴ Jim Scott, ‘Taiwan condemns China over Peacekeeping in Haiti’ Reuters via Swissinfo cited from *Turkish Weekly* 2 June 2005 <<http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/11824/taiwan-condemns-china-over-peacekeeping-in-haiti.html>> accessed 25 March 2013.

⁶⁰⁵ Sun Wen and Wang Zhao, ‘The Percentage of Trade Growth between China and Haiti reached a New Peak’ (*Xinhua News Agency*, 8 February 2010) <<http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2010/02-08/2115103.html>> accessed 20 May 2013.

veto resolutions in respect to UN peacekeeping.⁶⁰⁶

In addition, political solutions have always been the preference of the Chinese government in order to restore peace and security in conflict regions.⁶⁰⁷ When the Security Council considered the draft resolution extending the mission, China opposed the section resorting to military measures. Wang Guangya argued that the Security Council had failed to take adequate account of the importance of political reconciliation and economic recovery.⁶⁰⁸ In this context, China expected more participation during the conflict settlement, which assumed an advance in its political influence in Haiti. However, one issue that needs to be explored is which conditions should be fulfilled in pursuit of a successful political solution in conflict countries. In this regard, the underlying conditions required in achieving a successful political endeavour in solving international conflicts will be discussed in the case of Sudan.

In short, in the 1990s, when reviewing the cases of Macedonia and Guatemala, China was a less experienced practitioner in peacekeeping than other member states of the UN.⁶⁰⁹ Moreover, China perceived that the protection of national interest, such as territorial integrity, was a primary concern in regard of its foreign policy.⁶¹⁰ However, in the case of Haiti, the “One-China” policy has nevertheless gained flexibility. In fact, although a new precedent has been created by the Chinese government protecting the “One-China” policy in the case of Haiti, China has not abandoned the goal of territorial integrity.⁶¹¹ As Robert Ross explained, “if Beijing fails to retaliate against a Taiwan declaration of independence, secessionist movements in Tibet, Xinjiang and other parts of China could be emboldened to escalate their resistance to Chinese

⁶⁰⁶ Du Lin, ‘海地致函北京不支持台湾加入联合国 [Haiti wrote to Beijing mentioning no more Support for Taiwan joining the UN]’ (*VOA News Chinese*, 1 February 2007) <<http://www.voachinese.com/content/a-21-w2007-02-02-voa1-58898147/1101300.html#>> accessed 20 May 2013.

⁶⁰⁷ Pan Junwu, ‘解析国际争端解决机制及其发展前景 [Study on the Mechanism of International Conflict Settlement]’ (2009) 4 *Science of Law* 112

⁶⁰⁸ ‘Explanation of Vote by Permanent Representative of China to the UN Ambassador Wang Guangya at the Security Council on Haiti’ (*Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN*, 15 February 2007) <<http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t298160.htm>> accessed 22 May 2013.

⁶⁰⁹ Qi Haixia and Zhang Zuoli, ‘Veto or Abstention?’ (2014) 5 *World Economics and Politics* 101-110.

⁶¹⁰ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3730th Meeting, S/PV.3730, 10 January 1997, p. 17; UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3982nd Meeting, S/PV. 3982, 25 February 1999, p. 4.

⁶¹¹ ‘Why Say the Adherence to the Principle of One-China is the Basis and Premise for Peaceful Reunification?’ (*MOFA P.R. China*, 15 November 2000) <<http://ae.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t150868.htm>> accessed 25 May 2013

rule”.⁶¹² Nevertheless, in the case of Haiti, it is evident that peacekeeping operations were used as vehicles for promoting the “One-China” policy, on the one hand. On the other hand, China’s national interests helped determine its willingness to support specific operations.⁶¹³

5.3 The Case of Sudan (Darfur): Political Endeavour

In the case of Sudan, the question was raised by both domestic and international scholars: whether the responsibility to protect civilians superseded the need to obtain the host country’s consent.⁶¹⁴ The Darfur crisis that occurred in western Sudan exemplifies China’s stance on the approval of humanitarian intervention, which of course reflected Hypothesis 4. However, China came under criticism for obstructing any decision by the Security Council on possible sanctions against or UN intervention in Sudan. For instance, the *Seattle Times* asserted that China’s policy towards Sudan contributed to the common view of China as a “ruthless predator” of natural resources without concern for the management of local conflict.⁶¹⁵ Internationally, in November 2003, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila announced the humanitarian situation in the Greater Darfur Region of west Sudan may emerge as the worst humanitarian crisis in Sudan since 1988.⁶¹⁶ Six months later, the Darfur crisis was referred to as “genocide” in a report by the US, despite neither the Africa Union (AU) nor the UN sharing this view.⁶¹⁷ China nevertheless faced a

⁶¹² Robert S Ross is professor of Political Science at Boston College and Associate. Robert S Ross, ‘Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance and US-China Relations’ (2002) 2/27 International Security 55.

⁶¹³ Krister Karlsson, *China and Peacekeeping: Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations from 2000-2010 and the Theory of Offensive Realism* (Uppsala University 2011) 16.

⁶¹⁴ Alex J Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect – Five Years On’ (2010) 24/1 Ethics and International Affairs 154; Luke Glanville, *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History* (The University of Chicago Press, 2014) 200; Fred Grunfeld and Wessel N Vermeulen, *Failure to Prevent Gross Human Rights Violations in Darfur* (Brill Nijhoff, 2014) 44; Qiu Meitong and Zhou Qing, ‘保护的责任：冷战后西方人道主义介入的理论研究 [The Responsibility to Protect: Study on the Western Theory of Humanitarian Intervention in Post-Cold War Era]’ (2012) 2 Chinese Journal of European Studies 131.

⁶¹⁵ Peter S Goodman, ‘China and Sudan: Partners in Oil and Warfare?’ *Seattle Times* (Seattle, 27 December 2004) 5.

⁶¹⁶ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Sudan: Displacement Rises, Access Declines in Sudan, Says UN Humanitarian Affairs Office’ (7 November 2003) UN Document AFR/748, IHA/818; Gerard Prunier, *Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide* (Cornell University Press 2008) 124-148.

⁶¹⁷ The US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan a “genocide”, calling the killing of black Africans in the Arab-led nation “a coordinated effort, not just random violence”. The UN stated that the Darfur crisis involved mass murders of civilians, which have been committed by the Janjaweed, but not genocide. In 2004, the Chair of the Peace and Security of the African Union argued that abuses were taking place. He said that there was mass suffering, but it was not genocide. Scott Straus, ‘Darfur and Genocide Debate’ (2005) 1/84 Foreign Affairs 123; Report of

diplomatic dilemma due to its opposition to those initiatives imposing military sanctions for humanitarian purposes against Sudan.⁶¹⁸ For instance, diplomats and scholars proposed a boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.⁶¹⁹

In response to China's opposition to sanctions, the US revised the draft resolution twice, eliminating the direct threat of sanctions and instead proposing that the Security Council would only consider such measures.⁶²⁰ As a result, China decided not to block the resolution and then abstained from voting on it. Wang Guangya, China's Ambassador to the UN, stated that China's position on sanctions remained unchanged.⁶²¹ He also said that it was their considered view that instead of helping to solve complicated problems, sanctions may make them worse.⁶²² However, when reviewing similar situations in North Korea and Iran, it was a paradox that China supported the imposition of sanctions on those two countries.⁶²³ In the case of Sudan, the following questions need to be addressed: 1) What factors drove China to become a strong opponent of sanctions against Darfur? 2) Why did China and the US fail to conclude an agreement regarding sanctions? The case analysis also reveals China's stance on a state's consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping mission on its territory.

5.3.1 Background and the Chinese Response

According to the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, the Darfur crisis was based on a decades-long contest for land, water and other natural resources between black farmers and Arab-identified herdsman that turned into large-

the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564, adopted at the Fifty Fortieth Meeting, 25 January 2005; Ko Bapela to ask the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'Position and Response of the African Union on the Darfur Crisis as Being Genocide' (Press Release of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 3 November 2004) <<http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2004pq/pq99.htm>> accessed 30 May 2013.

⁶¹⁸ Eric Kiss and Kate Zhou, 'China's New Burden in Africa' in Dennis Hickey and Baogang Guo (eds) *Dancing with the Dragon: China's Emergence in the Developing World* (Lexington Books, 2010) 150-151; Rose Macfarlane, 'Why Has China Been Vilified by the West for its Engagement in Darfur and to What Extent is this Justified?' (2012) 8 *Journal of Politics and International Studies* 173.

⁶¹⁹ Sonja K Foss and Barbara J Walkosz, 'Definition, Equivocation, Accumulation, and Anticipation' in Monroe Price and Daniel Dayan (eds), *Owning the Olympics: Narrative of the New China* (The University of Michigan Press 2008) 354.

⁶²⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 1564, S/RES/1564, 18 September 2004, p. 2.

⁶²¹ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5040th Meeting, S/PV. 5040, 18 September 2004, p. 5.

⁶²² Ibid.

⁶²³ China's policy in respect of the cases in Iran and North Korea, see, Joel Wuthnow, *Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council: Beyond the Veto* (Routledge, 2013) 59-95.

scale violence in early 2003.⁶²⁴ Consequently, rebel groups such as the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement were opposed to Arab militias known as the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed was supported by the government in Khartoum, including via logistics and arms supply.⁶²⁵ By December 2003, the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that Jan Egeland, the Under-Secretary-General of the UN for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief declared Darfur “one of the worst humanitarian situations in the world”.⁶²⁶ In late 2004, Janjaweed and rebel groups infringed a ceasefire agreement, which increased tension in Darfur.⁶²⁷ Although the Peace Agreement stipulated that parties to the conflict would accept a power-sharing arrangement and a demobilisation force in Darfur, obstacles were faced in the implementation of the agreement. As only one rebel group signed this agreement, the conflict intensified.⁶²⁸

In April 2004, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was established based on reports by the joint observer mission of the AU and the EU, who were monitoring the ceasefire implementation.⁶²⁹ In July 2004, in order to achieve disarmament in Darfur, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1556, which endorsed the AU proposal to deploy a force to Darfur to protect civilians, demanded that parties to the conflict be disarmed and that those responsible for violations of human rights be brought to justice.⁶³⁰ China abstained from voting on the resolution.⁶³¹ In fact, from 2004 to 2007 China cast fifteen affirmative votes and abstained in six votes among twenty-one resolutions that were adopted by the Security Council. (Table 5.3) As noted by Thalakada, China’s voting behaviour illustrates its variable position on the use of

⁶²⁴ ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Security-General’ (Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004), 25 January 2005, p. 22-23.

⁶²⁵ De Waal, ‘Darfur, the Court and Khartoum: The Politics of State Non-Cooperation’ in Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark (eds), *Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa* (Royal African Society, 2008) 30-34.

⁶²⁶ USG Jan Egeland, ‘Humanitarian and Security Situations in West Sudan reach New Lows, UN Agency Says’ (UN News Centre, 5 December 2003) <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=9094&Cr1=#.Uan1HZVOy0s>> accessed 1 June 2013.

⁶²⁷ ‘Darfur: The Failure to Protect’ (Africa Report 89) (8 March 2005) International Crisis Group 3

⁶²⁸ Laurie Nathan, ‘No Ownership, No Peace: The Darfur Peace Agreement’ (*Crisis State Research Centre*, 6 September 2006) <http://www.peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/NoOwnershipNoPeaceDarfur_Nathan.pdf> accessed 3 June 2013.

⁶²⁹ ‘Darfur Deadline: An International Action Plan’ (Africa Report 83) (23 August 2004) International Crisis Group 2.

⁶³⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 1556, S/RES/1556, 30 July 2004, p. 2.

⁶³¹ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5015th Meeting, S/PV. 5015, 30 July 2004, p. 3.

force in the post-Cold War era.⁶³² In this regard, Zhang Yishan, China's Ambassador to the UN, argued that the Sudanese Government was responsible for resolving the Darfur situation and that the international community should make all necessary political efforts to assist the government of Sudan.⁶³³

⁶³² Nigal Thalakada, 'China's Voting Pattern in the Security Council 1990-1995' in Bruce Russett (ed), *The Once and Future Security Council*, St. Martin's Press 1997 84-86.

⁶³³ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5015th Meeting, S/PV. 5015, 30 July 2004, p. 3.

Table 5.3 China's Voting Behaviour on Darfur 2004-2007*

(Security Council Resolutions with Primary Concerns)

Issuing Date	Resolution Ref. No.	Primary Concerns	Invoking Chapter VII	The Chinese Vote
30 July 2004	S/RES/1556	The UN endorsed the AU mission in Darfur, and imposed an arms embargo against non-government actors.	Yes	Abstention
18 September 2004	S/RES/1564	Calling for support for the AU mission; considering taking additional measures, such as sanctions, against the petroleum industry.	Yes	Abstention
24 March 2005	S/RES/1590	1. Establishing UNMIS. 2. Requesting UNMIS to liaise with AMIS.	Yes	In favour of
29 March 2005	S/RES/1591	1. Establishing a committee to monitor sanctions. 2. Imposing travel ban and arms embargo.	Yes	Abstention
31 March 2005	S/RES/1593	Referring the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the ICC	Yes	Abstention
26 April 2006	S/RES/1672	Calling for additional sanctions, including travel ban and financial restrictions.	Yes	Abstention
16 May 2006	S/RES/1679	1. Urging all parties to follow the Darfur Peace Agreement. 2. Strengthening AMIS's capacity. 3. Endorsing the AU's decision to take concrete steps towards the transition from AMIS to UN operation.	Yes	In favour of
31 August 2006	S/RES/1706	Expanding mandate of UNMIS.	Yes	Abstention
31 July 2007	S/RES/1769	Establishing UNAMID to replace AMIS.	Yes	In favour of

*Source: UN Resolutions, available at: <<http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>>

As the Security Council deliberated on the imposition of sanctions, China threatened to veto the relevant draft resolution. For instance, Wang Guangya explained that sanctions based on enforcement measures would send the wrong signal and make negotiations more difficult.⁶³⁴ In April 2006, China repeated its claims that pressure on Khartoum would fail to produce a political settlement and make the situation even worse.⁶³⁵

However, as AU-proposed efforts to manage the conflict were inadequate, the Security Council therefore authorised the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement on the North-South dispute, and to provide support and coordinate with the AU effort.⁶³⁶ On 31 August 2006, the mandate of UNMIS was expanded by Resolution 1706.⁶³⁷ China abstained on the vote authorising the expansion of the mandate on the basis that the position of the Sudanese government should be taken into consideration.⁶³⁸ On 31 July 2007, when the Sudanese government demonstrated a positive reaction, China voted in favour of Resolution 1769, which authorised to launch an AU/UN Hybrid Operation (UNAMID) in Darfur taking over from AMIS. As of December 2014, China had contributed 1748 peacekeeping troops to UNAMID.⁶³⁹

In addition, after the UN takeover in Darfur, the ability of regional organisations to prevent conflict faced challenges and limitations. Theoretically, there are three reasons for the transition from the AU-led to a UN-dominated peacekeeping operation in Darfur: 1) the conflict in Darfur continued to escalate and began to spread west into Chad;⁶⁴⁰ 2) as a donor-funded mission, a prerequisite of AMIS was to maintain an

⁶³⁴ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5040th Meeting, S/PV. 5040, 18 September 2004, p. 4.

⁶³⁵ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5423rd Meeting, S/PV. 5423, 25 April 2006, p. 3.

⁶³⁶ UNMIS was authorised by Resolution 1590 in 2005, comprising some 10 000 troops and 600 police. See, ‘The United Nations and Darfur’ (August 2007) Peace and Security Section of the UN Department of Public Information 5.

⁶³⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1706, S/RES/1706, 31 August 2006, p. 3.

⁶³⁸ China, Russia and Qatar abstained. Wang Guangya stated that the resolution should have occurred after further consultations between the international community and the Sudanese government had taken place in September. UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5519th Meeting, S/PV. 5519, 31 August 2006, p. 5.

⁶³⁹ ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations Archive’ (*UN Peacekeeping Official Website*, December 2011) < http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml > accessed 4 June 2015.

⁶⁴⁰ More than 20 000 refugees had moved into eastern Chad and clashes between the locals and refugees were on the rise. *To Save Darfur* (Africa Report no.105), 17 March 2006, International Crisis Group p. 9.

appropriate environment for the UN mission in Darfur; 3) as the AU faced challenge to take concrete steps towards the implementation of the Peace Agreement due to challenges from Khartoum, the agreement was considered as a document in name only.⁶⁴¹ In this regard, an effective international response could only come through the UN deployment.⁶⁴²

5.3.2 Tacit Consent to the Use of Force in Libya – What’s the Difference?

The two controversial cases of Sudan and Libya prompted wide discussion throughout the world focusing on China’s potential policy change towards UN non-intervention and the use of force on a sovereign state.⁶⁴³ Scholars, such as Brain Spegele and Jason Dean argued that China’s decision not to veto the Security Council’s resolution to authorise states to use force in Libya reflected changes in Beijing’s diplomatic strategy as its global interests become more extensive and complex.⁶⁴⁴ In March 2011, China tactically supported the US-led coalition forces to establish a “no-fly zone” over Libya, in contrast to its voting behaviour in the cases of Zimbabwe and Myanmar.⁶⁴⁵ The author considers that the exceptional policy in respect of Libya was driven partly by three elements: the “One-China” policy, goodwill to the AU, and the principle of non-intervention.

In 2006, the Gaddafi administration recognised Taiwan as an independent state and condemned China as a “new colonialist power seizing resources in Africa”.⁶⁴⁶ This might be presumed as a reason for China’s abstention, and subsequent allowing of

⁶⁴¹ A European diplomat explained that it would take time for the UN to take over, and the donors would have to provide bridge funding to AMIS to fill the gap. *To Save Darfur* (Africa Report No. 105, 17 March 2006), International Crisis Group 16.

⁶⁴² *Getting the UN into Darfur* (Africa Briefing no. 43), 12 October 2006, International Crisis Group p. 2.

⁶⁴³ Chris Zambelis, ‘A Swan Song in Sudan and Libya for China’s Non-Interference’ (2011) 11/15 China Brief 10-12.

⁶⁴⁴ Brain Spegele, ‘China Takes New Tack in Libya Vote’, (*The Wall Street Journal*, 20 March 2011) <<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703292304576212431833887422.html>>, accessed 7 November 2012; Jason Dean, ‘China’s Vote on Libya Signals Possible Shift’ (*The Wall Street Journal*, 28 February 2011) <<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703933404576170793783265986>> accessed 18 March 2014; UN Security Council ‘Security Council Approves “No-Fly Zone” over Libya, Authorising “All Necessary Measures” to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions’ (17 March 2011) Press Release SC/10200.

⁶⁴⁵ When considering similar situations in Zimbabwe, Myanmar and Sudan, China used or threatened to use its veto power to block the implication of sanctions against sovereign states. UN Security Council Resolution 1973, S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011, p. 2.

⁶⁴⁶ Xinhua, China Demands Libya to Cease Official Ties with Taiwan, (*Xinhua News*, 11 May 2006), <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/11/content_4550886.htm>, accessed 19 March 2013.

Resolution 1973 to go through.⁶⁴⁷ Nevertheless, in the aftermath of NATO's military intervention, China supported the UN to start a political process (UNSMIL) based on the UN Charter.⁶⁴⁸ In response to the Chinese position on the establishment of a “no-fly zone”, Li Baodong explained that China had not blocked the passage of the resolution because it attached great importance to the request of the Arab League and the African Union.⁶⁴⁹ However, China's policy towards Libya was criticised by its domestic scholars for the high cost of its tolerance for the use of force.⁶⁵⁰ During the Libyan crisis in 2011, over 35,000 Chinese citizens were evacuated from the crisis zone, which cost about 20 billion US dollars.⁶⁵¹ In this regard, it may be explored that China's opposition to coercive sanctions against Syria (the case will be detailed later on) is meant to avoid a repeat of its mistakes in the case of Libya.⁶⁵²

5.3.3 Sanctions vs. Political Solutions in the Case of Sudan

As exemplified by Beijing's position on Darfur, it could be concluded that the hostility to non-traditional peacekeeping arose from concerns over sovereignty and non-intervention. From 2004 to 2007, the US and UK proposed to impose sanctions on several occasions at the UN Security Council, because of the Sudanese government's refusal to accept UN peacekeepers.⁶⁵³ However, China opposed those draft resolutions which contained coercive measures, and instead it persuaded the international community to resume seeking political solutions. For instance, after abstaining in the imposition of an arms sales embargo against the Sudanese government at the Security Council, China outlined conditions for the international

⁶⁴⁷ Security Council 1973 authorised the establishment of the NATO-led coalition force to set up a “no-fly zone” in Libya. UN Security Council Resolution 1973, S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011, p. 3.

⁶⁴⁸ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 6620th Meeting, S/PV. 6620, 16 September 2011, p. 4.

⁶⁴⁹ UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Approves No-Fly Zone Over Libya, Authorising All Necessary Measures to Protect Civilians’ (17 March 2011) Press Release SC/10200, para 14.

⁶⁵⁰ Yun Sun said that China's acquiescence to resolution 1973 which resulted in Western military intervention was a complete failure. See, Yun Sun, ‘Syria: What China Has Learned From its Libya Experience’ (2012) 152 Asia Pacific Bulletin 2; Yan Xuetong observed that as the West and Arab states did not show any appreciation for China's compromise on Libya and instead labelled China an irresponsible power, China should adopt a more assertive role to gain influence. Yan Xuetong, ‘China Should Be More Assertive’ *China Daily* (Beijing, 2 April 2011) 6.

⁶⁵¹ Wang Jinyan, ‘The Influence on China's Overseas Interests in the Case of Libya’ (2012) 2 Arab World Studies, 36-7.

⁶⁵² I-wei Jennifer Chang, ‘China's Evolving Stance on Syria’ (*Middle East Institute*, 18 February 2013) <<http://www.mei.edu/content/chinas-evolving-stance-syria>> accessed 18 March 2014.

⁶⁵³ Sudan threatened to mobilise its army to confront any possible deployment of UN-mandated international forces in Darfur province. See, ‘Sudan to Mobilise Against Resolution 1706’ (*UPI News*, 26 September 2006) <http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2006/09/26/Sudan-to-mobilise-against-1706/UPI-25061159286040/#ixzz2VLixeJWb> accessed 5 June 2013.

community to offer a satisfactory political solution to the settlement of the conflict:

We[China] believe that the satisfactory resolution of the political situation in Sudan requires, first, the speedy alleviation of the severe humanitarian situation; second, that political negotiations be expedited so as to reach as soon as possible, a comprehensive agreement based on respect for Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity; and, third, that the international community honour its assistance commitments expeditiously, provide effective logistical support and increase its contributions.⁶⁵⁴

When discussing Resolution 1564, which threatened oil sanctions, China argued that:

We [China] continue to believe that only a political settlement, achieved through negotiation, will lead to a final resolution of the Darfur crisis. China's position against sanctions remains unchanged.⁶⁵⁵

In November 2004 after voting in favour of Resolution 1574, which established a comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan, the Chinese representative to the UN stated:

China hopes that, once the agreement has been signed and the implementation begins, the UN will deploy a peace operation and the international community will immediately begin a package of programmes to assist Sudan in economic rehabilitation and development.⁶⁵⁶

In the case of Darfur, China indicated its enthusiasm for political solutions, but the question remains as to whether political methods could be used to diminish conflict and restore peace. The following paragraphs explore the elements of a successful political solution, using Sudan as a case analysis.

China's endeavour for a peaceful settlement of the Darfur issue can be regarded as consisting of two aspects: 1) China intended to start bilateral negotiations with the Sudanese government and to provide humanitarian aid; and 2) China persuaded Khartoum to accept the hybrid UN/AU peacekeeping mission and to adhere to the Annan Projects relating to Darfur.⁶⁵⁷ Arguably, China was not pleased to witness

⁶⁵⁴ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5015th Meeting, S/PV. 5015, 30 July 2004, p. 2.

⁶⁵⁵ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5040th Meeting, S/PV. 5040, 18 September 2004, p. 5.

⁶⁵⁶ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5082nd Meeting, S/PV. 5082, 19 November 2004, p. 5.

⁶⁵⁷ The Annan Projects were a political endeavour and consisted of three steps to realise peace in Darfur. These projects concerned financial support to the AU and deployed UN peacekeepers. 'Monthly Report of the Secretary General on Darfur', UN Document S/2006/1041, 28 December 2006.

turmoil in Sudan due to the potential adverse impact on its national interest.⁶⁵⁸ In this regard, China expressed serious concerns that sanctions with coercive measures might lead Sudan to become a failed state like Somalia.⁶⁵⁹ If the relationship between China and Sudan were taken into account, the conclusion may be reached that China was confident that it could pressure the Sudanese government to co-operate with the UN. From an economic perspective, China also has close trade relations with Sudan. For instance, Sudan's oil exports to China increased from 1.8 billion US Dollars in 2006 to 4.1 billion US Dollars in 2007.⁶⁶⁰ Moreover, a Chinese national-owned enterprise, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), became a major shareholder in Sudan's two largest oil companies.⁶⁶¹ In terms of military co-operation, from 2003 to 2007 China's arms sales to Sudan accounted for 7 percent of the entire overseas share.⁶⁶²

In order to encourage negotiations, China dispatched envoys to Darfur and organised high-level dialogues with leaders in Sudan starting in 2006. On 10 May 2007, Liu Guijin was appointed as a permanent special representative to Africa to pursue a better understanding and knowledge of the Darfur issue.⁶⁶³ On 2 November 2006, a meeting between the Chinese President Hu Jintao and the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir marked the possibility of realising a peaceful solution to the Darfur issue.⁶⁶⁴ Hu urged Bashir to strengthen dialogue with each party concerned and determine an appropriate settlement to maintain stability, as well as improve humanitarian conditions in the Darfur region.⁶⁶⁵ In February 2007, Hu made an official visit to Sudan, one of the countries on Hu's eight-country tour of Africa. Although Hu's visit

⁶⁵⁸ Matthew E Chen, 'Chinese National Oil Companies and Human Rights' (2007) 51/1 Orbis 43-44.

⁶⁵⁹ Alec Russell and William Wallis, 'Beijing puts Quiet Pressure on Sudan' *Financial Times* (London, 19 June 2007) 3.

⁶⁶⁰ Mai Haibing and Li Zhiqiang, '中国带给我们石油与和平 [China Brings Sudan Petro and Peace]' *Guangming Daily* (Beijing, 2 February 2007) 5.

⁶⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶² US Department of Defence, *Annual Report to the Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China* (2009) 58.

⁶⁶³ In January 2006, Lv Zengguo, Deputy Minister of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, made an official trip to Darfur. In April 2007, Zhai Juan, on behalf of the Chinese Chairman visited Sudan and arranged an official appointment with Sudanese President Bashir. See, Yu Jianhua and Wang Zhen, '中国在解决达尔富尔问题上的外交努力 [China's Diplomatic Endeavour in Darfur Issue]' (2008) 2 *Arab World Studies* 14.

⁶⁶⁴ 'Hu Jintao met the Sudanese President' (MOFA, 2 November 2006) < <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/2924/2926/t279467.shtml> > accessed 7 June 2013.

⁶⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

yielded results, his four proposals regarding political solutions faced challenges.⁶⁶⁶ Western governments, such as the US and other international groups criticised China for ignoring questions of governance and fundamental rights as it pursued business opportunities in Africa.⁶⁶⁷ However, China decided to escalate its pressure on Khartoum, which persuaded Sudan to accept the second and third phases of the Annan project. For instance, in March 2007, an important Chinese economic planning department (the National Development and Reform Commission), in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce, released an official document which announced that Beijing would no longer provide financial incentives (such as loans and tax breaks) to facilitate Chinese corporations to invest in Sudan.⁶⁶⁸

Based on the above analysis, one conclusion can be reached: China was confident of persuading the Sudanese government to co-operate with the UN's political measures, owing to its influence to the country. In this regard, it may be easier to understand China's strong opposition to the imposition of sanctions. In the case of Darfur, China's political endeavour for peaceful settlement on conflict within the UN framework yield result, as the deployment of UNAMID was ultimately consented by the Sudanese government. Andrew Natsios, US special envoy to Sudan, withdrew his negative assessment of Beijing for signing economic deals with the Sudanese government and not pressurising it over Darfur, and instead praised China's constructive role.⁶⁶⁹ He observed that after Khartoum had given consent to the establishment of UNAMID, China's mediation had made the Sudanese government accept a hybrid UN/AU peacekeeping force for the Darfur region.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶⁶ Hu proposed four principles to solve the Darfur crisis: 1) Respect for Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2) The Sudan issue should be resolved through peaceful resolution; 3) The UN and the AU have to take the core role in the Darfur crisis; 4) Improving the living conditions of the local people and establishing a stable environment. Hu claimed that the humanitarian crisis could be solved peacefully, and fully considered all parties concerned. It also required the international community to deliver humanitarian aid to protect refugees with dignity. See, Chen Hegao and Liu Yunfei, '胡锦涛同苏丹总统巴希尔会谈 [Hu Jintao hold talks with the Sudanese President Bashir]' (*Xinhua News*, 2 February 2007) < http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-02/02/content_5688877.htm > accessed 7 June 2013.

⁶⁶⁷ Howard W. French, 'Chinese Leader to visit Sudan for Talks on Darfur Conflict' *The New York Times* (New York, 25 January 2007) 5.

⁶⁶⁸ Li Xin, '组织化利益与政治性行动 [Organizational Profile and Political Behaviour]' (2012) 3 *International Politics Quarterly* 164-65.

⁶⁶⁹ Andy Sullivan, 'US Praised China's Role in Darfur' *China Daily* (Beijing, 21 September 2007) 2.

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid.

5.3.4 Reaffirming the Principle of Sovereignty and Consent of the Host Country in UN Peacekeeping

State consent for the maintenance of peace and security in conflict areas is a core issue in the context of state sovereignty.⁶⁷¹ When the Security Council considered Sudan's situation, China abstained six times (see Table 5.3). Resolutions 1593 (31 March 2005), 1679 (16 March 2006), 1706 (31 August 2006) and 1769 (31 July 2007) can be seen as reiterating China's position in respect to the principle of non-intervention and the consent by the host state. Indeed, China's policy towards Sudan could be interpreted as an explicit demonstration of the need to protect state sovereignty.⁶⁷² China's abstention on Security Council resolutions also consistently show its insistence that state consent is a prerequisite for international intervention and peacekeeping deployment. Prior to the first Gulf War in 1991, when the Security Council authorised Member States to "use all necessary means" to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait,⁶⁷³ Qian Qichen noted that "the Security Council should exercise great caution and avoid taking hasty actions on such major questions as authorizing some member states to take military action against another member state".⁶⁷⁴

Qian's words can be rephrased as follow: Chinese opposition has translated into a consistent requirement for Sudan's consent for any international measures in relevant Security Council resolutions. In addition, China opposed any draft resolution that it deemed to involve an attack on sovereignty or which imposed coercive measures or military operations. For instance, China's representative to the UN manifested its position on the question of national jurisdiction during the discussion of Resolution 1593:

Based on respect for national judicial sovereignty, we [China] would prefer to see perpetrators of gross violations of human rights stand trial in the Sudanese judicial system. We [China] have

⁶⁷¹ Muhammad Ijaz Latif and Rehman Afzal Khan, 'Peacekeeping Operations and State Sovereignty: Dilemma of Host State Consent' (2010) 2/30 Pakistan Journal of Social Science 235, 236.

⁶⁷² 'China's Growing Role in Peacekeeping Operations' (Africa Report 166, 17 April 2009) International Crisis Group, 19.

⁶⁷³ UN Security Council Resolution 678, S/RES/678, 29 November 1990, p. 2.

⁶⁷⁴ '联合国授权对伊拉克使用武力 [UN Adopted Resolution Authorising the Use of Force on Iraq]' *Xinhua News* (Beijing, 28 November 1990) 1.

noted that the Sudanese judiciary has recently taken legal action against individuals involved.⁶⁷⁵

Whenever the Security Council has expressed an intention to encroach on state sovereignty, China has expressed its displeasure. During the debate on Resolution 1679, China voted affirmatively to demonstrate its point:

China still has reservations concerning the resolution's invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter. [...] We [China] believe that, if the United Nations is to deploy a peacekeeping operation in Darfur, the agreement and co-operation of the Sudanese government must be obtained. That is a basic principle and precondition for the deployment of all United Nations peacekeeping operations.⁶⁷⁶

In contrast to the affirmative vote, China was very suspicious of draft resolutions that used ambiguous wording that risked being interpreted as enforcement actions under the auspices of the Security Council. Subsequently, China opposed this position during negotiations in respect of Resolution 1706, which endorsed an expansion of the UNMIS mandate.⁶⁷⁷ Having failed to accept "principled reservations", China abstained from voting. Wang Guangya explained that:

The transition of AMIS to a United Nations mission is a good and pragmatic approach. Such a transition can be possible and the mission can be deployed only when the consent of the Government of National Unity is obtained. Due to our principled reservations on the timing of the vote and on the text itself, China could not but abstain from voting.⁶⁷⁸

According to China's position, the Sudanese government's consent was crucial to authorising a UN peacekeeping deployment. On 31 July 2007, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 unanimously, which authorised the deployment of a hybrid peacekeeping force.⁶⁷⁹ China emphasised the crucial role of the Sudanese government in resolving the Darfur issue.⁶⁸⁰ Meanwhile, China requested that the actions of the Security Council should be "simple and clear cut, focusing on the Council's core

⁶⁷⁵ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5158th Meeting, S/PV. 5158, 31 March 2005, p. 5.

⁶⁷⁶ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5439th Meeting, S/PV. 5439, 16 May 2006, p. 6.

⁶⁷⁷ Resolution 1706 (2006) intended to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. See, UN Security Council Resolution 1706, S/RES/1706, 31 August 2006, p. 2.

⁶⁷⁸ China also consistently urged the sponsors to clearly include the phrase 'with the consent of the Government of National Unity' in the text of the resolution, which is a fixed and standardised phrase utilized by the Council when deploying United Nations missions. UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5519th Meeting, S/PV. 5519, 31 August 2006.

⁶⁷⁹ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5727th Meeting, S/PV. 5727, 31 July 2007, p. 10.

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid.

purpose of authorising deployment of the hybrid operation".⁶⁸¹ Those statements indicated that China welcomed a simple resolution authorising peacekeeping rather than exerting pressure or imposing sanctions. China repeatedly stood for the political settlement of the Darfur issue while respecting Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁶⁸²

Thus, from the above analysis, the case of Darfur demonstrated that state consent was one of China's primary considerations in peacekeeping operations. Compared with the case of Haiti and East Timor, China's political proposal for resolving the crisis played a more effective role in Sudan. Indeed, China was confident in shielding Sudan from international pressure, being willing to secure Sudan's consent by using diplomatic leverage on Khartoum. However, on several occasions, China's strong rhetoric on consent faced challenges. In Bosnia, China supported the vote for expanding the UNPROFOR's mandate to include the establishment of "safe areas" and authorised the use of force to protect civilians.⁶⁸³ Similarly, in 1992, China voted in favour of UN interventions in Somalia without the host state's consent, due to a lack of effective government in the country.⁶⁸⁴ It may be said that China adopts a consistent approach to the question of state consent except in the case of states with no effective government.

In general, since 2000 China has revised somewhat its position with respect to humanitarian intervention. Interestingly, however, in the case of Darfur, China did not object to pressure being brought to bear on Khartoum to provide a better environment for humanitarian assistance, which risked being interpreted as an infringement of Sudanese sovereignty. Davis is of the opinion that China's rhetoric reflects "pragmatic concerns" rather than "ideological disagreement" over the non-interference principle.⁶⁸⁵ For example, Wang Guangya, China's representative to the UN, argued that the international community "should increase humanitarian assistance to Darfur rather than create a situation that could lead to the closing of the door to relief and

⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

⁶⁸² Ibid.

⁶⁸³ UN Security Council Resolution 819, S/RES/819, 16 April 1993, pp. 1-14; UN Security Council Resolution 824, S/RES/824, 6 May 1993, p. 2.

⁶⁸⁴ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 3145th Meeting, S/PV. 3145, 3 December 1992, p. 17-18.

⁶⁸⁵ Jonathan E. Davis, 'From Ideology to Pragmatism: China's Position on Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era' (2011) 2/44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 267.

assistance”.⁶⁸⁶

In summary, the purpose of this analysis was to assess the reasons why China opposed sanctions against Sudan. It is submitted that China is dedicated to solving international conflicts by political means, but this approach has yielded few results, with Sudan being an exception. China persuaded the Sudanese government to co-operate with the UN peacekeeping operations. The success in Sudan supports the following conclusions. First, political solutions are possible if China makes its own bilateral efforts in conflict states. Starting with Hu Jintao’s conversation with Bashir and Liu Guijin’s appointment as a special envoy to Darfur, China’s efforts produced positive changes in the position of Sudan, which created a viable alternative to sanctions. Second, Russia was willing to back China’s opposition to sanctions and threatened to exercise its veto if the draft resolution came to a vote.⁶⁸⁷ This is because the Putin administration decided to develop a partnership with China in international relations as a counter balance to the US.⁶⁸⁸ Third, regional stakeholders were opposed to a coercive approach towards Sudan. Egypt and South Africa opposed the US proposal for sanctions. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit informed Ban Ki-moon that “sanctions never achieve political targets”.⁶⁸⁹ In addition, the Arab League also expressed doubt about the efficiency of sanctions.⁶⁹⁰

5.4 Vetoes in the Case of Syria: An Attempt to Enhance Influence

In the Sudanese context, China’s policy was presented as an example of its adherence to political endeavour to solve international conflict.⁶⁹¹ However, the case of Syria typically reflects the Chinese stance on the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. Also, China’s four vetoes against the imposition of sanctions indicated that it

⁶⁸⁶ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5040th Meeting, S/PV. 5040, 18 September 2004, p. 4.

⁶⁸⁷ Evelyn Leopold, ‘Russia, China Block Sudan Sanctions’ (*Reuters*, 17 April 2006) <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/206/39703.html>> accessed 10 June 2013. However, the US put neither obvious and systematic pressure on China nor any state-supported sanctions. US strategy with respect to China only focused on encouragement of bilateral pressure.

⁶⁸⁸ Huang Chengxue, ‘论中俄战略协作伙伴关系的发展前景 [An Outlook of the Sino-Russia Strategic Partnership]’ (2008) 4 *Foreign Affairs Review* 26.

⁶⁸⁹ ‘Egypt’s FM says Sanctions on Sudan could further Complicate Situation’ (*Xinhua News*, Beijing, 25 May 2007) <http://english.people.com.cn/200705/25/eng20070525_378052.html> accessed 30 September 2013.

⁶⁹⁰ Kwesi Kwaa Prah, ‘Darfur Beyond the Crossroads: Struggles of African Nationalism’ (2004) 172 *Pambazuka News* 249.

⁶⁹¹ Simon Adams, *Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council* (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2015) 10.

is attempting to explore a leading role in conflict settlement within the UN framework as a permanent Member State of the Security Council.

In terms of the principle of non-intervention, China has been challenged by Justin Morris, in relation to its paradoxical position in the case of Libya.⁶⁹² In contrast to its policy in the case of Syria, China voted in favour of resolution 1970 that imposed sanctions against Libya.⁶⁹³ However, China abstained on resolution 1973 when the Security Council authorised the use of force in the context of the R2P.⁶⁹⁴ In the subsequent discussion, Li Baodong argued that due to the lack of consent of the host state (which is accepted as a cornerstone of UN peacekeeping operations), China abstained from the vote. Li subsequently supported political negotiation and reconciliation by peaceful means advocated by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Libya, as well as by the African Union and the Arab League.⁶⁹⁵

This section provides a general explanation and discussion of China's diplomatic policy towards the Middle East and the role of political efforts in its peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, it considers the extent to which there is political risk for the Chinese government when it decided to veto draft resolutions on Syria. The argument proceeds in four stages: First, a background to the Syria crisis by analysing the Security Council debate after 2011 was provided, which emphasised how the non-intervention principle adhered to China's policy perspective. Second, the research explained the impact of China's veto and how China was able to develop a strategic relationship with the US. Third, a comparative study on China's policy in respect to the case of Libya and Syria exploring the reason for China to exercise the opposition to the imposition of sanction against Syria was to avoid the repetition of the investment loss in Libya. Fourth, the research investigated and explored China's incentive for exercising its veto power.

⁶⁹² Justin Morris, 'Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum' (2013) 89/5 International Affairs 1265-1266.

⁶⁹³ UN Security Council Resolution 1970, S/RES/1970, 26 February 2011, p. 2.

⁶⁹⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1973, S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011, p.2.

⁶⁹⁵ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 6498th Meeting, S/PV. 6498, 17 March 2011, p. 10.

5.4.1 Background

In general, Syria has undergone both internal and external conflicts. The country has been engaged in a long term dispute with Israel over the Golan Heights, an area of strategic and economic importance to both states.⁶⁹⁶ From the Israeli perspective, the Golan Heights benefits the country in both military and civil terms. First, the Heights provide Israel with a preferable vantage point for monitoring Syrian movements.⁶⁹⁷ Meanwhile, its topography provides a natural buffer to any military thrust from Syria. Second, the Golan Heights contains an important water resource,⁶⁹⁸ which provides fifteen percent of Israel's water supply.⁶⁹⁹ Nonetheless, the Syrian government has never relinquished its claim to the Golan Heights.⁷⁰⁰ Given the continuous state of armed conflict between Syria and Israel, the Security Council called for a resumption of the ceasefire and subsequently deployed the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights in 1974.⁷⁰¹

Map 5.4 Syria



⁶⁹⁶ The Golan Heights is a region in the Levant, which borders Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan. The plateau straddles the boundary between Syria and Israeli-held territory. See Human Rights Council in the United Nations, *Human Rights in the Occupied Syrian Golan* (United Nations General Assembly 27 February 2009); ‘Background of the Syrian Golan’ (*Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations*) < <http://www.un.int/syria/golan.htm> > accessed 25 September 2013.

⁶⁹⁷ Efraim Inbar, *Israeli Control of the Golan Heights: High Strategic and Moral Ground for Israel* (Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 90, 2011) 2.

⁶⁹⁸ ‘The Golan Heights Profile’ (*BBC Middle East*, 21 May 2013) < <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14724842> > accessed 24 September 2013.

⁶⁹⁹ Muna Dajani, *Dry Peace: Syria – Israel and the Water of the Golan* (The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence 2011) 7-8.

⁷⁰⁰ By 7 October 1973, Syrian forces had captured most of the southern portion of the Golan Heights. The Syrians had three infantry and one armoured division on the Golan Heights. One day later, Israel launched its first counterattack against Syria. Matthew T. Penney, *Intelligence and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War* (Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, 30 January 2013) 34.

⁷⁰¹ Matthew T. Penney, *Intelligence and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War* (Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, 30 January 2013) 37.

Internally, the failure of the Bashar al-Assad administration to carry out political reform created great tension in Syria.⁷⁰² The tension between the protection of constitutional rights and the coercive measures under the *Emergency Act* (1962)⁷⁰³ was sharply illustrated in a Human Rights Watch report where both the deteriorating situation and international human rights law were examined.⁷⁰⁴ Since March 2011, Syrian rebels have sought to forcibly overthrow the current regime and demanded democratic reforms.⁷⁰⁵ As they received support from the Arab Spring activism in Egypt and Tunisia, the Syrian domestic situation became worse and consequently led to an escalation in the conflict.⁷⁰⁶ The timeline of the armed conflicts between the Syrian government and the rebels can be divided into five phases (see Figure 5.4.1).

Figure 5.1 Timeline of the Armed Conflict in Syria⁷⁰⁷

Duration	Process
March – October 2011	The civil uprising and armed insurgency.
November 2011 – February 2012	An escalation of the conflict.
March – August 2012	The UN's efforts and the attempt for peace enforcement action.
September – July 2013	The continuation of the armed conflict.
August 2013 onwards	military intervention and political endeavour.

With regard to measures to resolve the conflict, the positions adopted by states within the international community have varied. Some states requested Assad to abdicate; others focused on preventing any form of outside intervention. For instance, China and Russia used their veto powers to block the adoption of four draft resolutions that attempted to restore peace by imposing coercive measures.⁷⁰⁸ In this regard, given

⁷⁰² Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘Syria: from Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?’ (2012) 88/1 International Affairs 95-96.

⁷⁰³ The *Emergency Act* 1962 contains 14 Articles. The Law is a critical suppressive law to affect rights of Syrians exclusively. See, ‘No Room to Breathe: State Repression of Human Rights Activism in Syria’ (2007) 18/6(E) Human Rights Watches 15-18.

⁷⁰⁴ World Report 2010, Human Rights Watch, p. 555.

⁷⁰⁵ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1st Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/S – 17/2/Add 1, paras 27-30.

⁷⁰⁶ In April 2011, Assad began to launch large-scale military operations against protesters, using tanks, infantry carriers, and artillery. From January 2012 to the present day, fighting in Syria between rebels and the Syrian government’s army and militias occurred on a daily basis, with an average death toll of between 100 to 200 a day, or over 1,000 a week. See, ‘Syrian Casualty Figures’ (*The Next Century Foundation*, 16 August 2012) < <http://www.ncfpeace.org/drupal/content/syria-casualty-figures> > accessed 28 September 2013; Lt Col S. Edward Boxx, ‘Observations on the Air War in Syria’ (2013) March-April Air and Space Power Journal 151.

⁷⁰⁷ Joseph Holliday, ‘The Struggle for Syria in 2011: An Operational and Regional Analysis’ (December 2011) Institute for the Studies of War 21; Joseph Holliday, ‘Syria’s Armed Opposition’ (March 2012) Institute for the Studies of War 6; Nada Bakri, ‘New Phase for Syria in Attacks on Capital’ *The New York Times* (New York, 21 November 2011) A4.

⁷⁰⁸ Four draft resolutions were submitted to the Security Council that intended to impose sanctions

contention among States, the UN resorted to political negotiations instead. On 10 March 2012, the joint special envoy to Syria, Kofi Annan presented a Six-point Plan.⁷⁰⁹ The plan outlined the progress to realise the ceasefire and a commitment to a political process.⁷¹⁰ For the purpose of monitoring the ceasefire, the Security Council agreed unanimously to establish the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS),⁷¹¹ which was a signal to persuade the Syrian government to adhere to its committed timeline to cease violence in a 5 April 2012 presidential statement.⁷¹²

However, neither the Syrian government nor the rebels complied with the Annan's political Six-point Plan. In July 2012, according to Annan's report to the Security Council, the Syrian government had violated its commitments under resolutions 2042 and 2043.⁷¹³ Meanwhile, the uncertain international environment undermined the efforts of the Special Envoy to achieve a political solution to the conflict.⁷¹⁴

On 18 August 2013, the UN dispatched a team to investigate the accusations of the use of chemical weapons during the Syrian conflict.⁷¹⁵ It is noteworthy that the

against the Assad administration. UN Document S/2011/612, 4 October 2011; S/2012/77, 4 February 2012; S/2012/538, 19 July 2012; S/2014/348, 22 May 2014.

⁷⁰⁹ Annan's six-point plan including: (1) commitment to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process; (2) commitment to stop the fighting; (3) ensuring timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting; (4) intensifying the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons; (5) ensuring freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them; (6) respecting freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed. See, UN General Assembly Resolution in the Sixty-Sixth Session, A/RES/66/253, 21 February 2012, p. 3; Annex to Security Council Resolution 2042, S/RES/2042, 14 April 2012.

⁷¹⁰ On 1 April the Syrian government had communicated to Annan that it would cease the use of heavy weapons and withdraw troops and military concentrations from population centres by 10 April, the deadline was later shifted to 12 April. See, 'May 2012 Monthly Report: UNSMIS Syria' (*Security Council Report*, 1 May 2012) <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2012-05/lookup_c_gIKWLeMTIsG_b_8075185.php> accessed 16 October 2013.

⁷¹¹ UN Security Council Resolution 2043, S/RES/2043, 21 April 2012, p. 2.

⁷¹² Press Release 'Security Council Presidential Statement on Syria Signals Intention to Authorize Mechanism to Monitor End of Violence, or "Consider Further Steps"', 6746th Meeting, SC/10601, 5 April 2012.

⁷¹³ The Security Council, 'August 2012 Monthly Report: UNSMIS Syria' (*Security Council Report*, 1 August 2012) <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2012-08/unsmis_syria.php> accessed 16 October 2013; The General Assembly also admitted on 3 August deplored the Security Council's failure to act on Syria and calling for a political transition. See UN General Assembly Resolution in the Sixty-Sixth Session, A/RES/66/253B.

⁷¹⁴ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 3rd Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, para 19.

⁷¹⁵ The establishment of the UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic based on the authority of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution A/RES/42/37C and Security Council resolution 620. See, UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES /42/37C, adopted at 84th Plenary Meeting, 30 November 1987; UN Security Council Resolution

Eastern and European countries hold different opinion from the US's perspective on how to prevent the Syrian government from deploying chemical weapons. For instance, the *Financial Times* reported that the US was considering air strikes against Assad's military assets in Syria.⁷¹⁶ However, this military initiative was opposed by other powers, such as Russia and China. During the Group of Twenty (G20) conference in St. Petersburg, Barack Obama intended to shape an international consensus for his military attack aimed at deterring Syrian leader Assad from deploying future chemical weapons.⁷¹⁷ However, the global community remained divided over action on Syria. China and the President of the European Council were against military action.⁷¹⁸ China's Deputy Minister of Finance, Zhu Guangyao, argued that "there is no military solution to the Syria conflict, there can only be a political solution".⁷¹⁹ He also expressed concerns that military intervention might damage the global economy if oil prices increased as a result.⁷²⁰ On the international level, after confirmation by the UN inspector of the use of chemical weapons, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2118 which condemned the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government and required the Syrian Arab Republic's co-operation to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles.⁷²¹

The Reason for States' Engagement in the Syrian Conflict

During the armed conflict in Syria, the US, Russia, China and the Arab League were directly and indirectly involved. The US and its allies acted as the major group which intended to overthrow the government by supplying the rebel groups. China, Russia and Iran acted as the opposition group and tended to support the current regime in

620, S/RES/620, 26 August 1988.

⁷¹⁶ James Blitz, Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Abigail Fielding-Smith, 'West Eyes Air Strikes on Syrian Military' (*Financial Times*, 25 August 2013) < <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4356011a-0d6d-11e3-ba82-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2iBweren2> > accessed 18 October 2013.

⁷¹⁷ Peter Nicholas and Paul Sonne, 'World Powers Remain Divided Over Syrian Action at G-20' (*The Wall Street Journal*, 5 September 2013) < <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324123004579056790769485228> > accessed 18 October 2013.

⁷¹⁸ George Parker, Charles Clover and Courtney Weaver, 'G20 Leaders Split Over Syria' (*Financial Times*, 6 September 2013) < <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5ba75aac-1619-11e3-a57d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2e4NOakBj> > accessed 18 October 2013.

⁷¹⁹ George Parker, Charles Clover and Courtney Weaver, 'G20 Leaders Split Over Syria' (*Financial Times*, 6 September 2013) < <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5ba75aac-1619-11e3-a57d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2e4NOakBj> > accessed 18 October 2013.

⁷²⁰ Ibid.

⁷²¹ Decides that the Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to other States or non-State actors. UN Security Council Resolution 2118, S/RES/2118, 27 September 2013.

order to create a stable political environment.⁷²² In fact, both groups treated Syria as a tool to maximise their national interests in the Middle East region, which made the situation worse. As Azuolas Bagdonas observed, despite the growing international pressure on Bashar Assad's regime in Syria, Russia provided political support during the development of the conflict, which was motivated by material interests and the wish to maintain influence and its reputation in the region.⁷²³

Figure 5.4 Countries For and Against Intervention in Syria



The author would like to note at this point that the desire to become a regional beneficiary is the primary motivation for China to adopt a policy of strong opposition to the imposition of sanctions against Syria.⁷²⁴ Samia Nakhoul described the essence of the conflict as a product of regional instability rather than the Syrian civil war itself.⁷²⁵ The local Syrian regime and the rebels seem to be two sides in a political gamble, which is controlled by different states to realise their national interests. For instance, the US has a strong interest in seeing Saudi Arabia, a leading supporter of the Syrian rebels, and its allies win this conflict. Such an outcome could substantially

⁷²² Liz Sly, 'US-led Air War in Syria Is Off to A Difficult Start' (*The Washington Post*, 10 October 2014) < http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/us-led-air-war-in-syria-is-off-to-a-difficult-start-with-moderate-rebels-disenchanted/2014/10/10/e0949dfa-4fe9-11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_story.html > accessed 10 December 2014.

⁷²³ Azuolas Bagdonas, 'Russia's Interests in the Syrian Conflict: Power, Prestige, and Profit' (2012) 5/2 European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, 56.

⁷²⁴ This allegation was based on a comment published on BBC News. 'Syria Crisis: Where Key Countries Stand' (BBC News, 18 February 2014) < <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587> > accessed 3 October 2014.

⁷²⁵ Samia Nakhoul, 'Special Report: Hezbollah gambles all in Syria' (Reuters, 26 September 2013) < <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/26/us-syria-hezbollah-special-report-idUSBRE98P0AI20130926> > accessed 15 January 2014.

enhance the influence of the US in the Middle East region.⁷²⁶ In contrast to the US position, Iran and Hezbollah hoped to increase or at least maintain their influence along the shores of the Mediterranean.⁷²⁷ For some members of the group, the fight is an existential one.⁷²⁸ In this connection, they are fighting not just for Syria, but for an international order that will protect vital American interests in relation to Chinese, Russian, and Iranian spheres of influence in the region.⁷²⁹

5.4.3 The Chinese Response to Military Intervention

In order to reduce the level of violence, the Security Council attempted to impose sanctions against the Syrian authorities, but Russia and China expressed strong opposition by using their respective veto powers based on their consistent policy of non-intervention.

The first Chinese veto occurred on 4 October 2011 with respect to the threat to impose sanctions against Syria. Chinese representative to the UN, Li Baodong, stated:

The international community should fully respect Syria's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. [...] As it now stands, the draft resolution focuses solely on exerting pressure on Syria, even threatening to impose sanctions. It does not help to facilitate the easing of the situation in Syria.⁷³⁰

Despite the Chinese block on the adoption of the resolution, the US (together with another eighteen other countries) made a second attempt on 4 February 2012.⁷³¹ This draft resolution intended to persuade the Syrian government to comply with the League of Arab States' action plan, which aimed to "facilitate a Syrian-led political

⁷²⁶ Michael Doran, 'Five Truths about Syria' (*Political*, 3 September 2013) < <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/opinion-michael-doran-5-truth-syria-96178.html> > accessed 16 August 2014.

⁷²⁷ For more detail, see Fred H Lawson, 'Syria's Relations with Iran: Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance' (2007) 61/1 *Middle East Journal* 29-47.

⁷²⁸ Holly Yan, 'Syria Allies: Why Russia, Iran and China Are Standing by the Regime' (*CNN News*, 30 August 2013) < <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/meast/syria-iran-china-russia-supporters/> > accessed 20 December 2013.

⁷²⁹ Roy Allison, *Russia, the West, and Military Intervention* (OUP, 2013) 170-188; Curtis Ryan, 'The New Arab Cold War and the Struggle for Syria' (2012) 42 *The Middle East Report* < http://www.merip.org/mer/mer262/new-arab-cold-war-struggle-syria?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter > accessed 28 May 2015.

⁷³⁰ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 6627th Meeting, S/PV. 6627, 4 October 2011, p. 5.

⁷³¹ UN Document S/2012/77, 4 February 2012, p. 2.

transition to a democratic, plural political system".⁷³² However, China, consequently, cast its veto for the second time. Li Daoyu explained the veto by stating, "As political solutions were not taken into account, members of the Security Council were seriously divided over the issue".⁷³³ As conflict parties were reluctant to conclude an agreement in respect of peace-enforcement issue, the Security Council decided to deploy an observer group to support the political efforts, named UNSMIS.⁷³⁴ However, owing to an intensification of armed violence across Syria, UNSMIS was suspended on 15 June 2012.⁷³⁵ On 20 July 2012, the Security Council approved the final extension for UNSMIS and reserved the right to authorise further extensions to the mission when the Security Council confirms the cessation of the use of heavy weapons and a sufficient reduction in the level of conflict by all sides.⁷³⁶

In relation to the modalities for restoring peace, Western countries maintained their efforts to have the Security Council impose sanctions on Syria. In response, China cast the third veto on the US-proposed draft resolution on 19 July 2012, which condemned the Syrian authorities and authorised action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.⁷³⁷ Li Baodong's declaration systematically outlined the concerns and scope desired by China for the settlement of conflict in Syria:

First, the draft resolution is seriously flawed, and its unbalanced content seeks to put pressure on only one party [...]. Secondly, the draft resolution would seriously erode international trust and co-operation on the issue of Syria [...]. Thirdly, sovereignty equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries are the basic norms governing inter-State relations enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations [...]. Fourthly, the draft resolution jeopardizes the unity of the Security Council.⁷³⁸

⁷³² Ibid.

⁷³³ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 6711th Meeting, S/PV. 6711, 4 February 2012, p. 10.

⁷³⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 2043, S/RES/2043, 21 April 2012, p. 2.

⁷³⁵ 'Statement Attributable to the Head of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria, General Robert Mood' (*UN Peacekeeping Archive* 15 June 2012) <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unsmis/documents/press_mood_16062012.pdf> accessed 20 January 2013.

⁷³⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 2059, S/RES/2059, 20 July 2012, p. 1.

⁷³⁷ The draft mainly focused on exerting pressure on the Syrian government, including immediately imposing measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter if the Syrian authorities had not fully complied with their commitments within ten days. UN Document S/2012/538, 19 July 2012, p. 2.

⁷³⁸ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 6810th Meeting, S/PV. 6810, 19 July 2012, p. 13.

China's fourth veto exercised on 22 May 2014, when the Security Council attempted to refer the Syrian case to the ICC.⁷³⁹ China's Ambassador to the UN, Wang Min, explained China's veto based on two serious reservations. The reservations comprised: 1) the jurisdiction of ICC should be exercised on the basis of respect for state judicial sovereignty and the complementarity principle.⁷⁴⁰ 2) To forcibly refer the situation in Syria to the ICC will jeopardise the efforts made by the international community to push for a political settlement.⁷⁴¹

While the four draft resolutions had no direct connections, they all demonstrated that the Syrian government was considered an unsatisfactory authority. With regard to the Chinese voting behaviour in the case of Syria, it is noted that China's veto was fundamentally based on its conservative position on the protection of state sovereignty, which of course includes the consideration of territorial integrity. Similar considerations have also been noted in the case of Myanmar. Moreover, pursuant to its concerns on political settlement, China was an enthusiastic advocate of political solutions rather than coercive measures. For instance, in April 2012, China contributed unarmed military personnel to UNSMIS.⁷⁴²

5.4.4 Veto Strategic: A New Choice or A Political Risk?

Arguably, China's vetoes on the situation in Syria may have both positive and negative implications. Its four vetoes challenged its image as a “responsible global power”. As Yun Sun observed, the policy was subject to widespread criticism from both diplomats and journalists, who assessed China's voting behaviour as disappointing and even labelled China as responsible for Syria's genocide.⁷⁴³ Rice Gladstone, the US Ambassador to the UN, expressed disappointment after the failure to adopt a resolution. She said that “we are facing a dark day and have missed yet

⁷³⁹ UN Document S/2014/348, 22 May 2014, p. 2.

⁷⁴⁰ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 7180th Meeting, S/PV.7180, 22 May 2014, p. 13.

⁷⁴¹ Ibid. p. 14.

⁷⁴² Robert Mood, ‘Statement Attributable to the Head of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria’ (12 June 2012)

< www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unsmis/documents/press_mood_16062012.pdf > accessed 14 June 2013.

⁷⁴³ Yun Sun, ‘What China has Learned from its Libya Experience’ (27 February 2012) 152 Asia Pacific Bulletin 2; Yan Xuetong, ‘China's Veto on Syria: A View from China’ (*Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 8 February 2012) < <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/08/china-s-veto-on-syria-view-from-china/9r1f> > accessed 16 June 2013.

another critical opportunity to work together”.⁷⁴⁴ At an explanatory level, comparison with China’s policy towards Libya gives substance to this criticism.⁷⁴⁵ However, the affirmative vote on UN sanctions against Libya caused China to receive an overwhelmingly negative assessment.⁷⁴⁶

5.4.4.1 Avoiding Repetition of the Libyan Experience

In fact, most of Chinese scholars argued that China’s vetoes not only strongly protected the principle of non-intervention, but also demonstrated great endeavours for political settlement of the Syrian issue.⁷⁴⁷ According to Yan Xuetong’s research, China’s energy-based diplomatic policy reflects its opposition to those draft resolutions with the imposition of sanctions initiative.⁷⁴⁸ In the author’s view, the Chinese veto of the UN’s initiative to authorise sanctions against Syria might set a precedent for similar action against countries “friendly” to China and suppliers of its energy needs, such as Libya and Myanmar.

In fact, China had nothing to gain from supporting the Security Council resolution.⁷⁴⁹ As a similar situation to that which prevailed in Libya, China prevented Syria from turning into Libya. In Libya, China supported the idea of economic sanctions

⁷⁴⁴ Rick Gladstone, ‘Friction at the UN as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syria Sanctions’ *The New York Times* (New York, 19 June 2012) A5.

⁷⁴⁵ On 26 February 2011, the Security Council adopted resolution 1970 unanimously, which imposed sanctions against the Qaddafi administration. Sanctions included: imposing an arms embargo on Libya; imposing a travel ban on Gadhafi and 16 relatives and loyalists; freezing foreign assets held by Gadhafi and loyalists; and referring the Gadhafi regime to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigations of crimes against humanity. UN Security Council Resolution 1970, UN Document S/RES/1970, 26 February 2011.

⁷⁴⁶ China’s vote challenged its consistent policy on non-intervention and the respect of sovereignty. Moreover, China’s vote seemed to reflect its national interests. Jason Dean, ‘China’s Vote on Libya Signals Possible Shift’ (*The Wall Street Journal*, 28 February 2011) <<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703933404576170793783265986.html>> accessed 16 June 2013.

⁷⁴⁷ Qu Xing, ‘The UN Charter, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Syrian Issue’ (March/May 2012) China International Studies 32-36; Liu Zhongmin, ‘叙利亚决议案：中国为何说不 [Why China Says No to Draft Resolution on Syria]’ (2011) 11 Social Outlook 66-67; Li Zhiyong, ‘规范争论与协商介入：中国对干涉内政的规范的重塑 [Normative Argument and Negotiate Participation: Re-building China’s Non-intervention Policy]’ (2015) 3 Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies 133-134.

⁷⁴⁸ Yan Xuetong is a Chinese scholar on diplomatic research in Tsinghua University, Beijing. See, Yan Xuetong, *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power* (Princeton University Press 2013) 199-222.

⁷⁴⁹ China’s policy in respect of the allowance to the passage of Resolution 1973 has been considered as a failure or mistake. Also, China was in the sense of betrayal by Western countries, as the Security Council resolution has been used as a blank check to realise “regime change” under the banner of R2P. See, Liu Tiewa and Zhang Haibin, ‘Debates in China about the Responsibility to Protect as a Developing International Norm: A General Assessment’ (2014) 14/4 Conflict, Security and Development 419.

proposed by the Arab League and abstained on the resolution that set up a “no-fly zone”.⁷⁵⁰ The Chinese representative to the UN, Li Baodong, explained that China’s affirmative vote was based on the needs of the Libyan people.⁷⁵¹ However, China’s policy received no gratitude from the Arab countries. For instance, during the second Gulf crisis in 2003, the Arab states still supported the use of force by the US, the country that backed Israel in the Israel-Palestine conflict.⁷⁵² One can predict that under the context of the principle of non-intervention, the only possible route for the Chinese government to remain in line with the resolution, which authorised the use of force in Syria, was by abstaining.⁷⁵³ In this regard, after the immediate departure of the President, Syrian rebels would nevertheless appreciate Western countries that had delivered substantive military support rather than the Chinese government. As Yan observed, the Arab League may also believe that the Chinese support was only motivated by the growing pressure of alleged crimes against humanity committed by the Syrian government.⁷⁵⁴ In addition, China would suffer no substantial loss of international reputation. Yan explained that China’s tacit attitude towards NATO-led intervention was not intended to make Western countries revise their ideas on the situation pertaining to China’s human rights and democracy record.⁷⁵⁵ In this connection, Beijing’s veto simply gave the Western world another disappointment.⁷⁵⁶

Second, China benefited from implementing its veto power with Russia. Yan concluded that China’s action on Syria promoted closer Sino-Russian relations.⁷⁵⁷ On the other hand, in terms of the Middle East situation, China’s behaviour could force

⁷⁵⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 1970, S/RES/1970, 26 February 2011; UN Security Council Resolution 1973, S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011.

⁷⁵¹ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 6491st Meeting, S/PV. 6491, 26 February 2011, p. 4.

⁷⁵² Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch, *The Iraq Causes and Consequences War* (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2006) 173.

⁷⁵³ Qu Xing, ‘The UN Charter, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Syrian Issue’ (March/May 2012) China International Studies 36.

⁷⁵⁴ Wang Yizhou and Yan Xuetong, ‘一张否决票的争议 [Arguments on Veto]’ (2012) 5 World Affairs 23.

⁷⁵⁵ Yan Xuetong, ‘中国否决联合国叙利亚决议利弊 [China’s Veto on Syria: Advantages and Disadvantages]’ (*Xuetong’s Blog*, 8 February 2012) <<http://yanxuetongvip.blog.sohu.com/203112403.html>> accessed 17 June 2013.

⁷⁵⁶ UN Security Council ‘Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria’s Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, Owing to Veto by Russia Federation, China’ (4 October 2011) Press Release SC/10403.

⁷⁵⁷ Yan Xuetong, ‘中国否决联合国叙利亚决议利弊 [China’s Veto on Syria: Advantages and Disadvantages]’ (*Xuetong’s Blog*, 8 February 2012) <<http://yanxuetongvip.blog.sohu.com/203112403.html>> accessed 17 June 2013.

the international community to respect China's role in the Security Council.⁷⁵⁸ In addition, the author maintains that China's interest in exercising its veto power on Syria was a gateway to facilitate enhancing its influence in the Middle East in order to realise China's energy interest. In this regard, China's policy towards Myanmar was driven by similar concerns.

Myanmar's Precedent on Non-intervention: A Safe Veto

In 2007, China vetoed a proposal sponsored by the US and Britain that would have urged the military junta in Myanmar to engage in a substantive political dialogue with the opposition National League of Democracy.⁷⁵⁹ As Myanmar is a significant natural gas and petroleum exporter, China intended to protect the stable environment by using its veto power. In 2009, the Sino-Burma pipelines project began construction and was completed in 2013.⁷⁶⁰ This project would allow oil shipped from the Middle East to bypass the Straits of Malacca.⁷⁶¹ Similar to its position on Darfur, China opposed the use of pressure against Myanmar. On 15 September 2006, Wang Guangya explained China's veto:

First, it was preposterous to consider problems such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic, drug trafficking, and refugee issues as threats, since doing so not only exceeds the mandate given by the Chapter of the UN to the Council, but will still undermine the Security Council's authority and legitimacy; Second, the international community has to encourage Myanmar to create a favourable environment in the country through the good offices visiting Ibrahim Gambari.⁷⁶²

In addition to China's concern for its own national resource security, the veto was also welcomed by the Burmese government, Russia and regional organisations. For instance, a Burmese representative to the Security Council stated that Myanmar did not pose any threat to international peace and security and assessed that the draft

⁷⁵⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 819, S/RES/819, 16 April 1993, p. 2.

⁷⁵⁹ UN Document S/2007/14, 12 January 2007, p. 2.

⁷⁶⁰ These oil and natural gas pipelines link Burma's deep-water port of Sittwe in the Bay of Bengal with Kunming in Yunnan Province of China. See, Zhong Jingjing, '中缅油气管道全线贯通 [Sino-Burma Pipelines Completed Constructions]' *The Beijing News* (Beijing, 5 June 2013) A2.

⁷⁶¹ At present, four fifths of China's oil exportation must to go through the Straits of Malacca where there is a mounting pirate threat. In order to reduce the risk in energy export, China strategically set up those pipelines with Myanmar. See Li Chenyang and Liang Fook Lye, 'China's Policies towards Myanmar: A Successful Model for Dealing with the Myanmar Issue?' (2009) 7 *China: an International Journal* 257, 262.

⁷⁶² UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5526th Meeting, S/PV. 5526, 15 September 2006, p. 2.

resolution, “had it been adopted, would create a dangerous precedent”.⁷⁶³ State consent as a fundamental principle has been continuously invoked by the Chinese government as a significant condition for imposing sanctions, as indicated in the case of Syria.⁷⁶⁴

With respect to the political dynamics, China received support from Russia but almost no pressure from the US.⁷⁶⁵ The explanation is that the US was being strategic as it might need China’s support on other core issues. For example, in the case of the North Korean nuclear issue, in order to persuade China to consent to a series of sanctions against North Korea, the US did not adopt a critical policy towards China’s veto in the case of Myanmar.⁷⁶⁶ Additionally, Russia backed the Chinese position on Myanmar in the Security Council, although it did not explicitly use its veto power. As Vitaly Churkin argued, “we [Russia] deem unacceptable any attempt to use the Security Council to discuss issues outside its purview”.⁷⁶⁷ In relation to the major regional stakeholders, the fact that ASEAN and SADC member states offered no support to the sanction proposal also militated in favour of Chinese opposition.⁷⁶⁸ In summary, it was an opportunity for China to highlight its affinity with actors having connections to Myanmar and also to create a way to build confidence in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa.⁷⁶⁹ Thus, it could be expected that the situation in Syria might develop along a similar pathway.

In the author’s view, Chinese opposition to sanctions in the case of Sudan and Myanmar would not suffer political risk. In the case of Sudan, given China’s close economic co-operation with the Sudanese government, the US sought to encourage

⁷⁶³ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5619th Meeting, S/PV. 5619, 12 January 2007, p. 10.

⁷⁶⁴ In the 6524th Meeting of the Security Council, a Syrian representative to the UN announced that ‘Syria saw no justification for a debate on this issue in the Security Council and the current situation in Syria could not be posed as a threat of international peace and security’. See, UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 6524th Meeting, S/PV. 6524, 27 April 2011, pp. 10, 13.

⁷⁶⁵ Wu Xiaofang and Li Shaoxian, ‘叙利亚我该怎样对待你? [How Could China Treat Syria?]’ (2012) 5 *World Affairs* 19–21.

⁷⁶⁶ Joel Wuthnow, *Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council: Beyond the Veto* (Routledge, 2013) 277.

⁷⁶⁷ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5619th Meeting, S/PV. 5619, 12 January 2007, p. 6.

⁷⁶⁸ Leon T. Hadar, ‘U.S. Sanctions against Burma: A Failure on All Fronts’ (1998) 1 Cato Centre for Trade Policy Analysis < <http://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policy-analysis/us-sanctions-against-burma-failure-all-fronts> > accessed 18 June 2013.

⁷⁶⁹ Toshihiro Kudo, ‘China’s Policy toward Myanmar: Challenges and Prospects’ (2012) Japanese Institute of Developing Economies 2.

China to exert bilateral influence on Bashir.⁷⁷⁰ It should not be neglected that Russia backed China's opposition to intervention, which played a significant role in resisting sanctions against Myanmar. Moreover, China's veto was also interpreted as an adherence to the principle of non-intervention.⁷⁷¹ However, in the case of Myanmar, it seemed as if Washington had attempted to condemn Myanmar rhetorically instead of substantially authorising sanctions. As Warren Hoge explored, US intentions regarding Myanmar were that it simply "wanted to embarrass China".⁷⁷² Though a resolution on sanctions could not be adopted, the US was able to place its opponents on the defensive.⁷⁷³

5.4.4.2 Beyond the Veto: Energy Security and National Status

In contrast to its veto in the case of Myanmar, the author considers that China could expect to encounter a higher level of diplomatic risk in vetoing the UN's initiative on Syria. As China lacked sufficient political influence on the parties to the conflict in Syria and had a consistent policy on non-intervention, China was reluctant to either host political negotiation or deliver substantive support to the Assad administration.⁷⁷⁴ Therefore, it is necessary to explore the Chinese motivation for the veto, and discuss how China could enhance its national profile in the Middle East without receiving criticism.

In response to China's veto on four draft resolutions at the Security Council, Western countries claimed that China should be held responsible for the serious violations of human rights in Syria.⁷⁷⁵ However, Chinese official statements repeatedly emphasised that the veto demonstrated China's sense of responsibility for the Syrian people.⁷⁷⁶

⁷⁷⁰ Jonathan Holslag, *China's Diplomatic Victory in Darfur* (Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies 2007) 3-4.

⁷⁷¹ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 5619th Meeting, S/PV. 5619, 12 January 2007, p. 11.

⁷⁷² Interview with Warren Hogue, the New York Times, Reporter Blog, 15 June 2013.

⁷⁷³ Joel Wuthnow, 'Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council: Beyond the Veto', (Routledge, 2012) 302.

⁷⁷⁴ President of the US, Barack Obama has decided to arm Syrian rebels. See, Shadi Hamid, 'Why the Current Syria Policy Does not Make Sense' (*Foreign Policy*, 17 June 2013) <<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/why-the-current-syria-policy-doesnt-make-sense/276922/>> accessed 18 June 2013.

⁷⁷⁵ Cao Yiting, “‘叙利亚之友’大会反对军事干涉，希拉里指责中俄 [Friends of Syria Opposed Military Intervention, Clinton Criticises China and Russia over Syria]” *Oriental Morning Post* (Shanghai, 26 February 2012) 8.

⁷⁷⁶ Authoritative sources, including Foreign Ministry spokespersons and ambassadors to the UN, have explained Beijing's vetoes and China's position towards Syria. 'Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Li Baodong after Vote on Draft Resolution on Syria' (*Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of*

According to Wang Min, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, argued that “as there is no special national interest in Syria, China’s position towards Syria demonstrated its consistent stance in all international affairs. It is not targeted at a particular issue or time”.⁷⁷⁷ Based on the existing Chinese position, the motivation for China’s veto was subject to speculation. Furthermore, a question additionally posed was that if China had no special interest in Syria, why did Beijing oppose all draft resolutions and consequently refuse to impose sanctions on the Syrian regime, in line with Moscow, which granted large benefits to Syria? In particular, it is difficult for the West to understand the “justification” for the Chinese position.⁷⁷⁸ In the opinion of the author, China’s policy on Syria was neither consistent with the “traditional alliance” theory nor does it revolve around entering into a new alliance with Russia.

First, China’s stance on the Syrian situation has targeted the protection of Chinese overseas interests.⁷⁷⁹ In Maoist China, Syria has shared a communist ideology with China and has been labelled as an ally of China in the past.⁷⁸⁰ In this regard, a substantial portion of China’s foreign policy was adopted under the label of “supporting friends in the Middle East”, which cultivated friendship and support from the under-developed countries.⁷⁸¹ Historically, during the 1950s, Syria had struggled

China to the UN, 19 July 2012) < <http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1963482.htm> > accessed 20 October 2013.

⁷⁷⁷ ‘Explanatory Remarks by Ambassador Wang Min after General Assembly Vote on Draft Resolution on Syria’ (*Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN*, 3 August 2012) < <http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t958262.htm> > accessed 20 October 2013.

⁷⁷⁸ Western countries, led by the US, emphasise the right of the international community to infringe on the autonomy of a nation-state to protect or advance other considerations, with the responsibility to protect (R2P) being the most notable example of this line of interventionist thinking. China, however, cares more about state sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs. China appears concerned that such intervention in situations of allegations of human rights violations could establish a precedent that one day might be used against Beijing. See, Harry Harding, ‘China RedisCOVERS Ethics in Foreign Policy’ (*Carnegie Ethics Online*, 6 January 2009) < http://www.cceia.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/0013.html > accessed 20 October 2013.

⁷⁷⁹ The goal was first announced officially by the former Chinese President Hu Jintao in his Government Work Report, which was delivered at the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP) on 8 November 2012. See, Hu Jintao, ‘坚定不移沿着中国特色社会主义道路前进，为全面建成小康社会而奋斗 [Firmly March on the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive to Complete the Building of a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects]’ *People’s Daily* (Beijing, 18 November 2012) 1.

⁷⁸⁰ Syria was one of the first Arab countries to establish diplomatic ties with China. See, Gu Kang, ‘庆祝中叙建交 50 周年 [The Celebration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between China and Syria]’ *People’s Daily* (Beijing, 11 August 2006) 3; Tareq Y Ismael and Jacqueline S Ismael, *The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon* (University Press of Florida, 1998) 51.

⁷⁸¹ In 1958, the bombardment in Kinmen Island has been realised as delivering support to the national liberation movements in the Middle East. The bombardment had three political motivations: first, to fight against Jiang’s Group (Republic of China) and prevent a state split; second, to sound out the

to cast off the yoke of the US and, of course, required assistance from other communist countries, such as China and the Soviet Union.⁷⁸² However, given the tense relations between China and the Soviet Union in the 1950s, if Syria intended to fight against the US it needed to accept aid from the Soviet Union, which meant Syria had to keep a certain political distance from China.⁷⁸³ In 1971, Hafez al-Assad, former president of Syria, decided to rent Tartus to Moscow, thus giving Russia its only military harbour in the Mediterranean region.⁷⁸⁴

When Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000, China and Syria accelerated economic co-operation and developed a close relationship.⁷⁸⁵ In 2004, the Syrian President Assad undertook his first official visit to China, which seemed to indicate that these two countries began to promote co-operation.⁷⁸⁶ However, in the author's view, in the absence of traditional co-operation between China and Syria, their co-operation was usually motivated by the pressure from the West. For instance, the Syrian government did not offer preferential policies to Chinese corporations similar to those granted to Russian and Iranian companies.⁷⁸⁷ Moreover, the Chinese government also imposed certain limitations on Syrian investors. For instance, Hong Kong, as a trading port for Syrian businesspeople entering mainland China, has refused to allow the creation of bank accounts in accordance with the sanctions imposed on Syria by US financial agencies.⁷⁸⁸

bottom-line of the US in the Taiwan Strait; and third, to polarise the relationship between Taiwan and the US. The Kinmen bombardment also put Mao's 'The East wind prevails over the West wind' ideology into concrete practice. *毛泽东文选 [Collected Works of Mao Zedong Vol. 8]* (1st edn, The People's Press, 1999) 8.

⁷⁸² Douglas Little, 'Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945–1958'. (1990) 44 (1) Middle East Journal 51.

⁷⁸³ Michael Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (OUP 2002), 54–55.

⁷⁸⁴ Ron Synovitz, 'Explainer: Why Is Access to Syria's Port at Tartus So Important to Moscow?' (*Radio Free Europe*, 19 June 2012) <<http://www.rferl.org/content/explainer-why-is-access-/24619441.html>> accessed 25 October 2013.

⁷⁸⁵ Wu Wenbin, '叙利亚总统会见王乐泉 [The President of Syria Met Wang Lequan]' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 14 April 2006) 3.

⁷⁸⁶ Shi Yanchun, 'Deepen Friendship with Syria' (2005) 2 *The Arab World* 4.

⁷⁸⁷ Mu Chunshan, '中国在叙利亚的利益 [China's National Profile in Syria]' (*The New York Times China*, 24 December 2012) <<http://cn.nytimes.com/opinion/20121224/cc24syria/>> accessed 16 January 2014.

⁷⁸⁸ This conclusion is in accordance with Ben Simpfendorfer's speech, 'The New Silk Road – How a Rising Arab World is Turning Away from the West and Rediscovering China' of 18 May 2009. Ben is the Chief China Economist at the Royal Bank of Scotland in Hong Kong.

However, as the current Assad regime is potentially facing defeat, China has adopted a rational policy towards Syria. In order to protect its existing national interest, China has modified its support for the Syrian government in recent cases. For instance, the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA), an official research branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has invited two delegations of the Syrian National Committee and the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces in May 2012 and April 2014, respectively.⁷⁸⁹ This may also indicate that China is attempting to redeem its reputation, which was damaged by the use of the veto in the Security Council and subsequent policies.

Second, China's position towards Syria does not correlate with policies prevalent during the Cold War. Having cast four vetoes against western countries' proposed sanctions at the Security Council, China and Russia are tacitly entering into a new alliance following the end of the Cold War.⁷⁹⁰ The term "new alliance" rhetorically assumes that the West, China and Russia are conducting a Cold War-style geopolitical game.⁷⁹¹ In addition, the international community also believes that the Sino-Russian alliance (to include Iran and Syria) may grow because of increasing energy requirements.⁷⁹² However, the author holds a different opinion from that of commentators.

The table below demonstrates the divisions between China and Russia, despite both states casting the same veto on the proposed UN resolutions on Syria. It is noted that compared with Russia, China's stance on Syria is more nuanced. While Moscow has been a major provider of conventional weapons to the Assad government, Beijing has no direct interest in Syria.⁷⁹³

⁷⁸⁹ Hua Chunying, 'Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on April 14, 2014' (*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 14 April 2014) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1146886.shtml> accessed 18 October 2014.

⁷⁹⁰ Joanna Paraszczuk, 'Iran, Russia, China, Syria Plan Largest War Game' *The Jerusalem Post* (Israel, 19 June 2012).

⁷⁹¹ Hua Chunying, 'Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on April 14, 2014' (*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 14 April 2014) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1146886.shtml> accessed 18 October 2014.

⁷⁹² Andrei P Tsygankov, 'Russia's Power and Alliances in the 21st Century' (2010) 30(S1) Politics 43-44.

⁷⁹³ Pieter D Wezeman, *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: Arms Transfers to Syria* (SIPRI Year Book 2013, OUP 2013) 269.

Table 5.4.4.2 Russia, China and Iran's Stance on the Syria Regime*

Concerns Stakeholders	National Interests in Syria	Foreign Policy-Arguing the US's Stance	Country's Own International Status
Russia	1. Economics: One of Syria's biggest arms suppliers; 2. Ideology: Russia's key policy goal is blocking American efforts to shape the Middle East region.	1. Any plans to strike Syria would be against provision the UN Charter; 2. It cannot prove that the Syrian government launched the chemical weapons attack.	Russia is one of five permanent Member States of the Security Council that has veto power.
China	1. Economics: To maintain the financial ties; 2. Strategy: a) Respecting state's internal affairs no intervention owing to human rights violations; b) China seeks to avoid repeating what happened in Libya.	1. Opposed to the use of chemical weapons and supports the US's proposal on chemical weapons inspectors; 2. The international community has to seek a political solution for Syria.	P-5 Member with veto power.
Iran	1. Religion: Iran is the world's most populous Shiite Muslim nation. The Syrian government is dominated by a Shiite offshoot; 2. Ally: Iran treats Syria as a strategic ally against Israel.	1. The Syrian government is a victim of international plots; 2. The US and Arab countries-led plot aims to make the region safer for Israel.	Always recognised as Washington's greatest threat in the Middle East region, especially with nuclear potential.

*The comparison is based on both Holly Yan's research published on the CNN website and the author's understanding of those three countries' foreign policy towards the Syria regime. See Holly Yan, 'Syria allies: Why Russia, Iran and China Are Standing by the Regime' (CNN, 30 August 2013)

< <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/meast/syria-iran-china-russia-supporters/> > accessed 1 November 2013.

Pursuant to the analysis above, China, to some extent, shared the same view as Russia on the principle of sovereignty in international law, but differences exist between them. First, in the context of sovereignty, China and Russia share the same view that non-intervention in internal matters is a fundamental principle of international law. However, this position is contrary to the emerging approach to the R2P, which has been supported by most Western countries, such as the US and Canada.⁷⁹⁴ The concept of R2P maintains that the protection of state sovereignty should give way if

⁷⁹⁴ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001) 2.

and when human rights have been seriously violated.⁷⁹⁵ Second, in terms of the status of the UN Charter, China and Russia both emphasised the leading role of the UN in solving international conflicts, and opposed military intervention without UN authorisation. Third, China and Russia themselves both face the possibility of intervention over certain issues, such as China's stance on Taiwan and Tibet, and Russia's stance on Chechnya.⁷⁹⁶ Fourth, previous cases in Libya and Somalia demonstrate that external intervention may fail to provide peace and security.⁷⁹⁷ Nevertheless, China has adopted a more placatory stance than Russia with respect to Syria. Li Weijian, assistant professor of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, stated that Russia has shaped its position as clear-cut, while China's is more low-key.⁷⁹⁸ China's and Russia's different positions towards the "Friends of Syria" could exemplify how Chinese policy is motivated primarily by a general doctrine of non-intervention rather than the kind of direct political and security ties that link Damascus and Moscow.⁷⁹⁹ In this connection, it is noteworthy that China's veto was based on pursuing strategic national interests: 1) as an energy rich country, Syria plays an important role in China's foreign policy. Thus, if Assad wins in the civil war, China would increase ties with Syria, which helps Beijing to enhance its influence in the Middle East;⁸⁰⁰ 2) Beijing does not perceive its use of the veto as a high risk strategy in this situation. As an important world power, China believed that if Syria changes its government, it will still need to retain good relations with China. For

⁷⁹⁵ For detailed explanation regarding "The Responsibility to Protect", see Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report by the Secretary-General, UN Document A/63/677, 12 January 2009 < <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/206/10/PDF/N0920610.pdf?OpenElement> > accessed 10 December 2012.

⁷⁹⁶ For Chinese territorial challenges, see M Taylor Fravel, *Stronger Borders Secure Nation* (Princeton University Press, 2008); For Russian territorial challenges, see Dmitri V Trenin and Aleksei V Malashenko, *Russia's Restless Frontier* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).

⁷⁹⁷ The UN Security Council authorised the establishment of a no-fly zone in Libya with the help of China's abstention. Sun Yun stated that 'neither the West nor the Libyan National Transitional Council showed much appreciation for China's abstention'. Disappointed with such results, China began to change its policy towards the Middle East. Sun Yun, 'Syria: What China Has Learned from its Libya Case' (2012) 152 East-West Centre < http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb152_1.pdf > accessed 5 November 2013.

⁷⁹⁸ Huang Xiang, '专家圆桌 [Experts Roundtable Talk: Interview with Liu Zhongmin, Li Weijian and Wang Jinglie]' *The Oriental Morning Post* (Shanghai, 28 August 2013) A15.

⁷⁹⁹ When invited to the 2nd 'Friends of Syria' gathering in Tunis, Russia declined, but China said it was considering the offer. Kathrin Hille and Michael Peel, 'China Takes More Nuanced Stance on Syria' (*Financial Times*, 22 February 2012) < <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4b772dca-5d64-11e1-869d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2jmNgdeII> > accessed 5 November 2013.

⁸⁰⁰ During the Libya crisis, China had to repatriate more than 30,000 citizens from Libya. Kathrin Hille and Michael Peel, 'China Takes More Nuanced Stance on Syria' (*Financial Times*, 22 February 2012) < <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4b772dca-5d64-11e1-869d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2jmNgdeII> > accessed 5 November 2013.

instance, as *Global Times* noted that the former president of the Syrian National Council asserted that the relationship between China and Syria would remain stable no matter the circumstances in Syria;⁸⁰¹ 3) with regard to the adoption of a few coercive measures in draft resolutions, China's veto would demonstrate its resolve to protect the principle of non-intervention; 4) due to its relative lack of political influence in the Middle East, China treated the Syrian crisis as an opportunity to secure and improve potential national benefit to China in the region.⁸⁰²

Securing National Investment in Iran

When reviewing the research on Chinese foreign policy, there are several articles that have proposed reasons for China's consistent opposition to UN resolutions regarding sanctions.⁸⁰³ Despite the emerging concept of "smart sanctions",⁸⁰⁴ Chinese scholars still denounced these sanctions for delivering unavoidable damage to vulnerable populations.⁸⁰⁵ In the case of Syria, beyond the usual rhetoric of anti-hegemonic sanctions, the author suggests that China's veto is an attempt to protect energy interests in Iran, a nation with geographical proximity to Syria.

First of all, in a political context, another reason for China's support for Syria, which is widely circulated, is to guarantee its strategic interest in the Middle East.⁸⁰⁶ Currently, as it is moving towards a tertiary-based economy, it is necessary for China to look for long-term export markets. In this context, developing countries are more attractive than the US.⁸⁰⁷ In addition, it is conceivable that an Assad-ruled Syria will

⁸⁰¹ Jiang Yang and Huang Peizhao, 'The International Society Concerns China and Russia's Stance on Syria' *Global Times* (Beijing, 12 June 2012) 10.

⁸⁰² Eva Bellin and Peter Krause, 'Intervention in Syria: Reconciling Moral Premises and Realistic Outcomes' (2012) 64 *Middle East Brief* 5.

⁸⁰³ Neil MacFarquhar and Anthony Shadid, 'Russia and China Block UN Action on Crisis in Syria' *The New York Times* (New York, 4 February 2012) A1; George Koo, 'China Opposed to Sanctions of Any Kind over Ukraine' (*RT News*, 15 May 2014) < <http://rt.com/op-edge/159192-china-opposes-to-sanctions-russia/> > accessed 19 July 2014.

⁸⁰⁴ The context of smart sanctions is to raise the target regime's costs of noncompliance while avoiding the general suffering that comprehensive sanctions often create. In other words, the logic behind smart sanctions is to make economic coercion work properly and more efficiently. See, Daniel W Drezner, 'How Smart is Smart Sanctions?' (2003) 5 *International Studies Review* 107.

⁸⁰⁵ James Reilly, 'China's Unilateral Sanctions' (2012) 35/4 *The Washington Quarterly* 122.

⁸⁰⁶ Michael D Swaine, 'Chinese Views of the Syrian Conflict' (2012) 39 *China Leadership Monitor* 39.

⁸⁰⁷ The structure of China's exports has witnessed significant changes: a) the ratio of processing trade has decreased; b) exports to American and European markets have fallen, and c) exports to newly emerging market such as Asia, Africa and developing countries have increased. Wang Jianye, '中国外贸的结构性变化 [The Transformation on China's Trading Structure]' (*ENN News*, 28 November 2011) < <http://www.ennweekly.com/2011/1128/3677.html> > accessed 5 November 2013.

remain a close ally of Iran due to religious similarities.⁸⁰⁸ It could be assumed that if the rebels prevail in the Syrian conflict, Iran may encounter international pressure and isolation. For instance, as Zhang Zhouxiang noted, the US intended to eliminate Iran's only ally in the region by overthrowing the Syrian government.⁸⁰⁹

Second, as energy has become a significant factor in states' diplomatic policy, it is easy to understand why major powers are involved in the Syrian crisis.⁸¹⁰ In this regard, China's position on Syria could further indicate that China's foreign policy in the context of geopolitical confrontation is changing from conservative detachment to active participation. According to the Geneva-based consulting group (Petro-Logistics) for July 2012, Chinese imports of Iranian oil were estimated at 587,000 barrels a day, which represented 54 percent of Iran's total exports.⁸¹¹ Meanwhile, Iran is also an important consumer of China's arms sales. China has become a subject for condemnation as a consequence of the arms sale to Iran.⁸¹² Washington consequently urged Beijing to stop transferring its conventional weapons to Iran.⁸¹³

The assumption that China is securing its national profile in the Middle East is nevertheless consistent with commentaries published in the *People's Daily* that the West is "acting on a hidden agenda and China should prevent the West's recurrent hegemony in the region by pushing for a power transition of Assad's government".⁸¹⁴ As Nicholas Wong observed, China is wary of another Western-led military intervention in the region in the light of the Syrian crisis.⁸¹⁵ Therefore, considering the existing relationship between China and Iran, it may be concluded that Chinese stances on Syria were partly motivated by its political concerns. However, given internet censorship, Chinese political commentary on official media faced difficulties

⁸⁰⁸ Jubin Goodarzi, *Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East* (Tauris 2009) 2-3.

⁸⁰⁹ Zhang Zhouxiang, 'Compromise Possible in Syria' *China Daily* (Beijing, 28 February 2012) 6.

⁸¹⁰ Simon Xu Hui Shen, "Qualitative Energy Diplomacy" in *Central Asia: A Comparative Analysis of the Policies of the United States, Russia and China* (The Brookings Institution 2011) 2-4.

⁸¹¹ Ilan Berman, 'Iran's Asian Lifeline' *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, 17 August 2012) 11.

⁸¹² Bates Gill, 'Chinese Arms Exports to Iran' (1998) 2/2 *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 55.

⁸¹³ Robert F. Worth and C. J. Chivers, 'Seized Chinese Weapons Raise Concerns on Iran' *The New York Times* (New York, 2 March 2013) A14.

⁸¹⁴ Zhang Hong, 'What Role Does the US Play at Syria' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 2015) 6.

⁸¹⁵ Nicholas Wong, 'China's Veto on Syria: What Interests are at Play?' (*Open Democracy*, 25 July 2012) < <https://www.opendemocracy.net/nicholas-wong/china%E2%80%99s-veto-on-syria-what-interests-are-at-play> > accessed 18 October 2014.

in revealing the true nature of Chinese policy towards Syria. There is, nevertheless, no clear answer to the question as to whether China has taken these steps solely because of the confrontation with the US in the Middle East or because it has recognised that its veto fulfils national interests.

Enhancing Political Influence: A Tentative Mediator

Beyond the usual foreign relations concerns, the author supposes that China's official stance throughout the Syrian crisis could reveal more about China's political intentions. In this regard, it might be anticipated that China endeavours to enhance its influence acting as an international mediator by replicating "the Roosevelt Structure".⁸¹⁶ Zhu Weibin, a Chinese scholar of history, states that Roosevelt's reconciliatory diplomacy was an opportunistic means of giving the US access to China's northeast.⁸¹⁷ Taking the comprehensive questions of national power into consideration, China is facing a similar situation as the US did under President Roosevelt's authority: it is a country that intends to enhance its influence in the world and enlarge its national interests. Thus, it is valuable for Chinese decision-makers to use the experiences of Roosevelt's foreign policy for reference.

In Syria, China may contribute to solving international conflicts by means of international reconciliation. Simon Shen, an associate professor from the Chinese

⁸¹⁶ Roosevelt's mediation in the Russo-Japanese War exemplified his policy of satisfying the interests of the US, then an emerging world power, in Northeast Asia. The peaceful conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War also demonstrated a natural outgrowth of Roosevelt's experience and foreign policy. Besides the Russo-Japanese War, Roosevelt was also invited as a mediator during the first Moroccan Crisis. The first Moroccan Crisis was initiated by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany's allegation that supported Morocco's independence to promote German commercial interests in Morocco. The crisis worsened German relations with both France and the United Kingdom, and helped ensure the success of the new Anglo-French Entente Cordiale. In order to escalate Russia's influence, the US supported Japan and opposed Russia's attempts to colonise Manchuria and control North Korea. However, Russia's unexpected vulnerability was beyond Roosevelt's anticipation. Thus, in order to protect US interests in the Northeast, Roosevelt decided to act as a mediator pursuing a balanced situation. In other words, the motivation for Roosevelt's mediation was to prevent Japan's assuming a leading role in the region. The US finally took on the responsibility of mediator and tried to guarantee an open door policy to the Chinese market despite lacking power in Northeast Asia. On 5 September 1905, Russia and Japan concluded the Treaty of Portsmouth, mediated by Roosevelt. Before the negotiation between Russia and Japan, however, the US and Japan signed an agreement securing US rights in the Philippines; in exchange, Japan's rights in North Korea were protected by the US. See, Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1750 to the Present* (2nd edn, Norton & Company 1994) 251, 253; Steven Ericson and Allen Hockley, 'Introduction' in Steven Ericson and Allen Hockley (eds), *The Treaty of Portsmouth and Its Legacies* (Green Press Initiative 2008) 1.

⁸¹⁷ Zhu Weibin, '从日俄战争看罗斯福的抑制日俄政策 [Theodore Roosevelt's Balance Policy towards Russia and Japan: A Study from Russo-Japanese War]' (2005) 4 Journal of the Northeast Normal University 65.

Hong Kong University, believes that if China takes on the responsibility to mediate the Syria crisis, theoretically it will have the responsibility to mediate more important international conflicts in the future.⁸¹⁸ Compared with the Libyan situation, China also delivered a message that if one side in the international conflict is accused of violating human rights, and the other side has no military response, China will not oppose international military intervention. It is fascinating that China participated in the Action Group for Syria and supported the Peaceful Agreement, which was concluded at the meeting, despite the vagueness as to whether such a structure fell under the UN framework.⁸¹⁹ China's different policy towards the Action Group for Syria and Friends of Syria indicated that China would participate in committees only if it has agenda-setting power.⁸²⁰

As a matter of fact, the principle of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs have been used by the Chinese government to oppose military intervention, not only in the Syrian case, but in other cases (such as Sudan and Myanmar) as well. However, decision-makers have to treat international affairs cautiously as it is difficult to make a clear distinction between internal or external affairs. As pointed out by Joseph Nye, a leading expert in international relations, due to the information revolution and globalisation, the traditional concept of sovereign boundaries has been diminished, and there is now no way to clarify which are domestic or diplomatic subjects.⁸²¹ The Syrian crisis may reach the conclusion that domestic conflicts easily evolve into international concerns. The Syrian government is therefore facing heavy pressure from outside.

⁸¹⁸ “More important conflicts” are the conflicts that have the potential to change the international strategic structure. Furthermore, such conflicts are based on China’s energy-led foreign diplomacy and “One-China” doctrine. Simon Shen, ‘中国调解外交试水叙利亚 [China’s Mediator Role in Syria]’ (2012) 16 The Nanfeng Windows 74.

⁸¹⁹ The components of the Action Group for Syria were a compromise among the powers: the US excluded Iran’s participation, and Russia barred Saudi Arabia’s participation; besides the five permanent Member States on the Security Council, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar were invited to be present at the meeting. See, UN Security Council ‘Secretary-General, Opening “Geneva II” Conference, Urges All to Impress Upon Both Sides “Necessity and Inevitability of a Political Solution”’ (22 January 2014) Press Release SG/SM/15602.

⁸²⁰ Simon Shen, ‘中国调解外交试水叙利亚 [China’s Mediator Role in Syria]’ (2012) The Nanfeng Windows 73.

⁸²¹ Joseph S Nye, ‘The Information Revolution and the Paradox of American Power’ (2003) 97 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting American Society of International Law 67; Joseph S Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (Public Affairs 2004) 1, 5.

In the context of globalisation, China has to discuss how to modify its diplomatic policy in response to the developing trends.⁸²² In response, the author supposes that China's practice in the Syrian case has indicated some changes in its foreign policy. It is noteworthy that the changes are more or less in contrast with the policy of "Keeping a Low Profile", which has dominated Chinese foreign policy since Deng's era. A division exists in China today between realism and practical nationalism.⁸²³ The former maintains that China's diplomacy must insist on Deng's policy, while the latter emphasises that China has to face the reality that it is undoubtedly on its way to becoming a great power.⁸²⁴ In this connection, China has consistently sought to persuade existing powers that its rise will not endanger their international status, but it is clear that China's foreign policy is currently undergoing revisions. In November 2012, Xi Jinping stated that "a country which pursues its own development, security and well-being must also let other countries pursue their development, security and well-being".⁸²⁵ As noted by Yan Xuetong, Xi's idea of constructing major power relations has nevertheless provided the necessary theoretical basis of the foreign policy transition (from "Keeping a Low Profile" to "Striving for Achievement").⁸²⁶

In fact, this policy transition proposes to realise the goal of "Peaceful Rise (和平崛起)". This pattern explicitly maps the direction of China's future development to a certain degree.⁸²⁷ As a rising power, China needs strategic allies in international relations rather than economic profits. For instance, it is impossible for a rising power to establish its credibility if the power does not provide security, protection and economic benefits to other nations, especially its neighbours.⁸²⁸ In this regard, the

⁸²² Zhang Baijia, 'Structure of the Chinese Diplomacy in the 20th Century' (2002) 1 Social Science in China 4-5.

⁸²³ These divisions are concluded in accordance with the discussions among Chinese scholars in the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS). See, Wang Jisi, 'The Question on Positioning China's Policy' (2011) 2 International Studies 5; Yan Xuetong, '从韬光养晦到奋发有为 [From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement]' (2014) 4 Quarterly Journal of International Politics 5-6.

⁸²⁴ Xing Yue and Zhang Yibing, '韬光养晦战略再思考 [Re-thinking the Policy of Keeping a Low Profile]' (2006) 6 International Review 13-19.

⁸²⁵ Xi Jinping, 'Work Together to Maintain World Peace and Security' (2013) 5 Foreign Affairs Journal 3.

⁸²⁶ Yan Xuetong, 'From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement' (2014) 7/2 The Chinese Journal of International Politics 161.

⁸²⁷ Both President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao adopted the wording "Peaceful Rise" in their public speeches in late 2003 and early 2004. However, Chinese official documents and statements have rarely referred to this concept.

⁸²⁸ Suisheng Zhao, 'Chinese Foreign Policy as a Rising Power to Find its Rightful Place' (2013) 18/1 Perceptions 101-2.

“Striving for Achievement” strategy will attract more allies by letting other countries benefit from China, which subsequently better serves China’s goal of rejuvenation. In the context of the Syrian crisis, while China is reluctant to counterbalance the US directly by challenging US military priority, China prefers to co-operate with other countries against the US in a non-confrontational manner. As Li Baodong observed, with regard to the respect of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria, China supports proposals raised by Russia and endeavours to promote an early launch of an inclusive political process led by the Syrian people.⁸²⁹

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on China’s policies towards the UN’s attempts to maintain international peace and security by examining the cases of East Timor (1999), Haiti (2004), Darfur (2004) and Syria (2011). The discussion aims to demonstrate China’s policy towards peace and security from its mixed record in the UN Security Council. What are China’s core concerns in diplomacy (international reputation and national interests)? What factors can impact China’s level of co-operation with Western states (given the variance of its policy on the imposing of sanctions)? Do the findings have broader relevance for other cases? What are the implications for the relationship between China, the US and Russia?

As a rising power, China has adopted a new position as that of a “responsible power”, which is intended to decrease the fear on the part of other countries that China represents an emerging hegemonic power. Hypothesis 1 evaluates this proposition. There is support for this hypothesis in the East Timor case examined above. China has dispatched civilian police to UN peacekeeping missions since then. Furthermore, with respect to its non-interference policy, there is support from the four cases examined. China’s support for INTERFET, an Australian-led multinational peacekeeping force, demonstrated its position on humanitarian intervention. If the prerequisites of state consent and the Security Council’s authorisation are met, China is willing to play a supportive role in shaping the UN response. However, there appears to be no reason to anticipate China’s relaxation of its position on sovereignty and non-interference in

⁸²⁹ Li Baodong, ‘Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Li Baodong after Vote on Security Council Draft Resolution on Syria’ (*Permanent Mission of the P.R. China to the UN*, 4 February 2012) <<http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t901712.htm>> accessed 30 May 2014.

other states' internal affairs. The reasons why China opposes intervention, to some extent as a remedy, can be seen from Hypothesis 2

As Taylor Fravel categorised, the crises in Taiwan and Tibet are issues pertaining to China's jurisdictional sovereignty.⁸³⁰ Nevertheless, from a Chinese emotional perspective, there is no prospect of giving ground on the "One-China" policy. China is alert to the possibility of territorial issues giving rise to intervention by other states. Thus, China has imposed sanctions against those countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In contrast, it has also treated humanitarian intervention cautiously in order to prevent a dangerous precedent affecting territorial integrity. However, in the case of Haiti, China revised its policy towards countries that have developed diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The policy changed from vetoing relevant peacekeeping proposals in the Security Council to actively participating. Hypothesis 2 may be substantiated with respect to Haiti, since China supported and participated in UN peacekeeping operations. It might be assumed that China was shaping its level of military and economic power as a counter balance to Taiwan's allies. Also, China is encouraging those countries to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan by enhancing their vested interest in respect of enhancing military and economic co-operation with China.

Hypotheses 3 and 4 generally work in the cases of Darfur and Syria (Syria is partial evidence for Hypothesis 4). In the case of Darfur, China-led bilateral interventions and the AU-UN-Sudan dialogue reduced the necessity for sanctions. For instance, Hu Jintao and Bashir's conversation in Beijing and Liu Guijin's mediation mission as a Chinese special envoy for Darfur produced positive changes in Sudan's co-operation with the UN. Moreover, China's success in Sudan contributed to the absence of any major resistance from the international community. With respect to the nuclear tests in North Korea and Iran, China was in favour of sanctions against Pyongyang due to its own security concerns, and nevertheless supported resolutions on Iran that concerned all stakeholders, including Russia, the European Union and the US. Arguably, China may encounter major pressure and its image as a "peace-loving" state may be challenged if it blocked the adoption of sanctions.⁸³¹

⁸³⁰ Taylor M. Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Co-operation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes* (Princeton University Press 2008) 46.

⁸³¹ Liu Shengxiang, Li Mingyue and Dai Weihua, '从中国的联合国投票看中国的朝鲜半岛政策

In contrast, China's opposition in relation to sanctions against the local government of Sudan was a safe policy. Excluding its own bilateral efforts, the US encouraged China's use of bilateral influence on Bashir. China's variables could be also observed: First, China's own bilateral influence on the local government of Sudan could confidently persuade the Bashir administration's adherence to the Security Council resolution. Second, China's political endeavour was supported by regional stakeholders, which kept political settlement of conflict as a possible option. The AU persuaded Bashir to accept UNAMID, which diminished the necessity for sanctions.

Hypothesis 4 is not only confirmed in the case of Syria but also in the cases of Burma and Zimbabwe. When reviewing China's vetoes on Syria, Burma and Zimbabwe, it can be seen that China did not cast a veto independently due to a desire to avoid being isolated. US influence was also weakened when Russia supported China's objections.

Typically, China's vetoes presented its positions on the issue of interference in the internal affairs of states and the imposition of sanctions. According to Fisher and Ury's terminology, "substance" and "relationship" are two kinds of interests considered by every negotiator.⁸³² It can be noted that China's primary substantive interest in situations of conflict is stability. In this context, the political environment in conflict states may undergo minimum political change in order to protect a sustainable development of China's overseas interest. In this regard, it assumes that China would endorse proposals in the Security Council when it believes the proposals will not seriously undermine stability.

However, China may agree with sanctions when there is a broad belief that doing so is legitimate. Given another more recent case, the argument appears to be useful in explaining China's position. In the case of Libya, China voted in favour of Resolution 1970 imposing sanctions, including travel and financial restrictions against Qaddafi.⁸³³ It was reasonable to assume that as there were no clear alternative options,

[China's Policy towards Korean peninsula: A View from China's Voting Record at the UN]’ (2013) 6 Socialism Studies 141-146.

⁸³² Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes* (Random House 2012) 167.

⁸³³ UN Security Council Resolution 1970, S/RES/1970, 26 February 2011, p. 2.

China preferred multilateral coercion to restore order.⁸³⁴ In addition, a desire to secure China's energy interests may be another possible reason for the support.⁸³⁵ In Libya, Beijing's tactical position on the establishment of a "no-fly" zone was judged as indicating a higher tolerance for Chapter VII measures.⁸³⁶

Indeed, China's veto in the case of Syria maybe explained as an attempt to use power to protect its position on internal affairs and its growing material interests. Moreover, China's veto on Syria demonstrated a tentative foreign policy reform. On the one hand, as one of five countries guaranteed veto powers by the UN Charter, China has an incentive to explore an expansion of the UN structures, such as endorsing the Action Group for Syria. On the other hand, China's rise is challenging the existing core diplomatic policy of "Keeping a Low Profile".

With regard to long-term Chinese intentions, policies adopted in relation to East Timor, Darfur, and Syria may therefore be interpreted as indicators of future Chinese diplomatic strategy in relation to underdeveloped countries, as it tries to secure vital interests (such as energy resources and markets). One factor that brought China closer to countries suffering from conflict and internal strife was the fact that those countries could provide a location for Chinese investment free from Western competition and strategic advantages, including energy resources. Meanwhile, combined with China's stated policy of non-interference in domestic affairs, the Chinese government has always been subject to accusations of inconsistency. As the International Crisis Group observed, China's behaviour has enabled the regimes in such states to resist demands from the international community to end conflict or stop human rights abuse.⁸³⁷

In order to shield these countries from international criticism, China struggles to balance its short-term resource requirements with its image as a responsible power. In

⁸³⁴ There was no regional stakeholder engaging in external mediation. Instead, the twenty-two-member Arab League supported the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya. See, UN Security Council Verbatim Record at the 6498th Meeting, S/PV. 6498, 17 March 2011, p. 10.

⁸³⁵ The resolution imposed on Qaddafi and several other senior officials, referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court, and imposed a blanket arms embargo. Those sanctions did not cover Libya's oil industry. By contrast, the proposed Syrian resolutions imposed sanctions against the oil industry.

⁸³⁶ Erica S. Downs, 'New Interest Groups in Chinese Foreign Policy' (*Brooking Institution*, 13 April 2011) < <http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2011/04/13-china-companies-downs> > accessed 1 December 2013.

⁸³⁷ *China's Thirst For Oil: Asia Report 153* (International Crisis Group, 9 June 2008) 21.

this regard, China not only promotes political solutions in conflict resolution but also plays a more constructive role in UN peacekeeping operations. For instance, China became a significant factor in the political endeavour to find solutions to the crises in Sudan and Myanmar.⁸³⁸ By December 2014, China also became the largest contributor of peacekeepers to UN peacekeeping operations among the five Permanent Members of the Security Council.⁸³⁹

While China entrusts its energy security in fragile regimes, the non-intervention principle is less helpful in securing these interests over the long term.⁸⁴⁰ For instance, the escalation of the Darfur conflict not only jeopardised China's investments in Sudan, but also threatened its investments in Chad.⁸⁴¹ In this regard, this shifting approach reflects the leadership questioning the merit of the "going out" strategy by considering human and political costs.⁸⁴²

In fact, this tentative shift has not been based on complete consensus among Chinese political scholars. While seeking to become a positive actor in multinational processes, in light of international pressure and security threats, conservatives oppose pressuring Sudan or imposing sanctions on Iran, citing traditional principles of Third World solidarity and non-interference as a justification.⁸⁴³ With regard to China's current policy, it appears to seek a more constructive diplomatic posture, pursuing energy benefits in the context of a balance of political and economic interests.

⁸³⁸ Trevor Houser and Roy Levy, 'Energy Security and China's UN Diplomacy' (2008) 4/3 *China Security* 69-70.

⁸³⁹ 'Peacekeeping Contributions as of December 2014' (*UN Peacekeeping Website*) < <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpkp/contributors> > accessed 18 March 2015.

⁸⁴⁰ Non-interference may have been useful to it in signing initial energy deals. However, political crisis and conflict lead to defaults on loans and investments and threaten equitable access to oil. See, Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, 'China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs?' (2008) 82 *Foreign Affairs* 38-39.

⁸⁴¹ In conflict countries, threats to Chinese citizens are growing, as seen in attacks and kidnappings in Ethiopia and the Niger Delta, as well as Sudan, and in anti-Chinese demonstrations in Zambia. In September 2006, during the presidential election, as the candidate Michael Sata ran on an anti-Chinese platform the Chinese ambassador threatened to cut diplomatic relations if Sata won the election, which was the first time that China had attempted to influence the outcome of an African election. When he lost the election there were anti-Chinese riots in the capital. In the Copperbelt, a city in the north of the country, there have been riots strikes and kidnapping of Chinese management. See, Report from Warri, 'Gunmen In Nigeria Kidnap Five Foreigners' *Lodi News-Essential* (California, 16 June 2007) 34; Padraig Carmody, *The New Scramble for Africa* (Polity Press 2011) 73.

⁸⁴² Trevor Houser, 'The Roots of Chinese Oil Investment Overseas' (2008) 5 *Asia Policy* 144.

⁸⁴³ *China's Thirst For Oil*, Asia Report no. 153 (International Crisis Group, 9 June 2008) 22.

6. Enhancing China's Peacekeeping Contributions: Legal and Political Challenges

The above case study illustrates that China has always been consistent in its rhetorical support for the principle of non-intervention in international relations. However, the emerging concept of the R2P in the international system continues to challenge the traditional primacy of state sovereignty.⁸⁴⁴ In this regard, the question regarding the sustainability of China's stance on non-intervention has been at the forefront of policy debates by Chinese scholars in recent years.⁸⁴⁵ In explaining the reason for the Chinese static interpretation of sovereignty, international scholars were willing to conclude that China's conservative policy towards intervention is due to the effect of historical grievances.⁸⁴⁶ For instance, as early as 1977, Suzanne Ogden stated that the factors relating to historical background and self-interest needed to be taken into account when analysing and determining Chinese behaviour on intervention and sovereignty.⁸⁴⁷ In 2015, Samuel Kim, in his research regarding China's early involvement with the UN, stressed the significant role of sovereignty as a "legal shield".⁸⁴⁸ However, in recent years, as the concept of R2P has prioritised humanitarian protection in international relations, China's traditional commitment to non-intervention faced great pressures. Barry Buzan, professor of international relations at London School of Economics, challenged the possibility of China's

⁸⁴⁴ Edward C Luck, 'Sovereignty, Choice, and the Responsibility to Protect' (2009) 1/1 Global Issue 10-21.

⁸⁴⁵ Chu Shulong, 'China, Asia and Issues of Sovereignty and Intervention' (2001) 2/1 Pugwash Occasional Papers 1-8; Mathieu Duchatel, Oliver Brauner, and Zhou Hang, *Protecting China's Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift Away from Non-interference* (SIPRI Policy Paper No. 41, June 2014); Ye Zicheng, '中国的大国外交心态 [China's Great Power Politics]' (2002) 1 Pacific Journal 62-66; Wang Zaibang, '论创造性坚持韬光养晦、有所作为 [A New Norm of Keeping a Low Profile and Striving for Achievements]' (2010) S1 Modern Foreign Relations 48-53; Liu Tiewa, 'China and Responsibility to Protect: Maintenance and Changes of Its Policy for Intervention' (2012) 25/1 The Pacific Review 153-173; Zhong Yingpan, 'China's Non-Intervention Question' (2009) 1/2 Global Responsibility to Protect 237-252.

⁸⁴⁶ Ann Kent, 'China and the International Human Rights Regime: A Case Study of Multilateral Monitoring, 1989-1994' (1995) 17/1 Human Rights Quarterly 1-2; Jonathan E Davis, 'From Ideology to Pragmatism: China's Position on Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era' (2011) 44/2 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 220; Alison A Kaufman, 'The Century of Humiliation and China's National Narratives' (10 March 2011) Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission 4.

⁸⁴⁷ Suzanne Ogden, 'The Approach of the Chinese Communists to the Study of International Law, State Sovereignty and the International System' (1977) 70 China Quarterly 335-56.

⁸⁴⁸ Samuel Kim, *China, The United Nations and World Order* (Princeton University Press, 2015) 414-415.

peaceful rise within contemporary international society.⁸⁴⁹ It seems fair to suggest that Chinese and international scholars have a different understanding on the necessity to protect state sovereignty when encountering what is perceived to be a serious human rights violation.⁸⁵⁰

In addition, Western scholars question whether the Chinese experts have overstated the consistency of the Chinese position on non-intervention, such as the opposition to exercising coercive measures in peacekeeping.⁸⁵¹ Also, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon has encouraged China to participate in peacekeeping missions, which are mandated by a broader concept of sovereignty based on the humanitarian protection perspective.⁸⁵² As Gill and Huang observed, China's participation in peace operations in sensitive areas such as Sudan and the Congo helps to temper the host governments' suspicions that the missions are really Western-led military intervention.⁸⁵³

In contrast to its advocacy of peacekeeping with traditional mandates, China's stance in regard to those more robust and complex peacekeeping mandates endorsing Chapter VII of the UN Charter⁸⁵⁴ has undergone a moderately positive change. After dispatching combat troops to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), the consistency of China's policy on the principle of non-intervention was critical.⁸⁵⁵ As Craig Murray noted, there was a suspicion that China's dispatch of combat troops might be contested as interfering in other countries' internal affairs.⁸⁵⁶

⁸⁴⁹ Barry Buzan, 'China in International Society: Is Peaceful Rise Possible?' (2010) 3 *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 5-36.

⁸⁵⁰ Discussing how the concept of sovereignty influences peacekeeping missions. See, Alex J Bellamy and Paul D Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (2nd edn, Polity, 2010) 13-41.

⁸⁵¹ Mu Ren, 'China's Non-intervention Policy Meets International Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era' (2014) 13 *Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies* 127-9.

⁸⁵² UN Readouts, 'Readout of Secretary-General's Meeting with the Chinese Leadership' (*UN Website*, 19 June 2013) <<http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=2869>> accessed 26 March 2015.

⁸⁵³ Cited from Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, *China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping* (SIPRI 25 November 2009) 27.

⁸⁵⁴ UN Security Council 'Traditional Peacekeeping's Transformation into More Robust, Complex Operations Focus of Discussion in Fourth Committee' (17 October 2003) Press Release GA/SPD/267.

⁸⁵⁵ Rosemary Foot, "Doing Some Things" in Xi Jinping Era: the United Nations as China's Venue of Choice' (2014) 90/5 *International Affairs* 1085-1100.

⁸⁵⁶ Craig Murray, 'China to Deploy "Security Force" to UN Peacekeeping Operation in Mali' (9 June 2013) US-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2; Jianwei Wang, 'China's Evolving Attitudes and Approaches toward UN Collective Security' in G John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi, and Zhu Feng (eds) *America, China, and the Struggle for World Order* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 118.

This chapter presents an assessment of the limitations associated with China's peacekeeping contributions and offers recommendations for how Chinese engagement in future peacekeeping operations could be shaped.

6.1 China's Role in Peacekeeping: Expanding or Not?

China's actions in regard to recent crises indicate that it has not always reached consensus on its long-standing commitment to non-intervention. As Yan Xuetong observed in 2011, "a few years ago, almost no Chinese scholar challenged the principle of non-intervention, of infringing on the sovereignty of other nations. Recently there are more and more debates on this issue".⁸⁵⁷ In this connection, as exemplified in the case of Libya, China sending military forces to Libya for an evacuation implied a break from the principle of "Keeping a Low Profile".⁸⁵⁸ In this regard, as intervention is inevitable to pursuing the responsible power image, Chinese decision-makers should formulate an alternative policy instead of its traditional principle of non-intervention.⁸⁵⁹

6.1.1 Dispatching Combat Troops to South Sudan and Mali

In the past, Chinese peacekeepers were police experts in forensic and criminal investigation fields, and those peacekeepers were deployed to fulfil the following tasks; logistical support, engineering and medical support.⁸⁶⁰ Since 2000, China intended to develop a more constructive engagement with peacekeeping operations. In 2006, China made its first attempt to deploy a peacekeeping contingent comprising combat troops to the UN mission in Lebanon.⁸⁶¹ However, as explained by the Chinese spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China's failure to adopt the decision of the deployment was due to an unclear mandate, which was authorised by the Security Council with respect to the use of force.⁸⁶²

⁸⁵⁷ Yan Xuetong, 'How Assertive Should a Great Power Be?' *New York Times*, (New York, 31 March 2011)5.

⁸⁵⁸ Gabe Collins and Andrew S Erickson, 'Implications of China's Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya' (2011) XI/4 China Brief 9-10.

⁸⁵⁹ Tiu Tiewa, 'China and Responsibility to Protect: Maintenance and Change of Its Policy for Intervention' (2012) 25/1 The Pacific Review 153-154.

⁸⁶⁰ Dong Song, 'Understanding Chinese Peacekeeping Force' *People's Daily (Overseas)* (Beijing, 15 February 2003) 3.

⁸⁶¹ Bernardo Mariani, 'China's Role in UN Peacekeeping Operations' in Carla P Freeman (ed), *Handbook on China and Developing Countries* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015) 260.

⁸⁶² Cheng Guangjin, 'Chinese Combat Troops Can Be Part of UN Peacekeeping' *China Daily* (Beijing, 7 July 2010) 1.

According to Senior Colonel Tao Xiangyang, as the deputy director of the ministry's peacekeeping affairs office, it may be possible for China to dispatch infantry battalions overseas if three pre-conditions are met. These are a request from the UN, information as to the real situation in the destination country or region, and the ability of the Chinese military.⁸⁶³ In this regard, on 25 September 2014, a spokesman of the Ministry of National Defence, Senior Colonel Geng Yansheng announced that the PLA decided to send a 700-strong infantry battalion to undertake peacekeeping in South Sudan in accordance with the invitation of the UN.⁸⁶⁴ The Chinese government, nevertheless, emphasised that the deployment was made under the official invitation of the UN and was also based on Security Council Resolution 2155.⁸⁶⁵

In fact, China encountered criticism resulting from its first deployment of combat troops in Mali. In January 2014, China dispatched 170 infantry personnel to serve in the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali.⁸⁶⁶ The first overseas deployment of Chinese troops, with light weapons, posed a certain degree of risk of Chinese economic hegemony and military intervention, which contrasted with its consistent non-intervention policy.⁸⁶⁷ A report issued in Heidelberg accused China of expanding its presence in Africa to secure access to natural resources, subsidize Chinese firms and exports, cement and enlarge political alliances and pursue economic hegemony.⁸⁶⁸ However, China sought to weaken the negative response prompted by its apparent deployment of combat troops. For instance, Liu Zhao, professor in the Peacekeeping

⁸⁶³ Interview with Senior Colonel Tao Xiangyang on 20 December 2012.

⁸⁶⁴ In February 2015, the first contingent comprising 144 troops arrived in South Sudan and 520 more Chinese soldiers will be deployed in the near future. According to Geng Yansheng, the mandate of this contingent was to protect civilians, UN employees and humanitarian workers, and to perform patrol and security duties. See, Xu Lin, '中国军队决定派步兵营赴南苏丹维和 [China Decided to Deploy Infantry Battalion to South Sudan]' *The PLA Daily* (Beijing, 26 September 2014) 3; William Davison, 'China Deploys Troops in South Sudan to Aid UN Peacekeeping' (*Blooming Business*, 2 March 2015) < <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-02/china-deploys-troops-in-south-sudan-to-aid-un-peacekeeping> > accessed 20 June 2015.

⁸⁶⁵ Zhang Yuan, '中国决定派步兵营赴南苏丹执行任务 [China Decided to Dispatch Combat Troops to UN Mission in South Sudan]' (*Xinhua News*, 25 September 2014) < http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-09/25/c_1112630377.htm > accessed 6 November 2014.

⁸⁶⁶ Qu Bo, '中国将向马里派出维和部队 [China Is Offering Peacekeepers to Mali]' (*China News*, 27 June 2013) < <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0627/c70731-21997307.html> > accessed 16 November 2014.

⁸⁶⁷ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Daniel Trombly, and Nathaniel Barr, *China's Post-2014 Role in Afghanistan* (FDD Press, 2014) 8.

⁸⁶⁸ Austin M. Strange and Bradley Parks, *Tracking Under-Reported Financial Flows: China's Development Finance and the Aid-Conflict Nexus Revisited: Discussion Paper No. 533* (University of Heidelberg, January 2014) 3.

Centre of the Ministry of National Defence, argued that the Chinese peacekeeping force to Mali, which aims to provide security for the Eastern headquarters of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), should be described as “protective units” rather than combat troops.⁸⁶⁹

Similar criticisms have also been made of the deployment in the recent case of South Sudan, although China announced that this was endorsed by both the UN and the local government. For instance, Nicholas Bariyo, senior journalist of the *Wall Street Journal*, has pointed out that Beijing’s efforts were to ensure the safety of its workers and assets in Africa and to guarantee a steady input of energy for the domestic market.⁸⁷⁰ However, Zhukov, an expert at the Africa Research Institute of the Russia Academy of Social Science, called Chinese military action in Sudan an “unprecedented deployment”, but refused to admit this action was a consequence of the Chinese expansion. Zhukov argued that China would not pursue an aggressive foreign policy like that of the US.⁸⁷¹ Joe Contreras, the acting spokesman for the UNMISS, denied that peacekeepers were protecting industry infrastructure in South Sudan, and added, “nowhere in the current mandate and mission does it say that peacekeepers will be asked to defend oil industry installations. When circumstances arise [...] our peacekeepers will be called upon to protect civilian oil industry workers but not the refinery or pipeline or storage tanks.”⁸⁷² Pragmatically, this was still a strategic choice for China to protect its vast investments and to bring peace to the Sudanese people without considering distinctions between politics and business.

Perhaps China’s remarkable contributions to Mali and Sudan are an indication of China’s growing confidence and ambitions. The author would like to note at this point that China has proposed to protect its economic interests in conflict areas, and the

⁸⁶⁹ Lv Desheng and Pang Qingjie, ‘安全部队远赴马里，中国展现大国担当 [China Deployed Protective Unit to Mali That Demonstrated the Image of Responsible Power]’ *PLA Daily* (Beijing, 5 December 2013) 1.

⁸⁷⁰ Nicholas Bariyo, ‘China Deploys Troops in South Sudan to Defend Oil Fields, Workers’ (*The Wall Street Journal*, 9 September 2014) < <http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-deploys-troops-in-south-sudan-to-defend-oil-fields-workers-1410275041> > accessed 6 November 2014.


⁸⁷¹ ‘中国派士兵保护自己在南苏丹的能源利益 [China Deployed Militant to Protect Its Energy Profile in South Sudan]’ (*Voice of Russia*, 11 September 2014) < http://radiovr.com.cn/2014_09_11/277157299/ > accessed 16 November 2014.

⁸⁷² Dean Yates, ‘U.N. Says China Not Yet Deploying Peacekeepers In South Sudan’ (*Reuters*, 10 September 2014) < <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/10/uk-china-sudan-idUKKBN0H502U20140910> > accessed 16 November 2014.

debates between China and the West have also highlighted the conceptual gap between the Western and the Eastern understanding of peace-building.

First, with regard to the vast oil fields of South Sudan, in 2011, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) holds an approximate 40 percent stake in a joint venture with an Indian national petroleum company.⁸⁷³ The CNPC also has 1600 kilometres of export pipeline that carries crude through neighbouring Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.⁸⁷⁴ According to the statistics of the US Energy Information Administration, in 2013 crude oil exports from Sudan and South Sudan to China together accounted for 86 percent of Sudan's and South Sudan's total exports.⁸⁷⁵

Chart 6.1 Sudan and South Sudan's Crude Oil Exports, 2013



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=SU>.

As indicated in Chart 6.1, China is therefore the leading export destination for crude oil from Sudan and South Sudan. Because of civil conflict, South Sudan's production was partially shut down. At the end of 2013 its crude exports accounted for 2 percent of China's total crude oil imports, down from 5 percent in 2011.⁸⁷⁶ Likewise, in the case of Libya, China evacuated nearly forty thousand workers and experts after the overthrow of the Gadaffi regime, which resulted in the loss of thirty-three billion US

⁸⁷³ U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), *Country Analysis Brief: Sudan and South Sudan* (EIA Report, 3 September 2014) 6.

⁸⁷⁴ Jill Shankleman, 'Oil and State Building in South Sudan' (2011) 282 US Institute of Peace Special Report 5.

⁸⁷⁵ U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), *Country Analysis Brief: Sudan and South Sudan* (EIA Report, 3 September 2014) 11.

⁸⁷⁶ Ibid. pp. 6-11.

Dollars of investment.⁸⁷⁷ It is presumed that China's blue helmet troops to South Sudan were a preventative measure in order to stop history repeating itself.

Second, with regard to the concept of peace-building, China and the Western world possess different ideological perspectives. The UN specified the role of peacekeeping missions, which mainly included supervision of cease-fires, maintaining local peace and security, facilitating national reconciliation and dialogues, bringing an end to armed conflicts, combatants' demobilization, repatriation, a return to society, legal construction, reconstruction of administrative agencies, organizing and supervising elections, protecting civilians, assurance of human rights, and cracking down on violent crimes.⁸⁷⁸ From a Western perspective, categories relating to the reconstruction of national institutions, elections and good governance are considered the primary tasks in peace-building, for example, the setting up legal aid centres and courts, police training schools and good governance offices.⁸⁷⁹

When Chinese peacekeepers take part in the peace-building mission in South Sudan, they normally focus on different duties than peacekeepers from the West. For instance, Liu Ruijiang, commander of the Chinese peacekeeping forces to South Sudan, stated that one duty of the Chinese peacekeepers is to help local people cultivate lands and to train them how to grow vegetables, which is different from troops in other countries focusing on military patrols.⁸⁸⁰ The Chinese peace-building style, however, follows the principle of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs and normally attaches importance to the role of economic and social development in promoting peace and security.⁸⁸¹

6.1.2 China's Systematic Stance in relations to Sanctions

Chinese scholars with expertise in international relations and international law have

⁸⁷⁷ ‘中国派士兵保护自己在南苏丹的能源利益 [China Deployed Militant to Protect Its Energy Profile in South Sudan]’ (*Voice of Russia*, 11 September 2014) <http://radiovr.com.cn/2014_09_11/277157299/> accessed 16 November 2014.

⁸⁷⁸ Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, ‘Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations’ (2003) 199-204.

⁸⁷⁹ Zhang Tao, ‘Chinese Peacekeeping Style Focuses on Peace Building’ (PLA Daily Online, 11 October 2014) <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-10/11/content_6174960.htm> accessed 16 November 2014.

⁸⁸⁰ Zhao Tao, ‘Chinese Peacekeeping Forces in South Sudan’ (*PLA Daily*, 11 October 2014) 2.

⁸⁸¹ Cao Xin, ‘Whether China Will Deploy Combat Troops to UN Peacekeeping Operations’ (*Southern Weekend*, 26 November 2009) B11.

continuously posed the question of whether outside forces, such as individual states, *ad hoc* coalitions of states or international organisations should legally be allowed to intervene in conflicts (both internal conflicts and conflicts between different states) under the guise of humanitarian intervention.⁸⁸² However, given no official disclosure, the international community is reluctant to formulate a comprehensive and systematic understanding of the Chinese position towards intervention. Nevertheless, from Chinese practice at the UN, it may be concluded that China does not support interventions that contain coercive features or robust economic sanctions. From the US scholars' perspective, China's policy on intervention is based on preventing the creation of a precedent that might result in outside intervention in China's own internal affairs.⁸⁸³ In 1999, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan responding to Kofi Annan's initiative on redefining the concept of state sovereignty, arguing that "sovereign equality, mutual respect for State sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of others are the basic principles governing international relations today [...] if the notion of 'might is right' should prevail, a new gunboat policy would wreak havoc".⁸⁸⁴

In contrast with Tang's words, China's recent behaviour at the UN demonstrates a drift away from a strict non-intervention principle. It deployed military troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, thus unveiling a more positive policy. On 25 November 2014, Wang Min, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, provided the first detailed Chinese position on sanctions. He proposed three themes in order to enhance the sanctions mechanism: First, maintaining the pre-eminence of the Charter of the UN over sanctions. The Security Council should strictly comply with the provisions

⁸⁸² Zhu Shilong and Liu Xuanyou, '中国外交不干涉内政原则探究 [Study on the Principle of Non-intervention in Chinese Diplomacy]' (2009) 8 Teaching and Research 39-43; Wang Yizhou, '发展适应新时代要求的不干涉内政学说 [Developing the Doctrine of Non-intervention based on the Requirements of the New Era]' (2013) 1 Journal of International Security Studies 4-18; Li Bojun, '全球治理：中国不干涉政策与国际法 [International Governance: China's Non-intervention Policy and the International Law]' (2014) 9 Pacific Journal 1-11; Zhang Zhongxiang, '试析中国对非洲外交中的不干涉内政原则 [Study on the Principle of Non-intervention in China's African Diplomacy]' (2010) 1 West Asia and Africa 11-16; Pan Yaling, '从捍卫式倡导到参与式倡导—试析中国互不干涉内政外交的新发展 [The Development of China's Non-intervention Principle: From the Protecting to Participating Initiative]' (2012) 9 World Economics and Politics 45-57.

⁸⁸³ US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *China's View of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control* (Verbatim Record of the Hearing, 27 February 2008) 6.

⁸⁸⁴ 'Tang Jiaxuan's Speech at Fifty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly' (*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 22 September 1999) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t4387.shtml> accessed 10 December 2013.

of the UN Charter and adopt a prudent and responsible policy on the question of imposing sanctions. Sanctions should not be used to pursue “power politics”. Second, political settlement should be the first concern, prior to the imposition of sanctions. In other words, sanctions should only be considered after other non-coercive measures have been exhausted. Indeed, the Security Council should adhere to the overall pattern of pursuing peaceful political settlement, and sanctions should not interfere with such efforts. Third, China considers the existing sanctions implementation system ineffective. Since imposing sanctions is a power conferred on the Security Council by the UN Charter, Member States should maintain and respect the dominant position of the Council. In this regard, China recommends that the UN should endeavour to reduce the negative impact of sanctions on civilians and on other states.⁸⁸⁵

Compared to China’s hesitant participation in peacekeeping during the 1990s, it has adopted a moderate position on the imposition of sanctions in recent cases.⁸⁸⁶ However, the paradox of protecting sovereignty in principle but accepting intervention in practice has generated a dilemma in Chinese foreign relations. Two major cases in the 1990s – Kosovo and East Timor, exemplify the contradictory Chinese position on multilateral humanitarian intervention.⁸⁸⁷ These cases also exhibit substantially differing views between China and the US regarding coercive intervention. Yet, China’s growing interest in pursuing the image of a responsible power has encouraged it to make more compromises relating to the imposition of sanctions.⁸⁸⁸ Therefore, policy modification is necessary in protecting China’s reputation among the international community.

6.1.3 From the “Responsibility to Protect” to “Responsible Protection”

While undergoing significant normative transformations regarding sovereignty in the international system, countries, such as China, which maintain the state’s absolute

⁸⁸⁵ UN Security Council Verbatim Record at 7323rd Meeting, S/PV. 7323, 25 November 2014, p. 14.

⁸⁸⁶ Wang Yizhou, ‘发展适应新时代要求的不干涉内政学说 [Developing the Doctrine of Non-intervention based on the Requirements of the New Era]’ (2013) 1 Journal of International Security Studies 4-6.

⁸⁸⁷ China’s policy toward Kosovo and East Timor in respect to the use of force was presented in Chapter 3 and 5.

⁸⁸⁸ Pan Yaling, ‘从捍卫式倡导到参与式倡导—试析中国互不干涉内政外交的新发展 [The Development of China’s Non-intervention Principle: From the Protecting to Participating Initiative]’ (2012) 9 World Economics and Politics 45-46.

jurisdiction over internal affairs, has faced challenges.⁸⁸⁹ In addition, the emergence of the R2P concept interprets state sovereignty as responsibility and emphasised the increasing importance of the rule of law and democratic values.⁸⁹⁰ Since the mid-1990s, as influenced by globalisation, Chinese scholars began to realise the difficulty of advocating an absolute principle of state sovereignty in the context of human rights protection.⁸⁹¹ Practically, China is under pressure from some regional organisations. Member States in these organisations have gradually softened their original understanding of sovereignty and intervention. For instance, the AU has shifted its stance from non-intervention to what is referred to as the “non-indifference” doctrine.⁸⁹² Recently, the League of the Arab States requested international intervention in both Libya and Syria.⁸⁹³ In this regard, Chinese scholars, such as Yan Xuetong and Wang Yizhou, both suggested that China should adapt its foreign policy by taking the concept of intervention more into consideration.⁸⁹⁴

In fact, growing criticism of China’s non-intervention principle is challenging the country’s image as a responsible power. In recent years, both the media and public intellectuals have called for Chinese participation in intervention, which indicates a discrepancy between decision makers and local populations regarding China’s

⁸⁸⁹ Yang Zewei, ‘国际社会的民主和法治价值保护性干预 [Democracy and the Rule of Law in International Societies and Protective Intervention]’ (2012) 5 Science of Law 41-43.

⁸⁹⁰ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Report of the International Commission on International Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2011) 11-16.

⁸⁹¹ Liu Bo, ‘国际人权保障机制中“保护的责任”研究 [Studies on the Responsibility to Protect in the International Human Rights Protection Mechanism]’ (2011) 4 Journal of International Relations 40-47; He Zhipeng, ‘国际法视野中的人权与主权 [Human Rights and State Sovereignty in the Context of International Law]’ (2009) 1 International Law Review of Wuhan University 130-167; Allen Carlson, ‘Moving Beyond Sovereignty? A Brief Consideration of Recent Changes in China’s Approach to International Order and the Emergence of the *Tianxia* Concept’ (2011) 20/68 Journal of Contemporary China 81-82.

⁸⁹² Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union stipulates the right of the Union, in certain cases, to intervene in a Member State and for the right of a Member State to request such intervention. “(h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes genocide and crimes against humanity; and (j) the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security”. For detailed information, see, Ben Kioko, ‘The Right of Intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act’ (2003) 85/852 International Review of the Red Cross 808, 819.

⁸⁹³ Caitlin Alyce Buckley, ‘Learning From Libya, Acting in Syria’ (2012) 5/2 Journal of Strategic Security 86.

⁸⁹⁴ Yan Xuetong is the leading scholar who contributes to acceptance of the concept of intervention in international politics. He stated that in the coming decade, the international norms of intervention and non-interference will be likely to co-exist. See, Yan Xuetong, ‘How Assertive Should a Great Power Be?’ *International Herald Tribune* (New York, 1 April 2011) 2; Wang Yizhou, ‘发展适应新时代要求的不干涉内政学说 [Developing the Doctrine of Non-intervention based on the Requirements of the New Era]’ (2013) 1 Journal of International Security Studies 4-18.

position on non-intervention.⁸⁹⁵ In response to this, China has endorsed the concept of R2P and has dedicated to play a constructive role in the normative development of the concept. As SIPRI observed, in contrast to many expectations, China did not “play any kind of spoiling role in the discussion leading up to the World Summit debate which embraced R2P in 2005”.⁸⁹⁶ In 2006, China voted in favour of the Security Council Resolution 1674 regarding the case of Somalia which reaffirmed R2P in the context of the protection of civilians in armed conflict from serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.⁸⁹⁷ Its support for the resolution demonstrated that China could accept the Security Council imposing sanctions on a failed state. Practically, while developing a prudent approach to R2P, China seeks to establish conditions for its support of intervention and consequently contradicts its consistent policy of non-intervention.

First of all, China values the role of regional organisations, such as the UN, the AU, and the Arab League in the maintenance of international peace and security. As exemplified in the Libyan case, China supported Security Council resolutions in 1970 and 1973, which imposed an arms embargo and a “no-fly” zone over Libya by stating that China attached great importance to the position of the 22-member Arab League on the crisis in Libya.⁸⁹⁸ Second, peaceful solutions are prioritised over military action. The crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan was an important test of China’s position on R2P. With regard to a strict adherence to non-interference, China’s inactive policy toward imposing sanctions caused a significant loss of international reputation.⁸⁹⁹ In response, China persuaded Sudan to accept UN-led peace operations by using its political influence in the region and subsequently contributed peacekeepers to the UN mission.⁹⁰⁰ Regarding China’s position on Darfur, Yuan Wu observed that R2P sets

⁸⁹⁵ Wang Yizhou, ‘创造性介入：中国全球角色之生成 [Creative Involvement: The Evolution of China’s Global Role]’ (Peking University Press 2013) 77-84, 98; Jiang Lei and Wang Haijun, ‘An Analysis on the Variance Attached Political Condition in the Current Foreign Aid’ (2011) 19/7 Pacific Journal 59.

⁸⁹⁶ Gareth Evans, ‘Responding to Atrocities: The New Geopolitics of Intervention’ in *SIPRI Year Book 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (OUP 2012) 30.

⁸⁹⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1674, S/RES/1674, 28 April 2006, p. 1.

⁸⁹⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1970, S/RES/1970, 26 February 2011, p. 2; UN Security Council Resolution 1973, S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011, p. 2-3; UN Security Council Resolution 6498, S/PV. 6498, 17 March 2011, p. 10.

⁸⁹⁹ Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano, ‘Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) 25/204 International Relations 214.

⁹⁰⁰ Wang Shuming, ‘保护的责任和中国的选择 [China’s Choice on the Responsibility to Protect]’ (2014) 16/6 International Forum 39-40.

limitations on military intervention and provides space for a peaceful solution, which is therefore in line with China's diplomatic strategy.⁹⁰¹ Third, China insists on the principles of international law and basic regulation in international relations. During the 2005 UN summit, China actively participated in the deliberations, which reaffirmed the Security Council's exclusive right to authorise the use of force.⁹⁰² This modification has nevertheless ensured China's veto power on any R2P-based resolution.⁹⁰³ In addition, China believes that the support for R2P is because the concept offers a form of constitutional legality governing humanitarian intervention. For instance, Chinese researchers demonstrated an antagonistic attitude towards the 2001 R2P report that was released by the Canada-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).⁹⁰⁴ This report attempts to justify Western intervention under the cover of humanitarian considerations.⁹⁰⁵

Whereas Western governments assert the intervention in Libya as a successful practice of R2P, Chinese academics regard it as a dangerous signal to opposition groups in other countries.⁹⁰⁶ In this regard, the fallout from the Libyan case explains the reason for China's resistance to the Syrian-related resolutions.⁹⁰⁷ In order to avoid the abuse of R2P, Chinese scholars proposed a new concept – “responsible protection” to make civilian protection intervention more accountable and proportionate.⁹⁰⁸ Whether the government should embrace this concept is still a matter under

⁹⁰¹ Yuan Wu, ‘试论中国在非洲内部冲突处理中的作用 [On China's Role in Dealing with Africa's Internal Conflicts]’ (2008) 10 West Asia and Africa 59-60.

⁹⁰² Li Souping, ‘保护的责任与现代国际法秩序 [The Responsibility to Protect and the Modern International Legal Order]’ (2006) 24/3 Tribune of Political Science and Law 101.

⁹⁰³ Andrew Garwood-Gowers, ‘China and the Responsibility to Protect: The Implications of the Libyan Intervention’ (2012) 2/2 Asian Journal of International Law 376-78.

⁹⁰⁴ Cheng Xiaoxia, ‘干涉与国际干预 [Interference versus International Intervention]’ (2002) 5 Jurists' Review 60-61.

⁹⁰⁵ Report of the ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect* (2001) 16-19.

⁹⁰⁶ Cheng Weidong, ‘对利比亚使用武力的合法性分析 [Analysis of the Legitimacy of the Use of Force Against Libya]’ (2011) 3 Chinese Journal of European Studies 24-26.

⁹⁰⁷ Yang Yonghong, ‘从利比亚到叙利亚—保护的责任走到尽头了？ [From Libya to Syria: The End of R2P?]’ (2012) 3 Forum of World Economics and Politics 69-81.

⁹⁰⁸ Ruan Zongze proposed four pillars given support to the concept of the responsible protection. There are: a) civilians are subjects to be protected; b) legitimate government and the Security Council has exclusive determining right to intervene; c) protection should only be implemented after exhausting political solutions; d) the goal of protection is to diminish humanitarian disaster. See, Ruan Zongze, ‘负责任的保护：建立更安全的世界 [The Responsible Protection: Building a Safer World]’ (2012) 3 International Studies 21; Chen Zheng, ‘建设性介入与负责任的保护 [Constructive Intervention and the Responsible Protection]’ in Su Changhe (ed), *Fudan International Studies Review* (Shanghai People's Press, 2013) 218-242.

discussion among academics, such as Ruan Zongze and Chen Zheng.⁹⁰⁹

6.2 Impediments to Chinese Participation in UN Peacekeeping

As Chinese peacekeeping forces co-operate with multinational forces in unsafe environments addressing complex and challenging mandates, challenges arise for China in its efforts to build a better international reputation.⁹¹⁰

6.2.1 Language Proficiency

English, as an international working language, is widely used during peacekeeping missions. However, Chinese peacekeepers' English language skills are generally deficient, even in daily usage.⁹¹¹ In the composition of China's peacekeeping contingents, each contingent includes at least one interpreter. Practically, an interpreter is likely to be an assistant to the contingent commander, which means troops or civilian police have difficulty receiving interpretation assistance.⁹¹² Although the UN praised China's troop performance and their ability to carry out specific assignments, it also reported that due to language barriers Chinese peacekeepers refrain from interaction with other peacekeeping contingents or with local individuals.⁹¹³

In response to these challenges, China appears to be placing greater emphasis on language training. In the Langfang and Huairou peacekeeping training centres English courses are mandatory.⁹¹⁴ However, given the limited time for pre-deployment training, the time scale provided is insufficient to improve language skills

⁹⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁹¹⁰ Courtney J Richardson, 'A Responsible Power? China and the UN Peacekeeping Regime' (2011) 18/3 International Peacekeeping 286-297; Bates Gill, and James Reilly, 'Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping' (2000) 42/3 Survival 50-59; Gao Xinman and Wang Honghai, '维和警察教育面临的挑战 [Challenges to Civilian Police Education]' (2012) 4 Police Education 25-28.

⁹¹¹ Dai Manchun, '国家语言能力、语言规划与国家安全 [Capabilities of National Linguistics and National Security]' (2011) 4 Applied Linguistics 129.

⁹¹² Cai Lin, '维和医疗分队联络官工作内容 [Duties of Liaison Officers in Peacekeeping Medical Team]' (2013) 10 Medical Journal of National Defending Forces in Southwest China 1135-1136.

⁹¹³ Chin-Hao Huang, 'Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: The People's Republic of China (Part 7: Capabilities and Caveats)' (*Providing for Peacekeeping*, September 2013) <<http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-china/>> accessed 30 June 2014.

⁹¹⁴ Qu Zhiwen, '维和警察培训要着眼于联合国维和任务区需要 [Peacekeeping Police Training Should Fulfil the Requirements of UN Peacekeeping Missions]' (2006) 1 Journal of Chinese People's Armed Police Force Academy 45-46.

significantly. In this regard, the author suggests that China needs to devise a training system involving regular exchanges with foreign peacekeepers that will help Chinese peacekeepers to practice English in a native language environment.

6.2.2 More Efficient Decision-Making Structure

The political environment is an important factor in shaping decisions. When analysing China's views of peacekeeping, attention must be paid to explaining how the domestic environment affects China's decision-making process. As a hierarchical country, senior leaders in Beijing usually make core decisions on peacekeeping.⁹¹⁵ In this regard, three organs work together to oversee China's peacekeeping operations, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Public Security. After receiving a UN request to contribute to a peacekeeping force, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will research the issue and then make a recommendation regarding the level, type and duration of the deployment to the State Council and the Central Military Commission.⁹¹⁶ The State Council will then subsequently consult with the Central Military Commission before adopting the ultimate decision. Such consultation normally includes the composition of peacekeepers and the force scale. In fact, the State Council is the final organ authorising peacekeeping deployment, although it usually approves the Central Military Commission's command of the actual peacekeeping missions.⁹¹⁷ As China's top military organ, the Central Military Commission selects peacekeepers from both the seven military regions and the Central Military Commission itself.⁹¹⁸


⁹¹⁵ Fanie Herman, 'The Role and Influence of Chinese Bureaucrats towards Peacekeeping Decision Making in the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)' (2014) 2/2 International Journal of Multidisciplinary Academic Research 10.

⁹¹⁶ The State Council is the chief administrative authority of China. The Central Military Commission is the highest state military institution with responsibility for commanding the entire armed forces in P.R. China. Both of these organs are authorised to exercise the right of national defence in pursuit of Article 89 and 93 of the Chinese Constitution. See Ma Ling, '论国务院和中央军委的国防权 [Study on the State Council and the Central Military Commission's Right on National Defence]' in GeHongyi (ed), 法律方法与法律思维 [Legal Methodology and Legal Thinking] (Legal Press, 2012) 128-139.

⁹¹⁷ Chin-Hao Huang, 'Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: The People's Republic of China (Part 2: Decision-making)' (*Providing for Peacekeeping*, September 2013) < <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-china/> > accessed 30 June 2014.

⁹¹⁸ The seven military regions are: Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chendu. See A'Yuan, '大军区机构的发展演变 [The Development of China's Military Regions]' (2007) 4 Extensive Collection of the Party History 33-34.

Figure 6.2.2 The Decision-Making Process of Chinese Peacekeeping Operations⁹¹⁹



Since 2000, the Ministry of Public Security has participated in the command system regarding riot police and civilian police deployment. It is responsible for the selection of police officers to participate in the peacekeeping missions.⁹²⁰ The mandate must also be approved by the Central Military Commission (Figure 6.2.2).

In order to support an effective decision-making system in peacekeeping, the Peacekeeping Affairs Office was established in 2001 under the Chinese Ministry of Defence to direct the PLA's participation in all UN peacekeeping operations.⁹²¹ In this regard, two offices, namely office A and B, were set up both at Beijing, the capital city of China, and at the UN (Table 6.2). Office A is directly instructed by the Central Military Commission. The office encompasses a range of responsibilities, such as selecting peacekeepers, peacekeeping courses and the arrangement and monitoring of peacekeeping development. Office B serves with the permanent Chinese mission at the UN headquarters in New York. These officers are in charge of collecting information on peacekeeping for Chinese decision makers in Beijing.

⁹¹⁹ Besides seven military regions, the Central Military Commission also conducts contributions to UN peacekeeping operations occasionally. The author therefore defined eight military regions in the figure.

⁹²⁰ Wang Wenshuo, ‘中国维和警察十年记 [Ten Years Anniversary of Chinese Peacekeeping Police]’ *China Police Daily* (Beijing, 16 January 2010) 3.

⁹²¹ Bate Gill and Chi-Hao Huang, ‘China’s Expanding Presence in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Implications for the United States’ in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (eds), *Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than War* (Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2009) 102.

Table 6.2 Management Structure for Chinese Peacekeeping Operations-Military Personnel*

	LOCATION	TEAM LEADER	NUMBER OF OFFICERS	DUTIES
Office A	Within the Territory of China-Beijing (Capital).	Senior Colonel-under PLA's General commander.	4-5 staffs.	1. Selecting and dispatching peacekeepers; 2. Monitoring peacekeeping development; 3. Communicating with relevant branches and offices both inside and outside China.
Office B	Based at the UN in New York.	China's military representative to the UN and co-operated with Ministry of Foreign Affairs.	Not specified.	

* Source: China's National Defence Official Website: <http://www.mod.gov.cn/reports/>.

In fact, a lack of effective decision-making means that it takes significant time for an order to be made.⁹²² After submitting its approval, the PLA General Staff has to obtain the agreement of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission. The bureaucratic system in China functions at a sclerotic pace and often impedes Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping.⁹²³ Thus, it is necessary to establish an office dedicated to peacekeeping affairs, under the bureau of international organisations in the MFA, for the purpose of developing and coordinating peacekeeping policy, and managing communication between the relevant government bodies as well as between Beijing and the permanent mission to the UN in New York.

6.2.3 Inadequate Peacekeeping-Related Personnel Exchange and Co-operation

China should also reflect on its marginalisation from peacekeeping institutions. For instance, as Brahimi observed, due largely to inadequate language capabilities and professional skills there was no Chinese representative on the international panel of experts on UN peace operations.⁹²⁴ Moreover, in terms of UN organisations, none of the headquarters of the seventeen UN specialised agencies are located on Chinese territory. These collectively constitute an obstacle to Chinese engagement with UN peacekeeping operations.

From the author's point of view, co-operation with peacekeeping-related programmes

⁹²² Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, *China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping* (SIPRI Policy Paper No. 25, 2009) 35.

⁹²³ Bates Gill and James Reilly, 'Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing' (2000) 3/42 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Survival* 51.

⁹²⁴ Cited from Romano Prodi, 'Forward' in Andrea de Guttry, Emanuele Sommariva, and Lijiang Zhu (eds), *China's and Italy's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Lexington Books, 2014) xvii.

could be focused in two fields: openness and exchanges with other peacekeeping forces; and utilising two UN peacekeeping operation training schools to help train Chinese peacekeepers. Over the past two decades, China has enhanced its military-to-military exchanges internationally. In addition, China has strengthened its military relationships with its neighbouring countries. For instance, it conducts multi-dimensional military exchanges with the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea – North Korea), the ROK (Republic of Korea – South Korea), Japan, Pakistan and India.⁹²⁵ Meanwhile, China engages in friendly exchanges with the militaries of ASEAN countries, and promotes military exchanges with developed countries like Australia and New Zealand.⁹²⁶ In addition, China continues to consolidate traditional friendly relations with Central and Eastern European countries, and increase practical exchanges with Western European countries while exploring ways in which to develop military ties with NATO and the EU.⁹²⁷

In contrast with its existing achievements, China must positively encourage greater co-operation with leading peacekeeping contributor states, such as India, Poland, Bangladesh, Austria, Canada, and Australia.⁹²⁸ In 2000, China and Britain co-hosted a seminar in Beijing discussing the future reform and co-operation in peacekeeping.⁹²⁹ In summary, enhancing regional and international co-operation and the sharing of expertise on peacekeeping training for police, combat troops and non-combat troops, including language training should be long-term objectives for China.

6.2.4 Deficiencies in the Existing Legal Framework Applicable to Chinese Peacekeepers

Whether international treaties can be directly applied in China is debatable.⁹³⁰ Given

⁹²⁵ *China's National Defence in 2010* (White Paper), available at Internet: <http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-03/31/content_4249942.htm> accessed 10 November 2012.

⁹²⁶ Ibid.

⁹²⁷ Ibid.

⁹²⁸ *China's National Defence (White Paper)*, Available on the Ministry of National Defence Website, <http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-03/31/content_4249942.htm>, accessed 19 March 2013.

⁹²⁹ *China's National Defence (White Paper)*, Section XIII International Security Co-operation, Available on the Ministry of National Defence Website, <http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-03/31/content_4249942.htm>, accessed 19 March 2013.

⁹³⁰ Chen Haifeng, Zhou Weiguo, and Jiang Hao, ‘国际条约与国内法的关系及中国的实践 [Relations between International Treaties and Domestic Law and the Chinese Practice]’ (2000) 2 Tribune of Political Science and Law 117-123; Chen Weidong, ‘条约入宪基本问题研究 [Studies on Fundamental Issues Regarding Verifying Treaties by Constitution]’ (2012) 3 Journal of Beijing Institute of

no clear regulation in the *Constitutional Law of the People's Republic of China*, legal experts hold two contradictory opinions. First, international treaties are not constitutionally integrated into the Chinese legal system.⁹³¹ The second position, also held by the author, states that those international treaties that have been ratified by the Chinese government can be treated as a source of Chinese domestic law.⁹³² Factually, the ratification of international treaties is a legal activity of the state. Article 58 of the *Chinese Constitutional Law* (1982) provides that “The National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee exercise the legislative power of the state”.⁹³³ Article 67 explains in detail the proceedings required for exercising the legislative power that includes “decid[-ing] on the ratification and abrogation of treaties and important agreements concluded with foreign states”. This concern is also exemplified by Article 7 of the *Law of the People's Republic of China on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties*, which constitutes (1) treaties of friendship and co-operation, treaties of peace and similar treaties of a political nature; (2) treaties and agreements relating to territory and delimitation of boundary lines; (3) treaties and agreements relating to judicial assistance and extradition; (4) treaties and agreements which contain stipulations inconsistent with the laws of the People’s Republic of China; (5) treaties and agreements which are subject to ratification as agreed by the contracting parties; and (6) other treaties and agreements subject to ratification.⁹³⁴

In the area of military law, Article 67 of the Act on National Defence (1997) provides that “China observes the relevant treaties and agreements concluded with foreign countries or acceded to, or accepted in its foreign military relations”.⁹³⁵ Despite the non-state status of the UN, the Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), which was concluded between the Chinese government and the UN in 2008, still has legally binding force to China.⁹³⁶ In this regard, Chinese peacekeeping activities are regulated

Technology 123-131; Song Jianli, ‘国际条约国内适用若干问题 [The Application of International Treaties in Domestic Jurisdiction]’ (2015) 5 People’s Judicature 51-55.

⁹³¹ Wan E’xiang, *国际条约法 [Law of the International Treaties]* (Wuhan University Press 1998) 192.

⁹³² Chen Hanfeng and Zhou Weiguo, ‘国际条约与国内法的关系及中国实践 [Chinese Practices on the Relations between International Treaties and Domestic Law]’ (2000) 2 Tribune of Political Science and Law 117-123.

⁹³³ Article 58 of the Constitutional Law of China.

⁹³⁴ Article 7 of the Law on the Procedure of Conclusion of Treaties; See, Zeng Lingliang, ‘论我国缔结条约程序法的完善 [Suggestions for the Law on the Procedure of Conclusion of Treaties]’ (2014) 9 Political Science and Law 2-9.

⁹³⁵ Article 67 of the Act on National Defence.

⁹³⁶ The Memorandums of Understanding, based on UN Doc. A/RES/62/225, 21 February 2008, p. 7.

by both domestic and international law, including those MOUs between China and the UN.

However, the number of Chinese general laws and regulations referring to Chinese peacekeeping troops or civil police are very limited.

6.2.4.1 Peacekeeping Troops

On 22 March 2012, the Central Military Commission adopted the tentative *Regulation on Participation of the People's Liberation Army in UN Peacekeeping Operations*. As the first military regulation, it contains seven chapters and thirty-seven articles and aims to regulate the participation of Chinese troops participating in UN peacekeeping operations.⁹³⁷ This regulation stipulates that China's participation in UN peacekeeping is endorsed by UN resolutions and by the agreements between China and the UN. In addition, Chinese peacekeepers are selected from professional soldiers and are subsequently deployed to particular countries or areas under the UN's control.⁹³⁸ However, the provisions of the tentative regulation have not yet been made public. Apart from the special regulation regarding Chinese peacekeeping troops, no provisions in general laws have been explicitly applied to Chinese peacekeeping activities. However, in respect to the national identity of Chinese peacekeeping personnel, several articles, as indicated below, are presumed to be applicable based on the personal jurisdiction provided by the general laws and regulations.

Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defence (1997) provides the implied legal authorisation for China to deploy its military forces abroad. Article 8 stipulates that “The People’s Republic of China maintains world peace and fights against any activities of aggression and expansion in foreign military relations”;⁹³⁹ in addition, Article 66 declares that “China supports the international community in its military-related actions taken for the benefit of safeguarding the world and regional peace, security and stability, and supports it in its efforts for arms control and

⁹³⁷ The Regulation covers the following aspects: education and training of peacekeepers, disciplines, type of weapons, uniforms, responsibilities, and allowance for peacekeepers.

⁹³⁸ Li Yun, ‘胡锦涛签署命令发布施行中国人民解放军参加联合国维持和平行动条例（试行）[President Hu Jintao has signed to establish the Regulation on Participation of People's Liberation Army in UN Peacekeeping Operations (Tentative)]’ (*Xinhua News*, 22 March 2012) < http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-03/22/c_111691498.htm > accessed 20 November 2014.

⁹³⁹ Article 8 of the Law on National Defence.

disarmament".⁹⁴⁰ Moreover, Article 65 is perceived as a guideline for foreign military relations and the conduct of military exchange and co-operation.⁹⁴¹ It stipulates, "China adheres to the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful coexistence, independently handles foreign military relations and conducts military exchange and co-operation".⁹⁴² This law also includes regulations regarding the rights and obligations of military personnel. Articles 56-58 in Chapter X are related to these duties.⁹⁴³ According to Lv Desheng, Head of the Peacekeeping Office, the Law on National Defence is considered the legal basis upon which the Chinese peacekeepers join UN peacekeeping operations, together with the UN Charter and the relevant UN mandates on peacekeeping.⁹⁴⁴

The *Law of the People's Republic of China on Military Officers in Active Service* (1988) is another law that provides disciplinary sanctions against those military officers on active service who violate military restraints.⁹⁴⁵ This law provides definitions of the different roles of military officers, focusing on the different fields of operational officers, political officers, logistical officers, armaments officers, and specialised technical officers.⁹⁴⁶ Historically, the behaviour of military officers was

⁹⁴⁰ Article 66 of the Law on National Defence.

⁹⁴¹ Zhu Yangming, '国防法立法实践与理论研究 [Practical and Theoretical Studies on National Defence Legislation]' (1995) 5 *Jurists' Review* 17-23.

⁹⁴² Article 65 of the Law on National Defence.

⁹⁴³ Article 56 declares that "the military personnel in active service must pledge allegiance to the motherland, perform the duties, bravely fight, be not afraid of sacrifice, and defend the security, honour and interest of the motherland". Article 57 provides that "the military personnel in active service must, in an exemplary way, observe the Constitution and laws, observe military regulations, execute the orders, and strictly observe the disciplines". Article 58 regulates that "the military personnel in active service shall carry forward fine traditions of the PLA, love the people, protect the people, actively participate in the construction of socialist material and spiritual civilisations, and accomplish the tasks such as emergency rescue and disaster relief".

⁹⁴⁴ Lv Desheng's words cited from Zhu Lijiang, 'The Legal Framework Applicable to National Personnel Deployed in UN Peacekeeping Operations: The Chinese Experience' in Adndrea de Guttry, Emanuele Sommarrio, and Lijiang Zhu (eds), *China's and Italy's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Lexington Books 2014) 287.

⁹⁴⁵ This law was first adopted by the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress in its third Session on 5 September 1988. To date, it has undergone revision twice, on 12 May 1994 and 28 December 2008 respectively. Sanctions imposed on military officers comprise disciplinary warning, serious disciplinary warning, recording of a demerit, recording of a serious demerit, demotion to a lower post, dismissal from post, and discharge from the military service. If one's behaviour constitutes criminal offence, the officer will be a subject to investigation for criminal responsibility according to military law.

⁹⁴⁶ Article 2 of the *Law of the People's Republic of China on Military Officers in Active Service*.

controlled by the communist party in Maoist China (1920), which was called “三大纪律八项注意 [Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention]”.⁹⁴⁷ Recently, these have been redefined by the Central Military Commission with different contents that fit the emerging situation and the development of the Chinese military. On 15 June 2010, *Regulations on Disciplines of the People's Liberation Army* came into force. Article 3 emphasises that every soldier in the PLA should 1) execute the guidelines and policy of the Communist Party of China; 2) abide by the national constitution, laws, and regulations; 3) strictly follow orders from superiors; 4) observe the acts, rules, and regulations of the PLA; 5) be consistent with the ‘Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention’.⁹⁴⁸

6.2.4.2 Peacekeeping Civil Police and Riot Police

With respect to Chinese civilian police, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security has adopted the *Tentative Regulation on Managing Peacekeeping Civilian Police in Mission Areas of the People's Republic of China* (2006). As there is no official disclosure of the regulation, the provisions cannot be entirely accessed. However, Qu and Ning’s articles provided a glance to the tentative regulation. Senior Colonel Qu Zhiwei, Director of the Department of Peacekeeping Training Centre, concluded sixteen disciplinary codes for the Chinese peacekeeping civilian police pursuant to the regulation.⁹⁴⁹ Ning Dewen, professor of the Armed Police Academy, cited Article 3 of the regulation, which provides that “the Chinese civilian police, in carrying out a task in the mission area, should be faithful to the Communist Party of China, to the nation, to the people, and the law. The police should also observe orders and commands; should firmly safeguard state sovereignty and protect national dignity, and should create and maintain reputations of the Chinese peacekeeping civilian police”.⁹⁵⁰ When taking an overview of the regulation, Zhang Huiyu, expert in peacekeeping policy

⁹⁴⁷ Three Main Rules: 1. Obey orders in all exercising actions; 2. Do not take a single needle or piece of thread for the masses; 3. Turn in everything captured. Eight Points for Attention: 1. Speak politely; 2. Fair payment for purchased products; 3. Return everything borrowed; 4. Pay for anything you damage; 5. Do not hit or swear at people; 6. Do not damage corps; 7. Do not take liberties with women; 8. Do not torture captives.

⁹⁴⁸ Article 3 of the Regulations on Disciplines of the People's Liberation Army.

⁹⁴⁹ Qu Zhiwen, ‘论中国维和民警在联合国任务区的行为准则 [The Code of Conduct for the Chinese Peacekeeping Civilian Police in UN Mission Areas]’ 6/18 Journal of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force Academy 34.

⁹⁵⁰ Ning Dewen, ‘讲政治是对中国维和民事警察的基本要求 [Upholding Politics with Chinese Characteristics Is A Fundamental Requirement for the Chinese Peacekeeping Civilian Police]’ 2/18 Journal of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force Academy 46.

research, maintained that the principle of “loves his (her) country” has been treated as a core element in China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations.⁹⁵¹ In addition, excluding rules regarding self-discipline, the fourth and fifth code of conduct can be seen as the domestic interpretation of international law and the principle of peacekeeping.⁹⁵² The fourth rule is to enforce duties independently, which is equivalent to the impartiality principle regarding UN peacekeeping. It stipulates that peacekeepers are 1) strictly coherent with the UN legal procedure; 2) only follow the commands and orders from the UN; 3) do not act under the control of any government or authority except the UN; 4) do not seek political asylum; and 5) avoid taking part in any political activity outside the UN. The fifth rule is to respect human rights, which contains four subsidiary rules, namely, 1) to respect the human rights of all persons in the mission area; 2) not to violate human rights in the course of law enforcement; 3) to support vulnerable groups including the old, the sick, and the disabled; 4) to undertake proper measures whilst detecting human right violations.⁹⁵³

The Law on People's Police of the People's Republic of China (1995) is partly applicable to the Chinese civilian police on peacekeeping operations, although no express provision refers to UN peacekeeping.⁹⁵⁴ Article 1 of the law stipulates that “domestic civilian police deployment” is the regulative object of the law.⁹⁵⁵ This law also provides that its purpose “is to safeguard State security, maintain public order, protect the lawful rights and interests of citizens, strengthen the building of the contingent of the people’s police, strictly administer the police, enhance the quality of the people’s police, ensure the people’s police’s exercise their functions and powers according to law, and ensure the smooth progress of reform, opening up and the

⁹⁵¹ Zhang Huiyu, ‘中国参与联合国维和述评 [Analysis of China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping]’ (2009) 2 Contemporary International Relations 52.

⁹⁵² The code of conduct includes: 1) love his country; 2) to abide by acts and regulations; 3) to commit to purposes of the UN; 4) to enforce duties independently; 5) to respect human rights; 6) to respect domestic laws and customs of the host nation; 7) to respect citizens of the host nation; 8) be polite to courteous reception; 9) be fair in investigation; 10) be honest; 11) to act as a trained diplomat; 12) to avoid the abuse of power; 13) never become an alcoholic and drug user; 14) to protect women and children; 15) to maintain the confidentiality of the UN; 16) to protect assets and environment of the host state.

⁹⁵³ Qu Zhiwen, ‘论中国维和民警在联合国任务区的行为准则 [The Code of Conduct for the Chinese Peacekeeping Civilian Police in UN Mission Areas]’ 6/18 Journal of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force Academy 35-36.

⁹⁵⁴ This law has been amended by the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress in its twenty-ninth session on 26 October 2012.

⁹⁵⁵ Interview with Jiang Bo, cited from ‘Debate on the Law on the People’s Police’ (1995) 2 Public Security Studies 1.

socialist modernisation drive”.⁹⁵⁶ This law contains eight chapters, which stipulate the duties and disciplinary code of the people’s police and subsequently regulates the punishment of police officers who violate this code.⁹⁵⁷ On 21 April 2010, the Ministry of Public Security, together with the Ministry of Supervision, and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, promulgated the *Ordinance on Disciplines for the People’s Police of the Public Security Organs*.⁹⁵⁸ This was the first regulation at ministry level comprising disciplinary codes and penalties. The law aims to codify the disciplinary code for public security organs, regularise the acts of the people’s police by public security organs and guarantee the lawful fulfilment of duties by the public security organs and the people’s police.⁹⁵⁹ However, this ordinance is only applicable to the Chinese police and the public security organs domestically, thus lacking application to deployments abroad.

In addition, the armed police force⁹⁶⁰ is an independent police force directed both by the Central Military of China and the Ministry of Public Security with light weapons to execute the security protection missions assigned by the state.⁹⁶¹ As they are likely to play a less coercive role than uniformed troops, China has contributed armed police to serve UN peacekeeping missions since 2000.⁹⁶² On 27 August 2009, the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress in its tenth session adopted the *Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Armed Police Force*.⁹⁶³ In contrast to the situation pertaining with regard to the military, armed police are regulated as an integral part of the country’s military forces, and are under the leadership of the State Council and the Central Military Commission, adopting a

⁹⁵⁶ Article 6 of the Law on People’s Police.

⁹⁵⁷ Preamble of the Law on People’s Police; ‘警察法的界定与地位 [Status and Definition of the Law on People’s Police]’ (2007) 5 Journal of Chinese People’s Public Security University 34-39.

⁹⁵⁸ The ordinance was entered into force on 10 June 2010 based on the Order of the Ministry of Supervision, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and the Ministry of Public Security (No. 20).

⁹⁵⁹ Article 1 of the Ordinance on Disciplines for the People’s Police of the Public Security Organs.

⁹⁶⁰ The origin of the People’s Armed Police can be traced back to the People’s Liberation Army, which was responsible for both defending the nation from foreign invasions and internal security. See, David Shambaugh, *Modernising China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (University of California Press 2004) 170; Liu Mingtao, ‘人民武装警察部队双重领导体制探源 [Research on the Origin of Double-leadership of the Armed Police Force]’ (2014) 2 Military History Research 42-50.

⁹⁶¹ Article 2 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Armed Police Force.

⁹⁶² Liu Qiuling, ‘Strategic Analysis on the PLA’s Military Operations Other Than War’ (2014) 537 Army Bimonthly 56.

⁹⁶³ The law was adopted by Order No. 17 of the President of P.R. China. Li Youbiao, ‘人民武装警察法评析 [Review on the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Armed Police Force]’ (2010) 1 Journal of Chinese Armed Police Force Academy 38-40.

system of combined unified leadership and hierarchical command in accordance with Article 3.⁹⁶⁴ With respect to the duties and disciplinary code applicable to armed police, they have similarities with the regulations governing troops and civilian police.

In fact, praise for Chinese peacekeepers partly results from the strict discipline under the Chinese domestic framework.⁹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the fragmentation of the Chinese legal system governing peacekeeping has meant that it has lagged behind the development of Chinese participation. As Wang Xinjian, official of the Central Military Commission recommended, there is a need to refine and amend China's law relating to the participation of troops and police in peacekeeping operations.⁹⁶⁶ In this regard, a more complete legal system would facilitate the further development of Chinese peacekeeping participation.

6.3 Moving Forward: More Accountability

In the 1990s, China remained conservative in supporting peace enforcement missions and was reluctant to participate in such missions when coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter were invoked. Meanwhile, China's embrace of economic development entails creating a stable international context: this is consistent with China's policy of "Keeping a Low Profile".⁹⁶⁷ A flexible interpretation of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security may be commendable, and many African conflicts in the late 1990s, for example Rwanda, required forceful action by the international community rather than restraint.⁹⁶⁸ In this context, China's diplomats have recognised the necessity of imposing legal intervention, including a peacekeeping mission at the Security Council level. For instance, Zhang Yishan, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN argued that UN should intervene in conflict areas "earlier, faster and more forcefully".⁹⁶⁹ The tragic experiences of Haiti, East Timor,

⁹⁶⁴ Li Youbiao, 'Analysis on the Law of People's Armed Police' (2010) 1 Journal of Chinese People's Armed Police Force Academy 36-38.

⁹⁶⁵ In 2013, the Under-Secretary-General Herve Ladsous praised the Chinese peacekeepers as "committed" and "very disciplined". See, Hou Liqiang, 'UN Peacekeeping Chief Praises Chinese Personnel' *China Daily* (Beijing, 17 October 2013) 5.

⁹⁶⁶ Wang Xinjian, '涉外军事行动法律保障问题初步研究 [Studies on Legal Issues of Foreign-related Military Operations]' (2010) 1 Journal of Xi'an Politics Institute of PLA 70-75.

⁹⁶⁷ Yian Xuetong, 'From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement' (2014) 7/2 The Chinese Journal of International Politics 166.

⁹⁶⁸ Saferworld, *China's Growing Role in African Peace and Security* (Saferworld, January 2011) 79.

⁹⁶⁹ Cited from John Hill, 'China Takes on Major Peacekeeping Role' (1 November 2013) Jane's Intelligence Review 1.

Sudan, and Syria exemplify China's policy revision, which indicates that China is moving away from its previous policy of "Keeping a Low Profile".

Since 2010, China's positive participation in UN activities, especially its positive engagement with UN peacekeeping, has made western scholars speculate about this policy revision. Meanwhile, diplomats and scholars are worried about the abandon of China's conservative foreign policy. For instance, in July 2010 the American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggested that China should not abandon the strategy of "Keeping a Low Profile".⁹⁷⁰ John Mearsheimer, a leading scholar of offensive realism argued, "as neighbours fear China's rise, China will receive challenges from those countries. I (Mearsheimer) would suggest Chinese leaders to be cautious and keep a low profile".⁹⁷¹ In fact, As Yan Xuetong observed, after the ruling of Xi Jinping, China has adopted a more assertive diplomatic policy compared to that of the 1990s.⁹⁷² In this regard, scholars who claim that China should maintain the "Keeping a Low Profile" policy have set theoretical limits for China enhancing its influence in international relations.⁹⁷³

As suggested by Chinese scholars, Chinese decision-makers should focus on improving China's national profile.⁹⁷⁴ This contains four categories, including a) the fundamentals of a political entity (territorial integrity, independent sovereignty, unified nations), b) national power (hard power, soft power, and structural power), c) core strategic elements (strategic resources and key infrastructures), and d) international reputation and dignity.⁹⁷⁵ It is noteworthy that foreign policy with

⁹⁷⁰ Hillary Clinton, *Hard Choices: A Memoir* (Simon & Schuster, 2015) 42.

⁹⁷¹ Yan Xuetong and John Mearsheimer, 'Can China Rise Peacefully?' (*Veritas*, 29 November 2013) <<http://news.ifeng.com/exclusive/lecture/special/yanxuetong/>> accessed 20 May 2014.

⁹⁷² Yan Xuetong, 'From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement' (2014) 7/2 *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 153-154.

⁹⁷³ Wang Yizhou, '发展适应新时代要求的不干涉内政学说 [Developing the Non-intervention Doctrine in the Context of the International Relations: Sino-African Relations as a Case Study]' (2013) 1 *Journal of International Security Studies* 4-18.

⁹⁷⁴ Gu Xuewu, '结构实力的猜想: 逻辑与命题 [A Conjecture of Structural Power: Logic and Proposition]' (2013) 2 *Journal of Tongji University* 28-36; Wang Yizhou, '发展适应新时代要求的不干涉内政学说 [Developing the Non-intervention Doctrine in the Context of the International Relations: Sino-African Relations as a Case Study]' (2013) 1 *Journal of International Security Studies* 4-18; Pan Yaling, '从捍卫式倡导到参与式倡导—试析中国互不干涉内政外交的新发展 [The Development of China's Non-intervention Principle: From the Protecting to Participating Initiative]' (2012) 9 *World Economics and Politics* 45-57.

⁹⁷⁵ The term "structural power" is a conjecture that is proposed by Gu Xuewu, professor of political science in University of Bonn. Gu in his article entitled 'A Conjecture of Structural Power: Logic and

respect to those four tasks regarding the promotion of national profile should be revised in pursuance of China's rejuvenation. During the period of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1990), the primary focus of the country was the development of the economy and the adherence to the "Keeping a Low Profile" was consequently essential.⁹⁷⁶ However, recent developments point to this policy coming to an end. As the favourable international environment for economic development did not assist China in building a noticeably better global image, the author suggests "strategic accountability" as the key in shaping a better environment for China's rejuvenation. The norm of "strategic accountability" requires China taking more responsibility to the maintenance of international peace and security. In this regard, the deployment of contingents comprising combat troop to the UN mission in Mali and South Sudan was a positive attempt for the Chinese decision-makers, despite numerous critics on China's expanding role in peacekeeping.

In fact, China's recent stance in relation to intervention provides an insight into its intentions in establishing further strategic credibility. In the case of the Syrian armed conflict, for example, China not only emphasised the need for a political solution to international conflicts, but also presented its attempt to become an international mediator.⁹⁷⁷ In 2011, before the Syrian case was brought to the Security Council, China made efforts to persuade all Syrian parties to resolve their differences through dialogue and negotiation.⁹⁷⁸ In addition, the repeated vetoing of certain proposals is a symbolic sign for China that, in the future, it will become more active in affairs regarding international security. This practice reflects the Chinese emphasis on UN

Proposition' introduced the concept of "structural power" in the field of international political science, which developed from the theory of Susan Strange (1988). Gu intended to engage an analysis on the power of nation by using the concept of "structural power" instead of using hard (soft) power. He also proposed the concept to explain the phenomenon of "paradox of unrealised power" – the great power in the world could be defeated by the weak. For detail explanation of the "paradox of unrealised power", see David A Baldwin, 'Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies' (1979) 31/2 World Politics 164; Gu Xuewu, '结构实力的猜想：逻辑与命题 [A Conjecture of Structural Power: Logic and Proposition]' (2013) 2 Journal of Tongji University 28-36.

⁹⁷⁶ This research would not go this way. For detailed argument, see, Yian Xuetong, 'From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement' (2014) 7/2 The Chinese Journal of International Politics 153-184.

⁹⁷⁷ Okon Eminue, and Monday Dickson, 'The UN Resolutions on Syria: Exploration of Motivation from Russia and China' (2013) 10 International Affairs and Global Strategy 5-13.

⁹⁷⁸ Hong Lei, 'Spokesman of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hong Lei Holds the Regular Press Conference' (*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 9 June 2011) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t829229.shtml> accessed 15 December 2013.

principles when solving international disputes. It could be predicted that China is conducting a political experiment in Syria for its international reconciliation policy within the UN framework. According to Simmon Shen, China, as a responsible power, will have the responsibility to mediate in other international conflicts and realise broader national benefits in the way of peaceful development.⁹⁷⁹

⁹⁷⁹ Simon Shen, 'No Longer Keeping a Low Profile: Changing in Diplomacy in China's Involvement in Syria' *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong, 13 July 2012) A4.

7. Conclusion

Since Xi Jinping came into power in 2013, China's growth in both military and economic power has undoubtedly had a positive impact in its international influence. On the other hand, as China is now more engaged in international affairs, the super powers, such as the US, are anxious about the rise of China, which may threaten their historic sphere of influence, especially in the Middle East. For instance, Christina Lin observed that China has used both economic (China's engagement with various infrastructure projects in the Middle East and Africa) and political tools (China has used its veto power to shield sanctions from countries accused of human rights violations, such as Syria) to enhance its influence.⁹⁸⁰ In order to overcome the challenge of the "China threat" theory, the term "responsible power" has been proposed by the Xi administration, which is intended to reduce the hostile response of other states. At the Security Council, China's positive engagement with UN peacekeeping operations was pivotal in the creation of a responsible power image. In some cases, for example over Sudan, China has taken the lead at the Security Council in calling for political endeavour and the deployment of peacekeeping missions. These policies demonstrate China's willingness to take on larger responsibilities as part of the international community's response to conflict regions. It is submitted that China's endeavour to establish an image as a "responsible power" in the context of international relations is consistent with its goal of "peaceful rise".

However, in regards to peacekeeping, China's position on the legitimacy of the use of force to protect the human rights of civilians was flexible. In some cases, such as East Timor and Haiti, China's support for missions that use force to deal with humanitarian crises illustrates that it facilitates the implementation of the principle of R2P. In this context, China's consistent policy of non-intervention was critical. It is noteworthy that debates both within China, and between China and international scholars, focus on what constitutes a legitimate intervention. This study has approached the question of whether the principle of non-intervention in respect of UN interventions has been modified by the Chinese decision-makers with regard to China's rise. The research presented here provides a detailed study of a range of issues by conducting a thorough

⁹⁸⁰ Christina Lin, 'China's Strategic Shift toward the Region of the Four Seas: The Middle Kingdom Arrives in the Middle East' (2013) 17/1 Middle East Review of International Affairs 33-34.

examination of China's policy with regard to peacekeeping, including the evolving approach in terms of the use of force, policy changes in relation to territorial claims, the relationship between China's peaceful rise while adopting the policy of "Keeping a Low Profile" and the policy on energy security.

The ultimate conclusion is reached that in order to pursue the image of a "responsible power" in the Xi administration, China should formulate an assertive foreign policy in relation to its engagement with the UN, including policy towards UN interventions. In this regard, China, as a positive contributor to peace operations, is consistent with its power-seeking behaviour. However, when the Chinese decision-makers intended to revise the consistency of its traditional non-intervention policy in international relations, there was a policy conflict between two Chinese ideologies for development, namely "Keeping a Low Profile" and "Striving for Achievement" (the latter policy promotes China playing a more positive role in international affairs)⁹⁸¹. In order to overcome the tension between these two policies, China's policy toward UN interventions has undergone a revision.⁹⁸² This, in turn, raises serious concerns regarding China's policy that may be challenged with regard to its non-intervention pledge.

In fact, the Chinese perspectives on UN peacekeeping operations, which generally reflect its position on multilateral intervention and state sovereignty, should be understood within the broader context of the evolving post-Cold War international order. As illustrated in Chapter 2, China has assumed the role of a guardian of both state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. This is a situation reflected not only in several of China's national position papers to the UN,⁹⁸³ but also in its statement on certain situations before in the Security Council.⁹⁸⁴ However, after

⁹⁸¹ Xu Jin, '中国外交进入奋发有为新常态 [China's Diplomacy Entered Into A New Stage: Striving for Achievement]' (2014) 10 International Strategy Programme 1-2.

⁹⁸² John Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions' (1995) 19/3 International Security 34.

⁹⁸³ Liang Heng, 'The Chinese Delegation at the Third Committee of the 70th General Assembly' (*Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN*, 3 November 2015) <<http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1311670.htm>> accessed 15 November 2015; Wang Yi, 'China's Position Paper at the Security Council Open Debate on Maintaining International Peace and Security' (*Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN*, 23 February 2015) <<http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1240751.htm>> accessed 15 November 2015.

⁹⁸⁴ UN Security Council, 'UN Peacekeeping Not Always as Fast, Effective as Required in Responding to Conflict, Secretary-General Tells Security Council' (20 November 2015) Press Release SC/12130;

examining China's voting behaviour in respect to Security Council resolutions invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is apparent that the understanding of what non-interference means to in China's foreign policy community is not static but in a state of flux. This is due to normative developments in the international system (Chapter 6.4), particularly the concept of R2P regarding human rights protection, in which the international community has a growing expectation that Chinese military should play a more active role than it currently elects to do. In addition, there is a growing feeling that it should diversify its roles.

As illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4, China had almost no formal interaction with the UN in the 1970s, but its engagement with the UN underwent a positive change in the 1980s and 1990s after the Deng administration formulated a range of policies pursuing economic development. In this regard, China began a policy of tentative cooperation with the UN and its affiliated institutions. However, those interactions were mostly limited to the economic field. In 1992, China's first contribution to the UN mission in Cambodia was charged with maintaining peace and stability during the civil conflict between the Khmer Rough and the Sihanouk government. Although China's support for the UNTAC mission may be understood as an attempt to strengthen its policy of "peripheral diplomacy" that seeks to create a favourable image in Southeast Asia,⁹⁸⁵ this support demonstrates its active contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.

Since the mid-1990s, under the administration of Hu Jintao, the Chinese government has gradually accepted the concept of "soft power" in international relations and decided to open debates behind it.⁹⁸⁶ After the ruling of Xi Jinping, China's foreign policy has undergone significant revision, and it evolved from the principle of "Keeping a Low Profile" to "Striving for Achievement", which requires that China

UN Security Council, 'Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Myanmar, Owing to Negative Votes by China, Russian Federation' (12 January 2007) Press Release SC/8939.

⁹⁸⁵ Miwa Hirono, 'China's Charm Offensive and Peacekeeping: The Lessons of Cambodia – What Now for Sudan?' (2011) 18/3 International Peacekeeping 328-329.

⁹⁸⁶ In 2006, Hu Jintao explained that the significance for China increasing its soft power is to enhance its cultural influence in international relations. Also Wang Huining observed that enhancing China's soft power in international relations plays an important role in the orientation of the Chinese cultural development. Wang Huning, '作为国家实力的文化：软权力 [Culture as National Power: Soft Power]' (1993) 3 Fudan Journal in Social Science 91-96; Hu Jintao, 'Hu Jintao's Speech on the Eighth National Congress of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles' *People's Daily* (Beijing, 10 November 2006) 1.

undertake more international responsibilities. However, as exemplified in China's voting behaviour regarding UN interventions at the Security Council, the principle of non-intervention has been maintained as a consistent policy in China's international relations. In this regard, there is a contradiction in Chinese foreign policy between the principle of non-intervention and the "responsible power" image.

The research therefore selected four case studies that examined China's evolving approach to UN interventions. The policy change is based on its primary concerns in international relations, such as energy needs and enhancing national influence in the international community. First, China contributed civilian police to UN peacekeeping in East Timor (this was the first mission to which China contributed civilian police demonstrating China's growing role in peacekeeping. Also with respect to China's energy strategy, China's contribution attempted to enhance its influence on certain states, such as East Timor, Sudan, and Syria, which has rich energy resources); Second, China contributed peacekeepers to the UN mission in Haiti (the first occasion China deployed peacekeepers to a state with diplomatic ties to Taiwan). In order to exemplify China's policy change in respect of its territorial claim over Taiwan, the example of Haiti contrasted with its policy towards Guatemala and Macedonia (where China used its veto to block the adoption of resolutions regarding peacekeeping at the Security Council). Third, the research investigates conditions for approaching a successful political settlement to conflict. In the case of Darfur, China was opposed to the imposition of sanctions against the Sudanese government, instead it encouraged the Sudanese government to comply with UN's political plan and consent to the deployment of a hybrid UN/AU peacekeeping missions within its territory. Fourth, in the case of Syria, China vetoed four draft resolutions, which aimed to impose sanctions against the local Syrian government. The author concluded that China's veto was based on its newly emerged policy of acting as a mediator in conflict regions. It is also noteworthy that energy needs is a significant motivation for China positive engagement with UN activities in respect to the conflict resolution.

In this context, as discussed in chapter 5, various interests such as natural resources, territorial claims, and enhancing its international influence, may contribute to China's emerging goals. However, parallel developments in Chinese policy and the pursuit of national interests have resulted in a number of noticeable conflicts in practice between

the principle of non-intervention and the image of a “responsible power”. In this way, China came with pressure which in turn challenged its responsible power image. In 2008, during Beijing’s hosting of the Olympic Games, the “Genocide Olympics” campaign targeted China’s policy in respect to the case of Darfur and its opposition to the imposition of sanctions.⁹⁸⁷ In addition, China’s successes in terms of economic growth have failed to remove international concern about a possible “China threat”. It is necessary for China to provide normative guidance and an appropriate explanation with regard to its policy initiative to reduce this negative perception.

In the context of Chinese foreign policy, simply supporting or overlooking the non-intervention principle is not an effective solution. A non-intervention based approach to the goal of China’s peaceful rise may partially, at least, address the tension by accommodating the image of a responsible power within international relations. However, the study raises a further question on how the conflict between the establishment of a responsible image and the principle of non-intervention can be resolved. Indeed, one of the key findings delineated in this study is that China should systematically outline its political and judicial responses to the definition of legal intervention. In doing so, China’s consistent policy of “Keeping a Low Profile” should be replaced by the policy of “Striving for Achievement”, which was proposed by Xi Jinping in October 2013 (as discussed in detail in chapter 6).

Nonetheless, accommodating the principle of “Striving for Achievement” within the existing political system is by no means a straightforward issue. In respect of Chinese domestic law, amending any domestic laws is an extremely complex task and unlikely to happen in the near future.⁹⁸⁸ However, the question does not end there. While acknowledging the fact that competition and cooperation exist between China and the US, the need for China to reduce those sharp issues of conflict with the US is vital. In the field of peacekeeping, the role of political efforts has not reached consent between those two countries. The author therefore recommends that China and the US open a political dialogue to encourage mutual understanding. Historically, there has been a

⁹⁸⁷ Helene Cooper, ‘Darfur Collides with Olympics, and China Yields’ *New York Times* (New York, 13 April 2007, 2.

⁹⁸⁸ Wang Haiping, ‘多样化军事任务中推进军事法发展 [To Carry Forward the Development of Military Laws through Diversified Military Missions]’ *Chinese Journal of Social Science* (Beijing, 25 April 2012) B06.

contradiction between China and the US when understanding the principle of international law, especially the context of the principle of non-intervention, which has been challenged by the emerging concept of the protection of civilians and the responsibility to protect. This problem was fundamentally due to the thirty years without communication between those two countries (1949-1979).⁹⁸⁹ As China's rise is no longer a prediction but a fact, China's identity as a great power has challenged the supremacy of the US in the world order.⁹⁹⁰ Since China's identity remains vulnerable, the US normally obstructs China's development in international relations. In this regard, as China and the US have a relationship that was unimaginable in the past century, the two countries should strengthen their co-operation and mutually benefit from a stable security environment.

China's increasing engagement in the UN and other international institutions could have positive effects. China's evolving policy toward UN peacekeeping, including the robust peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII, shows that China's foreign policy is driven by the desire to create the image of a responsible power and to embrace the ideas of mutual responsibility. As Huo Hwei-ling observed, the most important task of Chinese foreign policy is to create an international environment that allows countries with different social systems to co-exist and seek development.⁹⁹¹ On 22 September 2009, Hu Jintao became the first Chinese president to address the General Assembly that systematically presented China's endeavour and anticipation to co-operate with the international community in solving international matters.⁹⁹² In this regard, the UN has been considered as the best organisation for achieving this goal by the Chinese government. On the other hand, from the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 to the twenty-first century, China's position towards international institutions has shifted from an extremely critical to a more cooperative one. For instance, China is not only devoted to making the global architecture work, such as organising the

⁹⁸⁹ For a detail examination on the Sino-US relationship development, see, Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations* (Columbia University 2000); Biwu Zhang, *Chinese Perceptions of the US: An Exploration of China's Foreign Policy Motivations* (Lexington Books, 2013).

⁹⁹⁰ Fareed Zakaria, 'Does the Future Belong to China?' *Newsweek* (9 May 2005), p. 29.

⁹⁹¹ Huo Hwei-ling, 'Pattern of Behaviour in China's Foreign Policy: The Gulf Crisis and Beyond' (1992) 32/3 Asian Survey 274.

⁹⁹² Nina Hachigian, Winny Chen, and Christopher Beddar, *China's New Engagement in the International System* (Center for American Progress, November 2009) 1.

2016G-20 Hangzhou Summit, but also supports regional multilateralism.⁹⁹³

Meanwhile, China's endeavour on peaceful settlement of disputes exemplifies this trend. In the Security Council, China maintained that peaceful rather than coercive measures should be first exhausted when solving disputes.⁹⁹⁴ As Samuel Kim observed, "what matter most is not so much the growth of Chinese power but how and for what purpose a rising China will actually wield its putative or actual power in the conduct of its international relations".⁹⁹⁵ In this regard, a rising China will promote the integration of the entire world rather than a threat to other countries.

Finally, the UN could benefit greatly from China's engagement and the Chinese leadership derive legitimacy from its constructive role in matters of peace and development.⁹⁹⁶

Overall, as China's policy with regard to the principle of non-intervention has not been revised, it is not anticipated that China will participate in other forms of UN interventions apart from peacekeeping. In this regard, peacekeeping might be seen as a rather "safe" form of engagement. As observed by the International Crisis Group, peacekeeping has "the potential to nudge China toward greater familiarity with crisis management and conflict resolution, with a view to playing a larger role in the future".⁹⁹⁷ With regards to peacebuilding missions, obstacles based on the different understanding of intervention between China and the west may limit China's willingness to contribute. When considering China's solely socialist political system among the permanent Member States in the Security Council, its conservative policy toward peacebuilding continues to be a delicate counter balance for Beijing. This will, nevertheless, assist China to gain support from the Third World states. However, as

⁹⁹³ China pioneered the first East Asia Summit in 2005, seen as a possible alternative to the US-led Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and in 2009 co-created the so-called BRIC summit of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. In 2001, China also co-founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to facilitate political, military, and economic cooperation between China, Russia, and three Central Asian nations. *Ibid*, pp. 11-12.

⁹⁹⁴ Wanfa Zhang, 'Tapping Soft Power: Managing China's "Peaceful Rise" and the Implications for the World' in Sujian Guo and Shiping Hua (eds), *New Dimension of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Lexington Books, 2009) 124.

⁹⁹⁵ Samuel Kim, 'Chinese Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice' in Samuel S Kim (ed), *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium* (Westview Press, 1998) 9.

⁹⁹⁶ Janka Oertel, 'How China Is Changing the UN', (*The Diplomat*, October 05 2015) < <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/how-china-is-changing-the-un/> > accessed 8 March 2016.

⁹⁹⁷ *China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping Report no. 166* (International Crisis Group, 2009) 17.

China is motivated by establishing an image of being a “responsible power” that requires a greater role in international relations, Chinese policy in respect to peacebuilding may well be undergoing significant change (dispatching combat troops to the UN mission in Mali and South Sudan partly exemplified this).

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