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International News Supply in Ireland, c.1899-1949

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Abstract

During the first half of the twentieth century the Irish media were primarily reliant on news agencies for their coverage of international events. The Press Association was their dominant and often favoured supplier among these largely London-based and British organisations. The mainstream Irish newspapers engaged enthusiastically with this agency at a corporate and commercial level. This was particularly demonstrated through attendance at general meetings and service on boards by senior management and proprietors, and a series of investments. Their behaviour in this business environment rarely, if ever, displayed any signs of the political divisions normally so central to the consideration of the Irish newspapers at this time.

The following chapters cover events in Ireland from the turn of the twentieth century to the outbreak of World War I, World War I to the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the creation of the independent Irish state to the outbreak of World War II, World War II, and finally the end of the war in Europe to the inauguration of the Republic of Ireland in 1949. Each considers the corporate and commercial behaviour of the mainstream Irish newspapers within the systems and structures of international news supply against the background of domestic political and constitutional developments. Each chapter also contains a case study which examines the coverage of a major international news event. Despite relying on largely common syndicated sources the Irish media could, and often did, shape their coverage to reflect a range of editorial and political positions.

This study examines how far the experience of the Irish media reflected the significant constitutional and other changes in the first half of the twentieth century, which also saw notable developments in the international news industry. To what extent should these international influences be considered alongside domestic factors when considering the Irish media during this period?

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List of abbreviations

ACA	Army Comrades Association
AFP	Agence France-Presse
AGM	Annual General Meeting
ANZACs	Australia and New Zealand Army Corps
AP	Associated Press; also Associated Press Corporate Archive, New York
APWS	Associated Press World Service
BEF	British Expeditionary Force
BT	British Telecom Corporate Archives, London
BUP	British United Press
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
<i>DIB</i>	<i>Dictionary of Irish Biography</i>
<i>DIFP</i>	<i>Documents on Irish Foreign Policy</i>
DMP	Dublin Metropolitan Police
DNB	Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro
DORA	Defence of the Realm Act, 1914
EGM	Extraordinary General Meeting
ETC	Exchange Telegraph Company
GL	Guildhall Library Manuscripts Collection, London
GPO	General Post Office
ICA	Irish Citizen Army
IDA	Industrial Development Authority
INA	Irish News Agency
INS	Independent News Service
IPP	Irish Parliamentary Party
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRB	Irish Republican Brotherhood
ITGWU	Irish Transport and General Workers Union
JSA	Joint Service Agreement
LNA	London News Agency
<i>MC</i>	<i>Monthly Circular</i>
MoI	Ministry of Information
NAI	National Archives of Ireland, Dublin
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NLI	National Library of Ireland, Dublin
NPA	Newspaper Proprietors Association
NS	Newspaper Society Corporate Archive, London
NUJ	National Union of Journalists
<i>ODNB</i>	<i>Oxford Dictionary of National Biography</i>
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
PA	Press Association
PAC	Press Association Company
PASPC	Press Association Share Purchase Company
PNS	Provincial Newspaper Society
RA	Reuters Corporate Archive, London
RA CR	Reuters Corporate Archive, Central Registry, London
RA J	Reuters Corporate Archive, Roderick Jones Papers, London

List of abbreviations

RIC	Royal Irish Constabulary
ROIA	Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, 1920
TNA	The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew
UCD	University College Dublin
UCDA	University College Dublin Archives
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UP	United Press
UVF	Ulster Volunteer Force
WHO	World Health Organisation

Note on nomenclature¹

Throughout this thesis Ireland and Irish are used to refer to all-Ireland institutions or events. Northern Ireland is used to refer to the constitutional entity of that name created under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. The 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty and the 1922 Irish Free State Constitution Act created the Irish Free State, which was renamed Éire, or Ireland in English, under the 1937 Constitution of Ireland. In 1948 it was declared the Republic of Ireland, which was inaugurated in 1949. Irish Free State and Republic of Ireland are used to refer to this constitutional entity where appropriate. Where these terms are inaccurate for all or part of the period referred to, or otherwise inappropriate, the term ‘independent Irish state’ is used.² Where Connaught, Leinster, Munster and Ulster are occasionally used they refer to the four historical provinces of Ireland. Nationalist and Unionist are capitalised where they refer to particular political parties or movements, lower case is used for the ideologies involved or for popular public opinion of the relevant persuasion.

¹ The ‘Note on the use of terms in Irish’ in Dermot Keogh with Andrew McCarthy, *Twentieth Century Ireland: Revolution and State Building*, rev. edn. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2005), p. xiv and ‘Nomenclature’ in J.J. Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), p. xxi have been consulted in preparation of this note.

² For an exploration of the different names used for the independent Irish state and their political implications see Mary E. Daly, ‘The Irish Free State/Éire/Republic of Ireland/Ireland: “A Country by Any Other Name”’, *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January 2007), pp. 72-90.

Words and phrases in Irish are used as they would be in common parlance in the present day Republic of Ireland. When quoting from manuscript or primary published material their spelling and the use of accents are as they appear in the original. The city of Derry/Londonderry is referred to as Derry throughout except where Londonderry is part of a newspaper's title or it appears in original manuscript or primary published material.

During the period covered by this thesis a number of movements and political parties adopted names in Irish. In 1900 Arthur Griffith established Cumann na nGaedheal (League of the Gael) as a loose confederation of nationalist cultural and political groups and the Sinn Féin (Ourselves) political party in 1905. In 1922 political opponents of the Anglo-Irish Treaty retained the name Sinn Féin. Pro-Treaty politicians formed a new political party and adopted the name Cumann na nGaedheal. In 1926 Eamon de Valera led a split from Sinn Féin and formed the Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Destiny) party. Following electoral defeat in 1932 and 1933 Cumann na nGaedheal merged with the Centre Party and elements of the Irish political Right to form Fine Gael (Tribe of the Gael). A political party's annual convention is known as its *ard fheis* in Irish.

Dáil Éireann was the name of the separatist parliament established in Dublin by the successful Sinn Féin candidates following the 1918 general election. Members rejected the British abbreviation of MP and instead adopted TD (Teachta Dála). Following the creation of the Irish Free State this abbreviation was retained and the Dáil became the lower house of the independent Irish state's houses of parliament (also Oireachtas) with the Senate (also Seanad Éireann) as the upper house. The 'prime minister' was titled President of the Executive Council. Under the 1937 Constitution this office was renamed Taoiseach.

Following the disbanding of the Royal Irish Constabulary and Dublin Metropolitan Police the police force in the independent Irish state was named the Garda Síochána (Guardians of the Peace), also commonly referred to as 'the guards' or Gardaí.

Introduction

This is a study in how far a nation's media is itself national. During the first half of the twentieth century the Irish media, particularly the mainstream newspapers in this thesis, were largely reliant on news agencies for their coverage of international events. These largely common reports were interpreted from a range of editorial and political positions that frequently centred on domestic concerns. But the Irish media were influenced by the international news industry, to which they demonstrated clear connections through their corporate, commercial and organisational interactions with the systems and structures that supplied the common news agency material. In this business environment the political identities and divisions normally so central to the consideration of the Irish media during this period were rarely, if ever, apparent.

The following chapters seek to examine to what extent the experiences of the Irish media reflected constitutional developments, as well as political, social and cultural changes, in Ireland in the first half of the twentieth century. These developments, particularly the constitutional, often focused on Ireland's relationship to Britain, its empire and commonwealth. The role of the Irish media, particularly newspapers, in creating and defining modern Irish identity and in the developments of this period is recognised. Their history has traditionally been written from a national perspective focussing on institutional history, biography and their relationship to domestic politics. Little has been done to understand their interplay with the international media though. The research presented here aims to make a contribution to rectifying that situation by offering the first detailed study of their interactions with the systems and structures of international news supply. This international perspective provides evidence of behaviour and attitudes that are sometimes contradictory to the established national narrative. As well as examining their behaviour and attitudes on a corporate and organisational level it also considers their sources for international news, primarily common news agency material, and how this was presented and commented on. This was often presented in a way that sought to reinforce national perspectives. But Irish newspapers

collaborated with their British contemporaries in the creation and development of the systems and structures that supplied this news and continued to do so enthusiastically until after World War II. This might be viewed as surprising considering the importance attached to distinguishing Ireland as distinctive, particularly from Britain, in political and cultural nationalist movements and their supporting press in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is also notable that newspapers from the competing nationalist and unionist traditions in Ireland displayed common attitudes and behaviours and amicable cooperation within the business environment discussed here well into the twentieth century

The interactions of the Irish with the international media, and particularly international news, were primarily experienced through British institutions, particularly news agencies. This study seeks to contribute to our understanding of the agencies operating in Britain and Ireland during the first half of the twentieth century, in particular the Press Association (PA). The PA was a domestic news agency established along cooperative lines in 1868 to supply the non-London based newspapers of the United Kingdom. An essential element in the domestic systems and structures of national and international news supply throughout, it was far more than a conduit for the gathering and dissemination of news. Its close cooperative relationship with Reuters, the British international news agency, was sometimes more fraught than is generally realised, particularly after the PA purchased a controlling interest in Reuters in 1926. Despite their close links the PA and Reuters continued to operate as separate companies. Behind the scenes PA-Reuters was sometimes far from the homogenous or merged organisation it might have appeared to be externally. In addition the PA provided a forum to facilitate professional and corporate networks and at times acted as an advocate on behalf of its owners, who were also its customers: the non-London-based newspapers of Britain and Ireland. These functions are particularly examined in relation to the mainstream Irish daily newspapers. That the PA was as much an Irish as a British institution is often either overlooked or not sufficiently examined considering the implications such a description holds in light of wider British and Irish relations. This, too, is a situation that this study seeks to rectify.

Ireland began the twentieth century as a constitutionally incorporated part of the United Kingdom. The 1920s saw the creation of the separate polities of Northern Ireland and the Dominion status Irish Free State. During the 1930s the Irish Free State's remaining constitutional ties to Britain were systematically deconstructed and under the 1937 Constitution of Ireland it was renamed Éire, or Ireland in English. In 1948 the independent Irish state was declared the Republic of Ireland which was inaugurated in 1949 when it simultaneously left the Commonwealth. These constitutional changes can be viewed as the creation of an independent Irish nation-state, albeit with part of the island, Northern Ireland, still a part of the United Kingdom with certain devolved powers of self-government. These constitutional developments found reflections in the social, cultural, political and economic spheres.

Joel H. Wiener and Mark Hampton have noted that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 'newspapers developed in the framework of emerging nation-states, and were constitutive of national identities'.¹ This was in many ways, as Wiener has commented, the 'classic age of the "Fourth Estate" when the press by virtue of its size and power made a pretence to speak directly for the people'.² This is a concept that James Curran has termed the 'liberal theory' of the press in which the media are perceived as an essential, but independent, element of the state acting as guardians, watchdogs and independent advocates of the state and its constituent public.³ Did the fourth estate in the independent Irish state itself become 'independent'? And how far were their experiences similar or dissimilar to those of Northern Ireland?

¹ Joel H. Wiener and Mark Hampton, 'Introduction' in Joel H. Wiener and Mark Hampton (eds.) *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850-2000* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 1.

² Mark Hampton, Tom O'Malley, Simon Potter and Joel Wiener, 'Roundtable: Visions of the Press in Britain, 1850-1950. By Mark Hampton Urbana and Chicago: The University of Illinois Press, 2004. (pp. 218. ISBN 0-252-02946-1. \$35.00, £24.99 (Cloth))', *Media History*, Vol. 12, No.1 (2006), p. 80.

³ James Curran, 'Mediations of Democracy' in James Curran and Michael Gurevitch (eds.) *Mass Media and Society* (London: Hodder and Arnold, 2005), p. 122; James Curran and Jean Seaton, *Power Without Responsibility. The Press, Broadcasting and New Media in Britain*, 6th edn. (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 346-63.

The Irish nation, state, the British Empire, and international news

Ireland's historical relationship to Britain and its empire is complex and evades easy definition. Prior to the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and creation of the Dominion status Irish Free State the following year there were many elements of the governmental structure in Ireland that distinguished it from Britain. These included its Viceroy, which 'invested Ireland's constitutional position with a colonial implication',⁴ and its administrative centre in Dublin Castle. However, as Stephen Howe has pointed out, the state that emerged in the nineteenth century was 'a curiously hybrid one'. It did possess some clearly colonial features but also had 'institutions of government and law [...] in many ways less distinct from the English than were those of Scotland or even the Isle of Man'.⁵ Emmet Larkin has argued for the development of a *de facto* Irish state emerging in the nineteenth century awaiting *de jure* recognition from the British parliament. In Larkin's thesis a political structure represented by the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) led by Charles Stewart Parnell alongside religious and educational structures provided by the Catholic Church had emerged by 1886. These were supported by a citizenship comprising small and medium farmers and a developing commercial class linked to national identity. These elements were merely awaiting official recognition for the Irish state to spring into being.⁶

Larkin argues persuasively for a state *in potentia* and post 1886 a strong case can be made for the likelihood of Home Rule being achieved.⁷ However, the defeat of the Home Rule Bills introduced in 1886 and 1893 indicate the strength of Unionist opposition in Britain and Ireland. The introduction of the 1912 Bill prompted the signing of the Ulster Covenant

⁴ James Loughlin, 'Royal Agency and State Integration: Ireland, Wales and Scotland in a Monarchical Context, 1840s-1921', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2013), p. 379.

⁵ Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture* (Oxford: OUP, 2000), p. 37.

⁶ Emmet Larkin, 'Church, State, and Nation in Modern Ireland', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 80, No. 5 (Dec., 1975), pp. 1244-1276; Larkin developed this thesis in *The Roman Catholic Church and the Creation of the Modern Irish State, 1878-1886* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1975).

⁷ J.J. Lee, 'On The Birth of the Modern Irish State: The Larkin Thesis' in Stewart J. Brown and David W. Miller (eds.) *Piety and Power in Ireland, 1760-1960: Essays in Honour of Emmet Larkin* (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, Queens's University of Belfast, 2000), pp. 133-4.

where the Irish unionist community promised to resist Home Rule by ‘all means which may be found necessary’.⁸ Irish nationalists did not accept the theory of ‘Two Nations’⁹ in Ireland at this time but it was clear that the majority of unionists rejected the notion that ‘Irishmen could all live together under an Irish parliament’ espoused by John Redmond, the IPP leader from 1900.¹⁰

Attempts to establish objective criteria for ‘nationhood’ have proved problematic and often revolved around common language, shared territory or history, ethnicity, culture or a combination of some or all of the above.¹¹ The state might be considered the product of a recognisable grouping of political organisations or parties alongside legal, educational and governmental bodies operating jurisdictional autonomy associated with a national territory. In addition it might also refer to these governmental and organisational bodies and institutions themselves. Benedict Anderson and Peter Wortsman have characterised the nation-state as a product of ‘those nationalisms which, by the late twentieth century, have gotten married to states’.¹²

Anderson has elsewhere proposed an inherently limited and sovereign ‘imagined community’ as the basis for a nation.¹³ He positions print-capitalism as a key driver in the creation of this model. In particular he describes how, in the case of newspapers, the ceremony of reading is ‘replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence [the reader] is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion’.¹⁴ However, in addition to the virtual constructs formed in Anderson’s reading ceremonies, through their existence as material objects and institutions, newspapers can act as very public signifiers of separate

⁸ ‘Carson and the Ulster Unionists’ in the National Library of Ireland *The 1916 Rising: Personalities and Perspectives*, online exhibition, <http://www.nli.ie/1916/pdf/3.1.4.pdf>, accessed 1 October 2013.

⁹ J.J. Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), p. 14.

¹⁰ Joseph P. Finnan, *John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912-1918* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse UP, 2004), p. 30.

¹¹ E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), p. 5.

¹² Benedict Anderson and Peter Wortsman, ‘Replica, Aura, and Late Nationalist Imaginings’, *Qui Parle*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Nation and Fantasy (Fall / Winter 1993), p. 2.

¹³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. edn. (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 6-7.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35-7.

identity and community membership within a nation and state.¹⁵ It is unlikely that two individuals passing each other in the street in 1930s Ireland, one carrying a copy of the pro-British *Irish Times* and the other a copy of the nationalist *Irish Press*, would have considered themselves part of the same community. This is despite both being members of the Irish nation and citizens of the independent Irish state.¹⁶ It might be suggested that Anderson's analysis should be nuanced and individual newspapers be seen as representative of imagined *sub*-communities within the nation-state.

These discussions focussing on the nation and state might be seen to relate to aspects of formal empire, or the process of 'acquiring dominion in the strict constitutional sense'.¹⁷ But the nature of Ireland's historical imperial or colonial status is a notoriously thorny one. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed a process of 'constitutional decolonisation'¹⁸ in the independent Irish state: the removal of formal legislative and jurisdictional connections to Britain and the British Empire/Commonwealth and the creation of a constitutionally independent state. However, the operation of informal empire should also be considered. John Darwin has identified this as the use of trade, investment, diplomacy, or a combination of some or all of these, to draw a region in to the influence of an imperial power.¹⁹ The media could act as key conduits for the exertion of, or resistance to, this influence.

¹⁵ Harold A. Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, reprinted edn. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 74; Christopher Morash, *A History of the Media in Ireland* (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), p. 117.

¹⁶ For similar discussions of Anderson's 'imagined community' thesis with regard to the creation of a common British imperial identity see Simon J. Potter, *News and the British World: The Emergence of an Imperial Press System, 1876-1922* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003), p. 215.

¹⁷ John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1953), p. 1.

¹⁸ This term is used by Howard Johnson in the title of his chapter on the British Caribbean in *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. IV*. The development of structures of self-government in the Caribbean states whilst economic ties to Britain and its empire remained have comparisons with the use of the term here, but it should be noted that the Caribbean states remained within the British Commonwealth. See Howard Johnson, 'The British Caribbean from Demobilization to Constitutional Decolonisation' in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.) *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. IV: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: OUP, 2001), pp. 597-622.

¹⁹ John Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 112, No. 447 (Jun., 1997), p. 614.

The various potentials for an Irish state, states or none-of-the-above and their relationship to Britain and its empire and commonwealth that were contested in the early twentieth century provide the historical context for this study. The position of the news industry in relation to those debates and their aftermath will be referenced as part of the discussions below.

Comparisons will be drawn between the mainstream daily newspapers' use and presentation of international news in relation to these developments and their corporate and commercial behaviour within the largely London-based and British systems and structures that supplied it. These were part of the commercial interests and mutual interdependence that led to the emergence of the imperial press institutions and industry throughout the British Empire identified by Simon J. Potter.²⁰ This, he argues, contributed to an idea of greater Britishness which 'could embrace colonial communities as well as the peoples who inhabited Britain and Ireland'.²¹ He has commented that this 'helped ensure that papers in each of the Dominions would continue to share the same basic perspective on international events, even if editorial opinions varied'.²² While noting that 'Britain's colonies rarely provided a natural yardstick against which to measure Ireland's own position',²³ this study will seek to ascertain how far this characterisation can be applied to the Irish fourth estate, particular the mainstream daily newspapers, during the first half of the twentieth century.

Chandrika Kaul, writing with regard to the interaction between the Indian and British press, has identified a politics-press nexus which blurred the lines between press and politics and social and class networks. This was influenced by the growth of communication technologies and mass media ending the political monopoly on international news and providing greater public access to information.²⁴ She has elsewhere described how through the Empire Press Union Indian newspapers, the London-centred British media

²⁰ Potter, *News and the British World*, p. 1.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*, p. 212.

²³ Simon J. Potter, 'Introduction: Empire, Propaganda and Public Opinion' in Simon J. Potter (ed.) *Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), p. 15.

²⁴ Chandrika Kaul, *Reporting the Raj: The British Press and India c.1880-1922* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2003), pp. 13-14; see also Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, pp. 29-31, for example, on the idea of monopoly of information.

and Anglo-India ‘coalesced to an unprecedented degree and the consequent [development of] networks of information, opinion and influence [which] impacted one on the other’.²⁵ The similar role played by the systems and structures of international news supply, and particularly the PA, as facilitators of professional networks for the Irish newspaper industry will be discussed in the following chapters. This provides material to consider in light of Curran’s challenge to the ‘liberal theory’ of the press that argues ‘the media never became fully independent of the underlying structure of power’.²⁶

In trying to position the Irish media within an imperial analysis it should be remembered that, as Kaul has pointed out, it is probably impossible to advance a single theoretical framework that encompasses media and empire.²⁷ Indeed, the experiences and interaction of the mainstream Irish newspapers with the systems and structures of international news supply are notably different in many respects from that described in India by Kaul and in Australia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by Peter Putnis, for example.²⁸

In addition to imperial and colonial models it is also worth considering how Irish newspapers related to the transatlantic Anglo-American news industry identified by Joel H. Wiener. In this he describes a situation where editors and proprietors ‘constantly travelled back and forth across the Atlantic, seeking to improve their technological infrastructure’.²⁹ He argues that, with some cultural differences between the two countries persisting, in the final decade of the nineteenth century ‘Anglo-American popular journalism acquired the form that was to characterize it for much of

²⁵ Chandrika Kaul, ‘India, the Imperial Press Conferences and the Empire Press Union: The Diplomacy of News in the Politics of Empire, 1909-1946’ in Chandrika Kaul (ed.) *Media and the British Empire* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 135.

²⁶ James Curran, ‘Media and the Making of British Society, c.1700-2000’, *Media History*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2002), p. 148.

²⁷ Chandrika Kaul, ‘Introductory Survey’ in Chandrika Kaul (ed.) *Media and the British Empire* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 3.

²⁸ Peter Putnis, ‘How the International News Agency Business Model Failed - Reuters in Australia, 1877 – 1895’, *Media History*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1-17; idem, ‘Reuters in Australia: the Supply and Exchange of News, 1859 – 1877’, *Media History*, Vol.10, No.2 (2004), pp. 67-88.

²⁹ Joel Wiener, *The Americanization of the British Press, 1830s-1914: Speed in the Age of Transatlantic Journalism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 184.

the succeeding hundred years'.³⁰ Where then should Ireland be placed in this transatlantic model? The difficulty of providing a single answer to this question is as profound as the problem of describing a theoretical framework that encompasses media and empire identified by Kaul. The post-1905 *Irish Independent* was strongly influenced by the *Daily Mail's* depoliticised commercial model,³¹ and the *Mail* was itself part of Wiener's transatlantic media interactions. Eamon de Valera made numerous visits to American publications in order to inform himself on the business of running a newspaper prior to launching his own *Irish Press* in 1931.³² This study will seek to highlight the importance of considering the effect of interaction with the international news industry as well as the domestic influences on the development of the Irish fourth estate.

In considering these influences it is necessary to note that the behaviour of the PA and other news agencies in Britain and Ireland towards their subscribers differed in a number of ways from the behaviour of national news agencies elsewhere. For example, the PA never demanded membership from its subscribers or imposed exclusivity in the way that those in Australia and New Zealand and the Associated Press (AP) in America did.³³ Direct comparisons between the experience of Irish, and indeed British, newspapers with the systems and structures of international news supply with those in other territories should be made with great care.

Due to the nature of the systems and structures of supply, whereby the majority of international news in Irish newspapers was distributed under a series of exclusive agreements, the relationship of the Irish media to the

³⁰ Ibid., p. 183, 197.

³¹ Felix M. Larkin, 'No Longer a Political Side Show: T.R. Harrington and the "New" *Irish Independent*, 1905-31' in Mark O'Brien and Kevin Rafter (eds.) *Independent Newspapers: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), p. 30; Patrick Maume, 'The *Irish Independent* and Empire, 1891-1919' in Simon J. Potter (ed.) *Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain: Reporting the British Empire, c.1857-1921* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), p. 128; idem, 'William Martin Murphy, the *Irish Independent* and Middle-Class Politics, 1905-19' in Fintan Lane (ed.) *Politics, Society and the Middle Class in Modern Ireland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 233.

³² Mark O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001), pp. 22-3.

³³ Terhi Rantanen, 'The Struggle for Control of Domestic News Markets (1)' in Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen (eds.) *The Globalization of News* (London: Sage, 1998), pp. 40-7; Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb, 'Exclusivity and Cooperation in the Supply of News: The Example of the Associated Press, 1893-1945', *The Journal of Policy History*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2012), p. 467.

British PA and Reuters agencies is central to the questions posed here. In this regard the identification by Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen of the profound connection between ‘news agencies, national formation and globalization’ has influenced the framing of this study.³⁴ Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen suggest that, in the second half of the twentieth century, national news agencies were among the range of institutions which new nation-states came to feel they had to establish in order to seem credible as nations and in order to project or to control the dissemination of their ‘national image on global markets’.³⁵ However, the failure of the state-backed Irish News Agency (INA) (1950-57) and the resistance it experienced from the mainstream Irish newspapers is counterintuitive to the idea of a national press engaged in a state-sponsored project of nation-building. Here, as so often, Ireland does not conform to easy comparisons or generalisations.

Examining the development of the relationship between the Irish and international media through the study of news supply, and particularly its British and largely London-based elements, reveals how behaviours and attitudes displayed by the Irish media evolved slowly and subtly during the period under consideration here. This reflects the equally subtle and long-drawn-out adjustments in Anglo-Irish constitutional relations which institutions such as the media were engaged in shaping. This element of the history of the Irish media does not fit comfortably into the national narrative focusing on purely domestic influences and political affiliations that has largely defined it to date.

Irish newspaper and media history

In Ireland, as Potter has commented, the historical study of the media has to date primarily focussed on biography, institutional histories and politics, with a slightly new departure in Christopher Morash’s *A History of the Media in Ireland*.³⁶ Indeed much still remains to be done in this field.³⁷ The

³⁴ Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen, ‘The Globalization of News’ in Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen (eds.) *The Globalization of News* (London: Sage, 1998), p. 1.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁶ Simon J. Potter, ‘Social Histories of the Media in Britain and Ireland’, *Media History*, Vol. 18, Nos. 3 and 4 (2012), p. 9; Morash, *A History of the Media in Ireland*.

³⁷ Michael de Nie and Karen Steele are preparing an edited volume on *Ireland and the New Journalism* which is due for publication in August 2014: conversation with Karen Steele at

majority of recent work has focussed on the Dublin newspapers. Mark O'Brien has produced highly informative histories of both the *Irish Press* and the *Irish Times*.³⁸ Felix M. Larkin has published in a number of journals and edited collections on the *Freeman's Journal*³⁹ as has Patrick Maume on the *Irish Independent*.⁴⁰ More recently O'Brien and Kevin Rafter have produced an edited collection on this latter newspaper and its associated titles.⁴¹ With the possible exception of Eamon Phoenix's edited collection on the *Irish News*,⁴² there are still large gaps in the histories of the mainstream Irish newspapers in Belfast and Cork, as well as publications elsewhere in Ireland. Works such as Ian Kenneally's *The Paper Wall: Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland, 1919-1921*⁴³ and Marie-Louise Legg's *Newspapers and Nationalism: the Irish Provincial Press, 1850-1892*⁴⁴ have provided valuable information on the histories of Irish newspapers during specific periods. John Horgan's work on the development of Irish broadcasting and the INA has been very useful in producing the final chapter here. However, he has primarily focused on post-World War II developments in the Irish media, despite the titles of

the 'Newspaper and Periodical History Forum of Ireland' conference, Dublin City University, 8-9 November 2013.

³⁸ O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*; idem, *The Irish Times: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008).

³⁹ For example Felix M. Larkin, 'Arthur Griffith and the Freeman's Journal' in Kevin Rafter (ed.) *Irish Journalism Before Independence: More a Disease Than a Profession* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2011); idem, 'Keeping an Eye on Youghal: The *Freeman's Journal* and the Plan of Campaign in East Cork, 1886-92', *Irish Communication Review*, Vol. 13 (2012) pp. 19-30; idem, 'The Dog in the Night-Time: The *Freeman's Journal*, the Irish Parliamentary Party and Empire' in Simon J. Potter (ed.) *Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004).

⁴⁰ For example Patrick Maume, 'Parnellite Politics and the Origins of Independent Newspapers' in Mark O'Brien and Kevin Rafter (eds.), *Independent Newspapers: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012); idem, 'The *Irish Independent* and Empire'; idem, 'William Martin Murphy, the *Irish Independent* and Middle Class Politics'.

⁴¹ Mark O'Brien and Kevin Rafter (eds.), *Independent Newspapers: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012).

⁴² Eamon Phoenix (ed.), *A Century of Northern Life: The Irish News and 100 Years of Ulster History* (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 1995).

⁴³ Ian Kenneally, *The Paper Wall: Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland, 1919-1921* (Cork: Collins, 2008).

⁴⁴ Marie-Louise Legg, *Newspaper and Nationalism: the Irish Provincial Press, 1850-1892* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1992).

some of his works.⁴⁵ Hugh Oram's *The Newspaper Book* remains a valuable reference work for any student of the history of newspapers in Ireland.⁴⁶

Larkin has identified the highly politicised character of the Irish press in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁴⁷ The journalistic profession in Ireland has been characterised by Michael Foley as making the transition from 'a politically engaged group of workers to a professional group working for a post-colonial, less politically aligned press, one more concerned with nation building' as the twentieth century developed.⁴⁸ In a comparative light one might bear in mind Jean Chalaby's identification of the emergence of a journalistic profession in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Britain.⁴⁹ In this analysis the commercialisation and depoliticisation of the press was also driven by a 'discursive policy' focusing on sports, society, sensationalism and human interest journalism in search of a mass readership.⁵⁰ This ultimately led to 'the depoliticized aspects of the coverage' of the 1922 British general election,⁵¹ the same year that the Irish Free State came into being. Developments in the Irish news industry and journalistic practice should be considered concurrently with developments elsewhere as well as in light of domestic factors.

The period under consideration in this study witnessed major social, political and cultural change in Ireland and was also one of significant development in the wider media. This saw the personalisation, popularisation and commercialisation of the press.⁵² Mark Hampton has identified a move from the educational ideal to the more sensationalist new

⁴⁵ John Horgan, *Broadcasting and Public Life: RTE and Current Affairs 1926-1997* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004); idem, *Irish Media: A Critical History Since 1922* (London: Routledge, 2001).

⁴⁶ Hugh Oram, *The Newspaper Book: A History of Newspapers in Ireland, 1649-1983* (Dublin: MO Books, 1983).

⁴⁷ Larkin, 'Keeping an Eye on Youghal', p. 27; idem, 'T.R. Harrington and the "New" *Irish Independent*', p. 29.

⁴⁸ Michael Foley, 'How Journalism Became a Profession' in Kevin Rafter (ed.) *Irish Journalism Before Independence: More a Disease Than a Profession* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2011), p. 32.

⁴⁹ Jean Chalaby, *The Invention of Journalism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. 1.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 89.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 114-5.

⁵² Graham Law and Matthew Sternberg, 'Old v. New Journalism and the Public Sphere; or, Habermas Encounters Dallas and Stead', *19: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 16 (2013), p. 1, <http://19.bbk.ac.uk/index.php/19/article/view/657/897>, accessed 20 May 2013.

journalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Under the educational ideal parliamentary activities, national and overseas events and other worthy stories were reported with a minimum of opinion and interpretation. In new journalism, a more sensationalist and interpretative style was adopted and human interest stories pursued.⁵³ This development is often associated with, among others, W.T. Stead, ‘one of the inventors of the modern tabloid’ in the words of Laurel Brake and James Mussell.⁵⁴

Developments in the production of news during the first half of the twentieth century included the growth in the use of photographs and the introduction of by-lines. Larger circulation was achieved by newspapers catering to an increasingly literate general public, themselves an increasingly attractive market for advertisers. Advertising revenue allowed for reductions in the price of newspapers which further expanded their readership base.⁵⁵ It is worth noting here that it is estimated that newspaper sales in Ireland grew by a factor of seven between the 1880s and 1920s.⁵⁶ These developments affected newspapers’ commercial model making them increasingly reliant on advertising revenue generated by circulation figures as oppose to subscriptions. This in turn influenced newspapers to move to the political centre ground in order to deliver a mass readership to satisfy the advertisers’ requirements.⁵⁷ This model was seen in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries⁵⁸ and in Ireland, for example, in the re-launched *Irish Independent* post-1905, itself influenced by the *Daily Mail* in Britain as noted above. In addition, technological innovation and competitive developments had a significant impact on how international news was received by both the media outlets and the general public.

⁵³ Mark Hampton. *Visions of the Press in Britain 1850-1950* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), Chps. 2-3.

⁵⁴ Laurel Brake and James Mussell, ‘Introduction’, *19: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 16 (2013), p. 1, <http://19.bbk.ac.uk/index.php/19/article/view/669/896>, accessed 10 May 2013.

⁵⁵ Aled Jones, *Powers of the Press: Newspapers, Power and the Public Sphere in Nineteenth-Century England* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996), pp. 2, 7.

⁵⁶ Felix M. Larkin, ‘“A Great Daily Organ”: the *Freeman’s Journal*, 1763-1924’, *History Ireland*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2006), p. 47; idem, ‘“The Old Woman of Princes Street”: *Ulysses* and the *Freeman’s Journal*’, *Dublin James Joyce Journal*, No. 4 (2011), p. 21.

⁵⁷ Simon J. Potter, ‘Social Histories of the Media in Britain and Ireland’, *Media History*, Vol. 18, Nos.3-4 (2012), pp. 461-2.

⁵⁸ Monika Krause, ‘Reporting and the Transformation of the Journalistic Field: US News Media, 1890-2000’, *Media Culture and Society*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2011), pp. 93-4.

Newspaper benefitted from improved services provided by news agencies utilising the international cable network which provided a ‘quantum leap in the collection and distribution of news’.⁵⁹ But, as Potter has identified, this system, which had matured and consolidated its position by the turn of the twentieth century, in many ways acted to obstruct the free flow of information found in older, less formalised networks of international communication. The international cable infrastructure and news agencies restricted news by providing a limited word count due to transmission cost, but their speed made longer, slower to arrive, reports obsolete.⁶⁰ The growth of broadcasting, particularly radio, provided a new medium by which the general public could receive their news. (The development of radio in Ireland is primarily covered in the final chapter.) Tom O’Malley has noted the ‘emergence of a mass press, of cinema, radio and television in the twentieth century [which] allowed for a much wider and more rapid dissemination of ideas’.⁶¹ However, considering Potter’s analysis one must question how widely sourced was the information thus distributed in the case of international news. In Ireland its supply primarily centred on the PA, an organisation that the mainstream Irish newspapers had helped found and continued to engage with and support on a corporate and commercial level well into the twentieth century.

A summary of the history, ownership and political affiliation of each newspaper consulted in a series of case studies contained in this thesis (see the chapter summary below) is contained in Appendix B. These newspapers have been selected because they represent the mainstream Irish media of the period, but also because they represent the majority of Irish interaction with the PA and the international news industry. That the two criteria are complementary rather than mutually exclusive should probably not be

⁵⁹ Joel H. Wiener, ‘Get the News! Get the News! – Speed in Transatlantic Journalism, 1830-1914’ in Joel H. Wiener and Mark Hampton (eds.) *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850-2000* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 60.

⁶⁰ Simon J. Potter, ‘Webs, Networks, and Systems: Globalization and the Mass Media in the Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British Empire’, *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 46, No.3 (July 2007), pp. 630-2; on the development of the international cable network in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see also Dwayne Winseck and Robert M. Pike, *Communications and Empire: Media, Markets and Globalization, 1860-1930* (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2007).

⁶¹ Tom O’Malley, ‘Introduction’, *Media History*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2007), p. 122.

regarded with much surprise. In general they can be divided between the ideologies of nationalism and unionism, which in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were also broadly confessional, hence the politico-religious definitions of Catholic and nationalist or Protestant and unionist. Morash has commented that ‘at a time when the world media was undergoing an unprecedented transformation, the Irish newspapers - both in their content and their form – spoke to their readership of continuity’.⁶² This continuity can be seen in these newspapers in their role as signifiers of identity and as institutions as well as material objects.⁶³ However, they did adopt many of the changing practices that developed in the wider media described above (note is made of these developments in the following chapters). However these developments generally appear later in Ireland than elsewhere. A particularly good illustration is perhaps provided by the *Irish Times*. This newspaper began the twentieth century as the voice of southern Irish unionism. In the following decades its political stance evolved, particularly after the creation of the independent Irish state in 1922. It adopted a more commercial model in the 1940s and emerged as a non-politically aligned publication ‘to incorporate liberal thinkers from across the religious divide’ in the 1950s.⁶⁴ Foley has noted a comparable late development in the profession of journalism in Ireland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He links this to ‘[c]olonial conditions and the state of Irish capitalism’ among other factors.⁶⁵ Emmet O’Connor has identified a similar trend in Irish trade unionism. In his analysis this movement largely regarded itself as part of the British trade unionism at the turn of the twentieth century.⁶⁶ The formation of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union (ITGWU) in 1909 marked ‘the beginning of a long and painful decolonization that [...] modernized the movement and made it more relevant to native conditions’.⁶⁷ But it would not be until the 1940s that

⁶² Morash, *A History of the Media in Ireland*, p. 150.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 117; Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, p. 74.

⁶⁴ O’Brien, *The Irish Times*, p. 131.

⁶⁵ Michael Foley, ‘Colonialism and Journalism in Ireland’, *Journalism Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2004), pp. 374-5.

⁶⁶ Emmet O’Connor, *A Labour History of Ireland 1824-1960* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1992), p. 201.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

trade union organisation developed a notably national character particularly connected to the nation-state. Northern Irish union organisation would remain particularly focused on, and connected to, British trade unionism.⁶⁸ A similar evolution in the relationship of the mainstream Irish newspapers to the largely London-based and British systems and structures of international news supply and the corporate and commercial organisations that controlled them is discussed in the following chapters.

It has been noted elsewhere that during the first half of the twentieth century Irish newspapers were largely reliant on common agency material for their coverage of international events.⁶⁹ This news was often presented and interpreted in their published products from competing national and political perspectives. They were far from passive, powerless recipients of this service though and the pejorative use of the terms ‘colonial’ or ‘imperial’ to describe their relationship to the organisation of international news supply would be unhelpful and largely inaccurate. The mainstream Irish newspapers collaborated enthusiastically with their British contemporaries in the development of the systems and structures that supplied international news well into the twentieth century. Throughout the period under consideration the mainstream dailies were shareholders in the PA, sent delegates to general meetings, provided it with board members and invested to support the agency’s growth and development.⁷⁰ The first indications of newspapers from the independent Irish state disengaging at a corporate level can be tentatively identified in the mid to late 1930s. But in general the expression of dissatisfaction with the news supplied on national lines and clear evidence of disengagement on a corporate and organisational level did not appear until after World War II.⁷¹ Such dissatisfaction was not

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 204-6.

⁶⁹ See for example Donal Lowry, ‘Nationalist and Unionist Responses to the British Empire in the Age of the South African War, 1899-1902’ in Simon J. Potter (ed.) *Newspapers and Empire in Britain and Ireland* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), p. 161; Fearghal McGarry, ‘Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War’, *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 129 (May, 2002), p. 76; Donal Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland, 1939-1945: Neutrality, Politics and Society* (Cork: Cork UP, 1996), p. 117.

⁷⁰ Appendix A provides a list of Irish delegates at PA annual and extraordinary general meetings 1899-1949 and indicates board memberships.

⁷¹ Eamon de Valera did attempt to acquire the AP service prior to launching the *Irish Press* in 1931 and its first editor, Frank Gallagher, outlined specific requirements to the British

apparent in the media of Northern Ireland. These developments notably reflected state boundaries rather than the politico-religious definitions normally so central to the analysis of the Irish media, and particularly newspapers.

The developments in the behaviours and attitudes that the mainstream Irish newspapers displayed towards the systems and structures of international news supply do not fit comfortably with a national narrative defined by political affiliation centred on identity formation and their role in the project of nation-building. It is worth noting that these objectives are frequently evident in their shaping and presentation of international news reports which were based on common agency material. However, the newspapers had been centrally involved in creating and developing the very systems and structures that supplied this common material. This was a situation that persisted well into the twentieth century in a commercial and corporate environment where political divisions were rarely, if ever, apparent. Changing requirements in the international news supplied based on national criteria did not generally emerge until after World War II when the process of nation-building was well underway, if not necessarily complete, and concepts of identity had already begun to clearly adhere to state boundaries.

The systems and structures of international news supply in Ireland and Britain

During the first half of the twentieth century the international news supplied to Irish newspapers was primarily provided by the PA and Reuters. Their British competitors, and sometimes collaborators, the Exchange Telegraph Company (ETC) and Central News Agency were also sources. In addition the American AP service was available in varying degrees at various points during this period. So too was its domestic rival the United Press (UP), primarily via its Canadian registered subsidiary the British United Press (BUP). In addition news from the French Havas and German Wolff agencies could be accessed via their connections with Reuters.

United Press aimed at correcting a perceived British bias in the other agency news available. This was very much the exception to the rule however.

This study seeks to make a contribution to the wider history of the news agencies that supplied the British and Irish newspapers, in particular the PA. The central role this agency played in the gathering and distribution of news in Britain and Ireland is often overlooked when it is described, for example, as simply the ‘officially recognised national agency’ of the United Kingdom.⁷² This is not least because such descriptions fail to adequately acknowledge its role in the independent Irish state post-1922, and indeed in many ways the role of Irish newspapers within the PA.

There is a comparatively limited body of work on the British news agencies that Irish newspapers relied on for their international news. Donald Read’s *The Power of News*⁷³ has provided valuable contributions to the understanding of Reuters’ history but the other agencies remain little researched. J.M. Scott’s *EXTEL 100*⁷⁴ provides a centenary retrospect of the ETC as does George Scott’s *Reporter Anonymous*⁷⁵ for the PA, supplemented more recently by Chris Moncrieff’s *Living on a Deadline*, which is largely reliant on George Scott for the period covered here.⁷⁶ Recently Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb has published a number of articles from a business history perspective.⁷⁷ Though his concentration on the business aspects of news supply is justified and welcome he pays insufficient attention to other key social, cultural and political aspects of the media. A more nuanced consideration of how far media organisations are both similar

⁷² Terhi Rantanen, *When News Was New* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 108.

⁷³ Donald Read, *The Power of News: The History of Reuters*, 2nd edn. (Oxford: OUP, 1999); see also idem, ‘The Relationship of Reuters and Other News Agencies with British Press, 1858-1984: Business at Cost or Service for Profit’ in Peter Catterall, Colin Seymour-Ure and Adrina Smith (eds.) *Northcliffe’s Legacy: Aspects of the British Popular Press, 1896-1996* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).

⁷⁴ J.M. Scott, *EXTEL 100: The Centenary History of the Exchange Telegraph Company* (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1972).

⁷⁵ George Scott, *Reporter Anonymous: The Story of the Press Association* (London: Hutchinson, 1968).

⁷⁶ Chris Moncrieff, *Living on a Deadline: A History of the Press Association* (London: Virgin Books, 2001)

⁷⁷ Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb, ‘Exclusivity and Cooperation in the Supply of News’, pp. 466-198; idem, ‘Foreign Office Control of Reuters During the First World War. A Reply to Professor Putnis’, *Media History*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2010), pp. 281-293; idem, ‘The Structure of the News Market in Britain, 1870-1914’, *Business History Review*, Vol. 83 (Winter 2009), pp. 759-788.

to and different from other industries⁷⁸ would be welcome in his work. In addition, in his publications to date, the analyses he provides of some of the corporate and financial developments in the systems and structures of international news supply in Britain and Ireland are at least debatable. His monograph, *The International Distribution of News*, is due for publication in March 2014.⁷⁹ His thesis ‘Business, politics, technology, and the international supply of news, 1850-1945’⁸⁰ can only be viewed at the University of Cambridge it has not been possible to consult it in the preparation of this thesis.⁸¹ Siân Nicholas has written on the BBC, BUP and Reuters in the 1930s in Hampton and Wiener’s edited collection *Anglo-American Media Interactions*.⁸²

The exchange of news between the PA and Reuters bears many of the traits characterised by Rantanen as ‘bi-directional dependency’, whereby domestic and international agencies agreed mutually exclusive reciprocal supply agreements.⁸³ However, the PA’s contractual relationship with its customers was notably different from those seen elsewhere. It is not possible to make easy comparisons between the PA’s relationship with the British and Irish press and those of news agencies and national presses elsewhere such as in Rantanen’s own analysis of the Australian and New Zealand agencies, AP in America or the analyses of Kaul in India and Putnis in Australia, as noted above. One of the key differences is that the PA never required membership of, or imposed exclusivity on, its subscribers. Newspapers in Britain and Ireland, then, were free to utilise the full range of agency services available to them. That the PA came to represent an essential cog in the systems and structures of news gathering and

⁷⁸ Graham Murdock and Peter Golding, ‘Culture, Communications and Political Economy’ in James Curran and Michael Gurevitch (eds.) *Mass Media and Society*, 4th edn. (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005), p. 60.

⁷⁹ Cambridge University Press website, <http://www.cambridge.org/ie/academic/subjects/history/economic-history/international-distribution-news-associated-press-press-association-and-reuters-1848-1947>, accessed 27 October 2013.

⁸⁰ Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb, ‘Business, Politics, Technology, and the International Supply of News, 1850-1945’ (D.Phil Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2009).

⁸¹ Correspondence with Inter-Library Loans service, James Hardiman Library, National University of Ireland, Galway, 26 August 2013.

⁸² Siân Nicholas, ‘Keeping the News British: the BBC, British United Press and Reuters in the 1930s’ in Joel H. Wiener and Mark Hampton (eds.) *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850-2000* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 195-214.

⁸³ Rantanen, ‘The Struggle for Control of Domestic News Markets (1)’, pp. 35-37.

distribution was the product of a series of cooperative practices and strategic purchases and investments it pursued throughout the first half of the twentieth century. One of these was a controlling interest in Reuters from 1926, but news exchange agreements between the two agencies retained their pre-1926 character. Despite shared board memberships the two agencies remained separate corporate entities and this characterised their, normally amicable and cooperative, commercial relationship. Board level relationships were not always equally amicable, particularly with regard to events connected to the collapse of the cartelised 'News Ring' in 1934 which led to the partial loss of the AP service. It was, however, the value the American agency placed on the PA service that led to its decision not to compete directly in the British and Irish market but instead cooperate with the pre-existing systems and structures of news supply. The PA's sale of fifty percent of Reuters to the Newspaper Proprietors Association (NPA) in 1941 led to the creation of the Reuters Trust. But this sale was strongly contested by some of its own shareholders, led by James Henderson of the *Belfast News Letter*, and was highly divisive at the time.

This study seeks to enhance the understanding of the PA as a key part of the news industry in Britain and Ireland; its relationship with its domestic competitors, and sometimes collaborators; and the international news agencies, particularly AP, Reuters and UP. This is primarily achieved through the examination of its relationship to the mainstream Irish daily newspapers, but because they were equally members and customers of the agency it sheds light on how the PA related to the British media too. The, sometimes complex and subtle, relationship of the Irish media to international news and news agencies is rarely considered outside of their citation in the news columns. This study seeks to extend the understanding of news agency history in Britain and fully incorporate Ireland into the historiography. In addition it seeks to extend the historiography of the Irish media by providing a more detailed understanding of their relationship to the international news industry, particularly on a corporate, commercial and organisational level. The research presented here provides the opportunity to

see the PA, Irish and British media as part of the history of media and communications ‘networks that cross the boundaries of nation-states’.⁸⁴

As well as discussing developments in Ireland and the systems and structures that supplied international news during the period covered, each of the following chapters contains a case study. This practice is not commonly adopted in studies of national or international news industries or news agencies, though Kaul and Morash have both adopted similar approaches in *Reporting the Raj* and *A History of the Media in Ireland* respectively.⁸⁵ The purpose of the case studies here is not to present extensive content analyses; rather they might be considered the equivalent of an archaeologist’s exploratory trench. They provide the opportunity to compare the corporate and organisational behaviours of the Irish newspapers within the systems and structures of international news supply to their presentation and interpretation of the largely common news agency material. This serves to highlight that as well as their political, social and cultural roles media are part of an industry with both national and international dimensions in which news is a commodity and newspapers both institutions and products.⁸⁶ But the common, syndicated, news thus supplied can be used to support a range of political and editorial positions.

Chapter Summary

Chapter One briefly describes the events surrounding the formation of the PA in 1868-70. It then focuses on developments in Ireland, its news industry and the systems and structures of international news supply from the turn of the twentieth century to the outbreak of World War I. In many ways the Irish news industry and its systems and structures of international news supply changed little during this period. The case study covers the 1911 Delhi Durbar where it was announced that certain changes would be made to the structures of governance in India and that the partition of Bengal

⁸⁴ Rantanen, *When News Was New*, p. 38.

⁸⁵ Kaul, *Reporting the Raj*, pp. 165-256; Morash, *A History of the Media in Ireland*, pp. 24-29, 55-59, 91-96, 125-130, 160-65, 197-200.

⁸⁶ Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, p. 74; Morash, *A History of the Media in Ireland*, p. 150; Rantanen, *When News Was New*, p. 59.

would be reversed. These might have been seen to have implications for developments in Ireland.

Chapter Two covers the period from the outbreak of World War I to the Anglo-Irish Treaty. This period saw growth in separatism within Irish nationalism, the 1916 Easter Rising, the decline of the IPP and rise of Sinn Féin. However, comparative radicalism was not easy to spot in the mainstream Irish newspapers. They remained firmly committed to the pre-existing systems and structures of international news supply in Britain and Ireland and their corporate organisations. The case study examines the Gallipoli Campaign in August 1915 when the first of the Irish volunteer divisions raised as part of Kitchener's 'citizen's army' went into battle: the 10th (Irish) Division.

Chapter Three examines the period from the creation of the independent Irish state in 1922 to the outbreak of World War II. During this time the two new polities on the island of Ireland sought to forge their identities. In addition this marks a period of increasing integration and cooperation in the systems and structures that supplied the Irish newspapers with their international news. It also saw the collapse of the 'News Ring' cartel arrangement that had regulated and controlled international news supplies since the late nineteenth century. The case study examines the Spanish Civil War. This was an event of particular resonance in Ireland due to the predominant Catholicism and anti-communism of the independent Irish state's population and of the nationalist community in Northern Ireland. It also marks the first major instance in which Irish newspapers sent their own foreign correspondents to cover an international news event as opposed to relying on agencies for coverage. News agencies remained important however.

Chapter Four covers the period from the outbreak of World War II to the end of hostilities in Europe. The independent Irish state adopted neutrality during the conflict and part of the measures introduced to support this policy was a particularly stringent censorship regime. Northern Ireland, as part of the United Kingdom, was a belligerent. World War II is often regarded as having exerted particular influence in the broader development of concepts of identity in Ireland that increasingly came to be reflected in

the constitutionally separate independent Irish state and Northern Ireland. This chapter questions whether similar developments were apparent in the mainstream Irish newspapers. There are two brief case studies that compare the coverage of the Dunkirk evacuations in 1940 and the D-Day landings in 1944. These provide the opportunity to examine the way in which differing censorship regimes in Northern Ireland and the independent Irish state affected how the mainstream newspapers presented news from common agency sources.

Chapter Five covers the period from the end of World War II to the declaration of the Republic of Ireland in 1948 and its inauguration in 1949. It also briefly comments on some developments in the early 1950s. It was during this period that the first clear signs of newspapers from the independent Irish state disengaging at a corporate and organisational level from the PA emerged. Similar behaviour was not apparent in the newspapers of Northern Ireland. The case study covers the foundation of the United Nations. This provides the opportunity to examine how the mainstream Irish newspapers viewed the moves to establish this significant post-war international organisation. This is of interest in light of the differing wartime experiences of Northern Ireland and the independent Irish state, particularly as the latter sought to reintegrate itself into the international community following wartime neutrality. This policy would remain central to its foreign affairs agenda.

Archives consulted

With regard to news agencies the most significant archival information in this study has come from the records of the PA, which are part of the Guildhall Library Manuscripts Collection in London. Though much valuable information relating to the interaction of the Irish newspapers with the agency has been discovered, many series of accounts and correspondence have been lost or are incomplete following flood damage in 1994.⁸⁷ For example the Order Books up to 1941, when the PA changed its

⁸⁷ London Metropolitan Archive, Catalogue Information, Press Association Limited, http://search.lma.gov.uk/scripts/mwimain.dll/144/LMA_OPA C/web_detail/REFD+CLC~2FB~2F181?SESSIONSEARCH, accessed 28 October 2013.

pricing model, provide interesting information on the use of the agency's services by both Irish members and non-members. However the evidence they contain is fragmentary and can only realistically be regarded as indicative.

The PA records also contain some limited information relating to the Central News Agency, in which the PA and ETC bought a joint controlling share in 1937. The records of the ETC are also part of the Guildhall Library Manuscripts Collection. In conjunction with the PA archive they provide a valuable record of the relationship between the two agencies. There is little information of direct relevance to the Irish newspapers here though, except inasmuch as they were affected by the interactions of the two agencies.⁸⁸

Permission was kindly granted to conduct research in the corporate archives of Reuters, in London, AP, in New York and the Newspaper Society, in London. As with the ETC the relevance of Reuters for much of the period covered by this thesis is in its relationship to the PA, which distributed its international news in Britain and Ireland outside London. Useful information has, however, been uncovered with regard to the establishment of a news supply service for the independent Irish state's broadcaster, Radio Éireann, in the post-war period. Also, the attitude of Reuters to the short lived INA is informative in seeking to understand how Ireland was regarded within the international news industry on which Irish newspapers were predominantly reliant. Similarly to the ETC and Reuters the interaction of the Irish newspapers with AP was largely via the PA. Useful information has been found relating to de Valera's unsuccessful attempts to establish a direct AP service when setting up the *Irish Press*. In addition the reaction of AP to competitive inroads made by UP in Ireland in the post-war period is informative, particularly in how the Irish newspapers managed to leverage this to improve the quantity and quality of news available to them. At the time research for this thesis was carried out the AP archive was still being catalogued. Permission was kindly granted to view some unprocessed records. As a result some references to this archive are

⁸⁸ London Metropolitan Archive, Catalogue Information, Exchange Telegraph Company Limited, http://search.lma.gov.uk/scripts/mwimain.dll/144/LMA_OPA C/web_detail/REFD+CLC~2FB~2F080?SESSIONSEARCH, accessed 28 October 2013.

not as specific as would be ideal. The Newspaper Society's archive has produced some limited, but useful, information on Irish interaction with this trade body. This has provided some interesting comparative opportunities to interaction with the PA.⁸⁹

The British Telecom Corporate Archive, London, and The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, have both provided useful information regarding official British attitudes affecting the supply of international news to Ireland. In the latter case these are primarily found in records from the Admiralty, Dublin Castle (contained in Commonwealth Office records), Foreign Office, Home Office and Treasury. The findings from these sources are mainly confined to Chapters One and Two.

Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Vols. I-VIII,⁹⁰ draws from a number of archival sources in Ireland including the National Archives of Ireland, primarily for the purposes of this study the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the papers of leading political figures held in the University College Dublin Archives. This has provided a valuable source for information on Irish government attitudes to international news supply and news agencies. Mainly confined to Chapters Three to Five, these attitudes primarily focused on how news about Ireland was presented to foreign audiences.

⁸⁹ The Newspapers Society's in-house journal the *Monthly Circular* referred to in this thesis can also be consulted in the St. Bride Library, London.

⁹⁰ *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy Vols. I-VI*, 1919-1941, accessed online, <http://www.difp.ie/>; *Vol. VII*, 1941-1945, Catriona Crowe, Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh and Eunan O'Halpin (eds.) (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2010); *Vol. VIII*, 1945-1948, Crowe et al. (eds.) (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2012).

Chapter One

An Established System: International news supply structures in Ireland, 1899-1914

The period 1899-1914 witnessed a continuation, and in many ways an increasing intensity, of the trends within political and cultural nationalism in Ireland that had developed in the nineteenth century. Within Nationalism at this point the dominant political aspiration was Home Rule. Tensions with the opposing aims of Unionism increased following the passing of the 1911 Parliament Act, removing the House of Lords' veto on legislation. This was seen to make the prospect of Home Rule being passed, creating a self-governing Ireland within the United Kingdom and British Empire, a very real possibility. These conflicting political ideologies had their respective presses supporting their aims. Indeed the nationalist press at this time was largely a product of the internecine political conflict that had broken out in the pro-Home Rule Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) in the late nineteenth century. Regardless of their political affiliation the mainstream Irish daily newspapers were members and customers of the London-based Press Association (PA) news agency. The tensions between the ideologies they represented, displayed in their published products, were rarely, if ever, apparent in their corporate and commercial engagement with the systems and structures of international news supply of which the PA was a key conduit. This chapter will briefly consider Ireland's position at the turn of twentieth century and leading up to the outbreak of World War I. It will then describe how the systems and structures of international news supply in Britain and Ireland came about and the role that Irish newspapers had in their establishment and organisation up to the outbreak of war. A case study will then examine how the mainstream daily Irish newspapers covered, positioned and commented on the Delhi Durbar of 1911.

Ireland in the early twentieth century

Ireland entered the twentieth century as a constitutionally incorporated part of the United Kingdom with its representative politicians sitting in the House of Commons in Westminster. However, as has been noted in the

Introduction, Ireland's constitutional and governmental relationship to Britain was 'a curiously hybrid one'.¹ The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the growth in political and cultural nationalism in Ireland. The Gaelic League founded in 1893 promoted the Irish language and cultural interests. The Gaelic Athletic Association, 1884, originally founded as an Irish sports association quickly developed a political dimension and became primarily concerned with the uniquely Irish sports of Hurling and Gaelic Football.² The South African War, 1899-1902, had provided a focus around which advanced nationalist views had coalesced. It had also prompted 'a more vivid appreciation of the relationship between Irish loyalism and the imperial movement' among Unionism's business and political leaders.³ In nationalist circles the Irish Transvaal Committee had organised political resistance to the conflict and anti-recruitment campaigns. This organisation went on to provide the nucleus around which Arthur Griffith founded Cumann na nGaedheal, which in turn formed the basis for Sinn Féin.⁴ However, the dominant political aspiration within nationalism was for Home Rule within the United Kingdom and British Empire as represented by the IPP sitting in Westminster. This organisation had been reunited in 1900 under John Redmond following a 'nine-year civil war within the Home Rule movement'.⁵ This had been precipitated by the involvement in 1890 of its leader, Charles Stewart Parnell, in the divorce case between Captain W.H. O'Shea and his wife Katharine and Parnell's death in October 1891.⁶ Redmond's political outlook has been characterised

¹ Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture* (Oxford: OUP, 2000), p. 37.

² See for example Tom Garvin, *The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics* (New York: Homes and Meier, 1981); W. F. Mandle, *The Gaelic Athletic Association and Irish Nationalist Politics 1884-1924* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987).

³ Alvin Jackson, 'Irish Unionists and the Empire, 1880-1920: Classes and Masses' in Keith Jeffrey (ed.) *'An Irish Empire'?* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1996), p. 131.

⁴ For further discussions on Ireland and the South African War see: Donal P. McCracken, *Forgotten Protest: Ireland and the Anglo-Boer War* (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 2003); Donal Lowry, 'Nationalist and Unionist Responses to the British Empire in the Age of the South African War, 1899-1902' in Simon J. Potter (ed.) *Newspapers and Empire in Britain and Ireland* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004); idem, "'The Boers Were the Beginning of the End'?: The Wider Impact of the South African War' in Donal Lowry (ed.) *The South African War Reappraised* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2000).

⁵ Alvin Jackson, *Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800-2000* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003), p. 76.

⁶ Jackson, *Home Rule*, pp. 74-9.

by James McConnell as ‘crypto-monarchism, along with [...] federalism, imperialism and residual [catholic, middle] class solidarity’.⁷ But, as McConnell has also pointed out, his ‘favourable attitude towards the British throne clearly did distinguish him from many senior Irish nationalists’.⁸ As Patrick Maume has commented, Irish nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was drawn from a broad political and social base many of whose constituents felt themselves ‘imperfectly represented’ by the IPP.⁹

The hopes for Home Rule reached their high point in the years covered by this chapter. The 1911 Parliament Act ended the House of Lords’ ability to veto legislation, which had been used to block the second Home Rule Bill in 1893.¹⁰ Consequently when the third Home Rule Bill was introduced in 1912 many believed the main obstacle to its passage had been removed. The passing of the Home Rule Act in 1914 actually delivered the aims of the IPP, but its implementation was suspended at the outbreak of World War I. Subsequent events, including the Easter Rising of 1916 and the Irish War of Independence, 1919-21, intervened to produce a different historical outcome. There were competing political views during the period and more advanced nationalist groups espousing republicanism and socialism were present. At the other end of the spectrum the unionist tradition was opposed to any change in Ireland’s constitutional status. This was most notably represented in 1912 by the Ulster Covenant in which its signatories bound themselves to use ‘all means which may be found necessary to defeat’ Home Rule.¹¹ This hinted, as Alvin Jackson has noted, at ‘extreme measures of resistance’.¹² This threat was backed up by the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force in January 1913 which in turn prompted the formation by nationalists of the Irish Volunteers later the same

⁷ James McConnell, ‘John Redmond and Irish Catholic Loyalism’, *English Historical Review*, Vol. 125, No. 512 (Feb. 2010), p. 109.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁹ Patrick Maume, ‘William Martin Murphy, the *Irish Independent* and Middle-Class Politics, 1905-19’ in Fintan Lane (ed.) *Politics, Society and the Middle Class in Modern Ireland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 230.

¹⁰ The first had been defeated by an alliance between Unionists and Conservatives in 1886.

¹¹ ‘Carson and the Ulster Unionists’ in the National Library of Ireland *The 1916 Rising: Personalities and Perspectives*, online exhibition, <http://www.nli.ie/1916/pdf/3.1.4.pdf>, accessed 1 October 2013.

¹² Alvin Jackson, *Ireland 1798-1998* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 212.

year.¹³ By 1914 Unionists had persuaded the government that special provisions should be made for north-east Ireland and it was clear that the implementation of Home Rule would involve some form of partition.¹⁴

International news supply in Ireland in the early twentieth century

As Donal Lowry has pointed out, by the outbreak of the South African War 'all national and local newspapers [in Ireland] of any significance were largely dependent for coverage of the war on identical reports syndicated from international news agencies'.¹⁵ The agencies provided this information via the international cable network. As Simon J. Potter has commented, by the turn of the twentieth century the agencies and cable companies involved in the gathering and distribution of international news had matured and consolidated their position.¹⁶ Thus, mainstream newspapers were dependent on, and in many ways inherently part of, an established system.

In Ireland the newspapers were primarily reliant on one dominant agency, the London-based PA. Established in 1869 to supply the provincial newspapers of Britain and Ireland with news, the PA had from its beginning secured exclusive rights to the distribution of Reuters international news outside London. Reuters, by virtue of the international 'News Ring' cartel agreement with the French Havas agency, Wolff in Germany and the American Associated Press (AP), had exclusive rights to sell international news in Britain, Ireland and Britain's Imperial possessions, excepting Canada. There were competitor agencies within Britain and Ireland, most notably the Exchange Telegraph Company (ETC) established in 1872¹⁷ and

¹³ For further discussions of this period see Jackson, *Ireland*, Chp. 5.

¹⁴ Paul Bew. 'The Politics of War' in John Horne (ed.) *Our War: Ireland and the Great War* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2008), p.97-8; J.J. Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge: CUP), pp. 15-17.

¹⁵ Lowry, 'Nationalist and Unionist Responses', p. 161.

¹⁶ Simon J. Potter. 'Webs, Networks, and Systems: Globalization and the Mass Media in the Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British Empire', *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 46. No.3 (July 2007), pp. 630-2; on the development of the international cable network in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see also Dwayne Winseck and Robert M. Pike, *Communications and Empire: Media, Markets and Globalization, 1860-1930* (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2007).

¹⁷ J. M. Scott, *Extel 100: The Centenary History of the Exchange Telegraph Company* (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1972), p. 1.

the Central News Agency established in 1880.¹⁸ However their resources and therefore ability to gather and distribute international news were limited by comparison. Indeed the Central News Agency had lost its international collaborator when AP drove the United Press in America out of business in 1899.¹⁹

By the turn of the twentieth century the international news market and the cable infrastructure that facilitated it had become focused in the hands of a coterie of key players. The final block in the 'News Ring' had been put in place when the European agencies recognised AP as their American counterpart in 1898²⁰ and the globe was carved up between them into areas of exclusive pre-eminence. As Dwayne Winseck and Robert M. Pike have noted, only 'the cartel agency assigned a certain territory was to conclude contracts with a [domestic] agency in that area'.²¹ These agreements secured the domestic agency exclusive rights to the international agencies news, and that of its fellow cartel members. It also enforced a reciprocal exclusivity on the outward flow of news operating in such a way as 'to ensure the hegemony of the cartel and the subordination of other agencies', as Terhi Rantanen has written.²² From the 1860s the international cable market had been undergoing a similar process and by this time cartels 'ruled the global cable business'.²³ Domestic telegraph networks, with the exception of those of the US and Canada, were largely state owned.²⁴ This was the case in Britain and Ireland and, as will be seen later in this chapter, proved no hindrance to the operation of the wider, global, system of news gathering and distribution.

Of particular interest to this chapter and thesis is a report presented to the President of the Board of Trade in 1912 on 'The Position of Cable

¹⁸ Memorandum and Articles of Association of Central News Limited, 26 August 1880, Guildhall Library Manuscripts Collection, London (GL) MS 35600.

¹⁹ Terhi Rantanen, 'Foreign Dependence and Domestic Monopoly: The European News Cartel and the US Associated Presses, 1861-1932', *Media History*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2006), p. 27. This should not be confused with the United Press Association (later United Press International) established in 1907.

²⁰ Rantanen, 'Foreign Dependence and Domestic Monopoly', p. 27.

²¹ *Ibid.* p. 21.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Dwayne Winseck and Robert M. Pike, 'The Global Media and the Empire of Liberal Internationalism. Circa 1910-30', *Media History*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2009), p. 32.

²⁴ Robert Pike and Dwayne Winseck, 'The Politics of Global Media Reform, 1907-23', *Media Culture and Society*, Vol. 26, No. 5 (2004), p. 645.

Companies and of Wireless Telegraphy in Ireland Under Home Rule'.²⁵ The committee established to compile this report recommended that due to Ireland's particular position as a landing point for cables serving the whole of the United Kingdom and a number of associated commercial and security reasons:

It is desirable that the control of the foreshore where it is the property of the Crown and the bed of the sea within territorial waters should still rest with the Imperial Government. The British Board of Trade should, it is considered, continue to act as the licensing authority, and in any case powers of censorship and control in an emergency should remain vested in the Imperial Government.²⁶

With regard to the domestic infrastructure, though, the maintenance of the network would need to be handled by the Irish Post Office for practical reasons:

The British Post Office should retain the maximum possible amount of control over the provision and maintenance of the land lines connecting with cable and wireless stations in Ireland.²⁷

As noted above, the recommendations this report contained were overtaken by events. It does however reinforce the conclusion that by this time Ireland was inextricably linked into a wider United Kingdom and worldwide system of newsgathering and distribution. Further, as has been noted in the Introduction, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw a number of developments in newspaper production and the practice of journalism. However the modernisation, commercialisation and depoliticisation of the press, of which these developments were a part, were slower to emerge in Ireland than in Britain and America, for example.

For a variety of reasons then, domestic and international, political, commercial and social, the turn of the twentieth century represents a salient moment for Ireland and its mainstream news industry and a useful one from

²⁵ Report as to the position of cable companies and of wireless telegraphy in Ireland under Home Rule (1912), The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew (TNA), MT 10/1481.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

which to begin this study. It is, however, necessary to first take a more detailed look at how the domestic infrastructure and systems in Britain and Ireland came about to facilitate the flow of international news to these newspapers. Key to this is the foundation of the PA.

The Foundation of the Press Association

An apocryphal story relates that the origins of the PA lay in an hansom cab delayed in a London ‘pea souper’ containing three worthy, though anonymous, provincial newspaper proprietors.²⁸ The tradition grants benign and enlightened thinking to these ‘founding fathers’. They are positioned as motivated only by desire for a fair and equitable mechanism for the distribution of news to the provincial newspapers of Britain and Ireland. The reality, as will be shown here, is more complicated and sometimes contentious.

The Electric Telegraph Act of 1869 radically changed the structures of telegraph communication in the United Kingdom. The telegraph network had been developed by private commercial interests up to this point and grown up alongside the expanding railway network in the nineteenth century. The distribution of news was undertaken by the joint Intelligence Department of the Electric and Magnetic Companies. This service was not run by news men and dissatisfaction with the reliability and accuracy of what was provided was common among the newspapers. This was probably because, in part at least, ‘the prime purpose of the telegraph was to convey commercial news’ and other forms of news were something of an afterthought.²⁹ The newspapers, however, had no recourse to alternative sources due to the monopoly position exercised by a cartel agreement established in 1858 between the various domestic cable companies.³⁰

Proposals to transfer the telegraph network from private to public hands had first appeared in the 1850s. These proposals originated both within government, specifically the General Post Office, and the

²⁸ Chris Moncrieff, *Living on a Deadline: A History of the Press Association* (London: Virgin Books, 2001), pp. 9–10.

²⁹ Roger Neil Barton, ‘New Media: The Birth of Telegraphic News in Britain 1847–68’, *Media History*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2010), pp. 384, 386.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

commercial sector. The aims of the 1869 Act which emerged from these moves were four fold:

- A. The reduction and simplification of the charges for the transmission of telegrams throughout the United Kingdom.
- B. The extension of the wires from railway stations outside of town populations to post offices in the centre of such populations, the extension of the wires already carried into large cities towards the suburbs of such cities, and the extension of the wires from towns into rural and other districts unprovided with telegraphic accommodation. From the combined effect of these extensions it was hoped that a saving of time and a saving in cost of portage would accrue to the senders and receivers of messages.
- C. Such a complete separation of the commercial telegraph system from the railway telegraph system as would entirely relieve the commercial wires of railway messages, and throw on the railway wires those commercial messages only which arise out of the circumstances of railway traffic.
- D. *Free trade in the collection of news for the press, of which collection the telegraph companies had hitherto had a monopoly, with low rates for the transmission of such news, no matter by what or by how many agencies it might be collected.*³¹ (My emphasis).

That the Act specifically identified the removal of a monopoly provision, and the introduction of free competition, in the system of providing news to the press, alongside the aims of decoupling telegraph transmission from the railway infrastructure, the reduction in the cost of transmission and extension of transmission infrastructure serves to highlight a view of the press as both a commercial and social institution: the fourth estate. The moves proposed in the Act were ‘supported by most newspapers, which resented the telegraph companies’ monopoly of the news’.³² Ironically it served to create a state monopoly in the transmission of telegraphic communications by placing the infrastructure and skills under the control of the General Post Office.

³¹ House of Commons Parliamentary Papers. *Telegraphs: Report by Mr. Scudamore on the Re-Organization of the Telegraph System of the United Kingdom*, pp. 1-2; 1871 (304) XXXVII.703.

³² James Foreman-Peck, ‘Competition, Co-Operation and Nationalisation in the Nineteenth Century Telegraph System’, *Business History: Concepts and Measurements*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1989), p. 81.

The first moves to organise a collective system of newsgathering and distribution came in 1865. After an unsuccessful appeal to the Electric and Magnetic Companies following an increase in rates the president of the Provincial Newspaper Society (PNS), a Mr. Fisher of Waterford, proposed the creation of a limited liability company to negotiate a centralised agreement.³³ This proposal was ultimately unsuccessful but it does demonstrate that the costs and systems of news distribution were a live issue for newspapers a number of years before the 1869 Act and beginning of the PA.

Established in 1836 as a representative trade and lobby body for the non-London based newspapers of the United Kingdom, prior to the foundation of the PA the PNS had,³⁴ in particular, worked for the reform of libel laws and the removal of stamp duty. The momentum for collective organisation of news supply did not pick up again until 1867 when the intention to purchase the telegraph networks was first officially indicated by the Postmaster General. The PNS, as the provincial press' trade organisation, made representations. However, moves were being taken independently by the leading daily newspapers to organise themselves outside its auspices and, it was thought, by extension to exclude the smaller weekly, bi-weekly and tri-weekly members. On 30 March 1868 a number of leading provincial newspaper proprietors issued a letter inviting delegates to a meeting of daily provincial newspaper proprietors to be held at the Palatine Hotel in Manchester on 8 April. There are no Irish signatories to this initial letter, but it does include those of the *Edinburgh Scotsman*, *Glasgow Herald*, *Manchester Guardian* and *Sheffield Independent* among others. Those unable to attend were invited to address their correspondence to the offices of the *Manchester Guardian*.³⁵ When the meeting was held the only Irish representative was Thomas Crosbie of the *Cork Examiner*. It was

³³ Barton, 'New Media' p. 394; H. Whorlow, *The Provincial Newspaper Society 1836-1886* (London: Page, Pratte and Co., 1886), p. 75. Barton dates this price increase to 1865 whereas Whorlow, places it in 1864. The salient year is, however, undoubtedly 1865.

³⁴ In 1889 the organisation's name was changed to the Newspaper Society, under which it still exists, when the London-based publications joined. Forming the Newspaper Proprietors Association in 1906 they became a separate organisation in 1916; see Newspaper Society, The, *The Newspaper Society: A Centenary Retrospect 1836-1936* (Birmingham: Silk and Terry, 1936), p. 19.

³⁵ Circular, 30 March 1868, GL MS 35356.

resolved that a committee should be formed to carry out negotiations with the Post Office on behalf of the press to secure favourable transmission rates when the proposed bill passed in to law. Sir John Gray MP of the *Freeman's Journal*, who did not attend the meeting, was the sole Irish representative listed as a member of the committee.³⁶ On becoming aware of these moves the PNS issued a circular to all members declaring them 'contrary to the spirit of the agreement of 1865'. It sought a meeting with the chairman of the dailies grouping, J.E. Taylor of the *Manchester Guardian*.³⁷

On 29 June 1868 a further 'meeting of Proprietors of Daily Provincial Newspapers' was held at the United Hotel, Haymarket, London. Among the thirty present were nine from Ireland: Thos. Crosbie, *Cork Examiner*, F.D. Finlay, *Northern Whig*, Belfast, a Mr. Coulter and Thomas Potts, both *Saunders's Newsletter*, Dublin, Sir John Gray MP and J.W. Gray, both *Freeman's Journal*, Dublin, H. Maunsell, *Dublin Evening Mail*, David A. Nagle, *Daily Herald*, Cork, and J. Robinson, *Dublin Daily Express*. The stated aims were the formation of 'a Co-operative Association of Proprietors of Provincial Newspapers [... for ...] collecting and supplying news'. It was intended that 'all Provincial Newspaper Proprietors [...] be invited to join'.³⁸ There was no express intention to exclude non-dailies. The meeting voted to appoint a committee to make arrangements for the formation of a company to carry out its aims; among its members were Sir John Gray and Finlay. On 12 August 1868 a meeting was held between this committee and that of the PNS, though details of what precisely was discussed are elusive.³⁹ In light of the evidence it is likely that the main points were the development of an organisation that would address the news requirements of all the provincial newspapers of Britain and Ireland, not just the major dailies.

Referred to as the 'Manchester Meetings',⁴⁰ though one was in fact held in London, these would appear to be the formative events in the PA's history. There is little further archival evidence until the original Articles of

³⁶ Circular from J.E. Taylor, *Manchester Guardian*, 9 April 1868, GL MS 35356.

³⁷ Whorlow, *The Provincial Newspaper Society*, p. 81.

³⁸ Minutes of meeting, 29 June 1868, GL MS 35357.

³⁹ Whorlow, *The Provincial Newspaper Society*, p. 81.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 75 and the hand written title of 'Minutes of Manchester Meetings, 1868', GL MS 35356, though not the official archive catalogue.

Association were issued on 6 November 1868.⁴¹ These Articles pertain to The Press Association Limited (PA). On 1 November the similarly named Press Association Company Limited (PAC) was liquidated.⁴² In an explanatory note to the official authorities Taylor, of the *Manchester Guardian*, stated that he was chairman of both the PAC and the proposed PA. He went on to explain that the liquidation of a company that had never traded was due to the directors' intention to 'introduce the principles of mutuality and co-operation into the [new] Association'.⁴³ The PAC shares were intended to be dividend bearing whereas the PA, the original incarnation of the modern PA, was structured along cooperative lines whereby profits would be reinvested in the company.⁴⁴ This suggests that the PNS's original suspicions that the dailies were intending to organise themselves separately were, to an extent, correct. It would appear that it was largely successful in lobbying for an inclusive organisation structured to operate primarily for the benefit of, and to an extent as a servant of, its shareholding members: the provincial newspapers of the United Kingdom, whether daily, weekly, bi-weekly or tri-weekly. As the PA grew, and ultimately prospered, this structure of ownership and the concept of it as a benevolent servant of the press became a source of pride to its membership. It might then have been thought of as something akin to a dirty family secret that some of its parental figures did not, originally, hold these laudable intentions.

The PA began operation as a news agency in February 1870. From its beginnings one of its key assets was an exclusive agreement with Reuters, signed on 1 April 1869, for the distribution of international news, though not commercial intelligence, throughout the United Kingdom. The only exception was that Reuters was free to act within a fifteen mile radius of the General Post Office in London and the PA could not seek to resell

⁴¹ Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Press Association Limited, 6 November 1868, GL MS 35355.

⁴² Documents relating to the establishment of the Press Association, GL MS 35357.

⁴³ John Edward Taylor and Alex Ireland, liquidators of the Press Association Company Limited, and [?] Austin, solicitor, to C.E. Curzon, Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, (handwritten) 29 October 1868, GL MS 35357.

⁴⁴ At an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) in 1885 the PA voted to make its shares dividend bearing see Report of PA EGM, 1885, GL MS 35365/3.

news it had received from Reuters within this boundary.⁴⁵ This division cemented Reuters as the United Kingdom's dominant source of international news. The PA in its turn became a 'full service' provider of both national and international news. This arrangement with Reuters was similar to those that members of the international 'News Ring' had with other domestic agencies whereby exclusive reciprocal news supply arrangements were formalised between the international players and local agencies.⁴⁶ Whether this arrangement meant that the 'papers of the provinces benefitted more than the London publications from having access to foreign news', as Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb has asserted, is perhaps debatable.⁴⁷ To take his own example from 1889 he points out that the total PA subscription to Reuters was only five times that of an individual London newspaper. However he does not show or explain the potential variance in cost-benefit derived: the commercial benefit accruing to a (small) provincial newspaper with significantly lower circulation, possibly cover price, and therefore ability to capitalise on this news as commodity.⁴⁸ Admittedly such figures are notoriously difficult to quantify.

The PA's customers were also its owners, helping to ensure loyalty and with a vested interest in the agency's success. In addition shareholding members received a ten percent discount on subscription charges.⁴⁹ As well as employing its own reporters it was also able to supplement its service where necessary by employing the staff of the provincial newspapers as stringers.⁵⁰ Its ability to provide international news without the cost of retaining its own overseas staff, a comprehensive ability to gather national news, and the fact that its owners were also its customers provided the PA with a dominant position in the market place. Put simply the barriers to entry were very high for any stand alone agency wishing to compete on equal terms. The PA's closest competitor, the ETC, had a greater focus on market intelligence and sporting results.

⁴⁵ Agreement between Reuters and the PA, 21 April 1869, GL MS 35441.

⁴⁶ Rantanen. 'Foreign Defence and Domestic Monopoly', pp. 19-35.

⁴⁷ Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb, 'The Structure of the News Market in Britain, 1870-1914', *Business History Review*, Vol. 83 (Winter 2009), p. 778.

⁴⁸ Terhi Rantanen, *When News Was New* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 14, 42.

⁴⁹ PA Provisional Tariff, n.d. but probably for 1870, GL MS 35460/1.

⁵⁰ Stringers were not retained reporters but were paid on an *ad hoc* basis for copy provided.

The position attained by the PA should not, however, be considered monopolistic, as Silberstein-Loeb asserts.⁵¹ The system for news distribution in Britain and Ireland that arose following the 1869 Electric Telegraph Act was different in a number of ways from that which had existed previously, as described by Roger Neil Barton.⁵² Firstly, the means of collection and distribution were legislatively separated. One of the key aims of the Act, as noted above, was free competition in the collection and distribution of telegraphic news for the press. Secondly, as Silberstein-Loeb himself notes, ‘after nationalization, several organizations emerged that served the provincial newspapers with news from London’.⁵³ The largest of these agencies, the PA, ETC and Central News Agency, persisted well in to the twentieth century. For the remainder of the nineteenth century they did not display any desire to enter in to a cartelisation agreement similar to that which the Electric and Magnetic Companies had established prior to 1869, nor the cartel structure operated by the ‘News Ring’ agencies at an international level. In 1906 the PA and ETC did establish the Joint Service Agreement (JSA) whereby they collaborated on domestic sporting and market intelligence, but not news. As the twentieth century progressed the ties between these three agencies and Reuters became ever closer. In 1937 the PA and ETC did buy out and become joint majority shareholders in the Central News Agency, which continued as a subsidiary organisation.⁵⁴ The nature and remove of these developments, however, belie the notion that the 1869 Act and the formation of the PA created a monopoly in 1870.

The system of news collection and distribution that emerged in Britain and Ireland with regard to international news does bear many of the traits described by Terhi Rantanen as ‘bi-directional dependency’. This resulted from the mutual exclusivity arrangement between the international and domestic agencies.⁵⁵ Rantanen’s analysis focuses on the domestic / international relationship that developed in Australia and New Zealand

⁵¹ Silberstein-Loeb, ‘The Structure of the News Market in Britain’, p. 762.

⁵² Barton, ‘New Media’, pp. 379-406.

⁵³ Silberstein-Loeb, ‘The Structure of the News Market in Britain’, p. 768.

⁵⁴ Minutes of a meeting re. Central News Ltd., 22 November 1937, GL MS 35607.

⁵⁵ Terhi Rantanen, ‘The Struggle for Control of Domestic News Markets (1)’ in Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen (eds.) *The Globalization of News* (London: Sage, 1998), pp. 35-37.

which ‘shared certain similarities with the US Associated Press’.⁵⁶ It should be noted that the PA never imposed exclusivity on its subscribers and did not require its subscribers to be members. Therefore direct comparisons with AP and the Australian Associated Press and New Zealand United Press Association, which did adopt these practices,⁵⁷ should be made with care.

Irish newspapers, the Press Association and the development of news supply

Irish newspapers were very much part of the systems and structures of international news supply that emerged in the United Kingdom in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. From the beginning they were actively engaged with the PA and the ideological differences normally so apparent in their published columns were rarely, if ever, apparent in the forums it provided. The 1870 Return to Companies House lists seventeen Irish shareholders with 134 £10 shares from Belfast, Cork, Dublin, Derry, Tralee and Waterford. The total share issue was 864 shares between 235 shareholders. Irish shareholding at over fourteen percent was nearly twice as high as its proportion of shareholders, at just over seven percent.⁵⁸ By the turn of the century the number of Irish shareholders had fallen to thirteen, holding 528 of 4,944 issued shares, just under eleven percent. These were located in Belfast, Cork, Dublin and Derry (see Table 1.1 over).⁵⁹ Irish shareholding would hereafter remain relatively steady at around ten percent.

The wider engagement of Irish newspapers with the PA can be tracked through the attendance of their representatives at general meetings and presence on the company’s board. This comprised the Committee of Management, responsible for the main running of the company, and the Consultative Board, which would join the Committee to deliberate on more

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 37. See also Peter Putnis, ‘How the International News Agency Model Failed – Reuters in Australia, 1877-1895’, *Media History*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1-17; idem, ‘Reuters in Australia: the Supply and Exchange of News, 1859-1877’, *Media History*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2004), pp. 67-88.

⁵⁷ Rantanen, ‘Domestic News Markets’, pp. 40-7; Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb, ‘Exclusivity and Cooperation in the Supply of News: The Example of the Associated Press, 1893-1945’, *The Journal of Policy History*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2012), p. 467.

⁵⁸ PA Returns to Companies House, 1870, GL MS 35383/1.

⁵⁹ PA Returns to Companies House, 1906, GL MS 35383/2. The PA recapitalised in 1904 issuing three additional shares for each share already held. See PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, May 1904, GL MS 35358/11 and Report of PA AGM, and EGM held immediately afterwards, 1904, GL MS 35365/6.

significant or strategic issues. In 1871 Finlay of the *Northern Whig* served on the Consultative Board. In 1873 and 1874 James Henderson of the *Belfast News Letter* was on the Committee of Management. From 1875 to 1878 J. Robinson of the *Daily Express*, Dublin, was on the Consultative Board. Edmund Dwyer Gray MP of the *Freeman's Journal* was on the board between 1880 and 1884, though which constituent body is not indicated. Thomas Crosbie of the *Cork Examiner* took up a position between 1888 and 1892 and again between 1894 and 1898. Some Irish representation could be relied on at general meetings throughout the last three decades of the nineteenth century, the first time there were none being 1899.

Table 1.1 Irish Press Association shareholders 1870 and 1906

1870		1906	
Newspaper	Shares	Newspaper	Shares
		<i>Belfast Evening Telegraph</i>	24
<i>Belfast Morning News</i>	6	<i>Irish News, Belfast</i>	48
<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	12	<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	48
<i>Northern Whig</i>	12	<i>Northern Whig</i>	48
<i>Cork Constitution</i>	12	<i>Cork Constitution</i>	48
<i>Cork Examiner</i>	12	<i>Cork Examiner</i>	48
<i>Dublin Daily Express</i>	12	<i>Dublin Daily Express</i>	48
<i>Dublin Evening Mail</i>	6		
<i>Dublin Evening Standard</i>	6		
<i>Freeman's Journal, Dublin</i>	12	<i>Freeman's Journal, Dublin</i>	48
		<i>Irish Independent, Dublin</i>	48
<i>Irish Times, Dublin</i>	12	<i>Irish Times, Dublin</i>	48
<i>Kerry Evening Post</i>	4		
<i>Londonderry Guardian</i>	2		
<i>Londonderry Journal</i>	4	<i>Londonderry Journal</i>	24
<i>Londonderry Sentinel</i>	4	<i>Londonderry Sentinel</i>	24
<i>Saunders's Newsletter, Dublin</i>	12		
<i>Tralee Chronicle</i>	3		
		<i>Ulster Echo, Belfast</i>	24
<i>Waterford Mail</i>	3		

Prior to this, as well as those mentioned above, who were regular attendees, W. G. Glendening of the *Londonderry Sentinel* attended in 1884. J.M. Gillies of the *Freeman's Journal* attended in 1888 and in 1890 when he was joined by H.L. Tivy, *Constitution*, Cork, and F. C. Beveridge, *Belfast Morning News*. Beveridge also attended in 1892, though this time on behalf of the *Freeman's Journal*. This can be seen in light of the Gray family's joint ownership of the two newspapers between 1882 and 1891.⁶⁰ Wm. Colhoun of the *Londonderry Sentinel* attended in 1896 and 1898 and was joined at the latter by F. Allan of the *Irish Daily Independent*.⁶¹

In the last three decades of the nineteenth century the PA service developed gradually. There were minor price increases in 1877, 1879 and 1884.⁶² From 1880 Reuters Mail News was offered at much reduced cost to the cabled alternative.⁶³ From 1885 Reuters New York Prices were offered, altering the PA Reuters contract to include commercial intelligence.⁶⁴ In 1889 Chicago Prices were added.⁶⁵ In 1899 the opening prices of American produce markets were introduced and in 1901 so was Reuters Continental Bourse.⁶⁶ From the beginning the PA offered a service and pricing structure that encompassed daily morning and evening, tri-weekly, bi-weekly and weekly newspapers. In 1885 the practice of quoting separate prices for non-daily newspapers was dropped and instead it was stated that they would be charged 'pro rata according to the number of days on which the News [was] supplied'.⁶⁷ As the PA's service developed so did the telegraph infrastructure, as had been intended under the 1869 Electric Telegraph Act. In Ireland, prior to the Act, the network had largely covered the east and south coasts, running from Derry through Belfast and Dublin to Cork and on to Tralee. By the late 1890s it had expanded so that virtually every small

⁶⁰ Eamon Phoenix, 'The History of a Newspaper: the *Irish News*, 1855-1995' in Eamon Phoenix (ed.) *A Century of Northern Life: The Irish News and 100 Years of Ulster History* (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 1995), pp. 9-11.

⁶¹ Reports of PA AGMs, 1870-1899, GL MS 35365/1-5.

⁶² PA Tariff, 1877, GL MS 35460/1; PA Tariff, 1879, GL MS 35460/1; PA Tariff, 1884, GL MS 35460/2.

⁶³ PA Tariff, 1880, GL MS 35460/2.

⁶⁴ PA Tariff, 1885, GL MS 35460/2.

⁶⁵ PA Tariff, 1889, GL MS 35460/2.

⁶⁶ PA Tariff, 1899, GL MS 35460/3; PA Tariff, 1901, GL MS 35460/4.

⁶⁷ PA Tariff, 1885, GL MS 35460/2.

town throughout the country was connected.⁶⁸ Consequently by the turn of the century a stable and organised system for the collection and distribution of news throughout Britain and Ireland had been established. The PA had developed the man-power and resources to gather news and gradually grown the services it could provide. The Post Office had developed the technology and infrastructure to distribute it.

There were few significant changes to the infrastructure or arrangements to distribute agency news in Britain and Ireland in the early twentieth century. From 1911-12 '[f]inancial concerns obliged the Post Office to reverse its policy of limiting [...the] number of private wires' that newspapers could lease to receive their news.⁶⁹ Private wires were staffed by the newspapers or PA themselves, not the Post Office, and ran direct from the PA, or other agencies, to the newspapers' home office. This resulted in quicker news transmission and reduced costs, partly because lower paid female telegraph operators were used.⁷⁰ These moves had first been discussed in 1906 and 1907.⁷¹ In 1906 the PA and ETC concluded the JSA whereby they agreed to cooperate on the collection and distribution of sporting and financial intelligence within the United Kingdom. The agencies had previously been competing in these fields to the extent that their costs had become nearly unbearable. The legal agreement stated that

such competition has been found to be detrimental to the interests of both the said parties and it has been agreed with a view to putting an end to such competition and reducing the expense of the collection and distribution of the said news the said services (except and subject as in hereafter set forth) should be worked jointly and the expenses and receipts pooled.⁷²

⁶⁸ Bradshaws Railway Map of Great Britain and Ireland, 1862, with hand drawn telegraph routes, British Telecom Corporate Archives, London, (BT) POST 81/115; General Post Office Telegraph and Telephone Map for Ireland, 1898, TNA, MFQ 1/377/7.

⁶⁹ Silberstein-Loeb, 'Structure of the News Market in Britain', pp. 784-5.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Minute of the Postmaster General covering the report of a departmental committee on certain matters connected with the transmission of press messages, 1906-7, 26 October 1907, BT POST 30/4322C.

⁷² Agreement between PA and ETC, 3 July 1906, GL MS 22957/1.

This arrangement was such a success that the ETC reported to its shareholders in 1907 that

the agreement with the Press Association is [...] working satisfactorily. The heavy expenses incurred by both agencies have now been materially reduced, and the Directors hope that the pooling arrangement, will in the course of the next financial year, show a profit.⁷³

The action of the two agencies in creating this agreement eliminated competition between themselves, and also created an exceptionally strong incumbent against which any new agency entering the market had to compete. Indeed it was part of the legal terms of the agreement that ‘[i]n the event of competition springing up from outside every effort shall be made by the Joint Committee to combat it’.⁷⁴ The agreement was in fact so successful it lasted into the 1960s.⁷⁵ It should however be noted that this cooperation extended only to certain types of news: sporting and financial intelligence. In other areas the PA and ETC continued to compete as before. The JSA does lend itself to comparison with cartelisation agreements that occurred elsewhere in the international and domestic news markets. It should also lead one to question the description of the PA as a monopoly supplier provided by Silberstein-Loeb.⁷⁶ If this had been the case the PA would have been in a dominant market position to deflate prices to the extent that it could drive the ETC out of business. This was evidently not the case. Further, the two companies continued to compete in areas not covered by the agreement.

Detailed financial records are unreliable but numerous Irish newspapers can be identified subscribing to the PA in the period covered by this chapter. Further, these were not exclusively shareholding members. Between 1901 and 1911 the PA Members Order Book lists a number of Irish newspapers as subscribers. From Belfast the *Irish News*, *Belfast News Letter*, *Northern Whig*, *Ulster Echo* and *Belfast Telegraph*. From Cork the

⁷³ Report of ETC AGM, 1907, GL MS 23138 Box 1, Bundle 5.

⁷⁴ Agreement between PA and ETC, 3 July 1906, GL MS 22957/1.

⁷⁵ Silberstein-Loeb, ‘Structures of the News Market in Britain’ p. 786.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 762

Cork Constitution and *Cork Examiner* are listed and from Dublin the *Dublin Express and Mail*, *Freeman's Journal*, *Irish Times* and *Irish Independent*. In Derry the *Derry Journal*, *Londonderry Sentinel* and *Derry Standard* were receiving the service.⁷⁷ Between 1911 and 1915 the same member subscribers are found in Belfast, Cork and Derry. In Dublin the *Evening Telegraph* and *Sunday Independent* were added.⁷⁸ In addition the Non-Members Order Book lists a number of Irish newspapers for the period covered by this chapter.⁷⁹

<i>Table 1.2. Irish newspapers listed in the Press Association Non-Members Order Book, 1899-1914</i>	
<i>Cork Free Press</i>	<i>Limerick Leader</i>
<i>Clare Journal, Ennis</i>	<i>Londonderry Independent and Sporting News</i>
<i>Kerry News and Weekly Reporter</i>	
<i>Kerry People</i>	<i>Newry Reporter</i>
<i>Kerry Evening Star</i>	<i>Waterford News</i>
<i>Limerick Chronicle</i>	<i>Waterford Star</i>
<i>Limerick Weekly Echo</i>	<i>Waterford Mail</i>

These Order Books appear to represent one-off services though and the records relating to annual subscriptions may be lost: they are certainly not apparent in the archive. In Clare and Limerick, for example, a perusal of the printed copies of the newspapers themselves indicates that the non-member *Clareman* as well as the *Clare Journal*, and *Limerick Chronicle* all received regular PA and Reuters telegrams during the South African War of 1899-1902.⁸⁰

Indeed these Order Books, even if complete, would not necessarily be a perfect record of how and where Irish newspapers got their international news during this period. The *Cork Free Press*, in September 1911, was found to have published an evening paper special which it was

⁷⁷ PA Members Order Book, 1901-11, GL MS 35467/1.

⁷⁸ PA Members Order Book, 1911-15, GL MS 35472.

⁷⁹ PA Non-Members Order Book, GL MS 35468/1.

⁸⁰ James O'Donnell, 'The Banner and the Boers: The Depiction and Perception of the South African War (1899-1902) in Co. Clare' (M.A. Dissertation, National University of Ireland, Galway, 2008), Chp. 3.

not entitled to reproduce.⁸¹ It was pressed for payment in September, November and December. Eventually, in June 1912, William O'Brien MP 'under pressure, paid the sum of £200 due under his guarantee, and had also furnished a fresh guarantee for a similar sum'.⁸² O'Brien was leader of the All-for-Ireland League in the House of Commons, formed in 1909 by a group of dissident IPP MPs.⁸³ A similar guarantee had been requested from the *Irish Independent* in January 1903, this was provided to the sum of £400 by William Martin Murphy.⁸⁴ In February this newspaper's shares in the PA were transferred to him, having been previously held by IPP leader John Redmond.⁸⁵ It is evidence of the commercial success Murphy made of the *Irish Independent* that on his death in 1919 the PA board resolved that 'no guarantee in place of Mr. Murphy's be demanded'.⁸⁶

Between 1912 and 1914 there was concern within the PA about the practice of 'lifting', whereby morning newspapers used evening paper telegrams that had not been sent to them and vice-versa. Though the practice was not unique to Irish publications, they were certainly among the perpetrators. The *Cork Constitution* was found to have lifted in June and July 1912 and was threatened with being cut-off in September of that year.⁸⁷ In July 1913 the *Belfast News Letter* complained of lifting in evening papers.⁸⁸ In September the *Cork Examiner* made a similar complaint, specifically mentioning the *Cork Free Press*. In the same month the *Irish*

⁸¹ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, September 1911, GL MS 35358/17.

⁸² PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, June 1912, GL MS 35358/17; Guarantee for *Cork Free Press* provided by William O'Brien, 9 June 1912, GL MS 35459.

⁸³ Philip Bull, 'O'Brien, William', *Dictionary of Irish Biography (DIB)*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a6503>, accessed 17 September 2012; idem, 'O'Brien, William (1852-1928)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (ODNB)*, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35281>, accessed 17 September 2012.

⁸⁴ Guarantee for the *Irish Daily Independent and Daily Nation and Evening Herald* provided by William Martin Murphy, 19 January 1903, GL MS 35459.

⁸⁵ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, February 1903, GL MS 35358/10.

⁸⁶ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, September 1919, GL MS 35358/20.

⁸⁷ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, June, July and September 1912, GL MS 35358/17.

⁸⁸ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, July 1913, GL MS 35358/17. This may well have been aimed at the *Belfast Telegraph*, though it is not specifically named. The case study in this chapter shows a surprising lack of attribution by this newspaper with regard to the 1911 Delhi Durbar.

News and *Irish Times* were found to have lifted as well.⁸⁹ In March 1914 the PA board proposed a solution to the problem whereby 'the privilege of "lifting" Evening Paper Specials where no Morning Paper Special was offered on payment of the sum of £20 per annum' be extended to morning papers.⁹⁰ This was accepted by the *Irish Times*, *Belfast News Letter* and *Northern Whig*.

After the hiatus of 1899 when no Irish representatives were present at the PA Annual General Meeting (AGM) there was at least one attendee every year until the outbreak of World War I. None managed to make an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) in 1905 with regard to establishing a telephone service to distribute certain forms of news. In 1900 R.C. Annaud of the *Belfast Telegraph* was present as was J.M. Gillies of the *Daily Express*, Dublin. The latter newspaper was subsequently represented by J.T. Robson in 1903 and J.Y. McPeake in 1906. Also present in 1900 was Sir James Henderson of the *Belfast News Letter*, who also attended in 1901 and 1904. In 1902 and 1903 Charles Henderson of the same newspaper attended and went on to represent it at AGMs between 1905 and 1913 inclusive. In 1902, '03 and '04 the *Belfast Telegraph* was represented by R.H. Baird and again between 1907 and 1913 inclusive. In 1907 he was joined by Capt. Baird of the same newspaper. A. McConagle, *Ulster Echo*, Belfast, attended in 1902 and 1904. In 1903 H.L. Tivy of the *Cork Constitution* was present. George Crosbie of the *Cork Examiner* first attended an AGM in 1904 as did J. Fisher of the *Northern Whig*, Belfast. Crosbie returned in 1907, when he was elected to the PA board which he served on until 1917. He attended all AGMs in this period except 1912, due to ill health, and 1913, due to a coal strike affecting the Cork to Dublin rail service.⁹¹ W.T. Brewster of the *Irish Independent* first attended an AGM in 1907 and continued to attend annually up to 1914. J.G. Simington of the *Irish Times* also first attended in

⁸⁹ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, July 1913, GL MS 35358/17.

⁹⁰ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, March 1914, GL MS 35358/18.

⁹¹ Report of PA AGM, 1912, GL MS 35365/9.

1907 and returned in 1908 and 1911. William Colhoun of the *Derry Sentinel* attended in 1912 and 1913.⁹²

These Irish representatives were not silent participants in these meetings. In 1903 Tivy, *Cork Constitution*, raised a matter that

he hoped he would not be deemed to do so in an captious spirit whatever. It was this. There was a portion of the United Kingdom which possibly some gentlemen present might have at times heard of. He spoke of Ireland. (Laughter.) In Ireland they never ceased to entertain the greatest admiration for Englishmen and Scotchmen [sic], but at the same time there were people who, although retiring by nature – (laughter) – felt that they had sometimes opinions of their own; and it must be a matter of regret to his colleagues in Ireland, to see that neither on the Committee nor on the Consultative Board had there been an Irish representative placed. He did not ask them to do so now, but in the case of another vacancy he just brought forward that Ireland might be considered as having some claim. (Hear, hear.)⁹³

As can be seen from Tivy's tone this criticism was not antagonistic nor intended to reflect a serious criticism of neglect of Irish interests. Rather it expresses an Irish desire to be fully involved and represented in the PA at all levels.

In 1907, as noted above, George Crosbie of the nationalist *Cork Examiner* was elected to the PA board. His proposal was seconded by Simington of the unionist *Irish Times*. In accepting his election Crosbie said that he felt that

it was only doing justice to Ireland to have a representative of Ireland on [the] Committee, because in proportion to their population and size he thought Ireland had always stood loyally by the Press Association. (Hear, hear.)⁹⁴

As with Tivy the tone of Crosbie's speech is one of inclusion, and occasional banter, representing a desire for participation and cooperation.

As part of his work on the board Crosbie was involved in the creation of the Press Association Share Purchase Company Ltd. (PASPC) in

⁹² Reports of PA AGMs, 1899-1914, GL MS 35365/6-9.

⁹³ Report of PA AGM, 1903, GL MS 35365/6.

⁹⁴ Report of PA AGM, 1907, GL MS 35365/8.

1911 when he was serving as PA chair by rotation (1910-11).⁹⁵ The PASPC was a subsidiary of the PA whose purpose was to buy up PA shares that had become inoperative due to the newspaper they had been issued to going out of business or ceasing to take the PA service. Though not of specific importance to Ireland's interactions with the PA (other than this is where the *Irish Press* purchased its shares in 1941) it is worth brief mention. At the EGM convened immediately following the AGM in May 1911 Crosbie's only role was to propose the motion to amend the PA's Articles of Association. This would allow the board to form the PASPC and provide the capital to finance it as part of the PA's reserve fund. The ensuing discussion is of some interest. The purpose of the PASPC was described and the example was given, though it was accepted that it was not necessarily typical, of

two ladies who possessed shares of papers, one of which had been defunct for nearly 20 years, and the other had ceased to take news from the Press Association. Neither of those ladies was well off, yet the Press Association could not advance them a single penny upon the scrip they held.⁹⁶

On the other hand there had been many cases in the previous few years of new applications for membership. The previous *ad hoc* practice had been to direct these new applicants to the offer to sell that had been with the PA longest. The suggestion that such inoperative shares, and their shareholders, could most easily be satisfied with the issuing of a dividend was met with the following response.

[It was] objected to in the very strongest manner [...] their becoming a body of shareholders who would hold their shares for the purpose of getting dividends. There would be a growing number of persons desiring that the Committee should pay larger and larger dividends [...] it was an absolutely necessary provision that they should keep the management of the Association in the hands of the persons directly interested in giving the best supply of news. One of the

⁹⁵ Pauric J. Dempsey's entry in the *DIB* incorrectly describes Crosbie as president of the PA at this time. The PA did not have a president, its senior elected board member being the chairman, the role Crosbie fulfilled 1910-11. See Pauric J. Dempsey, 'Crosbie, George', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2229>, accessed 28 July 2013.

⁹⁶ Report of PA AGM, and EGM held immediately afterwards, 1911, GL MS 35365/8.

reasons for making the scheme was to avoid the growth of the outside class.⁹⁷

In 1885 the PA had voted to make its shares dividend bearing.⁹⁸ Having paid dividends at 10s a share in 1886, '87, '88 and '90 there was criticism at the 1890 AGM that this was leading to the hoarding of capital in the reserve fund. Further, it was argued that the payment of dividends was contrary to the principles upon which the organisation was founded.⁹⁹ Dividends were not paid after 1890, profits instead being reinvested in the company. Thus, despite technically being a limited company with dividend bearing shares, in practice the PA thereafter acted as a cooperative organisation¹⁰⁰ along the lines on which it had been originally incorporated in 1869. The only benefit deriving from PA membership was the, admittedly attractive, ten percent discount on subscriptions and the right to attend general meetings and to serve on boards and committees of the PA.

At the AGM held in May 1914, shortly before the outbreak of World War I, W.T. Brewster of the *Irish Independent* raised the question of how the PA might seek to assist newspapers that were forced to cease publication temporarily due to strike action or lockout. He stated that he had been asked to bring this matter up on behalf of R.H. Baird of the *Belfast Telegraph* and James Henderson of the *Belfast News Letter*, both of whom were unable to attend for personal reasons.¹⁰¹ This matter had first been raised by Baird with the PA's manager, who presented it to the board, in late 1910 and again in November 1913.¹⁰² The key point, as raised by Brewster, was

in the case of newspapers who, by reason of strikes or through no fault of their own, might be prevented from publishing for a comparatively short period, arrangements should be made for a cessation of telegrams, and a corresponding rebate during the enforced stoppage of regular issues.¹⁰³

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Report of PA EGM, 1885, GL MS 35365/3.

⁹⁹ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts 1886-90, GL MS 35365/4; Report of PA AGM, 1890, GL MS 3536/4.

¹⁰⁰ Rantanen, *When New Was New*, p. 72.

¹⁰¹ Report of PA AGM, 1914, GL MS 35365/9.

¹⁰² PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, November 1913, GL MS 35358/17.

¹⁰³ Report of PA AGM, 1914, GL MS 35365/9.

The response of the board in 1910 and 1913, which was reiterated in response to Brewster's point at the 1914 AGM, was that to cancel the supply of press telegrams to a town or towns affected by industrial action would bring them in to conflict with the Post Office and Post Office unions. Would the Post Office be expected to keep the men on who would normally operate the telegraph service at a loss? Further, in light of the Post Office's claims that 'Press work did not pay' this might provide an excuse that would hamper the PA's service in the long term. The proposed solution was that in such a circumstance the amount of traffic dispatched would be minimised and that 'the Manager should consult with the Post Office as to the best course to adopt'.¹⁰⁴ Brewster expressed some dissatisfaction with this *ad hoc* approach but did not press the matter any further.

The raising of this matter at the PA AGM by Irish newspapers has particular resonance in Irish history of the period. As Brewster himself said:

The newspaper with which he was identified had passed through very serious strike trouble, lasting some six or seven months, in Dublin. In the recent labour troubles there these were the only newspapers attacked; it was quite possible on occasions [...] that in the next 24 hours they would have had to stop publication.¹⁰⁵

The events to which he was referring were part of the Dublin Lockout which ran between August 1913 and January 1914. James Connolly and Jim Larkin's aims of unionising unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the Irish Transport and General Workers Union (ITGWU), founded in 1909, were proving increasingly successful at this point. The Lockout began when ITGWU members in the Dublin United Tramway Company, operated by William Martin Murphy who also owned the *Irish Independent*, went on strike in demand for improved pay and conditions. In September the 400-strong Dublin Employers Federation agreed to take on the ITGWU by

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

locking out all employees who were members of the new union.¹⁰⁶ Murphy was a leading member of the Federation and the target of much personalised criticism from the ITGWU and its supporters during the Lockout.¹⁰⁷ The result of this protracted period of industrial unrest was ‘an effective victory for the employers’ when the strikers returned to work in January 1914.¹⁰⁸ The significance attached to Brewster raising the matter should be tempered by the fact that the only other Irish delegate at the 1914 AGM was Crosbie, who was on the board and perhaps restricted from raising points not on the agenda. It is interesting though that the firmly unionist *Belfast Telegraph* and *Belfast News Letter* chose, in seemingly amicable communication, to request that their point be raised by the representative of the pro-Home Rule, nationalist, *Irish Independent*. This suggests that, despite differences in their political and editorial positions, they shared a common attitude to labour relations at managerial level.

From the turn of the twentieth century to the outbreak of World War I the systems that enabled news gathering and distribution in Britain and Ireland, established three decades earlier, changed little. This should be seen as a product of their effectiveness rather than stagnation. As will be seen in later chapters, where developments presented themselves that would improve this system they were adopted – though not necessarily immediately.

Irish newspapers had been supportive of, and engaged in, the processes that helped to create this system from the beginning and continued to be so. There was nothing that particularly marked them out from their British contemporaries, with the exception of Tivy’s non-confrontational point about Irish representation on the PA Board in 1903. As has been shown Irish members had certainly been present in the preceding decades. Among themselves they seemed to operate amicably and cooperatively in this corporate sphere, regardless of their political or religious affiliations. For example the nomination to the PA board of George Crosbie, of the

¹⁰⁶ Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 192; Pdraig Yeates, ‘The Life and Career of William Martin Murphy’ in Mark O’Brien and Kevin Rafter (eds.) *Independent Newspapers: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), pp. 21-3

¹⁰⁷ Thomas Morrissey S.J., *William Martin Murphy* (Dundalk: Dundalgan Press, Historical Association of Ireland, 1997), pp. 47-56.

¹⁰⁸ Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 192.

Redmondite *Cork Examiner*, was seconded by J.G. Simington of the, unionist, *Irish Times*. And the unionist *Belfast Telegraph* and *Belfast News Letter* asked the representative of the nationalist *Irish Independent*, to raise their concerns about industrial relations in 1914. As will be demonstrated in the next part of this chapter, a case study on coverage of the 1911 Delhi Durbar, these differences do become more apparent in the content of the printed newspapers themselves.

Case Study: The Delhi Durbar, 1911

The rationale behind this case study is to examine whether the 1911 Delhi Durbar, as a major imperial event, prompted particular debates or exposed competing attitudes towards Ireland's relationship to empire and its future. At the Durbar George V announced that the capital of India would be moved from Calcutta to Delhi and that the unpopular partition of Bengal would be reversed. This marked, as N.C. Fleming has noted, 'the first major revision of Raj governance'.¹⁰⁹ This might be considered in light of the contemporary development of potentially similar historic changes in Irish governance heralded by the passing of the 1911 Parliament Act. Having removed the House of Lord's veto this was widely regarded as paving the way for Home Rule.

The Delhi Durbar ceremony was held on 12 December 1911 and was part of a series of events to mark the accession to the throne of George V. In May 1911 the newly crowned king had made a ceremonial visit to Dublin leading the *Irish Times* to proclaim that it was 'The Second City of Empire',¹¹⁰ though Calcutta, the other viceregal city in the Empire, had a fairer claim to that title in population terms at least.¹¹¹ Previous royal visits to Ireland by Queen Victoria (1900) and Edward VII (1903) had, as Senia Pařeta has commented, 'instigated fierce debate within the nationalist community and highlighted the ever deepening rifts between constitutional

¹⁰⁹ N.C. Fleming, 'The Press, Empire and Historical Time: *The Times* and Indian Self-Government', *Media History*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2010), p. 185.

¹¹⁰ *Irish Times*, 8 July 1911, p. 6.

¹¹¹ A. J. Christopher, "'The Second City of Empire": Colonial Dublin, 1911', *Journal of Historical Geography*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1997), p. 151.

nationalism and “advanced” nationalism’.¹¹² These competing responses had served to mark the increasing importance of political as well as cultural nationalism in separatist debates helping to shape the future of Irish nationalism and, in many ways, ‘the course of twentieth-century Irish history’.¹¹³ It is perhaps notable that the 1911 visit does not seem to have produced similarly vociferous responses, though there is a limited literature available on the topic. It is possible that the Parliament Act and the prospects it presented for the introduction of Home Rule prompted a greater acquiescence among the nationalist community. Within Irish unionism, Alvin Jackson has commented, the period 1911-14 represented an upsurge in the superficial and sentimental attachment to empire.¹¹⁴ This was particularly prompted by the passing of the Act and the ‘threatened dismemberment of the United Kingdom’ that Home Rule represented.¹¹⁵ However, it is worth noting that Irish Unionist leaders and politicians were often reluctant to engage in deeper intellectual debates on empire during this period in case they might be used to support the argument in favour of Home Rule.¹¹⁶

The 1911 Durbar was, in fact, the third such event held to celebrate a British monarch in India. Queen Victoria and Edward VII had been similarly feted, in 1877 and 1903 respectively. However, the 1911 Durbar was distinguished by the actual presence of the monarch being celebrated and George V’s significant constitutional announcements.¹¹⁷ These spectacular gatherings where the British monarch received the Imperial crown of India provided for the ‘adopt[ion of] the symbolic trappings of Asia’s dynastic lordships’¹¹⁸ and the opportunity to ‘legitimate and popularize British Rule in India’.¹¹⁹ The Indian princes who ruled under the British government of India would come to offer their homage amid the

¹¹² Senia Pašeta, ‘Nationalist Response to Two Royal Visits to Ireland, 1900 and 1903’, *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 124 (Nov. 1999), p. 488.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 503-4.

¹¹⁴ Jackson, ‘Irish Unionists and the Empire’, pp. 143.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-8.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 123-4.

¹¹⁷ Alan Trevithick, ‘Some Structural and Sequential Aspects of the British Imperial Assemblages at Delhi: 1877-1911’, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1990), p. 570.

¹¹⁸ Robin J. Moore, ‘Imperial India, 1858-1914’ in Andrew Porter (ed.) *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. III: The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 468.

¹¹⁹ Trevithick, ‘Structural and Sequential Aspects’, p. 561.

splendour, processions and associated pomp and circumstance. The people of India would be able to see their new emperor, and the military forces would be celebrated.

As well as its role as ‘a cornerstone of the British system of worldwide economic, military and political power’¹²⁰ throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries India occupied a ‘correspondingly important position within the Empire’s media and communication system’.¹²¹ Reuters and the leading London daily newspapers retained correspondents there. Consequently coverage of the Durbar can be comfortably expected. In fact the PA produced additional coverage through its Foreign Special service. This was also known as the Supplementary Foreign Service and provided

Important and Interesting News of a Political, Social and General character, not included in Reuter’s Service, specially Telegraphed; of Interviews on Current Colonial and Foreign Affairs; and of Independent and Extended Reports of Occurrences of Great and Absorbing Interest.¹²²

The choice of the Delhi Durbar as a case study for this chapter allows for the examination of its treatment by the mainstream daily Irish newspapers as an imperial event. In addition it provides the opportunity to see how far ‘the complexities of the Irish imperial experience’ were exposed in that coverage.¹²³ The connections and associations of Ireland and India as imperial possessions and their agitations for greater autonomy, about which there is a significant literature, were well established at this point. In or around 1878 IPP MP Frank Hugh O’Donnell had conceived a plan to elect one or more Indian MPs from Irish constituencies who would follow the Home Rule argument on Irish matters and otherwise be representatives for

¹²⁰ Judith M. Brown, ‘India’ in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.) *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. IV: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 421.

¹²¹ Chandrika Kaul, ‘India, the Imperial Press Conferences and the Empire Press Union: The Diplomacy of News in the Politics of Empire, 1909-1946’ in Chandrika Kaul (ed.) *Media and the British Empire* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 128.

¹²² PA Tariff, 1911, GL MS 35460/5.

¹²³ Michael Silvestri, *Ireland and India: Nationalism, Empire and Memory* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 3.

India in Westminster.¹²⁴ Similar ideas were floated in 1883 and 1891, though none of them was brought to fruition. Michael Silvestri has commented that '[f]rom the late nineteenth century onwards, Ireland stood as an example of anti-colonial resistance to Indian nationalists'.¹²⁵ On the other hand Irishmen, and women, were present in India as part of the imperial administration and military forces. As part of the Durbar celebrations one of the seven British Army and two Indian regiments honoured by having new colours presented to them by George V was the Connaught Rangers. Their home depot was in Galway, capital of Ireland's western province. It is noted in newspaper reports of the time, the *Irish Times* on 12 December for example, that in the case of six of the regiments the new colours were consecrated by two Anglican Bishops. In the case of the Connaught Rangers, however, the service was conducted by a Roman Catholic Bishop. The colours of the Indian regiments were not consecrated.¹²⁶

The Delhi Durbar then has merit for a case study not just in being a significant, imperial, news event of which it is reasonable to presume sufficient news coverage, but also because of a series of factors that suggest that it would have had particular resonance in Ireland and Irish newspapers.

Though this case study does not purport to offer a detailed content analysis of the newspapers under study, one of the striking elements of the comparative coverage comes in the quantity of coverage, in terms of column inches, that the various newspapers dedicated to the event. This corresponds very broadly to the perceived politico-religious affiliations of each publication: those with a unionist bent dedicated more of their space to the event than those with nationalist affiliations. On 13 December 1911, the day after the Durbar itself when telegraphed news would first have been available to the morning newspapers, the *Belfast News Letter* dedicated nearly a full broadsheet page to its coverage and its Dublin based contemporary the *Irish Times* provided a nearly equal quantity of copy. The extent of the coverage provided by the nationalist newspapers was notably

¹²⁴ Jennifer Regan-Lefebvre, *Cosmopolitan Nationalism in the Victorian Empire: Ireland, India and the Politics of Alfred Webb* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p. 138.

¹²⁵ Silvestri, *Ireland and India*, p. 6.

¹²⁶ *Irish Times*, 12 December 1911, p. 7.

less extensive. This is consistent with the greater popular enthusiasm for empire among unionists at this time described above.

This case study will progress by giving an overview of the coverage each newspaper provided of the Delhi Durbar and events surrounding it in terms of source, frequency / quantity and comment. It will then compare two particular events, the burning of a tent in the Durbar camp and the Durbar itself. It will finally summarise its findings and offer some possible explanations for the coverage and reaction presented.

The unionist *Belfast News Letter*, as noted above, gave particular prominence to George V's visit to India. It cited the PA Special service, Reuters and in one example the Central News Agency as its sources. It also made use on one occasion of an informal correspondent,¹²⁷ an S.K. Ratcliffe, to provide a pen sketch of 'Imperial Delhi'.¹²⁸ The *Belfast News Letter* described Ratcliffe as having recently been resident in Delhi itself. Ratcliffe had been assistant editor and subsequently editor of the *Statesman* in Calcutta, 1902-07, and a member of the senate of the University of Calcutta, 1905-07. At the time of the Delhi Durbar he was a contributor to a number of British newspapers and periodicals, including the *Manchester Guardian*, and working as a university extension lecturer in London.¹²⁹ It is most likely that his article was contributed on a free-lance basis, possibly at

¹²⁷ I define an 'informal correspondent' as an individual who provided reports or copy of, or relevant to, an international event for a newspaper, but was not an employee. Though they might provide more than one item of copy these are usually only related to a single episode or event. Often, but not always, identified by name they are further distinguished in a period where by-lines were virtually unknown. The 1938 *Report on the British Press* by Political and Economic Planning (PEP) details the conventions by which the various types of correspondents might be identified: 'Our Correspondent' indicated a local resident shared by several newspapers, 'Our Own Correspondent' indicated a permanent resident staff reporter, 'Our Special Correspondent' indicated a staff reporter sent to specifically cover an event, or a non-staff reporter engaged specifically for that purpose, 'A Correspondent' indicated the, often but not always, unsolicited work of a free-lance reporter. The report estimated that at that time *The Times* had 120 foreign correspondents of whom about forty were either permanent staff or paid a retaining fee, the remainder being paid on a piece rate for published articles. The resources of the provincial newspapers of Britain and Ireland would have clearly been more limited. See PEP, *Report on the British Press: A Survey of Its Current Operations and Problems with Special Reference to National Newspapers and Their Part in Public Affairs* (London: PEP, 1938), p. 159-160.

¹²⁸ *Belfast News Letter*, 7 December 1911, p. 8.

¹²⁹ 'Ratcliffe, Samuel Kirkham (1868-1858) [sic]', *Scoop!* [Biographical dictionary of British and Irish journalists, 1800-1960], http://www.scoop-database.com/bio/ratcliffe_samuel_kirkham_1, accessed 19 September 2013.

the invitation of the newspaper.¹³⁰ From the beginning of December 1911 the *Belfast News Letter* carried daily coverage of the royal visit to India, which only dropped off a week after the Durbar itself on the nineteenth and twentieth of the month and between the twenty-fourth and twenty-sixth of the month. The latter can easily be explained by the disruption to print runs due to Christmas. From the beginning of January 1912 coverage is less extensive with no reports on the fifth and sixth of the month. The royal party's departure from Bombay is reported on the eleventh and there are subsequent reports on the twelfth and fifteenth relating to their voyage home.

The *Belfast News Letter* used a number of standard formulas in the titles and headlines it gave to the telegraphic reports it reproduced. 'The Royal Visit to India' and 'Their Majesties in ...' were regularly used and superlatives were frequently attached to descriptive phrases, for example: 'Brilliant Ceremonies Foreshadowed'¹³¹, 'An Imposing Reception [...] Triumphant Progress Through the City',¹³² 'Great Popular Ovation – Startling Political Changes'¹³³ and 'Their Majesties in India [...] Hearty Welcome by Cheering Thousands'.¹³⁴ In its editorial it is firmly in favour of British rule in India and the perceived benefits this provided, commenting on 4 December that

Much is heard from time to time of discontent in India with British rule, and it is true that agitators have stirred up seditious movements, but there can be no doubt that the masses of the people are loyal to their King-Emperor. [...] There are fanatics who raise the cry of 'India for the Indians' but the greatest disaster which could befall India would be the cessation or overthrow of English rule.¹³⁵

Though overtly commenting here on Indian matters a subtext can be seen in reference to Ireland and the ongoing, and increasingly successful, agitation by the IPP for Home Rule - and in more advanced nationalist circles for complete Irish independence. This is particularly noticeable in the use of the

¹³⁰ PEP, *Report on the British Press*, p. 135

¹³¹ *Belfast News Letter*, 1 December 1911, p. 8.

¹³² *Belfast News Letter*, 4 December 1911, p. 7.

¹³³ *Belfast News Letter*, 13 December 1911, p. 7.

¹³⁴ *Belfast News Letter*, 1 January 1912, p. 7.

¹³⁵ *Belfast News Letter*, 4 December 1911, p. 7.

phrase ‘India for the Indians’, which could be seen as a proxy for ‘Ireland for the Irish’. This was a common slogan among nineteenth-century Irish nationalists and the title of an anti-landlord pamphlet published by Henry O’Neill in 1868.¹³⁶ This attitude and model of comparison became overt in the newspaper’s editorial on 13 December, the day after the Durbar itself. Commenting on George V’s speech where the movement of the imperial capital to Delhi, from where the government would primarily restrict itself to ‘matters of Imperial concern’, and the reversal of the partition of Bengal were announced it concluded with:

The demands of the Indian Nationalists are to be satisfied by giving them provincial Home Rule, but when they get it they will insist on still larger powers, and perhaps use those which they have to undermine the authority of the supreme Government at Delhi. The Radical Government seems to be afflicted with a Devolution microbe, and it is now doing in India what it proposes to do as soon as possible in the United Kingdom. We can only hope that its policy will not be as disastrous there as we are sure it will be at home.¹³⁷

The *Northern Whig* provided similarly extensive coverage of the events in India as the *Belfast News Letter* and was similarly aligned to the Protestant / unionist community. It cited the PA Special and Reuters services as well as the *London Times*, though this was also provided as part of the PA service. It provided regular coverage from the beginning of December 1911. The first significant absence of news reports relating to the royal visit to India occurred four days after the Durbar ceremony on the sixteenth and seventeenth of the month and again from the nineteenth to twenty-second. There was an hiatus around the Christmas period and again between the fifth and seventh of January 1911. The departure of the royal party from Bombay was reported on the eleventh and twelfth of the month. The headlines and titles that the *Northern Whig* gave to its telegraphic reports contain less noticeably stock formulas than the *Belfast News Letter*, though phrases such as ‘Royal Visit to India’ and ‘Their Majesties in / leave for etc...’ do recur. What is notable about these headlines and titles is the

¹³⁶ David McGuinness and Linde Lunney, ‘O’Neill, Henry’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a6925>, accessed 19 September 2013

¹³⁷ *Belfast News Letter*, 13 December 1911, p. 7.

recurring use of the phrase ‘King-Emperor’, for example: ‘King Emperor in Bombay – Scenes of Magnificence’,¹³⁸ ‘Through the Durbar Camps – Magnificent Display by Native Princes – The King Emperor’s Courtesy’,¹³⁹ and ‘Proclamation of the King Emperor – Gorgeous Scenes at Delhi’.¹⁴⁰ There was also a significant presence of phrases relating to the native peoples and oriental nature of India. For example, ‘Native Loyalty’,¹⁴¹ ‘Scenes of Magnificence – Greetings from Ruling Chiefs’,¹⁴² and ‘The Idol of His Indian People’.¹⁴³ The use of these formulas in headlines and titles suggests a particular attitude to empire and ‘native’ peoples in the *Northern Whig*. These thoughts and attitudes are reflected in its editorial columns. For example, it wrote on the day of the Durbar itself:

It is a curious fact that, though the Durbar – a survival of the primitive assembly at the gate – is one of the oldest institutions in the East, very little use has been made of it for Imperial purposes. [...] in the matter of barbaric pearl and gold the Georgian Durbar is unique and the descriptions of the of the camps of the ruling chiefs read like a chapter out of the ‘Arabian Nights’¹⁴⁴

With regard to the necessity for an occasion such as the Durbar and on the character of the Indian people and the nature of governing the territory it further commented that ‘Indian people would willingly sacrifice some efficiency in the machine for a little of the warmth and colour that the personality of the SOVEREIGN alone can give’ (emphasis in the original).¹⁴⁵

The *Belfast Telegraph* had significantly less coverage of events surrounding the Delhi Durbar than both the *Belfast News Letter* and *Northern Whig*, despite being traditionally viewed as a unionist newspaper. This might be partly explained by the fact that it was an evening paper and therefore seen as serving a different social and commercial role in society,

¹³⁸ *Northern Whig*, 4 December 1912, p. 7.

¹³⁹ *Northern Whig*, 11 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁴⁰ *Northern Whig*, 13 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁴¹ *Northern Whig*, 5 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁴² *Northern Whig*, 8 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁴³ *Northern Whig*, 4 January 1912, p. 7.

¹⁴⁴ *Northern Whig*, 12 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

providing end of day market and sporting intelligence and perhaps a more light hearted or summary view of the news. It does seem to have been able to exploit the evening publications traditional advantage of providing reports of the events of the day of publication, whereas morning papers reported those of the day before. It carried a report on 12 December 1911 which began ‘The great Coronation Durbar is at an end’.¹⁴⁶ Delhi was, and is, five and a half hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time and the Durbar began at midday.

The *Belfast Telegraph*’s attribution of news agency material is extremely limited, citing the PA Special occasionally, and it frequently provides no source for its overseas news. This might be seen as a precursor of the concerns over ‘lifting’ that exercised the PA board between 1912 and 1914 mentioned above. The *Belfast News Letter* had written complaining of the practice in evening papers in July 1913.¹⁴⁷ The *Belfast Telegraph* was the major evening publication in Ulster and Belfast and in July 1914 it was censured for publishing telegrams provided for morning papers.¹⁴⁸ It carried a regular column entitled ‘The World Over’ which was a summary of reports carried in the London morning papers and here the *Daily Mail*, *Times*, *Daily Telegraph* and *Standard* are regularly cited. This may have been the product of the PA service but most likely it was taken from copies of these newspapers that arrived in Belfast with the morning mail. Coverage of events surrounding the Delhi Durbar began in early December 1911. There are daily articles from the sixth until the fourteenth, with subsequent articles on the sixteenth, nineteenth and twenty-seventh. In its headlines and titles it used the phrase ‘The King Emperor Visit’¹⁴⁹ and ‘Indian Empire – the King’s Durbar Speech’¹⁵⁰ similar to the *Northern Whig*, but there are no particularly noticeable formulas. There is no particularly prominent editorial line, but because of the lack of citation it is difficult to identify what copy is the product of agency news and which is editorial.

¹⁴⁶ *Belfast Telegraph*, 12 December 1911, p. 3.

¹⁴⁷ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, July 1913, GL MS 35358/17.

¹⁴⁸ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, July 1914, GL MS 35358/18.

¹⁴⁹ *Belfast Telegraph*, 4 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁵⁰ *Belfast Telegraph*, 13 December 1911, p. 3.

The Belfast-published, nationalist, *Irish News* provided coverage of events in India from early December 1911 until the departure of the royal party on 11 January 1912, but not in nearly the quantity found in either the *Belfast News Letter* or *Northern Whig*. There was a concentration of coverage on the 13 December, the day after the Durbar when agency news covering the event would have been available to the morning newspapers. It cites the PA, but not the PA Special, and Reuters. What is noticeable in its use of headlines and titles is a tendency to refer to ‘King George’ rather than ‘His Majesty’. For example, ‘King George in India – The Royal Landing at Bombay’¹⁵¹ and ‘The Indian Durbar – Opened at Delhi by King George – Royal Proclamation’.¹⁵² It does use ‘King-Emperor’s Speech Before Leaving’¹⁵³ and ‘His Majesty’s Farewell Message to Officials and People’,¹⁵⁴ but these are both related to official dispatches from the India Office providing the text of speeches delivered by George V. The seeming reluctance of the *Irish News* to use more honorific terms to describe the monarch may be seen as indications of its traditionally nationalist position.

A critical attitude towards empire is exposed when it commented on 4 December that

[The Durbar] will be an expensive ceremony; but the King’s advisers in India are good judges of the situation; and the people of India will ‘foot the bill’. Many of the more intelligent may protest against the amount; but 298,000,000 out of the 300,000,000 will know nothing about the matter. ‘Their’s not to reason why; theirs but to pay and die’ – if a slight alteration of Tennyson is allowable.¹⁵⁵

There is no particular evidence of an editorial line referencing India and Indian nationalism to Ireland. Sympathy is clearly evident when it refers to ‘Indian patriots’¹⁵⁶ who were pardoned as part of the reversal of the partition of Bengal. But that article was concerned with the contents of George V’s speech at the Durbar, its ramifications for India and its reception in Westminster.

¹⁵¹ *Irish News*, 4 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁵² *Irish News*, 13 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁵³ *Irish News*, 18 December 1911, p. 4.

¹⁵⁴ *Irish News*, 11 January 1912, p. 4.

¹⁵⁵ *Irish News*, 4 December 1911, p. 4.

¹⁵⁶ *Irish News*, 13 December 1911, p. 4.

The Dublin-published, nationalist, *Freeman's Journal* provided coverage of the events surrounding the Delhi Durbar from early December 1911 to the departure of the royal party on 11 January 1912. The extent of the reports follows a similar pattern to that of the *Irish News*, in that though the time frame covered extends over the whole of the royal visit to India the frequency and prominence of reports is much less than the *Belfast News Letter* and the *Northern Whig*. It cites Reuters and the PA, though not the PA Special. The headlines and titles it uses for these agency reports are in general unexceptional, typically reading 'Royal Visit to India'¹⁵⁷ or 'The King in India'.¹⁵⁸ Its titling reaches its most excitable on 13 December with: 'Durbar Day at Delhi – The Capital of The Empire – To Be Removed to Delhi – Important Announcement'.¹⁵⁹ It used 'King-Emperor Leaves Delhi'¹⁶⁰ on 18 December, reproducing a Reuters telegram.

Commenting on George V's Durbar speech which moved the capital of India to Delhi and reversed the partition of Bengal the *Freeman's Journal* questioned in an editorial how previous English politicians might have reacted to the apparent constitutional reversal whereby an

English King suddenly blazing out in the portentous appearance of a Mogul Emperor with plenary Oriental powers to shift capitals and shape satrapies? [...] the Oriental is to be impressed with the personal power of the monarch, and that the opinion of England has not only been left unconsulted, but that the whole thing has been done in secret by a few men.¹⁶¹

The editorial is concerned with the constitutional repercussions of the announcement, reversing the convention whereby a British monarch did not make or announce policy that had not been previously discussed and agreed by the Government and Parliament, and its implications for India. Critical of the nature of the announcement whereby '[t]o impress the Oriental Calcutta is suddenly made nothing and Old Delhi becomes everything, schemes of autonomy are adumbrated, and Bengal is reunited to the sound of the silver

¹⁵⁷ *Freeman's Journal*, 1 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁵⁸ *Freeman's Journal*, 16 December 1911, p. 6.

¹⁵⁹ *Freeman's Journal*, 13 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁶⁰ *Freeman's Journal*, 18 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁶¹ *Freeman's Journal*, 13 December 1911, p. 7.

trumpet'.¹⁶² The editorial does not make any reference that would compare India to Ireland specifically. Given the point in question this is perhaps not too surprising. But the attitude towards the King is telling.

The nationalist *Irish Independent*, also published in Dublin, produced almost daily coverage of events relating to the royal visit to India from the beginning of December 1911 until the eighteenth of the month, the exceptions being the fifth and fifteenth. After this coverage became sparse but did continue to the middle of January. It cited the PA Special and Reuters as well as quoting the *Daily Mail* on 9 December. It used headlines and titles such as 'The Coming Durbar',¹⁶³ and 'Their Majesties Gratified',¹⁶⁴ and when being more extensive 'Delhi's Welcome – Imperial Procession – Scenes of Oriental Splendour',¹⁶⁵ or 'The King in Delhi – Oriental Splendour – His Majesty's Visit to the Camps of Princes'.¹⁶⁶ Its editorial comment on matters surrounding the Delhi Durbar was notably muted. For example on 13 December 1911, commenting on the changes announced in George V's speech at the ceremony, it referred to the 1909 Government of India Act. Here it suggested that the reforms were the development of the policy instituted by that legislation, as the Marquis of Lansdowne and Lord Curzon, both ex-Viceroy of India, had said in the House of Lords.

[The] Act provided for an enlargement of the Legislative Council of the Governor-General and of the existing Provincial Legislative Councils; for the election of a certain proportion of their members by popular vote; and for greater freedom to discuss matters of general public interest, to ask questions at their meetings, and more especially to discuss the annual financial statements. [...The Act was not] the result of concessions to seditious agitation.¹⁶⁷

This might be read as an extremely oblique reference to Home Rule and the facility that it would provide for Irish politicians, sitting in Dublin, to debate and vote on internal matters. A veiled criticism of more advanced Irish

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ *Irish Independent*, 1 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁶⁴ *Irish Independent*, 13 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁶⁵ *Irish Independent*, 8 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁶⁶ *Irish Independent*, 11 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁶⁷ *Irish Independent*, 13 December 1911, p. 4.

nationalism might be read in to its suggestion that such advances in India were not achieved as a result of concessions to seditious elements. However the newspaper's general tone, though not necessarily trumpeting empire, is not notably critical of it.

The unionist *Irish Times* in Dublin followed a similar pattern of coverage to the *Irish Independent*. Starting from the beginning of December 1911 it provided coverage on an almost daily basis until the nineteenth, the exceptions being the fifth and fifteenth. As noted above, the quantity of coverage it provided on 13 December was particularly extensive. After this coverage reduced significantly but continued until the departure of royal party from India on 11 January 1912. It cites the PA Special and Reuters as well as the *Morning Post* from London on 12 December. Its headlines and titles are notably more sober than its unionist contemporaries in Belfast. For example, 'Their Majesties' Voyage',¹⁶⁸ 'Royal Visit to India [...] Enthusiastic Scenes',¹⁶⁹ 'The New Indian Capital – The King's Announcement – Re-Union of Bengal',¹⁷⁰ or, when feeling slightly more excitable, 'Indian Durbar – Unequaled Pomp and Splendour – Proclamation of The King'.¹⁷¹

In an editorial on 9 December it commented that:

The least imaginative persons will hardly read without a thrill of excitement and wonder the account of the King-Emperor's reception at the gates of India, Bombay [...] The authority of the West, with the humanity and splendour of the East, made such a picture as will send lovers of the classics back to Theocritus for a parallel.¹⁷²

The closest it came to comparing issues in Ireland to India was when it commented in the same article that:

It is a stormy time in the history of World politics. The domestic affairs of the United Kingdom are troubled and confused. [...] But, though serious [in India] they are not such as a firm and just

¹⁶⁸ *Irish Times*, 1 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁶⁹ *Irish Times*, 4 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁷⁰ *Irish Times*, 13 December 1911, p. 8.

¹⁷¹ *Irish Times*, 13 December 1911, p.7.

¹⁷² *Irish Times*, 9 December 1911, p. 10.

Government and the best Civil Service in the world need despair of solving.¹⁷³

Commenting on the Durbar itself it wrote that:

In India, where kings still appear as ennobled omnipotence, and are the centre of all tradition, a Coronation is the supreme assertion of physical authority, and of the might and grandeur which that authority entails. [...] British rule in India stands for firm and just government, material progress [and] impartial benefits.¹⁷⁴

With regard to moving the capital to Delhi and the reversal of the partition of Bengal it continued: ‘The changes were recommended to the Imperial Government in a long and reasoned statement by the Council of the Governor General of India’.¹⁷⁵

As with the *Irish News* and *Freeman’s Journal*, the editorial comment of the *Irish Times* focused on the relevance of the Durbar to India, its possible repercussions in Westminster and its implications for the system of parliamentary democracy. There is no particularly obvious attempt to draw specific parallels with Ireland.

The nationalist *Cork Examiner* carried coverage of events surrounding the Delhi Durbar from the beginning of December 1911 until the middle of January 1912. The pattern of this coverage was similar to that of the *Irish News* and *Freeman’s Journal*, only becoming particularly prominent on the days immediately surrounding the Durbar itself, particularly the 13 December. It cited the PA Special, Reuters, Central News Agency and *The Times* via the PA. It used ‘Royal Visit to India’, or variations of, most frequently in its headlines and titles and on 13 December used ‘Coronation Durbar – Yesterday’s Ceremonial – Impressive Spectacle [...] Momentous Changes’¹⁷⁶

It commented on 13 December that:

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ *Irish Times*, 13 December 1911, p. 6.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ *Cork Examiner*, 13 December 1911, p. 5.

The changes in the Indian Government are of great importance, and indicates that the Liberal policy of progress is being extended and that the transfer of the seat of Government from Calcutta to Delhi will ultimately have the effect of converting India into a series of autonomous provinces.¹⁷⁷

As in the case of the *Irish Independent* this might be seen as a highly veiled reference to the Ireland's prospects for self-government within the United Kingdom under Home Rule, but the link is tenuous at best. This newspaper's editorial comment on the Delhi Durbar is extremely limited. It is notable that on the same day and same page that the comment above occurs, in a single extended paragraph, an entire column of the editorial page was dedicated to criticism of 'the most virulent anti-Home Ruler' Edward Carson.¹⁷⁸ If there was a desire to draw direct comparisons between India and Ireland here was the opportunity – but it was not taken up.

To take a more detailed look at the sources and coverage of events surrounding the Delhi Durbar provided by these newspapers two news items will be examined in more detail: the burning of a ceremonial tent, reported on 6 December 1911, and the Durbar itself, reported on 13 December 1911.

The most extensive reports of the tent burning were, perhaps surprisingly, found in the *Cork Examiner*. It first reproduced a very short Reuters telegram:

The magnificent tent in which the King-Emperor was to receive the Indian princes has been burned down. The fire has caused a great sensation and the cause of the outbreak is quite unknown.¹⁷⁹

It then reproduced a later, more extensive, Reuters telegram which described: how the fire occurred following a full rehearsal of the Durbar, the 'huge massive silver poles'¹⁸⁰ in the tent, that it was the tent in which George V was to receive the Indian princes after arriving at Selingarh station and that it belonged to Bahawalpur State and 'cannot be replaced

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.; see Alvin Jackson, 'Carson, Edward Henry', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a1514>, accessed 26 October 2012.

¹⁷⁹ *Cork Examiner*, 6 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

owing to its size and decorated ceiling'.¹⁸¹ It then reproduced a London *Times* telegram, via the PA, which further described how at the time the tent was surrounded by troops who had been taking part in the rehearsal.

The rehearsal of the reception was over, and the soldiers had fallen out. Many of them had been permitted to enter the marquee. The floor was littered with loose straw, and it is easy to surmise how the fire started.¹⁸²

The implication here might be that a loose match or cigarette end was dropped by one of the soldiers. The *Cork Examiner* headlined these reports 'Durbar Sensation – King's Tent Burned Down'.¹⁸³ The *Northern Whig* used exactly the same headline, adding 'A Mysterious Occurrence'.¹⁸⁴ It reproduced the second telegram word for word and cited Reuters. The *Belfast Telegraph*, under the headline 'Explosion in Durbar Camp',¹⁸⁵ cited *The Times*, but does not specify if this was via the PA. The *Irish News* and *Freeman's Journal* both reproduced the first, short telegram, word for word citing Reuters, but did not add any further coverage. The *Irish News* used the headline 'Durbar Tent Burned – Sensational Occurrence at Delhi: Mysterious Fire'¹⁸⁶ whereas the *Freeman's Journal* chose to describe 'Another Durbar Disaster – King's Camp Burnt Down'.¹⁸⁷ The *Belfast News Letter*, *Irish Times* and *Irish Independent* all cited the PA Special. However this appears to be exactly the same telegram as that cited as Reuters in the *Cork Examiner* and *Northern Whig*. The telegram reproduced in the *Irish Times* was identical to the second, more extensive, Reuters telegram. In the *Belfast News Letter* there was a minor deletion. The *Irish Independent* edited it more heavily but there were enough common phrases to comfortably assert that the source was the same. For example, 'The fire has caused a sensation, and is likely to upset the elaborate programme arranged

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ *Northern Whig*, 6 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁸⁵ *Belfast Telegraph*, 6 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁸⁶ *Irish News*, 6 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁸⁷ *Freeman's Journal*, 6 December 1911, p. 7.

for the arrival of their majesties'.¹⁸⁸ However, whereas the *Belfast News Letter* and *Irish Times* played down the significance of the event in their headlines, 'The Kings Visit to India – Rehearsals at Durbar Camp – Royal Tent Burned Down'¹⁸⁹ and 'Royal Visit to India – Sensation at Delhi – King's Tent Destroyed by Fire'¹⁹⁰ respectively, the *Irish Independent* proclaimed 'Durbar Havoc – A Disastrous Fire – Reception Tent Destroyed'.¹⁹¹

With regard to the Delhi Durbar itself the *Cork Examiner*, *Northern Whig*, *Belfast News Letter*, *Irish Times* and *Irish Independent* all cited the PA Special service. Though as noted above the actual amount of space given to this coverage varied, there is no doubt that there was a single common source. They all opened their columns with:

The Coronation Durbar is at an end [or over]. Stupendous in conception and superbly staged and conducted the most stirring and brilliant spectacle ever seen in Hindustan has become history, for in the glorious sunshine of a perfect Indian day George V, King and Emperor, has in person proclaimed his Coronation in his empire in the East.¹⁹²

The headlines used by these newspapers were not the same however. The *Irish Times*, *Northern Whig* and *Belfast News Letter* all used notably celebratory phrases: 'Indian Durbar – Unequaled Pomp and Splendour [...] Rare Outburst of Loyalty',¹⁹³ 'Proclamation of the King Emperor – Gorgeous Scenes at Delhi – Ceremony of Unrivalled Magnificence',¹⁹⁴ and 'The Coronation Durbar – Historic Ceremony at Delhi – Great Popular Ovation'.¹⁹⁵ However the *Cork Examiner* and *Irish Independent* were more subdued: 'Coronation Durbar – Yesterday's Ceremonial – Impressive

¹⁸⁸ *Cork Examiner*, p. 5; *Northern Whig*, p. 7; *Belfast News Letter*, p. 7; *Irish Times* p. 7; *Irish Independent*, p. 5; 6 December 1911.

¹⁸⁹ *Belfast News Letter*, 6 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁹⁰ *Irish Times*, 6 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁹¹ *Irish Independent*, 6 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁹² *Cork Examiner*, p. 5; *Northern Whig*, p. 7; *Belfast News Letter*, p. 7; *Irish Times*, p. 7; *Irish Independent*, p. 5; 13 December 1911.

¹⁹³ *Irish Times*, 13 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁹⁴ *Northern Whig*, 13 December 1911, p. 7.

¹⁹⁵ *Belfast News Letter*, 13 December 1911, p. 7.

Spectacle'¹⁹⁶ and 'King's Announcement – Their Majesties Gratified'.¹⁹⁷ Though the *Belfast Telegraph* did not cite a source it was the PA Special it reproduced on 12 December using the headline 'Coronation Durbar – Brilliant Scenes at Delhi – Making History in India'.¹⁹⁸

The *Irish News* and *Freeman's Journal* both cited Reuters as their source for their coverage of the Durbar ceremony. Though there was a greater variation in the actual wording there were still enough shared phrases and constructions to identify a common source. For example the *Irish News*, under the headline 'The Indian Durbar – Opened at Delhi by King George – Royal Proclamation,' began:

All roads leading to the camp were this morning thronged with thousands of spectators for the Coronation Durbar. The British Governors arrived in State equipages, and the Indian Princes in magnificent gold and silver carriages.¹⁹⁹

Whereas the *Freeman's Journal*, 'Durbar Day at Delhi – The Capital of The Empire – To Be Removed to Delhi – Important Announcement', wrote:

All the morning the roads leading to the camp were thronged with thousands of spectators on foot and horseback, and in every variety of conveyance. The British Governors arrived in State equipages and Indian Princes in coaches and gold and silver carriages that rivalled one another in their magnificence.²⁰⁰

The coverage of these two events demonstrates that Irish newspapers were reliant on common news sources in order to report the Delhi Durbar and events surrounding it. It is difficult to suggest a reason why some newspapers cited Reuters and some the PA Special for the same telegram in the event of the tent fire. If it was only one newspaper it might have been a mistake at the editorial desk, the five newspapers all had access to both the PA Special and Reuters and came from various points on the politico-

¹⁹⁶ *Cork Examiner*, 13 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁹⁷ *Irish Independent*, 13 December 1911, p. 5.

¹⁹⁸ *Belfast Telegraph*, 12 December 1911, p. 3. This could further support the idea that the *Belfast Telegraph* was 'lifting' as the identical copy it uses was probably intended as a morning, not evening, special.

¹⁹⁹ *Irish News*, 13 December 1911, p. 5.

²⁰⁰ *Freeman's Journal*, 13 December 1911, p. 7.

religious spectrum of opinion – perhaps there is no real significance. What is apparent though is that they did have control over how they presented these reports and shaped their readers' attitudes to them through headlines. The comparison and reading of these is as revealing as an examination of editorial comment. In considering the *Irish Independent's* more sensational headline of the burning of the tent it should be remembered that it had by this time been relaunched as a half-penny daily, modelled on Lord Northcliffe's *Daily Mail*. Therefore the use of such phrases was most likely a product of the commercial and market aim as any politico-religious implication.

The Delhi Durbar, then, does not seem to have elicited particularly strong reactions with regard to Ireland's relationship to Britain and the Empire, though that of India was discussed. The quantity of coverage varies but the general trajectory is similar. Irish newspapers were primarily dependent on a common source for this coverage: the PA. As well as providing its own service the PA distributed Reuters' news to the provincial newspapers of Britain and Ireland. The use of the Central News Agency by the *Belfast News Letter* and *Cork Examiner* is interesting. However it was extremely limited and not particularly significant. What should be noted is that the *Irish News* and *Freeman's Journal* do not seem to have had access to the PA Special service. This was an additional subscription service costing £150 per year for morning papers and occasional telegrams were provided to evening papers for one shilling per seventy-five words.

The presence of these common sources does reveal editorial decision making in the majority of morning papers as to the quantity of coverage provided. With the exception of the *Irish News* and *Freeman's Journal*, they all had equal access to these telegraphed reports. Therefore where a newspaper provides less coverage this represents an active editorial decision. The apparent politico-religious nature of these decisions is significant in this light. To broadly generalise: newspapers aligned to the Protestant-unionist tradition actively decided to provide more coverage than their Catholic-nationalist contemporaries. Most simply this can be explained by the commercial imperative to provide their readership with what they

wanted, which suggests that the Delhi Durbar, its imperial nature, and the possibility of comparisons between India and Ireland were in fact of little interest to wider Irish society sympathetic to nationalist views. It is only the staunchly unionist *Belfast News Letter* that draws any overt comparison between India and Ireland. Editorial comment elsewhere focuses on the nature of the announcements at the Durbar and their implications for India and British constitutionalism. India was not seen as comparable to Ireland not least because of a seeming unwillingness to compare the Irish to the ‘native peoples’ of India, which in some cases provides more than a whiff of social Darwinism. This suggests a notable divergence in the mainstream Irish newspapers of the time from the ‘Irish Orientalism’ described by Michael Silvestri that ‘stressed the shared culture and sensibilities of Ireland and the Orient’.²⁰¹

These conclusions might be explained by considering that the dominant aspiration within Irish nationalism at the time was for Home Rule within the British Empire, not separatism or republicanism. 1911, with the passing of the Parliament Act, marked something of a high point for these hopes. As well as its obvious elements mentioned above the Durbar was also a celebration of empire, its purported benign benefits and civilising mission as well as the opportunities it presented for commercial and social advancement. These were advantages that the mainstream Irish newspapers of the time, with certain caveats, were more than happy to support. Further, with the tantalising prospect of Home Rule being delivered, those newspapers reflecting the nationalist tradition were not particularly keen to rock the imperial boat.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the twentieth century, and in the following decades, Irish newspapers were reliant on news agencies for their coverage of international events. They did not have foreign correspondents in the sense as it is understood today, a facility which some of their larger contemporaries in Britain were developing. Irish newspapers did make use

²⁰¹ Silvestri, *Ireland and India*, p. 5.

of ‘informal’ foreign correspondents from time to time. However, this was haphazard and dependent on who was on the spot and whether they were in-line with an individual newspaper’s editorial and political stand point. The news agencies they were dependent on were, further, London-based and British in nature. There are nuances that must be considered when reading these statements though.

The dominant source of this agency news was the PA, which had exclusive rights to Reuters reports, which further had exclusive rights to Britain and Ireland as a territory in which to sell international news. This was not, however, the only source and the persistent presence of the ETC and Central News Agency did provide alternatives. Though not as extensively used as the PA they were present, as has been seen in the case study in this chapter, and even local weekly, bi-weekly and tri-weekly newspapers that were not PA members had access to, and used, them.²⁰² It is difficult in this light to define the PA as a monopoly supplier of news. This is a description that can be applied to the Electric and Magnetic Companies prior to the Electric Telegraph Act. Similarly the Post Office’s position after the Act could be described as monopolistic with regard to the transmission of telegraph reports, at least before the introduction of leased private wires. Perhaps oligopolistic would be a more accurate term to apply to the PA.

Mainstream Irish newspapers should not be seen as passive, powerless, recipients of this news supply though. They were active participants in the formation and development of the PA. They invested in PA shares, attended its general meetings, raising comments when they saw fit, and served on its boards. The more frequent citation of PA-Reuters news may have been because the organisation was as much theirs as their contemporaries in Britain. It should also not be forgotten that it was also, probably, seen as a better, more reliable service.

This structure of news supply and its interconnection with the global news market, laid down in the 1860s, persisted with few alterations in to the twentieth century and was the established system as Ireland, Britain and the World faced in to World War I.

²⁰² O’Donnell, ‘The Banner and the Boers’, Chp. 3.

Chapter Two

War and Conflict: World War I to the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1914-22

The international structures that enabled the gathering and distribution of news did not undergo any dramatic change in the years between the outbreak of World War I and the Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed in December 1921, and creation of the Irish Free State in 1922. Similarly the domestic structures of news supply in the United Kingdom remained comparatively stable. The same could not, however, be said for the political, cultural and societal dynamics of Ireland.¹ As John Horne has commented, ‘[f]ew countries were more decisively affected by the Great War than Ireland. [...] Ireland’s modern political shape to a great extent derives from it’.² However, evidence of comparatively radical change in the Irish news industry, the fourth estate, is not always apparent. Indeed, in the mainstream daily newspapers, outside of their published content, the evidence sometimes suggests the contrary.

Initially Ireland’s role in World War I as part of the United Kingdom was broadly accepted by its population. In response to the deferred achievement of Home Rule the nationalist Irish Parliamentary Party’s (IPP) leader, John Redmond, speaking in Westminster, promised Irish support and recruits. He also encouraged their enlistment in Ireland. The aftermath of the Easter Rising of April 1916 and the British response, which included the execution of sixteen republicans and large scale internment of suspected revolutionary nationalists, is widely regarded as the key point from which Irish public opinion shifted from the pro-Home Rule constitutional nationalism represented by the IPP to support separatist nationalism. The post-war general election of December 1918 saw a resounding victory for the separatist republican Sinn Féin party and in many ways marked the ‘beginning of the end’ for the IPP. The period of the Irish War of Independence (1919-21) saw the end of any prospects of Home Rule being introduced as laid down in the 1914 Act and led to the Anglo-Irish Treaty

¹ Keith Jeffery, ‘Echoes of War’ in John Horne (ed.) *Our War: Ireland and the Great War* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2008), p. 263.

² John Horne, ‘Our War, Our History’ in John Horne (ed.) *Our War: Ireland and the Great War* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2008), p. 3.

that would create the Dominion status Irish Free State. But partition was effectively introduced during this period under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act which created the separate polities of Northern Ireland and the never-inaugurated Southern Ireland. While the published content of the mainstream daily newspapers broadly, if not always perfectly, reflected the changing attitudes and opinions in Ireland, most notably in the nationalist press, their corporate and managerial behaviour did not undergo any such radical change. Indeed, considering the wider trends in the period under consideration in this chapter, the absence of division along the politico-religious fault lines of Protestant-unionism versus Catholic-nationalism is particularly notable.

This chapter has been divided into four parts. The first three reflect the identifiable chronological phases briefly discussed above. The first covers the outbreak of World War I to the Easter Rising. The second section addresses events between the Easter Rising and the 1918 general election. The third section covers the period from the outbreak of the Irish War of Independence to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Each of these sections begins with a brief summary of the major events in Ireland. They then continue to present the contemporary position of the Irish newspapers and an examination of developments in the structures of international news supply, with a particular focus on the role of Irish newspapers therein. The fourth section presents a case study covering the sources, coverage and comment of the Gallipoli Campaign in August 1915 in Irish newspapers.

The outbreak of World War I to the Easter Rising (1914-1916)

Contemporary Context

The Ireland that would emerge in 1922 was significantly different from the one that might have been envisaged in early 1914. However, the fault lines that led to the creation of Northern Ireland and the dominion-status Irish Free State, and their constitutional and political relationship to Britain, could to an extent be seen in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war. While the signing of the Ulster Covenant to resist Home Rule in 1912 and the creation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in 1913 can be seen as ‘part of a Europe wide drift into militancy, [it] also helped to

reactivate militant nationalism in Ireland'.³ In reaction to the creation of the UVF the nationalist Irish Volunteers were formed in November 1913. This growing tension and increasing nationalist discontent more generally prompted real fears of civil war in Ireland. Catriona Pennell has commented that it was 'one of the paradoxes of modern Irish history that the outbreak of war in Europe may have prevented conflict in Ireland in 1914'.⁴

Attempts to broker a deal between the Unionists and constitutional Nationalists, in the shape of the IPP, at the Buckingham Palace Conference in July 1914 proved stillborn. The political position of the parties made a resolution on the question of the exclusion of all or part of Ulster, permanently or temporarily, from Home Rule impossible.⁵ The outbreak of war in August enabled the British Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, to finesse a solution (or non-solution) by simultaneously enacting the Bill unamended and postponing its implementation until 'not later than the end' of the conflict. This is a small, but significant, distinction from describing the Home Rule Act as being deferred until the end of the war.⁶ The support and loyalty of Ireland promised by IPP leader Redmond in exchange for placing Home Rule on the statute book enabled its enactment without the feared amendments discussed in July. Even as the war progressed he could still hope for its implementation, at least in some form. It had become clear though that, even as Redmond promised Ireland's loyalty, 'London intended to make special arrangements in an amending bill which would lead to some form of partition'.⁷

The demise of the IPP and the rise in separatism within the nationalist tradition in the ensuing years was by no means obvious at the outbreak of war. In the words of Alvin Jackson:

Between 1914 and 1916 it may be said that the Irish [Parliamentary] Party was becoming increasingly vulnerable; but it would be quite

³ Alvin Jackson, *Ireland 1798-1998* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004), p. 196.

⁴ Catriona Pennell, 'Going to War' in John Horne (ed.) *Our War: Ireland and the Great War* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2008), p. 39.

⁵ Alvin Jackson, *Home Rule: An Irish History* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 2003), p. 139.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁷ Paul Bew, 'The Politics of War' in John Horne (ed.) *Our War: Ireland and the Great War* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2008), p. 97-8.

wrong to argue for an irreversible decline. Equally, it might well be argued that the Easter Rising created some of the conditions for the party's demise without actually guaranteeing this finale.⁸

At the outbreak of hostilities Redmond announced his, and Ireland's, commitment to support the war effort in the Houses of Parliament.⁹ He encouraged the Irish Volunteers to enlist voluntarily in the British Army, most famously when addressing a gathering of Volunteers at Woodenbridge, Wicklow, on 20 September 1914:

The duty of the manhood of Ireland is twofold. Its duty is, at all costs, to defend the shores of Ireland against foreign invasion. It is a duty more than that of taking care that Irish valour proves itself; on the field of war it has always proved itself in the past. The interests of Ireland – of the whole of Ireland – are at stake in this war. This war is undertaken in defence of the highest principles of religion morality and right [...] I say to you: go on drilling and make yourself efficient for the work, and then account yourselves as men, not only for Ireland itself, but wherever the fighting line extends, in defence of right, of freedom and religion in this war.¹⁰

Even at this point though there were initial signs that the IPP would not continue to wield the same influence in British and Irish politics that it had previously exercised. In May 1915 a new cabinet was formed comprising members of both the Liberal and Conservative Parties, suspending traditional political rivalries in the interest of pursuing a united war effort. In this reorganisation of the executive arm of government the Unionist leader Edward Carson¹¹ was appointed Attorney-General. Redmond was also offered a cabinet position and the prospect of both the Nationalist and Unionist leaders sitting side by side in the cabinet had been the subject of some speculation in the press. However, adhering to the 'classic Parnellite principle of "independent opposition"' while Home Rule remained

⁸ Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 232.

⁹ J.J. Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), p. 21.

¹⁰ Richard Aldous, *Great Irish Speeches* (London: Quercus, 2007), p. 65.

¹¹ George D. Boyce, 'Carson, Edward Henry (1854-1935)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (ODNB)* <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32310>, accessed 26 October 2012; Alvin Jackson, 'Carson, Edward Henry', *Dictionary of Irish Biography (DIB)*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a1514>, accessed 26 October 2012.

unimplemented, Redmond had declined.¹² The problem that confronted the IPP in this circumstance was that the influence they had exercised since 1910, through a ‘casting vote’ in the House of Commons in support of the Liberal Party, was negated by the wartime political alliance. With no voice at cabinet they were increasingly marginalised at Westminster.

In Ireland, in the wake of Redmond’s speech at Woodenbridge, the Irish Volunteers split. The majority, becoming known as the Irish National Volunteers, supported Redmond. However, the Volunteer’s president, Eoin MacNeill,¹³ who had inspired the formation of the organisation in the Gaelic League’s bilingual newspaper *An Claidheamh Soluis* with his article ‘The North Began’, rejected Redmond’s call. On 24 September, along with twenty members of the committee, he declared the IPP leader’s policy contrary to their original aims and objectives.¹⁴ The exact aims of the original Irish Volunteers were, perhaps deliberately, vague, designed to attract the broad spectrum of Irish nationalists from supporters of Home Rule to socialist republicans.¹⁵ The minority that rejected Redmond’s appeal and followed MacNeill, variously estimated at between 8,000-13,500 of 158,000-188,000,¹⁶ might be said to be closer to these original aims though. Regardless of the particular motivations of individual volunteers they were not intended to be subsumed into or subsidiary to British military or security forces nor to serve overseas. In the wake of this split a ‘revolutionary conspiracy began to take shape to which the whole concept of Home Rule was irrelevant’.¹⁷

Redmond had hoped that the enlistment of Irish men in the British forces from both the nationalist and unionist communities would provide ‘the chance for a reconciliation between Ireland and Britain, but also an

¹² Bew. ‘The Politics of War’, p. 99-100.

¹³ Patrick Maume, ‘MacNeill, Eoin [John] (1867-1945)’, *ODNB* <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34813>, accessed 13 February 2013; Patrick Maume and Thomas Charles-Edwards, ‘MacNeill, Eoin (John)’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5283>, accessed 13 February 2013.

¹⁴ Charles Townshend, *Easter 1916: The Irish Revolution* (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 68.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 41-8.

¹⁶ Diarmaid Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland 1900-2000* (London: Profile Books, 2005), p.127; Lee, *Ireland*, p. 22; Townshend, *Easter 1916*, p. 68.

¹⁷ Pennell. ‘Going to War’, p. 46.

opportunity to consolidate the claims of Irish nationality'.¹⁸ To some extent the majority support of the Irish Volunteers for Redmond could be interpreted 'as evidence that imperial patriotism had indeed been growing in pre-war Ireland'.¹⁹ However, as Philip Orr has pointed out, 'unionists and nationalists understood their military contributions in terms of their opposed and mutually exclusive goals'.²⁰ Redmond had hoped for an Irish Army Corps around which national pride could focus.²¹ In light of the part played by the 'blood sacrifice' of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZACs) at Gallipoli and its role in the strengthening of Australian nationhood his 'prescription was shrewd'.²² The nationalist hope 'invoked the model of the loyal dominion such as Australia or Canada, achieving a nationalist status within the empire'.²³

Ultimately though the method by which Irish volunteer soldiers were accommodated in the British army served, if anything, to highlight the *different* political and religious traditions from which they were drawn. There were three volunteer divisions associated with Ireland: the 10th (Irish) Division, the 16th (Irish) Division – associated with the Irish National Volunteers – and the 36th (Ulster) Division – associated with the UVF volunteers. Regular Irish soldiers, both officers, NCO's and enlisted men, had historically served in Irish regiments such as Munster Fusiliers, Royal Irish Regiment, Dublin Fusiliers and Royal Irish Rifles as well as other regiments and corps, such as the Artillery. With the outbreak of war the professional standing army had to be buttressed with new recruits, initially volunteers and following legislation in 1916 conscripts - excepting Ireland. On the matter of conscription the IPP miscalculated and, on the urgings of John Dillon,²⁴ despite Redmond's inclination to abstain, voted against the

¹⁸ Jackson, *Home Rule*, p. 145.

¹⁹ James Loughlin, 'Mobilising the Sacred Dead: Ulster Unionism, the Great War and the Politics of Remembrance' in Adrian Gregory and Senia Pašeta (eds.) *Ireland and the Great War: 'A War to Unite Us All?'* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2002), p. 133.

²⁰ Philip Orr, '200,000 Volunteer Soldiers' in John Home (ed.) *Our War: Ireland and the Great War* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2008), p. 67.

²¹ Jackson, *Home Rule*, p. 151.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 147.

²³ Home, 'Our War, our History', p. 9.

²⁴ Frank Callanan, 'Dillon, John', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2603>, accessed 26 October 2012;

Bill.²⁵ The Liberal Party revolt collapsed, however, ‘leaving the [IPP] in a seriously exposed position in Westminster’.²⁶

Soldiers in battalions from the Irish regiments of the regular army were distributed throughout various divisions, whereas their volunteer contemporaries were largely grouped into the three identifiable divisions mentioned above.²⁷ The 10th Division’s designation was regional, as opposed to the more political motivations behind the naming of the 36th and 16th. Indeed it was the source of some pride in Ireland that the 10th was among the first divisions authorised as part of Kitchener’s ‘citizen army’ on 21 August 1914.²⁸ The 36th Division, authorized on 23 September 1914,²⁹ was primarily associated with members of the UVF who volunteered after Carson had secured assurance that they would be kept together as a coherent unit and that ‘Ulster’ would accompany the number thirty-six.³⁰ The 16th Division was authorised on 11 September 1914 and it was here that the majority of the Irish National Volunteers who did enlist following Redmond’s appeal found themselves. Redmond lobbied energetically to attach the ‘Irish’ designation to this division. Irish involvement in World War I, most easily signalled by these three volunteer divisions, has been described by David Fitzpatrick as ‘proportionately the greatest deployment of armed manpower in the history of Irish militarism’.³¹

It may be accurate to assert, as John Horne has, that the ‘real Irish contribution to the war remained military. Not only did recruitment make this highly tangible, it also supplied the symbolic currency of nationhood’³²

Alan O’Day. ‘Dillon, John (1851-1927)’, *ODNB*, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32831>, accessed 26 October 2012.

²⁵ Bew. ‘The Politics of War’, p. 103.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ A division within the British Army at this point was made up of three brigades. A brigade contained four battalions drawn from various regiments, the various battalions of the Munster Fusiliers did not necessarily all serve in the same division, or even brigade, for example. A battalion strength was roughly 1,000 officers, NCO’s and men. When headquarters, support and administrative staff was included a division contained roughly 15,000 officers, NCO’s and men.

²⁸ Jean Bowen and Desmond Bowen, *Heroic Option* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 2005), p. 213; H.E.D. Harris, *The Irish Regiments in the First World War* (Cork: Mercier Press, 1968), p. 219.

²⁹ Harris, *Irish Regiments*, p. 221.

³⁰ Bowen and Bowen, *Heroic Option*, p. 217.

³¹ David Fitzpatrick, ‘Militarism in Ireland, 1900-1922’ in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffrey (eds.) *A Military History of Ireland* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), p. 388.

³² Horne, ‘Our War, Our History’, p. 9.

but there were other areas of Irish life that were significantly affected by the conflict. In addition to the effect on Ireland's political landscape industry and labour were equally impacted, as Theresa Moriarty has noted. One of the immediate effects was the disruption to industry as reservists were called up and other workers left for industrial regions in Britain. Hours for those remaining were reduced as markets were lost, in the textile industry for example. Under wartime conditions the market for luxury goods contracted rapidly and workers in these industries were laid off.

In some respects [however] wartime dislocation reinforced the unsettled pattern of pre-war industry with high unemployment and poor trade. The war's impact on industry was to affect the course of Irish trade unionism over the next four years.³³

The Irish economy would adapt itself to the requirement of 'total war' though. The Belfast shipyards and textile industry reacted to meet the requirements for ships and uniforms, and the agricultural economy geared itself to feed Britain and its troops.

In Ireland, as elsewhere in Europe, trade unionism had been growing in the pre-war years and challenging the control on the labour market exercised by business owners. This was perhaps most notably demonstrated in the formation of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union (ITGWU) in 1909; the Irish Labour Party in 1912; and the Dublin Lockout of 1913. Despite the employers' 'effective victory'³⁴ in the Lockout the trade union movement remained resilient and the war helped to foster its growth outside its traditional urban and industrial areas, among agricultural workers and women.³⁵ In the post-war world trade unionism in Ireland emerged as a stronger movement than it had ever been.³⁶

³³ Theresa Moriarty, 'Work, Warfare and Wages: Industrial Controls and Irish Trade Unionism in the First World War' in Adrian Gregory and Senia Pašeta (eds.) *Ireland and the Great War: 'A War to Unite Us All'?* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2002), p. 75.

³⁴ Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 192.

³⁵ Moriarty. 'Work, Warfare and Wages', p. 83.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

Irish Newspapers and International News Supply

During the early years of World War I the mainstream Irish daily newspapers, reflecting the general public reaction, were broadly supportive of the role played by Ireland and Irishmen in the conflict. They continued to engage with systems and structures of international news supply in much the same way as they had in the preceding decades. When they did organise as an identifiable group it was in an all-Ireland capacity which displayed no evidence of divisions along politico-religious lines.

One of the effects of the early stages of the war on the Irish newspapers and their British contemporaries was the implementation of censorship under the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) and the restriction in supply of paper and print materials.³⁷ One of the products of this restriction of supplies may have been the discontinuation of the *Irish Independent's* Irish language column, which ceased in August 1914 when the paper was reduced to four pages per edition. The column did not reappear again until January 1919.³⁸ The presence of the column in the newspaper from its 1905 relaunch was a key indicator of its nationalist credentials.³⁹

With the outbreak of war the 'mutually acceptable principle for press control' between the newspapers and government created under the Joint Standing Committee in 1908 was no longer considered to be adequate by the government.⁴⁰ The importance attached to the role that news agency services could play as part of the war effort was highlighted when speculation arose about Reuters. The German origin of the agency's name and its cosmopolitan shareholding group were viewed with suspicion both in public and in certain official quarters.⁴¹ This would lead to extraordinary measures, covered later in this chapter, being taken by the government to

³⁷ Hugh Oram, *The Newspaper Book: A History of Newspapers in Ireland, 1649-1983* (Dublin: MO Books, 1983), p. 122.

³⁸ Aoife Whelan, "'Irish-Ireland'" and the *Irish Independent*, 1905-22' in Mark O'Brien and Kevin Rafter (eds.) *Independent Newspapers: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), p. 72.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁴⁰ Deian Hopkin, 'Domestic Censorship in the First World War', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1970), p. 153.

⁴¹ Donald Read, *The Power of News: The History of Reuters*, 2nd edn., (Oxford: OUP, 1999), pp. 118-20.

ensure the agency's sympathy to the British cause and its freedom from enemy influence.⁴²

In response to this perceived need for greater powers over the press the official Press Bureau was established on 7 August 1914. The role of this organisation was to distribute official reports from the Admiralty and War Office and examine telegrams sent and received by the newspapers. As the war progressed it also acted to curb overly exuberant reporting of British victories by the press, as a means of managing public opinion.⁴³ Irish newspapers, still primarily dependent on news agencies for their overseas news, were subject to the actions of the Bureau in London, but also to the censorship powers of the Irish administration based in Dublin Castle. The latter seems to have played a minor role in the early years of the war. It became more energetic in the pursuit of its duties after the Easter Rising and during the War of Independence. Even then it primarily focused its efforts on events within Ireland.⁴⁴ It would appear that these efforts were not confined to Ireland however. The Press Association (PA) manager noted in a report to the board in January 1917 that

an arrangement had been reached whereby the Press Bureau had agreed to pass on to English and Scotch [sic] [and presumably Welsh] newspapers any urgent request not to publish matter which the Irish Government considered should not be made public in Ireland.⁴⁵

Whether the PA had any active role in this censorship mechanism is unclear. What it does indicate is recognition that focusing purely on Irish newspapers would not adequately control news circulating in Ireland. Newspapers published in Britain, particularly the London dailies, had well established circulation in Ireland by this time.

⁴² Peter Putnis, 'Share 999. British Government Control of Reuters During World War I'. *Media History*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2008), pp. 141-165; idem 'Reuters and the British Government – Re-Visited'. *Media History*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2010), pp. 295-299; Johnathan Silberstein-Loeb. 'Foreign Office Control of Reuters During the First World War. A Reply to Professor Putnis'. *Media History*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2010), pp. 281-293.

⁴³ Hopkin. 'Domestic Censorship', pp. 154-5.

⁴⁴ Ian Kenneally, *The Paper Wall: Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland, 1919-1921* (Cork: The Collins Press, 2008), p. 5.

⁴⁵ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, January 1917, Guildhall Library Manuscripts Collection, London, (GL) MS 3538/19.

The ability of Irish newspapers, and others, to obtain news of the war, already restricted by their reliance on the news agencies, was exacerbated by the reluctance of the military authorities to allow correspondents to accompany the troops. As George Scott has noted in his centenary history of the PA, in the initial months of the conflict it 'had to pick up crumbs of news about the war from wherever it could, from anywhere in fact except where it was being fought'.⁴⁶ The effects of the Bureau's censorship and the restrictions placed on reporting were summarised in the PA's Annual Report for 1914 presented at the 1915 Annual General Meeting (AGM): 'special correspondents have not been allowed to accompany the various Armies; and all cablegrams received about the War from abroad have been severely censored'.⁴⁷ Subsequently these harsh restrictions were eased and the board was able to report the following year that

censorship is not nearly so severe as it was during the early months of the War [...]. The Admiralty and War Office have allowed correspondents to be attached to the Forces in various parts of the World.⁴⁸

The PA at this point had correspondents with the British and French forces on the Western Front, in Egypt, Macedonia, Mesopotamia and in East Africa. Its competitor news agencies similarly benefitted from this easing in reporting restrictions and in 1915 the Exchange Telegraph Company (ETC) had correspondents on the Western Front and in the Dardanelles.⁴⁹

As the structures of war reporting settled down the Irish newspapers had access to reports from a variety of sources. The Press Bureau released official reports and dispatches. The ETC and Central News Agency dispatched their correspondents to various points. The PA distributed news from its own special correspondents and Reuters', in some cases these were

⁴⁶ George Scott, *Reporter Anonymous: The story of the Press Association* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1968), p. 138.

⁴⁷ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1914 in Report of PA AGM 1915, GL MS 35365/9.

⁴⁸ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1915 in Report of PA AGM 1916, GL MS 35365/9.

⁴⁹ J. M. Scott, *EXTEL 100: The Centenary History of the Exchange Telegraph Company* (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1972), p. 97.

joint correspondents.⁵⁰ In addition the PA also distributed reports from the correspondents of *The Times*, *Morning Post* and *Daily Telegraph*.⁵¹ With the continuation of the war these structures developed and at the PA's 1918 AGM the Annual Report for 1917 described how:

The Association has more than maintained the organisation which has been steadily developed since August, 1914, for the purpose of the War Special Services. We share with Reuter special correspondents at the Headquarters of the three armies in France – British, French and American – and on the Italian front; also with the Allied forces in Macedonia and the British Army in Palestine; while, in conjunction with the London papers and Reuter, we have a special correspondent following the campaign in Mesopotamia. The arrangements made in various European capitals, on behalf of the Joint Service, for the collection of news emanating from enemy countries and neutral states have been continued, and in some cases, strengthened.⁵²

The nature to the Joint Service referred to is unclear. It might imply cooperation with the ETC as operated by the two agencies since 1906 under the Joint Service Agreement (JSA). However, this was a system of cooperation for the collection and distribution of sporting and market intelligence, not news. If it were the case that the two agencies cooperated in this way for news services during the war, which is not beyond the bounds of possibility, it would appear to be a departure from their normal relationships.

In the early years of World War I the broad position of the mainstream Irish newspapers was in support of Ireland's position as part of Britain's war effort, and Irishmen's role therein as volunteers. This should not be regarded with any particular surprise as these views were consistent with the traditional positions that these publications had adopted. With regard to the newspapers primarily focussed on in this study the *Belfast News Letter*, *Belfast Telegraph* and *Northern Whig* in Ulster maintained their unionist characters. Their Dublin contemporary the *Irish Times* remained true to its origins under its editor Edward Healy, 'a staunch

⁵⁰ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 142.

⁵¹ Scott, *Report Anonymous*, p. 141.

⁵² PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1917 in Report of PA AGM 1918, GL MS 35365/9.

Unionist who believed Ireland would disintegrate politically and economically if the link with Britain was broken'.⁵³ Similarly the *Cork Examiner* and *Irish News*, in Belfast, at opposite ends of the country, along with the Dublin based *Freeman's Journal* and *Irish Independent* maintained their positions on the pro-Home Rule, nationalist, spectrum. The ensuing years would see a degree of movement in some of these positions.

A comparison of the PA's returns to Companies House from 1906 and 1916 shows a small increase in Irish membership and shareholding. As noted in the previous chapter, in 1906 thirteen Irish newspapers held 528 of the 4,944 issued shares, just under eleven percent (see Table 1.1). In 1916 the same Irish shareholders were listed with the addition of the *Dublin Evening Mail* (48 shares) and the *Londonderry Standard* (24 shares) bringing Irish PA share holding to 600 of 4,944 issued shares, just over twelve percent.⁵⁴

The PA's 1914 AGM, held shortly before the outbreak of war, was attended by George Crosbie of the *Cork Examiner*, who was on the board, and W. T. Brewster of the *Irish Independent*. In 1915 Crosbie, still on the board, was joined by R.H.H. Baird of the *Belfast Telegraph* and A. W. Stewart from its sister publication the *Irish Daily Telegraph*.⁵⁵ Also attending was H.L. Tivy representing both the Dublin *Daily Express* and the *Cork Constitution*.⁵⁶ As noted above, comment was made in the Annual Report at this meeting of the disruption to news supply due to censorship. In addition it was noted that the outbreak of war had led to disruption in the supply of some other services, in particular financial, commercial and sporting. As a result rebates had been paid where these services had been affected.⁵⁷ Though there are no surviving details of the sums rebated by the PA for these disruptions the JSA returned twenty-five percent of subscription costs for the period July to December 1915 on its racing service. Among the recipients were the *Belfast Telegraph*, *Dublin Evening Mail*, *Dublin Evening Herald*, the evening sister paper of the *Irish*

⁵³ Mark O'Brien, *The Irish Times: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008), p. 37.

⁵⁴ PA Returns to Companies House, GL MS 35383/3.

⁵⁵ Oram, *The Newspaper Book*, p. 120.

⁵⁶ Report of PA AGM 1915, GL MS 353565/9.

⁵⁷ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1914 in Report of PA AGM 1915, GL MS 35365/9.

Independent, and *Dublin Evening Telegraph*, the *Freeman's Journal's* evening title.⁵⁸

It would appear then that, regardless of tensions in wider Irish society, in the early years of World War I Irish newspapers continued to engage with and be involved in the structures of news supply much as they had prior to the conflict. The PA's Members Order Book lists sixteen daily, evening and weekly newspapers for the years 1911-15. In Belfast the *Belfast News Letter*, *Belfast Telegraph*, *Irish News*, *Northern Whig* and *Ulster Echo*. In Cork the *Cork Constitution* and *Cork Examiner*. In Derry the *Londonderry Journal*, *Derry Standard* and *Londonderry Sentinel*. In Dublin the *Express and Mail*, the *Freeman's Journal* and its evening title the *Evening Telegraph*, the *Irish Independent* and its Sunday edition as well as its evening title the *Evening Herald*, and the *Irish Times*.⁵⁹ For those Irish newspapers which did not hold PA shares the Non-Members Order Ledger lists a number of titles from across Ireland for the years 1914-16.⁶⁰

<i>Table 2.1. Irish Newspapers listed in the Press Association Non-Members Order Ledger, 1914-16</i>	
<i>Clare Journal, Ennis</i>	<i>Limerick Leader</i>
<i>Clonmel Chronicle</i>	<i>Munster News</i>
<i>Cork Free Press</i>	<i>Omagh Herald</i>
<i>Kerry News, Tralee</i>	<i>Waterford News</i>
<i>Kerry Press, Tralee</i>	<i>Waterford Standard</i>
<i>Limerick Chronicle</i>	

It should be noted that the evidence in the Ledgers and Order Books referred to here and in other chapters is fragmentary. Further, it seems that they refer to exceptional orders rather than annual subscriptions. Therefore it cannot be irrefutably asserted that all the newspapers listed were taking all or some PA services continually during the periods covered. Therefore this evidence can only be considered as indicative. What it does demonstrate is the broad penetration of the PA, and probably other news agencies, into the Irish newspaper market and the importance of these services to the newspapers.

⁵⁸ Exchange Telegraph Company Joint Service Accounts, GL MS 23138 Box 2 Bundle 22.

⁵⁹ PA Members Order Book, GL MS 35472.

⁶⁰ PA Non-Members Order Ledger, GL MS 35473/1.

In the larger dailies this importance is highlighted by the identification of the *Belfast News Letter*, *Irish News*, *Irish Independent*, *Irish Times* and *Freeman's Journal* all having invested in private wire services from London by 1913.⁶¹

The position of Irish newspapers as a group within the United Kingdom news industry and news supply structures is illustrated by the events surrounding a deputation to the Postmaster General in October 1915. In the autumn of 1915 the Retrenchment Committee, established by the government to look in to the expenditure of certain government departments in light of the ongoing war, had recommended a significant increase in the rate charged for press telegrams.⁶² This special, reduced, rate had been created as part of the 1869 Electric Telegraph Act and had remained unchanged since 1875.⁶³

On 23 September Edmund Robbins, the PA manager, circulated a memorandum outlining the proposed increase in charges and their implications for the press. Around this time a decision was taken to send a deputation to either the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Postmaster General on behalf of the press, the exact details of how and when this decision was made are unclear. On 27 September the manager of the *Irish Times*, John Simington, wrote to Robbins. It is clear from his letter that these matters were being discussed in Ireland as elsewhere. It would appear that the deputation was initially planned for Thursday 30 September.

[Before he had realised] that the deputation is not likely to take place on Thursday I had made [up] my mind to go over and see you on the subject – in fact I had arranged with our local members of the Irish Newspaper Society that I would write and let you know that we were holding a meeting at the Waldorf Hotel at 10-O'clock on Wednesday morning [29 September], and that Mr. Brewster would arrive at the Salisbury [Hotel in London] to-morrow evening.⁶⁴

⁶¹ L. Home, General Post Office, London, to S. D. Schloss, Treasury, 23 September 1913, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA) T 1/11698, Treasury, Post Office use of telegraph lines as private wires by newspapers.

⁶² PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1915 in Report of PA AGM 1916, GL MS 35365/9.

⁶³ Memorandum by Edmund Robbins, PA manager, 23 September 1915, GL MS 35447.

⁶⁴ Simington to Robbins, 27 September 1915, GL MS 35447; see below for a description of the Irish Newspaper Society's origins.

He continued that Brewster, the manager of the *Irish Independent*, was in contact with Mr. Crosbie, *Cork Examiner*, Mr. Tivy, *Dublin Daily Express* and *Cork Constitution*, and Mr. Baird, *Belfast Telegraph*. In light of the deputation not going ahead he was unsure what actions would be taken that evening, but the Irish newspapers would remain in contact. It would seem that Brewster remained in Dublin as he wrote to Robbins on 30 September requesting a detailed breakdown of the cost implications of the proposed price changes. He advised that they were ‘arranging to hold a conference of Irish Newspaper Proprietors here on Monday [4 October]’.⁶⁵

Brewster’s plans to attend the meeting in Dublin seem to have been overtaken by the agreement of the Postmaster General to receive the proposed delegation on Tuesday 5 October.⁶⁶ Brewster cabled Robbins on 2 October confirming that he and Baird would attend on behalf of the Irish newspapers. He confirmed this in a letter the following day where he continued that

Mr. Baird is president and I am Hon. Secretary of the Irish Newspaper Society and we are in a position to speak for every daily paper in Ireland, as well as the principal weeklies and bi-weeklies.⁶⁷

On the same day that Brewster had cabled Robbins Baird wrote confirming his intention to be part of the deputation. He noted that his attendance might be prevented as he had ‘arranged to meet the Dublin Newspaper men on Monday next [4 October] at 1p.m.’.⁶⁸ These communications indicate that the same arrangements for Irish newspapers to be represented at the deputation were being followed as in the abortive plans outlined in Simington’s earlier letter. Brewster was to travel over and be in London the day before the proposed deputation, presumably in order to ensure an Irish presence. In the meantime the representatives of the Irish newspapers would meet in Dublin and a second delegate would subsequently travel to London to accompany Brewster. It is clear that this second delegate was intended to

⁶⁵ Brewster to Robbins 30, September 1915, GL MS 35447.

⁶⁶ Robbins to Herbert Samuel, Postmaster General, confirming appointment, 1 October 1915, GL MS 35447.

⁶⁷ Brewster to Robbins, 3 October 1915, GL MS 35447.

⁶⁸ Baird to Robbins, 2 October 1915, GL MS 35447.

be Baird. Both he and Brewster are named as the proposed Irish representatives in a letter from the secretary of the Newspaper Society, Henry Whorlow, to Robbins on 29 September.⁶⁹

The deputation that met the Postmaster General on 5 October 1915 included representatives from the Newspaper Society, the Northern Federation of Newspaper Owners, the Southern Federation of Newspaper Owners, the Scottish Daily Newspaper Society, the Newspaper Proprietors Association, the Society of Weekly Newspapers and Periodicals, the Yorkshire Newspaper Society, the PA, the ETC, the Central News Agency, the London News Agency, the Institute of Journalists and the National Union of Journalists. Representing the Irish Newspaper Society, Baird and Brewster were joined by Simington.⁷⁰ The Postmaster General's initial response to this massing of the news industry's guns was unsympathetic.

[However,] he intimated that he would be prepared to discuss the matter privately with four or five representatives who the Deputation might appoint. The invitation was accepted and lengthy negotiations took place which led to a compromise.⁷¹

This second meeting took place on 11 October. The delegates were drawn from a body representing, largely, the same organisations as at the original deputation, if slightly less numerous. Neither the Southern Society of Newspaper Owners nor the London News Agency was represented. Baird and Brewster remained on behalf of the Irish Newspaper Society, but not Simington.⁷² From this group J.S.R. Phillips, Newspaper Society, Edmund Robbins, PA, H.D. Robertson, Scottish Daily Newspaper Society, J.R. Scott, Northern Federation of Newspaper Owners, Sir George Toulmin, PA, and W.N. Watt, National Union of Journalists, were delegated to meet the Postmaster General.⁷³ The compromise presented proposed a reduction in

⁶⁹ Whorlow to Robbins, 29 September 1915, GL MS 35447.

⁷⁰ Deputation to the Postmaster General, 5 October 1915, GL MS 35447.

⁷¹ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1915 in Report of PA AGM 1916, GL MS 35365/9.

⁷² Deputation to the Postmaster General, 11 October 1915, GL MS 35447.

⁷³ *Ibid.*; Report of meeting at the Post Office, 11 October 1915, enclosed with circular letter from Robbins, 12 October 1915, GL MS 35447.

the price increase which would not come in to effect until 1 January 1917.⁷⁴ In fact it would not be introduced until 1 January 1920.⁷⁵ In the discussion that followed the delegation's return from the Postmaster General both Baird and Brewster are noted as having spoken in favour of the compromise. When put to the vote it was accepted by the assembled representatives.⁷⁶

That Irish newspapers were concerned about the potential for a significant increase in the cost of a service and that they organised to lobby against it is not surprising. However, what these events do show is that there was a pre-existing, Irish, structure for them to organise within: the Irish Newspaper Society. The archival evidence for this organisation is sparse. It is likely that it was a product of a fracturing of the Provincial Newspaper Society (PNS) in the late nineteenth century. Formed in 1836 the aim of this organisation was to 'promote the general interests of the provincial press, and to maintain the respectability of a body which may, without vanity, be said to occupy a very important place in the community'.⁷⁷ Apolitical in nature, it was after one of the PNS's annual dinners that the apocryphal 'conversation in the fog' that led to the foundation of the PA was said to have occurred. In 1888 the London newspapers joined the organisation and it was renamed the Newspaper Society, following the formation of the Newspaper Proprietors Association in 1906 their membership was 'of a "courtesy" character' until they disassociated in 1916.⁷⁸ Founded in 1907,⁷⁹ the Irish Newspaper Society was represented at a meeting in 1909 held to discuss the general fracturing and rudderlessness of the Newspaper Society.⁸⁰ It formally affiliated to the parent organisation in 1921.⁸¹ Brewster mentioned it when seconding Charles Henderson's nomination to

⁷⁴ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1915 in Report of PA AGM 1916, GL MS 35365/9.

⁷⁵ PA Tariff for 1920 and circular, 22 November 1919, GL MS 35460/7.

⁷⁶ Circular letter from Robbins, 12 October 1915, GL MS 35447.

⁷⁷ H. Whorlow, *The Provincial Newspaper Society 1836-1886*. (London: Page, Pratte and Co., 1886), p. 29.

⁷⁸ Newspaper Society, The, *The Newspaper Society: A Centenary Retrospect 1836-1936*. (Birmingham: Silk and Terry, 1936), p. 19.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

the PA board in 1917 (see below).⁸² Other than these few mentions there is scant evidence remaining for its activities. In its role in connection with the 1915 deputation it presents a very rare example of Irish newspapers organising as an identifiable group, or sub-group, distinct from the wider United Kingdom structures represented by the PA and Newspaper Society. It is notable that this is as an all-Ireland body, the politico-religious divisions that identified these newspapers in their published columns are not apparent. The two chief Irish representatives are Baird of the unionist *Belfast Telegraph* and Brewster of the nationalist *Irish Independent*. The reader might take note that Brewster's letter to Robbins of 3 October 1915 highlights his and Baird's mandate, through the Irish Newspaper Society, to speak on behalf of 'every daily paper in Ireland'.⁸³ This might be seen as more than just a confirmation of authority. In light of the fracture lines in Irish society and politics at this time it might also be seen as a protestation that there was at least something Irish that was united.

The Easter Rising to the Fall of the Irish Parliamentary Party, April 1916 – December 1918

Contemporary Context

The events of Easter Week 1916 would thrust Ireland back in to the heart of British politics and, to an extent, lead to increased sympathy for separatism within Irish nationalism and radicalisation of the population. On Easter Monday, 24 April, contingents from the minority grouping of the Irish Volunteers that had rejected Redmond's appeal to enlist, along with members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and the Irish Citizen Army (ICA),⁸⁴ seized the General Post Office (GPO) in Dublin. The Rising had been planned by the military council of the IRB, a secretive oath-bound society committed to removing British rule in Ireland,⁸⁵ which had exerted a strong influence over the Irish Volunteers. Following the 1914 split many of the Volunteer's more moderate elements had either left or those that

⁸² Report of PA AGM 1917, GL MS 35365/9.

⁸³ Brewster to Robbins, 3 October 1915, GL MS 35447.

⁸⁴ The Irish Citizen Army was formed in November 1913; its members were drawn from the trade union movement.

⁸⁵ Townshend, *Easter 1916*, pp. 3-4.

remained had been outmanoeuvred, including their leader MacNeill.⁸⁶ From in front of the GPO, in the heart of Dublin, Pádraig Pearse⁸⁷ read the Proclamation of the Irish Republic and announced the formation of its Provisional Government. In addition to the GPO the revolutionary forces seized positions in Dublin at the Four Courts, the South Dublin Union, the Mendicity Institute, Jacob's biscuit factory, Boland's Mill and St. Stephen's Green. However, plans for co-ordinated risings throughout the rest of Ireland to keep the British forces and Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) occupied were largely unsuccessful. Where these co-ordinated actions did take place, at Ashbourne in Meath, at Athenry in Galway, and at Enniscorthy in Wexford, there was virtually no communication with the leaders in Dublin.⁸⁸

Despite being significantly outnumbered by the forces that the British military brought to bear, by twenty to one in the estimate of John P. Duggan,⁸⁹ the Dublin contingent of the Easter Rising held out until 29 April. Then, 'on a cardboard picture backing, the decision of the Provisional Government to seek terms with British was sadly recorded and promulgated'.⁹⁰ Outnumbered and outgunned, with no response to the artillery brought up from Athlone and the shells of the gunboat *Helga* which moored in the Liffey, it is more of a surprise that the rebels held out for so long rather than that they failed.

In the aftermath of the Easter Rising it was not a foregone conclusion that public opinion would swing behind the rebels. The rise of Sinn Féin,⁹¹ decline of the IPP, and departure down the route that would lead to the Irish War of Independence could not be presumed. This was the result of a rather slower burn that, among other instances, saw the court-martial and conviction of suspected participants in the Rising, fourteen of

⁸⁶ Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, pp. 138-9; Townshend, *Easter 1916*, pp. 134-5.

⁸⁷ Ruth Dudley Edwards, 'Pearse, Patrick Henry (1879-1916)', *ODNB*, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/37840>, accessed 26 October 2012; J. J. Lee, 'Pearse, Patrick Henry', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a7247>, accessed 26 October 2012.

⁸⁸ Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 205.

⁸⁹ John P. Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1991), p. 12.

⁹⁰ Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 206

⁹¹ Established in 1905 by Arthur Griffith, Sinn Féin espoused a radical nationalism and abstention from the Westminster parliament. See Townshend, *Easter 1916*, pp. 10-12.

whom were executed,⁹² and the heavy handed and widespread arrest and internment of suspected revolutionary nationalists. As Alvin Jackson has commented:

on the whole it seems that the teetering pendulum of popular sympathy probably swung against the insurgents during and immediately after the Rising. It was the mid-term British response, both in political as well as military terms, that helped win a popular re-evaluation of the conflict.⁹³

The outcome of the Easter Rising might have been seen, for the nationalist community, as a fulfilment of Pearse's sentiment in his graveside oration at the funeral of IRB member Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa in August 1915: 'Life springs from death; and from the graves of patriot men and women spring living nations'.⁹⁴ However the unionist community would soon have an equally powerful event to symbolise their allegiances. On 1 July 1916 the four month long battle of the Somme began in France. The involvement, and heroism, of the 36th (Ulster) Division fighting on the anniversary of the battle of the Boyne (1690) was 'easily framed within the Ulster unionist mythic tradition'.⁹⁵ This 'became for Ulster unionists a sacred sacrifice where the union was sealed with blood of Ulster men'.⁹⁶

In the wake of the Easter Rising, David Lloyd George, the newly appointed Secretary of State for War, led attempts to broker a solution that would appease Ireland and head off further violent unrest. His preferred formula was the immediate enactment of Home Rule in Ireland, excluding the six most strongly unionist counties in Ulster.⁹⁷ But the discussions would prove ultimately fruitless when it became apparent that 'the two Irish leaders had apparently formed very different ideas of the partition proposal,

⁹² Though their convictions were connected to the Rising, Roger Casement, hanged in London for treason, and Thomas Kent, executed by firing squad in Cork following a court martial, had not actually participated in events in Dublin. See Michael Laffan, 'Casement, Sir Roger David', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a1532>, accessed 18 February 2014; Desmond McCabe and Lawrence William White, 'Kent (Ceannt), Thomas', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a4511>, accessed 18 February 2014.

⁹³ Townshend, *Easter 1916*, p. 206.

⁹⁴ Aldous, *Great Irish Speeches*, p. 69.

⁹⁵ Loughlin, 'Ulster Unionism and the Politics of Remembrance', p. 135.

⁹⁶ Jeffrey, 'Echoes of War', p. 267.

⁹⁷ Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 240.

Redmond seeing it as a temporary expedient while Carson viewed it as permanent'.⁹⁸ Upon realising that the situation could become permanent Redmond withdrew his support. In May 1917 Lloyd George presented him with the choice between the enactment of Home Rule with partition or a national convention within which to debate the future of self-government.⁹⁹ Redmond, perhaps feeling his party weakened by recent by-election losses to Sinn Féin in Longford and Roscommon and unwilling to commit to partition in the face of growing anti-British sentiment in Ireland, opted for the latter. In the Irish Convention that deliberated between May 1917 and April 1918 unionists from southern Ireland made considerable concessions to nationalist aims. Their contemporaries from Ulster were notably less willing to modify their positions though.¹⁰⁰ Its recommendations, when eventually presented, were only offered in exchange for the introduction of conscription in Ireland, a proposition which by that time was viewed as unacceptable. While the IPP had been occupied with these protracted discussions Sinn Féin, which had stood aloof from the Convention, continued to make gains. One of the most notable of these was in the East Clare by-election of July 1917, brought about by the death of John Redmond's younger brother and confidant Willie Redmond.¹⁰¹ He was killed in action while serving with the 16th (Irish) Division as part of the Royal Irish Regiment at Messines. The victorious Sinn Féin candidate was Eamon de Valera, senior surviving commander of the Easter Rising and a future Taoiseach and President of Ireland. John Redmond himself died in March 1918, before the conclusion of the Convention. Preoccupied by the Convention, which had also served 'to divide and truncate Irish Unionism',¹⁰² the IPP had 'left a political vacuum [which was] speedily filled by Sinn Féin'.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ Jackson, *Home Rule*, p. 155.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

¹⁰⁰ Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 210.

¹⁰¹ Terence Denman, 'Redmond, William Hoey Kearney ('Willie')', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a7609>, accessed 26 October 2012; *idem*, 'Redmond, William Hoey Kearney ['Willie'] (1861-1917)', *ODNB* <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35703>, accessed 26 October 2012.

¹⁰² Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 242.

¹⁰³ Jackson, *Home Rule*, p. 179.

Sinn Féin had not been officially linked with the Volunteers, IRB or ICA that took part in the Easter Rising, despite some popular association of the party with these events. However, the nationalists interned in its wake, educated in the ‘revolutionary academies’ of Frongoch and Reading Gaol,¹⁰⁴ graduated towards the party following their release in late 1916. The party’s *ard fheis* in October 1917, where de Valera was elected its president, marked the end of a period of reorganisation and committed the party to achieving an Irish republic. In Jackson’s words, ‘Griffith’s non-violent political party had lost its innocence: it had been radicalized, popularized and now – in November 1917 – bound with militant separatism’.¹⁰⁵

Perhaps the last roll of the dice for constitutional nationalism came in April 1918. The government, desperate for additional manpower following the German spring offensive of that year, linked the implementation of Home Rule, under the terms eventually recommended by the Irish Convention, to the introduction of conscription in Ireland. This ‘immediately ruined both the credibility of the convention and the residual popularity of Home Rule’.¹⁰⁶ Dillon, who had succeeded Redmond as leader of the IPP, led the party out of the House of Commons and both sides of Nationalist politics joined in signing an anti-conscription pledge. This move towards a more militant inclination came too late to save the IPP. In the post-war general election of December 1918 it won six seats as opposed to Sinn Féin’s seventy-three.

Irish Newspapers and International News

In the years following the Easter Rising there was a slow evolution in the mainstream nationalist Irish newspapers’ attitude to Sinn Féin. It was only in the aftermath of the party’s resounding electoral success in 1918 that they would notably move away from their traditional support of constitutional nationalism and soften their approach to radical separatism. The mainstream unionist newspapers would hold their traditional line. However, as before, these deepening divisions were widely ignored in the newspapers’ corporate

¹⁰⁴ Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 207.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

¹⁰⁶ Jackson, *Home Rule*, p. 185.

and commercial behaviour. Where they were referred to it was largely to minimise their significance. Within the systems and structures of international news supply this period also saw a radical restructuring in the ownership of Reuters, the PA's main source of international news. The negotiations and details of the deal that led to it becoming a private limited company, in which the government gained considerable control during the war for propaganda purposes, were not made public. But their effect in concentrating control of the agency within a small share ownership group in the inter-war period was a significant factor in facilitating the PA's purchase of a controlling interest in the international agency in 1926 (see Chapter Three).

The Dublin newspapers were notably more affected than their contemporaries elsewhere in Ireland during the Easter Rising. Their offices, based in the centre of the capital, were quite simply physically closer to the disruptive events of that week. Indeed much of the scholarship to date has focused around the effects and results of these events on the capital's newspapers and much remains to be done in examining those outside Dublin at this time.

No edition of the *Irish Independent* was produced on the day following the Easter Rising, Tuesday 25 April, nor in the following days. Its premises were seized by a group of Volunteers on the Thursday and held until Saturday.¹⁰⁷ Members of the ICA seized the offices of the *Dublin Evening Mail* and *Dublin Daily Express* on the Tuesday, but were driven out by British forces the next day.¹⁰⁸ Despite the destruction of its storage depot the *Irish Times* continued to publish on most days throughout that tumultuous Easter week.¹⁰⁹ Less fortunate was the *Freeman's Journal*, whose premises were destroyed with the loss of all its printing equipment and records, including its PA share certificates.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Oram, *The Newspaper Book*, pp. 128-9.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

¹⁰⁹ O'Brien, *The Irish Times*, p. 48.

¹¹⁰ Oram, *The Newspaper Book*, p. 129. The loss of the PA share certificates, and their replacement, was confirmed in a letter from John J. Kelly, *Freeman's Journal* secretary, to P.A. Shaw, PA secretary, on 9 March 1917, GL MS 35404.

In the aftermath of the Easter Rising the mainstream Irish newspapers were condemnatory of the rebels and their leaders.¹¹¹ The *Irish Times*, sure of its unionist constituency, demanded stern action from the government and disagreed with John Redmond's plea for clemency as the effect of the executions on public opinion became clear.¹¹² The *Freeman's Journal*, managing to quickly restart production from a temporary premises,¹¹³ caught the changing public mood and noted the sympathy the executions were arousing as early as the 9 May.¹¹⁴ The *Irish Independent* misread the quickly evolving position of its nationalist, middle class, readership though. It supported clemency for the rank and file only and on 10 and 12 May called for the execution of James Connolly and Seán MacDermott, the only surviving signatories of the proclamation read by Pearse.¹¹⁵ This was an editorial decision that would attach an infamy to the newspaper that it would still be reminded of fifty years later.¹¹⁶ In the months and years immediately following the Easter Rising Irish newspapers would only slowly and cautiously move from their traditional, pre-1916, political positions. Controlled by an ownership largely hostile to Sinn Féin, it was only in the aftermath of the party's resounding victory in the 1918 general election that they would soften their approach to its separatist republican ideals.¹¹⁷ It should also be borne in mind that a newspaper which endorsed Sinn Féin's radical agenda too wholeheartedly risked incurring the wrath of the Censor and the significant financial implications of suppression.¹¹⁸ In light of this, a comment by the Censor to the Under Secretary for Ireland in April 1917 is perhaps not surprising. In a minute regarding the infringement of DORA in the *Freeman's Journal's* reporting

¹¹¹ Felix Larkin, 'No Longer a Political Side Show: T.R. Harrington and the "New" *Irish Independent*, 1905-31' in Mark O'Brien and Kevin Rafter (eds.), *Independent Newspapers: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), p. 34.

¹¹² O'Brien, *The Irish Times*, pp. 50-51.

¹¹³ Oram, *The Newspaper Book*, p. 129.

¹¹⁴ Larkin, 'No Longer a Political Side Show', p.35.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-6.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 36, Fn. 35.

¹¹⁷ Ian Kenneally, 'Truce to Treaty: Irish Journalists and the 1920-21 Peace Process' in Kevin Rafter (ed.), *Irish Journalism Before Independence: More a Disease Than a Profession* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2011), p. 223.

¹¹⁸ Kenneally, *The Paper Wall*, p. 7.

of a meeting convened by George Noble Count Plunkett MP,¹¹⁹ the Censor noted that the ‘remainder of the Dublin newspapers in announcing Count Plunkett’s Meeting censored most carefully on their own, any undesirable parts’.¹²⁰

The first note of the Easter Rising and its effects on its Irish subscribers within the PA was made in the manager’s report to the board in May 1916. He reported that coverage of the events had been sent in the General News Service resulting in ‘a series of records in the quantities sent to all Subscribers’. He further anticipated that ‘claims would be made by the Irish Papers for rebates in the charges made for news supplies which were sent but not delivered during the time the Rebellion lasted’.¹²¹ Sixty percent rebates were agreed in November 1917 for seventeen days disruption in Dublin, fourteen days for Cork and six days for Belfast and Derry.¹²²

The 1916 PA AGM, held only shortly after the Easter Rising in May of that year, was attended by R.H.H. Baird, *Belfast Telegraph*, C.W. Henderson, *Belfast News Letter*, and A.W. Stewart, *Irish Daily Telegraph*. Despite being a member of the board George Crosbie, *Cork Examiner*, did not attend. The chairman’s speech noted

considerable regret in the absence of our members from Dublin – from the Capital City of our Sister-Isle – more especially as we know the reason why they are not with us. When the history of Easter week is recorded we shall realise more fully than we do to-day the circumstances with which they have had to contend and the dangers through which they have passed. We already know they have suffered to a very great extent, and must have suffered from the stress of mind which must have accompanied such anxious moments. Our sympathy goes out to them to the fullest extent. (Hear, hear).¹²³

¹¹⁹ Supported by Sinn Féin but not a member of the party at the time, Count Plunkett was elected MP for Roscommon North in a by-election on 5 February 1917. That his son, Joseph Mary Plunkett, was one of the executed leaders of the Easter Rising is likely to have been a central factor in his election.

¹²⁰ Minute from the Press Censor, Ireland, to the Under Secretary for Ireland, 20 April 1917, TNA CO/904/160/6.

¹²¹ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, May 1916, GL MS 35358/18.

¹²² PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, November 1917, GL MS 35358/19.

¹²³ Report of PA AGM, 1916, GL MS 35365/9.

The following year W. T. Brewster, *Irish Independent*, attended the AGM as did C. W. Henderson, *Belfast News Letter*. In 1918 they were joined by T. Moles, *Belfast Telegraph*, and J. J. Simington of the *Irish Times*.¹²⁴

At the 1917 AGM Crosbie, having served on the PA board since 1907, stepped down from the PA's governing body in accordance with its rules. At the same meeting Henderson was appointed to the board. In June of the same year he was appointed to the board of the PA Share Purchase Company, an appointment Crosbie had also held 1911-12.¹²⁵ Henderson's nomination at the AGM was proposed by Brewster. In a lengthy speech recommending Henderson's candidacy Brewster described his role in the formation of the Irish Newspaper Society in 1907, 'which includes every daily and evening paper in Ireland, and most of the important weeklies'. Henderson had been president of this body for its first two years and was re-elected to the position for 1916 and 1917. Brewster continued:

There is just one other thing I should like to mention. Mr. Henderson succeeds, in a kind of way Mr. George Crosbie [...]. Mr. George Crosbie is one of the Proprietors of the *Cork Examiner*, a paper of strong Nationalist views, associated with the Parliamentary Party in almost perhaps an official character. Mr Henderson is the representative of a Belfast newspaper of at least as strong Unionist views, and it is only proper that I should acknowledge that it is the turn of the Unionist Press to represent us in this way. (Hear, hear). I accentuate that by pointing out that I, who propose his election, am the representative of a paper that might fairly be described as an uncompromising advocate of the claims for Home Rule, with full fiscal control, and for an undivided Ireland. For these I am quite sure Mr. Henderson has not the slightest sympathy. (Laughter.) But I have every confidence in Mr. Henderson as a thorough business man and a real good fellow, and I am quite sure he will give us splendid service. (Cheers.)¹²⁶

As well as the more obvious references to the nationalist and unionist traditions in Ireland, Brewster's comments can be seen in light of the opinions held by the proprietor of his newspaper, William Martin Murphy. Murphy and the *Irish Independent* had opposed the 1914 Home Rule Act on the grounds that it did not provide 'effective control of revenue, including

¹²⁴ Reports of PA AGMs, 1917-18, GL MS 35365/9.

¹²⁵ PA Share Purchase Company Register of Members and Directors, GL MS 35408.

¹²⁶ Report of PA AGM, 1917, GL MS 35365/9.

the important area of customs and excise'.¹²⁷ In August 1917 Murphy, as a leading member of the Irish Convention, would champion a Dominion status Home Rule Ireland. His vision would ensure fair treatment of both unionist and nationalists under an all-Ireland government deferring to Westminster only in limited areas of competence such as defence, treason and naturalisation.¹²⁸

Upon his nomination to the board being endorsed by the AGM Henderson stated in his acceptance speech that:

I am a member for both the Nationalist and Unionist Party in Ireland. I have had meetings in Dublin at which Nationalists and Unionist were present, and I think they were always very successful meetings.¹²⁹

It is clear then, that, despite recognition of the political divisions in Ireland, these two men, representing major newspapers from opposing traditions, saw no problem or contradiction in cooperating in a business environment. Indeed they might even be said to have held each other in quite high regard. When these events at the 1917 PA AGM are seen in conjunction with the actions of a wider body of Irish newspapers in 1915, with regard to the deputation to the Postmaster General, an impression of a united and cooperative news industry in Ireland at this point emerges. This is in stark contrast to the traditional view of a media, and society, riven by partisan politico-religious positions. This latter interpretation, it should be noted, is justified by an examination of the printed columns of these newspapers.

While the Easter Rising and its aftermath convulsed Ireland and Britain World War I continued. Irish newspapers were still reliant on news agencies for their international news and DORA, the Censor and the Press Bureau continued to operate. In this environment the news agencies proved themselves content to cooperate with the public, and less public, mechanisms by which the British Government sought to influence news coverage. As mentioned above, at the outbreak of the war some concerns

¹²⁷ Thomas Morrissey S.J., *William Martin Murphy* (Dundalk: Historical Association of Ireland and Dundalgan Press, 1997), p. 60.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 71

¹²⁹ Report of PA AGM, 1917, GL MS 35365/9.

had been raised about the loyalty and freedom from enemy influence of Reuters, the PA's primary pre-war source of international news and close wartime collaborator.

Alongside the concerns regarding 'the loyalty of Reuters and its shareholders to the British cause',¹³⁰ largely deriving from the German origins of the company's name and the existence of non-British shareholders, the agency, which was at the time a publicly listed company, was in an increasingly precarious financial position. This prompted further concern among the press and politicians that financial difficulties could leave Reuters open to take over by foreign interests. In light of this, as Peter Putnis has described:

The British Government sought to develop a mechanism whereby it could secretly gain control of Reuters. At the same time, Reuters desperately needed new sources of income. On the basis of mutual interest, secret negotiations commenced in early September 1915.¹³¹

The outcome of these negotiations was that from December 1916 the publicly quoted Reuters Telegram Company was replaced with a new private limited company, Reuters (1916) Limited, control of which was secretly exercised by the British government through nominees on its board. This new company had an issued share capital of 999 shares at £1 each. 500 of these were issued to three government nominees and 498 to Reuters' chairman Mark Napier. This holding was in fact split equally between Napier and Reuters' general manager, Roderick Jones. In addition the nominees controlled on behalf of the government a special share, Share 999, which operated 26% of the voting rights and had wide ranging powers of appointment and veto.¹³²

In the following years, the government-backed financial mechanisms that had been necessary to enable this structure were gradually dismantled. The five hundred normal shares held by the government nominees, though not Share 999, were sold to Jones and Napier, 499 to Jones and one to Napier. Following the end of the War this final share, and its associated

¹³⁰ Putnis, 'Share 999', p. 143.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 150-1.

powers, was transferred to Jones and Napier, and subsequently to Napier alone. By mid-June 1919 ‘Reuters Limited was [...] fully controlled by Napier and Jones, with Jones having a majority share holding’.¹³³

Putnis’ interpretation of the motivations behind this restructuring of Reuters has been challenged by Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb. Putnis contends that the government’s actions were motivated by a desire to influence news coverage for propaganda purposes and address ‘a concern about a Reuters that might seek to be unhelpfully independent’.¹³⁴ The company, and particularly its senior executives Napier and Jones, was motivated by the need for financial security. Silberstein-Loeb argues that it was Jones in particular who was the prime mover in these events and that the ‘executives used the financial support of the government to precipitate a leveraged buyout, take the company private and then bring about a sale of the company after the war to the British press’.¹³⁵ Key to both interpretations is the existence of the secretive and powerful Share 999, and through it the government’s influence over Reuters. As Reuters’ historian Donald Read has pointed out the powers this share possessed were never exercised and it was surrendered in 1919.¹³⁶ Silberstein-Loeb highlights that these powers were limited to public policy, not the commercial operations of Reuters, and in practice were ‘hardly used’.¹³⁷ This only demonstrates that the government did not find the need to exercise these powers though, not that it wouldn’t. Their very existence implies that it would certainly have considered doing so if the need arose. Silberstein-Loeb further points out that the speed with which the government got rid of Share 999 is in contradiction to the desire for the control Putnis describes.¹³⁸ However in peace-time the level of control the government exercised, and its propaganda and news control facilities, would no longer have been desirable. Indeed if their secret existence had become public knowledge it would have been at least embarrassing, if not downright calamitous. Further, as Putnis has pointed out, during the negotiations that led to the

¹³³ Ibid., p. 156.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 157.

¹³⁵ Silberstein-Loeb, ‘Foreign Office Control of Reuters’, p. 283.

¹³⁶ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 132.

¹³⁷ Silberstein-Loeb, ‘Foreign Office Control of Reuters’, p. 288.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

restructuring it ‘was noted that the government only wanted control for the duration of the war’.¹³⁹

It is true that the restructuring of Reuters as a private company and the concentration of its shares in a limited number of hands facilitated its sale to the British and Irish press in a series of transactions between 1926 and 1941 (see Chapters Three and Four). Jones consistently described this outcome in his retrospective writings, both published and unpublished, as his driving ambition.

[The] regenerated Reuters must be delivered (and this was my fourth and paramount objective) into the permanent keeping of the newspapers of the United Kingdom [... in a way that] we must regard as a national trust.¹⁴⁰

He is less effusive about the significant financial benefit he, and Napier and subsequently his family, derived from these machinations.¹⁴¹

The behaviour of Reuters following the restructuring, and the absence of a need to exercise Share 999’s powers, is in line with the behaviour of other news organisations, indeed other commercial considerations of many hues, during World War I. The PA certainly demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the Censor, if at times it did grumble about the delays this imposed on its service. In this Silberstein-Loeb is correct to point out that ‘there is no reason to believe that the agency [Reuters] would have been reluctant to do its part for the country during the war if it remained a publicly traded company’.¹⁴² However, the PA and other agencies had neither Reuters’ international scope nor ability to influence how Britain’s war effort was perceived. His retrospective dismissal of the contemporary fears surrounding Reuters does not adequately take into account that these fears existed.¹⁴³ World War I represented a new type of conflict, ‘total war’. The uncertainty of what this

¹³⁹ Putnis, ‘Reuters and the British Government – Re-Visited’, p. 296.

¹⁴⁰ Roderick Jones, *A Life in Reuters* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951), p. 153.

¹⁴¹ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 132.

¹⁴² Silberstein-Loeb. ‘Foreign Office Control of Reuters’, p. 282.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 281-3.

implied for government, society and the world may well have been sufficient in itself to motivate the official action described.

The proposed sale of Reuters was first brought to official PA notice when a circular indicating that its directors had provisionally accepted an offer was reported to the board by the PA manager in November 1916. He further reported that:

in an interview, Mr. Roderick Jones had assured him that the prospective purchasers were British, and that they had no connection with the Press. He had further assured him that the object in view was to restore to Reuter its independence and to maintain its unassailable position.¹⁴⁴

The manager was instructed to keep an eye on developments and, if the opportunity arose, indicate that the PA might be interested in acquiring a share in the company. At the following months meeting the manager reported that the proposed sale had been accepted by Reuters' shareholders and the new, publicly revealed, ownership of Reuters. He further reported on a subsequent interview with Jones where he had been informed that:

Mr. Napier would remain Chairman, and with the former [Jones] as Managing Director, would virtually have complete control, on behalf of the new owners of the Company. The assurances respecting the future policy of the Company were of a satisfactory nature.¹⁴⁵

These reports signify three points of note. Firstly, the negotiations and their outcome leading to the restructuring of Reuters were indeed highly secretive. Even one of the company's closest commercial allies and key customers was seemingly unaware until the proposed sale was made public in a circular to shareholders. Secondly, the PA needed reassurance as to the nature of the purchasers. This probably reflected a concern that a London paper, or papers, might seek to gain control of the company to the detriment of the PA's interests. Finally, the PA would consider taking a share in

¹⁴⁴ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, November 1916, GL MS 35358/19.

¹⁴⁵ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, December 1916, GL MS 35358/19.

Reuters itself, presumably as a move to counter the possible implications of the former.

With regard to its own relationship with the structures put in place to manage news supply, the PA adopted a conservative and cooperative approach.¹⁴⁶ In the Annual Report for 1916, presented at the 1917 AGM, the ‘severe restrictions imposed by the Censorship’ were noted. It continued:

It has been the policy of the Association to submit everything relating to the War, either directly or indirectly, to the Official Press Bureau; so that no question shall arise in the office of a Subscriber that any risk will be run by publishing the Associations telegrams. At times this has somewhat interfered with the prompt despatch of some items which have appeared already in some papers.¹⁴⁷

This practice led to some complaints among the PA subscribers, and evening newspapers in particular often felt aggrieved. Their complaints were further compounded by the practice of holding back certain reports ‘so that the London mornings, with whom joint arrangements had been made’ could publish them first.¹⁴⁸ On the whole though the PA’s members and subscribers seem to have been satisfied with the service they received during World War I.

Irish newspapers, along with their British contemporaries, returned to peace-time conditions much as they had been at the outbreak of the war. However, ‘peace-time conditions’ is a description that few in Ireland would have recognised as pertaining to Ireland in the following years.

Conflict and Division, the Irish War of Independence to the Anglo-Irish Treaty

Contemporary Context

Sinn Féin’s resounding electoral victory in December 1918 allowed it to implement its policy of abstentionism. In January 1919 it established the First Dáil in Dublin and elected an executive. This separatist political body was backed by its own military force. Drawn from the Irish Volunteers and

¹⁴⁶ Scott, *Reporter Anonymous*, p. 141.

¹⁴⁷ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1916 in Report of PA AGM 1917, GL MS 35365/9.

¹⁴⁸ Scott, *Reporter Anonymous*, p. 142.

soon becoming known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), this body would fire the first shots of the Irish War of Independence. On the same day that the Dáil met for the first time, 21 January 1919, an RIC party was ambushed at Soloheadbeg in Tipperary. Two RIC men were killed and a quantity of gelignite was captured to be used in the manufacture of grenades.¹⁴⁹ The formation of the Dáil, asserting Sinn Féin's political predominance outside of Ulster, where it had enjoyed little electoral success, created an 'embryonic partition, in time too there were Sinn Féin courts administering justice'.¹⁵⁰ This presented unionists in Ulster with the opportunity to reaffirm their loyalist credentials and rejection of separatism. Here with 'no significant competition' from the rest of Ireland the role of Ulstermen in the war was exploited.¹⁵¹ The threat by Carson to 'call out' the UVF on 12 July 1919 served as both a reminder of unionism's claims on Britain and a threat. Ulstermen, as embodied in the 36th (Ulster) Division, had bound themselves to Britain and the United Kingdom through their 'blood sacrifice' on the Western Front: dues were owed. Should these debts be ignored, the violence hinted at in the Ulster Covenant should not be forgotten. The Peace Celebrations that took place throughout Britain on 19 July were largely absent in Ireland outside Belfast, 'indicating the extent to which [the country] was alienated from British rule'.¹⁵² The celebrations in Belfast, despite being postponed until 9 August in light of the politically volatile situation, enabled the unionist community 'simultaneously to share authentically in a profound British national experience *and* to address their own political concerns' (emphasis in the original).¹⁵³

Jackson describes three phases of the Irish War of Independence that continued until the truce of 11 July 1921 and the subsequent treaty negotiations. The first phase, which lasted until the winter of 1919-20, involved relatively minor attacks on RIC barracks and individual officers, including for example the killing of a member of the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP) detective division in July 1919. The second phase, which

¹⁴⁹ Duggan, *Irish Army*, p. 35.

¹⁵⁰ Dennis Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf: Northern Attitudes to the Independent Irish State 1919-1949* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1988), p. 4.

¹⁵¹ Loughlin, 'Ulster Unionism and the Politics of Remembrance', p. 137.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 138.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

lasted from early 1920 to late summer the same year, involved an escalation of these attacks in number and ambition. The final phase was marked by the creation of the IRA Active Service Units, or ‘flying columns’, and produced some ‘(from the republican perspective) spectacularly successful results’.¹⁵⁴ This escalation of violence by the IRA, posing a threat to the ‘state monopoly of power’,¹⁵⁵ was matched by the British forces. Facing declining recruitment in the RIC and requiring additional policing capability¹⁵⁶ it was decided to source auxiliary manpower from demobilised veterans of World War I. The Black and Tans, drawn from the ranks of enlisted men and NCOs, and the Auxiliaries, commissioned officers, began arriving in Ireland in March and August 1920.¹⁵⁷ The men that made up this paramilitary police force, disbanded in 1922, are primarily remembered in Ireland for their ill discipline, drinking and vicious reprisals. For example the ‘sacking’ of Balbriggan on 20 September 1920, where in reprisal for the fatal shooting of two RIC men they ‘took revenge by killing two local Sinn Féin leaders and burning property, including a hosiery factory, which was the town’s main source of local employment’. This action was compared by the *Manchester Guardian* to the sacking of Louvain by German forces in World War I.¹⁵⁸ Balbriggan was followed on 21 November by the fatal shooting of twelve civilians, and injuries to many more, when the sports ground of Croke Park was raided, allegedly in a search for members of the IRA who had taken part in the assassination of British intelligence agents in Dublin earlier that morning. On 11 December the city centre of Cork was burned by Auxiliaries ‘enraged by an IRA ambush’.¹⁵⁹ The IRA was capable of equally vicious attacks though, such as the ‘Bloody Sunday’ assassinations of 21 November 1920 when fourteen British officials identified as members of the DMP’s detective division were killed which prompted the actions of

¹⁵⁴ Jackson, *Ireland*, pp. 247-8.

¹⁵⁵ Julia Eichenberg, ‘The Dark Side of Independence: Paramilitary Violence in Ireland and Poland After the First World War’, *Contemporary European History*, Vol.19, No.3 (2010), p. 232.

¹⁵⁶ N.C. Fleming and Alan O’Day, *The Longman Handbook of Modern Irish History Since 1800* (Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd., 2005), p. 742.

¹⁵⁷ Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 255; Lee, *Ireland*, p. 43.

¹⁵⁸ Maurice Walsh, *The News from Ireland: Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), p. 84-5.

¹⁵⁹ Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 255.

the Black and Tans / Auxiliaries at Croke Park mentioned above. Ambush was the favoured tactic of the IRA Active Service Units and the actions at Kilmichael on 28 November 1920 and Headfort in Kerry in March 1921 left seventeen Auxiliaries and nine British soldiers dead respectively.¹⁶⁰ The IRA also practised the execution of suspected informers, in one instance killing a woman in her seventies believed to have informed the British forces of a planned ambush.¹⁶¹

As in any conflict of this sort, examples of brutality and heroism can be found as readily on one side as the other. However, as James S. Donnelly Jr. has noted, the escalation in British attempts to suppress the Irish rebels largely served to intensify civilian support for their actions and drive more recruits in to their ranks.¹⁶²

[I]nitial revulsion or hesitancy among many nationalists over acts of brutal IRA violence tended to be overwhelmed or diffused by the excesses of the British responses, both in specific cases and their totality.¹⁶³

While the War of Independence raged in Ireland the political nettle of deferred Home Rule had to be grasped in Westminster. However, following the abortive attempts to reconcile Nationalist and Unionist aims in 1914, 1916 and 1917-18 it was clear that the Act as formulated could not be applied. The result was the Government of Ireland Act passed on 23 December 1920. This legislation created two separate statelets of Northern and Southern Ireland 'each with an executive and council; and a proposed Irish Council consisting of representatives from both'.¹⁶⁴ The ultimate aim of the authors was a 'temporarily divided island [leading to] a united Ireland with a separate Parliament of its own, bound by the closest ties to Great Britain'.¹⁶⁵ However the reality was to provide unionists in Northern Ireland

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 248.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 249.

¹⁶² James S. Donnelly Jr., "'Unofficial' British Reprisals and IRA Provocations, 1919-20: The Cases of Three Cork Towns', *Éire-Ireland*, Vol.45, Nos. 1&2, Earrach/Samhradh / Spring/Summer (2010), p. 168.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 154.

¹⁶⁴ Jackson, *Ireland*, p. 254.

¹⁶⁵ Kevin Matthews, *Fatal Influence: The Impact of Ireland on British Politics, 1920-1925* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2004), p. 2.

with ‘the opportunity to avoid incorporation into a self-governing nationalist, and largely Catholic, Ireland’.¹⁶⁶ In the general election of May 1921, held in fulfilment of the Act, all Sinn Féin candidates outside Northern Ireland were returned unopposed. Shortly afterwards, on 11 July 1921, the truce between the IRA and British forces came in to force. The Government of Ireland Act 1920 and subsequent elections had served to create the reality of partition, but the political positions of those elected under its terms made its full implementation impossible. The negotiations that led to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 6 December 1921 created the Dominion status Irish Free State, but the Northern Ireland parliament was permitted to opt out of its jurisdiction. As Dennis Kennedy has written:

British Tories who had squirmed over Home Rule in 1912, accepted Irish Independence in 1921 because it was defined in superficially imperial terms; equally many Irish separatists, who might have accepted Home Rule in 1912, were not now prepared to accept any grant of independence which fell short of the republic for which Pearse and Connolly had laid down their lives.¹⁶⁷

The Treaty would be accepted, if narrowly, by the government and people of the new state. But the aftermath would be a bloody and divisive civil war.

Irish newspapers and International News Supply

Between 1918-22 the nationalist press softened its attitude to Sinn Féin’s separatist republican ideals. This period was also marked by a series of moves by the PA to consolidate its position as a key part of the systems and structures of international news supply in Britain and Ireland. The role of the Central, ETC and PA agencies as key conduits for the distribution of news about Ireland was noted as a challenge faced by the Dáil’s propaganda agents. Despite their increasing sympathy for Sinn Féin and its aims and their continued involvement with the PA there is no evidence that the mainstream daily nationalist Irish newspapers attempted to help alleviate the Dáil’s propaganda challenges. The mainstream Irish daily newspapers

¹⁶⁶ Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf*, p. 1.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

continued to engage on a corporate and commercial level with the systems and structures of international news supply in much the same way as they had previously.

Censorship continued to operate in Ireland until 30 August 1919 when Lord Decies stepped down as Censor of newspapers. However DORA remained in place and the newspapers ‘were no freer to publish than before’.¹⁶⁸ In effect the Irish newspapers were expected to enforce the requirements of the Act on themselves with no Censor to guide them. The following years would not be easy ones for the newspaper industry in Ireland as they endured what Ian Kenneally has described as ‘a series of legislative attacks’ from the authorities in Dublin Castle.¹⁶⁹ The swingeing powers embodied in the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act (ROIA) in August 1920 ‘signalled the end of what remained of free speech for Irish newspapers’.¹⁷⁰ Under these powers a number of newspapers were suppressed. As the War of Independence progressed the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries raided and destroyed the printing works of a number of newspapers such as the *Westmeath Independent* and *Kerry Weekly Reporter*.¹⁷¹ The Dáil was equally capable in intent, if not legislative power, of seeking to put pressure on the Irish newspapers.¹⁷² Equally, there were elements within the IRA willing to use physical force in attempts to influence the newspapers, the offices of the *Cork Examiner*, *Irish Independent* and *Skibbereen Eagle* for example were all targeted at various times.¹⁷³ The actions of the civil and military authorities of Dublin Castle were seemingly far more energetic in their prosecution of these attacks however.¹⁷⁴ This was, at least in part, because this period saw a broad move in the Irish newspapers towards a more sympathetic reception of Sinn Féin’s

¹⁶⁸ Kenneally, *The Paper Wall*, p. 7. For a detailed study of how both the Irish Administration and Dáil utilised propaganda and the experiences of the mainstream media in Ireland, outside of Ulster/ Northern Ireland, in this period see Kenneally, *The Paper Wall*.

¹⁶⁹ Kenneally, ‘Truce to Treaty’, p. 213.

¹⁷⁰ Kenneally, *The Paper Wall*, p. 12.

¹⁷¹ Oram, *The Newspaper Book*, pp. 143-5.

¹⁷² Kenneally, *The Paper Wall*, p. 67

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-7

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

separatist republican position following its resounding election victory in 1918.¹⁷⁵

As Maurice Walsh has pointed out, the Irish War of Independence ‘coincided with a vigorous and intense discussion in political and cultural circles in Britain and the USA about the nature of the press, public opinion and propaganda’.¹⁷⁶ Whereas Walsh describes how foreign correspondents covering events in Ireland sought to assert their professional independence following a period of complicity with censorship during World War I, there was another side to this development. Whether as a product of increased literacy, improved production and marketing techniques, innovative styles, better distribution infrastructure or a combination of all these factors and others, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had seen rapid growth in the press as an industry, and within that its potential as a tool to shape and influence public opinion. This importance was recognised by the republicans and the *Irish Bulletin* was a key tool in their struggle for Irish independence.¹⁷⁷ Their primary focus was on getting news out of Ireland though, rather than the distribution of pro-republican propaganda within Ireland. This is most likely because, as Kenneally has pointed out, their outlets at home were limited due to the strict powers exercised by Dublin Castle and because the majority of the Irish people were already on their side.¹⁷⁸ As noted above Irish newspapers were already demonstrating a greater sympathy for their aims. In addition it was recognised that the ability to influence international opinion in favour of republican aims was a key factor in forcing the British Government to concede to their demands. Within this propaganda effort the news agencies were seen as a key source of news for overseas publications and the established structures of supply were considered a hindrance. Count George Plunkett wrote in October 1919 that:

One of the greatest difficulties in the way of dealing with the British propaganda campaign arises from the fact that Irish news items are

¹⁷⁵ Kenneally, ‘Truce to Treaty’, p. 223.

¹⁷⁶ Walsh, *The News from Ireland*, p. 16.

¹⁷⁷ Kenneally, *The Paper Wall*, pp. 46-53.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-4

supplied to the foreign press through the medium of English agencies.¹⁷⁹

This situation was reiterated the following year in a report from the Propaganda Department:

Our chief difficulty has been with ‘spot news’. This is supplied by English News Agencies (Exchange Telegraph, Central News and PA). These agencies really get their news directly or indirectly from Dublin Castle sources.¹⁸⁰

It is at least debatable whether this slight on the journalistic professionalism of these agencies correspondents’ is fair. But it does demonstrate the perception the Propaganda Department had and indicates the real difficulties it experienced in accessing the international media.

Between the end of hostilities in July 1921 and the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 6 December press opinion coalesced in support of the outcome the negotiations would present.¹⁸¹ Northern Ireland was a reality that would not be reversed, but the rest of the Government of Ireland Act would not be implemented. On the other hand an Irish Republic was not going to be offered. Whether due to pragmatism, war-weariness or commercial motivations, by this time the ‘mainstream Irish papers had aligned themselves with business and church leaders in an alliance to support the Treaty’.¹⁸²

In the years following the end of World War I the PA, approaching its fiftieth anniversary, entered a period where it would consolidate its position as a key pillar of the news supply system in Britain and Ireland. In the Annual Report for 1918, presented at the 1919 AGM, it was announced that

¹⁷⁹ Dáil Éireann Report on Foreign Affairs presented by Count George Plunkett (Copy), Dublin, 27 October 1919, National Archives of Ireland (NAI) Dáil Éireann Papers (DE) 2/269, *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy (DIFP) Vol. I*, No. 27, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1919/Report-on-Foreign-Affairs/27.htm>, accessed 3 January 2013.

¹⁸⁰ Dáil Éireann Report of the Propaganda Department (Copy), Dublin 25 June 1920, NAI, DE 4/1/3, *DIFP Vol. I*, No. 41, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1920/Propaganda-Department/41.htm>, accessed 3 January 2013.

¹⁸¹ Kenneally. ‘Truce to Treaty’, p. 222.

¹⁸² Ibid. See also O’Brien, *The Irish Times*, p. 56 on the attitudes of southern unionism’s leading organ at the time and Larkin, ‘No Longer a Political Side Show’, p. 37 for those of the nationalist *Irish Independent*.

the London News Agency (LNA) had been purchased in early 1919. This action had been undertaken

with a view to avoiding the great amount of overlapping and duplication from services having so much in common.[...The acquisition] would allow the two services to be merged into one possessing the best features of both.¹⁸³

The following year the Annual Report recorded that £21,000 had been paid for the LNA. The advantages of this purchase and its amalgamation with the PA's own London service were reiterated and it was noted that this move enabled 'one much improved supply, embracing the best points of both, at the cost of a single subscription'.¹⁸⁴ The effect of this move on the Irish newspapers was probably quite limited; in documents relating to the purchase only the *Belfast Telegraph* is noted as subscribing to the LNA's service.¹⁸⁵

At the 1920 AGM a number of other developments were noted in the Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1919. £20,000 had been paid for an eighty-three year lease on Byron House, Fleet Street. This would solve 'the long standing difficulty of obtaining adequate accommodation for our increasing business while bringing the head offices and the Red Lion Court branch office under the same roof'. These business functions would be contained in the top four floors of the new premises 'leaving the valuable ground and first floors still let to responsible tenants at rentals more than sufficient to defray the ground rent'.¹⁸⁶ Moves were also afoot to develop an improved distribution system for the PA's services. A leased wire scheme was being trialled with improved transmission and reception equipment. If successful, lines would be leased directly from the Post Office for a fixed rate and the PA would operate the transmission equipment itself. The

¹⁸³ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1918 in Report of PA AGM 1919 GL MS 35365/10. The purchase was noted in the 1918 Annual Report, but because it occurred outside the reporting period the details did not appear until the following year's Annual Report and Statement of Accounts.

¹⁸⁴ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1919 in Report of PA AGM 1920, GL MS 35365/10.

¹⁸⁵ Documents relating to the purchase of the London News Agency, GL MS 35419.

¹⁸⁶ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1919 in Report of PA AGM 1920, GL MS 35365/10.

impending tariff increase, deferred since 1915, and the increased speed of delivery anticipated ‘rendered the action all the more necessary’ in board’s opinion.¹⁸⁷ The trial was running with a leased line from London to Bristol which was then used as a distributing centre to Newport, Cardiff and Swansea; Exeter and Plymouth; and Bath.¹⁸⁸ This area had been selected as

self-contained and peculiarly suitable for such a trial, as it comprehends in a convenient proportion the conditions and problems that have to be faced in other parts of the United Kingdom.¹⁸⁹

The trial was reported as progressing with promising results. Following a successful trial period an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) held later that year voted that the PA should adopt the system.

The board also reported in 1920 that a new contract had been arranged with Reuters and that relations between the two organisations ‘which were always of a close and friendly character, and which became even more intimate during the War, continue in the same spirit of co-operation and confidence’.¹⁹⁰ The details of this new contract are not stated and there does not appear to be a record of one in the archives for 1919. It may be that the arrangement had not been put to paper and this new agreement is the one agreed in the contract dated 11 May 1921, there is no mention of this contract being signed in the 1921 or 1922 Annual Reports. It was fairly standard practice for such agreements to have a rolling clause after the expiry of the initial term with termination being brought about by a notice period. The 1921 agreement continued much of the principles already existing between Reuters and the PA. In addition, during the negotiations the PA secured the right to supply special reports to the London correspondents of newspapers published outside of Britain and Ireland, but within the British Empire, in return for a ten percent revenue share to

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ News Distribution by the Press Association, 7 July 1919, British Telecom Corporate Archives, London, (BT) POST 30/4322C.

¹⁸⁹ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1919 in Report of PA AGM 1920, GL MS 35365/10.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

Reuters. With regard to overseas newspapers outside of this definition

Roderick Jones wrote that:

the position is different, owing to our contracts with various foreign agencies, but in any case in which we are at liberty to give permission we will do so on the condition mentioned above.¹⁹¹

These agreements were those that constituted the cartel structure for the distribution of international news operated by Reuters with the French Havas agency, Wolff in Germany and the Associated Press (AP) of New York. Also, though Jones preferred it not to be enshrined in the contract, it was accepted that the PA might arrange with *The Times*, or another London paper, to distribute the paper's overseas correspondence to the provincial press. Jones imposed the proviso on this agreement that it should not be intended to develop in to a competitor service to Reuters, or the 'Reuters – Press Association Special Foreign service', and 'as long as the system followed by the Press Association is the same as that followed in regard *The Times* for many years past'.¹⁹² This might be seen as a normalisation of practices that had developed during the war whereby the PA had distributed war reports from the correspondents of a number of London newspapers and cooperated closely with Reuters. It is also notable that Jones refers to a joint PA-Reuters Foreign Special. The PA had always previously distinguished this service as containing reports not included in the various classes of Reuters news it supplied, and in fact continued to do so. However, from the tariff for 1922 it introduced a joint pricing structure for the Reuters' services plus the PA Foreign Special. Both services continued to be offered separately as well. This might be seen as further normalisation of collaborative practices developed during the war.

The only dark cloud on the PA's otherwise seemingly sunny horizon in 1920 was the tariff increase for press rate telegrams introduced in 1915, but initially deferred until 1 January 1917. The PA had previously successfully lobbied for further postponements due to wartime conditions.

¹⁹¹ Jones to H.C. Robbins, PA manager, 11 May 1921, GL MS 35441.

¹⁹² Jones to Robbins, 11 May 1921, GL MS 35441. There are two separate letters covering this point and the former written on the same day with the same contemporary reference: R./M. Mi.

The same argument was extended by the PA manager, H.C. Robbins, in a letter to the Postmaster General on 4 September 1918. Robbins' letter was forwarded to Treasury on 10 October with a covering letter that noted:

The Postmaster General is of the opinion that a further postponement should be granted and he has informed the Press Association that he agrees to defer the introduction of the revised rates till the 1st January 1920.¹⁹³

A hand written note attached to the letters remarks: 'apparently the PMG has given his word'.¹⁹⁴ The reply from the Treasury to the Post Office dated 22 November, while acceding to the request, stated:

I am to request that in the event of a proposal for a further postponement being received, the matter may be submitted to this Department before a decision is arrived at.¹⁹⁵

The PA did indeed seek a further extension, using much the same reasons as before and arguing that they had not been sufficiently alleviated by the end of the war. However, either because wartime conditions no longer pertained or perhaps due to the Treasury's civil slap on the wrist the previous year, the General Post Office in passing on the request to the Treasury stated that:

All these objections were foreseen when the Act [introducing the deferred rates] was passed. The Postmaster General is of the opinion that they are not now sufficiently serious to justify further delay in introducing the new tariff.¹⁹⁶

Cautious of the unforeseen implications of these increased costs, and subsequent price increases in its own services, the PA only issued a provisional tariff for the first six months of 1920. This was 'to be reviewed

¹⁹³ Secretary, General Post Office, to Secretary, Treasury, 10 October 1918, TNA T 1/12479.

¹⁹⁴ Anonymous hand written note, n.d., TNA T 1/12479.

¹⁹⁵ Treasury Chambers to Postmaster General, signed T.L. Heath (Copy), 22 November 1922, TNA T 1/12479.

¹⁹⁶ Secretary, General Post Office, to Secretary, Treasury, 10 October 1919, TNA T 1/12479.

and altered if necessary for the second half of the year'.¹⁹⁷ In the event the revenue the new tariff rates returned was seemingly sufficient as there was no revision in the second half of 1920 and prices remained stable for 1921.¹⁹⁸

No representatives of Irish newspapers had attended the 1919 PA AGM, C.W. Henderson, *Belfast News Letter*, though on the board was absent due to ill health. A number did attend in 1920. Present, in addition to Henderson, were Robt. H.H. Baird, *Irish Daily Telegraph*, W.T. Brewster, *Irish Independent*, George Crosbie, *Cork Examiner*, and W. Lombard Murphy, *Irish Independent*. Murphy had succeeded his father, William Martin Murphy, as the head of Independent Newspaper following the latter's death in 1919. Henderson was joined at the EGM that approved the adoption of the leased wire scheme by E.N. Illingworth of the *Belfast Telegraph*.¹⁹⁹ The 1921 AGM was attended by Brewster, Murphy and Henderson, who had assumed the position of chairman for the preceding year, and were joined by E.W. Folkes, *Belfast News Letter*, and J.J. Simington, *Irish Times*. The Annual Report for 1920 presented at this meeting noted some delays in extending the leased wire scheme approved at the 1920 EGM. This was due to the Post Office significantly increasing the proposed rental charges it required.²⁰⁰ The negotiations resulting from this, seemingly still ongoing, appear to have provided the board considerable occupation, and the chairman (Henderson) in particular. Recognition of this was expressed in a vote of thanks, which was seconded by Brewster, who noted:

In Ireland they were well acquainted from long experience with Mr. Henderson's way of carrying out in the most thorough manner any duties entrusted to him [...]. He was glad to find they were all united in appreciating his services.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁷ Circular letter from H.C. Robbins, PA manager, 22 November 1919, attached to PA (provisional) Tariff for 1920, GL MS 35460/7.

¹⁹⁸ PA Tariffs 1920 and 1921, GL MS 35460/7.

¹⁹⁹ Reports of PA General Meetings 1919-20, GL MS 35365/10.

²⁰⁰ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1920 in Report of PA AGM 1921, GL MS 35365/10.

²⁰¹ Report of PA AGM 1921, GL MS 35365/10.

The PA, then, was in a commercially healthy position at this point. It had moved to consolidate its position in the news industry by the acquisition of the LNA and continued cooperation with Reuters, and invested in new premises on Fleet Street. Its plans to develop improved infrastructure and supply for its services, though delayed, were also in hand. It should not then be regarded with significant surprise, from a purely business point of view, that Irish newspapers appeared satisfied to remain both members and customers. Though the 1921 PA AGM was held prior to the truce and subsequent treaty negotiations it was clear to most observers by this time that any peaceful conclusion to the War of Independence would involve partition. In light of this and other developments in Ireland two things should be noted. Firstly, the Irish newspaper representatives in their actions and recorded statements do not seem to reflect the clear divisions that existed in wider Irish society and politics. These divisions had been referred to in the same forum, if with little levity, as recently 1917 and were apparent in their published columns at the time. The second is perhaps more interesting in light of this and the post 1918 shift, in the nationalist papers at least, towards greater sympathy for the aims of Sinn Féin. There is no evidence of those newspapers attempting to exercise any influence within the PA on behalf of the Dáil's Propaganda Department. The London-based news agencies, including the PA, had been specifically identified as pro-British and a bottleneck restricting the ability to distribute alternative news reports of events in Ireland during this period. Absence of action cannot be used as positive proof of anything, but this should at least contribute to debates as to how the Irish newspaper industry at this time is viewed and offer a challenge to broad brush definitions along politico-religious lines. This evidence would seem to indicate that an all-Ireland newspaper industry existed, and as the next chapter will show continued to exist in the inter-war period.

Case Study: The Gallipoli Campaign, August 1915

The role of Irishmen in the British military forces has received increasing attention in recent years and has been investigated by scholars such as Terence Denman, David Fitzpatrick, Keith Jeffrey and Peter Karsten among

others.²⁰² This case study is concerned with an examination of how the Gallipoli Campaign in August 1915, and the role of Irish soldiers within it, was reported and reacted to in the mainstream Irish daily newspapers of the time.

By the outbreak of World War I there were a number of regiments with specifically Irish monikers and identities in the British Army. Such names as the Connaught Rangers, Royal Irish Regiment and Royal Dublin Fusiliers had attained reputations for their martial prowess and valour, though their Irishness often attracted particular stereotyping: ‘The wild courage of the Celtic type had only to be harnessed to turn a stampede in to a cavalry charge’.²⁰³ Economic motivations were certainly a strong factor in the decision of Irishmen to enlist in the peace-time army, but so too was a spirit of adventure, a desire to ‘get out and see the world’ and family tradition.²⁰⁴ Anti-recruitment campaigns became a key aspect of advanced nationalism, particularly during the South African War and with the outbreak of World War I. However, the character and prowess of Irish soldiers was always viewed as a source of pride regardless of who they were fighting for. It should be borne in mind that the majority of Irishmen in the British army served as enlisted men and NCO’s. This probably made it easier for nationalists to reconcile the seemingly mutually exclusive anti-recruitment efforts with pride in the soldiers themselves.²⁰⁵ David Fitzpatrick has written that the natural military prowess of the race ‘was one of the few Irish stereotypes which evoked almost universal approbation in this bellicose era’.²⁰⁶ Though, as Joanna Bourke has noted, it was often

²⁰² See for example: Terence Denman, “‘The Red Livery of Shame’”: The Campaign Against Army Recruitment in Ireland, 1899-1914’, *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 29, No.114 (Nov., 1994), pp. 208-233; David Fitzpatrick, ‘Militarism in Ireland, 1900-1922’ in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffrey (eds.) *A Military History of Ireland* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996); Peter Karsten, ‘Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792-1922: Subordinated or Subordinated?’ *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Autumn 1983), pp. 31-64; and the edited volume, Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffrey (eds.) *A Military History of Ireland* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996).

²⁰³ Fitzpatrick, ‘Militarism in Ireland’, p. 379.

²⁰⁴ Karsten, ‘Irish Soldiers in the British Army’, pp. 38-41.

²⁰⁵ Denman. “‘The Red Livery of shame’”, p. 209.

²⁰⁶ Fitzpatrick, ‘Militarism in Ireland’, p. 379.

considered that ‘the type of martial vigour said to be possessed by the Irish made them profoundly unsuited to self-government’.²⁰⁷

War news recommends itself as a case study for this chapter because, in addition to war being a topic generally relied on to prompt significant coverage, the period covered by this chapter is dominated by World War I. Following its conclusion Ireland’s War of Independence became a, and at times the, international news event.²⁰⁸ The rationale behind the choice of the Gallipoli Campaign in August 1915 in particular is threefold. Firstly, this was the first use of an identifiable block of Irish soldiers recruited as part of Kitchener’s citizens army: the 10th (Irish) Division. Indeed this was the first time that a wholly Irish division had ever existed in the British Army, a source of some pride to the men according to Bryan Cooper’s contemporary account.²⁰⁹ These troops landed on 6 August. Secondly, Gallipoli was, and still is, widely identified with the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZACs). It was during this campaign that these troops ‘first went into battle during the Great War, [and] has become part of the Australian nation’s “creation myth”’.²¹⁰ Considering the deferred achievement of Home Rule this case study will consider whether there is any comparison drawn between the Irish troops at Gallipoli and those from these self-governing Dominions of the British Empire. Thirdly, the Gallipoli Campaign presents the opportunity to gauge the reaction in the mainstream Irish media to the British forces, Irishmen within them and to an extent the wider war, shortly before the Easter Rising of April 1916. Ben Novick has identified reports of the experience of the 10th (Irish) Division at Gallipoli as

²⁰⁷ Joanna Bourke, “‘Irish Tommies’: The Construction of a Martial Manhood 1914-1918”, *Bullán. An Irish Studies Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 1997 / Spring 1998), p. 17.

²⁰⁸ For the further information on how this was reported to the international media see Walsh, *The News from Ireland*.

²⁰⁹ Bryan Cooper, *The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli* (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1918 [reprinted Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1993]), p. 134. Cooper served as an officer with the Connaught Rangers in Gallipoli and Salonika during World War I. He was briefly a Unionist MP for Dublin City South in 1910, involved in the Irish Volunteers and was a TD for Dublin City from 1923 until his death in 1930, originally as an independent and from 1927 as a member of Cumann na nGaedheal; see Patrick Maume, ‘Cooper, Bryan Ricco’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2014>, accessed 17 November 2013.

²¹⁰ Keith Jeffrey, *Ireland and the Great War* (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), pp. 37-38.

the starting point for the change in attitudes in many nationalist circles more normally associated with the aftermath of the Rising.²¹¹

Following the initial landings in April the positions held by the British and Turkish forces at Gallipoli had developed in to a stalemate by mid-May 1915. With the aim of reinvigorating the campaign Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, dispatched significant additional forces to General Sir Ian Hamilton, Commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.²¹² Included in these reinforcements was the 10th (Irish) Division. Before landing at Gallipoli the decision was made to split the Division in order to buttress the forces already in position: the 29th Brigade was sent to reinforce the ANZACs at what was by then known as Anzac Cove; the 30th and 31st Brigades were to be used in landings to the north of the existing positions, at Suvla Bay.²¹³ These troops would take part in some of the bloodiest fighting of the campaign between their landing on 6 August and the eventual return to stale-mate at the end of the month.²¹⁴ Members of the 29th Brigade would be involved in the Battle of Sari Bair at Anzac between 7-12 August, in particular the assault on the hill known as The Farm. Members of the 30th and 31st Brigades at Suvla formed the attacking force that charged Chocolate Hill on 7 August and were centrally involved in the attacks on Kirtech Tepe Sirt on 7 and 15 August. These actions would impose a heavy price on the division, losing three-quarters of its original complement during this period.²¹⁵

During the Gallipoli Campaign as a whole (April 1915 – January 1916) the dominant sources of news for the Irish newspapers was the PA, and through it the PA Special and Reuters. These were supplemented with other agency reports from the ETC and Central news agencies. There were also very limited, though interesting, examples of the New York Associated Press (AP) and its competitor, the United Press, being cited. In addition official reports from the Press Bureau were cited as well as reports from

²¹¹ Ben Novick, *Conceiving Revolution: Irish Nationalist Propaganda during the First World War* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2001), pp. 17, 56.

²¹² Johnstone, *Orange, Green and Khaki*, p. 109.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 98-9.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

²¹⁵ Fitzpatrick. 'Militarism in Ireland', p. 391.

other, mainly London-based, newspapers. These reports were further supplemented by the reproduction of letters from soldiers received by members of the public and passed on to the newspapers. These will not be focused on here as the purpose of this case study is to demonstrate how the structures and systems of news supply that this thesis is concerned with operated in this example. Such letters have provided the basis for interesting and illuminating studies elsewhere though.²¹⁶

Due to the international structure of news supply, reports from AP where they occur were almost certainly distributed by the PA through its exclusive supply agreement with Reuters. Similarly some of the reports from other newspapers probably came through the same channels. Others may have been taken from copies of these newspapers arriving in Ireland.

As noted above, this case study will focus specifically on the Gallipoli Campaign in August 1915. In addition to the reasons already described this is also because the sheer quantity of copy generated would otherwise be too great to cover within its scope. The opaque nature, and sometimes confusion, in the reports that the Irish newspapers presented to their readership is perhaps not surprising considering the machinations of the Press Bureau. This is something the newspapers occasionally commented on themselves. The varying delays between events taking place and their reporting is striking. This is particularly notable when one bears in mind that during peace-time agency reports of events from across the globe were regularly received and printed within twenty-four hours. This case study will progress by first presenting an overview of the sources used by the Irish newspapers and their presentation. It will then look more closely at the coverage of the attack on Kirteç Tepe Sirt on 15 August involving soldiers from the 10th (Irish) Division. It will then proceed to an examination of the editorial comment provided by the Irish newspapers on the Gallipoli Campaign during August 1915.

In general the extent of coverage provided by the newspapers examined here, the mainstream Irish dailies, of the Gallipoli campaign in August 1915 was relatively standard and from the second week of the

²¹⁶ See for example Edward Spiers, *The Victorian Soldier in Africa* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2004).

month almost daily. It was presented alongside war news from other areas of conflict. These war news sections were frequently topped with headlines relating to various events, in large type taking up multiple column widths (normally two) of varying lengths. These were then often followed by a number of summary paragraphs of the day's news, still in multiple column width form. The subsequent reports were then presented in standard column width with their own headlines in smaller print, sometimes repeating those in the main headline section. With regard to the events covered in this case study there was no notable difference in the emphasis or interpretation suggested by the headlines. Gallipoli and the Dardanelles were used interchangeably to identify the events being reported. For example 'The Dardanelles – The Allies Progress [...] Enemy's Precarious Position'²¹⁷ and 'The Gallipoli Campaign – British Success Near Gaba Tepe'²¹⁸ in the *Belfast News Letter*. In another example from opposite geographical and political points in Ireland 'The Dardanelles – British Despatch – Substantial Progress'²¹⁹ and 'Gallipoli Peninsula [...] – Severe Fighting – Heavy Casualties'²²⁰ in the *Cork Examiner*.

As mentioned above the most common news source was the PA and the PA Special was the notably dominant cited source along with official reports from the Press Bureau. Often these sources were mutually cited, for example in the *Irish Independent*, under the headline 'British Submarine Success', the citation read '(Press Association War Special) / Press Bureau, Thursday, 8.30 pm.'²²¹ In this article the announcement of the sinking of a Turkish battleship by the Admiralty was verified by a report from an official Turkish communiqué. This demonstrates how the PA Special was at times itself a product of reports from various official sources. The reporting of official news from the opposing forces, in this case Turkish, though not necessarily frequent is notable. It is likely that this was also provided by the PA through 'arrangements made in various European capitals [...] for the

²¹⁷ *Belfast News Letter*, 12 August 1915, p. 6.

²¹⁸ *Belfast News Letter*, 16 August 1915, p. 5

²¹⁹ *Cork Examiner*, 11 August 1915, p. 5.

²²⁰ *Cork Examiner*, 20 August 1915, p. 5.

²²¹ *Irish Independent*, 13 August 1915, p. 3.

collection of news emanating from enemy countries and neutral states'.²²² Telegrams from the London *Times* and other newspapers provided by the PA are also found.

In addition to items that can be attributed to the PA and/or official despatches there were a number of interesting examples of other sources being cited by the newspapers examined here. It should be noted, however, that the referencing of other, and particularly foreign, newspapers can, in fact, often be attributed to the PA service. The *Belfast News Letter* referenced the London *Daily Chronicle*, 'The Dardanelles – Big Operations Resumed',²²³ and the *Day* from New York, 'A Jewish unit at the Dardanelles'.²²⁴ The *Irish Independent* reproduced a report from the Berlin newspaper *Lokalanzeiger* reporting the sinking of the Turkish warship *Hairredin Barbarossa*.²²⁵ It also reproduced reports from a number of London-based newspapers such as the *Daily Express*, 'New Operations – Allies Cut Cables',²²⁶ the *Daily Chronicle*, 'The Landing at Suvla [...] Irish Storm Positions',²²⁷ and the *Daily Mail*, 'Turkish Discontent – An Anti-German Feeling'.²²⁸ In one particularly interesting example it cited the New York United Press, 'A Terrorised Enemy – Turks and Submarines'.²²⁹ It is unclear where this competitor agency source came from: it would certainly not have been via Reuters as the cartel agreement operating between the major international news agencies would have precluded this. By extension this would make the PA a highly unlikely source. Though the United Press, through its subsidiary organisation the British United Press, would prove to be an aggressive competitor in the British and Irish news market after 1922 it did not gain its first customer until 1927.²³⁰ A third possibility is that this

²²² PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1917 in Report of PA AGM 1918, GL MS 35365/9.

²²³ *Belfast News Letter*, 14 August 1915, p. 6.

²²⁴ *Belfast News Letter*, 25 August 1915, p. 6.

²²⁵ *Irish Independent*, 11 August 1915, p. 5.

²²⁶ *Irish Independent*, 13 August 1915, p. 3.

²²⁷ *Irish Independent*, 25 August 1915, p. 3.

²²⁸ *Irish Independent*, 30 August 1915, p. 4.

²²⁹ *Irish Independent*, 14 August 1915, p. 5.

²³⁰ Oliver Boyd-Barrett, *The International News Agencies* (London: Constable, 1980), p. 120; Donald Read, 'The Relationship of Reuters and Other News Agencies with the British Press, 1858-1984: Service at Cost or Business for Profit?', in Peter Catterall, Colin Seymour-Ure and Adrian Smith (eds.) *Northcliffe's Legacy: Aspects of the British Popular Press, 1896-1996* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) p. 151.

report was a product of a mutual supply agreement with either the ETC or Central news agencies similar to that operated between Reuters and the PA. Central had operated such an arrangement with the defunct United Press Association in the late nineteenth century,²³¹ but once again there is no particular evidence to prove or disprove this theory. Other sources cited by the Irish newspapers included a report from the *Evening News* in the *Irish News*, ‘The Dardanelles – Turks Claim Success on Various Points’,²³² and under the same headline, ‘The Dardanelles’,²³³ it cited the *Star* and Paris newspaper *Temps*. The *Irish Times* reproduced reports from the *Daily Chronicle*, ‘The Gallipoli Campaign’,²³⁴ and ‘The Dardanelles – Turkish Losses’,²³⁵ the *Star*, ‘Bombardment of the Dardanelles’,²³⁶ and *Temps*, ‘Critical Position of the Turks’.²³⁷

The one exception to this pattern of news supply and coverage was the *Belfast Telegraph*. Though it does cite the PA Special the Central service is notably dominant in its news agency coverage. It also produced columns from ‘our special correspondent’, H.W. Nevinson. There were five pieces from this source during August 1915: ‘The Camp at ANZAC’ on the fifth,²³⁸ ‘Constitution Day – Turkish Celebrations’ on the seventh,²³⁹ ‘Adventurous Career – Experiences of a Middy VC’ on the seventeenth,²⁴⁰ ‘Life in Gallipoli – Amidst Enemy Shell’ on the twentieth²⁴¹ and ‘Gallant Incidents – in Recent Gallipoli Landings – Heroism of Irish Soldiers’ on the twenty-eighth.²⁴² It is likely that this source was Henry Nevinson who was a special correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* during World War I and

²³¹ Terhi Rantanen, ‘Foreign Dependence and Domestic Monopoly: The European News Cartel and the US Associated Presses, 1861-1932’, *Media History*, Vol. 12, No. 1, (2006), p. 27.

²³² *Irish News*, 16 August 1915, p. 5.

²³³ *Irish News*, 18 August 1915, p. 5.

²³⁴ *Irish Times*, 13 August 1915, p. 5.

²³⁵ *Irish Times*, 18 August 1915, p. 5.

²³⁶ *Irish Times*, 21 August 1915, p. 3.

²³⁷ *Irish Times*, 21 August 1915, p. 3.

²³⁸ *Belfast Telegraph*, 5 August 1915, p. 6.

²³⁹ *Belfast Telegraph*, 7 August 1915, p. 6.

²⁴⁰ *Belfast Telegraph*, 17 August 1915, p. 3.

²⁴¹ *Belfast Telegraph*, 20 August 1915, p. 4.

²⁴² *Belfast Telegraph*, 28 August 1915, p. 6.

covered the Gallipoli Campaign.²⁴³ Under the general conventions by which correspondents were identified in newspapers the description of Nevinson as ‘Our Special Correspondent’ by both the *Belfast Telegraph* and *Manchester Guardian* indicates that he was specially commissioned by the newspapers to cover the Gallipoli Campaign.²⁴⁴ His articles were published on the same days, though under different headlines, in the *Guardian* as in the *Telegraph*; for example ‘The ANZACs’,²⁴⁵ on the fifth and ‘The New Army in Gallipoli: Brilliant Charge of Irishmen at Suvla Bay’²⁴⁶ on the twenty-eighth. This indicates that the two newspapers contracted with Nevinson on an equal footing and possibly suggests some form of cooperation or other connection between them. This might be further supported by an example of the *Belfast Telegraph* reproducing an article from the *Manchester Guardian*, ‘Turkish Yoke – Armenians Brave Defence’.²⁴⁷ It is not possible to say further what the nature of this connection may or may not have been. In addition the *Belfast Telegraph* also reproduced articles from the *Daily Telegraph*, ‘The Dardanelles’,²⁴⁸ which was provided by the PA and the *Daily Mail*, ‘In Gallipoli’,²⁴⁹ and the *Daily Chronicle*, ‘Greatest Landing in History – The Descent on Suvla Bay’,²⁵⁰ which were not. The *Belfast Telegraph’s* preference for the Central service over the PA may have been a product of the delays in supplying reports caused by the cautious and conservative approach to passing the Censorship adopted by the agency. The effects of this practice and the holding of certain news reports for morning newspapers were particularly felt by the evening papers.²⁵¹ The delayed despatch of reports certainly prompted the *Belfast Telegraph* to

²⁴³ ‘Nevinson, Henry Woodd (1856-1941)’, *Scoop!* [Biographical dictionary of British and Irish journalists, 1800-1960] http://www.scoop-database.com/bio/nevinson_henry_woodd, accessed 28 February 2013.

²⁴⁴ Political and Economic Planning (PEP), *Report on the British Press: A Survey of Its Current Operations and Problems with Special Reference to National Newspapers and Their Part in Public Affairs* (London: PEP, 1938), p. 159.

²⁴⁵ *Manchester Guardian*, 5 August 1915, p. 12.

²⁴⁶ *Manchester Guardian*, 28 August 1915, p. 9.

²⁴⁷ *Belfast Telegraph*, 4 August 1915, p. 3.

²⁴⁸ *Belfast Telegraph*, 16 August 1915, p. 3.

²⁴⁹ *Belfast Telegraph*, 14 August 1915, p. 3.

²⁵⁰ *Belfast Telegraph*, 25 August 1915, p. 3.

²⁵¹ Scott, *Reporter Anonymous*, p. 142.

register ‘a strong complaint’ with the PA’s manager in September 1918.²⁵² This theory can be supported to a limited extent. For example the *Belfast Telegraph*, citing a Central telegram, reported the landings at Suvla (6 August) on 17 August, ‘At the Dardanelles – Recent British Landings – Encounters at Suvla Bay’.²⁵³ The PA Special, citing a Press Bureau report, did not give details of the landings until 20 August, as carried in the *Irish Times*, ‘Dardanelles – Stiff Fighting at Suvla Bay’.²⁵⁴

The length of time between the Suvla landings and their reporting in the Irish newspapers may seem surprising during a period of rapid news distribution in peace-time, but it was not unusual. The attack on Kirtech Tepe Sirt on 15 August, in which the 10th (Irish) Division played a prominent part, was not reported until nearly two weeks later. The majority of Irish newspapers examined here used the PA Special service and carried the article on 28 August (see Table 2.2 over). The presence of Irish troops is highlighted in their headlines, even though their identification is only a small part of the whole report. The similarity of the headlines used here is a good example of the wider trend across the Irish newspapers. All the newspapers identified the report as from the PA Special correspondent in the Dardanelles telegraphing via Alexandria on 19 August. Therefore it took over a week to be published in the newspapers. One of the reasons for this delay was probably the weight of demands on the telegraph network. The issue was highlighted in the PA Annual Report for 1914 where it was explained that the Post Office was experiencing difficulties in this regard due to ‘the sudden rush of long despatches relating to the War, and to depletion of staff through the large number of Telegraphists who have joined the Forces’.²⁵⁵ Further, once the telegram had arrived in London it still had to pass the Press Bureau before publication. Even so this is a significant delay.

²⁵² PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, September 1918, GL MS 35358/20.

²⁵³ *Belfast Telegraph*, 17 August 1915, p. 4.

²⁵⁴ *Irish Times*, 20 August 1915, p. 5.

²⁵⁵ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1914 in Report of PA AGM 1915, GL MS 35365/9.

<i>Table 2.2. Comparison of headlines in Irish newspapers using the Press Association report of assault on Kirtech Tepe Sirt (15 August 1915) published 28 August 1915</i>	
<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	‘Dardanelles Campaign – Irish Division in Action – Brilliant Bayonet Charge’, ²⁵⁶
<i>Cork Examiner</i>	‘Dardanelles Fighting – Strong British Position – Brilliant Charge by Irish Division - Quick Work With The Bayonet – Confidence Among Troops’, ²⁵⁷
<i>Freeman’s Journal</i>	‘Dardanelles – Suvla Bay Landing – Brilliant Irish Charge – Fierce Bayonet Work – Success Gives Confidence to Troops’, ²⁵⁸
<i>Irish Independent</i>	‘Suvla Bay Landing – Quick Work With The Bayonet – Crest of Hill Cleared – Dominating Position Captured’, ²⁵⁹
<i>Irish Times</i>	‘Dardanelles – Brilliant Charge by Irish Division – Quick Work With The Bayonet – Confidence Among Troops’, ²⁶⁰
<i>Northern Whig</i>	‘The Dardanelles – Strong British Position – Brilliant Charge by Irish Division – Quick Work With The Bayonet – Confidence Among Troops’, ²⁶¹

The article was quite extensive, taking up over a full page column in most cases. After describing the assault by the Irish troops in the first half it went on to describe time the correspondent had spent with the ANZACs. The *Freeman’s Journal* excised this latter section. The description of the action of the Irish troops was common, though there were some minor editing differences. It did not in fact name Kiretech Tepe Sirt as the target of the assault but this was indeed the action it described. This can be comfortably asserted because it described the action taking place on the left of the Suvla position and that the ‘attacking troops were a division which was almost wholly Irish and which had already the capture of Chocolate

²⁵⁶ *Belfast News Letter*, 28 August 1915, p. 5.

²⁵⁷ *Cork Examiner*, 28 August 1915, p. 8.

²⁵⁸ *Freeman’s Journal*, 28 August 1915, p. 5.

²⁵⁹ *Irish Independent*, 28 August 1915, p. 5.

²⁶⁰ *Irish Times*, 28 August 1915, p. 5.

²⁶¹ *Northern Whig*, 28 August 1915, p. 8.

Hill to its credit'.²⁶² It also described the artillery support provided by a mountain battery and how:

At six o'clock our men on the crest nearest to the Turkish hill charged with the bayonet. The Turks came out to meet them, and a most exciting bayonet fight followed on the saddle between the two crests. Our fellows could be heard cheering as they went forward and bayonets were flashing and stabbing for several minutes before the Turks began to give way.²⁶³

Three points here confirm the correct identification of the event. Firstly, the support of the mountain battery, secondly, the bayonet charge and, thirdly, the loud cheer put up by the Irish soldiers during and after the assault.²⁶⁴

There were, however, some notable discrepancies in the dates provided in the article. The newspapers described the charge as occurring on 19 August, despite the fact that it was noted at its beginning that the telegram had been sent from Alexandria on that day. The *Belfast News Letter* was an exception here dating it to 16 August. Further, the correspondent introduces the action earlier in the column describing how he 'witnessed a stirring bayonet attack carried out by the troops on the left of the Suvla position'.²⁶⁵ The *Belfast News Letter* and *Northern Whig* in Belfast both attach 16 August to this sentence.²⁶⁶ The *Freeman's Journal*, *Irish Independent* and *Irish Times* in Dublin all correctly identify 15 August.²⁶⁷ And the *Cork Examiner* dates it on 5 August (when the 10th (Irish) Division had not even landed at Suvla).²⁶⁸ It is perhaps interesting to note that the dates the newspapers attribute to the bayonet charge, correctly or incorrectly, appear to have been influenced by the cities in which they were published: Belfast, 16 August; Cork, 5 August; and Dublin, 15 August. This might suggest that these discrepancies were not

²⁶² *Belfast News Letter*, 28 August 1915, p. 5; *Cork Examiner*, 28 August 1915, p. 8; *Freeman's Journal*, 28 August 1915, p. 5; *Irish independent*, 28 August 1915, p. 5; *Irish Times*, 28 August 1915, p. 5; *Northern Whig*, 28 August 1915, p. 8.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁴ Cooper, *The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli*, pp. 94- 99; Johnstone, *Orange, Green and Khaki*, pp. 134-6.

²⁶⁵ *Belfast News Letter*, 28 August 1915, p. 5; *Cork Examiner*, 28 August 1915, p. 8; *Freeman's Journal*, 28 August 1915, p. 5; *Irish independent*, 28 August 1915, p. 5; *Irish Times*, 28 August 1915, p. 5; *Northern Whig*, 28 August 1915, p. 8.

²⁶⁶ *Belfast News Letter*, 28 August 1915, p. 5; *Northern Whig*, 28 August 1915, p. 8.

²⁶⁷ *Freeman's Journal*, 28 August 1915, p. 5; *Irish independent*, 28 August 1915, p. 5; *Irish Times*, 28 August 1915, p. 5.

²⁶⁸ *Cork Examiner*, 28 August 1915, p. 8.

the product decisions made in the papers' newsrooms, but of telegraph operators common to the circuits being used to supply the PA service within Britain and Ireland. Mistakes made at final distribution points on the telegraph network were replicated in the newsrooms they served. The dating of the attack on Kirtech Tepe Sirt to 19 August might be attributed to a similar mistake further down the distribution route, perhaps somewhere between Alexandria and London. The loss of skilled telegraphists to the military had certainly put pressure on the network, as noted above, and this may have been another product of that situation. If this were the case it would seem that the *Belfast News Letter* operated a degree of common sense with regard to the date of the attack and changed the clearly incorrect date to 16 August. It was not to know that this was still incorrect as the report it received dated the bayonet charge to that date, not 15 August. Perhaps the other newspapers should not be damned too hastily though; the incredibly stringent censorship regime had led the PA to adopt a cautious and conservative approach to the reports it despatched. It would be quite reasonable to expect a similar attitude in its customers relying on this highly trusted source of news.

The *Belfast Telegraph* did not use the PA Special report described above. But neither did it have a corresponding article from the Central or any other agency. On the same day that the PA Special was published in the other newspapers it did produce an article from Nevinson describing the same event, 'Gallant Incidents – in recent Gallipoli Landings – Heroism of Irish Soldiers'.²⁶⁹ Interestingly the *Irish News* did not have any corresponding coverage of the attack on Kirtech Tepe Sirt, even though it did have access to the PA Special service. This newspaper is perhaps the one exception to the general trend of coverage described. It carried somewhat less news of the Gallipoli Campaign throughout August 1915, though this is still present. Its editorial position, as will be described below, was certainly more focused on events within Ireland and this perhaps indicates an explanation. Still, it is surprising that it neglected this story.

²⁶⁹ *Belfast Telegraph*, 28 August 1915, p. 6.

Gallipoli, and the Irish soldiers there, was not a particularly prominent theme in the editorials of the Irish newspapers in August 1915. This was probably in part because of the fragmentary and delayed nature of reports received. In some cases information not revealed in official British despatches was found in those from the opposing forces. In such circumstances the newspapers were able to piece together a clearer view of events. In this vein the *Irish Times* commented on 11 August that:

The Press Bureau does its best to obscure the significance of this highly important operation by leaving the point at which the new landing was effected unspecified. Fortunately, however, the cable censor has not mutilated the Turkish report, so that we are able to derive from the enemy the intelligence which we are not permitted to receive from our own Commander.²⁷⁰

The *Northern Whig* commented on the same day that:

No mention is made of the strength of the forces employed [...] but the Constantinople message describes them as ‘new troops’, which would suggest that Sir Ian Hamilton has received strong reinforcements and has not been slow to make good use of them.²⁷¹

The *Cork Examiner* began its editorial column the following day with: ‘Though the recent news from the Dardanelles is reassuring, it is still somewhat vague and indefinite’.²⁷²

The editorials of the *Belfast News Letter*, *Cork Examiner* and *Northern Whig* are primarily concerned with the strategic military aims and progress of the Gallipoli Campaign. As the *Belfast News Letter* commented on 17 August, if progress could be made allowing the Allied forces to advance towards Constantinople and the Bosphorous

it would make it possible for Russia to export grain which she has in abundance and to receive the foreign products of which she stands in need. Thus if the Allies are able force the Straits and capture Constantinople they will [...] change the whole military situation.²⁷³

²⁷⁰ *Irish Times*, 11 August 1915, p. 4.

²⁷¹ *Northern Whig*, 11 August 1915, p. 4.

²⁷² *Cork Examiner*, 12 August 1915, p. 4.

²⁷³ *Belfast News Letter*, 17 August 1915, p. 4.

It also praised ‘the gallantry and dash of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps’.²⁷⁴

The *Freeman’s Journal* carried a similarly focused editorial on 12 August concluding that ‘success in the extreme south will immediately influence the situation in the extreme north, from Warsaw to the Baltic.’²⁷⁵ A few days earlier it had carried an editorial under the headline ‘Conscription’. This was not particularly concerned with Gallipoli but did comment that:

If the conscriptionists imagine that the only opponents of their needless policy is ‘an Irish faction’ [...] they will find out their mistake. [...] The imposition of conscription, save as an imperative military necessity, would split the British nation that the war has united.²⁷⁶

A similar editorial line was adopted by the *Irish News* around the same time. Under the headline ‘The Cult of Coercion’ it opined that the aim of the pro-conscription lobby was ‘to destroy all the hopes of democracy and place the country for ever in peace as in war under the heel of a Military-cum-Conservative Ascendancy’.²⁷⁷ It further commented, perhaps with a degree of prescience, with regard to unionist proponents of conscription in Ireland that

after the war [they will point to their] resolution and ask a sympathising Empire if it would not be a great crime to ask the North to take part in an Irish Home Government.²⁷⁸

Towards the end of the month it produced an editorial based around a letter received from Australia that had been passed on to it. This letter had been written by a ‘Mr. M.P. Jaguers, a prominent public man whose devotion to

²⁷⁴ *Belfast News Letter*, 12 August 1915, p. 4.

²⁷⁵ *Freeman’s Journal*, 12 August 1915, p. 4.

²⁷⁶ *Freeman’s Journal*, 7 August 1915, p. 4.

²⁷⁷ *Irish News*, 10 August 1915, p. 4.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

Ireland's cause has been unfailling'.²⁷⁹ In this column the *Irish News* commented that Ireland

has had from Australasia a need of help which was largely the means of bringing about the revolution in British feeling which resulted in the placing of Home Rule on the Statute Book.²⁸⁰

With regard to the troops in Gallipoli it commented that Irishmen whether from 'Ireland or from Australia or Canada have the backing of the nation and the race in their efforts, side by side with the men of England, Scotland and Wales'.²⁸¹ This provides the best, though still imperfect, example of a direct comparison being drawn between the achievement of deferred Home Rule for Ireland, the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire and the troops provided. It is, in fact, the exception rather than the rule though. The editorial concluded with a criticism of

the poseurs who claim to be the chosen few in whom has been miraculously vested the destiny of the nation, which they are endeavouring to work out by playing a game of mock-treason equally suitable to the purposes of the Kaiser and of Sir Edward Carson.²⁸²

This can be seen as indicative of the *Irish News*' support for Redmond, Home Rule, and Irish involvement in the conflict.²⁸³

On 27 August under the headline 'The Gallipoli Fighting' the *Belfast Telegraph* asserted that:

the palm must go with the victory, to the men from our own shores, from New Zealand and Australia who, in the face of apparently insurmountable difficulties made the successful advance in question.²⁸⁴

²⁷⁹ *Irish News*, 25 August 1915, p. 4.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*

²⁸² *Ibid.*

²⁸³ Eamon Phoenix, 'The History of a Newspaper: the *Irish News*, 1855-1995' in Eamon Phoenix (ed.) *A Century of Northern Life: The Irish News and 100 Years of Ulster History* (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 1995), p. 22.

²⁸⁴ *Belfast Telegraph*, 27 August 1915, p. 4.

This cannot really be described as a comparison of the Irish troops with those from Australia and New Zealand however. A far more common attitude to the Irish troops in Gallipoli is demonstrated in the *Irish Times* in an editorial entitled ‘The Dardanelles’ where it commented that:

a fact widely known already has just been confirmed by the accredited correspondent with the British forces – namely, that in the fresh troops which landed at Suvla Bay was included the Tenth Division, the first of Ireland’s three Divisions of the New Armies to go in to active service.²⁸⁵

It continued further on that the reasons that some of the landings aims were not achieved and captured positions not maintained ‘certainly did not include any want of gallantry and determination on the part of the troops engaged’.²⁸⁶ A similar opinion was expressed by the *Irish Independent* under the headline ‘The Irish at Suvla Bay’.

We must wait, and not, let us hope, in vain, for justice to be done to the 10th Division in the full official account of the landing at Suvla Bay. [...] Their deeds have been the theme of praise by all who beheld them.²⁸⁷

This case study has demonstrated that the presence and deeds of the 10th (Irish) Division, and Irish troops more widely, at Gallipoli in August 1915 were reported and highlighted by the mainstream Irish daily newspapers of the time. However their ability to do so was hampered by two factors. Firstly, the extent of the information available to them was restricted by the censorship regime operated by the Press Bureau. The *Irish Times* editorial quoted above hints that they may in fact have been more aware of events and conditions than their columns reveal. But their ability to publish these details was constrained. Secondly, the speed with which news could be despatched and received was restricted by the demands placed on the telegraph network and the absence of sufficient skilled telegraph operators. This is particularly notable when compared to peace-time

²⁸⁵ *Irish Times*, 26 August 1915, p. 4.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁷ *Irish Independent*, 31 August 1915, p. 2.

examples, such as the Delhi Durbar case study in Chapter One, where international news events were reported and published within twenty-four hours. The political reaction surrounding the presence of Irish troops in Gallipoli as part of the British forces was notably muted. Where it is apparent, it is within the previously established traditions of the newspapers. The nationalist *Freeman's Journal*, from Dublin, and its Belfast based contemporary, the *Irish News*, position Ireland and Irish troops within the pro-Home Rule constitutional nationalist tradition. The latter is notably critical of 'the poseurs who claim to be the chosen few in whom has been miraculously vested the destiny of the nation'.²⁸⁸ Comparison of Irish troops with the ANZACs from the self-governing Dominions of Australia and New Zealand is also muted, though the courage and valour of the latter is recognised. Where Irish troops are identified and compared it is within, and with those from England, Scotland and Wales, in the British army, not 'the Colonials'.

Considering the delays noted above in the delivery of news from Gallipoli, further coverage of the 10th (Irish) Division and other Irish troops in August 1915 could be revealed by extending the examination into September. However, for the purpose of this case study this is not necessary. The nature and extent of the coverage has been sufficiently demonstrated here within its aims as part of the wider thesis. The nature of the comment and reaction provided by these Irish newspapers to these events is notable. This is particularly interesting considering the shift towards separatism and republicanism that would occur in public opinion and the nationalist press in Ireland in the ensuing months and years. In as much as it can, it therefore supports the identification of the Easter Rising in April 1916 as a focal point for this changing mood.

Conclusion

The years between the outbreak of World War I and the Anglo-Irish Treaty marked a period of profound change in the political, cultural and societal

²⁸⁸ *Irish News*, 25 August 1915.

dynamics of Ireland.²⁸⁹ Home Rule and the constitutional nationalism of the IPP were abandoned in favour of the separatist republicanism represented by Sinn Féin. Unionism largely retreated into the six north eastern counties of Ulster and established its redoubt behind the border of Northern Ireland, leaving its southern adherents to adapt as they could to the new realities they would find in the Irish Free State. Cultural and social structures such as sport, religion and education would become increasingly prominent signifiers of identity of the new Irelands on the now divided island. The public face of the Irish newspapers, in their published forms, largely reflected these developments.

During the same period the structures of international news supply remained stable. The news agencies adapted during World War I to fulfil the dual aims of satisfying the demand for news and complying with the Censor, even if at times achieving these goals seemed almost mutually exclusive. The PA in particular developed collaborative structures with Reuters, such as the use of common correspondents, and the London newspapers that would become normalised following the cessation of the conflict. The immediate post-war years marked a period where it consolidated its strength in the British and Irish news system through acquisition, improved contractual agreements and technical developments. The highly secretive restructuring of Reuters during the war would prove particularly important as it pursued these aims in the inter-war years. The PA's acquisition of a majority, and subsequently virtually total, shareholding in Reuters was significantly facilitated by the results of the creation of Reuters (1916) Ltd. and subsequent events.

During this period Irish newspapers remained primarily reliant on news agency services for their international news. The nature of the international news market at this time made it almost inevitable that the PA would retain its dominance in Ireland as well as Britain. However, the behaviour of the Irish newspapers, as represented by their ownership and management, retained the character it had in the preceding decades. Within the British and Irish news system, as represented by organisations such as

²⁸⁹ Jeffery, 'Echoes of War', p. 263.

the PA and Newspaper Society, little seemed to change. The divisions apparent elsewhere were not apparent here, at times they are specifically referred to only to highlight their insignificance. The following chapters will chart how this situation developed.

Chapter Three

Business as Usual: The Inter-War Years, 1922-39

Between the creation of the independent Irish state in 1922 and the outbreak of World War II in 1939 the two youthful polities on the island of Ireland sought to define their identities and relationship to each other and, in the case of the independent Irish state particularly, Britain and the wider world. By the end of the period there was a growing distance between them. The mainstream daily newspapers that served Ireland and its population continued to engage with the systems and structures of news supply, increasingly focused on the London-based Press Association (PA), in a very similar pattern to that described in previous chapters. Their financial support for the PA's purchase of a controlling interest in Reuters during this period and behaviour at general meetings and on boards in many ways signifies a continuation of corporate and commercial attitudes. These largely ignored the politico-religious differences and divisions apparent in their published columns, differences that, in many ways, were now legislatively enshrined through the creation of the independent Irish state and Northern Ireland. However, from the mid-1930s the first indications of newspapers from the independent Irish state disengaging from the PA at a corporate and organisational level can be tentatively identified.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first covers the first decade of the independent Irish state's existence. Following a period of disruption and adjustment, including the Irish Civil War (1922-23), the Cumann na nGaedheal government pursued a socially conservative and economically orthodox policy prioritising internal and external stability. This period also saw the end of the venerable *Freeman's Journal* in 1924 and the launch of the *Irish Press* in 1931, which became the semi-official mouth piece of the Fianna Fáil party. The second section covers the period from the 1932 general election which brought Fianna Fáil to power and the subsequent policy changes which heralded 'a period of rapid and dramatic

constitutional change' in the independent Irish state.¹ In addition to developments in Ireland and its news industry this is a useful division because the completion of the PA's acquisition of Reuters and the collapse of the 'News Ring' roughly correspond to this point. The third section is a brief case study on the Spanish Civil War. This was an event that produced strong resonances in Ireland, particularly in the independent Irish state. It is also particularly interesting from the point of view of this thesis in that it marks the first instance in which newspapers from the independent Irish state sent their own correspondents to cover an international event. However, as will be demonstrated, news agencies remained important.

The Irish Free State and the Cumann na nGaedheal Government, 1922-32 *Contemporary Context*

The Anglo-Irish Treaty was narrowly passed by the Sinn Féin government. Similarly, in the heated Dáil debate on 7 January 1922 the Sinn Féin TDs, elected by the Irish people in the 1921 general election, accepted the Treaty, but only by a majority of seven votes. Anti-Treaty TDs refused to accept the verdict and boycotted the Dáil.² The split in the Cabinet and Dáil largely focussed on the Treaty's failure to deliver a republic and the inclusion of an oath of allegiance to the British monarch.³ This effectively marked the dividing line over which the Irish Civil War would be fought between 1922-23.⁴

The formal split over the Treaty in the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was marked at the Volunteer Convention held in Dublin on 26 March 1922. The anti-Treaty faction rejected the authority of the Free State government and its official institutions. On 14 April they seized the Four Courts in Dublin 'throwing down the gauntlet to the Provisional Government'.⁵

In the build up to the general election of June 1922 attempts were made to reconcile the pro and anti-Treaty sides of Sinn Féin. In May

¹ Joseph Lee and Gearóid Ó Tuathaigh, *The Age of de Valera* (Dublin: Ward River Press, 1982), p. 67.

² J.J. Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), p. 56.

³ Diarmaid Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland 1900-2000* (London: Profile Books, 2005), pp. 243-5.

⁴ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 67.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

Michael Collins,⁶ military leader of the War of Independence IRA, and Eamon de Valera, president of the pre-Treaty Irish Republic, attempted to conclude an electoral pact between the pro and anti-Treaty parties. Aimed at producing a coalition national government these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful.⁷ Electoral victory in June demonstrated that there was a majority of the population in favour of the Treaty and moreover that they were ‘tiring of debates about oaths and symbols and were more preoccupied with bread-and-butter issues’.⁸ During this period Arthur Griffith⁹ had grown increasingly frustrated with the failure of the Free State Army, under Collins, to resolve the occupation of the Four Courts. In addition, large areas of the south and west were dominated by anti-Treaty forces and the British government was exerting pressure for the restoration of order. This pressure was increased following the assassination of Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson on 22 June.¹⁰ When the Four Courts garrison refused to return the captured General J.J. O’Connell the Free State Army opened up with artillery fire in the early hours of 28 June 1922.¹¹ This marked the opening shots of the Irish Civil War which became a guerrilla conflict where the Free State Army drove the anti-Treaty forces out of the urban centres and former comrades fought against each other.¹²

During the ideological and physical struggles over the Treaty in the Irish Free State the reality of Northern Ireland and partition was being confirmed. The 1921 general election had delivered an overwhelming majority to the Unionists in which all forty of their candidates were returned compared to six each for the Irish Parliamentary Party and Sinn Féin.¹³ Between 1920-22 it too suffered civil unrest and strife as a product of tensions between the nationalist and unionist communities, including serious

⁶ M.A. Hopkinson, ‘Collins, Michael’, *Dictionary of Irish Biography (DIB)*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a1860>, accessed 24 June 2013

⁷ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 58.

⁸ Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 254.

⁹ Michael Laffan. ‘Griffith, Arthur Joseph’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a3644>, accessed 24 June 2013.

¹⁰ Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 254.

¹¹ John P. Duggan, *A History of the Irish Army* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1991), pp. 78-82.

¹² Dermot Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland: Nation and State* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1994), p. 9.

¹³ Thomas Hennessy, *A History of Northern Ireland 1920-1996* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1997), p. 18.

rioting in late September 1921.¹⁴ Despite some early signs that the two new states might reconcile themselves to each other's existence, such as the Craig-Collins pacts of January and March 1922, these were hampered by the mutual distrust of the two Irish governments and continuing violence.¹⁵

Between the June 1922 general election in the Irish Free State and the first meeting of the new Dáil on 9 September the pro-Treaty side lost its key civil and military leaders. Griffith suffered a brain haemorrhage on 12 August and Collins was killed in an ambush by anti-Treaty forces in Cork on 22 August. In an emergency meeting of pro-Treaty leaders held in the early hours of 23 August W.T. Cosgrave¹⁶ was elected Chairman of the Provisional Government.¹⁷ He would lead the Irish Free State's government until the 1932 general election brought the Fianna Fáil party, under de Valera, to power.

The adoption of the constitution codified in the Irish Free State Constitution Act by the Dáil formally brought the independent Irish state in to existence on 6 December 1922, with Cosgrave as President of the Executive Council. In the general election of August 1923 pro-Treaty Cumann na nGaedheal¹⁸ and anti-Treaty Sinn Féin both increased their popular share of the vote in a Dáil increased from 128 to 152 seats, as did smaller parties and independents, the only loser being Labour. However, Sinn Féin continued its policy of abstention. As a result Cumann na nGaedheal was able to form a government with a comfortable majority.¹⁹

The policy the government pursued was one of economic and social orthodoxy designed to 'contribute to the political stability coveted by Cosgrave. It would reassure sceptical English and Anglo-Irish observers of

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 23-4.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 23-34.

¹⁶ Euan O'Halpin, 'Cosgrave, William Thomas', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2077>, accessed 24 June 2013.

¹⁷ John M. Regan, *The Irish Counter Revolution 1921-1936: Treatyite Politics and Settlement in Independent Ireland* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2001), p. 78.

¹⁸ Cumann na nGaedheal was launched in April 1923. Its founders were motivated by the need to break with Sinn Féin and form a party in support of the Treaty and Free State government. See Mel Farrell, 'A "Cadre Style" Party? Cumann na nGaedheal Organization in Clare, Dublin North and Longford-Westmeath, 1923-27', *Éire-Ireland*, Vol. 47, Nos. 3 & 4 (Fall/ Winter 2012), p. 95.

¹⁹ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 94-5.

the adult attitude of the infant government.’²⁰ Despite this the Anglo-Irish, protestant, and often unionist, population did decline in the early years of the Free State. While revolutionary violence and terror played a part in the decline of this minority community, economic, social and other pressures were also influential. There was, as Andy Bielenberg has noted, ‘a wider spectrum of forces at work in this period’.²¹

The economic policies of the Free State government in the 1920s were characterised by fiscal austerity and economic orthodoxy. These included a cut in the old-age pension and the maintenance of labour and unemployment benefits at pre-1922 levels. In 1926 it was released from commitments to Britain’s national debt, but economic policies remained conservative and parity with Sterling on the Gold Standard was maintained.²²

In foreign affairs the government actively pursued the right to assert a policy that demonstrated independence from Britain and its dominions. To this end a high profile in the League of Nations was sought and bilateral European relations pursued.²³ The role of news and news agencies was a concern of overseas missions and the government. However, as with pre-independence attitudes, this concern was primarily with the management and presentation of news about Ireland rather than the presentation of international news to Ireland. In an undated letter on the suggested reorganisation of the Paris Mission and the establishment of a Press Bureau, Sean Murphy,²⁴ acting minister to France, wrote to Michael Hayes,²⁵ minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government, in 1922:

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

²¹ Andy Bielenberg, ‘Exodus: The Emigration of Southern Irish Protestants During the Irish War of Independence and the Civil War’, *Past and Present*, Vol. 218, No. 1 (2013), p. 232.

²² Lee, *Ireland*, p. 110.

²³ Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, pp. 355-6.

²⁴ Michael Kennedy. ‘Murphy, Seán Anthony’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a6097>, accessed 19 June 2013.

²⁵ Diarmaid Ferriter. ‘Hayes, Michael’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a3874>, accessed 19 June 2013.

We must get into the Press by slow and insinuating penetration, the distributing of interesting information, a little at a time, and rather to individual journalists than to the Head-quarters of the newspapers.²⁶

In 1924 the Irish Free State representative at the League of Nations, Michael MacWhite,²⁷ reported on Britain's attitude to the registration of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.²⁸ He wrote, rather gleefully, that they would 'very likely be hoist on their own petard because of the energetic way in which the Irish Government took up the challenge and refused to be bullied in the matter'.²⁹ He continued further on: 'Fortunately all the principal news agencies were represented here [...] whilst remaining in the background, I was able to supply them with material which they used to advantage'.³⁰ Despite such examples the consideration of the role of news and news agencies in the early years of the Irish Free State was often focused on its economic implications. Timothy A. Smiddy wrote from Washington in May 1924 that 'one unfavourable article is more injurious to the credit, trade, industry and world wide influence of the Irish Free State than many favourable ones'.³¹

In home affairs the government faced a threatened army mutiny in 1924 over criticisms of the civilian government's policies and recruitment, though ultimately civilian rule triumphed over this potential militaristic threat.³² In the same year the Boundary Commission promised under the Anglo-Irish Treaty was convened to deliberate on the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State. Major transfers to the Free State had been anticipated as a result of the Commission. Following a leak of its

²⁶ Sean Murphy to Michael Hayes (Dublin) n.d., National Archives of Ireland (NAI) Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Paris 1922-1923, *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy (DIFP) Vol. I*, No. 311, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1922/French-legation-generally/311.htm>, accessed 17 May 2013.

²⁷ Michael Kennedy. 'MacWhite, Michael', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5299>, accessed 19 June 2013.

²⁸ Through registration at the League of Nations it was made an international treaty as oppose to a domestic Act of Parliament.

²⁹ Michael MacWhite to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin), Geneva, 18 December 1924, NAI DFA 417/105, *DIFP Vol. II*, No. 298, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1924/Reaction-in-the-League-Secretariat-to-British-contentions-on-the-registration-of-the-1921-Treaty-at-the-League-of-Nations/634.htm>, accessed 17 May 2013.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Timothy A. Smiddy, Washington, to Desmond Fitzgerald, Dublin, 5 May 1924, NAI DFA GR 246, *DIFP Vol. II*, No. 212, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1924/Representation-of-the-Irish-Free-State-in-the-United-States-press/548.htm>, accessed 17 May 2013.

³² Duggan, *Irish Army*, pp. 29-33.

report recommending only minor changes to the *Morning Post* in 1925 diplomatic tensions emerged. A meeting of representatives from the three governments resolved to leave the border unchanged.³³ Perhaps one of the Commission's most significant long term outcomes was, as J.J. Lee has noted, to provide de Valera with 'an opportunity of rationalising his return to constitutional politics'.³⁴

At the 1926 Sinn Féin *ard fheis* de Valera argued that the failure of the Boundary Commission was due to the lack of republican representation in the Dáil. He continued the retrospective reengineering of his objection to the Treaty on the grounds of partition and argued that the party should abandon its abstentionist policy providing the oath of allegiance was abolished. Failing to convince a majority of the delegates he split from the party and founded the 'slightly constitutional'³⁵ Fianna Fáil in May the same year.³⁶ Effectively crushing Sinn Féin as a political force within a year³⁷ Fianna Fáil contested the June 1927 general election. Initially refusing to take the oath of allegiance they performed a *volte face* following the introduction of legislation making its acceptance a requirement of electoral candidacy.³⁸ They took their seats in August and following a snap general election in September were returned to serve a five year parliamentary apprenticeship with de Valera as the clear leader of the opposition.³⁹

Having continued its pursuit of stability through social conservatism and economic orthodoxy, in the lead up to the 1932 general election Cumann naGaedheal could see no alternative to further austere budgetary measures.⁴⁰ Hampered by worldwide economic conditions and lacking Ireland's traditional escape valve of emigration to ease tensions, it fought the election on law, order, religion and allegations of communist influences in some of

³³ Michael Kennedy, *Division and Consensus: The Politics of Cross-Border Relations in Ireland, 1925-1969* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2000), pp. 8-11.

³⁴ Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 140-50.

³⁵ Dáil Éireann Report, Vol. 22, col. 1615. Cited in Mark O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001), p. 1.

³⁶ Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 150-1.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

³⁸ Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 310.

³⁹ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, pp. 48-9.

⁴⁰ Lee, *Ireland*, p.168

Fianna Fáil's policies.⁴¹ Faced with a choice between 'more of the same' from the incumbents and Fianna Fáil's promises of improved unemployment, housing and social welfare benefits, a reduction in salaries for the highest paid public officials and the abolition of the oath⁴² the electorate favoured the latter. With the support of the Labour Party Fianna Fáil entered government.

It is particularly interesting from the point of view of this thesis that, from the inception of Fianna Fáil, de Valera and his supporters felt it essential to establish a newspaper of their own. The result was the launch of the *Irish Press* in September 1931 which would go on to be a significant player in the Irish media landscape until its closure in May 1995. Its purpose was to support the party's views, present its arguments, provide 'a forum for the dissemination of ideology to the masses while conversely giving supporters something practical to affiliate to' and to foster a sense of Irish national identity.⁴³ The pursuit of these aims would enable their political rehabilitation against the perceived, sometimes accurately, bias of the mainstream Irish daily newspapers.⁴⁴

The Irish News Industry and International News Supply

As mainstream Irish newspapers came to terms with the new constitutional arrangements on the island the PA and wider structures and systems of international news supply in Britain and Ireland continued the process of integration and consolidation begun following the end of World War I. As well as introducing innovations in its pricing structure and distribution infrastructure the PA undertook a number of purchases during this period, perhaps the most significant being a controlling interest in Reuters. During this period the mainstream Irish newspapers largely continued their previous patterns of behaviour within these systems and structures. In the case of those from the independent Irish state some comparison might be drawn between this behaviour and that of the Cumann na nGaedheal government towards Britain as it pursued economic and social stability. As the decade

⁴¹ Ibid., p.169; Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 363-4;

⁴² Lee, *Ireland*, p.169.

⁴³ O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, p. 2, 14.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 1-4.

progressed new names began to emerge representing the Irish newspapers at PA general meetings indicating generational, but not behavioural, change.

At its Annual General Meeting (AGM) held in London in May 1922 the Newspaper Society expressed ‘its sympathy with the Newspaper Proprietors of Ireland in their present difficulties’.⁴⁵ Present at this meeting were Charles Henderson, *Belfast News Letter*, Sir Robert Baird, *Belfast Telegraph*, Dr William Lombard Murphy, *Irish Independent*, and J.J. Simington, *Irish Times*. Though the shelling of the Four Courts had yet to take place, the tensions that would erupt in to civil war the following month were clearly apparent in the Irish Free State at this time. Unrest in Northern Ireland had already led to the passing of the Civil Authority (Special Powers) Act 1922.⁴⁶ In March the *Freeman’s Journal* in Dublin had been raided by anti-treaty forces and its presses smashed due to its support for the Treaty.⁴⁷ With Cork under the control of anti-treaty forces the *Cork Examiner’s* printing presses were smashed.⁴⁸

The mainstream Irish newspapers were supportive of the Treaty, whether through war-weariness, commercial motivations or pure pragmatism.⁴⁹ Though not always uncritical of government they would, in the coming years and decades, accept Ireland’s new constitutional arrangements. Even the traditionally unionist *Irish Times* was ‘ultimately forced to make its peace with [the] independent state’ in the 1920s.⁵⁰ Anti-imperial attitudes were expressed in print in Ireland, but these were found in non-mainstream publications with notably smaller circulations, most visibly

⁴⁵ Newspaper Society (NS). *Monthly Circular (MC)* Vol. 84 (1922), p. 69. The *Monthly Circular* was the in-house journal of the Newspaper Society. Though not publicly published it is held in the Newspaper Society’s corporate archive in bound annual volumes with continuous pagination; in this case 1922 is Volume 84 and the relevant text is located on page 69.

⁴⁶ Hennessey, *A History of Northern Ireland*, p. 32.

⁴⁷ Felix M. Larkin, ‘“A Great Daily Organ”: The *Freeman’s Journal*, 1763-1924’, *History Ireland*, Vol. 14, No.3 (May-Jun., 2006), p. 48.

⁴⁸ Hugh Oram, *The Newspaper Book: A History of Newspapers in Ireland, 1649-1983* (Dublin: MO Books, 1983), p. 151.

⁴⁹ Ian Kenneally, ‘Truce to Treaty: Irish Journalists and the 1920-21 Peace Process’ in Kevin Rafter (ed.) *Irish Journalism Before Independence: More a Disease Than a Profession* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2011), p. 222; John J. Horgan, ‘A Cork Centenary’, *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review*, Vol. 30, No. 120 (Dec., 1941), p. 577.

⁵⁰ Mark O’Brien, *The Irish Times: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008), p. 13.

in the ‘rhetorical solidarity with other colonial peoples expressed by republicans in their newspapers’.⁵¹

As the reality of partition and the existence of the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland came to be accepted, news agencies remained key to Ireland’s news supply. Within this structure the PA continued to play a central role, particularly through its arrangements with Reuters and the ETC.

For the years 1928-36 the PA’s Members Order Book lists the *Belfast News Letter*, *Belfast Telegraph*, *Cork Examiner*, *Cork Echo*, *Derry Journal*, *Londonderry Sentinel*, *Irish News* and *Northern Whig*.⁵² The page relating to Dublin is missing, but there is alternative evidence that the *Irish Independent*, *Irish Times* and, until 1924, the *Freeman’s Journal* were taking the PA service: their citation of agency sources in their printed columns for example. The Non-Members Order Book for the same period provides a range of Irish titles, demonstrating the PA’s importance across the entire Irish news industry.⁵³

<i>Clonmel Nationalist</i>	<i>Kilkenny Post</i>
<i>Clonmel Chronicle</i>	<i>Limerick Chronicle</i>
<i>Connacht Sentinel</i> , Galway	<i>Limerick Echo</i>
<i>Evening Telegraph and Evening Press</i> , Dublin	<i>Limerick Leader</i>
	<i>Munster News</i> , Limerick
<i>Evening News</i> , Waterford	<i>Star</i> , Dublin
<i>Galway Observer</i>	<i>Star</i> , Waterford
<i>Irish Press</i> , Dublin, (from 1931)	<i>Sunday Independent</i> , Dublin
<i>Kerry Express</i> , Tralee	<i>Tipperary Star</i> , Thurles
<i>Kerry Champion</i> , Tralee	<i>Tipperary Man</i> , Thurles
<i>Kerry News</i> , Tralee	<i>Tribune</i> , Galway
<i>Kerry Liberator</i> , Tralee	<i>Wexford People</i>

⁵¹ Caoilfhionn Ní Bheacháin, “‘The Mosquito Press’: Anti-Imperialist Rhetoric in Republican Journalism, 1926-39”, *Éire-Ireland*, Vol. 42, Nos. 1 & 2, (Spring/Summer, 2007), pp. 259-61.

⁵² PA Members Order Book 1928-36, Guildhall Library Manuscripts Collection, London (GL) MS 35467/2.

⁵³ PA Non-Members Order Book, 1928-36, GL MS 35468/2.

The presence of the *Irish Press* from 1931 and the listing of the *Irish Independent's* Sunday edition as a non-member publication should be noted. It is difficult to suggest a reason for the latter. It may be that the Sunday newspaper was being operated as a separate business at this point for which PA shares had not been purchased. It should further be noted that, as with examples cited in previous chapters, both the Member and Non-Member Order Books seem to refer to exceptional orders rather than annual subscriptions. Therefore it cannot be asserted that all the newspapers listed were taking all or some PA services continually, particularly in the case of non-members.

In addition to the news services that the order books refer to the PA was also central to the provision of sporting and market intelligence through its Joint Service Agreement (JSA) with the ETC. Throughout the 1920s a number of Irish newspapers can be identified as using this service, though once again the evidence is fragmentary and services are not necessarily continuous.⁵⁴

<i>Table 3.2. Irish subscribers to the Press Association-Exchange Telegraph Company Joint Service Agreement, 1918-28</i>	
<i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	<i>Irish Times</i>
<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	<i>Northern Whig</i>
<i>Cork Examiner</i>	<i>Wexford People</i>
<i>Evening Herald, Dublin</i>	<i>Wexford Free Press</i>
<i>Evening Mail, Dublin</i>	

Despite the challenges the tumultuous circumstances of the time might have presented, the structures of news supply to Irish newspapers were largely undisrupted. This was, at least in part, facilitated by a pragmatic and cooperative attitude between the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, in the Irish Free State, and the General Post Office (GPO) in London. In a letter to the Secretary of the GPO in 1929, concerning the rearrangement of certain telegraph circuits, P.S. O'Hegarty concluded that, with 'regards the general question of services, it is agreed that there is no urgency and that having regard to financial and other considerations the

⁵⁴ ETC / PA Joint Service Ledger, GL MS 23150/1-3.

carrying out of further alterations can be proceeded with as circumstances permit'.⁵⁵ It was, however, a concern of the Northern Ireland government during this period that their communications infrastructure should be independent of the Irish Free State.⁵⁶

The early 1920s saw a number of innovations in the PA's services. In 1921, following the conclusion of a new agreement with Reuters which in many ways normalised practices that had developed during World War I, it introduced a combined Reuters-PA Foreign Special service.⁵⁷ In 1924 it introduced a Combined Service which for morning papers comprised: Reuters Class I, the PA Foreign Special, General Evening Home News Class I, three Court Circulars, the eight pm weather forecast, the Morning Express (containing extracts from the London morning papers) and the Class I Parliamentary report. Priced at £900 this represented a saving of £93 if the constituent services were subscribed for individually.⁵⁸ The following year it added the option of a Parliamentary Special bringing the total Combined Service cost to £972.⁵⁹ In 1928 a number of price increases were introduced. The cost for the Combined Service rose to £992, or with the Parliamentary Special £1,064.⁶⁰ The reason for these increases was laid out in two letters enclosed with the tariff. Firstly, the PA general manager explained that prices had remained stable for eight years and that 'since then the system of delivering news directly into the offices of newspapers has been adopted and the various Services have been greatly extended and improved'.⁶¹ This system was the leased wire scheme trialled by the PA between 1919-20. It had been rolled out in subsequent years. Despite some initial confusion as to how integration with 'Free State Post Office' might be facilitated⁶² it was available in Northern Ireland by 1923.⁶³ By 1924 it

⁵⁵ P.S. O'Hegarty to Secretary, GPO, 15 July 1929, British Telecom Corporate Archives, London, (BT) POST 33/3341C.

⁵⁶ Under Secretary of State, Home Office, to Secretary, GPO, 13 June 1929, BT POST 33/3341C; Secretary to the Cabinet, Northern Ireland, to the Imperial Secretary, Home Office, 23 May 1923, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA) HO 267/392.

⁵⁷ PA Tariff, 1922, GL MS 35460/7.

⁵⁸ PA Tariff, 1923, GL MS 35460/7.

⁵⁹ PA Tariff, 1924, GL MS 35460/8.

⁶⁰ PA Tariff, 1928, GL MS 35460/9.

⁶¹ Circular letter, PA general manager, 10 November 1927, GL MS 35460/9.

⁶² Report of PA Annual General Meeting (AGM), 1922, GL MS 35365/10.

⁶³ Report of PA AGM, 1923, GL MS 35365/11.

had ‘been extended so that almost every daily paper in Great Britain and Ireland can be served by existing Circuits’.⁶⁴ The second reason for the 1928 price increase, as explained in a letter from the PA’s chairman, was that a number of the PA’s services were provided at a loss and the agency was currently operating a large overdraft. He also described the heavy liability the agency had with regard to the Notes issued in 1926 to part finance the PA’s purchase of a majority share holding in Reuters (see below). Further, in light of the option available to purchase additional Reuters shares it was ‘desirable to increase further the revenue of the Association’.⁶⁵

Just as the domestic structures of news supply had remained largely unaltered by the creation of the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland between 1920-22, neither had the international structures been disrupted. The cartelised ‘News Ring’ comprising the Associated Press (AP), Havas, Reuters and Wolff still operated, though the latter was now confined to Germany.⁶⁶ The PA still had exclusive rights to the Reuters service in Britain and Ireland outside London. The ETC and Central agencies provided some competition, though the operations of the British agencies were becoming increasingly cooperative. For example, in 1922, in conjunction with the Newspaper Proprietors Association (NPA), the Newspaper Society, Post Office and BBC they signed an agreement which prevented the BBC setting itself up as a news provider. It was further agreed that the BBC would obtain its news exclusively from the four agencies through Reuters, ‘the dominant partner’.⁶⁷ In 1933 the PA, ETC and Central jointly negotiated an agreement with the National Union of Journalists.⁶⁸ The only new player on the scene was the British United Press (BUP) which was competing energetically, if with little substantial success. Its arrival was

⁶⁴ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1923 in Report of PA AGM, 1924, GL MS 35365/11.

⁶⁵ Circular letter, PA chairman, 11 November 1927, GL MS 35460/9.

⁶⁶ Donald Read, *The Power of News: The History of Reuters*, 2nd edn. (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 159

⁶⁷ Siân Nicholas, ‘All the News That’s Fit to Broadcast: the Popular Press Versus the BBC, 1922-45’, in Peter Catterall, Colin Seymour-Ure and Adrian Smith (eds.) *Northcliffe’s Legacy: Aspects of the British Popular Press, 1896-1996* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 123-4.

⁶⁸ Agreement: Press Association Limited, Central News Limited and Exchange Telegraph Company Limited with National Union of Journalists, 31 March 1922, GL MS 22960.

greeted unenthusiastically by the established British news agencies.⁶⁹ It also caused a certain amount of nervousness on AP's part. The assistant general manager, J.S. Elliot, wrote to Frederick Roy Martin at AP's London office in 1924 regarding European competition from their domestic rival:

I hope something can be done to meet the activities of the United Press abroad. We cannot afford to have the big news producers of Europe get the idea that the United Press is the dominant agency.⁷⁰

There were some developments in the structures and systems of news distribution in Britain and Ireland from the early 1920s. In 1922 the PA and ETC renewed the JSA for the collection and distribution of sporting and financial information. Under the original 1906 agreement this was due to run until 1931. Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb has presented this as a product of inter-war rationalisation in the British and Irish news industry.⁷¹ However, clause three of the agreement indicates that it was primarily motivated by the intention to move the provision of the service over to the PA's leased wire scheme.

The Joint Service organisation for telephonic distribution between centres of the Joint Service shall be kept in operation for six calendar months from the date hereof and thereafter until the joint managers are satisfied that the Joint Service can be as expeditiously transmitted by the [Press] Association's System.⁷²

It was reported at the PA's AGM in 1923 that this had been completed by the end of 1922.⁷³ The new agreement was to run until 1941, and thereafter would continue in operation under a rolling renewal clause subject to three years notice by either party. It is an indication of how satisfactorily the

⁶⁹ Siân Nicholas, 'Keeping the News British: the BBC, British United Press and Reuters in the 1930s', in Joel H. Wiener and Mark Hampton (eds.) *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850-2000* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 195.

⁷⁰ Elliot to Martin, 1 January 1924, Associated Press Corporate Archives, New York (AP) 02A.3 Box 9/10.

⁷¹ Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb, 'Foreign Office Control of Reuters During the First World War. A Reply to Professor Putnis', *Media History*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2010), p. 284.

⁷² Agreement: The Press Association Limited with The Exchange Telegraph Company Limited, 10 February 1922, GL MS 22957/1.

⁷³ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1922 in Report of PA AGM, 1923, GL MS 35365/11.

service operated for both agencies, both before and after the renewal, that they were willing to adopt the PA's leased wire infrastructure cooperatively, extend the agreement ten years beyond its original term and ultimately not renegotiate it until 1961. It is in this sense a rationalisation of services, but only in so much as the original 1906 agreement was, now supplemented by technological innovation.

In 1930 the PA and Reuters extended their 1921 agreement by ten years. In addition to the earlier terms it was also agreed that Reuters would be allowed the opportunity to supply commercial and financial services within Britain and Ireland, provided that it did not replace an existing PA or JSA subscription.⁷⁴ It was also agreed that

the American and Continental Agencies allied to Reuters shall be free by arrangement through Reuters to supply a supplementary service or services to newspapers in the Provinces provided that such newspapers are subscribers to the full foreign service of the Press Association. [...Reciprocally it was agreed that the PA would] have the right by arrangement through Reuters of supplying a supplementary service or services to a foreign newspaper provided that such newspaper is a subscriber to the full service of the Agency allied to Reuters. [...] In no case shall such services be other than supplementary.⁷⁵

There was little indication that the mainstream Irish newspapers had any objection to the nature of the system that mediated the international news they received. Indeed, as will be discussed below, they remained seemingly satisfied with the PA service and were committed to, and supportive of, the organisation. There was, however, one exception.

In December 1929 de Valera made a visit to America to raise funds to support the establishment of the *Irish Press*.⁷⁶ During his six months in

⁷⁴ Reuters chairman and managing director, Roderick Jones, to PA general manager, H.C. Robbins, 8 March 1930, GL MS 35441.

⁷⁵ Reuters chairman and managing director, Roderick Jones, to PA general manager, H.C. Robbins, 8 March 1930, GL MS 35441. This is a separate letter to the above but has no distinguishing marks for referencing purposes.

⁷⁶ He had made similar trips in 1927 and 1928. During the first of these visits it was ruled that funds attached to bonds sold in America in 1919-21 to support the foundation of an Irish republic should be returned to their original subscribers less expenses. Many of these were signed over to de Valera and the monies, payable by the Free State government, used to support the *Irish Press*. See O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, pp. 14-15, 18.

the country he visited numerous American publications in order to inform himself on the business of running a newspaper.⁷⁷ Towards the end of this period he made contact with AP in New York to enquire after the possibility of receiving their service when the *Irish Press* began publication. In a polite reply he was informed that:

We now exchange news with the Reuter agency and do not ourselves deliver a service to either Ireland or England [...] at the moment, it does not seem practicable to suggest anything to meet your requirements except at a prohibitive cost. [...] Since you expect to have the news of the Press Association it might be possible for you to arrange to supplement this by filing from this side or having The Associated Press do so.⁷⁸

The opinion the *Irish Press* would hold of the established system of news supply was summed up by its first editor, Frank Gallagher, in his directions to sub-editors. 'Be on your guard against the habits of British and foreign news agencies who look at the world mainly through imperialist eyes'.⁷⁹ Frustrated in attempts to acquire a non-London-based source of international news through AP, the *Irish Press* subscribed to the BUP. Gallagher outlined his news requirements to the agency, including:

Movements for national independence anywhere, particularly those in the British empire [...] Political situations in all big nations with particular reference to foreign comments on British policy [...] All reference to Protection and Tariffs [...] the only information we are getting in the British press is criticism of protectionism [...] Definite news from Russia (facts rather than propaganda) [...] The progress of Gandhi's movement in India [...] the national movement in Palestine, the Frontier Movement in India, and also secessionist movements in Canada, Australia and South Africa.⁸⁰

How successfully Gallagher's requirements were fulfilled by the agency is debatable. The BUP made strenuous efforts to emphasise the British

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 22-3.

⁷⁸ AP assistant general manager to Eamon de Valera (Hotel Pennsylvania, New York), 20 May 1930, AP 02.1 Box 32/12.

⁷⁹ National Library of Ireland (NLI) MS 18361/3 Frank Gallagher Papers, nd. Cited in Lee, *Ireland*, p. 218.

⁸⁰ Gallagher to BUP, NLI, MS 18361 Frank Gallagher Papers. Cited in O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, p. 31.

element in its title and its Commonwealth credentials. ‘We are a Canadian concern’ insisted its managing director to the Admiralty in 1934.⁸¹ Gallagher’s instructions to the BUP and de Valera’s approach to AP are particularly significant, however unfruitful they may have been. They mark a conscious attempt by an Irish newspaper to acquire a source of international news that was neither London-based nor Anglo-centric. This was a notable exception to the general rule though.

In 1926 the close relationship that the PA and Reuters had enjoyed since 1869 was significantly strengthened when the latter bought a majority shareholding in the international news agency. This purchase was facilitated by the restructuring of Reuters that had taken place during World War I (see Chapter Two) and granted the PA the right to appoint four of the seven directors on the Reuters Board.⁸² Prior to the purchase control of Reuters was largely concentrated in the hands of Reuters’ chairman and managing director, Roderick Jones. The remaining shares were held by former chairman Mark Napier’s two sons, who were not actively involved in the company.⁸³ Because of this the PA purchase did not need to be approved by a wide and varying share-ownership group.

Donald Read has described how discussion on the sale of Reuters to the British newspapers began ‘in earnest in May 1925’.⁸⁴ Initially both the PA and NPA, representing the major London-based dailies, were involved in these negotiations. However, the NPA subsequently withdrew and the deal was concluded exclusively between Reuters and the PA. On 23 March 1926 an agreement was finalised. Reuters issued new share capital, just over fifty-three percent of which was purchased by the PA for £160,000.⁸⁵ There was a further option to purchase the remaining shares by 31 December 1930, which the PA exercised, paying £157,500. Jones retained a nominal 1,000 shares until his removal from Reuters in 1941.⁸⁶ The 1926 transaction

⁸¹ BUP managing director, Herbert Bailey, to Commander W.R. Richardson, Admiralty, 23 July 1934, TNA ADM 1/8776/153.

⁸² P.A. Shaw, PA secretary, to London Newspapers (Copy), 9 April 1926, GL MS 35609.

⁸³ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 172.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ The 1926 share capital comprised 50,000 A shares, 25,000 B shares of £1 each and 7 C, or directors, shares. The PA purchased 31,250 A shares and 8,750 B shares for £4 each.

⁸⁶ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 173.

was financed through two mechanisms. First, a loan of £80,000 was raised from Lloyds Bank at an interest rate of one and a half percent above bank rate with a minimum rate of four and a half percent. This was repaid in full by June 1929.⁸⁷ The remaining capital was raised by the issue of 800 Notes with a face value of £100 to PA members. These Notes bore an interest rate of six and a half percent per annum over a period of twelve years to 31 December 1937. A number were purchased by Irish newspapers. Further, through variations in 1933 and 1944, the majority were not ultimately redeemed until 31 December 1954. Though the two variations took place in periods covered by the second part of this chapter and Chapter Four respectively they will be covered here in order to present a coherent description of the evolution of this investment.

Internal PA and Reuters documents add something to the linear description of events above. The principles of the deal had been agreed by November 1925.⁸⁸ From that point until the beginning of March 1926 lawyers and auditors were ‘engaged in drafting and agreeing the various documents and Articles of Association’.⁸⁹ Though there was some suspicion that the NPA might withdraw as early as August 1925⁹⁰ the first clear indications emerged when the PA board resolved on 3 November that if the NPA did withdraw from the negotiations the PA would ‘go on alone’.⁹¹ It was confirmed on 1 December that negotiations with NPA ‘had proved abortive’.⁹²

On 5 December 1925 the PA secretary, P.A. Shaw, wrote to members making the initial Note offer. He explained that ‘the Chairman attached special emphasis to the desirability of all Members taking up some portion of the Notes’. He continued that through this mechanism

⁸⁷ ‘The Press Association Limited, Secretary’s Report on 6½% Notes’, 31 January 1933, GL MS 35611.

⁸⁸ ‘Private and Confidential: Notes on five hours’ conference at Byron House, Fleet Street yesterday afternoon’, 4 March 1926, Reuters Corporate Archive, London (RA), Roderick Jones Papers (J) Box 65.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ ‘Confidential: Negotiations with Newspapers. Main Events’, 17 September 1925, RA J Box 63.

⁹¹ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, 3 November 1925, GL MS 35358/21.

⁹² PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, 1 December 1925, GL MS 35358/21.

Members were, in fact, lending to themselves, with an object that in the view of the Committee could not fail to be of the greatest importance to the British Press and to the Members of the Association in particular.⁹³

Much correspondence accompanying pro-forma returned by the members, including those from Ireland, express strong support for the proposals. For example, on 21 December 1925 James Colhoun of the *Londonderry Sentinel* wrote to the PA's general manager expressing enthusiastic support to the 'the Reuter "Deal"'.⁹⁴ On 8 December the secretary of the *Cork Examiner* wrote to the PA's secretary expressing his newspaper's support for the actions 'of the PA management in securing controlling powers in Messrs. Reuters, Ltd.'.⁹⁵ The Note issue was not closed until early March 1926 and payment for the Notes was required by the end of that month.⁹⁶

The reaction of the Irish newspapers to the Note offer was relatively enthusiastic. Of the eligible newspapers only three turned the offer down outright, the *Irish News*,⁹⁷ the *Northern Whig*⁹⁸ and the *Witness*.⁹⁹ The *Derry Standard* initially indicated it would invest £100 but did not subsequently take up the offer.¹⁰⁰ Of the remaining newspapers, initial indications of interest reveal willingness to invest between £500 and £2,500. Of those that did purchase Notes the *Belfast News Letter*, *Dublin Express and Mail*, *Londonderry Sentinel* and the *Irish Times* all invested £500 each. The *Irish Independent*'s investment was twice this at £1000.¹⁰¹ The *Cork Examiner*¹⁰²

⁹³ Circular, P.A. Shaw, PA secretary, 5 December 1925, GL MS 35609.

⁹⁴ James Colhoun, *Londonderry Sentinel*, to H. C. Robbins, PA general manager, 21 December 1925, GL MS 35609.

⁹⁵ [?], secretary *Cork Examiner*, to P.A. Shaw, PA secretary, 8 December 1925, GL MS 35609.

⁹⁶ Circular P.A. Shaw, PA secretary, 11 March 1926, GL MS 35609.

⁹⁷ [?], secretary *Irish News*, to PA secretary, 4 January 1926, GL MS 35609.

⁹⁸ [?], secretary *Northern Whig*, to P.A. Shaw, PA secretary, 2 January 1926, GL MS 35609.

⁹⁹ [?], manager and secretary *Witness*, to PA secretary, 2 January 1926, GL MS 35609.

¹⁰⁰ John Glendening, proprietor *Derry Standard*, to PA secretary, 11 December 1925, GL MS 35609.

¹⁰¹ Ledger, 'The Press Association Limited. List of a Series of 800 Twelve-Year Notes of £100 each', GL MS 35610.

¹⁰² Pro-forma and letter, [?], secretary *Cork Examiner*, to P.A. Shaw, PA secretary, 8 December 1925, GL MS 35609.

and the *Belfast Telegraph*¹⁰³ each offered £2,500, although both eventually invested £1,200.¹⁰⁴ The reason that these latter two newspapers received fewer Notes than they were originally willing to invest in is revealed in a letter from Shaw dated 11 March 1926:

Owing to the very generous and gratifying support which our members have given to the scheme, it is possible to allot only a portion of the total of the sums offered. The Committee have, therefore, decided to allot in full all applications up to £1,000, and to make, as nearly as possible a *pro rata* allotment of the balance to make up the total of £80,000.¹⁰⁵

The Irish newspapers that invested in the Notes were drawn from both sides of the border and both sides of Ireland's traditional political and religious divisions. However, an examination of their actions confined solely to the Notes fails to reveal even the slightest indication of such polarising allegiances, normally so defining in the history of Irish newspapers.

This purchase provided the PA with a controlling interest in its key source of international news and the opportunity to, if not influence the structure of news supply, at least benefit from the arrangements that controlled it. Read has noted how after the purchase the PA 'expected to receive not only its news from Reuters cheaply but also to be paid an annual dividend'.¹⁰⁶ It can further be seen against a wider background of mergers and acquisitions in the international cable network which in turn 'supported the growth of global news agencies'.¹⁰⁷ Through the 1920s, as Dwayne Winseck and Robert M. Pike have noted, this activity 'transformed the global communications business in a few short years'.¹⁰⁸ Read has noted that the dividend the PA received from its shareholding in Reuters would

¹⁰³ [?] Baird, director, *Belfast Telegraph*, 12 December 1925, GL MS 35609.

¹⁰⁴ Ledger, 'The Press Association Limited. List of a Series of 800 Twelve-Year Notes of £100 each', GL MS 35610.

¹⁰⁵ Circular P.A. Shaw, PA secretary, 11 March 1926, GL MS 35609.

¹⁰⁶ Read, 'The Relationship of Reuters and Other News Agencies with the British Press, 1858-1984', p. 158.

¹⁰⁷ Robert Pike and Dwayne Winseck, 'The Politics of Global Media Reform, 1907-23', *Media Culture and Society*, Vol. 26 (2004), p. 646.

¹⁰⁸ Dwayne Winseck and Robert M. Pike, 'The Global Media and the Empire of Liberal Internationalism, circa 1910-30', *Media History*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2009), p. 44.

become a ‘vital element’ in its finances.¹⁰⁹ In return, Oliver Boyd-Barrett has noted, Reuters was provided with ‘financial security, independence from the threat of state intervention, legitimacy and prestige’.¹¹⁰

In considering the motivation for the investment of Irish newspapers in the Notes the first and simplest explanation is that they represented a purely pragmatic decision. Excess capital was placed in a relatively high yielding vehicle that would produce biannual interest payments totalling six and a half percent a year. This could feed directly in to the companies’ top line accounts without affecting the initial capital investment. However, as well as being presented as a sound financial investment the Notes were also positioned as a mechanism to secure Reuters as a British agency, under the stewardship of the British newspaper industry. Following the conclusion of the sale the PA made notable efforts to reengage the NPA and, through that organisation, bring the London newspapers into the ownership of Reuters.¹¹¹ Despite some interest this ultimately proved unsuccessful.¹¹² There is no indication that the Irish newspapers disagreed with these non-purely commercial aims.

Silberstein-Loeb has presented the 1926 share purchase as a merger between the PA and Reuters.¹¹³ This is a questionable characterisation of the relationship between the two agencies between 1926-41, when fifty percent of the company was sold to the NPA and the Reuters Trust was created (see Chapter Four). True, from 1926 the PA had the right to nominate four, and after 1931 six, of the seven Reuters directors. However, the two organisations continued to operate separately under their own managements. Indeed the possibility that this might not be the case had nearly derailed the negotiations in March 1926. Jones insisted on the retention of a clause preventing any salaried employee of the PA from being appointed a Reuters director. During a private conversation at the final meeting to conclude the

¹⁰⁹ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 173.

¹¹⁰ Boyd-Barrett, *The International News Agencies*, p. 113.

¹¹¹ P.A. Shaw, PA secretary, to London Newspapers (Copy), 9 April 1926, GL MS 35609.

¹¹² [?], NPA, to P.A. Shaw, PA secretary, 30 September 1926, GL MS 35609.

¹¹³ Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb, ‘The Structure of the News Market in Britain, 1870-1914’, *Business History Review*, Vol. 83 (Winter 2009), pp. 772, 778; idem. ‘Foreign Office Control of Reuters During the First World War. A Reply to Professor Putnis’. *Media History*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2010), p. 284.

agreement he managed to prevail on the PA chairman, Arthur Pickering, to persuade his board to drop their objections to this clause.¹¹⁴ He explained his reasons, which the PA accepted, in a subsequent letter:

The two Companies deal with each other as two independent and separate concerns. Day by day the Managers of Reuters call upon the Press Association to perform certain services in the United Kingdom for Reuters. Day by day the Managers of the Press Association call upon Reuters to perform certain services for the Press Association in the rest of the Empire and in foreign countries, all under contracts or agreements which exist and will continue to exist between Reuters and the Press Association. [...] Both parties meet each other on level ground, and the relationship works smoothly and in every way satisfactorily. But if one of the Managers of the Press Association was at the same time a Director of Reuters, the basis of equality would be gone.¹¹⁵

The organisational structure of shared directors but separate managements characterised the PA and Reuters' relationship between 1926-41. While often cooperative and congenial the two managements were always motivated in their discussions by the desire to get the best deal for their respective organisations. The agreement concluded in 1921 continued in operation after 1926 and was renewed on substantially the same terms in 1930. The PA general manager, H.C. Robbins, in concluding the renewed agreement wrote to Jones that it would 'cement even more firmly than before the alliance that has now existed between the two Agencies for upward of sixty years'.¹¹⁶ Jones replied confirming the various negotiations and commented that 'I cannot pay you higher compliment than to say that we consider you a foeman worthy of our steel'.¹¹⁷ True, the two agencies continued to cooperate increasingly closely on Foreign Special services. In the 1930 agreement it was noted that this would be continued 'on the same lines as heretofore' but that Reuters would increase its charge.¹¹⁸ In many ways this model of cooperation bears a similarity to the JSA operated by the

¹¹⁴ 'Private and Confidential: Notes on five hours' conference at Byron House, Fleet Street yesterday afternoon', 4 March 1926, RA J Box 65.

¹¹⁵ Roderick Jones, Reuters chairman and managing director, to Arthur Pickering, PA chairman (Copy), 6 March 1926, RA J Box 65.

¹¹⁶ H.C. Robbins, PA general manager, to Jones (Copy), 17 March 1930, GL MS 35441.

¹¹⁷ Jones to Robbins, 28 March 1930, GL MS 35441.

¹¹⁸ Jones to Robbins, 8 March 1930, GL MS 35441.

PA and ETC, who were otherwise competitors with both the PA and Reuters. The 1921 and 1930 agreements between Reuters and the PA can certainly be seen as part of wider trend of cooperation and integration in the system of news distribution in Britain and Ireland. But whether the 1926 share purchase can be characterised as a merger is highly doubtful. It should further be noted that the share capital of the two companies remained separate after 1926.

As mentioned above, the 1926 Notes had an original term of twelve years. The original agreement was structured to allow the PA to redeem the Notes from 31 December 1932 with a premium payment of five percent on the original capital investment. This premium reduced annually by one percent until 31 December 1937 when the Notes could be redeemed at face value. Discussions began within the PA in late 1932 as to the possibility of exercising this early redemption option. However, the financial position of the PA had changed drastically since 1926. The world economy was in a financial crisis precipitated by the Wall Street Crash of 1929. An internal document of 1 December 1932 stated that:

Had the PA position been what it was two years ago I would not have hesitated to recommend conversion had Interest rates been low. Today our Profit and Loss account is anything but satisfactory so far as regards Trading Profit, and our outlook for 1933 is no better.¹¹⁹

Discussions had progressed as far as making initial enquiries about the terms on which a loan could be raised to cover the cost of redemption. However, no organisation was willing to offer a fixed interest rate of less than four and a half percent.¹²⁰ In addition, it was noted that:

When we got the advance from the Union [Bank of Scotland] to finance the Reuter purchase, we were not asked to pledge Byron House, but there was a definite understanding that no further

¹¹⁹ 'Press Association Limited, 6½ percent Notes. The Question of Redemption', 1 December 1932, GL MS 35611.

¹²⁰ Presumably the terms of the loan would have required repayment of capital and interest, though this is not specified. In this case the cost to the annual balance sheet would have been in excess of paying the interest on the Notes.

commitments would be entered into which might depreciate the value of the Bank's security.¹²¹

This probably refers to those Reuters shares that were not acquired in 1926 and which the PA exercised its option on in 1931. This was financed through the realisation of £40,000 worth of securities and a bank loan of £117,500¹²² of which £74,000 was still outstanding in 1932.¹²³

Rather than redeem the Notes in 1932, or subsequent years, on the original terms the PA decided to write to the members and offer an amendment and extension to the terms. In a circular letter of 21 December 1932 Shaw wrote that:

In view of the present position of the money market, the Committee of Management of the Association have had under consideration the desirability of reducing the annual interest charge. The Notes were issued to provide part of the purchase price of an interest in Reuters Ltd. [...] In 1931 the Committee, with the unanimous approval of the Association, purchased the balance of the Reuters Shares, thereby greatly strengthening the Association. The Note Issue could be redeemed by borrowing, but instead the Committee have decided to offer to members an extension of the currency of the existing Notes.¹²⁴

It was proposed that the term of the Notes would be extended to 31 December 1944 and the interest rate reduced to five percent. At the end of this term they would be redeemed with a premium of two percent. There was no provision for early redemption with a sliding premium scale as in the original twelve-year agreement, but a clause did allow for their early redemption by mutual consent.¹²⁵ The Irish newspapers responded

¹²¹ 'Press Association Limited, 6½ percent Notes. The Question of Redemption', 1 December 1932, GL MS 35611. Byron House was the London headquarters of the PA from 1921 and the site, with other PA owned properties, on which the new PA-Reuters building opened in 1939 was built. See Chris Moncrieff. *Living on a Deadline: A History of the Press Association* (London: Virgin Books, 2001), pp. 77, 176; Read, *The Power of News*, p. 186-8.

¹²² PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1930 in Report of PA AGM, 1931, GL MS 35365/12.

¹²³ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1932 in Report of PA AGM, 1933, GL MS 35365/12.

¹²⁴ Circular P.A. Shaw, PA secretary, (Copy), n.d., GL MS 35611. The date of this letter is confirmed in various pro-forma replies. For example A.A. Hall, secretary *Irish Times*, to PA secretary, pro-forma, 28 December 1932, GL MS 35611.

¹²⁵ Memorandum varying terms and interest of 1926 Notes, (Copy) 1933, GL MS 35610.

positively to the offer of altered terms, with only the *Dublin Evening Mail* declining. It retained its six and a half percent interest rate and the original terms. Its Notes were redeemed by the PA on 30 December 1933.¹²⁶

There was one final variation to the Notes. In December 1944 their redemption was further extended to 31 December 1954 at a further reduced interest rate of four percent. The two percent premium was retained with the same provision for early redemption by mutual consent.¹²⁷ Once again the Irish newspapers that held notes agreed to the terms offered. This variation was in light of anticipated capital requirements for the upgrade of the PA distribution system (see Chapter Five).¹²⁸

The motivation for Irish newspapers' continued investment in the 1926 Notes should first be considered from a pragmatic, commercial point of view. Considering the domestic economic situation in 1933, particularly in the Irish Free State, and a wartime economy in 1944 (see below and Chapter Four) the stable income stream provided by interest payments would probably have been very welcome. Outside of this they provided little, if any, additional benefit. Though the Reuters shares did provide a dividend for the PA, it did not itself pay dividends. There was no suggestion that if the PA had not purchased control of Reuters that the valued supply of international news would have been lost. Therefore it is necessary to consider the Notes from the point of view of the argument in support of the purchase of Reuters shares that were not advanced from a purely commercial or financial view point. This was the securing of the agency as a British institution under the stewardship of the newspaper industry of Britain (and Ireland). In this light the Irish investments can be seen as paralleling those of their English, Welsh and Scottish contemporaries, acting to secure and maintain the market dominance of the PA and Reuters.

From a specifically Irish view point the investment of Irish newspapers in the 1926 Notes can be seen in conjunction with the policy of continued economic connection, and indeed integration, with Britain

¹²⁶ Ledger, 'The Press Association Limited. List of a Series of 800 Twelve-Year Notes of £100 each', GL MS 35610.

¹²⁷ Memorandum varying terms and interest of re-issued 1933 Notes, (Copy) 1944, GL MS 35610.

¹²⁸ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1944 in Report of PA AGM, 1945, GL MS 35365/14.

pursued by the Cumann na nGaedheal government. This policy has been described by Lee as tantamount to ‘virtual abdication in favour of established financial interests’.¹²⁹ The presence of Irish representatives at PA general meetings reflects this continued connection and integration of the major Irish daily newspapers with the PA and British news industry. From 1922-30 Charles Henderson, of the unionist *Belfast News Letter*, continued to hold the board position he had been proposed to by W.T. Brewster, of the nationalist *Irish Independent*, in 1917. He was simultaneously a director of the PA Share Purchase Company (PASPC) until 1924.¹³⁰ He attended every general meeting up to and including the 1931 Annual General Meeting (AGM), with the exception of one Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) in 1926 which no Irish representatives attended. In 1931 he was joined by James Henderson, also of the *Belfast News Letter*.¹³¹ Brewster and William Lombard Murphy of the *Irish Independent* attended the 1922 and 1923 AGMs. In 1923 Sir Robert H.H. Baird, of the *Belfast Telegraph*, also attended. He returned in 1924 and in 1932, when he was joined by William Baird. In the intervening years the *Belfast Telegraph* was represented in 1926 and 1928-31 by J. McKaig. At the 1925 AGM the *Irish Independent* was represented by William Lombard Murphy and James Donohoe, and at the second EGM held that year by Gerald J. Murphy. This latter Murphy also attended the AGMs in 1926, 1927 and 1930. Sir Robert Lynn of the *Northern Whig* attended the 1930 AGM. Lynn was also at this time a member of the Northern Ireland parliament representing Antrim North.¹³² In 1932 the two *Belfast Telegraph* Bairds were joined by a returning James Henderson, of the *Belfast News Letter*, and George Crosbie, of the *Cork Examiner*. Whilst this indicates a continuation of Irish newspapers’ involvement with the PA it also reveals something of a changing of the guard. The names of delegates familiar in the previous years and decades changed as the sons of the newspaper-

¹²⁹ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 110-11.

¹³⁰ ‘PA Share Purchase Company Register of Members and Directors’, GL MS 35408/1.

¹³¹ Reports of PA General Meetings, GL MS 35365/10-12.

¹³² Diarmaid Ferriter, ‘Lynn, Robert John’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a4965>, accessed 18 November 2013.

owning families and newly appointed senior executives appeared. This demonstrates generational as well as an organisational continuation.

In addition to the 1926 and 1931 Reuters share purchases and other developments already mentioned, evidence of the PA's continued post-war growth and the consolidation of its market position are provided in the reports of its general meetings during this period. In 1922 the PA congratulated itself on a number of exclusives on the 'Irish question'.¹³³ However of far more interest to at least one Irish delegate was the extension of the leased wire scheme first trialled between 1919-20 (also called the private wire scheme). It had been noted in the annual report that progress on this was slow due to higher than expected proposed line rental cost from the Post Office.¹³⁴ Brewster, of the *Irish Independent*, enquired 'whether there was any immediate prospect of the extension of the scheme to Ireland'.¹³⁵ As noted above, despite some initial uncertainty as to how integration with the Post Office in the Irish Free State would be facilitated, by 1924 this scheme had been extended to cover both Britain and Ireland. In the Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1922 the purchase of the freehold for the PA's headquarters, Byron House,¹³⁶ as well as a number of other London properties, was reported.¹³⁷ In 1925 it was reported that 'the various special arrangements between Reuters and the Press Association again proved satisfactory'. The use of joint correspondents accompanying Ramsay MacDonald and Austen Chamberlain on overseas missions was considered particularly successful.¹³⁸ In the same year the purchase of the 'Sportsman' (Ivan) Sporting News Agency was reported. It was anticipated that this would enable continued improvements in the PA's sporting services.¹³⁹

¹³³ Report of PA AGM 1922, GL MS 35365/10.

¹³⁴ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1921 in Report of PA AGM, 1922, GL MS 35365/10.

¹³⁵ Report of PA AGM 1922, GL MS 35365/10.

¹³⁶ An eighty-three year lease hold had been acquired for this property in 1920, see Chapter Two.

¹³⁷ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1922 in Report of PA AGM, 1923, GL MS 35365/11.

¹³⁸ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1924 in Report of PA AGM, 1925, GL MS 35365/11.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.* The purchase was actually completed in January 1925 so consequently is not covered by the reporting period for the 1924 Statement of Accounts and a price is not mentioned in the Annual Report. There is no specific entry relating to the purchase in the 1925 Statement of Accounts.

In 1928 the PA doubled its capitalisation through the issue of 4,944 previously unissued shares of £10 each. This was financed out of the PA's profits and the new shares were issued to existing members at a ratio of one-to-one on shares already held. This effectively doubled the nominal value of members' shareholding, for no additional outlay, as well as doubling the cost of entry for new members. The EGM convened immediately after the 1928 AGM, attended by Charles Henderson and McKaig, passed the required resolution unanimously.¹⁴⁰ It was explained that in light of the growth and consolidation of the PA in previous years, including the development of the private wires scheme, purchase of Byron House and acquisition of a controlling interest in Reuters, the recapitalisation would provide 'that the share-holding of Members, and the qualifications for new Members should correspond with the greatly improved position of the Organisation'.¹⁴¹ It was further explained that the recapitalisation 'may be regarded as the culmination of the policy followed during the past two years of strengthening the fabric of the Institution, and greatly widening its sphere of usefulness'.¹⁴² Two contemporary developments in the PA's cash flow might be usefully considered alongside the recapitalisation. Firstly, the statement of accounts for 1927 notes the first dividend payment from the agency's Reuters shares. This was a taxable sum of £10,300.¹⁴³ Secondly, as noted above, 1928 saw the introduction of increased charges for a number of services in the PA's tariff. It may be that doubling the PA's issued share capital, which appeared as a liability in the statement of accounts, would have the advantageous effect of reducing the overall tax liability increased as a result of the Reuters dividend. This might prompt a reconsideration of how vital an element the dividend was in the PA's finances, as described by Read, at this stage.¹⁴⁴ At the same time the corresponding doubling of its

¹⁴⁰ Report of PA EGM, 1928, GL MS 35365/12.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1927 in Report of PA AGM, 1928, GL MS 35365/12.

¹⁴⁴ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 173. Subsequent developments such as the looming Great Depression and outbreak of World War II certainly placed greater pressures on the PA's resources in subsequent years.

shareholders' nominal assets, for no outlay, might have acted as welcome sweetener for their increased costs under the new tariff charges.¹⁴⁵

Having committed to exercise its right to purchase the outstanding Reuters shares, with the exception of a nominal 1,000 retained by Jones, the PA's financial health suffered some setbacks between 1930-31. At the 1931 AGM it was reported that income from subscriptions in 1930 had declined by £5,192 14s 8d, though this should be considered in light of profits of £53,439 2s and a yearend credit balance of £21,101 5s 1d.¹⁴⁶ Rather more concerning was the continued decline in subscriber numbers due to depression in the newspaper industry, as was the appearance of cracks in the fabric of Byron House.¹⁴⁷ Income declined again in 1931, though by the lesser sum of £1,578 18s 10d and a slightly healthier yearend balance of £21,331 14s. Works to rectify the structural problems at Byron House were ongoing at the time of the 1932 AGM. Against a background of newspaper closures the launch of 'the organ of the De Valera Party [sic]', the *Irish Press*, in September 1931 was noted.¹⁴⁸

Fianna Fáil, the 'economic war' and Éire / Ireland, 1932-1939

Contemporary Context

Faced with a choice between continued austerity under Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil's electoral promises (see above) the Irish Free State electorate chose the latter.¹⁴⁹ Following the general election of February 1932 de Valera and his party entered government with the support of Labour.

Fears that either the military or outgoing government might stage a 'pre-emptive coup to forestall the feared revenge of their civil war enemies' proved unfounded.¹⁵⁰ Tensions did emerge between the anti-treaty remnants of the IRA, identifying with Fianna Fáil, and the Army Comrades

¹⁴⁵ Considering the limited information contained in a Statement of Accounts this should be regarded as purely speculative.

¹⁴⁶ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1930 in Report of PA AGM, 1931, GL MS 35365/12.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1931 in Report of PA AGM, 1932, GL MS 35365/12.

¹⁴⁹ Lee, *Ireland*, p.169

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 175.

Association (ACA). The IRA had supported Fianna Fáil during the election campaign and on entering government de Valera released ninety-seven members imprisoned under the Public Safety Act.¹⁵¹ Introduced in 1931, partly prompted by fears of a conspiracy between the IRA and communist groups to undermine the state, de Valera suspended the Act in 1932.¹⁵² The ACA was formed in February 1932 and used as ‘a quasi praetorian guard’ by Cumann na nGaedheal.¹⁵³ This Fascist-inspired organisation would later become known as the Blueshirts, and later still the National Guard. It was, as Diarmaid Ferriter has noted, divided between the overtly political aims of its leaders and the more mundane concerns of its grassroots members fearing an ‘autocratic de Valera / IRA partnership’.¹⁵⁴ Against a background of continuing public tensions between the ACA and IRA and wavering Labour support in the Dáil de Valera called a surprise general election in January 1933.¹⁵⁵

In its electoral appeal to the voters in 1933 Cumann na nGaedheal toned down its previous anti-communist rhetoric. It focused on economic issues, including promising to end the ‘economic war’ (see below), and emphasised its anti-British and pre-independence credentials.¹⁵⁶ Despite this change of tactics Fianna Fáil was victorious in the ballot, securing enough seats to form an overall majority and return to government on its own. In the aftermath of the general election, facing the prospect of an extended period out of power, a number of key Cumann na nGaedheal members and supporters gravitated towards the Blueshirts.¹⁵⁷ In September 1933 the party amalgamated with the Blueshirts and Centre Party to form Fine Gael. Cosgrave continued to lead the party in the Dáil while former Garda Commissioner and Blueshirt leader Eoin O’Duffy¹⁵⁸ was appointed its extra-parliamentary head. He filled this position until resigning in

¹⁵¹ Ibid. pp. 176-7.

¹⁵² Ibid.; Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 414.

¹⁵³ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, pp. 75-6.

¹⁵⁴ Ferriter, *Modern Ireland*, pp. 416-7.

¹⁵⁵ Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 178-9.

¹⁵⁶ Jason Knirck, ‘A Cult of No Personality: W.T. Cosgrave and the Election of 1933’, *Éire-Ireland*, Vol. 47, Nos. 3 & 4 (Fall / Win, 2012), pp. 76, 89.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁵⁸ For further information on O’Duffy and the Irish Brigade in the Spanish Civil War, see the case study later in this chapter.

September 1934.¹⁵⁹ Following the renewed mandate for Fianna Fáil and escalating clashes between the Blueshirts and IRA de Valera moved to crush the two organisations. Between 1933-36 he deployed a mixture of diversionary tactics and legislative powers, including military tribunals.¹⁶⁰ The Blueshirts were declared illegal in August 1933; the same action would not be taken against the IRA until June 1936.

The Fianna Fáil government that took power in 1932 did deliver on many of its promises, increasing the old-age pension and unemployment benefit and instituting an ambitious housing programme. During the 1930s finance and credit structures were introduced to support the development of native industries along with import quotas, licences and tariffs.¹⁶¹ However, much of the potential represented by these positive social and economic policies was frustrated by actions guaranteed to infuriate Ireland's largest trading partner. One of the first acts of the new government was to repudiate annuities payable to Britain as a legacy of pre-independence land purchase legislation. This marked the opening shot of the 'economic war' that would continue until 1938. Britain in retaliation imposed import tariffs on Irish livestock and livestock products, a key aspect of external funds in Ireland's balance of payments. Fianna Fáil in turn imposed duties on British coal. The retaliatory spiral of tit-for-tat duties and quotas continued until 1934. This included the imposition of a two-fifths of a penny import duty by the Free State on imported daily newspapers in 1933, 'designed to limit the sale of the British yellow press'.¹⁶² Kevin Rafter has recently discussed the campaign against the circulation of the British popular press in Ireland, both before and after independence, led by 'influential – and conservative – Catholic Church organisations'.¹⁶³ This led to the banning of the *News of the World* in 1930. Throughout this period, he argues, the Irish newspapers 'primarily acquiesced with the campaign for censorship and offered little opposition to what was an attack on journalism and the freedom of

¹⁵⁹ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, pp. 82-7; Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 179-80.

¹⁶⁰ Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 179-80.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 190-3.

¹⁶² Brian P. Kennedy, 'The Failure of the Cultural Republic: Ireland 1922-39', *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review*, Vol. 81, No. 321 (Spring, 1992), p. 19.

¹⁶³ Kevin Rafter, 'Evil Literature', *Media History*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2013), p. 412.

expression and speech'.¹⁶⁴ The 1933 tariffs were, in this analysis, merely the culmination of a much longer campaign.¹⁶⁵

During the first years of the 'economic war' Britain would recoup about two-thirds of the value of the withheld annuity payments, but the Irish Free State's economy would suffer increasingly adverse effects as a result of British tariffs.¹⁶⁶ An economic ceasefire resulted in the coal-cattle pact of January 1935 which was renewed annually until the Anglo-Irish Agreement on trade in 1938. This provided for some preferential treatment on British imports and removed the restrictions on agricultural exports from the independent Irish state. In return for a one-off lump sum payment of £10,000,000 Britain waived its claims on the annuities and other ongoing payments to the sum of £100,000,000. It also relinquished military control of the 'treaty ports' of Berehaven, Cobh and Lough Swilly retained in the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty.¹⁶⁷ This latter concession would prove vital in the enabling the independent Irish state to remain neutral during World War II.

In many ways the early results of the economic war played fortuitously for Fianna Fáil's aims of economic independence and self-reliance in food production through diversification in agricultural production. This latter aim was pursued through the introduction of subsidies designed to encourage tillage production, increase agricultural employment, and decrease cattle production. Unfortunately the increase in tillage actually led to a decrease in agricultural employment and cattle exports increased.¹⁶⁸ Despite some amelioration from the coal-cattle pact, economic conditions in Ireland remained depressed. Unemployment rose in 1935 and would remain stubbornly high for the rest of the decade.¹⁶⁹ This was despite almost continuous population decline since the creation of the independent Irish state, facilitated in a large part through emigration.¹⁷⁰ By 1938 the home market was saturated with Irish goods, and it was clear that an active export sector was needed; however, Irish industries developed

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 417.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 418.

¹⁶⁶ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 178.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 214.

¹⁶⁸ Lee and Ó Tuathaigh, *The Age of de Valera*, p. 13-5.

¹⁶⁹ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 201.

¹⁷⁰ Lee and Ó Tuathaigh, *The Age of de Valera*, pp. 166, 180.

behind protectionist barriers lacked the ability, and in many cases the will, to compete internationally. May 1939 saw the introduction of a particularly severe budget.¹⁷¹

As well as seeking to assert Ireland's economic independence and bolster self sufficiency, Fianna Fáil embarked on a systematic dismantling of the remaining constitutional ties to Britain contained in the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty. This was facilitated by the 1926 Imperial Conference and the Balfour Report which, 'written largely at South African and Irish behest, affirmed the equal constitutional status of the Dominions with the Mother Country'.¹⁷² The 1931 Statute of Westminster removed Britain's right to legislate on behalf of the Dominions, granting them greater legislative autonomy within the British Empire.¹⁷³ Ireland was the first dominion territory to adopt the Statute.¹⁷⁴ In November 1932 the role of the Governor-General was marginalised and the incumbent James McNeill replaced by Donal Ó Buachalla, 'a loyal acolyte of de Valera'.¹⁷⁵ Its powers were absorbed into the office of the President of the Executive Council, then held by de Valera. In May 1933 the oath of allegiance was abolished, 'notwithstanding Opposition objections'.¹⁷⁶ Later the same year the right of appeal to the Privy Council was removed from the constitution allowing 'the Free State to assert its right to secede from the commonwealth'.¹⁷⁷ In 1936 the abdication of Edward VIII provided the opportunity to remove references to the British monarch and Governor-General from the constitution.¹⁷⁸

In 1937 a new constitution was passed by referendum. It renamed the Irish Free State Éire, in the Irish language, or Ireland, in English. The

¹⁷¹ Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 216-7.

¹⁷² John Darwin, 'A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics' in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.) *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. IV: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: OUP, 2001), pp. 68-9.

¹⁷³ Ibid.; Deirdre McMahon, *Republicans and Imperialists: Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930s* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1984) pp. 198-202; Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 213-4.

¹⁷⁴ Deirdre McMahon, 'Ireland and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1900-1948' in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.) *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. IV: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: OUP, 2001), p. 156.

¹⁷⁵ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 177.

¹⁷⁶ Chris Cooper, 'The Politics of Empire: Douglas Hailsham and the Imperial Policy of the National Government, 1931-38', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol. 41, No. 3 (Sep., 2013), p. 431.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 432.

¹⁷⁸ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 202.

office of the Governor-General was replaced with a President appointed by popular election. The head of the executive arm of government was restructured and renamed the Taoiseach creating ‘a powerful constitutional position’.¹⁷⁹ The Senate, abolished in 1936 for attempting to obstruct the Dáil,¹⁸⁰ was reinstated along reconstituted lines ‘superficially based on vocational representation, but ultimately chosen by a restricted electorate’.¹⁸¹ The right to jurisdiction over Northern Ireland was asserted, and its legislative incorporation into the independent Irish state allowed for ‘pending reintegration of the national territory’. The special position of the Roman Catholic Church representing the faith of the majority of the population was recognised. Divorce was forbidden and the role of women ‘within the home’ emphasised; though the rights of minority religions were protected and the Constitution contained firm commitments to human rights.¹⁸² In a general election held on the same day as the referendum Fianna Fáil lost its overall majority in the Dáil but returned to government with the support of Labour.¹⁸³ In a snap general election in June the following year, called after the conclusion of the 1938 trade agreement and end of the economic war, it regained enough seats to once again form a government on its own.¹⁸⁴

Against such a background of assertive economic and constitutional independence in home affairs it should be regarded with little surprise that the right to an independent policy in foreign affairs was pursued by Fianna Fáil. ‘[The] identification of foreign affairs as a critical area of government policy is evidenced by the fact that [de Valera] retained the foreign affairs portfolio continuously’ between 1932 and 1948.¹⁸⁵ He served as President of the Council at the League of Nations in 1932 and the Eucharistic Congress

¹⁷⁹ Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 370.

¹⁸⁰ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 272

¹⁸¹ Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 370.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 369-70; Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 202-207.

¹⁸³ Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 210-11.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

¹⁸⁵ Lee and Ó Tuathaigh, *The Age of de Valera*, p. 73.

held in Ireland the same year provided an opportunity to affirm the independent Irish state's Catholicism on an international stage.¹⁸⁶

The concern discussed above about the presentation of Irish affairs abroad through news agencies demonstrated by the pre-independence Sinn Féin and post-independence Cumann na nGaedheal governments continued. Seán Murphy,¹⁸⁷ assistant secretary at the Department of External Affairs, wrote in a memorandum in April 1932 that:

The recent reports from the Paris and Berlin Legations confirm the view that the Continental Press depends entirely for news of Ireland on the large telegraph agencies and their London Correspondents. Both these sources are definitely pro-English. [...] The big telegraph agencies such as Reuter, Havas, Stefani, etc. have offices in London, and they supply their Continental subscribers with Irish news. It is inevitable that the *personnel* [emphasis in original] of these agencies are in the main Anglophile. The establishment of an Irish Telegraph Agency is not practicable and even if it were it is doubtful whether it would effect much. The older and more international agencies would undoubtedly use all their efforts and influence to kill it.¹⁸⁸

The experience of dealing with the established structure of news supply in a foreign mission was described by Michael MacWhite,¹⁸⁹ minister to America, in 1937. MacWhite wrote to Joseph P. Walshe,¹⁹⁰ secretary at the Department of External Affairs, from Washington with regard to the 'economic war' that:

English news agencies had been able to disseminate, effectively and in advance, the British viewpoint of the issues involved, and in this country British propaganda rarely or ever falls on deaf ears. Some would like to attribute the stand taken by the Government to the 'old hatred' of England, but they have a better appreciation of the rights and wrongs of the case to-day.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁶ Dermot Keogh, *Ireland and Europe 1919-1989* (Cork and Dublin: Hibernian University Press, 1990), pp. 39-41; idem, *Ireland and the Vatican: The Politics and Diplomacy of Church-State Relations, 1922-1960* (Cork: Cork UP, 1995), p. 94.

¹⁸⁷ Kennedy, 'Murphy, Seán Anthony', *DIB*.

¹⁸⁸ Memorandum by Seán Murphy on relations with the press, Dublin. 20 April 1932, NAI DFA Unregistered Papers, *DIFP Vol. IV*, No. 36, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1932/Relations-with-the-press/1405.htm>, accessed 17 May 2013.

¹⁸⁹ Kennedy, 'MacWhite, Michael', *DIB*.

¹⁹⁰ Michael Kennedy, 'Walshe, Joseph Patrick', *DIB*,

<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a8908>, accessed 19 June 2013.

¹⁹¹ Michael MacWhite, Washington, to Joseph P. Walshe, (Dublin) (Confidential), 10 March 1937, NAI DFA Secretary's File S64. *DIFP Vol. V*, No. 36,

Some consideration of how news agencies affected the reporting of international events in Ireland did emerge during this period. Charles Bewley, minister to Germany, in a report from Berlin in 1936 on the effects of the Italo-Abyssinian War on European affairs commented:

I have not, of course, any apprehension that official circles in Ireland accept the items of news which are allowed by the English telegraphic agencies to appear in the Irish press as a correct record of the events which have taken place, although I could not help noticing when I was in Dublin in February that even the most nationalist sections of the public had apparently swallowed English propaganda wholesale on the political situation in Europe.¹⁹²

He commented in a similar vein when reporting on anti-Semitism in Germany in 1938 that:

The newspapers published in Ireland, like the rest of the English press, take their information from English press agencies which are in fact in Jewish hands, - Reuter, Exchange Telegraph, etc. [...] This of course means that, in the long run, public opinion on foreign affairs and public policy in international relations are formed, not by the Government of Ireland but by anonymous agencies acting on the dictation and in pursuance of the policy of persons who are neither Irish nor Catholic but bitterly opposed both to Irish Nationalism and to the Catholic Church.¹⁹³

The attitudes expressed in these reports should be considered in light of Catholic convert Bewley's well known anti-Semitism and vehement dislike of Britain. He was judged incompetent to fulfil his post in Berlin and recalled to Dublin in the summer of 1939.¹⁹⁴

An interesting additional insight into the attitude of the party of government in the Irish Free State after 1932 towards the British news agencies is revealed in the report of a call paid to the PA's editor-in-chief,

<http://www.difp.ie/docs/1937/Survey-of-work-of-Irish-Minister-in-Washington/2182.htm>, accessed 17 May 2013.

¹⁹² Extracts from a confidential report from Charles Bewley, Berlin, to Joseph P. Walshe. Dublin, (43/33), 18 May 1936, NAI DFA 19/50A, *DIFP Vol. IV*, No. 337,

<http://www.difp.ie/docs/1936/German-political-situation/1706.htm>, accessed 17 May 2013.

¹⁹³ Report from Charles Bewley, Berlin, to Joseph P. Walshe, Dublin, (43/33), 9 December 1938, NAI DFA 202/63, *DIFP Vol. V*, No. 249, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1938/Anti-Semitism-in-Germany/2395.htm>, accessed 17 May 2013.

¹⁹⁴ Michael Kennedy. 'Bewley, Charles Henry', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a0640>, accessed 19 June 2013.

Henry Martin, in December 1933. His visitor was Erskine Childers,¹⁹⁵ a future Irish President and son of the Sinn Féin propagandist of the same name¹⁹⁶ executed by the Free State government during the War of Independence. At the time of his visit he was advertising editor for the *Irish Press*.¹⁹⁷ Noting Childers' connection to the newspaper Martin wrote that 'he visited me as an official emissary of the Fianna Fail party'. Martin continued:

He declared that Mr. De Valera [sic] and all his Cabinet, and every member of the Fianna Fail Party, were firmly convinced that the coloured and distorted reports of Mr. De Valera's [sic] policy, and the unpleasant things said about it in the Continental Press, had either emanated from or were due to, misrepresentations by the Press Association.¹⁹⁸

Martin recorded that he denied all the accusations and resolved that Childers should

go back convinced himself and able to convince Mr. De Valera's [sic] party that all our news from Ireland was fairly presented, with no bias, and that so far as we, and Reuters to whom we passed it, were concerned, there should be no conceivable cause of complaint.¹⁹⁹

Childers was reportedly convinced. Martin described a letter from him in which Childers said he was 'reporting personally to Mr. De Valera [sic] very favourably concerning us'.²⁰⁰ How effective Childers' reported representations were in shaping the opinions of members of Fianna Fáil and the journalistic and editorial staff of the *Irish Press* can only be speculated at. It might perhaps be noted that the *Press* did continue to subscribe to the PA service, and indeed became a shareholder in 1941.

¹⁹⁵ Pauric J. Dempsey and Lawrence William White. 'Childers, Erskine Hamilton', *DIB* <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a1648>, accessed 19 June 2013.

¹⁹⁶ M.A. Hopkinson. 'Childers, (Robert) Erskine', *DIB* <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a1649>, accessed 19 June 2013.

¹⁹⁷ O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, p. 33.

¹⁹⁸ 'Mr. De Valera's Government [sic] and the Press Association. An important visit – and the sequel', 9 January 1934, RA 1/013299.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

Irish Newspapers and International News

Between 1932 and the outbreak of World War II in 1939 the pattern of acquisition, development, growth and consolidation in the systems and structures of international news supply in Britain and Ireland, with the PA as a key cog in the machinery, continued. One of the products of these developments was the closure of the Central News Agency's international news service when the ETC and PA purchased a joint controlling interest in the competitor agency in 1937. As a result of the collapse of the 'News Ring' in 1934 the PA and its subscribers lost the AP World Service (APWS) until 1939. In many ways one of the characteristics of this period was a constriction in the available sources of international news in Britain and Ireland. Irish newspapers continued to use the available news agency services and remained primarily, and almost exclusively, reliant on the PA. It is during this period that the first indications of newspapers from the independent Irish state disengaging from the PA at a corporate and organisational level can first be tentatively identified. Those Irish newspapers that remained, often represented by a new generation of owners and senior executives, continued to display familiar cooperative attitudes though.

The PA's Members Order Book for 1936-40 lists the *Belfast News Letter*, *Belfast Telegraph*, *Irish News* and *Northern Whig* from Belfast. From Cork the *Cork Examiner* and *Cork Echo* are listed as subscribers and from Derry the *Derry Journal*, *Derry Standard* and *Londonderry Sentinel* appear. From Dublin the *Dublin Evening Mail*, *Irish Times* and *Irish Independent* are listed, plus the latter's evening title the *Evening Herald* and its Sunday edition, which moved from the Non-Members Order Book in 1939.²⁰¹ The Non-Members Order Book for 1936-40 indicates a decline in Irish subscribers from twenty-three in 1928-36 to fifteen, including the *Sunday Independent* prior to 1939.²⁰²

²⁰¹ PA Members Order Book, 1936-40, GL MS 35467/3.

²⁰² PA Non-Members Order Book, 1936-40, GL MS 35468/3.

<i>Table 3.3. Irish newspapers listed in the Press Association Non-Members Order Book, 1936-39</i>	
<i>Connacht Sentinel, Galway</i>	<i>Limerick Chronicle</i>
<i>Connacht Observer, Galway</i>	<i>Limerick Echo</i>
<i>Irish Press, Dublin</i>	<i>Limerick Leader</i>
<i>Kerry Champion, Tralee</i>	<i>Sunday Independent, Dublin (until Jan. 1939)</i>
<i>Kerry Express, Tralee</i>	
<i>Kerry News, Tralee</i>	<i>Tipperary Star, Thurles</i>
<i>Kilkenny Post</i>	<i>Waterford Evening News</i>
<i>Liberator, Tralee</i>	<i>Waterford Star</i>

As with previous examples, these records are fragmentary and seem to refer to exceptional orders rather than annual subscriptions. Therefore it cannot be asserted that all the newspapers listed were taking all or some PA services continually, particularly in the case of non-members. However they do provide a useful indication of the extent to which the PA was used in the Irish newspaper industry.

The services and the pricing that the PA offered remained relatively unchanged during this period, though a price increase was introduced in 1936. The PA general manager explained that this was due to increased costs due to improved services ‘resulting from better organised and speedier collection of the news, closer supervision of the editorial process, and the introduction of brighter and more effective methods of presentation’.²⁰³ One significant innovation, at the end of the period covered by this chapter, was the introduction of the APWS. This was announced in a circular letter to newspapers to which it was offered in February 1939. It was explained that the PA had acquired exclusive rights to the service outside London and that it was only available to those newspapers already subscribing to Reuters Class I and the Foreign Special ‘conditional upon those two Services being continued’.²⁰⁴

AP had approached the PA in November 1938 indicating that it would like the British agency to handle the service. The PA general

²⁰³ Circular, H.C. Robbins, PA general manager (Copy), 27 November 1935, GL MS 35460/12.

²⁰⁴ Circular, Edward W. Davies, PA general manager (Copy), 9 February 1939, GL MS 35460/13.

manager suggested to the board that it would be advisable to undertake the distribution of the service to the provincial press of Britain and Ireland

rather than to refuse the offer and compel the A.P. to make arrangements through another news agency, or to market its service direct. He also indicated in his report the extent to which existing arrangements with Reuters had a bearing on the proposal, subject to the consideration that since the date of those arrangements the Press Association had, at Reuters request, already made one direct contract with the A.P.²⁰⁵

Jones sat in on the section of the board meeting that discussed the AP proposal. He argued, and the PA directors agreed, that it would be unwise to decline the offer

but that it was also very important that any arrangements [...] should show that Reuters had an interest in the matter, and should not in any circumstances be such as to convey that Reuters had been ignored.²⁰⁶

The general manager was authorised to pursue negotiations with AP on the understanding that the PA would not seek to market the service to the London papers.

AP had apparently begun preliminary work towards providing such a service in 1934 but 'conditions in Europe and in the United States caused delay in getting a news service started until 1938 - 1939, when a limited report was provided to certain newspapers in London and the provinces'.²⁰⁷ Therefore the PA's introduction of the APWS in Britain should be seen in light of the collapse of the cartelised 'News Ring' in 1934. As a result of this dramatic change in the structures of international news supply Reuters had lost the APWS, receiving only the AP's North American news service in return for its own world, and the PA's British, news.²⁰⁸

The events culminating in this destruction of the old order of international news supply had arguably begun in 1927 when the European

²⁰⁵ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, December 1939, GL MS 35358/24.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ AP Reference Files, World Listings. Archive File: World Service, author: Lloyd Stratton, 15 October 1958.

²⁰⁸ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 185.

news agencies had agreed to cancel AP's differential payment. Thus American news from that point was effectively accepted at equal value to European.²⁰⁹ Tension began in Japan and the Far East between Reuters and AP over the latter's agitation for more open competition. In 1930 AP and Rengo of Japan agreed in principle to enter into a reciprocal news supply agreement once Rengo's agreement with Reuters expired in 1933. This was motivated by the links between Rengo's domestic competitor, Dentsu, and UP. Towards the end of 1930 AP gave notice of its intention to quit the cartel. It was explained that AP didn't want a complete break with the European agencies, but a less restrictive agreement. In 1932 a new agreement was signed between AP, Reuters, Havas and Wolff. In a game of brinkmanship designed to bring AP and Rengo back into line the Reuters board, made up of PA nominees, gave notice to terminate the new agreement in 1933, on Jones's advice. Jones's bluff was called when AP made it clear 'it could do without Reuters anywhere in the world'.²¹⁰ In 1934 Jones sailed to New York in an attempt at appeasement, but returned with only the modified supply exchange described above. Replaced by a series of bi-partite agreements, where greater competition was allowed, the 'division of the globe into exclusive news-agency territories had gone for ever'.²¹¹

AP was quite open about the regard in which it held the PA. Writing to Robbins, PA general manager, in January 1934 Kent Cooper, AP general manager, described his personal admiration for the PA. He went on that, while not perturbed at the loss of Reuters, he 'would be glad indeed if a way could be found to have a direct relationship with the Press Association'.²¹² The worth of the PA service was perhaps not fully realised in London. It was the domestic agency that AP valued, not Reuters. De Witt Mackenzie, Executive Assistant in Charge of Foreign Affairs, authored a confidential memorandum in 1933 evaluating a potential switch from Reuters to ETC for foreign news through AP's London bureau. In it he wrote that while Reuters

²⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 180-5.

²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 184.

²¹¹ Ibid., p. 185.

²¹² Kent Cooper, AP general manager, to Henry Robbins, PA general manager, (Copy) 12 January 1934, in PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, February 1934, GL MS 35358/23.

could be disposed of without significant disruption: ‘Through Reuters we get the service of the Press Association which covers all domestic news and undoubtedly is the best thing of its kind abroad’.²¹³ In 1934 AP and the PA signed a direct contract that did not involve Reuters. The high value that AP placed on the PA service and consideration of the close ties between it and Reuters could arguably have led to the AP’s decision not to compete in the British and Irish news market outside London in 1939. Not wanting to risk this service and simultaneously be required to compete with a well established incumbent, AP instead chose to cooperate and utilise the established structures of news gathering and distribution.

In a letter to Jones on 8 March 1934 Robbins noted that the PA’s contract with AP would introduce only nominal changes to the working relationship. He noted, however, that the new Reuters AP agreement ‘gives that body the right to have direct relations with papers in this country, [...] kindly let me know precisely what this means in regard the Provincial Press’.²¹⁴ In particular Robbins wanted to know what the implications were under the 1930 PA-Reuters agreement that guaranteed that the services of foreign agencies could only be supplementary (see above). Jones sought to assure Robbins that: ‘These rights, in essence, are what they have been for several years past’. He described how under the agreements of 1926 and 1927 the ‘News Ring’ agencies services were only to be supplied in each other’s territories as supplementary services, mirroring the workings of the PA-Reuters 1930 agreement. This was included ‘in a revised form’ in the 1931 agreement (signed in 1932). The 1934 agreement, he wrote, did not specifically mention this method of working but worked in practice so that ‘we each are perfectly free to exercise the rights which we both have had for several years’.²¹⁵ Robbins replied to Jones’s obfusatory letter seeking further clarification.²¹⁶ Jones, in a far briefer reply than his previous letter, confirmed that since the 1931 agreement ‘each of us has been completely

²¹³ Confidential memorandum authored by De Witt Mackenzie, AP Executive Assistant in Charge of Foreign Affairs, 18 December 1933, AP 02.1 Box 32/10, Records of General Manager Kent Cooper, Subseries 2: Foreign Bureaus 1924-1939.

²¹⁴ Robbins to Jones (Copy), 8 March 1934, in PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, April 1934, GL MS 35358/23.

²¹⁵ Jones to Robbins (Copy), 9 May 1934, GL MS 35358/23.

²¹⁶ Robbins to Jones (Copy), 15 May 1934, GL MS 35358/23.

free to supply news services to clients of the other'.²¹⁷ Robbins replied that consequently

the safeguards and compensation for the P.A. which were prescribed in the Reuter-P.A. supplementary agreement of 1930 no longer exist. If this is so, the situation from the P.A. standpoint seems to have been altered since 1930.²¹⁸

There is no record of Jones' reply.

Jones' forced resignation in 1941 has, among other factors, been connected to a growing dissatisfaction among Reuters' PA board members dating back to his mishandling of the events surrounding the collapse of the 'News Ring'.²¹⁹ However, it seems unlikely that this concurrent behaviour was forgotten. Further, this does not seem like the behaviour that would typify a merged organisation.

Notwithstanding Jones' contractual sleight of hand, the eventual acquisition of exclusive right to the APWS was a significant addition to the PA's services. It can be seen as part of a wider trend of acquisition, development, growth and consolidation during the inter-war years. This made the PA an essential cog in the machinery of news supply in Britain and Ireland and a dominant presence in the market place. Prior to acquiring the APWS the PA had, in conjunction with the ETC, purchased a majority shareholding in the Central News Agency in 1937,²²⁰ 'which had been losing money for years'.²²¹ The PA and ETC were 'equal partners' in this transaction.²²² Though Central's overseas operation was subsequently closed down²²³ it was reported at the 1938 PA AGM that it would operate 'on the same entirely independent lines as formerly, and the responsible officials are continuing their functions'.²²⁴ The motivation behind the transaction was not then to absorb the smaller agency. Rather it was to

²¹⁷ Jones to Robbins (Copy), 16 May 1934, GL MS 35358/23.

²¹⁸ Robbins to Jones (Copy), 29 May 1934, GL MS 35358/23.

²¹⁹ Read, *The Power of News*, pp. 196-211.

²²⁰ Report of PA AGM 1938, GL MS 35365/13.

²²¹ Read, 'The Relationship of Reuters and Other News Agencies with the British Press', p. 151

²²² 'Minutes of a meeting re. Central News Ltd.', 22 November 1937, GL MS 35607.

²²³ Read, 'The Relationship of Reuters and Other News Agencies with the British Press', p. 151.

²²⁴ Report of PA AGM, 1938, GL MS 35365/13.

prevent a competitor gaining a foothold in the British news market, denying it an opportunity that ‘would have placed it in a position greatly to extend its activities in this country’.²²⁵ Though it was not specified at the time the competitor referred to was the BUP. This is revealed in the PA general manager’s report book in 1942:

The P.A.’s primary interest was to prevent the B.U.P. from purchasing the C.N. news side, and thereby obtaining a ‘ready made’ London and Provincial teleprinter system, a working home-news organisation and 2 seats in the House of Commons Gallery.²²⁶

This transaction was, therefore, slightly more complicated than the acquisition of Central by the PA as part of wider trend of rationalisation and mergers in the inter-war British news industry.²²⁷ Its motivations were, however, completely consistent with the notable resistance from the established British news agencies to the BUP’s attempts to enter the market. These included ‘a campaign orchestrated by Sir Roderick Jones [...] to discredit the BUP in the eyes of the BBC, the government and Parliament’.²²⁸

The PA’s sound market position in the 1930s was not however matched by its buildings. Following the structural problems at Byron House reported in 1931 and 1932 it was decided to demolish the existing structure and redevelop on the site and adjacent properties owned by the PA. This new property would house both the PA and Reuters. It was to be wholly owned and financed by the PA and when the building was finally occupied in July 1939, less than two months before the outbreak of World War II, Reuters paid a full market rent for its space.²²⁹ Designed by Sir Edward Lutyens²³⁰ and Smee and Houchin, the final cost of the new premises was £450,000, far in excess of the original estimate of £140,000. This was part

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ PA General Managers Report Books, ‘PA Connection with CN and CPC’, 4 May 1942, GL MS 35363/1.

²²⁷ Silberstein-Loeb, ‘Foreign Office Control of Reuters’, p. 284.

²²⁸ Nicholas, ‘Keeping the News British’, p. 195.

²²⁹ Read, *The Power of News*, pp. 186-8; George Scott, *Reporter Anonymous: The Story of the Press Association* (London: Hutchinson and co., 1968), pp. 200-1

²³⁰ Among Lutyens other works is the Irish National War Memorial at Islandbridge, in Dublin, which commemorates Irish soldiers in World War I.

financed by raising £200,000 from PA members through the issue of 400 Debentures of £500 each bearing an interest rate of four percent.²³¹ Of the eligible Irish newspapers the *Belfast Telegraph* invested £1000 and the *Belfast News Letter* £500.²³² The Debentures were paid for in five instalments between 5 November 1935 and 1 June 1937. They were redeemed by the drawing of lots at AGMs: the *Belfast News Letter* in 1947 and the *Belfast Telegraph* in 1951. It is interesting to note that only newspapers from Northern Ireland invested in the Debentures, particularly considering the enthusiastic and continued all-Ireland support for the 1926 Notes. In considering this reaction commercial pragmatism and the prevailing economic conditions in the independent Irish state at the time must be considered. It is true that the interest payment on the Debentures was lower than the five percent being paid on the 1926 Notes following the 1933 variation. However, this did not discourage newspapers from the independent Irish state taking part in a Note issue in 1946, which also bore an interest rate of four percent (see Chapter Five). The reaction of Irish newspapers to the Debentures should also be considered in light of the beginnings of a trend for newspapers from the independent Irish state to disengage from the organisational structures of the PA which first becomes apparent in the mid to late 1930s.

James Henderson of the *Belfast News Letter* attended every PA AGM from 1932-39, having first attended with Charles Henderson in 1931. He was joined in 1932-33 by Sir Robert Baird of the *Belfast Telegraph*. This newspaper was then represented by Joseph McKaig in 1934, having last attended in 1931, and again between 1936-39. In 1934 the *Cork Examiner* and its evening title the *Evening Echo* were represented by George Crosbie and James Crosbie respectively. The former was probably the second son of George Crosbie who had served on the PA board between 1907-17 and died in November 1934.²³³ A George Crosbie had last attended a PA AGM in 1932. The delegate of that name who attended in 1935 and 1937-39 was

²³¹ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1935 in Report of PA AGM, 1936, GL MS 35365/13.

²³² 'The Press Association Limited. Issue of £200,000 First Mortgage Debentures in 400 Debentures of £500 each', date of first issue 5 November 1935, GL MS 35396.

²³³ Pauric J. Dempsey, 'Crosbie, George', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2229>, accessed 28 July 2013

clearly Crosbie junior. In 1934 the *Irish Independent* was represented by G.J. Murphy who had last attended in 1930.²³⁴ Though it is only a small sample over a limited time span it is, perhaps, notable that during this period the only newspaper from the independent Irish state to be regularly represented was the *Cork Examiner*, a title with significant links back to the foundation of the PA. Other than this only the *Irish Independent* is represented, and this only once. Irish newspapers had been generally well represented at PA general meetings in the preceding decades, and the *Belfast News Letter* and *Belfast Telegraph*, from Northern Ireland, kept up regular attendance.

At the 1935 AGM James Henderson was elected to the PA's board, a position he retained until 1951. His proposal was seconded by George Crosbie. Though not as striking as the proposal by Brewster, of the nationalist *Irish Independent*, of Charles Henderson, of the Unionist *Belfast News Letter*, in 1917 the speech in support of Henderson's nephew by Crosbie, of the nationalist *Cork Examiner* whose father had served on the PA board 1907-17, did contain a taste of the 1917 vintage. Whilst recommending Henderson for his celerity and hard work Crosbie commented that:

Perhaps it may seem funny to you that I, as a Cork man should be supporting the election of a Belfast man, but that sort of thing does happen sometimes (laughter).²³⁵

The high regard and cooperative business attitude of the previous generation of Irish newspaper owners seems to have survived the turmoil of the intervening years well enough to stretch across the border and generations of the two youthful polities. Following his election Henderson was appointed to the board of the PASPC, 1935-43,²³⁶ and served on the PA's finance committee, 1936-39.²³⁷

²³⁴ Reports of PA AGMs 1932-39, GL MS 35365/12-13.

²³⁵ Report of PA AGM, 1935, GL MS 35365/13.

²³⁶ 'PA Share Purchase Company, Register of Members and Directors', GL MS 35408.

²³⁷ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, 1936-39, GL MS 35358/24.

Newspapers from Ireland continued to attend AGM's of the Newspaper Society from the mid 1930s, though it is frequently the same names and same titles that are found in the PA's records.²³⁸ There is no sign of the affiliate Irish Newspaper Society represented in the 1915 deputation to the Postmaster General. Interestingly, the *Irish Press* became a member of the Newspaper Society in 1937, though there is no sign of it ever attending a general meeting.²³⁹

Between 1922 and 1939 Ireland moved from a period of revolution to comparative stability. The reality of partition and the existence of two states on the one island came to be accepted, though not necessarily always welcomed. If the 1920s marked a period of conservatism and orthodoxy, as the independent Irish state sought to establish itself, the 1930s was an era marked by the assertion of the right to independence. Irish newspapers accepted the new constitutional and political realities of the period. They also remained actively engaged with the PA and their traditional structures of news supply throughout.

As the independent Irish state was growing more successfully assertive of its independence the PA, in particular, was strengthening its central position in the British and Irish news market. Through agreements in 1922, 1930 and 1939 and acquisitions in 1926, 1931 and 1937 it became associated with every significant source of agency news in Britain and Ireland with the exception of BUP. This agency's efforts to enter the British and Irish market were strongly resisted by the incumbents. As the independent Irish state was becoming more independent, and pursuing an independent foreign policy, the structures that controlled its newspapers' access to foreign news were becoming increasingly focused on one, British mediated, source. It is interesting to note therefore, that the latter period of this chapter saw the first time when newspapers from the independent Irish state sent their own correspondents to cover an international event: the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). For this reason, and others, that is the subject of this chapter's case study.

²³⁸ NS MC Vols. 97-101 (1935-1939).

²³⁹ NS MC Vol. 99 (1937), p. 250.

Case Study: The Spanish Civil War (1936-39), reaction, interpretation, news sources, foreign correspondents and the coverage of Irish volunteers.

The coup that began the Spanish Civil War on 18 July 1936 was the result of tensions between traditional conservative elites, which in many ways included the Catholic Church, and modernising liberal secularism. A divided Left saw a conservative government returned in 1933 which attempted to reverse the modernising policies introduced between 1931-33 by the first government of Spain's Second Republic. A reunited Left was returned to power in 1936 determined to reinvigorate its reform programme including curbing the power of the Catholic Church and the secularisation of education. Spain's military and civilian Right coalesced to support military intervention. The result was a coup aimed at imposing traditional conservative values led by a Spanish officer corps with dreams of imperial rebirth following the loss of Spain's empire in 1898.²⁴⁰ Just as there was no particular sympathy expressed by Irish commentators for Mexico as a former colony during conflict and civil war in the 1920s,²⁴¹ this imperial dimension of the Spanish Civil War was not highlighted by the mainstream Irish newspapers.

In the Ireland of the 1930s the Spanish Civil War provided a news event of particular resonance. This was especially the case among the population of the independent Irish state and among nationalist community in Northern Ireland where the Catholicism of the majority of these groups provided a key aspect of their cultural identity. The centrality of this confessional identity was demonstrated by widespread participation in the centenary celebration of Catholic emancipation in 1929. This began with general communion throughout the country on 19 June and approximately half a million people attended a Pontifical High Mass in the Phoenix Park, Dublin, on 23 June.²⁴² Similarly the Eucharistic Congress held in Dublin in 1932 provided for the affirmation and celebration of this identity on an

²⁴⁰ Helen Graham, *The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: OUP, 2005), pp. 1-19.

²⁴¹ Mary N. Harris, 'Irish Images of Religious Conflict in Mexico in the 1920s' in Mary N. Harris (ed.) *Sights and Insights: Interactive Images of Europe and the Wider World* (Pisa: Pisa UP, 2007), p. 222.

²⁴² Keogh, *Ireland and the Vatican*, pp. 50-1.

international stage.²⁴³ Indeed the Irish response to the Spanish Civil War had precedents in, for example, the conflicts and civil war in Mexico in the 1920s. Here reports ‘of socialism, communism and secularisation, particularly the secularisation of education, aroused concern in Ireland and served as a warning of possible threats to Irish Catholicism’.²⁴⁴

In Ireland reports of anti-clerical abuse following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, such as the murder of religious personnel and desecration of churches, and the Communist complexion of the Republicans prompted a sympathetic response to the Nationalists.²⁴⁵ The unionist majority in Northern Ireland and its supporting press largely saw ‘no religious issue in Spain, only a political problem’ to be dealt with by the London government.²⁴⁶ It is worth noting that there was a strong anti-communist strain in inter-war Northern Irish unionism.²⁴⁷ It would seem reasonable to suggest that this would have had some influence on that community’s reaction to the Spanish Civil War.

The impact and reception of the Spanish Civil War in Ireland has been the subject of some significant studies in the past, most notably by J. Bowyer Bell, Fearghal McGarry and R.A. Stradling.²⁴⁸ The reaction to and positioning of the conflict by the mainstream Irish newspapers has been described in these previous works, and this case study will not attempt an extensive replication of this. Instead it will focus on how they received the news upon which this comment and positioning was based. This is particularly interesting for the concerns of this thesis because the Spanish Civil War marks the first occasion on which newspapers from the independent Irish state sent their own formal correspondents to cover an

²⁴³ Keogh, *Ireland and Europe*, pp. 39-41; idem, *Ireland and the Vatican*, p. 94.

²⁴⁴ Harris, ‘Irish Images of Religious Conflict in Mexico in the 1920s’, p. 207.

²⁴⁵ The two sides in the Spanish Civil War are referred to here as Republicans and Nationalists. In order to distinguish them from similarly named Irish movements, for the purpose of this case study, where they begin with a capital letter they refer to Spain unless specifically distinguished.

²⁴⁶ J. Bowyer Bell, ‘Ireland and the Spanish Civil War’, *Studia Hibernica*, No.9, (1969), p.141; Fearghal McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War* (Cork: Cork UP, 1999), p. 176.

²⁴⁷ Hennessey, *A History of Northern Ireland*, pp. 67-8.

²⁴⁸ Bell, ‘Ireland and the Spanish Civil War’, pp.137-163; McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War*; idem, ‘Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War’, *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 129 (May, 2002), pp. 68-90; R.A. Stradling, *The Irish and the Spanish Civil War: Crusades in Conflict* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1999).

international event.²⁴⁹ Gertrude Gaffney²⁵⁰ reported for the *Irish Independent* from the Nationalist side and Lionel Fleming²⁵¹ from the Republican for the *Irish Times*. In addition the *Irish Independent* published reports from Francis McCullagh,²⁵² as did the *Irish Press* later in the conflict,²⁵³ having initially turned him down.²⁵⁴ The *Irish Independent* also published articles from Thomas Gunning, a member of the Irish Brigade fighting with the Nationalist forces, and Charles McGuinness, ‘an Irish deserter from the International Brigades’ on the Republican side.²⁵⁵ However, Gunning, the globetrotting McCullagh, and McGuinness should be distinguished from Gaffney and Fleming as they arrived in Spain of their own volition and offered their services to the Irish newspapers as opposed to having been specifically sent by them. This case study will first briefly

²⁴⁹ I draw a distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ correspondents, the former, such as Fleming and Gaffney, being employees of a newspaper sent specifically to cover an event on its behalf. The latter I would describe as individuals who provided reports of an international event for a newspaper, but were not employees nor specifically sent to cover the story on its behalf and often travelled of their own volition before receiving a commission. There were a number of significant examples of informal Irish correspondents prior to Fleming and Gaffney. For example Francis McCullagh, who also covered the Spanish Civil War (see Fn. 252), and Michael Davitt who reported on the South African War for both the *Freeman’s Journal* and *New York American*. Davitt had already resolved to cover that conflict, resigned his parliamentary seat and was on his way to South Africa before receiving confirmation that the newspapers would take his work; see Laurence Marley, *Michael Davitt: Freelance Radical and Frondeur* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), p. 246. In addition Eamon Phoenix has identified Tom O’Donoghue as reporting from the Western Front for the Belfast published *Irish News* during World War I, but it is not entirely clear which definition of correspondent he fits; see Eamon Phoenix, ‘The History of a Newspaper: the *Irish News*, 1855-1995’ in Eamon Phoenix (ed.) *A Century of Northern Life: The Irish News and 100 Years of Ulster History* (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 1995), p. 17.

²⁵⁰ Gaffney was originally from Armagh, part of Northern Ireland post-partition. Recruited to the *Irish Independent* in 1935 she wrote its women’s column as well covering a number of international events in the inter-war period. See Patrick Maume. ‘Gaffney, Gertrude (‘Gertie’, ‘Conor Galway’)’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a3396>, accessed 16 January 2013.

²⁵¹ Fleming was from an impoverished Anglo-Irish family from Cork. See Lionel Fleming, *Head or Harp* (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1965).

²⁵² McCullagh had a varied and wide ranging journalistic career, though he wrote for few Irish publications. Finding himself present at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) he provided reports to the *New York Herald*. He also reported from the Mexican civil war in the 1920s. See John Horgan, ‘Journalism, Catholicism and Anti-Communism in an Era of Revolution: Francis McCullagh, War Correspondent, 1974-1956’, *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review*, Vol. 98, No. 390, Overlooked in Irish History (Summer 2009), pp. 169-184; Patrick Maume, ‘McCullagh Francis’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5634>, accessed 4 June 2013.

²⁵³ McGarry, ‘Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War’, p. 82.

²⁵⁴ Mark O’Brien, ‘“The Best Interests of the Nation”: Frank Geary, the *Irish Independent* and the Spanish Civil War’, in Mark O’Brien and Kevin Rafter (eds.) *Independent Newspapers: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), p. 91.

²⁵⁵ McGarry, ‘Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War’, pp. 79-80.

examine the editorial treatment in the Irish newspapers to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and the particular motivating factors involved in the wider Irish reaction to the conflict. It will then look at the work of Fleming and Gaffney in particular and the coverage provided by the mainstream Irish daily newspapers where it will focus particularly on March 1937. This marks a point at which Irish volunteers on both sides of the conflict were in Spain and the Irish Brigade with the Nationalist forces faced its first, and really only, military test in the assault on the village of Titulcia outside Madrid on 13 March.²⁵⁶ It might be anticipated this event would be highlighted in Irish newspapers and it thus provides the opportunity to judge the strengths and restrictions of their news supply.

When confirmation of the coup in Spain filtered through to Ireland on 20 July 1936 it produced a range of editorial reactions in the mainstream Irish newspapers. In Dublin the *Irish Independent*, for which the devout Catholicism of its founder William Martin Murphy was central to its commercial sensibility,²⁵⁷ adopted a pro-Nationalist position later in the conflict. It would come to view ‘the widespread anticlericalism in Spain as evidence of the influence of Soviet communism’²⁵⁸ and to see the war as ‘solely a battle between communism and catholicism’.²⁵⁹ Its initial editorial reaction was quite moderate though. It commented: ‘That the conditions in Spain are of the gravest is the one certainty of an obscure situation’.²⁶⁰ The *Irish Times* commented that ‘there is abundance of rumour – whether trustworthy or not – to show that Fascists and “Reds” are at one another’s throats in many areas’. It continued that:

It is of no great importance to us in Ireland whether Spain decides to throw in her lot with Communism or Fascism: for either alternative is equally detestable to people of a liberal tradition.²⁶¹

²⁵⁶ McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War*, p. 41.

²⁵⁷ O’Brien, “‘The Best Interests of the Nation’”, p. 81.

²⁵⁸ McGarry, ‘Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War’, p. 72.

²⁵⁹ O’Brien, “‘The Best Interests of the Nation’”, p. 86.

²⁶⁰ *Irish Independent*, 20 July 1936, p. 8.

²⁶¹ *Irish Times*, 20 July 1936, p. 6.

Under the editorship of Robert ‘Bertie’ Smyllie this paper was ‘unrepentant in its support for the democratically elected socialist-republican government’ that the Nationalists were seeking to overthrow.²⁶² Mark O’Brien has characterised the *Irish Press* as adopting an ‘insular editorial ethos of non-coverage’ and, unsurprisingly considering its close connections to Fianna Fáil, supporting the government’s policy of non-intervention.²⁶³ However in its initial editorial reaction, which did not appear until 23 July, it was critical of reported clerical abuses and the ‘Communist schemes’ operated under the government prior to the revolt. It presented the Nationalist forces and their supporters as ‘ready for any desperate measures to overthrow such a system of tyranny, sacrilege and spoliation’.²⁶⁴

The *Cork Examiner*’s reaction to the Spanish Civil War has been described by Bell as ‘more royal than the king [...and] taking little note of the impact on either Irish policy or Irish Catholicism’²⁶⁵ and identified as pro-Franco by McGarry.²⁶⁶ On 21 July it expressed support for the Nationalists, commenting that:

The Republican regime was forced on the people by a minority [...] Oratorical service was rendered at the shrine of democracy, but the Left extremists are not democrats and do not seek democratic government.²⁶⁷

It concluded two days later that ‘the civil war must develop into a straight contest for supremacy between Right and Left’.²⁶⁸

In Belfast the nationalist *Irish News* has been described by McGarry as pro-Catholic and Nationalist and corresponded ‘with Franco’s Spanish Press Services in London on methods of discrediting pro-Republican propagandists’ later in the conflict.²⁶⁹ On 20 July it praised how ‘the virile opposition of Catholic leaders to the policy of the present [Spanish]

²⁶² O’Brien, *The Irish Times*, pp. 89-90.

²⁶³ O’Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, p. 68.

²⁶⁴ *Irish Press*, 23 July 1936, p. 5.

²⁶⁵ Bell, ‘Ireland and the Spanish Civil War’, p. 140-1.

²⁶⁶ McGarry, ‘Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War’, p. 83.

²⁶⁷ *Cork Examiner*, 21 July 1936, p. 6.

²⁶⁸ *Cork Examiner*, 23 July 1936, p. 8.

²⁶⁹ McGarry, ‘Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War’, p. 87.

Government has done much to check the advance of Communism'.²⁷⁰ Three days later it described how Communism had 'left a trail of blood in Europe from the Arctic to the Mediterranean'.²⁷¹ Its unionist contemporaries offered more muted responses. The *Belfast News Letter* commented on 20 July that the outcome of the

conflict between what may be described as the Conservative forces of Spain and a movement which seems to be deriving its inspiration and perhaps support from Moscow will be awaited with anxiety.²⁷²

The *Belfast Telegraph* used the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War as an opportunity to criticise the instability and authority of the League of Nations as well as pointing out the threats that such conflicts posed to international trade. It concluded that

It remains to be seen whether the newly formed Government of Spain will be able to overcome this grave emergency, which may well have repercussions extending far beyond the frontiers of the country.²⁷³

In its editorial on 20 July the *Northern Whig* saw the conflict as a contest between imperfectly allied Fascists and monarchists versus equally imperfectly allied Socialists and Communists.²⁷⁴ It too positioned the conflict with regard to its implications for wider international relations. It commented on 27 July that the 'rebels have, of course no official status, and to recognise them in any way would be an act of overt hostility to Spain'.²⁷⁵

The broad political, economic and social conditions in Ireland at the time of the Spanish Civil War have been described earlier in this chapter. It is, perhaps, useful though to examine in slightly more detail some of the influences that prompted particular Irish responses to the conflict, particularly in the independent Irish state. The formation of the ACA has been mentioned above. In 1933, by then known as the Blueshirts, they

²⁷⁰ *Irish News*, 20 July 1936, p. 4.

²⁷¹ *Irish News*, 23 July 1936, p. 4.

²⁷² *Belfast News Letter*, 20 July 1936, p. 6.

²⁷³ *Belfast Telegraph*, 20 July 1936, p. 6.

²⁷⁴ *Northern Whig*, 20 July 1936, p. 6.

²⁷⁵ *Northern Whig*, 27 July 1936, p. 6.

merged with Cumann naGaedheal and the smaller Centre Party to form Fine Gael with O'Duffy as its extra-parliamentary leader. Resigning in 1934 he formed the briefly lived National Corporate Party in 1935. This represents Ireland's closest brush with Fascism, in conjunction with the Comrades and Blueshirts. However, despite certain pre-conditions normally conducive to its growth, including heavy urban unemployment and a serious agricultural slump, Fascism failed to secure any serious political momentum in Ireland.²⁷⁶ By 1935 'the Blueshirts were largely a vanquished force and de Valera was effectively targeting his public safety powers against the IRA'.²⁷⁷ However, the outbreak of war in Spain in July 1936, with reports of anti-clerical abuse, brought 'the external forces of international communism [...] into sharper focus as did the implications of the conflict for the Catholic church'.²⁷⁸ It breathed new life in to the fractured rump of the National Corporate Party and the Blueshirts and prompted a resurgence in anti-communism in Ireland.²⁷⁹

As Bell has noted, in Spain at the outbreak of the Civil War there was hardly any point on the European political spectrum that was not represented in some form.²⁸⁰ Whereas in Britain reaction to the conflict was largely defined by anti-Fascism, in Ireland it primarily centred around Catholicism and anti-communism.²⁸¹ Patrick Belton saw an ideal focus for the domestic activities of his anti-communist Irish Christian Front.²⁸² The 'hysterically anti-communist' and 'loudly anti-semitic' Belton was a sometime TD and co-founder of the National Corporate Party with O'Duffy.²⁸³ He persuaded the Catholic hierarchy in Ireland to hold a national church collection to support the Nationalists which raised £40,000.²⁸⁴ Anti-Fascism was also a motivating factor in Irish responses to the Spanish Civil War. Roughly 200 Irishmen fought in the International

²⁷⁶ Lee, *Ireland*, p.182.

²⁷⁷ McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War*, p. 22.

²⁷⁸ Enda Delaney, 'Anti-Communism in Mid-Twentieth-Century Ireland', *English Historical Review*, Vol. CXXVI, No. 521 (August 2011), pp. 884-5.

²⁷⁹ McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War*, p. 24.

²⁸⁰ Bell, 'Ireland and the Spanish Civil War', p.138.

²⁸¹ McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War*, p. 7.

²⁸² Bell, 'Ireland and the Spanish Civil War', p. 145.

²⁸³ Pauric J. Dempsey, 'Belton, Patrick', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a0572>, accessed 19 November 2013

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*; Keogh, *Ireland and the Vatican*, p. 127.

Brigades in the Republican forces led by Frank Ryan, ‘an effective and dedicated agitator for the Left’²⁸⁵ with an IRA background. Bell has noted that ‘[f]ew of these Irishmen could be called Orthodox Communists, but all saw Spain as a battleground between Democracy and Fascism and felt that they must participate’.²⁸⁶ On the political Right O’Duffy announced his intention to raise an Irish Brigade to fight with the Nationalists. Positioning his adventure as a Catholic crusade against Communism he gathered approximately 700 recruits who sailed from Galway in October 1936.

The response of the Irish government was enshrined in the 1937 Spanish Civil War (Non-Intervention) Act.²⁸⁷ This forbade any citizen of the independent Irish state from travelling to join the belligerents in Spain or assisting anyone else to travel for that aim. Those who did intend to travel to Spain for humanitarian or other purposes, such as journalism, were only permitted to do so with the express permission of the Minister for Justice in the former case or the Minister for External Affairs. In addition the government retained the right to prevent citizens of other countries from departing the state to act as belligerents in the conflict and to prevent export of materials that might be used for war. Conviction under the Act could lead to a fine of up to £500 and/or imprisonment for up to two years. In the face of some vociferous public and political pressure to recognise the Nationalists de Valera used the official Vatican response as a method to neutralise this criticism. In the Dáil he pointed out that the policy of neutrality was a continuation of that pursued by his Cumann naGaedheal predecessors and that diplomatic policy was based on the relationship between states, not specific governments.²⁸⁸ In addition, as Dermot Keogh has pointed out, no ‘other policy was feasible if Ireland wished to retain her good name at the League of Nations’.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁵ Bell, ‘Ireland and the Spanish Civil War’, p. 147.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ *Irish Statute Book*, produced by the Office of the Attorney General, ‘Spanish Civil War (Non-Intervention) Act, 1937’, <http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1937/en/act/pub/0001/index.html>, accessed 19 November 2013.

²⁸⁸ Keogh, *Ireland and Europe*, pp. 84-5; idem, *Ireland and the Vatican*, pp. 127-32.

²⁸⁹ Keogh, *Ireland and the Vatican*, p. 132.

However, by the time the Act was passed in February 1937 the Irish volunteers on both sides were already in Spain and their support organisations, including the Irish Christian Front were already active. The nature and scale of public reaction, focusing itself around elements of the Spanish Civil War of particular interest to Ireland ensured that Irish newspapers would take an active interest. However, their trusted and reliable source of news of previous decades, the PA, opted not to provide a War Special. This was in light of recent experience with regard to the Italo-Abyssinian War where the

news value of the campaign [had], however, failed to hold public interest, and [...it was] felt that its value was out of proportion to its cost. In view of this experience [...] when the Spanish Civil War broke out at the end of July, we decided that we would endeavour not to burden our members with another War Special.²⁹⁰

As has been described elsewhere in this thesis the PA's subscribers were the provincial newspapers of Britain and Ireland. It is the value and interest of the much larger market which almost certainly motivated this decision. As mentioned above, the Irish reaction to the war was motivated by different foci than Britain and in this the news requirements of the Irish newspapers were out of step with their British contemporaries. The PA Foreign Special did operate and special correspondents were occasionally cited in Irish newspapers. The Foreign Special was an additional annual subscription service that operated continuously as opposed to War Specials which were introduced at additional cost for the duration of specific conflicts. It would appear that the cited Foreign Special coverage was provided as part of the combined PA-Reuters Foreign Special service by Reuters correspondents under the terms of the 1921 and 1930 agreements.²⁹¹ The decision not to provide a War Special meant that the PA did not commit additional manpower and resources not that coverage was not provided.

As described above the Spanish Civil War was the subject of particular interest in Ireland. The pitfalls of *post hoc ergo propter hoc* are

²⁹⁰ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1936 in Report of PA AGM, 1937, GL MS 35365/13.

²⁹¹ PA-Reuters Special Accounts 1936-40, GL MS 35486/2.

recognised. But it is notable that this is the first time that newspapers from the independent Irish state, both before and after independence, sent ‘formal’ foreign correspondents to cover an international event: Fleming and Gaffney.

Fleming recorded in his autobiography that when the *Irish Independent* ‘sent a man down to Franco’s side to describe the fearful threat to Christianity’ Smyllie instructed him to ‘go down on the Republican side. I don’t give a bugger what your conclusions are, so long as they’re honest’.²⁹² Fleming was in Spain for three weeks in late August and September 1936. His last article was published on 18 September when he had already returned to Dublin.²⁹³ The identity of the *Independent’s* correspondent he refers to is unclear. It did not start publishing articles from McCullagh until late September, and the bulk of the Irish volunteers on both sides were not in Spain until later in the year or early the next, which would seem to preclude Gunning and McGuinness. Gaffney was in Spain in February and March 1937.

In his articles Fleming does seem to have tried to offer as balanced a view as possible.

Both sides are absolutely merciless (this point must be stressed, because some people are talking about Government ‘atrocities’ as if the rebels wore kid gloves), and very little quarter is given.²⁹⁴

With regard to the reports of anti-clerical abuse among the Republican forces, he accepted that this had occurred but explained that

Rightly or wrongly, the people believe the rebellion was due to the Army officers and the priests acting together. [...] If an officer is captured, he is killed, and they see no reason why a priest should not meet with the same fate.²⁹⁵

²⁹² Fleming, *Head or Harp*, p. 169.

²⁹³ *Irish Times*, 18 September 1936, p. 7.

²⁹⁴ *Irish Times*, 10 September 1936, p. 7.

²⁹⁵ *Irish Times*, 16 September 1936, p. 7.

His attempts at measured reporting are in contrast to McCullagh's ('Hats off to the Dons! I am heart and soul with the Patriots in the Spanish Civil War'²⁹⁶) and Gaffney's (see below).

In terms of agency services the *Irish Times* cited Reuters and the PA. It also used the PA Special, even by-lining its correspondents occasionally, such as A. F. Tinley on 12 March 1937.²⁹⁷ By this time it had adopted the practice of citing multiple agencies for single articles. This was not universally applied and attribution to an individual agency in a subheading did occur, but the referencing of one or more agencies was also common. Sometimes no agency was attributed. This practice of flexible and multiple referencing allowed it to model its copy to its own position from the raw agency material, styling the Republican troops as government forces and the Nationalists as insurgents, and sometimes Fascists. In an unattributed article under the headline 'Big Battles in Spain' it wrote:

After keeping up the pressure for two hours the insurgents gave up, leaving the bridge still in the hands of the Government, and their men in the University City in peril owing to the difficulty of receiving supplies.²⁹⁸

In another instance, where Reuters was cited, it was reported that: 'An important success was claimed by Spanish Government forces last night after a lightning thrust on the Guadalaraja sector'.²⁹⁹ Similarly in an example where the PA was cited an article described how:

About 100 Italian lorries have been captured in the last two days, and were found to be of excellent material. The rounds of cartridges taken are estimated at five million. Italian prisoners state that [...] they were told they were needed to complete the Fascist victory in Spain.³⁰⁰

References to the Irishmen on either side of the conflict in news agency copy in March 1937 were, in effect, non-existent. This is presumably

²⁹⁶ *Irish Independent*, 23 September 1936, p. 7.

²⁹⁷ *Irish Times*, 12 March 1937, p. 8.

²⁹⁸ *Irish Times*, 2 March 1937, p. 7.

²⁹⁹ *Irish Times*, 19 March 1937, p. 7.

³⁰⁰ *Irish Times*, 23 March 1937, p. 7.

because the agency correspondents were either unaware or did not consider them particularly relevant. The German and Italian troops with the Nationalists were more numerous and internationally significant. The Irishmen in the Republican forces were part of the English speaking Abraham Lincoln Brigade³⁰¹ and again may not have seemed particularly significant to a non-Irish correspondent. They may also have been covered under the description ‘British’.

With regard to its positioning of the conflict the *Irish Times* saw the Spanish Civil War as a struggle between Fascism and Democracy. It had no doubts about where General Franco stood having declared in August 1936 ‘he is a Fascist’.³⁰² However it saw Spain as the unfortunate arena in which the European powers were working out an ‘undeniably grave situation [...]’. For some time past tension has been growing on the Continent between the Fascist Powers on the one hand and the democracies on the other’.³⁰³ It considered that the international support being provided to both the Nationalist and Republican forces was merely a way to fight wider ideological battles by proxy. ‘The truth seems to be that the foreign participants in the Spanish war are acting in a spirit of complete cynicism, caring little or nothing at all for the fate of Spain’.³⁰⁴ In the same editorial it made an interesting comment with regard to the Irishmen fighting in Spain. It claimed that

they have gone out to the Peninsula in the spirit of crusaders, and it is a crying shame that these fine young men should be used as cannon fodder. While we at home must deplore their adventure, we cannot but be proud of their spirit.³⁰⁵

It is unclear whether this referred to Irish volunteers on both sides of the conflict, which it seems to. On the other hand the description of them as ‘crusaders’ chimes with O’Duffy’s promotion of his Irish Brigade’s purpose.

³⁰¹ Bell, ‘Ireland and the Spanish Civil War’, p. 153.

³⁰² *Irish Times*, 11 August 1936, p. 6.

³⁰³ *Irish Times*, 25 March 1937, p. 6.

³⁰⁴ *Irish Times*, 19 March 1937, p. 6.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

In the *Irish Independent* Gaffney was by-lined in a number of extensive and well illustrated articles in late February and March 1937. Visiting the Irish Brigade at its training base in Cáceres she described how they ‘stood out in the matter of grooming and smartness of bearing and putting on their uniforms’. Explaining how a shortage of supplies had led to some of the Irishmen being issued with uniforms intended for German soldiers, she continued that because ‘Germans have unusually large hips and Irishmen are slenderly built around the hips the result was frequently unhappily baggy’. She further described how the brigaders ‘got on wonderfully well with the people of the town’ and how their ‘native wit had many a stone on which to sharpen its edge inside Cáceres’ ancient walls’.³⁰⁶ This description of smart, broad shouldered, witty Irishmen is in contrast to McGarry’s findings of a pious but bibulous group of varied calibre.³⁰⁷ In a subsequent article Gaffney described a visit close to the Madrid front, travelling through areas that had recently seen fighting. She described the destruction left by retreating Republican forces: houses where ‘both doors and windows were but gaping apertures revealing the overturned and deliberately broken furniture [...] Here and there the horror of that frenzy of destruction would be pitifully emphasised by the fluttering of a blind still in place’.³⁰⁸ She continued in a similar vein a few days later:

The destruction of these houses looked more like the work of mad demons than of human beings; you could not imagine a sane demon losing control of himself to such an extent.³⁰⁹

On 25 March the *Irish Independent* carried a report which was not by-lined but was described as being from its ‘Special Correspondent’ on the Madrid Front. It described how

Pushing on under fierce fire from the Red lines, the Irish Brigade made a magnificent advance of three miles in a vital offensive on the Madrid Front. As a result of the advance Patriot lines are now established within eight miles of Madrid in this sector. [...] The Reds

³⁰⁶ *Irish Independent*, 1 March 1937, p. 6.

³⁰⁷ McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War*, pp. 38-9.

³⁰⁸ *Irish Independent*, 5 March 1937, p. 6.

³⁰⁹ *Irish Independent*, 8 March 1937, p. 7.

did not wait for hand-to-hand fighting with their attackers! When they saw the Irishmen break through, despite the barrage, they abandoned their trenches³¹⁰

It further reported the death of four Irish brigaders. This report was, broadly, describing the assault on Titulcia which took place on 13 March, an event in which the Brigade ‘neither reached the village nor managed to engage any Republican troops in combat’.³¹¹ Though Gaffney was identified as a ‘Special Correspondent’ in her by-lined articles it is more likely that the author was Gunning.³¹² It should also be noted that this article was published nearly two weeks after the event. Other than in these articles provided by its own correspondents it is again difficult to identify Irishmen in news reports from Spain.

Under the conventions adopted by newspapers at this time the attribution of a story to its ‘Special Correspondent’ tended to indicate a journalist or expert ‘sent out or commissioned to cover a particular story or event’.³¹³ This is consistent with Gaffney and Fleming, who was described as such in the *Irish Times*, being sent by their respective employers to report on events in Spain. However, it also indicates that arrangements were made by the *Irish Independent* with Gunning before he left for Spain, though probably after he had decided to join O’Duffy’s adventure. Gunning had previously been a reporter for the paper and, as noted above, was probably the author of the story covering the Titulcia assault.³¹⁴ In contrast, the reports the *Irish Independent* published from McCullagh were attributed to ‘Captain Francis McCullagh – the well-known War Correspondent’³¹⁵ indicating that his work was free-lance and probably unsolicited.³¹⁶

In addition to its various correspondents in Spain the *Irish Independent* regularly cited agency sources. These were Reuters, the ETC and PA, including the PA Special. As with the *Irish Times* it by-lined

³¹⁰ *Irish Independent*, 25 March 1937, p. 9.

³¹¹ McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War*, p. 41.

³¹² McGarry, ‘Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War’, p. 79.

³¹³ Political and Economic Planning (PEP), *Report on the British Press: A Survey of Its Current Operations and Problems with Special Reference to National Newspapers and Their Part in Public Affairs* (London: PEP, 1938), p. 159.

³¹⁴ McGarry, ‘Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War’, p. 79.

³¹⁵ *Irish Independent*, 1 December 1936, p. 8, for example.

³¹⁶ PEP, *Report on the British Press*, p. 159

agency correspondents occasionally, for example Christopher Holme, PA Special Correspondent at Patriot Headquarters, on 15 March. It also adopted the practice of citing multiple agency sources for individual articles and using these as the basis on which to write its own copy. This allowed it to place its own emphasis on the basic reports received, such as describing Nationalist forces as Patriots and Republicans as Reds. For example, citing both Reuters and the ETC under the headline ‘More Red Attacks Beaten Off’ it described ‘claims that the Reds who twice attacked the Patriot positions at San Claudio on the Asturias front, were repulsed, leaving many dead and one tank’.³¹⁷

The *Irish Independent*’s positioning of the Spanish Civil War is demonstrated in comments describing the ‘dissensions among the Spanish Communist leaders and their foreign mercenaries’ and how the ‘Anti-God hordes in Spain, by their cold blooded murders, their unspeakable outrages and their campaign of destruction have written the foulest chapter in the history of Communism’s onslaught on Christianity’.³¹⁸

Unlike the *Irish Independent* and the *Irish Times* the *Irish Press* did not send its own correspondent to Spain, though it did use some of McCullagh’s articles later in the conflict. Consequently it was largely reliant on news agency services for its coverage. Of these it seemed to favour Reuters over the PA or PA Special, though they were all provided by the PA in London. It also cited UP on a number of occasions. This is almost certainly the product of the BUP service which the paper can be identified as taking through Gallagher’s letter outlining his requirements (see above).

The referencing and citation of agency sources in the *Irish Press* was not particularly consistent, and sometimes no attribution was provided at all. In a number of cases very similar or identical passages appear in other publications, for example on 29 March both the *Irish Press* and the *Irish Times* began articles on events in Spain with ‘Apart from some aerial activity Spain seems to have spent a relatively quiet Easter. There is at the moment a lull on the Guadalajara front’.³¹⁹ The same wording continues for

³¹⁷ *Irish Independent*, 1 March 1937, p. 9.

³¹⁸ *Irish Independent*, 2 March 1937, p. 8.

³¹⁹ *Irish Press* 29 March 1937, p. 1; *Irish Times*, 29 March 1937, p. 7.

a few short paragraphs. Further on the *Irish Times* cites Reuters where the *Irish Press* does not attribute its article to any agency source. However, because it had adopted the practice of referencing multiple agencies for the same articles, which were then adapted to its own copy, it is difficult to identify specific sources.

The *Irish Press* carried frequent articles on the Spanish Civil War throughout March 1937, often on its front page. It had adopted the practice of carrying news rather than advertising here from its launch in 1931. However, as noted above, it adopted a policy of editorial neutrality. The closest it perhaps came to expressing an opinion was when it quoted the *Leader* magazine:

‘The attitude of any citizen of the Soarstát towards the question of intervention in Spain should not and must not be made the test of that citizen’s Christianity or Catholicism’ [...] in reply to contributors who criticise the Government’s attitude of non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War.³²⁰

Rather than seeing the Spanish Civil War as a contest between ideologies of any description the *Irish Press* saw it simply as none of Ireland’s business. Mark O’Brien has suggested this was quite a brave position for the paper to adopt considering the open support for Franco expressed by the Catholic Church which enjoyed a particularly influential position in the independent Irish state at that time.³²¹ However, any particular partisan editorial position would have been conspicuous, and potentially embarrassing, considering the paper’s close association with Fianna Fáil.

The practice of multiple citation or non-attribution of agency sources was also found in the newspapers outside Dublin. Though the latter was less prominent these practices were equally used as a method by which they could present their own interpretations of the conflict based on the raw copy. The *Cork Examiner* from the Irish nationalist tradition, for example, described ‘more Red success in Spain’ on 23 March 1937.³²² The agency services it cited were Reuters and the PA Special, including by-lining the

³²⁰ *Irish Press*, 12 March 1937, p. 3.

³²¹ O’Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, p. 68.

³²² *Cork Examiner*, 23 March 1937, p. 7.

PA's Special Correspondent, Christopher Holme.³²³ Its pro-Franco stance has been identified above and this, along with its limited ability to identify Irishmen in Spain, was illustrated in an editorial comment where it described how:

Cries of woe are raised as to the operations of these foreign 'armies' against Madrid forces, but no reference is made whatever to the thousands of French and Russian nationals fighting with the Red forces and if mention is made of them it is simply to glorify them for heroic sacrifices they are making for the so-called democratic 'Red' Government.³²⁴

It did identify Irishmen in Spain within the Nationalist forces, but only as a part of a wider grouping including Poles alongside the far more significant German and Italian presence.³²⁵ In Belfast the *Irish News*, also with a background in Irish nationalism, was more inclined than its contemporary in the far south not to attribute news sources. Where it did these were more commonly single sources for individual articles. These were also Reuters and the PA Foreign Special and it by-lined Holme on a number of occasions³²⁶ and his contemporary A.F. Tinley.³²⁷ Its admiration for Franco was displayed, for example, when it described 'evidence of clear vision in his every movement, without unduly casting unnecessary burden on his men',³²⁸ but once again the ability to identify Irishmen within these forces was limited. Its attitude to the Republican side of the conflict, as well as its use of propaganda, was illustrated when it commented that:

It is a notable fact that though the Red Government in Spain is riven with internal strife and its armies are being driven backwards, its flow of propaganda increases rather than diminishes.³²⁹

The Belfast newspapers from the unionist tradition offered a recognisably smaller amount of coverage than their Dublin based

³²³ *Cork Examiner*, 15 March 1937, p. 7.

³²⁴ *Cork Examiner* 30 March 1937.

³²⁵ *Cork Examiner*, 24 March 1937, p. 6.

³²⁶ *Irish News*, 13 March 1937, p. 5; *Irish News* 15 March 1937, p. 5.

³²⁷ *Irish News*, 1 March 1937, p. 5.

³²⁸ *Irish News*, 13 March 1937, p. 4.

³²⁹ *Irish News*, 1 March 1937, p. 4.

contemporary, the *Irish Times*, or those newspapers from an Irish nationalist background. This does not indicate that they failed to utilise the full range of news gathering resources available to them though. The *Belfast Telegraph* as well as citing Reuters also produced unattributed copy, though this was nothing new for this particular publication. It also carried articles by-lined Pembroke Stephens ‘by arrangement with the *Daily Telegraph*’.³³⁰ Its positioning of the conflict and identification of foreign troops in Spain was exemplified in an editorial commenting that:

It is circumstantially reported that a fairly large Italian army is now operating in Spain with General Franco’s forces and that by its side is a smaller but substantial German force. [...] Except some unexpected development should occur it is quite probable the war will last on for many months.³³¹

The *Belfast News Letter* cited Reuters and the PA, as well as occasionally providing no source. Interestingly towards the end of March it carried a number of articles attributed to an unnamed correspondent. The attribution of these articles to ‘A Special Correspondent’, rather than the newspaper’s special correspondent, indicates that these were unsolicited reports.³³² Who the correspondent might have been is unclear, but they were certainly reporting from, and sympathetic to, the Republican forces, describing the Nationalist forces advancing on Madrid as ‘the enemy’.³³³ In positioning the conflict the newspaper commented that:

The Roman Catholic Church has conducted an intensive propaganda in General Franco’s favour, representing his armies as forces fighting for religion and freedom against ‘the blood thirsty persecutors of the Church’.³³⁴

Its main aim in this column was to draw comparison with events in Spain to refute criticism of the mistreatment of Northern Ireland’s Catholic population though. The *Northern Whig* did not introduce any notably

³³⁰ *Belfast Telegraph*, 1 March 1937, p. 10; 8 March 1937, p. 8.

³³¹ *Belfast Telegraph*, 23 March 1937, p. 10.

³³² PEP, *Report on the British Press*, p. 159.

³³³ *Belfast News Letter*, 26 March 1937, p. 7; *Belfast News Letter*, 27 March 1937, p. 5.

³³⁴ *Belfast News Letter*, 13 March 1937, p. 6.

innovative news gathering procedures, relying on the PA Foreign Special and Reuters which it consistently cited. It identified the presence of German and Italian troops with the Nationalist forces describing how it had been reported that they were ‘becoming increasingly impatient of [Franco’s] failure to achieve a swift and spectacular victory by capturing the capital’.³³⁵

In considering the news sources used to cover the Spanish Civil War by Irish newspapers the decision to send Fleming and Gaffney as the independent Irish state’s first formal foreign correspondents is significant. Irish newspapers did not enthusiastically adopt this practice in the ensuing decades, preferring to remain primarily dependent on news agencies for their foreign news.³³⁶ In this light, the PA’s decision not to provide a War Special might be posited as having a contributory effect. Further, the unavailability of the APWS during this period due to the collapse of the ‘News Ring’ should be considered. The particular reception of the Spanish Civil War in Ireland meant that Irish newspapers needed their own news, or at least the ability to supplement their traditional, non-Irish, news sources. If the news agency correspondents did not highlight the Irishmen the newspapers could not draw attention to them as they were able to do in, for example, World War I. The public was kept aware of the presence of Irishmen on both sides of the conflict in other ways though, such as the announcement of death and injuries suffered, often relayed through relatives at home.

Despite their significance Fleming and Gaffney only remained in Spain for finite, relatively short, periods. As a result news agency services remained important for continuous coverage. The war correspondent’s job, as well as being risky for the individual, is expensive for the newspaper or agency, and this is why the PA did not provide a War Special. In this system of agency news the dominant source was the PA, also distributing news received through Reuters. The ETC was still available, but Central was

³³⁵ *Northern Whig*, 11 March 1937, p. 6.

³³⁶ During World War II the *Belfast Telegraph* did have correspondents of its own with each arm of the British forces. At the same time in the independent Irish state a strict policy of neutrality was seen to require rigorous censorship. This would have significantly detracted from the benefit of foreign correspondents.

seemingly already in decline before the ending of its foreign service after the joint PA-ETC purchase of a controlling majority in 1937. McGarry has also identified Havas as a source,³³⁷ but this too was received via Reuters and distributed by the PA. In this sense Irish newspapers remained as reliant as ever on common sources of news and the loss of the APWS in many ways marks a period of restriction. The use of BUP by the *Irish Press* is significant, as noted above it marks an active effort by an Irish newspaper to acquire a non-British source of news. However, though based on UP, this was still a standardised service designed for British consumption. The adoption of the practice of citing multiple agencies and using them as the basis for their own copy allowed the Irish newspapers greater flexibility in how they presented this largely standardised raw material. It also makes it more difficult to identify exactly what was common.

The mainstream Irish newspapers positioned the Spanish Civil War on the one hand as a conflict of ideologies. This was the approach adopted by the *Cork Examiner*, *Irish News*, *Irish Independent* and *Irish Times*. These ideologies were not particularly seen as implicitly Irish though. The debates surrounding them were not used as proxies for Ireland's own internal debates in the way previous, imperial, events had been for example. It should be noted that there was no realistic prospect of Ireland abandoning democratic principles or becoming a Communist state. On the other hand the conflict was positioned as not really any of Ireland's business. This was the approach of the *Belfast News Letter*, *Belfast Telegraph*, *Irish Press* and *Northern Whig*. There is an element of surprise in these groupings. Particularly in the case of the traditionally unionist *Irish Times*, though by this point more accurately pro-British, with nationalist newspapers and the nationalist *Irish Press* with the unionist Northern Irish titles. As described above the response of the unionist Northern Irish titles was to see the conflict as a matter for the British government. The *Irish Press*' connection to the party of government in the independent Irish state meant that any reaction not reflecting the official policy of non-intervention would have been particularly surprising. In this these newspapers can be seen modelling

³³⁷ McGarry, 'Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War', p. 76.

their positioning of the Spanish Civil War to their respective states. Within the Irish nationalist community, with its strong anti-communist inclinations and Catholic identity, the Spanish Civil War had particular resonances. This was the identity of the majority population in the independent Irish state where the *Irish Times* and its readership now existed. Though not agreeing with the positioning of its contemporaries the newspaper was almost compelled to express an opinion. This perhaps demonstrates the first indication of Irish newspapers, the fourth estate, beginning to adhere to legislative boundaries and reflect the nation-state, or states, in which they existed.

Conclusion

The period 1922 to 1939 was one of significant political, constitutional, economic and social developments in Ireland. The ‘ideological consensus’ that enabled the rapid constitutional changes in the 1930s ‘rested on, and was reflective of, other consensual aspects of southern society which also, over time, tended to set it apart from the North’.³³⁸ The governmental structures acquired by the independent Irish state in 1922 allowed it to introduce a series of ‘legislative instruments of social control’³³⁹ suited to its own aims. The same structures facilitated an economic policy which led to an increasing differential in social welfare services favourable to the residents of Northern Ireland.³⁴⁰ This also provided the ability to wage ‘economic war’. In addition, and with the influence of external developments such as the Statute of Westminster in particular, the introduction of a series of significant constitutional changes by the post-1932 government were facilitated, culminating in a new constitution in 1937.

The same period saw significant developments in the systems and structures of news supply in Britain and Ireland and internationally. Primary among these was the acquisition of control of Reuters by the PA in 1926 and 1931 and the collapse of the cartelised ‘News Ring’ in 1934. Other

³³⁸ Lee and Ó Tuathaigh, *The Age of de Valera*, p. 84.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

³⁴⁰ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 140.

developments should be noted though. In 1922 the PA and ETC renewed the JSA and in 1925 the PA purchased a sporting news agency. In 1937 the PA and ETC acquired a joint majority shareholding in the Central agency, specifically to prevent the BUP doing so, and subsequently closed down its international news service. The BUP's entry in to the British and Irish news market is significant, but during this period its success was limited, particularly in Ireland. Also, in 1939, the PA acquired the exclusive rights to the APWS outside London. This and other developments point towards a process of increased integration and cooperation in the structures of international news supply in Britain and Ireland between World War I and World War II, with the PA as a key cog in the machinery. This might also be described as a process of rationalisation.³⁴¹

As an Irish state increasingly independent of Britain emerged the structures and systems that controlled the supply of international news to its newspapers were becoming notably more integrated. By the late 1930s this produced a situation whereby the news available to Irish newspapers was particularly standardised and not from an Irish perspective, with little opportunity to acquire alternatives. The *Irish Press*, despite its suspicion of the established news agencies, took the PA service, presumably in order to supplement its BUP service and ensure a sufficient supply of international news, or perhaps vice-versa. Despite criticism in official circles, primarily with regard to news supply from Ireland, both the Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil governments recognised it was impractical to attempt to establish an alternative Irish service. The ability of Irish newspapers to overcome these restrictions when their news requirements were out of step with the rest of the PA's subscribers was limited. Despite the undoubted significance of Fleming and Gaffney being sent to cover the Spanish Civil War, the challenges and cost of maintaining a foreign correspondent over an extended period meant that their services could only be supplementary. The services of the news agencies, largely centred on the PA, remained crucial. Just as it had been realised by the late 1930s that the independent Irish state

³⁴¹ Silberstein-Loeb, 'Foreign Office Control of Reuters', p. 284. Many of Silberstein-Loeb's interpretations of events leading to this description have been disagreed with in this and previous chapters, but the term itself is not necessarily inaccurate.

could not survive without foreign trade and the influence of the international economy, so its newspapers could not operate effectively without being part of the international structures of news supply.

Despite these apparent restrictions the mainstream Irish newspapers remained largely committed to, and supportive of, the PA. Their financial support of the initial acquisition of Reuters shares in 1926 facilitated one of the key developments in the structure. Their continued support through the Note extensions and the behaviour of their delegates at general meetings further supports this interpretation. In particular George Crosbie's support of James Henderson on his appointment to the PA board in 1935, and its similarity to Brewster's support of Henderson's uncle in 1917, is suggestive of an attitude that passed down the generations. However the initial signs of a disengagement of newspapers from the independent Irish state in the 1930s and their failure to support the Debentures in 1935 is perhaps indicative of changing attitudes. The development of ownership and managerial groups within the mainstream Irish newspapers adhering increasingly to state boundaries tentatively suggested here might be equally tentatively suggested to be developing in their published products at the same time, as seen in the case study.

How these developments might have progressed in peace-time can only be the subject of speculation. With the outbreak of World War II in 1939 the Dáil declared neutrality and authorised the government 'to proclaim a state of emergency at its discretion' on 2 September 1939.³⁴² The introduction of the Emergency Powers Act imposed 'the most intensive period of censorship in the history of the [independent Irish] state.'³⁴³ Northern Ireland, as part of the United Kingdom, was committed to war. The effect of these developments is the subject of the next chapter.

³⁴² Lee, *Ireland*, p. 221.

³⁴³ Donal Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland 1939-1945: Neutrality, Politics and Society* (Cork: Cork UP, 1996), p. 284.

Chapter Four

World War II, Neutrality¹ and Censorship, 1939-45

With the outbreak of World War II in 1939 the independent Irish state adopted a policy of neutrality. Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom was a belligerent. The adoption of neutrality can be seen as a continuation of the assertion of the right to an independent foreign policy pursued by successive governments in the independent Irish state which was itself connected to the demonstration of the full measure of sovereignty it had attained. Neutrality was seen to entail the imposition of a particularly rigorous censorship regime designed to ensure that no media in the independent Irish state provided evidence to any belligerent that might be seen as contravening the policy. At the same time it served to reassure the public that the pursuit of neutrality was in the best interest of the state. As a product, World War II saw two separate censorship regimes operating in the separate Irish polities. The sources their newspapers relied on for their international news remained common though. Allowing for the difficulties of travel and other wartime disruptions, the mainstream daily Irish newspapers remained seemingly engaged on a corporate and organisational level with the systems and structures of international news supply. In addition this period saw some key developments in corporate organisation of these systems and structures. For example, in 1941 the Press Association (PA) sold fifty percent of Reuters to the Newspaper Proprietors Association (NPA). As the War drew to an end a series of agreements were concluded by the news agencies which were designed to reinforce and continue the increasingly integrated and cooperative practices they had developed in the inter-war period.

This chapter covers the period from the outbreak of war in 1939 to the end of hostilities in Europe in 1945; it is divided into four sections. The first briefly describes the policies and practices that the pursuit of neutrality entailed in the independent Irish state and the wartime experience of Northern Ireland. The second briefly describes how the wartime experiences

¹ References to neutral Ireland and Irish neutrality throughout this chapter pertain to the independent Irish state.

of the two polities and the operation of the policies and practices they adopted affected the mainstream Irish newspapers. The third examines the corporate and commercial relationship of those newspapers to the systems and structures of international news supply during World War II. The fourth presents two brief case studies comparing the coverage and comment they provided of the Dunkirk evacuation, 27 May – 5 June 1940, and the D-Day landings, 6-12 June 1944.

Ireland and the operation of censorship and neutrality during World War II

The neutrality of the independent Irish state in World War II served as an affirmation of the full measure of sovereignty attained and ‘reflected a kind of declaration of full independence by the Irish state’.² Ronan Fanning has characterised this policy as the product of an emphasis on sovereignty rather than an ideological commitment to neutrality itself.³ Indeed Aengus Nolan suggests that with the outbreak of war no clear definition of the policy had actually been developed by the government of the independent Irish State and Department of External Affairs.⁴ Irish neutrality had its basis in, and was regarded through, an anti-English sentiment and Ireland’s historical relationship to Britain, an attitude that had widespread public and political support.⁵ Clair Wills has noted the absence of ‘any significant discussion about the rights and wrongs of the policy’ in the Dáil debate on the matter.⁶ One notable critic was the Fine Gael deputy leader James Dillon. While not advocating the adoption of belligerent status he did believe that neutral Ireland should do everything in its power to prevent a German victory. As a

² Joseph Lee and Gearóid Ó Tuathaigh, *The Age of de Valera* (Dublin: Ward River Press, 1982), p. 78.

³ Ronan Fanning, ‘Irish Neutrality: An Historical Review’, *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol. 1 No. 3 (1982), p. 30.

⁴ Aengus Nolan, *Joseph Walshe: Irish Foreign Policy 1922-1946* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2008), pp. 131-3.

⁵ Fanning, ‘Irish Neutrality’, p. 28; Eunan O’Halpin, *Defending Ireland: The Irish State and Its Enemies Since 1922* (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 152

⁶ Clair Wills, *That Neutral Island: A Cultural History of Ireland During the Second World War* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 47.

result of these views he was forced to resign from his party in February 1942.⁷

In addition to this widespread public and political support Eunan O’Halpin has noted that Eamon de Valera, Taoiseach and minister for external affairs, had two other principal assets in pursuit of neutrality: a concomitant pledge dating back to the 1938 Anglo-Irish agreement not to allow Britain’s interests to be harmed from Irish territory and a personal ‘talent for statecraft’.⁸ As the war progressed ‘neutrality became increasingly linked to the question of partition’.⁹ While Northern Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom it would have been unthinkable for an Irish government led by the republican nationalist Fianna Fáil party to publicly cooperate with Britain in its war aims. In the meantime, however, de Valera and his government, aware of the implications of Britain’s geographical proximity in particular, played a ‘double game’. The first side was a strict adherence to neutrality in public that included the censorship regime described below. This literal interpretation of neutrality was extended so far as to justify de Valera’s (in)famous visit to the German minister in Dublin, Eduard Hempel,¹⁰ to offer his condolences on the death of Hitler. The other side was to ensure that no belligerent, particularly Britain, could gain more through invasion than they achieved through the practical operation of Irish neutrality.¹¹ This was pursued through a number of cooperative measures.

Seen in a European and world context Irish neutrality in 1939 was not exceptional, it was the policy adopted by the majority of European states and the United States.¹² However, seen in light of the state’s Commonwealth membership and historical connections to Britain it was conspicuous.¹³ Across the British Empire ‘there was an extraordinary

⁷ Maurice Manning. ‘Dillon, James Mathew’, *Dictionary of Irish Biography (DIB)*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2602>, accessed 24 July 2013

⁸ O’Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, pp. 151-3.

⁹ Fanning, ‘Irish Neutrality’, p. 31-2.

¹⁰ John P. Duggan. ‘Hempel, Eduard’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a3916>, accessed 24 June 2013.

¹¹ J.J. Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), p. 244.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 242.

¹³ Wills, *That Neutral Island*, p. 47.

acceptance and even enthusiasm for the war effort'.¹⁴ In Australia George VI's declaration of war was taken as applying to all his subjects, in New Zealand a cabinet meeting and official declaration from the Governor-General delayed a state of war coming in to existence for a few hours. In South Africa a parliamentary vote committed the country to war, a state confirmed after the Governor-General refused Prime Minister General J.B.M. Hertzog's request for a general election following the defeat of his favoured policy of neutrality. Canada remained technically neutral for a week due to the insistence by Prime Minister Mackenzie King that a declaration of war should first be considered by parliament. While the Dominions went through their various governmental and parliamentary processes Northern Ireland entered the war as part of the United Kingdom, a position welcomed by its Unionist political leaders.¹⁵

In Britain Irish neutrality was viewed with a mixture of confusion and resentment. It was considered the nadir of the protectionist policies of the 1930s by a population largely 'unable to absorb the fact that the country was no longer part of the United Kingdom'.¹⁶ O'Halpin has noted that Winston Churchill in particular 'could never accept that independent Ireland had flown the imperial nest'.¹⁷ This attitude was reflected in articles critical of the policy in the British press, though few of these reached the population of neutral Ireland due to the energetic activities of the Censor. The majority of actions against British newspapers occurred when this criticism was at its height in the early part of the war, when Britain's prospects were at their most bleak.¹⁸

Political consensus did not lead to political unity however and de Valera rejected suggestions from the Fine Gael and Labour parties to form a national government with Fianna Fáil. The furthest he was willing to go was

¹⁴ Keith Jeffrey, 'The Second World War' in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.) *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. IV: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: OUP, 2001), p. 307.

¹⁵ Brian Barton, *Northern Ireland in the Second World War* (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 1995), p. 4.

¹⁶ Wills, *That Neutral Island*, p. 5.

¹⁷ O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p. 173.

¹⁸ Robert Cole, *Propaganda, Censorship and Irish Neutrality in the Second World War* (Edinburg: Edinburgh UP, 2006), p. 2; Donal Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland, 1939-1945: Neutrality, Politics and Society* (Cork: Cork UP, 1996), p. 191.

to give them seats on the purely advisory National Defence Conference.¹⁹ The party continued in government through the war and two general elections. Following the election held in 1943, despite de Valera's attempts to extend the life of the Dáil by a year,²⁰ Fianna Fáil formed a minority government when the opposition parties, suffering from internal divisions, proved unable 'to coalesce into an effective alternative'.²¹ Following a defeat in the Dáil on 9 May 1944 de Valera called a snap general election. Exploiting the theme of 'responsibility without power' and in difficult campaigning conditions due to wartime restrictions, on fuel and newsprint in particular, Fianna Fáil returned as a majority government in June 1944.²²

In order to maintain neutrality and protect the state's position the Dáil granted the government extensive powers under the Emergency Powers Act, 1939, which allowed for legislation by executive order. Enabling legislation to amend the Constitution allowed for 'the declaration of a state of emergency during a time when armed conflict was taking place without the participation of the state'.²³ As a consequence of the Act World War II is sometimes referred to as 'The Emergency' in Ireland. Under this legislation the state was empowered to control supplies of essential materials, prices and wages, introduce a censorship regime that was more stringent than the regimes introduced in most other countries, particularly neutrals,²⁴ and implement rationing. In addition, the 1939 Offences against the State Act provided for the suppression and coercion of the IRA and other militant groups that might threaten Irish neutrality and stability.²⁵ Measures taken under this legislation included the introduction of internment in June 1940, under which three IRA members died whilst on hunger strike, and the execution of six IRA members for crimes against the state throughout the

¹⁹ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 237.

²⁰ Dermot Keogh with Andrew McCarthy, *Twentieth Century Ireland: Revolution and State Building*, rev. edn. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2005), p. 139.

²¹ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 240-1.

²² Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, pp. 133-4.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

²⁴ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 1.

²⁵ R.M. Douglas. 'The Pro-Axis Underground in Ireland, 1939-1942', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Dec., 2006), p. 1160; Diarmaid Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland 1900-2000* (London: Profile Books, 2005), p. 419.

course of the war.²⁶ Despite these legislative moves the independent Irish state was notably unprepared for the consequences of World War II, particularly in its ability to protect its neutrality militarily.²⁷ As a consequence intelligence operations and the Censor became key tools in preventing public disorder and hostile internal and external actions.²⁸

The censorship regime introduced in neutral Ireland under the Emergency Powers Act covered posts, telegraphs and the press and ‘was implemented with increasing severity until the very end of the war’.²⁹ The bulk of staff was deployed in the postal section, situated close to the central sorting office in Dublin due to the large volume of material that had to be handled. Domestic mail, including correspondence with Northern Ireland, was not subject to censorship. Initially neither was that exchanged with Britain, though from mid-1940 selective examination was introduced. For the duration of the war full censorship was applied to all correspondence with continental Europe, the majority of other countries and all air mail.³⁰ The telegraph section staff was centred in Dublin with additional personnel distributed at key locations throughout the country. It covered all public telegraph and telephone services, wireless communications and special services including newspapers’ private wires. From 1940 it also operated surveillance on private telephone services on behalf of military intelligence, G2.³¹

The press censor was based in Dublin Castle under the direction of Michael Knightly, an Irish War of Independence veteran, former journalist with the *Irish Independent* and editor-in-chief of the Dáil and Senate reports.³² Donal Ó Drisceoil has characterised the aim of press censorship domestically as ‘the promotion of that image of the war and Irish neutrality

²⁶ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 113.

²⁷ O’Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p. 153.

²⁸ Mark M. Hull. ‘The Irish Interlude: German Intelligence in Ireland, 1939-1943’, *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 66, no. 3 (Jul. 2002), p. 716; Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 101.

²⁹ John Horgan, *Irish Media: A Critical History Since 1922* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 42.

³⁰ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, pp. 16, 65-6.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 79, 83.

³² Pauric J. Dempsey, ‘Knightly, Michael T.’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a4598>, accessed 28 July 2013.

that the government wished the Irish public to receive'.³³ Or, as J.J. Lee has put it, to convince 'a people anxious to be convinced that the preservation of neutrality was the supreme national good'.³⁴ It took the Censor some time to get its personnel into place following the outbreak of war and for the first two weeks of the conflict the mainstream daily newspapers in the independent Irish state operated a 'voluntary censorship'.³⁵ The actions of the Censor in pursuit of its aims included banning the mention of any Irishman, including those from Northern Ireland, serving in the Allied forces.³⁶ It was also designed to ensure a public presentation of neutrality that would not inflame belligerent states, and potentially give them an excuse to intervene in Irish affairs, and to suppress information that might be of strategic value.³⁷ Reports were pared down as much as possible to official statements and communiqués, sources were to be identified prominently and a balance sought in the presentation of news from both sides. Only official titles were permitted. Hitler was always Herr Hitler, and terms such as 'Nazi', 'Fascist', 'Reds' and 'Bolshevik' were banned.³⁸ The government's concern 'was not the reception of belligerent propaganda *per se*, but that no Irish controlled media should become, or be regarded as, channels for its dissemination'.³⁹ With regard to radio there was no attempt to prevent the reception of external broadcasts from the BBC and Axis territories. The latter included the output of Irish men and women working for German English-language propaganda services, most notably perhaps William Joyce, better known by his on-air persona of Lord Haw Haw.⁴⁰ The state broadcaster, Radio Éireann, did not come under the auspices of the press censor. As a government controlled news medium it was expected to

³³ Donal Ó Drisceoil. "'Censorship as Propaganda' the Neutralisation of Irish Public Opinion During the Second World War' in Brian Girvin and Geoffrey Roberts (eds.) *Ireland and the Second World War: Politics, Society and Remembrance* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2000), p. 151.

³⁴ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 262.

³⁵ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 95.

³⁶ Ó Drisceoil. 'Censorship as Propaganda', p. 159.

³⁷ Douglas Gageby, 'Media, 1945-70' in J.J. Lee (ed.) *Ireland 1945-70* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1979), p. 125; Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 42; Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 6.

³⁸ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, pp. 116-7.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴⁰ O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p. 197.

effectively censor itself.⁴¹ This position led to some embarrassing episodes where it broadcast news items which had been censored in the newspapers.⁴² As a result informal arrangements were put in place whereby the Censor sent orders and directions to the news room and was consulted on matters of doubt. From late summer 1941, following further slip ups, doubtful material had to be read over the telephone to the Censor, and occasionally de Valera.⁴³

The pursuit of a policy of neutralised news ‘helped desensitise many Irish people to the atrocities of war’.⁴⁴ John Horgan has written that the ‘almost pathological even handedness of the censorship left the mass of Irish readers quite unprepared for the horrors that were revealed when the censorship was finally lifted’.⁴⁵ This included the suppression of stories of war atrocities. From early 1943 these stories began to arrive in large numbers, mainly concerning the Nazi outrages in the Eastern Europe. The German discovery of a mass grave in the Katyn forest containing the bodies of Polish officers executed by Russian forces was received in April 1943. All were either suppressed or shorn of all relevant details.⁴⁶ Reports of the slaughter of priests and brothers of the De la Salle College in Manila, as well as students and refugees, by Japanese troops as well as further reports of the killing of religious personnel in 1945 were heavily censored. Most other atrocity stories from the Pacific war were suppressed.⁴⁷

Wartime conditions provided the opportunity to introduce the isolationist self-sufficiency envisaged in the 1930s but the state’s economy was incapable of supporting its population, which was relatively low by European standards. Though largely secure in food production, the policies that had made the state ‘dependent on imported raw materials [for] industrialisation had reduced rather than increased self-sufficiency’.⁴⁸ The virtual absence of a merchant marine of its own led to the establishment of

⁴¹ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 14.

⁴² Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 48.

⁴³ Ibid.; Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 99.

⁴⁴ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 130.

⁴⁵ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 46.

⁴⁶ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, pp. 124-5.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 125-6; idem. ‘Censorship as Propaganda’, p. 155.

⁴⁸ Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 232-4

Irish Shipping in 1941 with limited success.⁴⁹ Despite the restrictions necessitated by the conditions imposed as a result of World War II Lee has described neutral Ireland as having 'a relatively cosy war'.⁵⁰ However, just as Ireland's neutrality had prompted particular external reactions because of its historical and constitutional links to Britain and the Commonwealth, so the maintenance of this position in light of its material requirements and geographical location required a particular internal response. Diarmaid Ferriter has noted that neutrality 'could not have been achieved without a huge degree of moral and political ambiguity, not to mention utter pragmatism'.⁵¹

Whilst the continued existence of partition was publicly used as a reason for the independent Irish state's refusal to join the war in support of Britain the existence of Northern Ireland provided a practical solution obviating British intervention in the neutral state.⁵² The return of the treaty ports of Berehaven, Cobh and Lough Swilly under the terms of the 1938 Anglo-Irish agreement had provided the territorial integrity necessary for the independent Irish state to pursue neutrality. At the same time, with outbreak of World War II, it ensured that Northern Ireland would play a vital strategic role during the Battle of the Atlantic as a base for shipping, convoy escorts and aircraft.⁵³ Access to its ports ensured that the Allies could keep the Atlantic supply route open: 'the most important strategic link of all'.⁵⁴

The possibility of deferred reunification was offered early in June 1940, when a German invasion of Ireland as a back door to Britain's defences was considered a real possibility.⁵⁵ In return for this promise the independent Irish state would publicly agree to cooperate with British forces in its own defence.⁵⁶ The offer was, however, rejected by de Valera for both internal and external reasons. Firstly, it is doubtful whether London could

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 233; Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 120.

⁵⁰ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 233.

⁵¹ Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 388.

⁵² Ibid., p. 245

⁵³ Barton, *Northern Ireland in the Second World War*, p. 88.

⁵⁴ Jeffrey, 'The Second World War', p. 320.

⁵⁵ O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, pp. 171-2.

⁵⁶ Dennis Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf: Northern Attitudes to the Independent Irish State 1919-49* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1988), p. 217.

have brought the Northern Irish unionist community with it, considering the reaction of the Prime Minister, Lord Craigavon.⁵⁷ In Brian Barton's analysis he had 'without compunction placed the narrow interests of the six-counties and the preservation of the union above loyalty to the crown and empire and the crushing of fascism'.⁵⁸ Secondly, acceptance could have threatened internal party unity in Fianna Fáil and the process of reunification would almost certainly have entailed a reworking, if not dismantling, of the 1937 Constitution of Ireland. Thirdly, Britain appeared to be losing. The effective impact of Irish entry into the war would have been minimal in the event of a British victory, and disastrous for the state in the event of a German one.⁵⁹ A renewed offer of deferred reunification was made after the American entry in to the war in December 1941, but again rejected. 'De Valera was not to be coddled by another "wild" Churchillian gesture' in Lee's words.⁶⁰

Though limited, plans for the invasion of neutral Ireland did exist in Britain. It was also thought that similar plans existed in Germany. In the latter case these fears faded once Germany attacked Russia.⁶¹ In the former case invasion might either have been a pre-emptive action or in response to a German landing. The policy adopted instead was a series of 'silent sanctions'. These were designed to restrict access to imported goods and materials and ensure that neutral Ireland remained aware of its reliance on its larger, belligerent, neighbour.⁶² As the threat of a German invasion of Britain receded Ireland became only secondarily important, often as a source of meteorological information.⁶³ While this was a key target of the sometimes farcical German intelligence operations in Ireland,⁶⁴ no such efforts were required by the British and Allied forces. The provision of such data was part of cooperative practices adopted by the independent Irish state

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 149; Timothy J. White and Andrew Riley, 'Irish Neutrality in World War II: A Review Essay', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol. 19 (2008), p. 146.

⁵⁸ Barton, *Northern Ireland in the Second World War*, p. 78.

⁵⁹ Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf*, p. 218-19; Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 248-50.

⁶⁰ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 250.

⁶¹ Fanning, 'Irish Neutrality', p. 146; O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, pp. 171-2.

⁶² Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, pp. 119-20.

⁶³ Hull, 'The Irish Interlude', pp. 707, 717.

⁶⁴ Ibid., passim.

which have led to its description as non-belligerent, rather than technically neutral.⁶⁵

Whilst the publication of all meteorological information in newspapers in neutral Ireland was banned by the Censor, due to its potential use to belligerents, the Irish Meteorological Service exchanged information with Britain throughout the war.⁶⁶ The operation to prevent this information reaching the public domain went so far as the suppression of a picture of the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, P.J. Little, skating on a frozen pond in Herbert Park, Dublin, during the unseasonably cold winter of 1942-43.⁶⁷ Other cooperative practices included regular liaison with Allied military authorities to prepare joint plans for defence in the event of a German invasion; the forwarding of reports on Axis ship, submarine and aircraft movements in the Irish Sea; ‘intimate cooperation’ between G2 and Allied intelligence; and permission for Allied maritime patrol aircraft to overfly a land corridor in Donegal.⁶⁸ As the war progressed, and Britain’s prospects improved, official attitudes towards Germany became less cordial and conversely more benevolent towards Britain.⁶⁹ This included allowing Allied airmen who came down in neutral Ireland to cross the border and return to their units while German airmen were interned.⁷⁰

In addition to these ‘benevolently neutral’ practices the independent Irish state kept up food supplies to Britain and did not prevent its citizens travelling to fill vacancies in the wartime economy or join the Allied military forces.⁷¹ Visitors travelling the other way were frequently amazed at the comparatively plentiful food supply, proliferation of light and availability of leisure activities in the neutral state.⁷² The economic motivation of those travelling for work from a depressed economy can be easily understood, but those travelling to enlist were probably motivated by a more complex series of factors. Clair Wills has discussed a number of

⁶⁵ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 7.

⁶⁶ Ó Drisceoil, ‘Censorship as Propaganda’, p. 153.

⁶⁷ Mark O’Brien, *The Irish Times: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008), p. 119.

⁶⁸ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 122.

⁶⁹ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 253.

⁷⁰ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, pp. 123-4.

⁷¹ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 244; Wills, *That Neutral Island*, p. 60.

⁷² Wills, *That Neutral Island*, pp. 5-6.

motivations for these men: ethical anti-Fascism; a family tradition of service in the British military; a feeling of loyalty to the British Crown, particularly in the Anglo-Irish community; for others it may have had ‘as much to do with [financial] necessity, even opportunism, as with ideology’.⁷³ A number of these men who volunteered for military service, among them deserters from the Irish Army, simply crossed the border into Northern Ireland. O’Halpin has pointed out that such enlistment ‘was no indicator of their personal opinions on the rights and wrongs of Anglo-Irish relations’ though.⁷⁴

As mentioned above, as part of the United Kingdom Northern Ireland was automatically committed to war, not that there was any indication that its Unionist politicians would have desired to follow the independent Irish state’s policy of neutrality. Dennis Kennedy has noted how Northern Irish Unionists saw neutrality as ‘the final rejection by Irish Nationalism of all things British’.⁷⁵ Though it was covered by one of twelve boards established in 1940 ‘to provide the national framework for regional organisation’⁷⁶ there were a number of factors that distinguished Northern Ireland’s wartime experience from Britain. Conscription was not introduced, despite agitation that it should be by Unionist leaders.⁷⁷ There were fears that if it was it would prompt widespread unrest among the nationalist population and that the jobs of those men away on war service would be taken by an influx of economic migrants from the independent Irish state. There was also no compulsory general labour registration and no policy of industrial concentration.⁷⁸ Further, as a product of the way in which responsibilities were divided between Belfast and London under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act and 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty Northern Irish politicians and representatives sometimes found themselves at a disadvantage. They were excluded from many central planning forums and

⁷³ Ibid., p. 65.

⁷⁴ O’Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p. 169.

⁷⁵ Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf*, p. 234.

⁷⁶ Philip Ollerenshaw, ‘War, Industrial Mobilisation and Society in Northern Ireland, 1939-1945’, *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May, 2007) p. 172.

⁷⁷ Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 445.

⁷⁸ Ollerenshaw, ‘War, Industrial Mobilisation and Society in Northern Ireland’, pp. 174-6.

the effectiveness of their lobbying for war contracts was hampered.⁷⁹ In other ways Northern Ireland did share all the wartime privations of Britain. ‘Real effort and sacrifice were involved not just in military terms’, agricultural output was significantly increased, and heavy industry produced warships and aeroplanes.⁸⁰ By the spring of 1941 the linen industry was at almost full capacity.⁸¹

On the nights of 15-16 April 1941 Belfast was heavily bombed by the Luftwaffe. In a gesture of solidarity, ignoring traditional divisions, de Valera ‘immediately despatched to Northern Ireland all the fire-fighting assistance that could be mustered’.⁸² The raid caused extensive damage to the city’s newspaper premises and for a short time the *Belfast Telegraph* printed the editions of its unionist contemporaries the *Belfast News Letter* and *Northern Whig* and the nationalist *Irish News*, as well as its own.⁸³ It should be noted that neutrality did not protect the independent Irish state from bombing. On 31 May 1941 parts of Dublin were damaged by German aircraft led astray when the British Research Station to combat bombing interfered with the wireless beam used by the German aeroplanes to identify their targets. On 26 August 1940 a creamery and railway station were bombed in Wexford. In both cases the Germans admitted responsibility and agreed to pay compensation for the loss of life and damage to property.⁸⁴

In January 1942 the first United States troops in Europe arrived in Northern Ireland. This location was not chosen randomly. Francis M. Carroll has identified the objective as both military and political. The American forces would replace British troops for redeployment to the Middle East and provide for the defence of the whole of Ireland in the event of a German invasion. They would complete their training in the war zone and it was hoped that their presence would provide a moral or sentimental inducement to the independent Irish state to enter the war on the side of the

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 180-1.

⁸⁰ Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 449.

⁸¹ Ollerenshaw, ‘War, Industrial Mobilisation and Society in Northern Ireland’, p. 184.

⁸² Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 125.

⁸³ Hugh Oram, *The Newspaper Book: A History of Newspapers in Ireland, 1649-1983* (Dublin: MO Books, 1983) p. 209.

⁸⁴ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 125-4.

Allies.⁸⁵ The response in Dublin was to use it as an opportunity to reassert the state's neutrality and opposition to partition.⁸⁶ Reacting to the arrival of the American forces de Valera declared that 'no matter what troops occupy the six-counties, the Irish people's claim for the union of the whole national territory, and for supreme jurisdiction over it, will remain unabated'.⁸⁷

The presence of American troops in Northern Ireland led to the emergence of tensions between Dublin and the Allies in the build up to the D-Day landings in 1944. It was feared that the presence of Axis legations in neutral Ireland and the porous border posed a security risk as preparations for the invasion of Normandy intensified. On 21 February the United States representative in Dublin, David Gray,⁸⁸ presented a letter to de Valera outlining these concerns and requesting that neutral Ireland expel the Axis diplomatic representatives. The following day the British representative, Sir John Maffey,⁸⁹ signalled his government's support of the sentiments.⁹⁰ The resolution of the 'American Note' affair, as it became known, provides an example of the 'double game' de Valera and his government played during the war. When Gray's actions became public knowledge they were 'greeted in Ireland with a mixture of outrage and defensiveness'.⁹¹ De Valera, understandably, rejected the request outright on 7 March. As Wills has commented, to sever 'diplomatic relations with either side, especially under duress from the other, would have sounded the death knell of neutrality'.⁹² In the meantime, however, and unknown to the public, G2 had held a meeting with representatives of both the American and British intelligence services. The various possibilities for security leakages were discussed and the Allied representatives made suggestions as to how to tighten up the weak points in Irish intelligence operations. They left Dublin satisfied that

⁸⁵ Francis M. Carroll. 'United States Armed Forces in Northern Ireland During World War II', *New Hibernia Review / Iris Éireannach Nua*, Vol. 12, no. 2 (SAMHRADH / SUMMER, 2008), p. 20.

⁸⁶ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 122.

⁸⁷ *Irish Times*, 28 January 1942, p. 1.

⁸⁸ Bernadette Whelan, 'Gray, David', *DIB*,

<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a3590>, accessed 24 July 2013.

⁸⁹ Niall Keogh and Bridget Hourican. 'Maffey, John Loader', *DIB*,

<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5323>, accessed 24 July 2013.

⁹⁰ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 155.

⁹¹ Wills, *That Neutral Island*, p. 387.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 386.

G2 'would continue to be as efficient as [...] in the past in countering Axis espionage in Ireland'.⁹³ De Valera emerged as victor in popular political terms and with enhanced prestige that he put to good use in helping to set up the Fianna Fáil general election victory of 1944.⁹⁴

When events surrounding the note became public knowledge the American press directed particularly severe criticism at neutral Ireland.⁹⁵ Joseph P. Walshe, secretary at the Department of External Affairs, reported a discussion on the matter with Maffey in a memorandum to de Valera on 14 March. Maffey had revealed that the details of the note and de Valera's reaction had been known in Dublin within twenty-four hours of its presentation and that Gray was the source. Walshe then pointed out that the American newspapers had cited an Associated Press (AP) report with a Belfast date-line. An article on the matter had been stopped in the *Observer* and other British publications by the British Censor following an appeal to the Dominions Office on behalf of Dublin by Maffey's secretary, Norman Archer. The *Observer's* source had apparently been Washington.⁹⁶ A coded telegram to Robert Brennan, Irish minister to the United States,⁹⁷ the following day stated that the story had not got out through the Dublin Censor. It was concluded that it must therefore have been passed by the British censorship apparatus. It confirmed that the first real break appeared to have been an AP telegram from Belfast.⁹⁸ The article's author was AP's correspondent Roger Greene. In internal AP correspondence he confirmed to the Robert Bunnelle, chief of bureau in London, that Gray was his source.

The story of Minister Gray's interview with DeValera [sic] on the presentation of American State Department note to the Eire

⁹³ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 156.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*; Lee, *Ireland*, p. 251.

⁹⁵ Wills, *That Neutral Island*, p. 387.

⁹⁶ Memorandum from Joseph P. Walshe to Eamon de Valera, 14 March 1944, National Archives of Ireland (NAI), Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Secretary's Files A53, *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy (DIFP) Vol. VII*, No. 388, Catriona Crowe, Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh and Eunan O'Halpin (eds.) (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2010), p. 391.

⁹⁷ Michael Kennedy. 'Brennan, Robert', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a0934>, accessed 26 July 2013.

⁹⁸ Dearg code telegram from the Department of External Affairs to Robert Brennan (Washington) (no. 77), 15 March 1944, NAI, DFA, Secretary's Files A53, *DIFP Vol. VII*, No. 391, p. 393.

Government was told to me by Mr. Gray, with the stipulation that he was not to be quoted as the source.⁹⁹

The pursuit of neutrality during World War II would be seen publicly and politically as an ‘outstanding display’ in the independent Irish state.¹⁰⁰ But the differing experiences of the Irish people and the policies of their respective governments ‘were confirmation of the gap that had opened in Ireland between North and South’.¹⁰¹ The experience of World War II created a state based concept of nationalism¹⁰² in which ‘the focus shifted from the goal of national reunification, to the survival of the partitioned state’.¹⁰³ Externally, as the war drew to a close the government of the neutral Ireland experienced a certain coolness from the Allies and a post-war resentment of Irish neutrality from London and Washington. This would be an attitude that ‘de Valera would find difficult to eliminate in a world shaped by victors’.¹⁰⁴

Irish newspapers and international news in World War II

During World War II the Irish newspapers were primarily reliant on news agency services for their coverage of international events. The operation of censorship restricted the use they could make of this news though, particularly in the independent Irish state. The news they received was mediated through London. Censorship and propaganda functions operated within these British-based agencies, some of them specifically targeted at Ireland.

Ireland’s geographical location and historical connection to British infrastructure meant that the majority of communications, in particular telegraph communications on which news agency services were reliant, had to pass through Britain. In one sense this was of benefit. Britain ‘suffered little damage to its telecommunications plant’ during World War II, in

⁹⁹ Greene to Bunnelle (Copy), 25 March 1944, Associated Press Corporate Archives, New York (AP) 02A.2 Box 6. Subject Files, Series III, Foreign Bureau Correspondence.

¹⁰⁰ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 262.

¹⁰¹ Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf*, p. 220.

¹⁰² Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 299.

¹⁰³ Wills, *That Neutral Island*, p. 424.

¹⁰⁴ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, pp. 157, 159-60.

comparison to France, Greece and Japan for example.¹⁰⁵ Consequently communications continued as normally as possible. It also meant, however, that these communications were subject to British oversight and censorship. Daniel R. Headrick has noted that the British censors ‘allowed coded telegrams to and from neutral embassies in London, but those transiting Britain on their way to neutral Eire [sic] were held up for twenty-four hours’.¹⁰⁶ With regard to news services this also meant that the ‘Irish control was merely the last of a number of censorship filters through which all coverage was passed’.¹⁰⁷ Ó Drisceoil has noted that during World War II there was ‘no Irish news agency and no Irish paper could afford a foreign correspondent’.¹⁰⁸ Consequently Irish newspapers were primarily reliant on the British PA and Reuters news agencies and the American AP and United Press (UP),¹⁰⁹ supplemented to a degree by news reports from the German news agency issued by the German legation in Dublin.¹¹⁰ He has interestingly pointed out that the position of the Allied news agencies as the dominant news source for Irish newspapers had the effect of shaping their news agenda to a British perspective.¹¹¹ For example, while battles in North Africa received extensive coverage, the crucial Eastern Front ‘remained the most poorly reported part of the whole conflict’. This was partly due to the absence of British and American troops and partly because of the secrecy of the Soviet authorities and the suspicion with which they treated western correspondents. Their communiqués were treated with equal suspicion by the Irish Censor.¹¹² This attitude was a product of the deep-seated anti-communism in Irish political culture. Attacks on Soviet Communism in the press, despite the fact that they constituted criticism of a belligerent after June 1941, were passed on ‘theological and ethical grounds’. Anti-

¹⁰⁵ Daniel R. Headrick, *The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-1945* (New York: OUP, 1991), p. 223.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 298.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*; *idem.*, ‘Censorship as Propaganda’, p. 156; *idem.*, ‘“May We Safely Refer to the Land League?”: Independent Newspapers and Emergency Censorship, 1939-45’ in Mark O’Brien and Kevin Rafter (eds.) *Independent Newspapers: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), p. 97.

¹¹⁰ Ó Drisceoil, ‘Censorship as Propaganda’, p. 156; *idem.*, *Censorship in Ireland*, pp. 117-8.

¹¹¹ Ó Drisceoil, ‘Censorship as Propaganda’, p. 157.

¹¹² Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 121.

communism was one of the reasons why Russia opposed Irish membership of the United Nations in the post-war period.¹¹³

Ó Drisceoil's description of the foreign news supply structures for Irish newspapers in World War II, while correct, deserves some further clarification. Firstly, Irish newspapers also cited the Exchange Telegraph Company (ETC), though its use was limited in comparison to the other agencies. As with Reuters and the PA this was a British agency which, while separate, had significant commercial ties to the PA. Secondly, as has been discussed in previous chapters, the newsgathering practices of the PA and Reuters were by this time highly integrated and cooperative. Further, the PA had exclusive distribution rights to Reuters' news in Britain and Ireland outside London. Indeed from October 1942 Reuters was entitled to use AP's North American service in its own service for Britain and Ireland, and for bulletins in its World Service.¹¹⁴ Thirdly, the AP and UP services delivered to Irish newspapers were designed for British consumption. The AP service was based on its World Service (APWS). It was compiled in the AP office, which from 1942 was leased from the PA in its London headquarters Byron House,¹¹⁵ and edited and distributed outside London by the PA under an exclusive agreement. AP's News Manual (1937-49) described the nature of the service.

The Associated Press of Great Britain distributes in London a complete report of world news to British and Irish newspapers. It is a typical Associated Press report edited for British requirements which demand accuracy speed and brevity.¹¹⁶

The UP service was provided by its Canadian registered subsidiary the British United Press (BUP) which was always keen to assert its British credentials. These were not always fully accepted by British officials

¹¹³ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 208; see also the case study in Chapter Five.

¹¹⁴ Christopher Chancellor, Reuters joint general manager, to Robert Bunnelle, PA chief of bureau, London (Copy), 27 October 1942, AP 02A.2 Box 37. Foreign Bureau Correspondence, London.

¹¹⁵ Edward Davies, PA general manager, to Lloyd Stratton, AP corporate secretary, 16 February 1951, AP 01.4B, Box 37, Series VII: Affiliates and Subsidiaries.

¹¹⁶ News Manual (1937-1949), AP, Reference Files: World Service Listings.

though. Charles Peake of the Foreign Office wrote to W.B. Woodburn of the Civil Service Commission in July 1939 that:

They are of course a Canadian company and are, in theory, entitled to be treated as British. [...] I would certainly tell him [the BUP managing director] everything that we don't mind the Americans knowing, though I doubt whether it would be wise to go much further.¹¹⁷

(It should be noted that this sentiment was expressed prior to American entry into the war, indeed before the outbreak of war.) In the independent Irish state at this time the BUP service was only taken by the *Irish Press*. In Northern Ireland the *Belfast Telegraph* also cited this news agency during World War II. In addition the latter newspaper had its own war correspondents, one assigned to each branch of the British forces.¹¹⁸ The foreign news supplied to newspapers in neutral Ireland during World War II was in fact more centred on Britain, and particularly concentrated in the PA, than Ó Drisceoil suggests.

Ó Drisceoil's has described a regime in Britain that operated 'an elaborate pre-censorship [... that...] achieved its aims by co-operation rather than confrontation with the press'.¹¹⁹ Certainly complaints about heavy handed and restrictive practices that characterised the PA's early experience in World War I are not apparent (see Chapter Two). In the records of its Annual General Meetings (AGMs) these matters are confined to a relatively mild acknowledgement of the 'problems of censorship'.¹²⁰

With the outbreak of World War II Reuters was regarded in government circles as being as important as the BBC in projecting news sympathetic to the British cause both at home and abroad.¹²¹ In this 'the BBC was not simply a medium of news and entertainment: it was a weapon

¹¹⁷ 'Treatment of the British United Press', Charles Peake, Foreign Office, to W.B. Woodburn, Civil Service Commission (Copy), 20 July 1939, The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew (TNA), FO 395/666.

¹¹⁸ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p.51; see the case study later in this chapter for evidence of BUP citation.

¹¹⁹ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 285.

¹²⁰ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1940 in Report of PA AGM, 1941, Guildhall Library Manuscripts Collection, London (GL) MS 35365/14.

¹²¹ Donald Read, *The Power of News: The History of Reuters*, 2nd edn. (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 192.

of war'¹²² and so, by extension, might Reuters be viewed. To this end Reuters secured reduced wireless transmission costs and 'a package of Government payments' totalling £18,000¹²³ a year in return for an expanded overseas service aimed at 'projecting the British case more effectively'.¹²⁴ The handling of these arrangements by Reuter's chairman and managing director, Roderick Jones, would, among other factors, lead to his forced resignation in 1941 (see below).

During the war British censorship 'was generally more flexible than during the First [...though...] still tight and sometimes unpredictable'.¹²⁵ In order to facilitate its operation official censors worked inside the PA and Reuters news rooms.¹²⁶ Between March and September 1944 additional staff was placed in the PA news room with the specific purpose of operating a special censorship on news sent to the whole of Ireland. Though the reason for these additional measures was not specified it was presumably related to monitoring communications in the lead up to D-Day and its aftermath. In the end the 'arrangement caused very little delay or difficulty and the censors did not in fact have much to do'.¹²⁷

These operational changes to newsgathering and distribution were not particularly resented by the British agencies. The PA, distributing Reuters and AP news as well as its own service to the Irish newspapers, 'was not, of course, [seeking] an unqualified freedom to report the news' and it developed 'a particularly cordial and sympathetic relationship with the Censor' according to George Scott.¹²⁸ The ETC developed a similarly cooperative relationship as it was realized, in the words of J.M. Scott, 'that a full news service was essential to morale at home, and a useful weapon abroad – call it propaganda if you will'.¹²⁹

¹²² Siân Nicholas, *The Echo of War: Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 1939-45* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1996), p. 2.

¹²³ Read, *The Power of News*, p.197

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 193-4.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

¹²⁷ PA General Manager's Report Book, 11 October 1944, GL MS 35363/2.

¹²⁸ George Scott, *Reporter Anonymous: The Story of the Press Association* (London: Hutchinson and Co.,1968), p. 233.

¹²⁹ J.M. Scott, *EXTEL 100: The Centenary History of the Exchange Telegraph Company* (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1972), p. 166.

Due to the historical connection of Irish newspapers to the PA and the British news market they would traditionally have received the same service as their provincial British contemporaries. However, this does not seem to have been necessarily the case during World War II. Ó Drisceoil has identified a propaganda function within the news agencies with regard to neutral Ireland through their habit of delivering copy marked for publication in Ireland only.¹³⁰ There is no evidence of this practice in the archives of the British agencies; copies of the news distributed were very rarely preserved. It is, though, consistent with the attitudes described above and the view of the media as a means to distribute propaganda ‘directed at enemy, neutral and occupied countries [...] as necessary and even desirable’.¹³¹ In his study of propaganda directed at neutral Ireland during World War II Robert Cole identifies the role of the Nazi controlled Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (DNB) and the Italian Stefani agencies as channels for Axis propaganda. He also identifies the Ministry of Information (MoI) as a tool for the dissemination of British and Allied propaganda.¹³² He does not pay any notable attention to the role of the American and British news agencies though. This is surprising considering the connections between the British government, MoI and Reuters and the presence of censors in the news rooms of the PA and Reuters, and probably the other agencies, during the conflict, particularly those placed in the PA in 1944 to specifically oversee news distributed to Ireland. Indeed he seems to rather overlook the potential propaganda role of news agencies with regard to Ireland during this period. He comments that ‘the Eire [sic] press continued to report much having to do with the war’ based on news agency material and notes rather quizzically that ‘apparently there were very few Irish correspondents in foreign countries’ at this time.¹³³

When Britain declared war on 3 September 1939 the Censor in the independent Irish state did not have its personnel in place. The editors of the state’s daily newspapers were summoned to a meeting in Government Buildings in Dublin. They were asked not to give publicity to matters that

¹³⁰ Ó Drisceoil, ‘Censorship as Propaganda’, p. 156; idem. *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 117.

¹³¹ Nicholas, *The Echo of War*, p. 2.

¹³² Cole, *Propaganda, Censorship and Irish Neutrality in the Second World War*, pp. 2-3.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

would ‘impair neutrality’. For the next two weeks they operated a ‘voluntary censorship’.¹³⁴ With its staff assembled the Censor contacted the various government departments on 14 September in order to gain their views on what material should come under its remit. With regard to foreign news the Department of External Affairs was to the fore.¹³⁵ On 5 September Walshe, the department secretary, had been urged that:

unless a strong censorship is rigorously imposed on the Press at once, public opinion may get entirely out of control with extremely unfavourable reactions on the Government which in the best interests of the country have adopted the neutrality policy.¹³⁶

He was advised with regard to the Censor’s request, on 15 September, that:

If the Department is to fulfil the special duty laid upon it in the present emergency, to ensure and maintain the status of neutrality vis-à-vis the belligerent States, it is clear that a public opinion must be built up in this country favourable to Irish neutrality at once. A purely negative Press censorship policy will not achieve this end. A positive newspaper campaign would go far to do so.¹³⁷

It was also urged that a constructive attitude should be taken towards the newspapers proprietors considering that ‘they will be asked to sacrifice much of the material which they have to buy on a permanent contract basis from the British controlled Press agencies’.¹³⁸

On 19 September the editors of the major dailies and the *Sunday Independent*, the only Sunday paper published in the state at that time,¹³⁹ once again met the Censor. While the meeting was generally friendly there was a certain resentment among the editors towards the restrictions that were being placed on them. This was particularly felt in relation to the

¹³⁴ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 95.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 95, 98.

¹³⁶ Memorandum from Michael Rynne to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (Copy) (Secret), 5 September 1939, NAI, DFA, Legal Advisers Papers, *DIFP Vol. VI*, No. 9, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/+Furtherance-of-neutrality-policy+/3009.htm>, accessed 2 July 2013.

¹³⁷ Memorandum on the Emergency Powers (No. 5) Order 1939 from Michael Rynne to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) (Copy) (Secret), 15 September 1939, NAI, DFA, Legal Advisers Papers, *DIFP Vol. VI*, No. 24, <http://www.difp.ie/docs/1939/Emergency-Powers/3024.htm>, accessed 2 July 2013.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ Ó Drisceoil, “‘May We Safely Refer to the Land League?’”, p. 103.

freedom to express opinions on the merits and defects of the belligerents and their policies. Apparently Robert ‘Bertie’ Smyllie of the *Irish Times* was most vociferous on this point.¹⁴⁰ Smyllie and his newspaper would have a fractious relationship with the Censor throughout World War II. Censorable material, which was to be submitted for consideration before publication, was initially defined as that relating to: the defence forces; foreign air, naval or military forces; safeguarding neutrality; weather reports; commercial shipping and aircraft; supplies; financial information; and information regarding the civil service. In August 1941 a comprehensive list of censorable material in fifty-one sections was issued. An additional eighteen would be added by the end of the war.¹⁴¹ Material submitted to the Censor would be stopped, passed, or passed subject to restriction on content or time. Failure to comply with directions issued would bring to bear a series of sanctions up to and including the possibility of legal action, though this was never used.¹⁴²

Under a series of Orders under the Emergency Powers Act between September 1939 and January 1941 the Censor received extensive powers: it could direct what could or could not be published, the results of which the newspapers were not permitted to reveal; it was given the power to seize and prohibit the importation of foreign newspapers. From July 1940 it acquired the ability to seize material published domestically. From January 1941 press messages intended for publication outside the state were required to be submitted to the Censor. In February 1942 these Orders were replaced by a single Order significantly strengthening the Censor’s powers. These were now extended to all printed matter. Printers and publishers could be prevented from printing any specified matter and ordered to resubmit for censorship before printing or publication. The powers of seizure were extended to materials which were not documents, such as badges and effigies. All press messages for publication outside the state, excepting sporting and social, were now subject to approval.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 95-6.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 98.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-3

During the war the Censor's powers to seize imported newspapers were exercised on five occasions and fifteen titles were suppressed for varying periods.¹⁴⁴ These actions were primarily aimed at articles critical of Irish neutrality or seen to be contravening the Censor's rules on internal news, though atrocity stories were suppressed in the *Sunday Chronicle* in 1941.¹⁴⁵ Prior to the outbreak of World War II British daily and weekly newspapers had enjoyed a healthy circulation in Ireland, though this had been declining in the late 1930s.¹⁴⁶ Despite the introduction of tariffs on imported newspapers during the 'economic war', in the early to mid-1930s English daily newspapers had a circulation in the region of 170,000 copies compared to approximately 280,000 for Irish dailies. In addition some 350,000 imported Sunday newspapers were sold each week.¹⁴⁷

By the late summer of 1941 the sale of British newspapers in the independent Irish state had declined by approximately sixty percent.¹⁴⁸ The actions of the Censor had some impact on this development, in 1940 the *Daily Mirror* and *Cavalcade* ceased Irish circulation following suppression.¹⁴⁹ There was also a resentment and incomprehension, even unwillingness to accept, Irish neutrality among at least some publishers. The withdrawal of the *Daily Express* in 1941 'was considered by some to have been a political decision of Lord Beaverbrook [intended] as a means of showing his dislike of Irish neutrality'.¹⁵⁰ In June 1944 J.C.M. Eason, the largest newspaper wholesaler in the state, wrote to the publisher of *Strand Magazine* attempting to explain the operation of Irish neutrality and the resentment that propagandistic criticism of it could elicit among the public. He received a reply bemoaning that 'it is a great pity that there is not a little more sympathy in Ireland for the English point of view'.¹⁵¹

The decline in the circulation of imported newspapers was particularly affected by supply shortages and distribution problems.¹⁵² By

¹⁴⁴ Ó Drisceoil, 'Censorship as Propaganda', p. 159; idem. *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 190.

¹⁴⁵ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, pp. 188-199.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 188.

¹⁴⁷ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 35.

¹⁴⁸ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 46; Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 188.

¹⁴⁹ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, pp. 194-5.

¹⁵⁰ L.M. Cullen, *Eason and Son: A History* (Dublin: Eason and Son Ltd., 1989), p. 361.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 371.

¹⁵² Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 46.

early 1940 the cross-channel mail boat was no longer reaching Dublin in time to connect with the early morning trains that distributed the newspapers. Even when routed through Belfast delays were experienced.¹⁵³ In time the situation became such that many imported dailies were held over to be distributed with the Dublin dailies the following day.¹⁵⁴ Increasing restrictions and curtailment of public transport facilities further hampered the distribution of all newspapers; by 1942 the Cork-Dublin train journey could take twelve hours.¹⁵⁵ The distribution of newspapers by lorry and bus, adopted to overcome problems with rail distribution, were soon hampered by fuel shortages. These problems of distribution became so severe that deliveries to rural areas practically ceased.¹⁵⁶ The decline in necessary supplies in Ireland led to price increases and a restriction in the availability of newspapers published in the independent Irish state.¹⁵⁷ Commenting on the situation in March 1942 the PA general manager noted that the constraint on newsprint supplies was so severe that it was likely to reach crisis point by May if it was not relieved in some way.¹⁵⁸ Similar supply difficulties combined with distribution problems made neutral Ireland a less attractive market for the British publications. This must be considered as an at least equally important factor in the decline of British newspapers as the operation of the Censor.¹⁵⁹ By the time a security ban was imposed by Britain in March 1944 preventing the supply of all but daily newspapers to Ireland, including Northern Ireland, sales of British newspapers in neutral Ireland were of such negligible proportions that ‘the consequence was not serious’ for Easons.¹⁶⁰

The combined effect of supply and distribution problems, the operation of the Censor, and with regard to broadcasting the problem of recharging batteries where radios were available, meant that ‘for the

¹⁵³ Cullen, *Eason and Son*, p. 360.

¹⁵⁴ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 188.

¹⁵⁵ Cullen, *Eason and Son*, p. 362.

¹⁵⁶ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 188.

¹⁵⁷ Cullen, *Eason and Son*, p. 362.

¹⁵⁸ PA General Manager’s Report Book, 11 March 1942, GL MS 35363/1.

¹⁵⁹ Cullen, *Eason and Son*, pp. 362, 369.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 364.

majority of Irish people who stayed at home, the conflict was distant from their own concerns'.¹⁶¹

The regime that operated in Northern Ireland under the direction of the Minister of Information has been described as draconian in some quarters, but has been little documented.¹⁶² With regard to neutral Ireland the unionist newspapers from Northern Ireland did not have any significant circulation. They did not therefore draw particular attention from the Censor. The nationalist publications could be relied upon to be sympathetic to the cause and requirements of neutrality.¹⁶³ Eamon Phoenix has noted that the *Irish News*, for example, was 'unswerving' in its support for the policy.¹⁶⁴

With regard to neutral Ireland some of the most famous stories of newspapers' battles with the Censor relate to the *Irish Times* and its editor, Smyllie. Though the newspaper had by this time made its peace with the independent Irish state and begrudgingly supported neutrality it was clear that the traditionally pro-British publication and its editor were not going to accept the Censor's restrictions complacently.¹⁶⁵ It should be noted that Smyllie's strong anti-Fascism almost certainly informed his attitude to the belligerents as well. Consideration was given by the Censor to allowing the *Irish Times* some leeway in the opinions it expressed considering its well known pro-British stance. However this was rejected on the grounds that Germany might plead ignorance of this knowledge and use it as an example of contravention of neutrality. This was considered particularly pertinent considering that the *Irish Times* was the only Irish newspaper that Britain allowed free transit through neutral countries to Germany.¹⁶⁶ The paper had numerous run-ins with the Censor as the war progressed and in January 1940 was ordered to submit all material prior to publication following a report it carried of a speech by Senator Frank McDermott calling for Irish

¹⁶¹ Wills, *That Neutral Island*, pp. 3-4.

¹⁶² Horgan, *Irish Media*, pp. 50-1.

¹⁶³ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 199.

¹⁶⁴ Eamon Phoenix, 'The History of a Newspaper: the *Irish News*, 1855-1995' in Eamon Phoenix (ed.) *A Century of Northern Life: The Irish News and 100 Years of Ulster History* (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 1995), p. 31.

¹⁶⁵ O'Brien, *The Irish Times*, pp.13, 101-2.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 106-7.

ports to be opened to the British and French navies. The order was lifted in February but by mid-1940 Smyllie was once again drawing the Censor's ire over his editorial content. In August 1941 the paper was ordered to submit all leading articles and editorial material, after it expressed support for the British-Soviet invasion of Iran, and in October the same year to submit all book reviews. From the end of December 1942 it was ordered to submit all proof material in full prior to publication after the Censor objected to its carrying a reminder of the British monarch's Christmas Day broadcast and a report of a speech day at a school in Northern Ireland under the headline 'Services to Empire'. These restrictions remained in place until the end of the war.¹⁶⁷ Some of Smyllie's more amusing mechanisms to get around the Censor's blue pencil included the method he adopted in reporting the experience of a former *Irish Times* staff member, John A. Robinson, who had joined the British navy. The ship on which Robinson was serving was torpedoed. In order not to fall foul of the restrictions on reporting the presence of Irishmen serving in the Allied forces Smyllie announced in the paper that 'The many friends in Dublin of Mr John A. Robinson, who was involved in a recent boating accident, will be pleased to hear that he is alive and well'.¹⁶⁸ On Victory in Europe Day the paper's proofs were as usual submitted to the Censor, including an unusually high number of single column photographs of Allied war leaders. When the approved proofs were received back Smyllie rearranged the images to form a full page 'V' for victory on the front page,¹⁶⁹ though one would like to think it may also have been a concluding gesture at the Censor from the famously idiosyncratic editor. Despite its struggles with the Censor the paper was supportive of de Valera's response to the 'American Note' issue and came to his defence when Churchill criticised Irish neutrality in a speech at the end of the war.¹⁷⁰

The *Irish Independent* submitted less material to the Censor than its contemporaries throughout the war and operated a form of self-censorship aimed at avoiding the authorities.¹⁷¹ This did not prevent it having some

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 101-121 passim.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 113.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. p.119.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 117, 121.

¹⁷¹ Ó Drisceoil, "May We Safely Refer to the Land League?", p. 101.

material censored. It was ordered to submit proofs in full between 6-30 August 1940. In December 1940 it was prevented from publishing articles describing the experience of Irish people in the Blitz.¹⁷² Between February 1942 and February 1945 there were five occasions on which the newspaper was published without a leading article due to censorship interference,¹⁷³ the *Irish Times* reacted in a similar way in November 1944.¹⁷⁴ The *Irish Independent's* Sunday publication had an occasionally fractious relationship with the Censor and was threatened with full submission in June 1943, though this was never imposed.¹⁷⁵ Its evening title, the *Evening Herald*, was 'extremely compliant'.¹⁷⁶

The *Irish Press* was fully in support of neutrality and the government's position, 'as the war loomed the paper spoke down to the electorate effectively telling it what its duty was'.¹⁷⁷ The paper came under particular scrutiny from the Axis representatives in Dublin, who placed upon it 'the demands of strict neutrality', due to its connections to the Fianna Fáil party.¹⁷⁸ This led to a 'rather precarious relationship with the press censor'.¹⁷⁹ In particular the paper complained that it was being unfairly targeted for censorship as a counter foil to the *Irish Times's* well known pro-British stance. If the *Times* complained of the Censor's actions the, unduly harsh, treatment of the *Press* would be held up as an example of impartiality it argued.¹⁸⁰ Though never ordered to submit in full it was subject to an order to submit all pictorial matter and photographs between August and October 1944. From 14 January 1945 it was required to submit its 'Film Notes' following an unauthorised mention of the Allied troop entertainment service ENSA.¹⁸¹

Due to the *Cork Examiner's* distance from the Censor in Dublin it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for it to submit matter prior to

¹⁷² Ibid., pp. 97-8.

¹⁷³ Ibid., pp. 102-3.

¹⁷⁴ O'Brien, *The Irish Times*, p. 118.

¹⁷⁵ Ó Drisceoil, "'May We Safely Refer to the Land League?'" , pp. 103-2.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 104-5.

¹⁷⁷ Mark O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001), p. 74.

¹⁷⁸ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 139.

¹⁷⁹ O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, p.76.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 170.

publication other than by telephone.¹⁸² John Horgan has commented that ‘its conservative management operated a type of self-censorship under the censor’s benign but distant supervision’.¹⁸³ This did result in some embarrassing episodes. In November 1943 the Censor drew attention to twenty-five instances of the paper and its evening title, the *Evening Echo*, committing minor breaches of the regulations between January 1942 and October 1943. Despite this relations between the Censor and the *Cork Examiner* remained cordial throughout the war.¹⁸⁴

When the censorship regime was lifted in the independent Irish state on 11 May 1945 the *Irish Times* was free to vent its spleen against the ‘draconian and irrational’ Censor. Over the following weeks it published a series of photographs on its front page that had been suppressed during the war under the title ‘They Can be Published Now’. Included in this series was the picture of Little skating mentioned above.¹⁸⁵ The *Irish Independent* raged against the ‘stupid, clumsy and unjust’ Censor and the *Sunday Independent* condemned its ‘petty tyranny’.¹⁸⁶ The *Irish Press*, in contrast, toed the party line and paid tribute to ‘the sense and impartiality which characterised the very difficult work’ of the Censor. It also justified actions against agency news reports on the grounds that during wartime they operated as propaganda outlets for the belligerents.¹⁸⁷ This is an interesting position considering the *Irish Press* had become a shareholding member of the PA in 1941 (see below).

The corporate and commercial relationship of Irish newspapers to international news during World War II

Despite the restrictions and privations of war suffered by the people and press of Ireland the newspapers remained connected to the PA and the structures and systems of international news supply discussed in previous chapters. Certainly the lack of an alternative source of international news, as noted above, was a key factor in this. However, this continued connection

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 175.

¹⁸³ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 44.

¹⁸⁴ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 176-7.

¹⁸⁵ O’Brien, *The Irish Times*, p. 119.

¹⁸⁶ Ó Drisceoil, “‘May We Safely Refer to the Land League?’”, p. 106.

¹⁸⁷ O’Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, p. 78.

can also be viewed as part of the actions of ‘well-to-do businessmen – both Catholic and Protestant – [who] maintained links to Britain through education, marriage, social ties, *business and financial interests*, not to mention inclination’ (my emphasis).¹⁸⁸

The PA’s Order Books for the early part of World War II list a number of Irish newspapers. The Members Order Book for the period 1936-40 contains the *Belfast News Letter*, *Belfast Telegraph*, *Derry Journal*, *Derry Standard*, *Irish News*, *Londonderry Sentinel* and *Northern Whig* from Northern Ireland. In the independent Irish state the *Cork Examiner* and its evening title the *Evening Echo* are listed along with the *Dublin Evening Mail*, *Irish Times* and *Irish Independent* plus the latter’s evening title the *Evening Herald* and its Sunday edition.¹⁸⁹ The Non-Members Order Book for the same period lists eight Irish titles, all from the independent Irish state.¹⁹⁰

<i>Table 4.1. Irish newspapers listed in the Press Association Non-Members Order Book, 1939-40</i>	
<i>Connacht Observer</i> , Galway	<i>Liberator</i> , Tralee
<i>Irish Press</i> , Dublin	<i>Limerick Echo</i>
<i>Kerry News</i> , Tralee	<i>Waterford Evening News</i>
<i>Kilkenny Post</i>	<i>Waterford Star</i>

The newspapers listed in the Members Order Book produces a familiar collection of titles at this point. However, a comparison of the above table with those in previous chapters reveals a notable decline in non-member orders. This is particularly noticeable with regard to the inter-war period where twenty-three Irish newspapers appear for the period 1928-36 (Table 3.1) and fifteen for 1936-39 (Table 3.3). Whether this is a product of declining interest in international news, the closure of titles or the effect of wartime restrictions on newspaper production is unclear.

As with similar examples in previous chapters, the records in the Order Books are fragmentary and seem to refer to exceptional orders rather

¹⁸⁸ Wills, *That Neutral Island*, p. 23.

¹⁸⁹ PA Members Order Book, 1936-40, GL MS 35467/3.

¹⁹⁰ PA Non-Members Order Book, 1936-40, GL MS 35468/3.

than annual subscriptions. This supposition is supported by two factors that might reasonably seem to be connected. Firstly, there are no Order Books present in the archive for the post-1940 period. Secondly, this date coincides with a change in the PA's services and pricing structure. In a preamble to the tariff for 1941 it was announced that the combination of subscription services and 'Offered Specials' (exceptional orders) that the PA had previously operated would be done away with and a Comprehensive Service would be introduced. For morning papers this would include: General Evening news; Reuters Empire and Foreign General News; PA Empire and Foreign Special news; PA War Special; Parliamentary news; Court Circulars; Weather Forecasts (suspended for the duration of the war); Morning Express, containing extracts from the London morning dailies (not available for evening newspapers); Golf; General Sports; Racing, which replaced a plethora of services; Cricket; and Football, including both association and rugby union and league. There were still a number of additional services offered of which the APWS was one. Morning and evening newspapers would be charged the same subscription price. Previously evening titles had paid less than their morning contemporaries. Charges would be based on a sliding scale determined by the newspapers' circulation, bringing the PA into line with the operations of news agencies in other countries.¹⁹¹ The new charges ranged from £2,050 per annum for those with a circulation of more than 200,000 copies daily to £1,300 for those whose circulation was less than 20,000.¹⁹² In comparison the charge for the less extensive Combined Service, introduced in 1924 and by 1940 called the Complete Service, was £1,128 for morning papers including the Parliamentary Special, regardless of circulation. Subscription charges for weekly, bi-weekly and tri-weekly publications would be quoted on application to the general manager.¹⁹³ The previous principle applied by the PA in these cases was to charge *pro-rata* for the days on which news was supplied and it would seem reasonable to suggest that a similar policy was

¹⁹¹ Scott, *Reporter Anonymous*, p. 239.

¹⁹² PA Tariff, 1941, GL MS 35460/14.

¹⁹³ PA Tariff, 1940, GL MS 35460/14.

adopted. The change in pricing structure was justified on the grounds that the PA

does not sell news. It sells the right to reproduce news. It seems, therefore, equitable that those who reproduce it in a larger number of copies should pay more than those who reproduce it in a smaller number.¹⁹⁴

The reason for these innovations was the need to balance the PA's finances. Previously income had comprised subscription services, provided at a loss, supplemented by charges to newspapers for the 'Offered Specials' and revenue from non-newspaper sources. It was also argued that the new model would 'allow the Editor-in-Chief to ensure that the coverage of everything is adequate for all reasonable editorial needs'.¹⁹⁵ Subscribers who might face increased subscription costs under the new system were asked to consider the saving they would make when they included their previous expenditure on 'Offered Specials'. The evidence from the Order Books suggests Irish newspapers were certainly using these additional services. At the same time the PA also made a new arrangement with the London newspapers whereby an 'All-in' service was supplied in return for a bulk payment from their representative body, the NPA. The London publications then worked out how the cost should be shared among themselves.¹⁹⁶

With the outbreak of war, prior to the introduction of the Comprehensive Service and new pricing model, the PA had announced the introduction of a War Special in a message over the private wire system. Its general manager, Edward W. Davies, confirmed the details in a circular letter on 5 September 1939. The War Special was to be organised in conjunction with Reuters, maintaining practices developed during World War I and continued during the inter-war period. It would only be available to those subscribers currently taking the Reuters Class I or II service and would be priced at £15 15s.

¹⁹⁴ PA Tariff, 1941, GL MS 35460/14.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Scott, *Reporter Anonymous*, p. 239.

War news now being given in the Reuter and Foreign Special Services will cease to be included in those Supplies when the War Special starts. The Reuter I and II and Foreign Special will, of course, be continued to cover overseas news not directly concerned with the War.¹⁹⁷

The tariff for 1941 included a further circular from Davies pointing out a reduction in the price of Reuters Class I and II and the PA's Foreign Special services, presumably due to the significant amount of news being diverted from these services to the War Special. In addition general sports and golf reports had been reduced in price due to wartime restrictions and the weather service had been discontinued. Racing services were maintained at their pre-war price 'as the Authorities will make every endeavour to carry through a normal programme'.¹⁹⁸ In 1940 when English racing was cancelled due to bad weather early in the year and suspended for three months in the summer it was replaced with Irish racing.¹⁹⁹ When racing was suspended later in the war the PA-ETC Joint Service also supplemented Irish results and reduced subscription costs to eighty percent of the pre-war charge.²⁰⁰ Increased charges were introduced for the Comprehensive Service in 1943 and 1944. This was due to the combined effects of increased news gathering costs for both the PA and Reuters; decreased revenue from discontinued services for the PA; and increased charges from Reuters due to lost markets.²⁰¹ There is no evidence of newspapers in neutral Ireland either seeking or receiving discounts or rebates due to the restrictions imposed on them by the Censor that were distinct from PA subscribers in Britain and Northern Ireland. Presumably, then, they did have to sacrifice much of the material they received, as predicted in the Department of External Affairs memorandum on the Emergency Powers (No. 5) Order 1939 (see above). How constructive the Censor's attitude was as a result is debatable.

¹⁹⁷ Circular, Edward W. Davies, PA general manager (Copy), 5 September 1939, GL MS 35460/14.

¹⁹⁸ Circular, Edward W. Davies, PA general manager (Copy), 6 December 1940, GL MS 35460/14.

¹⁹⁹ Report of PA AGM, 1941, GL MS 35365/14.

²⁰⁰ Minute Book of the Joint Service Committee, 14 April 1943, GL MS 23136/1.

²⁰¹ PA Tariff, 1943, 1944, GL MS 35460/14; PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1942 in Report of PA AGM, 1943, GL MS 35365/14

During World War II there was a notable absence of representatives from Irish newspapers at PA AGMs compared to their attendance patterns in the preceding decades. In 1940, the first held after the outbreak of war, James Henderson, of the *Belfast News Letter* attended. He was chairman of the PA 1940-41 and remained on the board for the duration of the war. During the war he was also a director of the PA Share Purchase Company. He was first appointed to this position for the period 1935-43 and reappointed 1943-47.²⁰² He was joined at the AGM in 1940 by Joseph McKaig of the *Belfast Telegraph*. Both also attended in 1941 and 1942. In 1943 and 1944 Henderson was the sole Irish representative. At the 1945 AGM, which was held in May shortly before the end of the war in Europe, he was joined by Thomas Crosbie of the *Cork Examiner*.²⁰³ It would, however, be difficult to argue that this was a continuation of the declining attendance at PA general meetings, particularly for newspapers from the independent Irish state, discussed in the previous chapter. A far more reasonable explanation would be the difficulties of travel during wartime. The disruptions caused to newspaper distribution discussed above would have had an equal effect on passenger journeys. Such difficulties were described in a letter from Henderson to Jones, Reuters' chairman and managing director, apologising for his absence from a Reuters board meeting. In particular he identified the problem of sleeping berths from Belfast being commandeered and the difficulty in obtaining permits to travel between Britain and Ireland.²⁰⁴ Representatives from the newspapers in neutral Ireland would presumably have experienced similar difficulties, though not commandeering.

Interpretation of the attendance pattern of Irish newspapers at PA AGMs as evidence of Irish disengagement from the organisation during this period is equally refuted by the attendance of seven delegates from Irish

²⁰² PA Share Purchase Company Register of Members and Directors, GL MS 35408/1.

²⁰³ It is interesting to note that this was Crosbie's first appearance at a PA AGM since he took control of the *Cork Examiner* following his father's death in 1934, in the intervening years the paper had been represented by his younger brother George. See Pauric J. Dempsey, 'Crosbie, George', *DIB*,

<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2229>, accessed 28 July 2013

²⁰⁴ Henderson to Jones, 12 September 1939, Reuters Corporate Archive, London (RA), Roderick Jones Papers (J) Box 72.

newspapers representing eight publications (the *Irish Times* and Dublin *Evening Mail* were represented by a single delegate) at an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) held on 17 October 1941. This meeting was held to discuss the sale of fifty percent of Reuters' shares, by then held in totality by the PA, to the NPA. This is arguably one of the most significant events in the corporate history of Reuters and the PA. It is on a par with Reuters' restructuring during World War I and the PA's purchase of a controlling interest in 1926 and 1931. More recently Reuters' simultaneous flotation on both the London and New York stock exchanges in 1984 and merger with Thomson, the international publishing company, in 2008 stand out as major developments. In order to understand why the 1941 sale came about and why Irish newspapers attended in such comparatively large numbers it is necessary to briefly mention a series of events with pre-war origins.

Donald Read has described in detail the background to the board room manoeuvrings that led to Roderick Jones' resignation as chairman and managing director of Reuters in 1941 and precipitated the share sale to the NPA.²⁰⁵ In particular Jones' mishandling of the events surrounding the collapse of the 'News Ring' in 1934 had severely shaken his fellow directors' confidence in him. George Scott has provided a PA view of Jones 'lording it' over his fellow directors and how 'he considered these men from the provinces his inferiors and that he would have preferred the company around [the board room] table of the peers of Fleet Street'.²⁰⁶ In summary, by the time of his resignation Jones was beset on three sides. Firstly, he was confronted by an increasingly fractious board. Secondly, alongside the official view of Reuters' importance to the British war effort (see above) had grown the opinion that this service was increasingly inadequate. It was felt that internal reorganisation, and specifically the removal of Jones, was necessary. Thirdly, some of Jones' immediate deputies, the Reuters general managers, acted to assist both of these views from within the company.

At a board meeting held on 12 September 1939 Jones had convinced his fellow directors to approve arrangements he had concluded with the government 'for the financing and expansion of overseas news services'.

²⁰⁵ Read, *The Power of News*, pp. 186-214 passim.

²⁰⁶ Scott, *Reporter Anonymous*, p. 212.

This was despite some misgivings as to how this arrangement might be seen to affect Reuters' impartiality.²⁰⁷ During November and December 1940 the Ministry of Information (MoI) began discussions to renegotiate the agreement. Henderson, who was PA chairman 1940-41, revealed his attitude to the proposals and their perceived implications for Reuters' impartiality in a letter to Alexander McLean Ewing, of the *Glasgow Herald* and deputy chairman of the Reuters. He also displayed a growing antagonism toward Jones: 'So far as I'm concerned I'm prepared to torpedo the whole thing – and him [Jones] with it'.²⁰⁸

Negotiations between Reuters and the MoI began in January 1941. During these talks a letter intended to work in conjunction with the 1939 agreement written to Jones by Lord Perth, director-general designate of the MoI in 1939, came to light, largely at the instigation of the MoI. This included a proposal that Reuters would appoint a senior general manager to represent the ministry, effectively providing government control of Reuters' output. Though the terms of this letter were never officially implemented there was enough suspicion over the clauses relating to ministry interference to cause a final breach between Jones and the board forcing his resignation.

Though Jones' protestations with regard to the Perth letter never being accepted may have retrospectively been proved to be correct, this was merely the last straw for the PA-Reuters directors.²⁰⁹ His mishandling of negotiations with AP in 1933-4 had nearly cost the PA its favoured American news source, and did cost them the APWS for a short time. His obfuscatory explanation of the effect the new agreement would have on the PA must have left a bad taste in their mouths (see Chapter Three). His autocratic manner and presumptive behaviour with regard to the 1939 agreement with the government would have further infuriated these proud provincial newspapermen.

By the second quarter of 1941 the PA was the sole shareholder in Reuters. On 8 April the NPA and PA had met following an approach from

²⁰⁷ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 196.

²⁰⁸ Henderson to Ewing, 28 November 1940, RA 1/963514.

²⁰⁹ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 212.

the London papers. A brief presented by Lord Rothermere, proprietor of the *Daily Mail* and chairman of the NPA, stated that:

The recent change in Reuters and the resignation of Sir Roderick Jones presents another opportunity for discussing a Reuters owned by the whole newspaper industry of Great Britain and Ireland [...] It is all wrong that Reuters organisation with world-wide ramifications and supplying news to national papers should be controlled entirely by provincial newspaper interests.²¹⁰

If suitable agreement could not be reached the NPA requested certain reassurances. In particular these were required as to the steps being taken by Reuters to ensure impartiality and reliability in its worldwide newsgathering operations, particularly from a Europe under the control of totalitarian regimes. This was necessary in order for the London newspapers

to determine whether we should remain as subscribers, or organise our own newsgathering and distribution agency, or make other arrangements. We doubt if the provincial newspapers have the experience necessary to satisfy us who have our own representatives in all parts of the world.²¹¹

Negotiations were pursued in the following months and by late September the majority of the PA board were in favour of the sale and creating a trust to control Reuters. Support for the sale was not unanimous though and Henderson was one of the key detractors.²¹²

Though approved at the EGM the sale of the shares to the NPA provided one of 'the sharpest and most serious differences of opinion in the history of the P.A.'²¹³ Between 30 September and 3 October the PA secretary received twenty-five letters and telegrams from members requesting an EGM to discuss the proposed sale of Reuters shares to the NPA. Among these were letters from the *Belfast Telegraph* and the

²¹⁰ Memorandum by Ewing summarising Rothermere's brief, 25 June 1941, RA 1/963518.

²¹¹ Report of PA EGM, 17 October 1941, GL MS 35365/14.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Scott, *Reporter Anonymous*, p. 226

Northern Whig and a telegram from the *Cork Examiner*.²¹⁴ It cannot be proven that all the requests for an EGM were from newspapers opposing the sale, though at least one ‘wish[ed] to enter [a] strong protest against the sale [of] Reuters share[s]’.²¹⁵ There is an indication that they might have been part of an organised campaign among opponents, many of the communications adopt a similar formula and cited clause fifty-six of the PA’s Articles of Association. Further, it would seem reasonable to suggest that those PA members in favour of the sale would not have demanded the EGM in order to examine the board’s favoured course of action. Notice of the EGM to be held on 17 October was sent out by the PA secretary on 8 October.²¹⁶

When it was convened on 17 October the EGM proved to be a particularly well attended meeting. The chairman greeted those present noting that: ‘Many of you are in this conference room for the first time’.²¹⁷ Of the sixty-seven delegates seven were from Ireland representing eight newspapers. A.L. Collyer represented both the *Irish Times* and the *Evening Mail*, Dublin. The *Irish Times* bought the *Evening Mail* in 1960,²¹⁸ and though this might be seen as evidence of closer corporate links prior to the purchase than previously imagined it is likely that Collyer, the *Irish Times*’ London manager,²¹⁹ was merely acting as a proxy for the *Evening Mail*. He was joined by P.A. Cox, *Irish Independent*, E.J. Hayes, *Northern Whig*, Henderson, *Belfast News Letter*, Joseph McKaig, *Belfast Telegraph*, A. Strachan, *Cork Examiner*, and W.H. Young, *Irish News*.²²⁰ Hayes and Henderson had travelled from Northern Ireland. Henderson was regularly travelling between Belfast and London at this time and Hayes was managing director and the author of the letter to Harvey requesting the EGM on behalf of the *Northern Whig*. McKaig was editor of the *Belfast Telegraph*’s

²¹⁴ W. Baird, *Belfast Telegraph*, to E.J. Harvey, PA secretary, 1 October 1941; E.J. Hayes, *Northern Whig*, to Harvey, 1 October 1941; Crosbie, *Cork Examiner*, to Harvey (telegram), 3 October 1941, GL MS 35612.

²¹⁵ Charles Hyde, *Birmingham Post*, to PA Secretary (telegram), n.d., GL MS 35612.

²¹⁶ Report of PA EGM, 17 October 1941, GL MS 35365/14.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ O’Brien, *The Irish Times*, p. 159.

²¹⁹ ‘Collyer, Arthur Lionel (?-1949)’, *Scoop!* [Biographical dictionary of British and Irish journalists, 1800-1960], http://www.scoop-database.com/bio/collyer_arthur_lionel, accessed online 3 August 2013.

²²⁰ Report of PA EGM, 17 October 1941, GL MS 35365/14.

London office²²¹ and had frequently attended general meetings on its behalf in the inter-war period. Travelling from Ireland, particularly the neutral state, to attend the meeting in London at short notice would not have been easy at this time. It is possible therefore that Cox, Strachan and Young were also attached to their respective newspapers' London offices. Their names do not otherwise appear in the lists of general meeting delegates either before or after this meeting. Even though five of the seven Irish delegates may not have actually travelled from Ireland it is still significant that this many attended, representing over ten percent of the total delegates, particularly considering the pattern of declining Irish attendance at PA general meetings from the mid-1930s discussed in the previous chapter. This demonstrates that the major Irish daily newspapers were still engaged with, and concerned about, the PA's fortunes and future.

Ewing, as chairman, opened the meeting and spoke first outlining the board majority's arguments in favour of the share sale to the NPA. These were, briefly, that Reuters would benefit from the expertise that the NPA would bring to the running of the agency and summarised as:

- (1) The conviction that a stronger Reuters will result from the N.P.A. being associated with us in the direction of the company;
- (2) That I am satisfied with their good faith, and I am convinced that all their efforts will be directed towards improving Reuter services and therefore improving the value of the investment they are making;
- (3) and, lastly while I regard the financial advantages to the P.A. as very great, neither I nor any member of the Board would have agreed to the sale of shares for reasons of finance only.²²²

Henderson spoke first on behalf of those opposed to the sale. The objection was not based specifically on bringing members of the NPA onto the Reuters board but to the implications that the sale of shares would have. He believed that this would be 'detrimental alike to the interests of the P.A. and Reuters'. He described the NPA's negotiating stance as characterised by

²²¹ 'McKaig, Joseph (1883-?)', *Scoop!* [Biographical dictionary of British and Irish journalists, 1800-1960], http://www.scoop-database.com/bio/mckaig_joseph, accessed 3 August 2013.

²²² Report of PA EGM, 17 October 1941, GL MS 35365/14. Subsequent quotations from this EGM are drawn from the same source.

threats and pressures to the PA board, such as withdrawing their custom from Reuters and setting up an alternative news agency if they were not sold the shares. He also believed that they already had an adequate representation in Reuters. This was provided through what he estimated to be an approximately twenty-five percent shareholding in the PA through their provincial editions and provincial newspapers that they owned or controlled. As a result of these factors the share sale would lead to a domination of Reuters and the PA by the NPA, whose good will could not be relied upon.

A resolution was moved by R.A. Gibb, *Evening Telegraph*, Luton:

That this meeting urges the Directors not to complete the proposed sale of fifty per cent of the issued Share Capital of Reuters Limited to the N.P.A., but to seek the co-operation of London newspapers in the management of Reuters Ltd., while maintaining the control.

Those opposed to the share sale did not reject the involvement of the NPA in Reuters: generally it was accepted that this would be beneficial. Their concerns were focussed on the belief that a fifty percent stake in Reuters in addition to their provincial holding in the PA would lead to London domination of both agencies. Gibbs' resolution was defeated on a show of hands by seventeen to forty-three. Only one vote was allowed per company, not per newspaper title, and in some cases there was more than one representative present though they may have been representing different titles owned by the same company. Collyer was seemingly in a unique position representing two companies. When the resolution was defeated on a show of hands Henderson called for a poll, a count of shares represented by the individual votes, on which the resolution was again defeated by 2,272 to 4,896. A footnote to the report of the meeting records that upon verification, after the meeting had been closed, the poll confirmed that the motion was defeated by 2,288 to 5,024. It further noted that claims that the votes cast by provincial editions of the London newspapers or those allied to them had swung the balance against the motion were not supported by the verification process.

Following approval by the EGM the PA sold fifty percent of its shares in Reuters to the NPA on 28 October 1941.²²³ Thereafter Reuters' operations were guided by an Agreement of Trust which stipulated that the company's shareholders were to regard their investment as 'in the nature of a trust' to ensure the independence of Reuters. Reuters shares would no longer be dividend bearing. The PA and NPA appointed four trustees each and a chairman was appointed by the Lord Chief Justice.²²⁴ In subsequent years shares were sold to the Australian Associated Press and New Zealand Press Association, in 1947, and briefly, between 1949 and 1953 the Press Trust of India.²²⁵

The votes of individual delegates at the EGM are not recorded and other than Henderson no Irish delegate spoke. It is therefore impossible to say which side of the argument they favoured. The *Belfast News Letter*, through Henderson, almost certainly supported the motion. If the assumption that those PA members who called for the EGM did so because they were opposed to the sale it can be further surmised that the *Northern Whig* supported the motion through Hayes. Similarly the *Cork Examiner*, Strachan, and *Belfast Telegraph*, McKaig might be argued as representing votes opposing the sale.

If this suggested interpretation of how the Irish newspapers' delegates may have voted at the EGM is accepted it indicates one further interesting point. This is that the Henderson and Crosbie, who registered the *Cork Examiner's* call for the EGM, continued to share common business attitudes despite their newspapers' traditionally opposing positions in Ireland's politico-religious landscape. This would mark a continuation of attitudes indicated in George Crosbie's seconding Henderson's appointment to the PA board in 1935. This was itself indicative of a much longer tradition of high regard and cooperative business attitudes within an all-Ireland newspaper industry. There is evidence that this all-Ireland behaviour was starting to be affected by legislative boundaries during this period however.

²²³ Trust agreement between the PA and NPA, 28 October 1941, GL MS 35612.

²²⁴ Read, *The Power of News*, pp. 281-92.

²²⁵ Trust agreements 3 March 1947, 1 February 1949, 14 December 1950 and 9 July 1953, GL MS 35612.

The 1941 Trade Union Act in the independent Irish state sought to confine negotiating rights to the largest union in a particular industry and confined these to Irish-based unions.²²⁶ Emmet O'Connor has identified this as the state's 'first attempt at revising the form of trade unionism inherited from the colonial era'.²²⁷ In Northern Ireland, operating under different legislation, the Belfast newspaper proprietors 'revived' the Belfast Newspaper Society.²²⁸ This was prompted in response to representative negotiations between the Newspaper Society and the National Union of Journalists and Institute of Journalists. It was reported in the Newspaper Society's in-house journal, the *Monthly Circular*, in October 1943 that

the Belfast Newspaper Society had intimated that in relation to wages and working conditions of employees of its constituent members it wished to maintain the position, already established, that it was an autonomous body exercising accordingly the right to decide whether or not it accepted agreements negotiated between the [Newspaper] Society and various unions.²²⁹

Therefore the Belfast Newspaper Society was a separate organisation to the Irish Newspaper Society represented in the deputation to the Postmaster General in 1915. Further, unlike the all-Ireland body, it was not affiliated to the Newspaper Society. This is only a minor event with scant archival evidence but it is indicative of a Northern Irish newspaper industry drawing behind its borders. Though there is no evidence of Northern Irish newspapers disengaging from the PA in the way that those in the independent Irish state seemed to have been, this is indicative of a disconnection from another United Kingdom wide newspaper body.

There was a particularly notable development in the Irish association with the PA during the period covered by this chapter. This coincided with events surrounding the 1941 EGM. On the 8 July 1941 the PA general

²²⁶ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 290.

²²⁷ Emmet O'Connor, *A Labour History of Ireland 1824-1960* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1992), p. 143.

²²⁸ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 54.

²²⁹ Newspaper Society (NS) *Monthly Circular (MC)*, Vol. 105 (1943), p. 184. The *Monthly Circular* was not publicly published. It is held in the Newspaper Society's corporate archive in bound annual volumes with continuous pagination; in this case 1934 is Volume 105 and the relevant text is located on page 184.

manager, Davies, reported to the board that the '*Irish Press*, Dublin, has at length decided to become a member of the P.A., and thereby to secure the advantage of members' rates to services'.²³⁰ The sale of ninety-six shares at £10 each was approved by the PA Share Purchase Company on the same day and the deed of transfer was signed on 8 October.²³¹ Consequently the *Irish Press* was fully entitled to attend the EGM that month. It would be tempting to attach significance to this purchase occurring in close proximity to Jones' resignation and the proposed sale of shares to the NPA. One might also consider Britain's improving war prospects and the imminent entry of the United States into the conflict. Both of these points might suggest a lessening of isolationist attitudes and increasing orientation towards the Allies within the *Irish Press*, and by extension de Valera and Fianna Fáil. This would be broadly in keeping with the general trend of official Irish attitudes to the belligerents as the war progressed. There is a far more pragmatic explanation though: the PA's 1941 tariff changes (see above). Prior to the outbreak of war, presuming it was taking the Complete Service including the Parliamentary Special, the *Irish Press* would have been paying just over £1,240 per annum, including a ten percent surcharge for non-members.²³² In addition it may have been paying over £1,000 a year for 'Specials'.²³³ The charge for the Complete Service was reduced to £907 10s during the war, but did not include the War Special which was a further £873 10s: £1,780 total, before any additional 'Specials'. With a circulation of approximately 90,000,²³⁴ under the new pricing structure the *Irish Press*' subscription charge for the Comprehensive Service would have been £1,980. The charge for members was £1,800. Therefore the £960 cost of membership would have been recovered through subscription saving within

²³⁰ PA General Manager's Report Book, 8 July 1941, GL MS 25263/1.

²³¹ PA Share Purchase Company Minute Book, 8 July 1941 and 8 October 1941, GL MS 35406/2.

²³² PA Tariff, 1939, GL MS 35460/13.

²³³ PA Non-Members Order Book, 1936-40, GL MS 35468/3. The Order Books are hand written ledgers with numerous annotations, crossings out and corrections. They are therefore very difficult to decipher accurately. The *Irish Press* appears to have paid over £1300 in 1938 and nearly £500 in 1939 up to the outbreak of war.

²³⁴ O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, p. 45.

six years.²³⁵ Further the value of PA shares, though not dividend bearing, was highly stable and would have remained a standing asset on the *Irish Press*' balance sheet. The only other benefit to holding PA shares was their granting of the right to attend and vote at general meetings and be elected to PA boards. There is, however, no evidence that the *Irish Press* ever exercised these rights in the period covered by this thesis.

As the Allies' prospects improved and the end of the war appeared to be coming in to sight the agencies that provided Irish newspapers with their international news began planning for a post-war world. At the PA's 1944 AGM it was announced that a new contract had been signed with Reuters and the exclusive agreement to handle the APWS outside London had been extended by five years.²³⁶ The value that the PA and AP attached to each others' services has been discussed in the previous chapter. In addition to maintaining access to the PA's service the motivation behind AP's decision to renew the agreement, whereby it operated within the established structures of news supply and distribution in Britain and Ireland rather than seek more open competition, is revealed in internal documentation. In a memorandum to Kent Cooper, AP's general manager, Alan Gould, assistant general manager, wrote in 1944 that

since the Reuter-PA combination has such overpowering advantages, on their home grounds, that AP's best bet is to concentrate on gaining the secondary (or supplementary) position in the British Isles; in other words, outpointing the British United Press.²³⁷

The importance AP attached to out-competing UP in any market is revealed in a memo authored by Lloyd Stratton, assistant general manager, to the AP board:

²³⁵ PA Tariff, 1941, GL MS 35460/14. These figures are dependent on my having got my pounds, shillings and pence sums right, but should be broadly correct.

²³⁶ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1943 in Report of PA AGM, 1944, GL MS 35365/14.

²³⁷ 'Memo for Mr. Cooper', 21 March 1944, AP 02A.2 (1944 Unprocessed), Foreign Bureau Correspondence, London.

I cannot overstate the urgency of meeting the United Press challenge. It is AP's foremost opposition - economically, idealistically, commercially, morally. It must be attacked promptly and relentlessly at every vulnerable spot.²³⁸

In January 1945 the PA, ETC and Reuters signed an agreement governing the gathering and distribution of financial and commercial services. To run initially for fourteen years from 1 April 1945 its purpose was to

firstly eliminate the duplication of market reporting and to substitute a system whereby each market is reported only once; secondly to regulate the agencies through which the resulting pooled service shall be issued.²³⁹

This agreement incorporated the PA-ETC Joint Service as the primary method of distribution for these services in Britain and Ireland outside London. It divided the gathering of information between Reuters and the ETC.

In late 1944 the PA began plans for the third and final extension of the Notes issued to members to fund its initial purchase of Reuters shares in 1926. At a board meeting on 11 October the general manager presented a draft application to the Treasury to enable this alteration. It described the existing private wire infrastructure used to distribute news to the majority of the PA's subscribers and its need for upgrade. It stated that:

It is consequently essential that as soon as conditions permit after the end of the European War, an extensive and costly reorganisation of the Provincial telegraph system shall take place and the London system will also call for enlargement. [...] Although therefore the Association is in a position to repay the Notes on 31 December 1944, the only result of this would be that it would need almost at once to borrow the money again for its vital reorganisation programme.²⁴⁰

²³⁸ AP Reference Files, World Listings. Archive File: World Service, author: Lloyd Stratton, 5 October 1944.

²³⁹ 'Heads of Agreement regarding Commercial and Financial Services between Reuters Ltd., The Press Association Ltd., and The Exchange Telegraph Company Ltd.', January 1945, GL MS 35441.

²⁴⁰ PA General Manager's Report Book, 11 October 1944, GL MS 35363/2.

The PA did subsequently find itself needing to borrow to fund this work. It once again turned to its members with another Note issue for this purpose, which will be discussed in the next chapter. The extension was announced at the 1945 AGM. With an interest rate reduced from five percent to four percent the Notes would now be redeemable on 31 December 1954. This would ‘assist in financing our post-war programme’ it was stated.²⁴¹

As discussed above, during World War II Irish newspapers were primarily reliant on a London-based system of news gathering and distribution. The fall of France in 1940 had resulted in the end of Havas, which had been turned in to a ‘Vichy propaganda organ’. Its post-war successor, Agence France-Presse (AFP), was formed from the combination of the ‘Free French’ agencies, one run by the French authorities in Algiers and the other in based in London funded by the British government.²⁴² In 1933 Wolff had been merged with the German Telegraph Union, nationalised and renamed the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (DNB) under Nazi control.²⁴³ But the system that operated during World War II was essentially the one that had evolved over the preceding seven decades. Irish newspapers had been part of creating, fostering and developing this system. Their large representation at the 1941 PA EGM demonstrated that they were still involved in, and concerned with, its development. Despite the collapse of the ‘News Ring’ in 1934 and a major organisational restructuring of Reuters in 1941 the system remained resilient. Up to this point there was no particular indication that Irish newspapers were dissatisfied with the service. Indeed by 1942 all the major daily newspapers in Ireland were shareholding members of the PA, the system’s linchpin. It should be noted that in the case of the *Irish Press* its 1941 share purchase was almost certainly motivated by the financial benefits of membership.

For both the belligerents and neutral Ireland news and how it was distributed and presented was a major consideration in pursuit of their

²⁴¹ Report of PA AGM, 1945, GL MS 35365/14.

²⁴² Graham Storey, *Reuters’ Century, 1851-1951* (London: Max Parrish, 1951), pp. 212-3, 241.

²⁴³ Jürgen Wilke, ‘The Struggle for Control of Domestic News Agencies (2)’ in Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen (eds.) *The Globalization of News* (London: Sage, 1998), p. 50.

wartime policies. The case studies which follow will compare the coverage of the Dunkirk evacuation in 1940 and the D-Day landings in 1944.

Case Studies: A comparison of the coverage the Dunkirk evacuation (1940) and D-Day landings (1944) in Irish newspapers.

The purpose of these case studies is to examine the effect that the restrictions in reporting and news supply had on the ability of Irish newspapers to present news of two specific and separate events during World War II. Considering the largely common agency sources of news for all Irish newspapers it is designed to reveal how the different censorship regimes in Northern Ireland and neutral Ireland influenced the news presented to the public, particularly with regard to headlines and editorial comment. Due to restriction on time and space the periods of study have been limited. In the case of Dunkirk this is 27 May - 5 June 1940, the period when the Allied troops began their withdrawal to the ports of Northern France and the completion of the evacuation. In the case of D-Day the period covered is 6-12 June 1944, the period between the initial sea and air landings and the Allies securing the beachheads.

Dunkirk perhaps represented the nadir of Britain's fortunes in World War II. German forces had advanced rapidly across Europe, covering 300 miles in three days. Nervous of French armies to the south and having largely corralled the Allied forces in the north, they slowed their advance taking a further three days to cover thirty miles.²⁴⁴ In the subsequent fighting German forces defeated the French and British armies, 'destroying the former and booting the latter off the continent in a frantic evacuation from the last port still in friendly hands'.²⁴⁵ Between 27 May and 4 June 1940 a flotilla of craft, both large and small, evacuated over 330,000 troops. The last British troops were evacuated on 2 June but the evacuation of French troops continued for two more nights. Approximately one third of

²⁴⁴ Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and John Pritchard, *The Penguin History of the Second World War* (London: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 136.

²⁴⁵ Robert M. Citino, 'The German Assault, 1939-1941' in Thomas W. Zeiler, with Daniel M. Dubois (eds.) *A Companion to World War II Vol. I* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), p. 155.

the forces evacuated were not British.²⁴⁶ At this point a German victory in Europe appeared a very real possibility and the United Kingdom seemed isolated. Russia did not enter the war for another year and it would be eighteen months until America assumed belligerent status in December 1941.

Almost exactly four years later the western Allied forces invaded continental Europe with troops drawn from Britain, its Commonwealth and Empire, America and a number of other countries, including Irishmen serving in the Allied forces. The 90,000 air and seaborne troops that landed on D-Day, 6 June 1944, were the advance guard 'of a force of two million drawn from a dozen nations which was to be set ashore in France within the next two months'.²⁴⁷ By this time the war had begun to turn in the Allies' favour and 'it was clear, long before D-Day, that Germany was going to "lose" World War II'.²⁴⁸ Formal planning by the Allies for the invasion of Western Europe had begun at the Casablanca conference in January 1943.²⁴⁹ The D-Day landings marked the beginning of a campaign that would result in the surrender of Germany and the end of the war in Europe almost a year later.

The experience and reaction in the two Irish polities to the development of World War II have been discussed above. It is perhaps useful for the purpose of this case study to reiterate some of the developments in the censorship regime in neutral Ireland. By the time the Dunkirk evacuation took place the majority of powers contained in the Emergency Powers (No. 5) Order of 13 September 1939 were in place. Newspapers were required to submit prior to publication news and editorial matter relating to a number of areas including foreign air, naval or military forces and safeguarding neutrality. Further, the Censor was empowered to issue directions to newspapers prohibiting the publication of 'any specified

²⁴⁶ Calvocoressi, Wint and Pritchard, *The Penguin History of the Second World War*, p. 137.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 539.

²⁴⁸ Christopher R. Gable, 'The Western Front, 1944-1945' in Thomas W. Zeiler, with Daniel M. Dubois (eds.) *A Companion to World War II Vol. I* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), p. 309.

²⁴⁹ Calvocoressi, Wint and Pritchard, *The Penguin History of the Second World War*, p. 538.

matter or any particular class or classes of matter' permanently or for a specified period.²⁵⁰ The Emergency Powers (No. 36) Order of 12 July 1940 granted authority to direct the seizure of material by the Gardaí. On 28 January 1941 the Emergency Powers (No. 67) Order extended the Censor's powers to press messages intended for publication outside the state. These Orders were replaced by the Emergency Powers (No. 151) Order on 17 February 1942. This retained and extended the powers of the Censor under the previous Orders. These now included printed material of all kinds, the prohibition on printing any specified class or classes of matter and the tightening of censorship powers on messages for publication outside the state.²⁵¹

Prior to Dunkirk the *Irish Times* had already fallen foul of the Censor. It had been required to submit all material prior to publication in January and February 1940. From August 1941 it was required to submit all leading articles and editorial material and from December 1942 all proof material in full. Though the other major daily newspapers in neutral Ireland had a less fractious relationship with the Censor, by the time of the D-Day landings they had all come under its gaze in one form or another.

Though official attitudes in neutral Ireland became more benevolent towards the Allies as the war progressed, and the behind the scenes cooperation continued throughout the war, the powers of the Censor were extended and strengthened throughout this period. Tony Gray, who worked in the *Irish Times*' editorial department during World War II, has commented that

between the autumn of 1940 and the summer of 1942 [...] the activities of the Irish press censor were sharply stepped up in the wake of the fall of France.²⁵²

In Northern Ireland the *Belfast News Letter*'s citation of sources with regard to Dunkirk was particularly limited, with only the PA being clearly identified, and that not very often. Its headlines were complimentary of the

²⁵⁰ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 20.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-2.

²⁵² Tony Gray, *Mr Smyllie, Sir* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1991), p. 152.

British forces during this particularly difficult period and included examples such ‘Greatest Rearguard Action in History’²⁵³ and ‘Part the Navy Played – Wonderful Feat of Organisation’.²⁵⁴ In terms of its editorial position it noted how:

For a fortnight now the two forces [British and French] cut off from the main body of Allied armies have been writing their names large upon the pages of military history.²⁵⁵

Upon the completion of the evacuation of British forces it further commented that:

Ere long the British Expeditionary Force will be stronger than ever. As a nation however, we have had a severe lesson, the moral of which is inescapable. Almost with one accord the men who arrived home from Flanders urge the need for more and still more aircraft.²⁵⁶

The troops waiting to be evacuated at Dunkirk did indeed receive a pounding from the Luftwaffe and ‘bitterly reproached the RAF for not protecting them’.²⁵⁷

The *Belfast Telegraph* identified its agency sources far more regularly and cited the BUP, ETC and PA War Special. That is not to say it did not use multiple sources for its copy or sometimes provide none at all. It also produced an article on 1 June entitled ‘The Epic of Dunkirk Evacuation’ by-lined J.B. Firth by arrangement with the *Daily Telegraph* and *Morning Post*.²⁵⁸ Its headlines were also complimentary of the British forces, though tending to dwell on the peril they were facing. They included examples such as ‘Situation Very Grave, Very Confused’,²⁵⁹ ‘British Fall back in Good Order’²⁶⁰ and ‘Embarkation Goes On – All Through the Night

²⁵³ *Belfast News Letter*, 31 May 1940, p. 5.

²⁵⁴ *Belfast News Letter*, 1 June 1940, p. 5.

²⁵⁵ *Belfast News Letter*, 30 May 1940, p. 4.

²⁵⁶ *Belfast News Letter*, 3 June 1940, p. 4.

²⁵⁷ Calvocoressi, Wint and Pritchard, *The Penguin History of the Second World War*, p. 137.

²⁵⁸ *Belfast Telegraph*, 1 June 1940, p. 4.

²⁵⁹ *Belfast Telegraph*, 25 May, 1940, p. 5.

²⁶⁰ *Belfast Telegraph*, 29 May 1940, p. 5.

at Dunkirk'.²⁶¹ A good example of its editorial reaction to these events was provided by its comment, approximately half way through the evacuation, that:

the retreat of an army, dog-tired with strenuous fighting and subject to continuous assault by day, proceeds in good order. [...] When men in desperate straits are at this very hour opposing the enemy without flinching there is no room for black despair.²⁶²

Prior to this it had opined, in what can probably be seen as a criticism of the neutrality of the independent Irish state:

against the gallant efforts of the Dutch and Belgian forces to resist the invader stands the inescapable fact that a strict observance of neutrality has not saved their countries from terrible desolation, bloodshed and absorption for a time at least into a regime totally inconsonant with their democratic traditions.²⁶³

The *Northern Whig* cited the PA War Special, though it too carried a significant amount of copy without any clear attribution. It was by this time carrying news on its front page rather than advertising, it had also adopted the practice of continuing stories covered there on subsequent pages. Its headlines were characterised by praise for the efforts of the retreating troops such as 'B.E.F. [British Expeditionary Force] Make Gallant Stand: Line Held',²⁶⁴ 'Allied Navies Holding Dunkirk Open – Bitter Fighting as Our Troops Retire',²⁶⁵ and 'Triumph of Allied Sea Power – 887 Ships Carryout B.E.F. Withdrawal'.²⁶⁶ It carried no significant editorial throughout the majority of the evacuation but did comment in the early stages that 'such news as we can with safety be allowed to publish suggests that the first furious onslaughts have been arrested and the enemy brought to general battle'.²⁶⁷

²⁶¹ *Belfast Telegraph*, 4 June 1940, p. 7.

²⁶² *Belfast Telegraph*, 30 May 1940, p. 6.

²⁶³ *Belfast Telegraph*, 28 May 1940, p. 4.

²⁶⁴ *Northern Whig*, 28 May 1940, p. 1.

²⁶⁵ *Northern Whig*, 30 May 1940, p. 1.

²⁶⁶ *Northern Whig*, 4 June 1940, p. 1.

²⁶⁷ *Northern Whig*, 27 May 1940, p. 4.

The traditionally nationalist *Irish News* had access to similar sources and operated under the same censorship regime as its unionist contemporaries in Northern Ireland. It too had adopted the practice of carrying news rather than advertising on its front page at the outbreak of World War II.²⁶⁸ It cited the PA, PA War Special and PA Special. It seems likely that in the latter case this was the PA War Special and the different citations were a product of editorial or type-setting mistakes. It also cited the *Times* via the PA and the Official German News Agency. Its headlines were notably less upbeat than the unionist Belfast newspapers and characterised by examples such as “‘Situation Increasingly Grave’”,²⁶⁹ ‘War Weary B.E.F. Comes Home’²⁷⁰ and ‘30,000 B.E.F. Casualties – Evacuation Ends – Nazis Claim Fall of Dunkirk’.²⁷¹ Its editorial comment on the events in northern France were characterised by examples such as the ‘Allied troops in the north are making a desperate bid to reach the coast’²⁷² and ‘heroic efforts are being made to evacuate the Allied troops’.²⁷³ In the aftermath of the evacuation it commented that:

the menace [of Hitler] has to be faced and it is being faced with determination. In Eire as in England precautions are being made to protect the people, and in both countries claims of parties have been forgotten, if not forsaken.²⁷⁴

In these examples the newspaper can be seen treading the line between its traditional political affiliation and the reality of its existence, and that of the majority of its readership, in the belligerent United Kingdom. It was supportive of the Allied troops, critical of Nazism, but equally supportive of the independent Irish state’s right to neutrality and the official measures it took to defend its stance, as Eamon Phoenix has noted.²⁷⁵

In neutral Ireland the *Cork Examiner* cited the PA, PA War Special, AP and the German News Agency. It also carried a notably higher quantity

²⁶⁸ Phoenix, ‘The History of a Newspaper’, p. 31.

²⁶⁹ *Irish News*, 28 May 1940, p. 1.

²⁷⁰ *Irish News*, 31 May 1940, p. 1.

²⁷¹ *Irish News*, 5 June 1940, p. 1.

²⁷² *Irish News*, 30 May 1940, p. 4.

²⁷³ *Irish News*, 31 May 1940, p. 4.

²⁷⁴ *Irish News*, 5 June 1940, p. 4.

²⁷⁵ Phoenix, ‘The History of a Newspaper’, p. 31.

of copy attributed to official communiqués from both sides of the conflict. Frequently the main war news section was made up of numerous paragraphs recounting the reports contained in these. The agency material was primarily located in subsequent articles. Its headlines were notably absent of the partisanship displayed in the Belfast newspapers. They contained examples such as ‘Germans Reinforced from South – London View of Fighting – Situation One of Increasing Gravity’,²⁷⁶ ‘Bitter Fighting as Allies Try to Reach the Sea – Allies and Germans Join Battle in the Streets of Calais and Dunkirk’.²⁷⁷ Its editorial was typified by comments such as: ‘The British and French forces in Belgium were reported yesterday to be retiring to the coast and the Germans were making excellent claims of success’.²⁷⁸ When the evacuation had been nearly completed it commented that:

The evacuation of British and French forces from the Flanders sector, so far as it has progressed, cannot be described otherwise than a great achievement. The Germans are naturally exultant at having compelled the Allies to withdraw, and of course made the operation as difficult as possible.²⁷⁹

In Dublin the *Irish Independent* adopted the practice of containing official communiqués in a specially identified section of its war news entitled ‘War Communiques’. In addition it cited the PA, PA War Special, *Times* Special War Service and the German News Agency. Its headlines were also characterised by a lack of partisanship including examples such as ‘Allies Retreating to Coast – Rearguard Action Covers Withdrawal’,²⁸⁰ ‘Allied Troops Great Feat at Dunkirk – The Germans Held Back – French View of Retreat’.²⁸¹ Its editorial was characterised by comments such as

the Anglo-French forces making their way to the coast at Dunkirk are fighting doggedly and holding their ground in spite of pressure by the Germans from the east and west. [...] ‘How long will this war last?’ is a question that has been frequently discussed. [...] This

²⁷⁶ *Cork Examiner*, 28 May 1940, p. 5.

²⁷⁷ *Cork Examiner*, 30 May 1940, p. 5.

²⁷⁸ *Cork Examiner*, 30 May 1940, p. 4.

²⁷⁹ *Cork Examiner*, 3 June 1940, p. 4.

²⁸⁰ *Irish Independent*, 30 May 1940, p. 7.

²⁸¹ *Irish Independent*, 3 June 1940, p. 7.

conflict may like the 1914-18 struggle, develop in to a war of attrition, and on that supposition it may be of long duration.²⁸²

Upon the completion of the evacuation it commented that:

It is announced by the Allies that the last land and naval forces defending Dunkirk were re-embarked on Monday night. [...] Reporting the capture of the fortress of Dunkirk, the German high command says it was taken after severe fighting. The Germans claim that 40,000 prisoners and booty that cannot yet be estimated, have fallen into their hands.²⁸³

These headlines and editorial comment display a particularly studied attempt to present reports from both sides of the conflict equally. The reference to World War I is interesting though, considering the presence of Irish troops as part of the British army at that time. This may have been a very oblique reference to the presence of Irish men in the present conflict despite the state's neutrality. Equally it may have been a reminder of the economic hardship that a prolonged conflict could produce.

Uniquely among the newspapers examined here the *Irish Press* did not offer any editorial comment on Dunkirk, preferring instead to focus its attention on domestic matters. The paper carried reports of the evacuations on its front page (where since its launch in 1931 it had printed news rather than adverts), these shared prominent space with non-war related and domestic matter. It cited the UP, though in reality this was almost certainly the same BUP service being used by the *Belfast Telegraph*. It is difficult to find common citations and the practice of rewriting agency copy further complicates the identification of common sources. In addition it cited the PA War Special, the German News Agency and official communiqués. As in other examples its main war news section was largely made up of reports drawn from the communiqués with agency-sourced material placed in subsequent columns, often continued inside the paper. Its headlines, where they expressed any detectable partisanship, seemed to favour the ascendant German forces. Examples included 'Increasing Gravity of Allies Position –

²⁸² *Irish Independent*, 1 June 1940, p. 5.

²⁸³ *Irish Independent*, 5 June 1940, p. 6.

Germans Cross Another River, Threaten Ports'²⁸⁴ and 'Last Allied Forces Leave Dunkirk and Wreck Port'.²⁸⁵

Similarly to the other newspapers in neutral Ireland examined here the *Irish Times*' main war news section was primarily composed of reports of official communiqués, though these were sometimes cited within an agency-sourced report. It seemed to dislike referencing the German News Agency, preferring instead to cite communiqués from the German High Command, for example, in other agency sources. The agencies it did cite were the PA, PA War Special and AP. In its headlines it betrayed a trace of its pro-British sympathies including 'Step-By-Step Withdrawal of the B.E.F. – Chosen Units Fight Rearguard Action – Dunkirk, Battered, Held by French Navy',²⁸⁶ 'Allies Holding Flanders Front – Covering Dunkirk Withdrawal – Several B.E.F. Units Arrive in England',²⁸⁷ and 'German Effort at Dunkirk – Shells Poured into Fortified Area'.²⁸⁸ In its editorial it revealed a noticeably pro-Commonwealth and British inclination, despite the Censor's gaze. It commented, for example:

The British Commonwealth commands colossal resources, the fringe of which has not yet been touched. Without a big navy the Germans cannot interfere with them; and even if the entire Expeditionary force should be captured tomorrow, Herr Hitler still would be face to face with the most formidable Power on earth.²⁸⁹

When the evacuation was nearing its end it commented that:

the units that remain in and around Dunkirk are continuing to put up a magnificent fight. The story of this little force's performance in Belgium and Northern France must be numbered among the most magnificent feats of arms in modern history. [...] while the Germans [...] have made 'great strategical [sic] gains', their military leaders will be the first to pay tribute to those British and French troops.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁴ *Irish Press*, 28 May 1940, p. 1.

²⁸⁵ *Irish Press*, 5 June 1940, p. 8.

²⁸⁶ *Irish Times*, 30 May 1940, p. 5.

²⁸⁷ *Irish Times*, 31 May 1940, p. 5.

²⁸⁸ *Irish Times*, 3 June 1940, p. 5.

²⁸⁹ *Irish Times*, 30 May 1940, p. 4.

²⁹⁰ *Irish Times*, 3 June 1940, p. 4.

One of the noticeable differences between the newspapers in Northern Ireland and neutral Ireland in their coverage of Dunkirk is the tendency to much clearer identification of news agency sources in the latter. This is particularly interesting in light of the findings in the case study in the previous chapter where it was the Dublin newspapers that were far more likely to cite multiple sources or none at all. This was almost certainly a product of the Censor's requirement in neutral Ireland that newspapers publish the source of their stories prominently.²⁹¹ This provides the opportunity to confirm the unattributed source of news in Northern Irish newspapers in some cases. For example, in an unattributed report on 29 May the *Irish News* began: 'With their left-wing uncovered by the capitulation of the Belgian Army new dispositions have been taken by the British and French forces in the North'.²⁹² On the same day the *Irish Times* began a report with the same sentence, word-for-word, which it attributed to the PA War Special.²⁹³ This confirms that Irish newspapers, regardless of their politico-religious inheritance or which side of the border they were on, were using common sources of news. This example comes from the traditionally nationalist *Irish News* in Northern Ireland and the traditionally unionist, though by this time more accurately pro-British, *Irish Times* in the independent Irish state. Further it goes some way to confirm the practice of basing copy on an unattributed news agency source or sources.

Almost exactly four years after the withdrawal from Dunkirk the British and Allied forces returned to France. When 20,000 troops began to cross the channel by air in the early hours of 6 June 1944, to be dropped behind the beaches that a further 70,000 would land on at dawn,²⁹⁴ the *Belfast Telegraph*, as an evening paper, had the advantage of its morning contemporaries. In both Northern and neutral Ireland they would have gone to press before the first reports of the landings were released. The *Belfast Telegraph* announced in its headlines on that day 'Allies Land in France –

²⁹¹ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 117.

²⁹² *Irish News*, 29 May 1940, p. 5.

²⁹³ *Irish Times*, 29 May 1940, p. 5.

²⁹⁴ Calvocoressi, Wint and Pritchard, *The Penguin History of the Second World War*, p. 539.

Europe's Greatest Day Successfully Begun' and 'Shelling from the Warships'.²⁹⁵ In its editorial it pointed out that these events were taking place

almost exactly four years after the return of the battered British Army and Allied remnants from France in 1940. Whichever way one looks across the Continent the weeks are certain to be the most critical of the war, perhaps the most testing in human history. No amount of propaganda can obscure the harsh realism any longer.²⁹⁶

Its main report was based on official communiqués and supplemented with Reuters reports. Over the following days it cited the BUP, Reuters, PA and the Combined [British] Press. In a number of cases these were by-lined. For example Walter Crombie, BUP; Leonard Mosley, Reuters; R.A. Eccleston, PA Military Correspondent, who was also later by-lined without being identified as a PA correspondent; and Clark Lee, Combined Press.

In considering the range of sources cited by the *Belfast Telegraph* here, and those in the other newspapers examined in this case study, it should be noted that initially all D-Day reports for the British press, including those from the news agencies, were pooled. Through this practice the reports from the correspondents accompanying the Allied forces in the initial landings were made available to all newspapers, not just those from which the individual correspondents were accredited. Of the 800 correspondents accredited from around the world to cover D-Day only 180 reported from the forward areas, of which twenty-five represented the British national papers and news agencies.²⁹⁷ Pooling enabled the more efficient use of the limited communications infrastructure and ensured that those correspondents who had not accompanied the initial landings, and their employers, were not significantly disadvantaged. On D-Day those who had not been allowed to accompany the landings were locked in the conference room at the Ministry of Information's headquarters at the Senate House in London. The doors were unlocked at 7.30am, after the Allies' press officer indicated that the first landings had been achieved successfully,

²⁹⁵ *Belfast Telegraph*, 6 June 1944, p. 5.

²⁹⁶ *Belfast Telegraph*, 6 June 1944, p. 4.

²⁹⁷ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 263.

and the correspondents were released to send the communiqué they had been issued earlier.²⁹⁸ After the first few days pooling of all news was considered unnecessary and ‘competition between the correspondents resumed’.²⁹⁹ It did continue to an extent under the Combined British Press service, which had also operated before D-Day.³⁰⁰

The *Belfast Telegraph* also cited its own correspondents in its coverage: Gordon Holman, *Belfast Telegraph* Navy Expert; Leslie Randall, *Belfast Telegraph* Special Reporter; and James Stuart, *Belfast Telegraph* Air Expert. These are presumably the three correspondents, one with each branch of the British forces, identified by Horgan.³⁰¹ They do not appear to have arrived in Normandy until a few days after the initial landings though. As the landings progressed the *Belfast Telegraph* announced the Allies’ successful progress in its headlines: ‘Satisfactory Progress’ in Landings: 13,000 Sorties – Heartening Picture of Second Phase’,³⁰² ‘Beachhead Build-Up “Without Halt”: Gains Everywhere’,³⁰³ and ‘Allies 40-Miles Continuous Beachhead: Caen – Bayeux – Isigny’.³⁰⁴

The day after the initial D-Day landings the *Belfast News Letter*’s headline announced: ‘Battle 10 Miles Inland in France – 240-Mile Front Say Nazis – Allied Losses Less than Expected’.³⁰⁵ Its main report was based on official communiqués and it also mentioned the German News Agency, supplemented with an account of shelling from the Allied ships by Reuters Special Correspondent Desmond Tighe, though the *News Letter* did not provide a by-line. This report was commonly used in the Irish newspapers (see below). The newspaper’s editorial commented that

this war of liberation – a war not merely to free Europe from a cruel tyranny, but to rid the world of a hideous nightmare – has reached its supreme crisis. [...] Now, more than ever, it is imperative that

²⁹⁸ Richard Collier, *The WARCOS: The War Correspondents of World War Two* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), pp. 164-5

²⁹⁹ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 265.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

³⁰¹ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 51.

³⁰² *Belfast Telegraph*, 7 June 1944, p. 5.

³⁰³ *Belfast Telegraph*, 9 June 1944, p. 5.

³⁰⁴ *Belfast Telegraph*, 10 June 1944, p. 3.

³⁰⁵ *Belfast News Letter*, 7 June 1944, p. 5.

munitions and equipment shall go out from yards and factories in an ever-increasing flow.³⁰⁶

As the landings progressed its attribution of sources was limited and primarily restricted to official communiqués, though Reuters was cited. Examples of the headlines it adopted to highlight the Allies' successes include 'Advances by the Allies in France – Airborne Troops Hold Nazi Attacks – Enemy reserves in Action'³⁰⁷ and 'Good Progress in Northern France – Bridgehead Now 51 Miles Wide'.³⁰⁸

The *Northern Whig*'s main headline on 7 June announced that the 'Invasion is Going Well: "Our Forces Succeeded in Initial Landings" – Fighting 10 Miles Inland'.³⁰⁹ Its editorial described how:

The day for which the British people have waited for four years, the day on which captive peoples of Europe have built their hopes, has come. [...] Inevitably, memory casts back to that other June four years ago [...]. By the middle of the month [June 1940] Britain and her Dominions stood alone.³¹⁰

In the subsequent days its identification of sources was similar to that of the *Belfast News Letter*, primarily citing official communiqués, though Tighe's report was also present in the *Northern Whig* on 7 June. Interestingly it carried an article describing the reaction in Bayeux to the Allied entry into the town by-lined John Hetherington of the *Melbourne Herald*.³¹¹ It would seem likely that this report was provided as part of the initial pooling of reports. As the Allied advance continued the paper's headlines contained encouraging descriptions such as 'Gains on All Fronts in Heavy France Fighting – Enemy Masses 10 Divisions, Throws in Reserves'³¹² and 'Beachhead Secured: Allies set for Breakout – Decision on Bayeux Battle by Tonight'.³¹³

³⁰⁶ *Belfast News Letter*, 7 June 1944, p. 4.

³⁰⁷ *Belfast News Letter*, 9 June 1944, p. 5.

³⁰⁸ *Belfast News Letter*, 12 June 1944, p. 5.

³⁰⁹ *Northern Whig*, 7 June 1944, p. 1.

³¹⁰ *Northern Whig*, 7 June 1944, p. 2.

³¹¹ *Northern Whig*, 9 June 1944, p. 2.

³¹² *Northern Whig*, 9 June 1944, p. 1.

³¹³ *Northern Whig*, 12 June 1944, p. 1.

On 7 June the *Irish News*' main headline was 'Allies Success in Initial Landings in France – Losses Less Than Anticipated – Fighting at Caen Ten Miles Inland'.³¹⁴ It cited the AP Special, a PA Correspondent it did not by-line and a report from 'Berlin Paris Radio'. Interestingly it by-lined Maurice Desjardine, Canadian Press War Correspondent: as with the example of Hetherington in the *Northern Whig* it is likely this was received via the pooling arrangement. It did not, however, use Tighe's Reuters report. In its editorial it noted how

The war accordingly enters what may well be its final phase. Undoubtedly, it will be its fiercest. French battlegrounds have ever been the scene of bloody and bitter fights. The trial of strength between the Allies and the Germans will add to the annals of warfare its most remarkable chapter.³¹⁵

Over the following days it cited AP, the PA, including special correspondents, Reuters, the German News Agency and official communiqués. In addition it by-lined Sydney Mason, Reuters Special Correspondent, and Hal Boyle, AP War Correspondent. Its headlines were not notably different from its Belfast contemporaries including examples such as 'Panzers Hurlled Back From Caen – Allies Capture Bayeux – Heavy Fighting Inland',³¹⁶ 'German Reserves in Action Along Whole Normandy Front – Allies Report Progress',³¹⁷ and 'Desperate Battle Around Bayeux – Allied Bridgehead Now Safe'.³¹⁸

In neutral Ireland the *Cork Examiner* reported the Allied landings in Northern France, citing Reuters, with the headline 'Allied Air and Land Troops Strike Inland After a Dawn Invasion of French Coast'.³¹⁹ It also carried Tighe's report. Uniquely it did not offer any editorial comment on the landings on this or subsequent days. As the invasion progressed it cited the PA, Reuters, Combined British Press or Combined Allied Press, AP and the Official German Agency. From 8 June it introduced a side column

³¹⁴ *Irish News*, 7 June 1944, p. 1.

³¹⁵ *Irish News*, 7 June 1944, p. 2.

³¹⁶ *Irish News*, 8 June 1944, p. 1.

³¹⁷ *Irish News*, 9 June 1944, p. 1.

³¹⁸ *Irish News*, 12 June 1944, p. 1.

³¹⁹ *Cork Examiner*, 7 June 1944, p. 3.

entitled 'Flashes from the Front' in which a variety of these sources as well as reports of the broadcasts from Paris and German Radio were presented. The newspaper by-lined a number of correspondents including Tighe and others such as Hanson W. Baldwin, Combined Press; F.B. McGarry, PA; F.W. Perfect, Combined Press; and Marshall Yarrow, Reuters. Its headlines were characterised by a studied neutrality containing examples such as 'Allies Capture Bayeux – German Opposition Grows in New invasion Phase'³²⁰ and 'Allies Take Another Town 15 Miles from Cherbourg'.³²¹

In Dublin the *Irish Independent's* headline on 7 June announced 'Allies Land in France - Many Bridgeheads Made' and 'Terrific Sea-Air Cover for Troops'.³²² Its report was based on official communiqués and reports of BBC announcements. This was supplemented with reports from Reuters, including Tighe, from the PA and from the German News Agency. In subsequent days it composed its main reports from a combination of Reuters, AP and the PA, citing them together in parenthesis under the main headline. It also cited official communiqués. Its headlines included 'Battle of Normandy – Bitter Fighting as Germans Throw in Reserves'³²³ and 'Allies Pincer Drive for Cherbourg Marks New Invasion Phase – Big Enveloping Movement'.³²⁴ On 12 June it carried an editorial which pointed out that: 'Though overshadowed by the titanic clash on the coast of Normandy, the war continues to rage on widespread, far-flung fronts'.³²⁵ In this it discussed, or rather described, the advance of the Allies and German withdrawal in Italy, and events on the Eastern Front, particularly Russian war aims with regard to Finland. It also covered events in East Asia, including developments in India and China, and Allied advances in the Pacific 'the precise value of which in the greater strategy of this conflict cannot be estimated by the outsider'.³²⁶

Similarly to the *Irish Independent* the *Irish Press* cited a combination of agencies in its reports of the D-Day landings and subsequent

³²⁰ *Cork Examiner*, 8 June 1944, p. 3.

³²¹ *Cork Examiner*, 12 June 1944, p. 3.

³²² *Irish Independent*, 7 June 1944, p. 3.

³²³ *Irish Independent*, 8 June 1944, p. 3.

³²⁴ *Irish Independent*, 10 June 1944, p. 3.

³²⁵ *Irish Independent*, 12 June 1944, p. 2.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

developments. Under the headline ‘Warships Shell Normandy: Allies Land Along 75 Mile Coast Strip – Airborne U.S. Tank Troops Lead Assault’ it credited the PA, Reuters, UP and AP in parenthesis.³²⁷ It also referenced official communiqués. In addition it carried a report citing Reuters and quoting an official German communiqué, headlined ‘Berlin Says Paratroopers Lost Heavily’.³²⁸ In an editorial it commented that:

The very confidence with which the Allies have begun this vast movement on land, sea and in the air is impressive [...] but it will not be known for some time whether permanent bridgeheads have been established. The greatest clash of arms in history is only in its first round.³²⁹

As the invasion progressed its headlines included ‘Germans Throw in reserves Along Entire Front – Berlin Says Great Battle Raging for Normandy’³³⁰ and ‘More Armour Thrown in by Both Sides – Allies Claim Gains in Furious Battles’.³³¹

The *Irish Times*’ report of the landings on 7 June was drawn from official communiqués and headlined ‘Allies Advance 10 Miles in to France – Bridgeheads Established in Normandy’.³³² It had begun carrying news on its front page by this time as part of a drive for modernisation and greater business efficiency.³³³ It also carried Tighe’s Reuters report. It concluded its editorial on that day:

Many thousands of gay young lives already have been lost, and no man can tell how many others are committed to their doom. This hour is one of the most solemn and tragic hours in human history. Mankind’s destiny has been thrown upon a cruel hazard.³³⁴

Its coverage of the invasion as it progressed was largely based on official communiqués, though it does cite Reuters, AP and PA sources as well as the

³²⁷ *Irish Press*, 7 June 1944, p. 1.

³²⁸ *Irish Press*, 7 June 1944, p. 1.

³²⁹ *Irish Press*, 7 June 1944, p. 2.

³³⁰ *Irish Press*, 9 June 1944, p. 1.

³³¹ *Irish Press*, 10 June 1944, p. 1.

³³² *Irish Times*, 7 June 1944, p. 1.

³³³ O’Brien, *The Irish Times*, p. 123.

³³⁴ *Irish Times*, 7 June 1944, p. 3.

German News Agency and Vichy Radio. Its coverage is surprisingly muted compared to Dunkirk under headlines such as: ‘Allied Invasion Forces Clear All Landing Beaches – Capture of Bayeux’³³⁵ and ‘Americans Advance Several Miles on a “Broad Front” – Capture of Four Towns’.³³⁶ This is probably a product of the close eye the Censor was keeping on the paper by this time, requiring it to submit all proofs in full. It provided daily editorial from 7-10 June characterised by comments such as:

The conflict in Normandy is so huge as to defy imagination. [...] the Allied forces struck at the obvious point – the nearest point to Paris – and for that very reason, the Germans, who probably have been anticipating all sorts of possible moves, may have been caught more or less on the wrong foot. For the moment no spectacular advances can be expected.³³⁷

As the Allied beachheads became more secure it commented that:

According to German reports, the Allies now have fifteen or sixteen divisions in action. The British report that they are faced with about ten German divisions; but both sides are throwing in reinforcements with the greatest possible speed. Manifestly, the first real great test of strength is at hand.³³⁸

The citation of German sources for Allied strengths and vice-versa as well as the non-committal comment can be seen as an example of the effect of the Censor’s demand for even handedness.

There is a notable similarity and consistency in the headlines that the mainstream Irish newspapers used for the D-Day landings. This may be a product of them being drawn from agency sources. It should also be borne in mind that the events occurring on the Normandy coast were momentous enough in their own right and required little of the enhancement that would have drawn the Censors ire in neutral Ireland.

The Report by Reuters Special Correspondent, Tighe, of the Allied landings was, according to Reuters, the ‘best published description of the

³³⁵ *Irish Times*, 8 June 1944, p. 1.

³³⁶ *Irish Times*, 12 June 1944, p. 1.

³³⁷ *Irish Times*, 8 June 1944, p. 3.

³³⁸ *Irish Times*, 10 June 1944, p. 3.

invasion' and was included in the initial pooling of reports on D-Day.³³⁹ It began:

Guns are belching flame from more than 600 Allied warships. Thousands of bombers are roaring overhead, fighters are weaving in and out of the clouds as the invasion of Western Europe begins.³⁴⁰

This account was published in the *Belfast News Letter*, *Cork Examiner*, *Irish Independent*, *Irish Times*, and *Northern Whig*. There were some differences in presentation though. The *Belfast News Letter* used the headline '600 Warships Bombard French Coast', but did not provide a by-line. In the *Cork Examiner* it was 'How the Battle Began – "An Incredible Sight" – At Dawn' by-lining Tighe. The *Irish Independent* entitled the report 'An Incredible Sight', the *Irish Times* 'The Assault Seen from a Warship' and the *Northern Whig* "'Terrific Gigantic" Channel Spectacle', all by-lined Tighe. This provides an example of the just how common the news sources used by Irish newspapers, in both polities, could be despite some differences in presentation. A similar example is provided in a report by another Reuters correspondent, Marshall Yarrow, of his glider landing with air-borne troops. 'It was dark, it was deadly, and we landed in a country of stinking swamps and hidden snipers' he wrote.³⁴¹ It appeared in the *Cork Examiner*, 'I Crawled Through Normandy, It Was Dark and Deadly'; the *Irish Press*, 'Ran the Gauntlet of Snipers'; the *Irish Times*, 'War Reporter's Story of Glider Invasion', and the *Northern Whig*, 'I Landed in Normandy With the First Glider Forces'. All these newspapers by-lined Yarrow.

The reason neither of these reports appeared in the *Belfast Telegraph* is probably its evening publication. Appearing in morning papers they would have lost their uniqueness by the time its edition came out. The rapidly evolving events in Normandy would almost certainly have moved the news agenda on as well. As described above the morning and evening newspapers received separate services from the PA, though based on largely

³³⁹ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 265.

³⁴⁰ *Belfast News Letter*, 7 June 1944, p. 5; *Cork Examiner*, 7 June 1944, p. 3; *Irish Independent*, 7 June 1944, p. 3; *Irish Times*, 7 June 1944, p. 1; *Northern Whig*, 7 June 1944, p. 2.

³⁴¹ *Cork Examiner*, 12 June 1944, p. 3; *Irish Press*, 12 June 1944, p. 1; *Irish Times*, 12 June 1944, p. 1; *Northern Whig*, 12 June 1944, p. 2.

the same categories of news. Further it should be remembered that this newspaper had its own correspondents, whose reports it would presumably have privileged. They do not appear to have been included in the group of correspondents that accompanied the first landings, but this potential lost advantage was negated by the initial pooling of reports. The differences in news supply for morning and evening papers may have been the reason it employed them. The absence of Tighe's report from the *Irish Press* can presumably be attributed to an editorial decision: there is no reason to suggest it did not have access to the story. It did carry a report from the UP correspondent Collie Small on 7 June which described how:

The Channel, dappled by a light swell and exploding occasionally into puffy white caps, was choked with boats of every description. [...] Smoke plumes rose all over the bombarded area, sheets of red flames mushroomed out, then subsided under billowing clouds of dirty smoke.³⁴²

The absence of Yarrow's report from the *Belfast News Letter* and *Irish Independent* can most easily be explained by editorial decisions. With limited space due to supply restrictions all newspapers almost certainly had far more copy from the agencies than they could fit in. That neither Tighe nor Yarrow's reports appeared in the *Irish News* is surprising, particularly considering that it did not offer any comparative pieces.

In a limited capacity these case studies have illustrated a number of points. Firstly, newspapers in both Northern and neutral Ireland were reliant on notably common news sources. This should not be regarded as surprising. It is consistent with the findings in previous chapters here and those of scholars, such as Ó Drisceoil, who have examined news supply in Ireland during World War II. What is perhaps more interesting is the amount of common copy found in columns. This is more easily identifiable in the D-Day coverage. In considering this the differences between the two events should be borne in mind. Dunkirk was an emergency evacuation of over 330,000 personnel, whereas D-Day was an extensively and intricately

³⁴² *Irish Press*, 7 June 1944, p. 1.

planned invasion. The effect these differences would have had on the military aspects of the events, particularly in terms of communications and organisation, were equally pertinent to media coverage. Agency reports and their collection and distribution would have been better organised and supplied for D-Day. Differences can be identified in the presentation of news coverage with regard to headlines and editorials. In the former case certain common constructions and phrases can be identified though. This is again consistent with Ó Drisceoil's findings of newspapers in neutral Ireland drawing their headlines from news agencies, a practice also followed by the Northern Irish newspapers it would seem. On both sides of the border the traditional political and confessional differences of the individual newspapers does not seem to have any particular impact on this practice. The general trend in neutral Ireland is, however, consistent with the demands of the Censor characterised by Horgan as demanding an 'almost pathological even handedness'.³⁴³ The greater tendency to cite Axis sources, such as the German News Agency, by newspapers in neutral Ireland as well as the official communiqués from belligerents on both sides is another aspect of this requirement. Neutrality was largely supported by the population of the independent Irish state and seen as a success in the war's aftermath. It might be suggested that the Censor's requirements and the neutralised news they produced were therefore in keeping with the public's desire for news coverage.

Secondly, a greater concentration in agency distribution has been revealed here, in conjunction with findings earlier in this chapter. The PA distributed its own service as well as its Special and War Special service. It also handled the Reuters and AP reports cited in Irish newspapers. The AP and BUP reports were specifically designed for British consumption based on their American parent agencies' services. The BUP service was cited by both the *Belfast Telegraph* and *Irish Press*, though notably in the latter case the 'B' was dropped. These case studies have only identified ETC citation in the *Belfast Telegraph*. This agency was cited in neutral Ireland at other points in the war. An explanation for its general absence here might be

³⁴³ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 46.

suggested in an example in which the *Irish Times* identified a common ETC and Reuters correspondent.³⁴⁴ The pooling of resources by the British press was a particular aspect of the initial D-Day landings, but was carried out throughout the war, including during the BEF's campaign in 1940.³⁴⁵ The Combined (Allied / British) Service has been identified by Jürgen Wilke as an 'Anglo-American enterprise [...] supplied by AP, UP, Reuters and AFP' begun in 1944,³⁴⁶ but the British news agencies were pooling as the Combined British Press prior to this.³⁴⁷ In addition to this concentration of news sources the nature of British censorship operations should be borne in mind when considering war news in Ireland. Throughout the war censorship staff worked in the PA and Reuters' news rooms. Ó Drisceoil has noted how certain news items were marked for publication in Ireland only and were presumably influenced by these resident censors. In addition, at the time of the D-Day landings there was censorship staff in the PA news room specifically tasked with overseeing news distributed to Ireland. It would seem reasonable to suggest that comparative practices operated within the BUP and ETC.

Thirdly, though not central to the case study itself, the continuation and adoption of certain news practices have been identified. The use of agency sources as the raw material upon which the newspapers' own copy was based continued, and in the case of the Northern Irish newspapers expanded. The *Irish Independent* and *Irish Press* can both be identified using multiple citations in their coverage of D-Day. There is evidence that the Northern Irish newspapers neglected to cite their sources in many cases. The Censor's requirement for clear identification of sources would have discouraged this in neutral Ireland. The development of these practices makes the definitive identification of common sources more problematic though. In the cases of the *Irish News*, *Irish Times* and *Northern Whig* the move to carrying news rather than advertising on their front pages is identified.

³⁴⁴ *Irish Times*, 15 November 1941, p. 6.

³⁴⁵ Greg McLaughlin, *The War Correspondents* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 65.

³⁴⁶ Wilke, 'The Struggle for Control of Domestic News Agencies (2)', p. 51.

³⁴⁷ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 256.

Fourthly, the *Belfast Telegraph* emerges here as exploiting the international news gathering resources available to it most extensively. Not only does it, in common with the majority of Irish newspapers, utilise the PA-centred service including specials, Reuters and AP, but it also cites the BUP. In addition it was the only Irish newspaper with its own war correspondents. These do not appear to have fulfilled the same role, argued in the case study in the previous chapter, served by Lionel Fleming and Gertrude Gaffney to correct a perceived deficit in Irish news requirements in the standardised, British, agency services. It did not adopt the more liberal attitude associated with it in later periods until the editorship of Jack Sayers, which began in 1953.³⁴⁸ Taken in conjunction these news gathering practices may, alternatively, indicate a deficit in news requirements felt by the *Belfast Telegraph* as an evening paper in comparison to its morning contemporaries. In the case of the PA services the news distributed to morning and evening papers, though based on the same categories, was not the same copy. Particularly in the rapidly evolving news agenda that both of the events covered in these case studies would have presented. It may be that the practice of privileging the news supplied to morning papers identified in World War I still remained in some form. In this case the *Belfast Telegraph*'s news gathering practices might be perceived as acting to correct this deficit.

Finally, these case studies are by their nature limited. They do not reveal news suppressed by the Censor in neutral Ireland, such as in the case of atrocity stories in Europe and the Pacific at other times during the War. The strength of this control is most clearly seen here in a comparison of editorial comment and to an extent headlines. A comparison of the *Irish Times*' coverage reveals a notable muting of the paper by D-Day. These case studies have revealed that these two events were relatively well covered in newspaper in both Northern Ireland and the independent Irish state. What they could do with this news based on common sources is perhaps the most significant finding. As has been pointed out elsewhere in this thesis this is frequently the most revealing aspect of news coverage.

³⁴⁸ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 74.

Conclusion

The adoption of neutrality by the independent Irish state during World War II can be seen as a continuation of the assertion of the right to an independent foreign policy by successive governments. As a product of Irish neutrality Northern Ireland became strategically important to Britain's war effort, particularly with regard to maintaining the Atlantic supply route.

One of the effects of the war on Ireland was the imposition of a particularly rigorous censorship regime in the neutral state. This was designed to ensure that its media did not offer any news, comment or opinion that might be seen to be in contravention of neutrality by the belligerents. In addition it was designed to reassure the Irish public that the policy was in the national interest. Another effect of the war was the development of a state-based concept of nationalism defined by the constitutional divisions created in the 1920s.

Despite these developments Irish newspapers remained primarily reliant on a common source of international news centred in London. This was provided by the same structures and systems that had operated for the preceding seven decades, which Irish newspapers had been actively engaged in creating and developing. As the war approached its conclusion the agencies involved in the collection and distribution of international news in Britain and Ireland concluded a series of agreements. These would continue and enhance the increased integration and cooperation that had characterised the inter-war period. Despite its key role in the collapse of the international 'News Ring' in 1934, in pursuit of more open competition in the international news market, AP opted to continue, for at least five more years, to operate within the established system in Britain and Ireland. This was largely motivated by a recognition that the PA and Reuters enjoyed a dominant primary position in the market that was, at least for the time, unassailable. The BUP was competing but, in the case of Ireland certainly, its success was limited. In considering the agency services used by Irish newspapers during this period it should be noted that this chapter has only identified the *Irish Press* and *Belfast Telegraph* using the BUP. The common source was realistically the PA distributing its own services plus Reuters and AP.

With regard to the Irish news industry this chapter has identified three key points. Firstly, newspapers in the independent Irish state continued to use news agency services in a similar pattern to their pre-war practices; what they could do with it was limited by the Censor but the sources remained identifiably the same. Admittedly, because of the wider structures and systems of international news supply, they had limited opportunities to access significant alternative sources. Secondly, the major daily Irish newspapers remained concerned and engaged with the PA and its fortunes and future, as demonstrated by their representation at the 1941 EGM. This can also be seen as a continuation of pre-war attitudes and practices. At the same time, in the actions of the Belfast Newspaper Society, there is evidence that the Northern Irish newspapers were beginning to withdraw behind their border. Thirdly, war restrictions and distribution problems resulted in a noted decline in the circulation of British newspapers in neutral Ireland, though this had begun in the late 1930s. Consequently the readership in the independent Irish state was increasingly served in a great majority by its own national newspapers.

The next, and final, chapter in this thesis will examine the effect of these potentially contradictory and simultaneous developments: an increasingly state-based concept of identity and continued integration in the international structures and systems of news supply operating in Ireland. Did the behaviour and attitudes of Irish newspapers towards these systems and structures begin to reflect increasingly nation-state orientated concepts of identity in wider society as has been tentatively suggested they were beginning to prior to World War II?

Chapter Five

The Post Emergency Press in Ireland: The effects of World War II and its aftermath on the Irish news industry, 1945-49

Post-war Anglo-Irish relations became increasingly focussed on partition and a residual British resentment of Irish wartime neutrality, a policy that was widely regarded as successful and applauded in the independent Irish state. Economic, cultural, social and political differences between the independent Irish state and Northern Ireland contributed to a growing distance between the two Irish polities. In addition a clear definition of the independent Irish state's constitutional relationship to Britain and its continuing, if largely inactive, Commonwealth membership was seen to be increasingly desirable. This chapter covers the period from the end of World War II in Europe to the independent Irish state becoming a republic and its simultaneous exit from the Commonwealth in 1949. This has been chosen as the terminus of this chapter, and thesis, for two primary reasons. Firstly, with the declaration of the Republic of Ireland in 1948 and its inauguration in 1949 the process of 'constitutional decolonisation' and outward creation of a nation-state discussed in the Introduction was completed. (It is worth noting that republicans, including Eamon de Valera, would have rejected the use of the term before reunification had been achieved.) These developments can be seen to have had a parallel in the mainstream Irish news media. The mainstream daily newspapers of the independent Irish state, in particular, displayed an increasing independence of, and separation from, their British contemporaries. Indeed these developments in the media, or fourth estate, reflect political and constitutional developments in the nation-state far more closely than might normally be assumed. Secondly, the 1950s in Ireland, and the political, social cultural and economic developments of that decade, is a significant period of study in its own right and the subject of much scholarly work in theses, books and articles. The extension of the interests of this thesis into that period is, quite frankly, the work of another day.

The years immediately following World War II might be regarded in Irish history as an epilogue to the war or an hiatus before the 'crucial period

of transition' in the independent Irish state between 1948 and 1962.¹ In the case of the Irish news industry the few short years following the end of the war saw a number of key developments with regard to its relationship to the structures and systems of international news supply. Initially it would have seemed that Irish newspapers would return to their pre-war pattern of behaviour in this regard. They continued to receive the Press Association (PA) service, also distributing Reuters and the Associated Press (AP). A number invested in a Note issue in 1946 to provide funds for the upgrade of the PA's communications infrastructure. In the same year the state broadcaster in the independent state, Radio Éireann, signed a combined contract for news supply with the British news agencies of the PA, Reuters and the Exchange Telegraph Company (ETC). At a casual glance the Irish news media were becoming more integrated with a London-based system of international news supply. However, between 1946-47 the first stirrings of editorial dissatisfaction with the PA's service emerged among Irish newspapers. This was, at least in part, associated with the arrival of the United Press (UP) in Dublin offering a full international news service, as opposed to the one provided by its Canadian registered subsidiary, the British United Press (BUP), from London. In 1950 the short-lived Irish News Agency (INA) was established under legislation enacted in 1949. This was a government-backed organisation designed to 'obviate the [perceived] situation whereby all news about Ireland carried on the international news agencies was sub-edited – often prejudicially – in London'.² Finally, during the period covered by this chapter there is evidence of the organisational disengagement of Irish newspapers from structures and systems of international news supply, first tentatively identified in Chapter Three in the mid to late 1930s.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first generally covers the period from the end of World War II to the 1948 general election in which the Fianna Fáil party, after sixteen continuous years in power, was replaced by the first inter-party government. The second section covers

¹ Tom Garvin, *News From A New Republic: Ireland in the 1950s* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2010), p. 9.

² John Horgan, 'Government, Propaganda and the Irish News Agency', *Irish Communications Review*, Vol. 3 (1993), p. 31.

events in the early years of that new government leading up to the declaration and inauguration of the Republic of Ireland. In addition some comment is made on events in the following few years. The final section is a case study examining the coverage, comment and reaction of the mainstream daily Irish newspapers to the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

The end of the war in Europe to the 1948 general election

Contemporary Context

When the news of Adolf Hitler's death reached Dublin the Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera, 'decided that, in accordance with the dictates of protocol, he should go and condone with the German Minister',³ Eduard Hempel.⁴ He had visited the United States representative in Dublin, David Gray,⁵ two weeks earlier to offer his sympathies on the death of the American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. He regarded this as a natural step in light of the independent Irish state's policy of neutrality during World War II. However, this and other events in Dublin prompted by the end of the war, incensed the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. These included rioting when some Trinity College Dublin students hoisted a Union Jack and were reported to have burnt a tricolour. Some University College Dublin (UCD) students were prominent in the subsequent rowdy scenes in College Green.⁶ In a speech broadcast on 13 May 1945 Churchill criticised Irish neutrality and specifically attacked de Valera. Speaking of the early stages of the war, Churchill argued:

³ Dermot Keogh with Andrew McCarthy, *Twentieth Century Ireland: Revolution and State Building*, rev. edn. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2005), p. 161.

⁴ John P. Duggan. 'Hempel, Eduard', *Dictionary of Irish Biography (DIB)*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a3916>, accessed 24 June 2013.

⁵ Bernadette Whelan. 'Gray, David', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a3590>, accessed 24 July 2013.

⁶ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, pp. 162-3. Trinity was the traditional university of the Irish Protestant-unionist community. At this time the Catholic Hierarchy forbade Catholic students from attending without permission, which would only be granted for grave and valid reasons. UCD was one of the three colleges of the National University of Ireland which, though non-denominational, was regarded as acceptable by the Hierarchy. See Diarmaid Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland, 1900-2000* (London: Profile Books, 2005), p. 89; Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 149.

We had only the north-western approach between Ulster and Scotland through which to bring the means of life and to send out the forces of war. Owing to the actions of Mr. de Valera, so much at variance with the temper and instincts of thousands of southern Irishmen, who hastened to the battle fronts to prove their ancient valour, the approaches which the southern Irish ports and airfields could so easily have guarded were closed by hostile aircraft and U-boats. [... If] it had not been for the loyalty and friendship of Northern Ireland we should have been forced to come to close quarters with Mr. de Valera or perish forever from the earth. However, with restraint and poise to which, I say, history will find few parallels, we never laid a violent hand upon them [...] and left the de Valera government to frolic with the German and later Japanese representatives to their heart's content.⁷

De Valera's reply was broadcast on 16 May and was widely applauded by the population of the independent Irish state.⁸ The traditionally pro-British *Irish Times* was supportive of his reaction⁹ and the speech was reprinted in pamphlet form by the *Irish Press*.¹⁰ Deliberately adopting a more diplomatic tone than 'the reply I would have given a quarter of a century ago' de Valera said:

Mr Churchill makes it clear that, in certain circumstances, he would have violated our neutrality and that he would justify his actions in Britain's necessity. It seems strange to me that Mr Churchill does not see that this, if accepted, would mean that Britain's necessity would become a moral code and that when this necessity became sufficiently great, other people's rights were not to count. [...] Surely Mr Churchill must see that, if his contention be admitted in our regard [...] no small nation adjoining a great power could ever hope to be permitted to go its own way in peace.¹¹

He continued later:

Could he [Churchill] not find in his heart the generosity to acknowledge that there is a small nation that stood alone, not for one year or two, but for several hundred years against aggression; that endured spoliations, famines, massacres in endless succession; that

⁷ *The Times*, 14 May 1945, p. 5.

⁸ Tony Gray, *The Lost Years: The Emergency in Ireland, 1939-45* (London: Little Brown, 1997), p. 235.

⁹ Mark O'Brien, *The Irish Times: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008), p. 121.

¹⁰ Mark O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001), p. 78.

¹¹ Richard Aldous, *Great Irish Speeches* (London: Quercus, 2007), p. 98.

was clubbed many times into insensibility, but that each time, on returning consciousness, took up the fight anew; a small nation that could never be got to accept defeat and has never surrendered her soul?¹²

In an interview just over a year later Churchill's son, Randolph Churchill, revealed that his father had told him, in retrospect, his speech was one 'which, perhaps, I should not have made, but it was made in the heat of the moment'.¹³

The widespread public support for de Valera's response to Churchill could be seen as symptomatic of a much broader feeling in the independent Irish state that neutrality and the government's wartime policies had been largely successful.¹⁴ As a result of this, Tom Garvin has argued, the government 'did not clearly realise or fully accept the proposition that there was a decision, or rather a series of decisions, to be taken' in a wide range of domestic and foreign policy areas.¹⁵ Consequently they 'made a series of "non-decisions" that in the short to medium term were disastrous to the country's development prospects'.¹⁶

The anticipated, and feared, flood of returning emigrants, mainly from war work in Britain,¹⁷ did not materialise in a state pursuing a policy of economic austerity as 'Ireland recovered only haltingly from the "Emergency"'.¹⁸ In fact emigration, largely to Britain, increased significantly between 1945-48¹⁹ in an economy where unemployment remained high, despite some industrial recovery.²⁰ The social and economic policies of the post-war Fianna Fáil government were characterised by an attitude of anti-Beveridgeism, ideological antipathy to state intervention and resistance to claims for wage increases.²¹ Teachers went on strike between March and October 1946 in pursuit of improved pay. The attempts of the

¹² Ibid., p. 100.

¹³ *Irish Times*, 2 October 1946, p. 1.

¹⁴ Thomas Bartlett, *Ireland: A History* (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), p. 467.

¹⁵ Tom Garvin, *Preventing the Future: Why Was Ireland So Poor For So Long?* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2005), p. 62.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁷ Dermot Keogh, *Ireland and Europe, 1919-1989* (Cork and Dublin: Hibernian University Press, 1990), p. 205.

¹⁸ J.J. Lee, *Ireland, 1912-1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), p. 288.

¹⁹ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 169.

²⁰ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 288.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 284-9.

state's first minister for health and social welfare (James Ryan appointed in 1947) to modernise the provision of health services in the independent Irish state were hampered by resistance from vested interests in the medical profession and the Catholic Hierarchy. In particular attempts to tackle mother and child welfare and infectious diseases were criticised on two counts. Firstly, there was a perceived potential for unwarranted state intervention in the general public's private lives. Secondly, touching on 'the delicate matter of sexuality', there was a risk that women might not be treated by a Catholic doctor or in accordance with Catholic teaching.²² Electoral defeat would spare Fianna Fáil from having to deal with opposition to the implementation of the 1947 Public Health Act.²³

At the same time Northern Ireland was benefitting from a series of post-war health and social welfare measures that 'widened the gulf between North and South'.²⁴ Bills opposed by Unionist politicians in Westminster as impractical were proposed, often enthusiastically, shortly afterwards in Belfast because, as Jonathan Bardon has written, 'Britain was prepared to pay most of the very large sums of money needed' to support them.²⁵ The improved social and welfare services were covered in the Family Allowance Act 1945, Northern Ireland Insurance Act 1946, Industrial Injuries Act 1946 and National Health Service Act 1948. In addition parity in taxation and services between Northern Ireland and Britain was formally agreed in 1946.²⁶ The 1947 Education Act introduced a new structure and improved access to primary, secondary and further education.²⁷ A 'social and economic gap of substantial proportions' between Northern Ireland and the independent Irish state was, thus, developing during this period. This, combined with the continued political gap, acted to strengthen and deepen partition.²⁸ By the 1950s there was a 'growing tendency for [nationalist] Catholics to see their future in terms of a Northern Ireland context rather

²² Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 184.

²³ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 315.

²⁴ Jonathan Bardon, *A History of Ulster* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1992), p. 597.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 590.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 590-1, 596-8; Ferritter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 450.

²⁷ Ferritter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 453.

²⁸ Denis Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf: Northern Attitudes to the Independent Irish state 1919-49* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1988), p. 236.

than an all-Ireland state'.²⁹ Garvin has commented that in the 1940s and 1950s a 'slow realisation was dawning [...] that partition was no temporary improvisation'.³⁰

Despite what might be seen as ideological differences on social welfare policy with the British Labour government, brought to power in the post-war 1945 general election, the Fianna Fáil government established cordial relations with its executive counterparts in London.³¹ This was, at least in part, helped by some sympathies within the Labour party for Irish reunification and criticism of Unionist rule in Northern Ireland.³² This, in conjunction with re-energised nationalist organisation in Northern Ireland in the form of the Anti-Partition League, which was supported by the *Irish News*, caused predictable resistance and concerns among the unionist community and politicians.³³ In the independent Irish state an increased focus was placed on partition by the launch of the Clann na Poblachta party in 1946, posing a threat to Fianna Fáil's republican constituency (see below).³⁴ This, along with the renewed nationalist energy in Northern Ireland, contributed to de Valera's call for a commitment from London to end partition in 1947.³⁵

Despite some after effects from the policy of neutrality hampering the independent Irish state's attempts to integrate into the wider post-war world,³⁶ between 1946-8 it normalised its relations with the former Allied powers 'and became an exemplary upholder of cold war values'.³⁷ This was despite some continued American resentment of wartime neutrality.³⁸ With regard to Russia 'Ireland was emphatically on the other side'.³⁹ Russian suspicion of Irish anti-communism and pro-Catholicism would be a factor in

²⁹ John Darby, 'The Historical Background' in John Darby (ed.) *Northern Ireland: The Background to the Conflict* (Belfast: The Apple Tree Press, 1983), p. 23.

³⁰ Garvin, *News from a New Republic*, p. 8.

³¹ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 166.

³² Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf*, p. 236-7.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 237; Eamon Phoenix, 'The History of a Newspaper. The *Irish News* 1855-1995' in Eamon Phoenix (ed.) *A Century of Northern Life: The Irish News and 100 Years of Ulster History, 1890's-1990's*, (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 1995), p. 33.

³⁴ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 295.

³⁵ Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf*, p. 237.

³⁶ Gray, *The Lost Years*, p. 242.

³⁷ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 166.

³⁸ Lee, *Ireland*, p.302.

³⁹ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 208.

its blocking the smaller state's entry to the UN until 1955 (see the case study below).⁴⁰ This did not result in foreign policy stagnation though and the independent Irish state joined the UN sponsored World Health Organisation (WHO) and Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).⁴¹

At a meeting of heads of foreign missions held in Dublin in September 1945 de Valera, who was minister for external affairs as well as Taoiseach, highlighted the risks he perceived for the independent Irish state in the post-war world and the role mission heads should play. Threats included the 'denationalising influences of Great Britain, and in a lesser, but by no means small degree, the United States' and 'the Russian threat to Christian civilisation'.⁴² Due to the nature in which post-war world power was likely to be polarised, the state's fortunes, for the foreseeable future, would be cast 'with Great Britain, North America and Western Europe, and, to a lesser extent, with the Dominions'. The mission heads needed to work to counteract anti-Irish opinions within the populations and press of these countries.⁴³ Those stationed in the Latin countries of Europe should seek to emphasise the Christian values and civilisation that Ireland shared with their host nations through Catholicism. While the raw material on which the missions should base the information they distributed could be supplied from Ireland, the means and emphasis should be suited to local requirements. Close contacts should be developed with the Catholic Church, 'the best propaganda organisation in the world'.⁴⁴ In addition friendly relations should be cultivated with the daily press and news agencies in the various countries in which the mission heads were stationed.⁴⁵ This was reiterated in a discussion document later in the conference in which it was

⁴⁰ Donal Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland, 1939-1945: Neutrality, Politics and Society* (Cork: Cork UP, 1996), p. 296.

⁴¹ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 166.

⁴² Speech to Head of Missions Conference by Éamon de Valera on post-war Irish foreign policy and diplomatic relations, Dublin, 11 September 1945, University College Dublin Archives (UCDA), P150/ 2701, *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy (DIFP) Vol. VIII*, No. 8, Catriona Crowe, Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh and Eunan O'Hallpin (eds.) (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2012), pp. 7-8.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

advised that each ‘newspaper has to be separately handled and given individual attention. Know the editor personally’.⁴⁶

As in the inter-war years, official attitudes towards news agencies in the independent Irish state seem to have focused primarily on their effect on news about Ireland in the international media. This can be seen in conjunction with the discussions and instructions to heads of missions. A good example is contained in a letter from Joseph P. Walshe,⁴⁷ secretary at the Department of External Affairs, to heads of missions. In this letter Walshe highlights a report provided by the ETC ‘which seems to have been published extensively in foreign newspapers’.⁴⁸ The report in question concerned a vote in Dáil on legislation that withdrew outstanding pay and benefits from men who had been absent from the Defence Forces for more than 180 days. In addition they were barred from public or civil service jobs, or positions within state supported companies, for seven years and their right to unemployment benefit was withheld. As noted in the previous chapter a number of Irishmen, including deserters from the Irish Defence Forces, served in the Allied militaries during World War II. These men were particularly affected by this legislation. Walshe’s consideration of the ETC report was that: ‘It would be difficult to find a better example than this despatch of the manner in which British news agencies doctor-up Irish news for foreign consumption’. He continued by describing the ETC report as

nothing more than a barefaced distortion. It carefully glosses over the fact that these men were *deserters* [emphasis in the original] from the Irish Defence Forces and tries to make it appear that the purpose of the Order is to penalize men, not for desertion from the Irish Army, but for joining the British Forces.⁴⁹

By the end of World War II Fianna Fáil had lost much of the reforming zeal that had characterised its early years in power following its

⁴⁶ Topics suggested by Thomas J. Kiernan for discussion at Heads of Missions Conference, Dublin, 13 September 1945, National Archives of Ireland (NAI), Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Secretary’s Files P100, *DIFP Vol. VIII*, No. 12, p. 21.

⁴⁷ Michael Kennedy. ‘Walshe, Joseph Patrick’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a8908>, accessed 19 June 2013.

⁴⁸ Letter from Joseph P. Walshe to all missions concerning deserters from the Irish Defence Forces, Dublin, 14 November 1945, NAI DFA 305/16, *DIFP Vol. VIII*, No. 34, p. 55.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

initial electoral victory. Indeed, the rise of Clann na Poblachta from 1946 was characterised by ‘rhetoric concerning the need for radical social and economic change’ which echoed that used by Fianna Fáil in 1932.⁵⁰ The foundation of this party was prompted by a perceived missed opportunity in the failure to establish a republican alternative to Fianna Fáil.⁵¹ Its aims included the restoration of public morality and confidence in democratic government and curbing political patronage and bureaucratic interference. Urban slums were to be demolished and housing stock upgraded and allocated based on a cubic capacity per head. It proposed the development of advanced social welfare provisions including a minimum wage and achieving full employment and full production. The means of production and distribution were to be organised in order to achieve equitable allocation of essential commodities. In agriculture machinery was to be provided on a cooperative basis and produce prices guaranteed. Culturally it based its morality on the teachings of the Catholic Church and aimed for a cultural revival along Gaelic lines. This would be facilitated by the creation of state-backed national cultural institutions and the introduction of free primary, secondary, technical and university education.⁵² Under the leadership of Sean MacBride, a lawyer with strong IRA connections from the 1920s and 1930s,⁵³ the party proceeded to inflict a number of electoral defeats on Fianna Fáil in 1947. In addition to victories in the local elections in June⁵⁴ Clann na Poblachta also won two of three Dáil by-elections that took place towards the end of the year.⁵⁵

Against this background of an electoral threat to Fianna Fáil’s predominant position there was a growing public dissatisfaction with continuing austerity. In addition, a number of Fianna Fáil parliamentarians had been criticised in a tribunal of enquiry investigating allegations of collusion and abuse of public power in the sale of the Locke distillery in

⁵⁰ Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 481.

⁵¹ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 177.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 179-81.

⁵³ Ronan Keane, ‘MacBride, Seán’, *DIB*,

<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5109>, accessed 16 August 2013.

⁵⁴ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 295.

⁵⁵ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 187.

Westmeath.⁵⁶ In an attempt to deny Clann na Poblachta the opportunity to further develop its electoral machinery de Valera called a general election, held on 4 February 1948.⁵⁷ Led by a cabinet which had demonstrated little evidence that it had innovative solutions to the independent Irish state's post-war problems or vision for the future, and regarded as increasingly complacent by many, Fianna Fáil 'fought a jaded campaign'.⁵⁸

Fianna Fáil did return as the largest party in the Dáil, but without an overall majority. However, in contrast to previous elections, the opposition parties combined to form the first inter-party government. These parties 'covering the whole ideological range, even within the admittedly narrow spectrum of Irish doctrinal discourse',⁵⁹ were 'united only by the unanimous wish to see Éamon de Valera and his party on the opposition benches'.⁶⁰

The Irish news industry and international news supply

In the immediate post-war years the Irish news industry, as represented by the mainstream daily newspapers, appeared relatively stable. Their pattern of engagement with the systems and structures of international news supply of the previous decades, particularly as represented by the PA, looked set to continue. In addition the independent Irish state's state broadcaster, Radio Éireann, signed a news supply agreement with the ETC, PA and Reuters. However, during this period the first evidence of Irish dissatisfaction with the PA-Reuters service emerged. This was at least partially a product of aggressive competitive activities in the Irish news marketplace by UP.

Donal Ó Drisceoil has argued that one of the effects of World War II in the independent Irish state, and particularly the operation of censorship, was an adverse influence 'on the development of a critical analysis in the media'.⁶¹ This is, to an extent, supported by a contemporary comment from AP's chief of bureau in London, John Lloyd, that 'newspapermen in Ireland are afraid to quote Irish authorities or attribute anything to them except on

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 186-7; Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 296-7.

⁵⁷ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 296.

⁵⁸ Garvin, *Preventing the Future*, p. 107; Lee, *Ireland*, p. 298.

⁵⁹ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 299.

⁶⁰ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 190.

⁶¹ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 285.

rare occasions. The authorities seem to be a bit strict in Ireland'.⁶² Perhaps partially as a product of this, the domestic news industry in Ireland remained relatively stable in the post-war years. The major daily newspapers in Belfast and the *Cork Examiner* remained noticeably true to their traditional political and ideological affiliations. As noted above, the *Irish News* was supportive of the development of the Anti-Partition League, in line with its traditional nationalist orientation. In 1953 the previously 'impeccably unionist' *Belfast Telegraph* 'became a paper considerably more open to other agendas' under the editorship of Jack Sayers.⁶³

In Dublin the *Irish Independent* increased its circulation to become the widest read daily newspaper in the independent Irish state, with a 'considerable political reach'.⁶⁴ It offered 'robust support for Catholic causes'⁶⁵ and is frequently politically identified with the Fine Gael party during this period.⁶⁶ Gary Murphy has, however, argued that, whilst frequently editorially critical of Fianna Fáil and particularly de Valera, it was also willing to bring its weight to bear against Fine Gael 'and proved quite critical at times of Fine Gael's first Taoiseach, John A. Costello'.⁶⁷ It was a 'steadfast defender of the emergent professional middle class and a bitter foe of what it saw as the redistribution of income' particularly to the rural smallholder community.⁶⁸ The editor of its Sunday edition, Hector Legge, had notably close ties to members of the post-1948 inter-party government, in particular the minister for agriculture, James Dillon.⁶⁹

⁶² John Lloyd, chief of bureau, London, to Alan J. Gould, assistant general manager, 17 September 1946, Associated Press Corporate Archive, New York (AP), 02A.2 (1946 Unprocessed), Foreign Bureau Correspondence, London.

⁶³ John Horgan, *Irish Media: A Critical History Since 1922* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 74; see also Andrew Gailey, *Crying in The Wilderness: Jack Sayers: A Liberal Editor in Ulster, 1939-69* (Belfast: The Institute of Irish Studies, The Queen's University of Belfast, 1995).

⁶⁴ Gary Murphy, 'The Politics of Despair: Independent Newspapers and Post-war Irish Society' in Mark O'Brien and Kevin Rafter (eds.) *Independent Newspapers: A History*, (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), p. 109.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Garvin, *News From A New Republic*, p. 61.

⁶⁷ Murphy, 'The Politics of Despair', p. 109.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 112.

⁶⁹ Kevin Rafter, 'A Tale of "Womanly Intuition": Hector Legge at the *Sunday Independent*, 1940-70' in Mark O'Brien and Kevin Rafter (eds.) *Independent Newspapers: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), pp. 123, 130.

The *Irish Press* continued its role as Fianna Fáil's semi-official mouthpiece and with the rise of Clann na Poblachta defended de Valera and his party's time in office, launching a series of attacks on the political newcomers.⁷⁰ In the aftermath of the 1948 general election 'Fianna Fáil again turned its attention towards using the *Irish Press* to spread its message to the electorate'.⁷¹ The former minister, and still a TD, Sean Lemass was appointed managing director. Though officially a business position he became closely connected with the editorial side of the newspaper. In a libel case brought by the minister for social welfare, William Norton, in 1949 Lemass conceded his role in editorial decision-making and acknowledged having provided the substance of the article in question. In making this admission Lemass effectively acknowledged that the *Irish Press* was a party newspaper, contrary to the promises of de Valera and its founding editor, Frank Gallagher.⁷² In 1949 it launched a Sunday edition, an occurrence that John Horgan has linked causally to Fianna Fáil's electoral defeat.⁷³ In planning for this new publication Lemass targeted Fianna Fáil's large rural constituency. To exploit this market an innovative distribution network was developed to deliver the *Sunday Press* for sale outside church gates after mass. This included recruiting priests who were also Fianna Fáil supporters to collect the paper from urban centres for distribution in their rural parishes.⁷⁴ Under its first editor, Matt Feehan, a member of the Fianna Fáil national executive appointed to be the voice of the party, the new paper had a nationalist tone from its beginning.⁷⁵ The success of the *Sunday Press*, achieving a circulation of 379,000 by the mid-1950s,⁷⁶ did not apparently come at the expense of the incumbent domestic Sunday publication. The *Sunday Independent*'s circulation was almost 400,000 by the end of the 1950s.⁷⁷ This suggests that the majority of readers who bought the new newspaper did not do so at the expense of the *Sunday Independent*, 'to

⁷⁰ O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, pp. 80-1.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 82-3.

⁷³ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 56.

⁷⁴ O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, pp. 85.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁷⁷ Rafter, 'Hector Legge at the *Sunday Independent*', p. 126.

which they would have objected on political grounds'. They would instead have previously purchased a British Sunday newspaper, or none at all.⁷⁸

In the immediate post-war years the *Irish Times* was under pressure to adopt a more business-like approach and to modernise. These aims were received with, at best, lukewarm enthusiasm by its long standing editor, Robert 'Bertie' Smyllie. This was a product of the influence of Dublin businessman Frank A. Lowe, co-opted onto the board in 1941 and appointed chairman in 1945.⁷⁹ One of the effects of his modernising agenda, already in place by this time, was the change to carrying news rather than advertising on the paper's front page from 1941. Editorially, by the late 1940s, 'the paper had moved beyond its traditional Protestant base to incorporate liberal thinkers from across the religious divide'.⁸⁰ This is particularly clear if one bears in mind Ian d'Alton's characterisation of a southern Irish Protestant community as conservative as its Catholic counterpart on matters such as divorce abortion and 'the place of women in society and the family'. The *Irish Times*, he suggests, 'especially in the 1940s and 1950s, may sometimes have got just a little ahead of its natural audience'.⁸¹ With the declaration of the Republic of Ireland in 1948 by the Fine Gael led inter-party government the *Irish Times* broke its connection with the traditionally pro-Commonwealth party it had supported since 1922. With no political or religious affiliation it was now 'the only national daily free to criticise the church, government and the opposition at any given time'.⁸²

Evidence of a developing distance between the newspapers in the independent Irish state and Northern Ireland on business and industrial matters emerged in the post-war period. In 1947 the Dublin newspapers agreed a 'revolutionary eight hour day and minimum rate of pay' with the national Union of Journalists (NUJ).⁸³ These changes were initially resisted

⁷⁸ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 57.

⁷⁹ O'Brien, *The Irish Times*, pp. 122-3.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁸¹ Ian d'Alton, 'A Protestant Paper for a Protestant People: The *Irish Times* and the Southern Irish Minority', *Irish Communications Review*, Vol. 12 (2010), p. 68.

⁸² O'Brien, *The Irish Times*, p. 133.

⁸³ Hugh Oram, *The Newspaper Book: A History of Newspapers in Ireland, 1649-1983* (Dublin; MO Books, 1983), p. 227.

by all three major Dublin dailies.⁸⁴ (It is not clear if the *Cork Examiner* was party to the same agreement.) Similar negotiation with the Belfast dailies proved less successful, partly due to a weaker union organisation.⁸⁵ This development had been presaged in similar circumstances in 1941. Further, it might be seen in contrast, for example, to the all-Ireland negotiating stance adopted during the deputation to the Postmaster General in 1915.

On the other hand, in the immediate post-war years it may have reasonably seemed that Irish newspapers would return to the pattern of engagement with the structures and systems of international news supply, particularly the PA, which had pertained for seventy-plus years. The PA returns to Companies House for 1946 lists eleven Irish newspapers holding 1,056 of 9,888 issued shares, over ten and a half percent. These shareholders were from Belfast, Cork, Derry and Dublin.⁸⁶ Of these, eight had held shares since the foundation of the PA and its first returns in 1870 (see Table 1.1). These were the *Belfast News Letter*, *Cork Examiner*, *Derry Journal* (known as the *Londonderry Journal* in 1870), *Dublin Evening Mail*, *Irish News* (known as the *Belfast Morning News* in 1870), *Irish Times*, *Londonderry Sentinel* and *Northern Whig*.⁸⁷ The *Belfast Telegraph*, established in 1870,⁸⁸ was listed in the next available returns for 1906 as was the *Irish Independent*, established in 1891.⁸⁹ The *Irish Press*, established in 1931, had purchased shares in 1941. Thus all the major daily Irish newspapers were shareholding members of the PA by the end of World War II.

⁸⁴ O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, pp. 79-80; idem, *The Irish Times*, pp. 123-4.

⁸⁵ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 54.

⁸⁶ PA Returns to Companies House, 1946, Guildhall Library Manuscripts Collection, London (GL) MS 35383/6.

⁸⁷ PA Returns to Companies House, 1870, GL MS 35383/1.

⁸⁸ Oram, *The Newspaper Book*, pp. 71-3.

⁸⁹ PA Returns to Companies House, 1906, GL MS 35383/2.

<i>Table 5.1. Irish newspapers listed in the Joint Service and Joint Service Subscribers Ledger, 1943-49</i>			
<i>Belfast News Letter*</i>	1943-49	<i>Irish Independent*</i>	1943-49
<i>Belfast Telegraph*</i>	1945-49	<i>Irish News*</i>	1943-48
<i>Cork Examiner*</i>	1943-49	<i>Irish Press*</i>	1943-47
<i>Evening Echo (Cork)*</i>	1947-49	<i>Limerick Chronicle</i>	1943-49
<i>Evening Herald (Dublin)*</i>	1943-48	<i>Limerick Leader</i>	1943-49
<i>Evening Mail (Dublin)*</i>	1943-48	<i>Londonderry Standard</i>	1943-49
<i>Galway Sentinel</i>	1943-48	<i>Northern Whig*</i>	1945-49
<i>Galway Observer</i>	1949	<i>Wexford People</i>	1947
* - denotes PA shareholder. The <i>Evening Echo</i> and <i>Evening Herald</i> were the evening titles of the <i>Cork Examiner</i> and <i>Irish Independent</i> respectively.			

The Order Books referred to in previous chapters do not exist for the post-war period, the practice of issuing ‘Offered Specials’ that they represented having been discontinued with the introduction of the PA’s Comprehensive Service in 1941. There is some fragmentary evidence of Irish newspapers’ use of PA services though. The Joint Service Subscribers Ledger and Joint Service Ledger list a number of PA shareholding and non-shareholding Irish newspapers receiving services between 1943-49.⁹⁰ The services referred to in these ledgers appear to pertain mainly to sporting and commercial information, which would suggest that they represent the Joint Service operated by the PA and ETC since 1906. However they also mention ‘specials’ which may have been a product of the PA’s Special Reporting Service. This was introduced in 1946 ‘to cater for the more particular and parochial interests of individual newspapers in a way that was not possible within the confines of the general news service’.⁹¹ The areas it offered to cover were:

- (a) Reports of Local Law and Parliamentary – supplied under standing instructions.
- (b) Reports on Police Courts and County Court Cases, Company and Other Meetings, Deputations, Arbitrations etc. – when specially ordered
- (c) Local Wills – supplied under standing instructions.

⁹⁰ Joint Service Subscribers Ledger, GL MS 35506/1; Joint Service Ledger, GL MS 35506/2.

⁹¹ George Scott, *Reporter Anonymous: The story of the Press Association* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1968), p. 246.

- (d) Reports of Events of Local Interest which are not included in the General News Service, or of which Brief Accounts only are given in that Service.⁹²

There is evidence that the PA and ETC collaborated on the provision of at least some of these services in, for example, the instructions issued to reporters for the PA and ETC Joint Law Report service. The only surviving copy of these instructions in the archive dates from 1951. It is perhaps sufficient though to provide an indication of the service being provided to Irish newspapers by the news agencies. This was probably provided as part of the Special Reporting Service and may have been billed in the Joint Service ledgers.

- BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Evening): Short reports of cases affecting Belfast, Ulster and Dundalk.
- BELFAST NEWS LETTER (Morning): Cases from Northern Ireland – copy to London Offices.
- BELFAST NORTHERN WHIG (Morning): Cases from Armagh, Antrim, Down, Derry, Fermanagh and Tyrone, including the cities of Belfast and Londonderry (include Bankruptcy). Copy to London Office.
- CORK EXAMINER (Morning): Short reports of cases from: Clare, Cork, Galway, Kerry, Kilkenny, Kings County, Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford. Copy to London Office.
N.B. Send to Cork evening paper any case of general importance to Ireland.
- DUBLIN EVENING MAIL (Evening): Short summaries of important Irish cases – up to half-column where of extra importance. Not Admiralty.
- DUBLIN EVENING HERALD (Evening): Good summaries of Irish cases. If too late send to *Dublin Independent*.
- DUBLIN IRISH TIMES (Morning): Up to half-column of cases of Irish interest unless more specially ordered.
Send to London Office.
- TYRONE COURIER AND DUNGANNON NEWS (Weekly): All cases from south-east Tyrone and north Armagh bounded by lines joining Cookstown, Omagh, Fivemiletown, Aughnacloy, Caledon, Armagh and Portadown.
News Concerning people from this area those who have left and those who have connection with this area.
Press: Wednesday 10am
Wire Monday and Tuesday; post other days.⁹³

⁹² PA Tariff for 1947, GL MS 35460/14.

The PA was indicated as the distributor in all cases.

With regard to organisational involvement with the PA the only Irish delegate at Annual General Meetings (AGMs) between 1946-9 was James Henderson, of the *Belfast News Letter* (though Thomas Crosbie, of the *Cork Examiner*, had attended the 1945 meeting held shortly before the end of the war in Europe).⁹⁴ During this time Henderson was on the PA board and he served on the board of the PA Share Purchase Company until 1947.⁹⁵ This low attendance might be seen to indicate a growing disengagement of the Irish news industry from the PA, in both the independent Irish state and Northern Ireland, similar to that discussed in previous chapters. There were a number of developments during this period that add further information to these considerations. Firstly, in 1946 a number of Irish newspapers provided financial backing to support the development of the PA's distribution infrastructure. Secondly, in the same year Radio Éireann, the independent Irish state's state broadcaster, signed its first agreement for news supply with the British news agencies. Thirdly, shortly after this, the first indications of editorial dissatisfaction with the PA service emerged among the Irish newspapers. These three developments will be discussed below in more detail.

In 1944 the PA had, for the second time, extended the term of the Notes it had issued in 1926 to part-fund its purchase of a controlling interest in Reuters (see Chapter Three). The purpose of the 1944 extension was to allow the agency sufficient capital to pursue a planned post-war upgrade of its communications infrastructure, or private wire network (see Chapter Four). At the 1946 AGM it was announced that the PA proposed to raise £150,000 to part-finance these works by issuing a new series of Notes to its shareholding members. These new Notes would bear an interest rate of four

⁹³ 'Private and Confidential: Press Association and Exchange Telegraph Company's Joint Law Reports: List of Papers for Law Service and Local Law Cases: The Law Courts, January 1951', GL MS 23157.

⁹⁴ Reports of PA General Meetings, 1945-9, GL MS 35365/14-15. There were no Extraordinary General Meetings during this period.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*; PA Share Purchase Company Minute Books, 1945-9, GL MS 35406/2.

percent.⁹⁶ The 1926 Notes, also bearing an interest rate of four percent following the 1944 extension, were repayable in 1954 with a two percent premium on investment.⁹⁷ They represented £50,100 of the PA's issued loan capital at this point.⁹⁸ In addition the Debentures issued in 1935 to part-finance the redevelopment of the PA and Reuters' London headquarters, Byron House, also bearing an interest rate of four percent, represented issued loan capital of £140,000.⁹⁹ They were due to be repaid in full by 1951.

In a circular letter dated 15 May 1946 the PA's general manager and secretary, Edward W. Davies, outlined the details of the new Note offer to members. They were to be known as the 'Second Notes', to distinguish them from the 1926 issue. Their purpose was to part finance the continuation of work already underway to upgrade the private wire network from the Morse-based Creed-Wheatstone system to multi-channel teleprinters. The upgrade would also facilitate transmission of photographs.¹⁰⁰ The main advantages of the new system would be the increase in capacity from 120 words a minute to about 400. In addition all newspapers would be served direct from London and receive the PA's reports at the same time. Previously reports had been routed through various exchanges depending on distance from London. The adoption of multiple, up to six, channels over the previous single Morse channel meant that 'specials' and other high priority messages could be sent over separate channels without interfering with the other news. Finally, the new equipment meant that messages would arrive in the newspapers' offices ready for the sub-editors and printing machines. Previously Morse tapes had to be passed through additional machinery on arrival.¹⁰¹ The Second Notes would carry a face value of £250 each and bear an interest rate of four percent. Payment was to be by way of a £1 deposit payable on application.

⁹⁶ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1945 in Report of PA AGM, 1946, GL MS 35365/14.

⁹⁷ Report of PA AGM, 1945, GL MS 35365/14.

⁹⁸ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1945 in Report of PA AGM, 1946, GL MS 35365/14.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Circular, Edward W. Davies, PA general manager and secretary, (Copy), 15 May 1946, GL MS 35398.

¹⁰¹ Scott, *Reporter Anonymous*, pp. 239-40.

A first instalment of £124 was payable on 1 October 1946 and a second instalment of £125 was payable between 1 April and 30 June 1947. Interest would be paid biannually after the second instalment. The term was to be seventeen and a half years when the Notes would be redeemed at face value on 31 December 1965. The PA reserved the right to redeem all or any part of the issue at face value from 31 December 1956.¹⁰²

Of the eligible Irish newspapers the *Irish Times*¹⁰³ proposed to invest £1,000, the *Cork Examiner*¹⁰⁴ £1,250 and the *Belfast Telegraph*¹⁰⁵ and *Irish Independent*¹⁰⁶ £5,000 each. Ultimately the *Irish Times*¹⁰⁷ only received three notes (£750), the *Cork Examiner*¹⁰⁸ four (£1,000) and the *Belfast Telegraph*¹⁰⁹ and *Irish Independent*¹¹⁰ ten each (£2,500). The newspapers received fewer Notes than they had indicated they would invest in because the offer ‘was heavily over-subscribed, and allocations were made to members on a proportionate basis’.¹¹¹ A similar circumstance had arisen with regard to the 1926 Note issue. This might be seen to indicate that the PA’s membership, including some of its Irish members, were as enthusiastic supporters of the agency as they had been twenty years previously. Notably three of the four investing Irish newspapers were from the independent Irish state. This might be seen to indicate a continuation of the pattern of corporate and organisational engagement they had displayed for the previous seventy-plus years.

There are though some further points to consider with regard to Irish investment in the Second Notes. Firstly, as with the 1926 Notes and 1935 Debentures, financial pragmatism should not be ignored. The Second Notes

¹⁰² Circular, Edward W. Davies, PA general manager and secretary, (Copy), 15 May 1946, GL MS 35398.

¹⁰³ Pro-forma letter of application, [?], secretary *Irish Times*, to Press Association, 28 May 1946, GL MS 35398.

¹⁰⁴ Pro-forma letter of application, [?] Crosbie, chairman, and [?], secretary, *Cork Examiner*, to Press Association, 22 May 1946, GL MS 35398.

¹⁰⁵ Pro-forma letter of application, [?] Baird, director, and [?], secretary, *Belfast Telegraph*, to Press Association, 21 May 1946, GL MS 35398.

¹⁰⁶ Pro-forma letter of application, John O’Riordan, secretary *Irish Independent*, to Press Association enclosed with O’Riordan to Davies, 29 May 1946, GL MS 35398.

¹⁰⁷ Pro-forma letter, Davies to secretary, *Irish Times*, 19 July 1946, GL MS 35398.

¹⁰⁸ Pro-forma letter, Davies to secretary, *Cork Examiner*, 19 July 1946, GL MS 35398.

¹⁰⁹ Pro-forma letter, Davies to secretary, *Belfast Telegraph*, 19 July 1946, GL MS 35398.

¹¹⁰ Pro-forma letter, Davies to secretary, *Irish Independent*, 19 July 1946, GL MS 35398.

¹¹¹ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1946 in Report of PA AGM, 1947, GL MS 35365/14.

represented a relatively stable investment and interest rate in a world economy still recovering from World War II. Secondly, bearing this in mind, six of the eligible Irish PA shareholders did not invest. There are possible explanations for this. As neither the *Londonderry Sentinel* nor the *Derry Journal* was a daily newspaper, they simply may not have had the financial resources of their larger daily contemporaries. The *Dublin Evening Mail* had declined the first extension of the 1926 Notes in 1933. No explanation was given but, bearing in mind that it remained a shareholding member of the PA, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, limited resources must be considered as the default reason for its lack of investment in 1946. An evening daily from a similar tradition to the *Irish Times*, it may well have been suffering from declining circulation over the preceding decades. Established in 1820 it was bought by the *Irish Times* in 1960. It was not however a commercial success and closed in 1962.¹¹² Of the major daily Northern Irish newspapers that did not invest in the Second Notes it should be remembered that all three, the *Belfast News Letter*, *Irish News* and *Northern Whig*, had suffered extensive damage to their premises in the 1941 bombing of Belfast. It would seem reasonable to suggest that the cost of rebuilding and reequipping would still have been making significant claims on their balance sheets at this point. The *Irish Press*' lack of investment in 1946, in comparison to its major daily contemporaries in the independent Irish, state might seem slightly harder to explain. With a circulation of approximately 90,000 it was presumably in relatively good financial health.¹¹³ Further, as mentioned above, it would find the resources to launch a Sunday edition three years later. It was suggested in the previous chapter that this paper's primary, and possibly sole, interest in investing £960 in PA membership in 1941 was the beneficial financial effect this would have on its news supply costs. It might therefore be suggested that the *Irish Press*' only interest in the PA was as a news conduit. This leads on to the third point of consideration concerning Irish newspapers' investment in the Second Notes, particularly those from the independent Irish state.

¹¹² O'Brien, *The Irish Times*, p. 159; Oram, *The Newspaper Book*, p.48.

¹¹³ O'Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press*, p. 45.

It has been pointed out in this study with regard to other investments and engagements of Irish newspapers with the systems and structures of international news supply, and particularly the PA, that financial and commercial pragmatism must be the first consideration in explaining any actions. Bearing this in mind the Second Notes can be distinguished from the 1926 Notes and 1935 Debentures. In the case of the two earlier examples the benefit accrued almost solely to the PA and to the newspapers only by association. There was no indication that the supply of Reuters news would have been threatened if the PA had not purchased a controlling interest in 1926. Further the purchase was expressly presented as a mechanism to secure Reuters as a British agency under the stewardship of the British newspaper industry. The Irish newspapers did not noticeably demur at this aim. The 1935 Debentures, which only newspapers from Northern Ireland invested in, provided the PA with the finances to develop a prestigious head office for itself and Reuters in the heart of London's news industry. Once again though, the specific benefit accrued primarily to the agencies and the newspapers only by association. The Second Notes provided for the upgrade of the PA's private wire infrastructure. In this there were specific benefits to the newspapers in improved speed and quantity of news supply and production methods. This, considered in conjunction with the Second Notes as a sound financial investment, makes a far more pragmatic case. However, non-investing newspapers would have ultimately benefited from the same supply and production improvements as investors. Ultimately, though the upgrade was rolled out across the PA network in Britain by May 1949, the British Post Office could not provide the necessary voice frequency circuits to serve Ireland at that point. Belfast was added to the teleprinter system in 1953 and Dublin and Cork soon afterwards.¹¹⁴ The 1926 Notes and 1935 Debentures are arguably distinct from the Second Notes. However, there is a case to be made for the Second Notes representing a continuation of corporate Irish engagement with the London-based, British, systems and networks of international news supply.

¹¹⁴ Scott, *Reporter Anonymous*, p. 240.

At the AGM when the oversubscription of the Second Notes was announced it was also reported that delays in manufacturing meant that it was not possible to indicate when the upgrade would occur.¹¹⁵ At the same time a further development in the supply of international news to Ireland was announced.

The PA's Annual Report for 1946 stated that the PA, in conjunction with Reuters and the ETC, had begun to supply a combined news service to Radio Éireann on 16 September.¹¹⁶ Originally named 2RN the Irish state broadcaster was, in the 1920s, primarily regarded as 'a medium for instruction, education and entertainment, and only secondarily (if at all) as a medium of information, commentary or criticism'.¹¹⁷ Its international news output was a product of rebroadcasting information received from other radio stations such as the BBC and Vatican Radio.¹¹⁸ In its early years these were restricted to late evenings 'for fear of offending the powerful newspaper interests'.¹¹⁹ In the inter-war period there had been a series of abortive negotiations with the British news agencies, some of which had involved the Irish newspapers. These had failed largely on grounds of cost and the inability to reach agreement with the newspapers.¹²⁰ In 1942 Hector Legge, editor of the *Sunday Independent*, had raised the matter of Radio Éireann's news broadcasts with the PA's general manager, Edward Davies. Davies reported to the board that, having gone in to the records, he had found that there had been several sets of unsuccessful negotiations between 1923 and 1936. In conjunction with the ETC and Reuters an approach had subsequently been made to the Irish government with regard to reopening the matter. His opinion was that:

No agreement concluded would be likely to mean much in the way of revenue, but it would be well worth while as an acknowledgement of our rights and as a basis to build upon in the future.¹²¹

¹¹⁵ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1946 in Report of PA AGM, 1947, GL MS 35365/14.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ John Horgan, *Broadcasting and Public Life: RTÉ News and Current Affairs, 1926-1997* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), p. 4.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.; Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 100.

¹¹⁹ Horgan, *Broadcasting and Public Life*, p. 5.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

¹²¹ PA General Manager's Report Book, 13 January 1943, GL MS 35363/2.

Discussions were carried out via the Irish high commissioner in London, John Dulanty. The minister for posts and telegraphs in Dublin, P.J. Little, considered that, as the majority of international news was drawn from the BBC with permission covering the copyright, no direct contract was required. In addition, wartime restrictions meant that any news supplied by the agencies would be of limited benefit.¹²² It was decided not to pursue the matter any further and Davies concluded these brief discussions in a letter to Dulanty. He deliberately made the point that ‘the Home broadcasting contract between the news agencies and the British Broadcasting Corporation does not in fact give the Corporation the complete copyright’.¹²³ Horgan has written that Radio Éireann rebroadcast BBC reports with permission and presumably covering copyright, contrary to the PA opinion expressed at the time.¹²⁴ In all likelihood it would have required a team of copyright and constitutional lawyers to resolve the legal position. Davies concluded his letter cordially saying that, under the circumstances and maybe as a result of Dulanty’s consummate networking and smoothing,¹²⁵ they would return to the question ‘when conditions change’.¹²⁶

Whether from a desire to normalise the copyright position, to improve its news output or as a result of increased post-war funding,¹²⁷ Radio Éireann made contact with the PA shortly after the end of World War II. On 13 December 1945 Davies reported to the board that there were signs that Radio Éireann ‘intended to improve the quality of its news broadcasts’.¹²⁸ He had been approached in October by Radio Éireann’s news editor, M.J. Lawlor, to investigate news supply possibilities. Davies had discussed the matter with Reuters and in the meantime Lawlor had also approached the ETC. Discussions had then taken place between the three

¹²² PA General Manager’s Report Book, 9 June 1943, GL MS 35363/2.

¹²³ Davies to Dulanty, 18 June 1943 (Copy) in PA General Manager’s Report Book, 14 July 1943, GL MS 35363/2.

¹²⁴ Horgan, *Broadcasting and Public Life*, p. 4.

¹²⁵ Michael Kennedy, ‘Dulanty, John Whelan’, *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2830>, accessed 29 August 2013.

¹²⁶ Davies to Dulanty, 18 June 1943 (Copy) in PA General Manager’s Report Book, 14 July 1943, GL MS 35363/2.

¹²⁷ Horgan, *Broadcasting and Public Life*, p. 14; idem, *Irish Media*, p. 49.

¹²⁸ PA General Manager’s Report Book, 13 December 1945, GL MS 35363/3.

agencies. On 28 November Davies had written to Lawlor outlining a combined service at an estimated annual cost of £5,000.¹²⁹ It was noted that, considering there was no longer a joint agency agreement with the BBC, this might seem to be a strange contractual arrangement. In addition the quoted price was quite low. Davies explained these points by noting that, with a smaller audience and revenue than the BBC, Radio Éireann would be unlikely to take two services, which might be ‘rather hard’ on the ETC. In addition its planned news broadcasts were comparatively limited which, in conjunction with its smaller budget, meant that it would be unlikely that a higher price could be achieved.¹³⁰ On 10 January 1946 Davies reported to the board that negotiations were continuing.¹³¹ The following month a letter from the Department of Posts and Telegraphs in Dublin placed ‘negotiations on an official footing’. It was specified that the service should provide ‘complete world cover including Great Britain and British Racing results’.¹³²

On 27 June Lawlor travelled to London to conclude negotiations with the PA, ETC and Reuters. Despite his attempts to achieve a reduction in price the agencies stuck to the annual charge of £5,000, exclusive of transmission costs. It was agreed that they would cover the cost of staffing the London end of the teleprinter service. Lawlor then met with the Reuters editorial staff who would be responsible for preparing the service.¹³³ From the beginning Reuters was responsible for compiling and transmitting the combined agency service. This was due to a number of factors including

the opposition of the PA’s Irish newspaper subscribers to a service being made to Radio Eireann and the fact that Radio Eireann itself wanted a European rather than a purely British service.¹³⁴

On 12 September 1946 Davies reported to the PA board that completed contracts for the service had been sent to Dublin for signature.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ PA General Manager’s Report Book, 10 January 1946, GL MS 35363/3.

¹³² PA General Manager’s Report Book, 14 February 1946, GL MS 35363/3.

¹³³ PA General Manager’s Report Book, 11 July 1946, GL MS 35363/3.

¹³⁴ Confidential, Radio Eireann, 1 December 1961, Reuters Corporate Archive, London (RA), Central Registry (CR), Box 52.

The only significant change to previous drafts was that the Department of Posts and Telegraphs had changed the jurisdiction to Dublin. Davies, in conjunction with Reuters and the ETC, had concluded that in the event of this becoming relevant in any dispute the agencies would simply terminate the contract. The amendment had therefore been accepted. The three agencies' net revenue from the service would be 'less than £1,000 a year each, but it is quite clear that no contract at a higher figure would have been accepted on the other side'.¹³⁵ On 10 October Davies reported that the service had commenced on 16 September. With the exception of some understandable initial teething problems he concluded 'that the service has started well, and that Radio Eireann is satisfied that its requirements are receiving the special attention that was promised'.¹³⁶

Towards the end of 1946, then, both the mainstream print and broadcast news media in Ireland appeared to be integrated into London-based systems and networks of international news supply. The newspapers relied predominantly on the PA distributed news service. In addition a number had invested in the PA's Second Notes designed to enhance its predominant position in the British and Irish market through technical innovation. Though notably different in some respects, this behaviour was recognisably similar to the 1926 Notes, which part funded the PA's purchase of a majority shareholding in Reuters, and possibly to the 1935 Debentures. The independent Irish state's broadcaster had concluded an agreement with the British news agencies for the first time in its history and Northern Ireland was covered by the BBC.

At this time the wider structures and systems of international news supply were largely recognisable as those that had pertained before the war. AP and Reuters were the dominant Anglophone international news agencies, particularly in Britain and Ireland. Both agencies' services were distributed outside London by the PA under exclusive agreements. UP continued to provide a competitor service via its Canadian-registered subsidiary the BUP. The French Havas agency had effectively disappeared with the fall of France in 1940 when it had been turned into a 'Vichy

¹³⁵ PA General Manager's Report Book, 12 September 1946, GL MS 35363/4.

¹³⁶ PA General Manager's Report Book, 10 October 1946, GL MS 35363/4.

propaganda organ'.¹³⁷ Its successor, Agence France-Presse (AFP), was formed from a combination of the two wartime 'Free French' agencies run from London and Algiers.¹³⁸ Reuters had declined to 'compete and cooperate' with AFP, in a similar way to its relationship with AP, when the French agency accepted a large government subsidy.¹³⁹ This made its news suspect in Reuters' eyes. The German Wolff agency had been replaced in 1933 by the Nazi controlled Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (DNB).¹⁴⁰ Following the gradual relaxation of Allied press control in Germany the Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA) agency would be formed from a merger of the three agencies in the Western Allied zones in 1949. Reuters would collaborate with DPA.¹⁴¹ In 1947 the PA disposed of its share in the Central News Agency to the ETC. The two agencies had bought a joint majority shareholding in this agency in 1937 in order to prevent UP gaining a foothold in the British and Irish market (see Chapter Three). Under the 1947 deal the PA acquired the Central's parliamentary service, which would continue to be run independently, and its photographic library. The ETC acquired the remainder of the company's assets including its advertising agency.¹⁴² This, in conjunction with the joint agreement between the PA, ETC and Reuters on the gathering and distribution of financial and commercial information in 1945, might be seen to indicate that the ETC was increasingly focusing on sporting, financial and commercial services. Whilst continuing to cooperate with the other agencies it was beginning to leave the news realm to the PA and Reuters.

However, at the same board meeting that Davies announced the commencement of the British agencies' joint service to Radio Éireann he also reported a significant development in Ireland, one that provides a

¹³⁷ Graham Storey, *Reuters' Century, 1851-1951* (London: Max Parrish, 1951), pp. 212-3.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

¹³⁹ Donald Read, *The Power of News: The History of Reuters*, 2nd edn., (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 309.

¹⁴⁰ Jürgen Wilke, 'The Struggle for Control of Domestic News Agencies (2)' in Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen (eds.) *The Globalization of News* (London: Sage, 1998), p. 50.

¹⁴¹ Read, *The Power of News*, p. 310.

¹⁴² PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1946 in Report of PA AGM, 1947, GL MS 35365/14; J.M. Scott, *EXTEL 100: The Centenary History of the Exchange Telegraph Company* (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1972), p. 171.

contrary impression to that of Irish integration in to the London-based systems and networks of international news supply just described.

On 10 October 1946 Davies informed the PA board that UP was planning to set up an office in Dublin.¹⁴³ The latest and most complete information with regard to these developments had come to him via James Henderson of the *Belfast News Letter*. It was understood that UP's intention was to supply the proposed Dublin office with its full world news service via teleprinter from its London office. This would then be distributed to the Dublin newspapers and the Dublin office of the *Cork Examiner* by hand. The Belfast newspapers were to be offered a selected service supplied by telephone. The UP Dublin office would also cover Irish stories which would be sent to London for inclusion in the agency's world service. It was also reported that a Mr Gallagher, from PA-Reuters Features, had found on a recent visit to Dublin that a number of editors were

profoundly dissatisfied with the PA and Reuters services on the grounds that they were designed for British consumption. Their view was that as regards foreign news at any rate, Dublin should be favoured with a special service as would be available to the newspapers of a Capital city in a European country.¹⁴⁴

Though Davies considered these opinions unfounded he did suggest that it might be politic to do something to meet them. In this regard he had consulted with Reuters' general manager, Christopher Chancellor. It had been suggested that the wireless Globereuter European news service might be offered to the newspapers in the independent Irish state. There would be no technical difficulty in this proposition. However, it was pointed out that under the licence granted by the British Post Office this service could not be offered to any other PA subscribers in Britain or Northern Ireland. This presented a problem to one of the PA's guiding principles: that all services should be equally available to all subscribers. In addition, much of the news in Globereuter was already included in the PA's Comprehensive Service. Therefore the increased cost of the additional service might not be accepted

¹⁴³ PA General Manager's Report Book, 10 October 1946, GL MS 35363/4.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

by the Irish newspapers.¹⁴⁵ The board resolved to instruct the PA's news editor, D.R. Spendlove, who was due to visit Dublin to meet with the agency's correspondents there, to spend some time looking into the attitudes of the newspapers to the PA-Reuters service.¹⁴⁶

Davies reported to the PA board on 14 November on 'UP's invasion of Eire' based on Spendlove's findings. Spendlove had held meetings with the editorial and management staff of the Cork and Dublin newspapers.¹⁴⁷ UP had not apparently had any success in Belfast or Cork and was currently supplying three morning and one associated evening title in Dublin. The UP having prevailed on one Dublin newspaper to take its service the others had 'felt more or less bound to follow suit'.¹⁴⁸ With regard to the PA-Reuters service:

No substantial criticism was made of the services in general, and such complaints as there were did not appear capable of support by particular instances. The Dublin newspapers do naturally feel that the news is not presented from a specifically Irish angle, but it is very hard to see how it could be so presented other than by an Irish news agency.¹⁴⁹

Only one example of specific criticism from the newspapers that Spendlove met was given. This related to coverage of the trial of Archbishop Aloysius Stepinac where it was felt that 'the prosecution had a better show than the defence'.¹⁵⁰ In September 1946 Archbishop Stepinac of Zagreb, the prelate of Yugoslavia, had been prosecuted in a 'show trial' for wartime Nazi collaboration by the post-war Communist government.¹⁵¹ This had been the subject of a number of questions and motions and a debate in the Dáil. The independent Irish state had made representations on behalf of Stepinac to a number of countries with which it had diplomatic relations including

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, 10 October 1946, GL MS 35358/26.

¹⁴⁷ PA General Manager's Report Book, 14 November 1946, GL MS 35363/4. The newspapers Spendlove met with are not named but it would seem fair to suggest that these were the major Dublin dailies and the *Cork Examiner*.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Stella Alexander, 'Archbishop Stepinac Reconsidered', *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1978), p. 76.

Britain, South Africa, Canada and the United States.¹⁵² In light of Spendlove's findings and the limited benefit it was considered it would provide to the Irish newspapers the board resolved not to offer the Globereuter service.¹⁵³

On 13 February 1947 Davies reported further findings on UP's activities in Ireland to the PA board. As a result of Spendlove's report various suggestions had been passed on to the PA's editorial department and these seemed to be having a beneficial impact. However, at that point the *Cork Examiner* and its evening title the *Evening Echo* were identified as taking the UP service. In Dublin the *Irish Independent* and its evening title the *Evening Herald* as well as the *Irish Times* were subscribing too. Contrary to previous understandings the *Irish Press* was not taking the full UP service from the new Dublin office but was instead continuing to take the London-based BUP service it had used for some time. An analysis carried out by Davies indicated that Reuters was the dominant international agency cited in all the Dublin dailies. AP was ahead of UP in the *Irish Times* and *Evening Herald*. In the *Irish Independent* UP had recently overtaken AP and in the *Irish Press* the BUP was below both AP and AFP.¹⁵⁴ Information received from an unnamed correspondent in Dublin by the PA's editor-in-chief, Henry Martin, indicated that the UP service was regarded as "on the whole [...] worthwhile" but he does not show any marked enthusiasm'.¹⁵⁵ On 10 July Davies informed the board that he had made arrangements to visit the PA's Irish members on an upcoming holiday to Ireland. He would take the opportunity to enquire further into how the PA-Reuters and UP services were received.¹⁵⁶

On 11 September Davies reported to the PA board on his 'Irish Tour'. During the course of his travels he had held meetings with the managerial, proprietorial and editorial heads of four newspapers in Belfast, two in Cork, three in Derry, five in Dublin and two in Limerick.¹⁵⁷ The

¹⁵² Dermot Keogh, *Ireland and the Vatican: The Politics and Diplomacy of Church-State Relations, 1922-1960* (Cork: Cork UP), pp. 227-30

¹⁵³ PA General Manager's Report Book, 14 November 1946, GL MS 35358/26.

¹⁵⁴ PA General Manager's Report Book, 13 February 1947, GL MS 35358/26.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ PA General Manager's Report Book, 10 July 1947, GL MS 35358/26.

¹⁵⁷ PA General Manager's Report Book, 11 September 1947, GL MS 35358/26.

newspapers were not named but taking into account the records of Irish PA shareholding and the Joint Service ledgers mentioned above the newspapers he visited may have been:

<i>Table 5.2 Likely Irish newspapers visited by Press Association general manager Edward Davies in response to expressions of editorial dissatisfaction</i>			
Belfast	<i>Belfast News Letter*</i>	Dublin	<i>Dublin Evening Mail*</i>
	<i>Belfast Telegraph*</i>		<i>Evening Herald*</i>
	<i>Irish News*</i>		<i>Irish Independent*</i>
	<i>Northern Whig*</i>		<i>Irish Press*</i>
Cork	<i>Cork Examiner*</i>		<i>Irish Times*</i>
	<i>Evening Echo*</i>	Limerick	<i>Limerick Chronicle</i>
Derry	<i>Derry Journal*</i>		<i>Limerick Leader</i>
	<i>Londonderry Sentinel*</i>		
	<i>Londonderry Standard</i>		
* - denotes PA shareholder. The <i>Evening Echo</i> and <i>Evening Herald</i> were the evening titles of the <i>Cork Examiner</i> and <i>Irish Independent</i> respectively.			

Davies' findings were that:

The quality of our service was everywhere regarded as good, apart from one Dublin Editor who in effect takes the view that we should give him a special Irish service without extra money.¹⁵⁸

He also reported a meeting with Radio Éireann's news editor, Lawlor, who 'though satisfied on the whole, had a good deal to say about various aspects of the service'.¹⁵⁹ UP's attempts to secure a contract with the state broadcaster had at that point been unsuccessful, though it would start taking the service from December 1948.¹⁶⁰ Davies concluded his report by commenting that the Dublin newspapers did not seem to be greatly impressed with the UP service and that the 'Cork and Belfast newspapers appear to be quite satisfied that they did the right thing in turning the U.P.'s proposals down'.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ PA General Manager's Report Book, 10 March 1949, GL MS 35363/6; Horgan, *Broadcasting and Public Life*, p. 9.

¹⁶¹ PA General Manager's Report Book, 11 September 1947, GL MS 35358/26.

A number of points can be drawn from this series of events. Firstly, the dissatisfaction expressed by Irish newspapers with the PA-Reuters service was primarily centred on its British character rather than any specific absence of news to meet their own requirements. Though Lawlor's comments to Davies are not detailed they may have centred on similar concerns. There are elements in the PA's attitude towards the Irish complaints that are reminiscent of an inability to 'absorb the fact that the country was no longer part of the United Kingdom', as described by Clair Wills with regard to Irish neutrality in World War II.¹⁶² The one specific example that is given refers to the trial of a Catholic cleric in a Communist country which had also been the subject of considerable attention in the Dáil. This should be seen in light of pro-Catholic, anti-communist attitudes in the independent Irish state expressed in de Valera's speech to the heads of Irish foreign missions in 1945 and also seen with regard to, for example, the Spanish Civil War (see the case study in Chapter Three). Secondly, these complaints and the PA's response seem to have been prompted by UP's entry into the Irish market, specifically Dublin. Though almost certainly exploiting latent or explicit pre-existing attitudes the competitor agency represents an example of market forces prompting enhanced customer demands and reciprocal responses from an incumbent supplier. Thirdly, and connected to both previous points, is UP's limited success outside Dublin. The traditionally unionist publications in Northern Ireland would not have had the same complaints as their nationalist contemporaries; a British service was exactly what they wanted. The *Irish News* may not have felt that the limited telephone service offered from Dublin was sufficiently valuable on a cost-benefit basis. Similarly the *Cork Examiner*, which seems to have trialled the service but later rejected it, may have come to the same conclusion. Whether Irish complaints with regard to the PA-Reuter service would have been expressed without the UP's moves to establish a Dublin office can only be the subject of speculation. However, that they emerge, and the pattern in which they are demonstrated, is indicative of an all-

¹⁶² Clair Wills, *That Neutral Island: A Cultural History of Ireland During the Second World War* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 5.

Ireland news industry beginning to fracture. Further, this split is broadly along the state lines created by partition. In this can be seen the emergence of a national media, or medias, concomitant to the separate Irish polities. But this is exposed as much by market and industry developments as ideological agendas.

The PA did not seemingly see any major cause for concern following its investigations into UP in Ireland. Reuters was still the dominant international news agency in the Dublin newspapers, and indeed Irish newspapers. Steps had been taken to meet Irish complaints, which seemed to be having a beneficial effect. The findings of Davies' 'Irish Tour' was that the PA was regarded as providing a good service, UP's market penetration was limited to Dublin, and where it had secured contracts it was not regarded with particularly marked enthusiasm. There was in effect no realisable threat to the PA's dominant market position. However, at the September 1947 board meeting at which Davies presented his findings a further development was reported.

On 13 August Davies had met with AP's London head of bureau, John Lloyd, and world desk, Robert Lindsay. During the meeting Lloyd and Lindsay had informed Davies that AP's general manager, Kent Cooper, was 'very worried by the fact that the United Press have an office in Dublin and are supplying their service to the Dublin newspapers'.¹⁶³ This had apparently been a subject of discussion during a recent visit by Lindsay to AP's head office in New York. AP's concern was not the product of any particular Irish-American focus or interest in Ireland. Rather it was prompted by the intensely competitive relationship between the two American news agencies. AP's assistant general manager, Lloyd Stratton, had written in 1944 that UP was their 'foremost opposition - economically, idealistically, commercially, morally. It must be attacked promptly and relentlessly at every vulnerable spot'.¹⁶⁴ Cooper had written to Davies in July 1945 expressing concern at reports he had received of AP's lack of penetration in the British and Irish market: 'We began the arrangement with

¹⁶³ PA General Manager's Report Book, 11 September 1947, GL MS 35363/4.

¹⁶⁴ Memo to AP board, 5 October 1944, AP Reference Files, World Listings, Archive File: World Service, author: Lloyd Stratton,

you as a joint one in order to meet the competition of the BUP'.¹⁶⁵ This presumably refers to the 1939 agreement under which the PA had acquired exclusive rights to the AP World Service (APWS) outside London. This agreement had been extended for five years in 1944. Lindsay had written in a report on the British and Irish news market, compiled during his time in New York: 'AP must maintain its prestige, particularly against UP, in this densely populated newspaper market, the second largest English-speaking community in the world'.¹⁶⁶ AP had apparently been keeping an eye on UP's activities in the Ireland before Lloyd and Lindsay met Davies. In April 1947 Stratton had written in response to a report from Lloyd on a recent visit the head of the London bureau had paid to Dublin:

Please put it down in your calendar to take up the question of substituting AP service well in advance of the expiration of the UP arrangement, which I read to be of an initial term for one year.¹⁶⁷

Whether this specifically refers to an individual newspaper or multiple titles is not clear, but the principle would have been followed in all cases.

Lloyd and Lindsay pushed for action despite Davies' reassurances that UP's presence in the Irish market was limited to Dublin, and that its service was not regarded particularly highly by the Irish newspapers. It was agreed that newspapers in both Northern Ireland and the independent Irish state would be offered the full APWS as distributed to the London newspapers and the PA. This was normally edited by the PA for inclusion in its own edition of the APWS. Under the new proposals the APWS would be distributed to the Irish newspapers' London offices. They could then send it on over their own private wires or over a joint wire that either they or the PA would arrange. They could retain their existing subscriptions to the PA edited APWS or only take the full service as they desired. Chancellor, the Reuters general manager, had reportedly expressed concern over the proposal. Though it was acknowledged there were no grounds for legitimate

¹⁶⁵ Cooper to Davies (copy), 23 July 1945, AP 02A.2 (1946 Unprocessed), Foreign Bureau Correspondence, London.

¹⁶⁶ 'The World News Report, London', 15 February 1947, AP 02A.2 (1947 Unprocessed), Foreign Bureau Correspondence, London.

¹⁶⁷ Stratton to Lloyd (copy), 8 April 1947, AP 02A.2 (1947 Unprocessed), Foreign Bureau Correspondence, London.

objection he felt that this arrangement would give AP a transmission advantage in Ireland.¹⁶⁸

On 19 September Davies wrote to the Irish newspapers outlining the proposal. This was followed up by Lindsay during a visit to Ireland.¹⁶⁹ Whether this was the primary purpose of the visit or not is unclear. It is likely that, as head of AP's world desk in London, he would have taken the opportunity to contact the PA's Irish correspondents as well. At the PA board meeting on 9 October Davies reported that, following the letters and Lindsay's visit, there was

a measure of interest in the *Irish Press* and the *Irish Independent*. From a letter I received direct it appears that a similar interest is taken in Cork. Other evidence suggests that the Belfast newspapers as a whole, and at least one of the Dublin offices, are definitely not disposed to take the full A.P. Service.¹⁷⁰

As the name of the Cork newspaper is not given it is impossible to be certain, but it would seem likely that it was the *Cork Examiner*, the dominant publication in the city, though the *Examiner* was already taking the APWS at its London office at this time.¹⁷¹ It would therefore seem likely that its interest was in the shared wire proposal which would conceivably reduce its costs. Further information indicated that the interest expressed by the *Irish Independent* and *Irish Press* was predominantly in the potential for receiving wired photographs through the proposed new arrangements. In a supplement to the report for the 9 October board meeting, based on a meeting with Lindsay on 7 October, Davies confirmed that 'the only likely customers for the service by direct wire are the *Cork Examiner* (and *Echo*), and the Dublin *Irish Press* and *Irish Independent* (and *Evening Herald*)'.¹⁷²

At the PA board meeting on 13 November Davies reported that: 'None of the Irish newspapers has yet given any firm indication of an intention to adopt the suggestion for receiving the full A.P. service direct

¹⁶⁸ PA General Manager's Report Book, 11 September 1947, GL MS 35363/4.

¹⁶⁹ PA General Manager's Report Book, 9 October 1947, GL MS 35363/4.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Davies to Lloyd, 18 August 1947 (Copy) in PA General Manager's Report Book, 11 September 1947, GL MS 35363/4.

¹⁷² PA General Manager's Report Book, supplement, 9 October 1947, GL MS 35363/4.

from London'.¹⁷³ The *Irish Independent* and *Irish Press* were apparently still pursuing talks with AP but their interest was primarily in wired photographs. The following month, despite 'vigorous prodding', neither was showing any inclination to take the full APWS.¹⁷⁴ They had reportedly purchased some AP picture transmission equipment and received pictures of the recent royal wedding in London.¹⁷⁵

Considering the complaints from Irish newspapers about the PA-Reuters service why was the AP's offer of the full APWS unsuccessful? Firstly it should be noted that these complaints emanated from the independent Irish state, and particularly Dublin, not Northern Ireland. The interest that was expressed in the full APWS came from the independent Irish state and the Northern Irish newspapers were 'definitely' not interested. Secondly, price must be considered. As the APWS proposals did not progress no detailed costings exist. However, the Irish newspapers already had access to an edited version of the APWS through the PA. Further, there were prospects that this service, if it was considered limited, might improve with the introduction of a multichannel service over the PA's network, the upgrade of which was at that time in hand. The cost of the full APWS may not have seemed justified at this point. In addition the likely financial resources of the Irish newspapers discussed above in relation to the Second Notes are potentially relevant in this case too. Taking the UP and APWS offer together alongside the Second Note issue it is notable that the *Irish Press* declined both, already having the BUP service. This information is based on internal PA documents and may be wrong, the newspapers habit of dropping the 'B' in BUP means that an examination of the printed newspaper does not resolve this question. It is interesting that it is also identified as citing AFP. The possible reasons for its non-investment in the Second Notes have been discussed above. The *Belfast Telegraph* has been identified as taking the BUP service during World War II in the case studies in the previous chapter; this is not apparent in the case study in this chapter but this does not necessarily indicate that it had dropped the service. The

¹⁷³ PA General Manager's Report Book, 13 November 1947, GL MS 35363/5.

¹⁷⁴ PA General Manager's Report Book, 11 December 1947, GL MS 35363/5.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

limited UP service offered to Belfast from Dublin would probably not have induced it to change its subscription. The *Irish Independent* and *Irish Times* both took the UP service. Neither had previously subscribed to the BUP, but both declined the APWS. The *Cork Examiner* declined the UP service, but it has been identified as already taking the full APWS service via its London office. The practice of multiple, limited or non-citation of agency news sources which had developed in the inter-war period meant that newspapers were by this time exercising greater editorial control over the copy drawn from these sources. Bearing this in mind, it should be considered just how much raw material did a newspaper need? Running a newspaper, like any business, requires a careful balance between revenue and expenditure.

By the end of 1947 a number of key developments had occurred in the post-war relationship of the Irish media to the systems and structures of international news supply. All the major daily Irish newspapers were shareholding members of the PA. A number had invested in a mechanism which would strengthen the agency's dominant market position through the upgrade of its distribution infrastructure. With the exception of the *Irish Press*, the non-investment of the other shareholding newspapers can be reasonably explained by a likely absence of available capital. In addition the independent Irish state's state broadcaster had signed a combined agreement for international news supply with the PA, ETC and Reuters. However, at the same time the first expression of editorial dissatisfaction with the service supplied by the PA, including Reuters and AP international news, had emerged. These demands were primarily focussed on the perceived British character of the service though and, with the exception of the Stepinac case, details of their alternative requirements are absent. This dissatisfaction and the associated demands had seemingly been prompted by the entry of an aggressive competitor into the market. Despite this the PA-Reuters service appears to have remained the dominant and preferred source of international news. However, by the end of 1947 the four major daily newspapers in the independent Irish state had each introduced a supplementary source of news, either APWS, BUP or UP. This was not the case in Northern Ireland, nor were there any indications that there was significant demand for such additional resources. It should be noted that the *Belfast Telegraph* seemingly

had BUP and the other Northern Irish newspapers may not have had the resources to introduce an additional service at this point.

The first inter-party government, the declaration of the Republic of Ireland and exit from the Commonwealth

Contemporary Context

The government that took power following the general election of February 1948 was drawn from across the spectrum of political ideologies in Ireland at the time. It was led by the traditionally pro-Commonwealth Fine Gael, whose origins could be traced back to the Cumann na nGaedheal party ejected from office by Fianna Fáil in 1932. It also comprised Clann na Talmhan (the Farmer's Party), both sides of a divided Labour party, a medley of independents and the recently formed radical republican party Clann na Poblachta. John A. Costello was nominated as a compromise Taoiseach when Clann na Poblachta's leader, MacBride, found himself unable to accept Fine Gael's leader, Richard Mulcahy, who had led the pro-Treaty Irish Free State forces during the War of Independence.¹⁷⁶ MacBride, who had been involved with the IRA in the 1920s and 1930s, was the son of John MacBride, executed Easter Rising leader and second in command of one of the Irish Brigades that fought with the Boer forces during the South African War. His mother was the noted nationalist leader Maud Gonne. Cabinet positions were divided among the constituent groups of the new government. The former Fine Gael deputy leader and now an independent, James Dillon, who had been forced to resign from the party in 1942 over his criticism of Irish neutrality in World War II, became minister for agriculture. MacBride was appointed minister for external affairs and his party colleague, Noel Browne, received the health portfolio. Browne's resignation in April 1951 over resistance to his attempts to implement provisions covering free ante and post-natal care and free child health care up to the age of sixteen contained in the 1947 Health Act, also known as the Mother and Child crisis, rocked the government.¹⁷⁷ It was ultimately

¹⁷⁶ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 299.

¹⁷⁷ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, pp. 216-8.

brought down in June that year when three rural TD's rebelled over milk prices – 'cows', not mothers'' as J.J. Lee has helpfully pointed out.¹⁷⁸

The new government undertook a number of tasks in a 'spirit of new age optimism'.¹⁷⁹ These included a large housing and hospital construction programme, and the creation of a national trust, An Taisce, to preserve Ireland's environment and heritage. It also established the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) to attract inward investment. Under Dillon moves were made to modernise the independent Irish state's agricultural economy.¹⁸⁰ MacBride pursued a vigorous foreign affairs agenda, refusing to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) because of partition, and representing the independent Irish state at the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). He managed to secure £36,000,000 in Marshall Aid, seven eighths of it in the form of a loan, from an America still resentful of Irish neutrality during World War II. The majority of this was spent on agricultural improvements, under Dillon's department, and electricity, telephones and afforestation. MacBride came to enjoy a degree of international esteem, partly as a result of his work in the Council of Europe of which the independent Irish state was a founder member in 1949.¹⁸¹ As chair of UNESCO's international commission for the study of communication problems in 1980 he was responsible for the 'Many Voices, One World' report which was highly critical of the treatment of third-world issues by western news agencies.¹⁸² Three decades earlier he had been the driving force behind the establishment of the short-lived Irish News Agency (INA). This agency was initially intended as a means to counter negative representations of Ireland in the international press produced by the London-based news agencies (see below).

However, the foreign affairs spotlight during this period was stolen from MacBride on 7 September 1948 when Costello announced the intention to declare the independent Irish state a republic. The details

¹⁷⁸ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 319.

¹⁷⁹ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 202.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 202-3.

¹⁸¹ Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 301-5.

¹⁸² Elizabeth Keane, *Seán MacBride: A Life* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2007), p. 216; Carla King, 'MacBride, Séan (1904-1988)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (ODNB)* <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/65847>, accessed 3 September 2013.

surrounding Costello's announcement in Canada, on his first overseas trip as Taoiseach, have been much debated in Ireland, both academically and on high stools. Opinions vary on whether he was acting independently of cabinet, from a desire to steal Fianna Fáil's republican thunder, upstage his own minister for external affairs, or pre-empt an independent bill by TD Peadar Cowan. Alternatively he was acting on a decision already taken in cabinet, which included the repeal of the External Relations Act that authorised the British monarch to sign letters of credence for Irish diplomats, which had not been properly recorded or communicated. In another interpretation he was reacting to a leaked story in the *Sunday Independent* reporting this decision.¹⁸³ Speculations become increasingly obscure from here.¹⁸⁴ The *Sunday Independent* had carried a story on 5 September reporting that the country was to leave the Commonwealth and repeal the Act. The editor and author of the story, Legge, insisted that it was not the product of a leak but journalistic intuition. Kevin Rafter has written on Legge's close connections with a number of the inter-party government's cabinet members, particularly Dillon. He has concluded that if it was a product of intuition 'it was most likely very well informed intuition'.¹⁸⁵

Regardless of the details surrounding Costello's announcement the Republic of Ireland Act was passed in December 1948. The Republic was formally inaugurated on 18 April 1949, the thirty-second anniversary of the Easter Rising. The independent Irish state had severed all formal ties to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. Despite this Britain would continue to extend Commonwealth privileges to Irish citizens and benign links were retained with the Dominions, particularly Australia, Canada and New Zealand.¹⁸⁶ In Northern Ireland the Prime Minister, Sir Basil Brooke, called a snap general election in direct response to the passing of the Act in

¹⁸³ Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 484; Keane, *Seán MacBride*, pp. 101-7; Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, pp. 194-5; Lee, *Ireland*, pp. 300-1.

¹⁸⁴ These include the suggestion that Costello was reacting to diplomatic snubs from the Governor-General of Canada, Lord Alexander, a member of a prominent unionist family from Tyrone. In this, probably apocryphal, version of events Costello reacted in a fit of temper to Alexander's failure to toast the Irish President at a dinner in Ottawa and the use as a centrepiece of a replica of a cannon used at the siege of Derry (1689) bearing the inscription 'The walls of Derry and no surrender'; see Keane, *Seán MacBride*, pp. 103-5.

¹⁸⁵ Rafter, 'Hector Legge at the *Sunday Independent*', p. 131.

¹⁸⁶ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 196; Lee, *Ireland*, p. 300.

Dublin.¹⁸⁷ Exploiting unionist outrage at the developments in the southern state he inflicted a resounding defeat on the Northern Irish Labour Party.¹⁸⁸ In Britain Westminster passed the Ireland Act in June 1949 guaranteeing that no part of Northern Ireland would cease to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of its parliament.¹⁸⁹ By mid-1949 partition had been legislatively and electorally guaranteed by all three jurisdictions.

The Irish news industry and international news supply

As described above, many key developments in the post-war relationship of Irish media to the systems and structures of international news supply had occurred before the inter-party government took office. There are however a number of events that bear comment.

At the PA's AGM in 1950 the launch of the INA was noted. It was concluded that 'it will not be, and in fact is not set up to be, a competitor in the true News Agency field'.¹⁹⁰ Though the INA's period of operation (1950-57) is strictly outside the period covered by this thesis it is worth brief comment. The establishment of the agency had first been suggested to de Valera by MacBride in 1945 but vetoed by Fianna Fáil in 1947.¹⁹¹ On appointment to cabinet in 1948 MacBride was in a position to put his proposals into action. The agency was initially conceived as a propaganda tool to present the case of the independent Irish state against partition and overcome the effects of sub-editing of Irish news stories in London. It was perceived that this practice automatically gave a pro-British angle to all stories, which was by extension anti-Irish and contrary to the aims of Irish nationalism. The agency would also provide a news source for the international media on industrial and cultural developments and help to encourage foreign trade and tourism.¹⁹² It was to be non-party and non-political and would not deal in 'hot news' in competition to established

¹⁸⁷ Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf*, p. 239.

¹⁸⁸ Lee, *Ireland*, p. 301

¹⁸⁹ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 196.

¹⁹⁰ Report of PA AGM, 1950, GL MS 35365/15.

¹⁹¹ Horgan. 'Government, Propaganda and the Irish News Agency', p. 31; Keane, *Seán MacBride*, p. 126. Whilst living in Paris in his twenties MacBride had worked as journalist for Havas and written for the London *Morning Post*; see Keane, *Seán MacBride*, p. 49.

¹⁹² Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 57; idem. 'Government, Propaganda and the Irish News Agency', p. 31, 33.

news agencies.¹⁹³ Even before it began operation the agency faced opposition from the newspapers in the independent Irish state, NUJ and members of the Dáil.¹⁹⁴ By the end of its first year of operation the INA had moved well beyond its role as a features and propaganda agency intended by the legislation that created it and moved into the ‘hot news’ market, both in Ireland and abroad.¹⁹⁵ The decision to make it a ‘*bona fide*’ news agency was, according to its managing director Conor Cruise O’Brien, taken at the very first board meeting.¹⁹⁶ This was because it was felt that the INA ‘would not be taken seriously by other media unless it was acting as a normal agency, and in order to broaden its revenue base’.¹⁹⁷

Horgan has identified a number of factors that prevented the INA from successfully establishing itself, including the ‘financial nexus’ that existed between the Irish and British newspapers.¹⁹⁸ This, he argues, was specifically represented by a number of senior editorial staff in Dublin who supplemented their income by acting as news agency correspondents. In both their professional roles, as members of the NUJ and through influence with TDs they acted to resist the agency.¹⁹⁹ The INA would agree a mutually exclusive reciprocal supply agreement with the Independent News Service (INS),²⁰⁰ an American competitor of AP and UP, and later UP.²⁰¹ However there was significant resistance from other news agencies, particularly the PA and Reuters.

On 24 March 1950 the PA general manager, Davies, had a meeting by appointment with O’Brien, the INA’s managing director and also a civil servant in the Department of External Affairs.²⁰² O’Brien writes in his *Memoir* that, due to the original anti-partition propaganda aims of the INA,

¹⁹³ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 58; idem, ‘Government, Propaganda and the Irish News Agency’, p. 33.

¹⁹⁴ Horgan, *Irish Media*, pp. 58-9.

¹⁹⁵ Horgan, ‘Government, Propaganda and the Irish News Agency’, p. 34.

¹⁹⁶ Conor Cruise O’Brien, *Memoir: My Life and Themes* (Dublin: Poolbeg Press Ltd., 1998), p. 148.

¹⁹⁷ Horgan, ‘Government, Propaganda and the Irish News Agency’, p. 35.

¹⁹⁸ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 38.

¹⁹⁹ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 59; idem, ‘Government, Propaganda and the Irish News Agency’, p. 34.

²⁰⁰ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 59; idem, ‘Government, Propaganda and the Irish News Agency’, p. 36.

²⁰¹ Horgan ‘Government, Propaganda and the Irish News Agency’, p. 40.

²⁰² Geoffrey Wheatcroft, ‘O’Brien, Conor Cruise (1917-2008)’, *ODNB*, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/100654>, accessed 5 September 2013.

he accepted the position reluctantly in order to preserve his career prospects in the department.²⁰³ Initially Reuters was approached through the Irish high commissioner in London but O'Brien had been referred to the PA by Reuters' secretary, H.B. Carter. Following the meeting Davies sent Carter a copy of a memorandum he had dictated.²⁰⁴ According to this record O'Brien and Davies discussed the possibility of the INA receiving, for information purposes only, the combined PA-ETC-Reuters service supplied to Radio Éireann. Also the possibility of a reciprocal supply agreement between the INA and Reuters had been discussed. Davies explained that he couldn't speak on behalf of Reuters, but in the event of any such arrangement the PA would necessarily be consulted. He pointed out that agencies, such as the INA, 'sponsored by Governments were not regarded in the same light as independent News Agencies'. Also 'as far as hard news from Ireland was concerned, we already had our own correspondents who met our requirements'. Davies promised that their discussions would receive the consideration of Reuters and the PA. He explained that O'Brien had been directed to him because 'for historical reasons Eire was within the Press Association's sphere of operations'.²⁰⁵ What he actually meant, as he wrote to Reuters' general manager Christopher Chancellor, was that O'Brien 'was referred to me because Eire is part of the British Commonwealth'.²⁰⁶ O'Brien does not mention this meeting in his *Memoir*. He does, however, comment on the structural challenges posed by the Irish newspapers' continuing membership of the London-based PA though, which he describes as 'a survival from a previous historical period, outlived in most other respects'.²⁰⁷

Davies reported his meeting with O'Brien to the PA board on 25 April. In discussions with the ETC and Reuters it had been indicated that Reuters had no interest in a reciprocal agreement with the INA and all three

²⁰³ O'Brien, *Memoir*, p. 147.

²⁰⁴ 'Irish News Agency', 24 March 1950, enclosed with Davies to Carter, 24 March 1950, RA Microfilm 136.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Davies to Chancellor, 19 April 1950, RA Microfilm 136.

²⁰⁷ O'Brien, *Memoir*, p. 149.

agencies would prefer not to provide any service whatsoever.²⁰⁸ Considering that it was thought virtually impossible to prevent the INA seeing the Radio Éireann service an offer might be made to supply the same material for information only.²⁰⁹ This was subsequently confirmed in writing to the INA at a cost of £2,000 a year.²¹⁰ The INA rejected the offer on the grounds of cost.²¹¹ At the same meeting Davies reported this to the board he also informed them of a meeting he had had with the INA's general manager, Joseph Gallagher (appointed 18 May 1950²¹²) in which the INA's intention to engage in 'hot news' had been revealed. In response to Gallagher's suggestion of a trade in services between the two agencies Davies stated that the INA

from our point of view would suffer the double disadvantage of being our competitor and also a Government-subsidised affair. I did not therefore see any likelihood that we should be prepared to make any arrangements with it.²¹³

In light of these developments it had been decided that no further attempt would be made by the British news agencies to negotiate a price for the Radio Éireann service with the INA.²¹⁴ Gallagher had subsequently visited the ETC. Its chairman and managing director, S.M. Anderson, informed Davies in a telephone conversation that he retained the right to enter into a direct contract with the INA. While accepting this, Davies had informed him that the PA would resist any attempts to include Joint Service material in such an agreement.²¹⁵ There is no evidence that the INA and ETC concluded such an arrangement with or without the Joint Service.

²⁰⁸ PA General Manager's Report Book, 25 April 1950, GL MS 35363/6. The reason for this attitude is not specified but was probably because the INA was both a government-backed agency and potential competitor.

²⁰⁹ Again the reason for this opinion is not specified. Most likely the agencies presumed that as both the INA and Radio Éireann were government-backed organisations they would share information.

²¹⁰ PA General Manager's Report Book, 6 June 1950, GL MS 35363/6.

²¹¹ PA General Manager's Report Book, 13 July 1950, GL MS 35363/6.

²¹² Horgan, 'Government, Propaganda and the Irish News Agency', p. 35.

²¹³ PA General Manager's Report Book, 13 July 1950, GL MS 35363/6.

²¹⁴ PA Committee of Management / Board of Directors Minute Book, 13 July 1950, GL MS 35358/27.

²¹⁵ PA General Manager's Report Book, 13 July 1950, GL MS 35363/6.

The INA did attempt to set up supply and news exchange agreements with continental news agencies. However the PA and Reuters appear to have blocked such arrangements whenever the opportunity presented itself. For example, in January 1951 Ginafranco Cobor of the Agenzia Nazionale Radiocor in Milan wrote to Cecil Fleetwood-May, Reuters' European manager. Cobor explained that he had been offered feature material by the INA in which he might be interested 'provided that the relations between Reuters and The Irish Agency are not of competition' (emphasis in the original).²¹⁶ Fleetwood-May replied that:

Although no doubt it is not to be taken very seriously, the Irish News Agency and its Features Service are definitely a competition and we should not like you to handle the service side by side with Reuters. I trust therefore that you will turn down the proposal.²¹⁷

How aware the INA's senior executives were of such reactions to the agency is unclear. O'Brien notes that he and INA chairman Roger Greene 'soon found that business opportunities for the agency were very limited' on their visits to European and American news agencies.²¹⁸

Beset throughout its existence by a limited ability to establish reciprocal news supply agreements and criticism from the mainstream Irish newspapers, NUJ, politicians and the Department of Finance the INA was threatened with closure in 1954.²¹⁹ Inadequately funded and unable to establish a service that was sufficiently attractive to the Irish and international press, it 'limped along for a further three years' and was finally closed down in 1957.²²⁰

As mentioned above, in December 1948 Radio Éireann began taking the service UP supplied from its Dublin office.²²¹ In March 1949 the news editor, Lawlor, wrote to Davies informing him that he was under pressure from the Department of Finance to secure a fifty percent reduction in the

²¹⁶ Cobor to Fleetwood-May, 6 January 1951, RA Microfilm 136.

²¹⁷ Fleetwood-May to Cobor (copy), 17 January 1951, RA Microfilm 136.

²¹⁸ O'Brien, *Memoir*, p. 150.

²¹⁹ Horgan, 'Government, Propaganda and the Irish News Agency', p. 40.

²²⁰ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 61.

²²¹ Horgan, *Broadcasting and Public Life*, p. 9.

current charge for PA-ETC-Reuters service.²²² This was possibly a product of pressure brought to bear from the inter-party government ‘convinced of the financial profligacy of its predecessor’ towards the state broadcaster.²²³ The agencies strongly resisted any suggestion that they might be able to reduce their price. During the negotiations Lawlor noted that ‘there were other agencies which were prepared to offer some sort of service on low terms’.²²⁴ In a memorandum on a telephone conversation with Lawlor the Reuters managing editor, Walton A. Cole, noted that:

the main criticism of the service – and it applied more to U.K. news than to the foreign report – was that in contrast with the UP we were not giving the Irish angle.²²⁵

He continued that Lawlor had emphasised that:

if the contract was renewed there would have to be an assurance that the Eire angle would be covered at least as well by us as it is at present by the UP.²²⁶

Though it is not specifically confirmed in the archive, it would appear that the agreement was not terminated nor was a reduction in price secured. Presumably the improved coverage of the Irish angle was provided. The three British agencies and Radio Éireann agreed a new contract and price increase in 1953.²²⁷ This outcome is reminiscent of the way UP had affected the PA’s relationship with, and services supplied to, the newspapers in the independent Irish state between 1946-7. The presence of an aggressive competitor in the market place had secured a commitment to meet the demands for news supply cognisant of Irish concerns and requirements.

UP also had an effect on AP’s approach to the Irish news market. Following the 1948 general election de Valera embarked on an extended world tour visiting, among other countries, America, Australia and New

²²² Lawlor to Davies (copy), 1 March 1949, RA Microfilm 500.

²²³ Horgan, *Irish Media*, p. 50.

²²⁴ Davies to Carter, 9 March 1949, RA Microfilm 500.

²²⁵ Memorandum, Walton to Chancellor, Reuters general manager, 11 April 1949, RA Microfilm 500.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

²²⁷ Davies to Chancellor, 16 February 1953, RA Microfilm 500.

Zealand.²²⁸ AP's London office requested special coverage of his time in America, especially for the *Irish Independent*. It was noted that the *Irish Press* had made a similar request to UP so this was considered a competitive situation.²²⁹ The impact of this request is difficult to determine as the *Irish Independent* tended to adopt the by now common practice of citing multiple agencies. For example, when reporting de Valera's meeting with the American President, Harry Truman, on 10 March 1948 it cited AP, UP and Reuters.²³⁰ The UP's impact at the *Irish Press* is equally difficult to gauge, in the same example it by-lined its own staff reporter, Liam Mac Gabhan.²³¹ He is similarly by-lined a number of times and appears to have accompanied de Valera on the American leg of his trip at least. He might therefore be considered part of the history of Irish foreign correspondents like Lionel Fleming and Gertrude Gaffney in the Spanish Civil War and Gordon Holman, Leslie Randall and James Stuart for the *Belfast Telegraph* in World War II.

AP's efforts seem to have elicited a favourable response from the *Irish Independent* though. In November the same year 'bullish coverage' was requested of Dillon's visit to America to attend the Food and Agriculture Organisation conference.²³² AP's chief of bureau in London, Lloyd, subsequently sent a more detailed request to the agency's executive editor, Alan J. Gould. The *Sunday Independent* had requested a special interview with Dillon for its edition on 21 November. Its editor, Legge, who was closely connected to Dillon,²³³ had arranged for the minister to grant the interview to an AP representative. Lloyd concluded his letter by saying that AP in London

²²⁸ Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 197.

²²⁹ Telegram, n.d., AP 02A.2, Box 12, Subject Files, Series III; Alan J. Gould, AP assistant general manager, to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Boston and Philadelphia offices (copy), 9 March 1948, AP 02A.2, Box 12, Subject Files, Series III.

²³⁰ *Irish Independent*, 11 March 1948, p. 5.

²³¹ *Irish Press*, 11 March 1948, p. 1; Sean Kearns, 'MacGabhann, Liam', *DIB*, <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a5037>, accessed 23 August 2013.

²³² Lloyd to Gould, 8 November 1948, AP 02A.2, Box 12, Subject Files, Series III.

²³³ Rafter, 'Hector Legge at the *Sunday Independent*', p. 123,

would particularly like to please the *Independent* at this time because it has given notice to UP and is installing our full service rather than the present abbreviated one as of the first of the year.²³⁴

AP missed Dillon when his ship was diverted from New York to Halifax due a dock strike.²³⁵

The *Irish Independent* began taking the full APWS service in 1949. This resulted in a great deal of pressure from AP's London office to provide items of specifically Irish interest, both for the *Independent* and the Irish market in general. This was particularly driven by the competitive relationship with UP. Lloyd wrote to Gould on 2 March 1949 that UP had beaten AP with a story on the Marshall Plan allocation to the independent Irish state. He concluded:

As UP is obviously making a big effort to beat us on Irish regional material, we would appreciate whatever Washington and New York can do to help us meet the competition.²³⁶

In April specific coverage was requested of American reaction to the coming into effect of the Republic of Ireland Act. Though this was particularly prompted by the *Sunday Independent* it was considered worthwhile for the Irish market in general.²³⁷ In June Lloyd reported that UP was competing aggressively and trying to make the *Irish Independent* regret dropping its service in favour of the APWS.

There have been some instances lately where the *Independent* has come up on the short end as compared to its competition and Mr. Geary, the editor, has brought these to our notice. [... The *Irish Independent*] is Ireland's leading newspaper [...]. I can assure you that it will be to all our gain if we can deliver the goods a little more fully.²³⁸

²³⁴ Lloyd to Gould, 12 November 1948, AP 02A.2, Box 12, Subject Files, Series III.

²³⁵ Gould to Lloyd (copy), 16 November 1948, AP 02A.2, Box 12, Subject Files, Series III.

²³⁶ Lloyd to Gould, 2 March 1949, AP 02A.2 (1949 Unprocessed), Foreign Bureau Correspondence, Ireland.

²³⁷ Lloyd to Gould, 11 April 1949, AP 02A.2 (1949 Unprocessed), Foreign Bureau Correspondence, Ireland.

²³⁸ Lloyd to Gould, 20 June 1949, AP 02A.2 (1949 Unprocessed), Foreign Bureau Correspondence, Ireland.

In response Gould circulated instructions to a number of AP offices in America.

The situation is that recently we superseded other services in the *Irish Independent* at Dublin. Now others are strenuously trying to recapture lost ground. [...] be on the alert for activities of visiting Irish or other items likely to interest the Ould Sod.²³⁹

These examples provide particularly useful instances of the effect competition had on the international news coverage that Irish newspapers could demand. It is noteworthy that it was AP that the *Irish Independent* chose to use. Though AP's network of offices was more extensive Reuters had a well established presence in America. However Reuters, through the PA, was not in the same competitive position with regard to UP as AP. Despite the success of UP with some of the Dublin newspapers and Radio Éireann the PA -Reuters service was still the dominant source of international news. It was the fierce competitive relationship between the two American agencies that enabled the *Irish Independent*, primarily in these examples, to demand international news coverage of particularly Irish interest.

Events in Ireland between 1946 and 1948 do not appear to have adversely affected AP and the PA's wider relationship. At the PA AGM in 1949 it was announced that the exclusive agreement to distribute the APWS outside London had been renewed. It was also reported that the private wire network upgrades were expected to come into operation that year.²⁴⁰ In June Davies reported to the board that the network upgrade had begun operation in May and was working very well. There were however some problems with supplying the Irish newspapers. There was difficulty in securing adequate wire capacity to supply Dublin and Belfast and a teleprinter channel from Dublin to Cork would not be available 'for some time'. The possibility of renting a direct wire to Cork was being

²³⁹ Gould to Washington, Chicago, Kansas City, Philadelphia, Boston, San Francisco and Atlanta offices (copy), 24 June 1949, AP 02A.2 (1949 Unprocessed), Foreign Bureau Correspondence, Ireland.

²⁴⁰ PA Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1948 in Report of PA AGM, 1949, GL MS 35365/15.

investigated. This, and the wire capacity that was available to supply Dublin and Belfast, was more expensive than that used to provide the upgraded service to subscribers in Britain. Davies recommended to the board that the Irish newspapers were ‘entitled to facilities equal to other members, despite the additional expense’.²⁴¹ This was in keeping with the principle raised when offering Globereuter to the Dublin newspapers had been considered in response to UP’s competitive activities: that all PA subscribers were entitled to the same services. Ultimately Belfast was fully added to the upgraded teleprinter system in 1953 ‘and Dublin and Cork soon afterwards’.²⁴²

The post-war years had seen a number of developments in the relationship of the Irish news industry to the structures and systems of international news supply. But in many ways it was still integrated with the London hub that had served it and the British news industry for eight decades by the end of the 1940s. However, the first evidence of editorial dissatisfaction with the service supplied had emerged during this period. It is perhaps worth noting here that similar dissatisfaction had been expressed with regard to Reuters’ news in Australia by Keith Murdoch, proprietor of the *Melbourne Morning Herald*, in 1924²⁴³ and by an Indian delegate to the Empire Press Union in 1930.²⁴⁴ Despite this evidence of dissatisfaction the PA, Reuters, and to an extent ETC, were still the dominant and preferred news source in the mainstream Irish newspapers despite the energetic competition between UP and AP. There were, however, two events that bear brief note. Taken on their own they do not appear particularly significant. But when considered in light of the other events discussed in this chapter they can be seen to indicate how newspapers in Ireland saw themselves with regard to the wider news industry of which they had been a part for so long.

Firstly, in 1948 the trade publication *Newspaper World* produced a special publication to mark its golden jubilee: *The Press 1898-1948*. The

²⁴¹ PA General Manager’s Report Book, 9 June 1949, GL MS 35363/6.

²⁴² Scott, *Reporter Anonymous*, p. 240.

²⁴³ Terhi Rantanen, ‘The Struggle for Control of Domestic News Agencies (1)’ in Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen (eds.) *The Globalization of News* (London: Sage, 1998), p. 42.

²⁴⁴ Chandrika Kaul, ‘India, the Imperial Press Conferences and the Empire Press Union: The Diplomacy of News in the Politics of Empire, 1909-1946’ in Chandrika Kaul (ed.) *Media and the British Empire* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 139.

Belfast News Letter, *Belfast Telegraph* and *Irish News* all took out adverts in this celebratory publication.²⁴⁵ No newspaper from the independent Irish state did. Having said that neither did the *Northern Whig* or any other newspaper from Northern Ireland. However those three publications that did take out adverts could reasonably be seen at this point as the major daily publications in Northern Ireland. The *Northern Whig* closed down in 1963 having ‘long been the superfluous third morning newspaper’ in Belfast.²⁴⁶ The others continue to publish to this day. Secondly, in 1948 George Crosbie of the *Cork Examiner* was replaced as the Newspaper Society’s councillor for Ireland by James Henderson of the *Belfast News Letter*. Crosbie had held this position for over a decade and for most of this time the position of substitute councillor had been held by T.V. Murphy of the *Irish Independent*. In 1948 Murphy left the council altogether and Crosbie became the substitute councillor. The following year he vacated this office and was replaced by Sir Wm. Baird of the *Belfast Telegraph*. Henderson and Baird continued to hold these positions in the following years. In 1952 they are respectively listed as the councillor and substitute councillor for Northern Ireland. There are no councillors listed for the Republic of Ireland, Southern Ireland or Éire.²⁴⁷ Though this development passes without comment in the Newspaper Society’s in-house journal, the *Monthly Circular*, it indicates the demise of the Irish Newspaper Society. This organisation had been founded in 1907 and affiliated to the Newspaper Society in 1921. In 1915 its delegates had been part of a deputation to the Postmaster General with regard to proposed price increases for the transmission of press telegrams. At this meeting they had been empowered to ‘speak for every daily paper in Ireland, as well as the principal weeklies

²⁴⁵ Newspaper World, *The Press 1898-1948* (London: Newspaper World, 1948), pp. 15, 19, 24.

²⁴⁶ Oram, *The Newspaper Book*, p. 291.

²⁴⁷ Newspaper Society Corporate Archives, London (NS), *Monthly Circular (MC)*, Vols. 110-114 (1948-1952). The *Monthly Circular* was the in-house journal of the Newspaper Society. Though not publicly published it is held in the Newspaper Society’s corporate archive in bound annual volumes with continuous pagination. The Council position listings are found inside the front cover of each volume and have no page number with the exception of 1951 and 1952 which are on Vol. 113 (June, 1951), p. 220 and Vol. 114 (July, 1952), p. 230.

and bi-weeklies'.²⁴⁸ Further, though the Northern Irish newspapers continued to be part of the Newspaper Society, those in the independent Irish state did not. Though minor, this is perhaps the clearest evidence of what had been an all-Ireland news industry fracturing into two in the post-war period. This division was defined by legislative state boundaries. The national press of Ireland had seemingly become the presses of the independent Irish state and Northern Ireland.

The events described in this chapter might be interpreted as describing a news media in the independent Irish state that no longer saw itself as part of a British news industry. But it did see itself as part of, and connected to, the international, or multinational, news industry. The newspapers exercised this connection through their membership of the PA. The following case study examines their coverage, comment and reaction to the foundation of perhaps the most significant post-war multinational organisation: the UN.

Case Study: The Foundation of the United Nations

The foundation of the UN in 1945 and its development in the post-war period was driven and affected by a number of factors according to Richard Ryan, a former permanent representative to the UN for Ireland. Though it followed the turmoil inflicted by two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century it was also the product of a collapse of the pre-twentieth century 'world order' and the influence of industrialisation. It coincided with a 'growing sense of the need for internationalism or multilateralism not only to offer an alternative paradigm to nationalism but also to reflect growing interdependence among nations and therefore states'. Its organisation was inspired by the inter-war failure of the League of Nations but its development over the next five decades was 'deeply affected' by the Cold War.²⁴⁹ The independent Irish state had played an important role in

²⁴⁸ W.T. Brewster, *Irish Independent* manager, to Edmund Robbins, PA manager, 3 October 1915, GL MS 35447.

²⁴⁹ Richard Ryan, 'Ireland on the World Stage: At the United Nations and on the Security Council', *New Hibernia Review / Iris Éireannach Nua*, Vol. 7, No. 4, (Winter / Geimhreadh, 2003), pp. 9-10.

European politics through the League of Nations.²⁵⁰ At the conclusion of World War II the League's acting secretary general was Sean Lester, an Irishman, as the *Irish Independent* pointed out.²⁵¹ Lester had joined the League secretariat in 1933 becoming 'the first Irish diplomat to serve in an international institution'. In 1937 he had been appointed deputy secretary general. He became acting secretary general in 1940 following the resignation of the pro-Nazi Joseph Avonol.²⁵² Active membership of the League had been pursued by successive post-independence Irish governments. This was part of the assertion of sovereignty and a right to an independent foreign policy and 'to clearly demonstrate the Free State's independence of other dominions, but especially Britain'.²⁵³ The independent Irish state would not, however, become a member of the UN until 1955. Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom was represented by Britain, one of World War II's 'victors' and a permanent member of the Security Council.

Initially official opinion in the independent Irish state on whether to seek UN membership was ambivalent (this is the period covered by this case study). This particularly focused on the implications the principal of collective action by UN members might have for Irish neutrality.²⁵⁴ Could the state, having successfully defended its neutrality throughout World War II, be drawn into a war not of its choosing through membership? By mid-1946 the Department of External Affairs expressed the opinion that this was not a significant worry, particularly as other European neutrals had reached the same conclusion.²⁵⁵ In addition there were fears that Britain and the United States might veto an application for membership from the independent Irish state as a result of lingering resentment over wartime neutrality. Such an action would have 'dented Ireland's prestige as it sought to re-enter the international mainstream'.²⁵⁶ Upon confirmation in July 1946

²⁵⁰ Keogh, *Ireland and Europe*, p. 231.

²⁵¹ *Irish Independent*, 9 January 1946, p. 4.

²⁵² Michael Kennedy, 'Lester, Seán (John Ernest)', *DIB*,

<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a4809>, accessed 8 September 2013.

²⁵³ Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, p. 355.

²⁵⁴ Joseph Morrison Skelly, 'Ireland, the Department of External Affairs and the United Nations, 1946-55: a New Look', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol. 7 (1996), p. 66.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

that the two major western powers would welcome an application a bid was rapidly prepared. John Morrison Skelly has concluded that had de Valera ‘harboured fundamental doubts about the UN he would not have acted so quickly [...]. Further, de Valera applied for admission despite numerous indications that the USSR might reject Ireland’s bid’.²⁵⁷

When the independent Irish state’s application was considered in the Security Council in August 1946 it was vetoed by the Soviet Union, along with applications from Portugal, Austria, Finland, Jordan and Ceylon. Dermot Keogh has commented that this was motivated ‘partially by an effort to bargain for the admission of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Albania and Outer Mongolia’.²⁵⁸ The Soviet Union explained its blocking of the independent Irish state’s application on the grounds of its failure to make a contribution to the fight against Fascism during World War II.²⁵⁹ When the application was again considered a year later a Russian delegate levelled the criticism that ‘even in the most critical part of the war, Ireland expressed sympathy with the Axis and Franco’s Spain’.²⁶⁰ Other criticisms included the comparatively favourable treatment of Axis news stories compared to Soviet ones in the press under the wartime censorship regime and the independent Irish state’s pro-Catholicism.²⁶¹ The absence of diplomatic relations between the two states was also given as a reason for blocking the application.²⁶² But, as Skelly has noted, ‘basically the Soviet Union feared that Ireland would back the west in the General Assembly’.²⁶³

Despite this initial rejection the independent Irish state did not withdraw its application. An element of indifference to membership developed in the early 1950s based on financial concerns within the Department of External Affairs and fears of being drawn into a Cold War conflict not of the state’s choosing, such as Korea. In addition, as Skelly has also noted, ‘Ireland’s admission as part of a “package deal” might have cast

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Keogh, *Ireland and Europe*, p. 202.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 203.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid., p. 204; Skelly, ‘Ireland, the Department of External Affairs and the United Nations’, p. 67.

²⁶³ Skelly, ‘Ireland, the Department of External Affairs and the United Nations’, pp. 67-8.

it as an ally, if not a pawn, of the United States'. This was an unacceptable prospect for de Valera 'who envisaged Ireland playing an active, independent role in the UN, just as it had in the League of Nations'.²⁶⁴ However, the application remained with the UN until Ireland was admitted in 1955, along with fifteen other applicants, as part of an arrangement agreed by the five permanent Security Council members.²⁶⁵

The mainstream Irish daily newspapers were all reliant on news agencies for their coverage of the early work of the UN, though attribution was not always clear or consistent. On 27 June 1945 the *Irish Independent* reported the signing of the UN Charter in San Francisco under the headline 'Truman Hails the World Charter – Warning to Trouble Mongers'. In a sub-article it described 'The Chief Points', focusing particularly on the military organisation of the new body.²⁶⁶ The *Irish Press* covered the same story under the headline 'Analysis of World Security Plan'.²⁶⁷ It described the structure the UN would take including the roles of the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council and Secretariat. It highlighted under a sub-heading 'Non-Members Disputes' how a non-member country could refer to the General Assembly or Security Council for the resolution of disputes providing 'it accepts in advance the obligations of pacific settlement provided by the charter'.²⁶⁸ The *Irish Independent* used this and a number of other shared phrases under its 'Chief Points' headline. Both newspapers cited Reuters. In addition the *Irish Press* reported the signing ceremony under the headline 'Truman Call for Unity Behind Charter' citing UP. In reality this was almost certainly provided by the BUP, as discussed above. The *Irish Times* carried the headlines 'Peace Charter Signed' and "'Let Us Not Fail" – Truman'.²⁶⁹ It did not cite any agencies but the second paragraph of its "'Let Us Not Fail'" headline began with the same words as the *Irish Independent's* first paragraph under 'Truman Hails the World Charter' which cited Reuters: 'Millions now dead

²⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 76.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 79.

²⁶⁶ *Irish Independent*, 27 June 1945, p. 3.

²⁶⁷ *Irish Press*, 27 June 1945, p. 1.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ *Irish Times*, 27 June 1945, p. 1.

would be alive if the world had the new security Charter a few years ago – and the will to use it’.²⁷⁰ The *Irish Press* did not offer any editorial comment. The *Irish Independent’s* editorial expressed the opinion that:

Everything depends on the spirit in which the Great Powers act. If they keep together, eschewing dangerous rivalries respecting the rights of others and imbuing all their associates with an unswerving determination to preserve peace, the world will not have to undergo the ordeal of another great war.²⁷¹

The *Irish Times’* editorial expressed a similar opinion. After first noting that at ‘a later stage the neutrals, including, as we hope Eire, will be admitted to membership’. It continued:

What really matters for the next twenty or thirty years – and that is as far as one can reasonably look ahead – is that there shall be unity and fixity of purpose among the nations that have the real power. In other words Great Britain, Russia and the United States, and, to a lesser degree, France and China, can guarantee world peace if they will have the will, and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.²⁷²

Outside Dublin the *Cork Examiner* carried the headline ‘World Charter a “Foundation” – But Not Perfect – How the New “League” Will Combat Aggression’.²⁷³ It did not cite any agency but it would seem to have also been using the Reuters reports. Its editorial commented that:

Everything depends on the sincerity of the signatories towards one another and toleration for the weaker nations [...]. Under this new World Charter small nations will have certain rights, on paper at least, to bring their grievances before the Assembly or General Council even in opposition to the ‘Big Five’.²⁷⁴

The *Belfast News Letter* also cited Reuters under the headlines ‘50 Nations Outlaw War – San-Francisco Pact – “Peace With Teeth”’ and ‘The

²⁷⁰ *Irish Independent*, 27 June 1945, p. 3; *Irish Times*, 27 June 1945, p. 1.

²⁷¹ *Irish Independent*, 27 June 1945, p. 2.

²⁷² *Irish Times*, 27 June 1945, p. 3.

²⁷³ *Cork Examiner*, 27 June 1945, p. 3.

²⁷⁴ *Cork Examiner*, 27 June 1945, p. 2.

“Teeth” – How International Force Will Work’.²⁷⁵ It expressed the opinion that: ‘The smaller nations have their part to play in the organisation, but obviously its success must depend on the wholehearted co-operation of the major powers’.²⁷⁶ The *Belfast Telegraph*, as an evening paper, reported the signing of the Charter on 26 June under the headline ‘History Made at San Francisco – Charter to Banish War from World’ without any agency attribution.²⁷⁷ The following day, under the headline ‘United Nations Talks End – Quicker Action Needed – Urged by President’, it by-lined Paul Scott Ranking of Reuters.²⁷⁸ On the same day its editorial offered the opinion that:

The main emphasis is on the structure of a world organisation rather than its principles, with the power and authority resting mainly on the five Great Powers - America, Russia, Britain, France and China. The existing distribution of power in the world is accepted, and within that framework it is sought to lay the foundations of a stable peace.²⁷⁹

The *Irish News* cited Reuters under the headline ‘Charter Signed’²⁸⁰ but did not attribute any agencies under ‘50 Nations Adopted Charter to New League’ and ‘How the New League Will Use its Teeth’.²⁸¹ These headlines are very similar, as is the copy, to headlines used in the *Belfast News Letter* which cited Reuters. The *Irish News* did not make any editorial comment on the signing of the UN Charter. The *Northern Whig* did not cite any agencies for its reports but its headlines ‘50 United Nations Sign World Charter – U.S. President at Ceremony’, and ‘Millions Will Die if We Fail – Truman’²⁸² are very similar to a number of those mentioned above that cited Reuters. There is also a recognisable similarity in the copy. Its editorial offered the opinion that: ‘Positive action by the United Nations, however, depends on the faith which the people of each member nation has in the organization’.²⁸³

²⁷⁵ *Belfast News Letter*, 27 June 1945, p. 5.

²⁷⁶ *Belfast News Letter*, 27 June 1945, p. 4.

²⁷⁷ *Belfast Telegraph*, 26 June 1945, p. 2.

²⁷⁸ *Belfast Telegraph*, 27 June 1945, p. 6.

²⁷⁹ *Belfast Telegraph*, 27 June 1945, p. 4.

²⁸⁰ *Irish News*, 27 June 1945, p. 1.

²⁸¹ *Irish News*, 27 June 1945, p. 1.

²⁸² *Northern Whig*, 27 June 1945, p. 1.

²⁸³ *Northern Whig*, 27 June 1945, p. 2.

In these reports there is a seemingly common predominant source in Reuters and a consensus that the success of the UN would depend on the actions of the five permanent Security Council members. Despite this there are a number of points that can be raised. That neither the *Irish News* nor the *Irish Press* offers any editorial comment might be seen as reflective of the ambivalent official attitude in Dublin to the UN at the time. The other newspapers in the independent Irish state can be seen placing some emphasis on the rights of small nations enshrined in the UN Charter. This is less significantly highlighted in the unionist Northern Irish newspapers. In addition there is a similarity in their headlines, focusing on the UN's 'teeth' in some examples, which is distinct from the seemingly more muted examples in the independent Irish state. In the latter case this may have been a habit acquired as a product of wartime censorship, which had only been lifted the previous month.

On the 6 August 1945 the *Irish Times* reported the meeting of the UN General Assembly in London under the headline 'Plans for First Meeting of Assembly' referencing the 'PA diplomatic correspondent' in the first paragraph.²⁸⁴ The following day all the morning papers covered in this case study carried the same article, the *Belfast Telegraph* did not have a corresponding article on either day. The *Belfast News Letter's* headline was 'New League – The First Plans This Week'²⁸⁵ and the *Cork Examiner's* 'Exit League of Nations – Winding Up This Week'.²⁸⁶ Neither cited any agency. The *Irish Independent* and *Irish News* both by-lined the PA's diplomatic correspondent, Frank A. King, under the headlines 'Conference of 14 Powers – To Arrange New League Meetings'²⁸⁷ and 'To Plan New League – 14 Powers London Meeting'²⁸⁸ respectively. The *Irish Press's* headline was '14-Nation Talks in London', it did not provide a by-line and cited the PA, Reuters and AP. Despite this its article was not noticeably more detailed nor did it contain significant additional information.²⁸⁹ The

²⁸⁴ *Irish Times*, 6 August 1945, p. 6.

²⁸⁵ *Belfast News Letter*, 7 August 1945, p. 3.

²⁸⁶ *Cork Examiner*, 7 August 1945, p. 3.

²⁸⁷ *Irish Independent*, 7 August 1945, p. 3.

²⁸⁸ *Irish News*, 7 August 1945, p. 1.

²⁸⁹ *Irish Press*, 7 August 1945, p. 3.

Northern Whig's report entitled 'Talks to Plan United Nations Assembly Meeting' did not cite any agency or provide a by-line.²⁹⁰

This provides an example of how a common news source might be treated at this point: it might be unattributed, attributed, attributed and/or by-lined or attributed to multiple agencies. Though there is a commonality in the headlines certain differences can be noticed. When this is considered alongside the practice of using agency material as a basis from which to produce copy, whether attributed or not, the difficulty of confidently identifying common sources at this point can be appreciated. Why the *Irish Times* carried the article a day earlier than the other morning dailies is unclear. It might be as simple as the newspaper being later to go to press than the others for some reason. As a result it may have received the story in time to include it on 6 June. The lack of a comparable article in the *Belfast Telegraph* may be due to its evening publication. This was not a particularly prominent story (which incidentally might be why so much common copy has survived in the morning dailies: it did not receive significant sub-editorial attention or re-writing). Consequently, by the time the *Belfast Telegraph* went to press on 7 June other stories may have replaced its prominence in the news agenda.

On 25 October 1945 Dillon, minister for agriculture in the inter-party government but at this point an independent opposition TD, questioned de Valera in the Dáil on whether the independent Irish state intended to apply for UN membership. Though not strictly an international news story the coverage of this exchange reveals some interesting evidence of how the traditional politico-religious definitions of the mainstream Irish newspapers were still relevant at this point. Even when not dependent on news agencies their editorial decisions could place different emphases on what might be assumed to be a fairly standardised report of a parliamentary debate. The exchange was reported in the three major Dublin dailies. Under the headline 'United Nations Membership – Eire's Attitude to be Debated' the *Irish Independent* recorded de Valera's statement that an application would not be made 'before deputies and the people generally have had

²⁹⁰ *Northern Whig*, 7 August 1945, p. 1.

ample opportunity to appraise the significance of such a step'. Dillon asked whether it had been considered that there should be 'representatives of at least one Catholic country free to propound solutions consistent with Catholic philosophy for the problems besetting the world'.²⁹¹ Under the headline 'Membership of United Nations – Debate in Dail Soon' the *Irish Press* recorded the same exchange.²⁹² The *Irish Times* under the headline 'Membership of United Nations – Eire to Study the Charter Before Applying' recorded the same statement from de Valera. However it recorded Dillon as questioning whether the representatives should be from 'at least one Catholic country which was free to propound solutions for the present world problems'.²⁹³ This was a minor variance but does perhaps reveal a residual attitude based in the *Irish Times*' traditional Protestant identity. The *Cork Examiner* covered the same exchange under the headline "“Catholic Voice of Authority and Detachment” – Eire and the United Nations Organisation'.²⁹⁴ It reported Dillon as asking de Valera whether there should be 'representatives of at least *our* [my emphasis] Catholic country, which is free to propound solutions consistent with Catholic philosophy'.²⁹⁵ The official record of the debate reveals that the Dublin newspapers were correct and that the *Cork Examiner* was in error. Dillon did refer to 'at least one Catholic country'.²⁹⁶ The reason for the *Cork Examiner*'s variance may have been an error in a parliamentary correspondent's short hand, in transmission from Dublin to Cork by telegraph or telephone or at the sub-editing desk or in type setting. Though a minor example it does show how a different complexion could be placed on the same story through small variations, whether deliberate or not.

Neither the *Belfast News Letter* nor the *Belfast Telegraph* reported the exchange. Under the headline 'Eire and the United Nations – Will Not Seek Membership Till Sure of Commitments' the *Irish News* recorded the same exchanges as the *Irish Independent* and the *Irish Press*.²⁹⁷ The story

²⁹¹ *Irish Independent*, 26 October 1945, p. 4.

²⁹² *Irish Press*, 26 October 1945, p. 1.

²⁹³ *Irish Times*, 26 October 1945, p. 1.

²⁹⁴ *Cork Examiner*, 26 October 1945, p. 3.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁶ *Dáil Debates*, Vol. 98, col. 613 (25 October 1945).

²⁹⁷ *Irish News*, 26 October 1945, p. 1.

was carried prominently on its front page. The *Northern Whig* also carried a report of the exchange on its front page but allocated far less column space and placed it at the bottom of the page. Under the headline ‘Dev Questioned on United Nations’ it reported that:

Mr Dillon asked the Eire Minister for External Affairs in the Dail yesterday if the Government proposed to apply on behalf of Eire for membership to the United Nations, and if so when.²⁹⁸

As noted above, this was not strictly an international news story, but its coverage demonstrates two points. Firstly, the debate is from the period when the Independent Irish state was officially ambivalent to UN membership. Skelly has argued that this was a ‘smokescreen’ thrown up while de Valera awaited indications from Britain and the United States that an application would be welcomed.²⁹⁹ Secondly, even when not reliant on news agencies for their coverage, different complexions were placed on reports by the Irish newspapers through editorial decisions, and sometimes mistakes. Or indeed they simply might not be covered. This particular example reveals the newspapers adhering to their traditional politico-religious affiliations. The traditionally Catholic-nationalist *Irish Independent* and *Irish Press* in Dublin, the *Irish News* in Belfast and *Cork Examiner* reported the story prominently including the pro-Catholic aspect of the debate. The traditionally Protestant-unionist *Irish Times*, though this was not necessarily an accurate description of the newspaper at this point, reported the debate but minimised the pro-Catholicism within it. Its Belfast contemporaries, the *Belfast News Letter* and *Belfast Telegraph*, ignored it. The *Northern Whig* reported the debate, but not extensively, and did not mention its pro-Catholic elements.

All the newspapers examined in this case study carried editorials on the early work of the UN. On 26 January 1946 the *Irish Press* wrote concerning disputes in the Security Council. Persia, a non-member state, had applied to have ‘Russian interference in her domestic affairs’ mediated, receiving the support of Britain and the United States. Russia objected and

²⁹⁸ *Northern Whig*, 26 October 1945, p. 1

²⁹⁹ Skelly, ‘Ireland, the Department of External Affairs and the United Nations’, p. 69.

‘countered by raising the question of Britain’s interference in Greece and Indonesia’. While not particularly dwelling on the outcome of the dispute its editorial was more concerned that:

It has been argued that the interests of the smaller nations can safely be entrusted to the Security Council, but if the case of Persia is not even given a formal hearing each individual small nation will have been given ample proof that its interests cannot thus be protected.³⁰⁰

Ireland’s position as a ‘small nation’ can be seen as being referenced here. The editorial echoing the caution displayed by the Fianna Fáil government, of which the *Irish Press* was a semi-official mouthpiece, towards the UN. The *Irish Times* on 7 February 1946 also referred to these ongoing disputes in the Security Council. It introduced the claims that the United States was making to establish a military base on Manus Island in the Pacific. Before the war this island had been under Australian trusteeship mandated by the League of Nations, in reality a virtual annexation as the *Irish Times* described it. However the line that it took focused on the Commonwealth and, through Australia, Manus Island’s position within it:

it is not without significance to those who are interested – as all Irishmen must be interested – in the future of the British Commonwealth. [... Australians] are in no way subservient to Great Britain, being bound to the mother country only by sentiment and the visible link to the Crown, to which they are all most passionately loyal. [...] Australians and Canadians alike – to say nothing of New Zealanders – have become more firmly attached to the British Crown than ever they were. They respect and admire the United States; but they cling to the British Commonwealth as their birthright.³⁰¹

The *Irish Times* can be seen here referencing Ireland’s own position within the Commonwealth in line with its traditional pro-British stance.

The *Irish Independent*, also referencing the Anglo-Russian dispute in the Security Council, wrote in an editorial on 16 February 1945 that:

³⁰⁰ *Irish Press*, 26 January 1946, p. 4.

³⁰¹ *Irish Times*, 7 February 1946, p. 3.

People everywhere ardently wish for the success of a body whose declared purpose is to preserve international peace. Utterly weary of war and destruction the world looks for a spirit of goodwill among the Big Powers, and for an end to their disputes. It is only from their ambitions and jealousies that any danger threatens for the small nations.³⁰²

Taking what might be considered as something of a middle ground between its two Dublin contemporaries it was welcoming of the aims and ambitions of the UN. But it was conscious of the independent Irish state's position, present and future, as one of the 'small nations'. It may also have been cognisant of the influence of one of the 'Big Powers' on Ireland's own history.

On 5 January 1946 the *Cork Examiner* looked back at the role played by Irishmen who had left the neutral state to fight in the Allied forces during World War II. Bearing this in mind it argued that:

Under all the circumstance there ought to be a place for Eire in the new Organisation, so that she may do her share in assisting the other members to make the Peace, and what is more important to keep it. [...] We have got to co-operate in the world economy whether we like it or not [...]. We have also to co-operate in upholding the Christian outlook of civilisation [...]. In isolation we could neither render the best service to ourselves, not to speak of others.³⁰³

In many ways this is quite a bold editorial. The role of Irishmen in the Allied, particularly British, forces was still contentious in the independent Irish state. Here the *Cork Examiner*, while highlighting the importance of Christianity, is strongly arguing for a multinational approach from a government that was at this time officially ambivalent towards the UN. In addition, a certain criticism of neutrality might be detected in its comment on isolation.

In Northern Ireland the *Belfast News Letter* and *Northern Whig* were hopeful for the future of the fledgling organisation. On 11 January 1946 the *Belfast News Letter* wrote that:

³⁰² *Irish Independent*, 16 February 1946, p. 4.

³⁰³ *Cork Examiner*, 5 January 1946, p. 2

It is for the Assembly now to prove itself, to demonstrate its worthiness for the great and vital task that confronts it, in short to translate into action the principles which it affirms.³⁰⁴

On 15 January the *Northern Whig* expressed the opinion that:

The United Nations Organization is in its infancy. Its development may be slow, but given time and the will of the peoples, it can become most of what is hoped for it.³⁰⁵

The *Belfast Telegraph* was similarly hopeful and highlighted the need for co-operation, particularly between Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. It wrote on the same day that:

With the setting up of the United Nations the Great Powers, however much they may maintain their separate influence, are committed to working alongside other peoples. In other words the value of the Big Three lies in the sincerity and closeness of their co-operation with the United Nations.³⁰⁶

The *Irish News*, noting the absence of eastern European states under Russian control from the UN, commented in its editorial on 8 January that:

If the United Nations organisation means to work for peace it will have to safeguard the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government. That right was enshrined in the Atlantic Charter.³⁰⁷

Unlike the more generalist comments of its unionist contemporaries in Northern Ireland the nationalist *Irish News* can be seen here highlighting the rights of 'small nations', like the *Irish Independent* and *Irish Press* in Dublin. A thinly veiled warning of the threat of communism can also be detected consistent with its post-war attitude.³⁰⁸

The pattern of coverage, comment and reaction on the foundation of the UN in the mainstream daily Irish newspapers this case study has described is in many ways comparable to the trends described in the case

³⁰⁴ *Belfast News Letter*, 11 January 1946, p. 4.

³⁰⁵ *Northern Whig*, 15 January 1946, p. 2.

³⁰⁶ *Belfast Telegraph*, 15 January 1946, p. 4.

³⁰⁷ *Irish News*, 8 January 1946, p. 2.

³⁰⁸ Phoenix, 'The History of a Newspaper', p. 34.

studies in the preceding chapters. This is despite the significant developments that would soon occur in their relationship to the systems and networks of international news supply described previously in this chapter. They were largely reliant on common sources for their coverage of international news and this was predominantly the London-based PA-Reuters service also distributing AP. The *Irish Press* cited UP in addition, but in reality this was almost certainly the BUP service. The use of news agency material as the basis from which to write their own copy, which might or might not be attributed, has been highlighted. The way in which this news was presented and commented on by the Irish newspapers is broadly consistent with the political-ideological-religious identities and positions that had existed for decades. However, these identities and positions now pertained to a national boundary which had been confirmed by the events of World War II and would soon be legislatively and electorally guaranteed. In this the significant evolution that this case study has revealed becomes apparent. The debate in their columns was no longer about Ireland's relationship to the wider world but that of the independent Irish state, soon to be the Republic of Ireland, and Northern Ireland, reflecting the increasing social, political and economic distance between the two polities.

Conclusion

This chapter has described a series of events that taken individually might not seem particularly significant. However viewed together they indicate a trend of changing attitudes towards the systems and structures of international news supply in the Irish media, or fourth estate. At the same time that the mainstream Irish daily newspapers were seemingly continuing their corporate and commercial engagement with the systems and structures of international news supply, the first expressions of editorial dissatisfaction with the news provided emerged. This criticism was particularly focused on it being designed for British, not Irish, consumption. The one solid example that emerged related to the trial of a Catholic cleric in a Communist state. This is consistent with the development of a concept of Irish identity

reposing in the independent Irish state, different from British identity, which had Catholicism and anti-communism as two of its key signifiers.

The emergence of editorial dissatisfaction appears to be at least partially linked to the arrival of an aggressive competitor in the Irish news market: UP. And competition is perhaps the most significant factor to bear in mind when considering the relationship of the Irish news media to the systems and structures of international news supply during this period. In response to UP a greater focus on Irish requirements for international news had been promised and sought to be delivered to the newspapers of the independent Irish state by both the PA-Reuters and AP. A similar result was secured by Radio Éireann. State-backed attempts to provide a specifically Irish source of international news had been hampered by the PA and Reuters, but the INA was beset by domestic resistance throughout its existence. The British news agencies restricted its ability to offer any kind of effective competitive service by refusing to enter into supply agreements themselves and discouraging associated agencies from doing so. It should be noted that this attitude was primarily driven by a suspicion of any state-sponsored news agency though, including AFP, rather than any specifically anti-Irish sentiment. In addition an inability, or unwillingness, to consider the independent Irish state as no longer part of the United Kingdom, and after 1949 the Commonwealth, can also be seen in the British agencies' responses. Comparable developments are not apparent in the attitudes and requirements of Northern Ireland's newspapers. They would not be expected in its broadcaster: the BBC. The Irish newspapers in both polities did remain shareholding members of the PA, and the PA-Reuters service seemingly remained the dominant and preferred source of international news. The change that can be identified is in how the newspapers perceived themselves within this organisation and the wider news industry. Particularly within the independent Irish state they were beginning to see themselves as unique, though still sharing a number of interests.

The events discussed above raise two key questions. Firstly, considering the expressions of editorial dissatisfaction with the PA-Reuters service, why was the offer of the APWS not received more enthusiastically? The PA-Reuters service remained the primary source of international news

for the mainstream daily Irish newspapers and the agencies' dominant market position contributed to the failure of the INA. Cost must be considered. As noted previously in this chapter, in terms of balancing revenue and expenditure how many additional sources of news did the Irish newspapers actually need? Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, why was the BUP not more successful in Ireland during the inter-war period, particularly bearing in mind that the PA edited APWS only became available in 1939? This indicates that in the majority of Irish newspapers the need for an additional international news source was not felt prior to World War II. However, in its aftermath it was. By the end of 1947 the major daily newspapers in the independent Irish state all had an additional news source, either APWS, BUP or UP. This indicates that the experience of World War II had a transformative effect on how Irish newspapers viewed their international news requirements, and by extension those of their readers. The competitive presence of UP allowed the newspapers and Radio Éireann to secure commitments to provide news more sympathetic to their requirements from the British agencies and AP. This change in attitude is consistent with other descriptions of World War II creating a state based concept of national identity in Ireland conforming to partition.³⁰⁹ The apparent withdrawal of the newspapers of the independent Irish state from the Newspaper Society is a further indication that they no longer considered themselves part of the British news industry.

How then can these developments be explained? On the one hand an Irish news industry can be seen that continued to engage on a corporate and commercial level with the systems and structures of international news supply in a way very similar to that which had pertained for eight decades. On the other, however, elements of it were beginning to express dissatisfaction with the service provided for the first time and seemingly disengaging at an organisational level. This is evidence of an all-Ireland news industry that became two news industries largely defined by state boundaries: two fourth estates concomitant to the two separate polities on the island of Ireland. It should perhaps be noted at this point that the major

³⁰⁹ Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf*, p. 236; Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 299; Wills, *That Neutral Island*, p. 424.

events in these developments happened before the 1948 general election which brought the first inter-party government to power that would declare the independent Irish state a republic. These developments are most probably the product of changing attitudes that evolved over time, first tentatively identified in the late 1930s in this study. By the time the Republic of Ireland was declared and inaugurated the newspapers in the independent Irish state saw themselves as a national element in an international news industry. Via their membership of the PA they continued to exercise their connection to the international news agencies, ‘the first international or, indeed, global media organizations and [...] among the first of the world’s transnational or multinational corporations’.³¹⁰ But, by this time, within this global structure the Dublin newspapers saw themselves as comparable to those of London, New York and Paris not Cardiff, Edinburgh and Manchester. Cork’s relationship to Dublin might be compared to that of the press in the major British provincial cities to London. The Belfast newspapers still largely saw their relationship refracted through London. A corollary can perhaps be seen between the attitudes of Irish newspapers to these multinational structures of news and the official state attitude towards the UN and other multinational governmental organisations. An Irish fourth estate increasingly reflecting the nation-state, where the media, primarily the mainstream daily newspapers but by this time also radio, increasingly focused their coverage and saw themselves and their readership in the context of the jurisdictional boundaries and constitutional structures on the island of Ireland.

However, the interesting point about these developments in the Irish news industry, or industries, is not that they happened. Rather, considering the recognised importance of the media and particularly newspapers in creating and defining modern Irish identity, what is surprising is that they happened so late.

³¹⁰ Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen. ‘The Globalization of News’ in Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen (eds.) *The Globalization of News* (London: Sage, 1998) p. 1.

Conclusion

The first half of the twentieth century was a period of significant change in Ireland. Social, cultural and political developments were reflected in the media consumed by the Irish public. In this they played a recognised role in the project of nation-building that is a part of the national histories of the media in Ireland and other countries. In their international news coverage they provided the major source for the Irish public's understanding of world events. In the newspapers in particular, editorial decisions with regard to headlines, quantity of coverage and comment helped to shape their readership's understanding of Ireland's place on the world stage. But this presentation and interpretation often reflected competing domestic points of view. There is a further, and largely unrecognised, international dimension to the Irish media's history in this period which this study has sought to illuminate. That is their corporate, commercial and organisational relationship to the international news industry, particularly the agencies that supplied international news.

The social, cultural and political changes in Ireland in the first half of the twentieth century were reflected in constitutional developments largely focused on its relationship to Britain and its empire and commonwealth. These evolved in a slow and complex manner. By the beginning of the 1950s The Republic of Ireland had emerged as a recognisable nation-state with independent political and state institutions and a largely agreed national identity centring on Catholicism and other unique cultural signifiers such as sport. (It should be noted that a small Protestant, and sometimes unionist, minority did remain in the Republic of Ireland.) Indeed one of the effects of World War II was the emergence of an increasingly state-based concept of identity where even the Northern Irish nationalist community began to see their future in terms of the separate polities rather than a united Ireland.¹ Though a unique constitutional entity,

¹ John Darby, 'The Historical Background' in John Darby (ed.) *Northern Ireland: The Background to the Conflict* (Belfast: The Apple Tree Press, 1983), p. 23; Donal Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland 1939-45: Neutrality, Politics and Society* (Cork: Cork UP, 1996), p. 299; Clair Wills, *That Neutral Island: A Cultural History of Ireland During the Second World War*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, Belknap Press, 2007), p. 424.

Northern Ireland could not itself be considered a nation-state as it remained part of the United Kingdom, albeit with certain devolved powers of self-government. In addition the continuation of conflicting political and cultural visions between its large Catholic-nationalist minority and Protestant-unionist majority prevented the development of an agreed concept of 'national' identity. This future for Ireland would not have been envisaged, let alone accepted, by either nationalists or unionists at the turn of the century. Indeed the characterisation of the Republic of Ireland as a nation-state would not necessarily have been accepted by nationalists, particularly republicans, while partition persisted.

The Irish media, primarily the mainstream daily newspapers in this study, began the twentieth century as part of a news industry encompassing the United Kingdom with strong international elements and connections, broadly reflecting constitutional arrangements. This was particularly reflected in their membership of the Press Association (PA), which they had been centrally involved in creating. Their relationship to this organisation and the wider systems and structures of international news supply evolved slowly and subtly during this period. The behaviours and attitudes their representatives displayed at a corporate and professional level showed no sign of the politico-religious definitions normally so central to the examination of Irish newspapers during this period though. Indeed where these were referred to it was to dismiss their relevance. These political definitions softened over the period and new commercial and populist models of news production and presentation were adopted, reflecting developments in the wider media, but they appear to emerge later in Ireland. The profession of journalism was a similarly late developer according to Michael Foley.² At a corporate and organisational level clear indications of Irish newspapers disengaging from the PA and the, largely British and London-based, systems and structures of international news supply do not emerge until after World War II. At the same time expressions of editorial dissatisfaction with the news provided by the PA and Reuters along national lines emerged in a number of newspapers and additional sources of

² Michael Foley, 'Colonialism and Journalism in Ireland', *Journalism Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2004), pp. 374-5.

international news were sought. These developments were particularly apparent in the media of the independent Irish state, not Northern Ireland. The fracturing of an all-Ireland news industry into two, along state lines, can be clearly witnessed here. But considering the traditional politico-religious, national, understanding of the Irish media this too would appear to be surprisingly late. Despite these changes in attitude the Irish newspapers did remain part of the PA, and through it connected to the international media and its systems and structures of news supply. Conor Cruise O'Brien characterised this complex and seemingly contradictory situation as the newspapers of the independent Irish state joining in 'the howls of anti-British rage that followed the [1949] Ireland Act, but they quietly chose to remain in the Press Association dominated by the national oppressor'.³ This is an understandable, if somewhat pejorative and simplistic, view for the managing director of the Irish News Agency (INA) to take.

The corporate and managerial interaction of Irish newspapers with the systems and structures of international news supply

The Irish media's relationship with the United Kingdom and international systems and structures of news supply at the turn of the twentieth century was particularly represented by their connections to PA. Through its exclusive reciprocal supply agreement with Reuters it was connected to the other major international news agencies represented by the cartelised 'News Ring': the American Associated Press (AP), French Havas and German Wolff agencies. Irish newspapers had been closely involved in the establishment of the PA in 1868-9, provided share capital to support it and were represented on its board of directors and at general meetings. The growing tensions in Ireland that centred on the competing aims of Nationalism and Unionism in the early twentieth century were not apparent in their commercial and corporate interactions with the agency. Where complaints were raised they focused on claims for greater Irish inclusion in the PA. These sentiments were expressed in the comments of H.L. Tivy, representing the Cork *Constitution*, at the 1903 Annual General Meeting

³ Conor Cruise O'Brien, *Memoir: My Life and Themes* (Dublin: Poolbeg Press Ltd., 1998), p. 149.

(AGM) calling for Irish representation on the board. His sentiments were echoed by George Crosbie, of the *Cork Examiner*, when elected to that body in 1907. This is particularly noteworthy because Irish newspapers during this period were largely defined by their political affiliation. Indeed, in many ways, the nationalist press in Ireland at this time was a product of the late nineteenth century factional warfare in the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) which had extended to Irish nationalism and its supporting press.⁴

The period of conflict and turmoil between the outbreak of World War I and the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921 is in many ways central to the creation of modern Ireland.⁵ This period saw a continuation and strengthening of the all-Ireland corporate and commercial behaviour of the mainstream Irish newspapers. In one example this was demonstrated in the deputation to the Postmaster General in 1915 prompted by proposals to increase press telegraph rates. R.H.H. Baird, of the unionist *Belfast Telegraph*, W.T. Brewster, of the nationalist *Irish Independent*, and J.J. Simington, of the unionist *Irish Times*, represented the Irish newspapers. They were present as part of this delegation on behalf of the key interests in the British and Irish newspaper industry under the auspices of the (all-Ireland) Irish Newspaper Society. They had a mandate, according to Brewster, to speak on behalf of all the Irish daily newspapers as well as the principal non-dailies. At the PA AGM two years later Brewster proposed the election to the board of C.W. Henderson of the unionist *Belfast News Letter*. In a lengthy and complimentary speech he noted that Henderson was the Irish successor to George Crosbie, of the nationalist *Cork Examiner*, on the PA board. He further noted that ‘it is the turn of the Unionist Press to represent us in this way’.⁶ This occurred at a point when it had been realised for some time that any solution to the tensions in Ireland would lead to some form of partition.⁷ Further, it was almost a year after the Easter Rising of

⁴ Felix M. Larkin, ‘No Longer a Political Side Show: T.R. Harrington and the “New” *Irish Independent*, 1905-31’ in Mark O’Brien and Kevin Rafter (eds.) *Independent Newspapers: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), p. 27.

⁵ Keith Jeffery, ‘Echoes of War’ in John Home (ed.) *Our War: Ireland and the Great War* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2008), p. 263.

⁶ Report of PA AGM, 1917, Guildhall Library Manuscripts Collection, London (GL) MS 35365/9.

⁷ Paul Bew, ‘The Politics of War’ in John Home (ed.) *Our War: Ireland and the Great War* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2008), p. 97-8.

1916, an event often considered central to the change in Irish nationalism from a constitutional pro-Home Rule position to a more radicalised separatism represented by the Sinn Féin party. It is worth noting that the mainstream Irish newspapers were initially condemnatory of the rebels and their leaders.⁸ They would only gradually soften their attitude to Sinn Féin and its separatist ideals, particularly following its resounding electoral victory in 1918.⁹

The inter-war period was marked by integration and consolidation in the systems and networks of international news supply in Britain and Ireland in which the PA emerged as a particularly important linchpin. It purchased a number of smaller news agencies and renewed and continued its Joint Service Agreement (JSA) with the Exchange Telegraph Company (ETC), first set up in 1906. The two agencies bought a joint majority share holding in the Central News Agency in 1937 with the specific aim of preventing the British United Press (BUP) from doing so and strengthening its position in the British and Irish news market. In 1926 and 1931 the PA purchased a controlling, then overwhelming majority, shareholding in Reuters. This was financially supported by the Irish newspapers through investment in a Note issue. Their behaviour in this matter, while it should also be regarded in terms of pragmatic business principles, displays no indication of the politico-religious divisions normally so central to the consideration of Irish newspapers at this time. Newspapers from both Northern Ireland and the independent Irish state and both sides of the nationalist-Catholic / unionist-Protestant divide invested. In the majority of cases they continued to hold this investment until 1954, despite at least two opportunities to withdraw.

During the same period the corporate engagement of Irish newspapers with the PA, as evidenced by their behaviour at general meetings, continued in much the same pattern as it had for the preceding decades. Indeed one of the notable developments of this period was the emergence of a new generation of Irish newspaper owners and senior executives attending these meetings. The common and cooperative attitude

⁸ Larkin, 'No Longer a Political Side Show', p. 34.

⁹ Ian Kenneally, 'Truce to Treaty: Irish Journalists and the 1920-21 Peace Process' in Kevin Rafter (ed.) *Irish Journalism Before Independence: More a Disease Than a Profession* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2011), p. 223.

expressed by their seniors seems to have survived to cross both the new border and the generations. One such example was the seconding of the *Belfast News Letter*'s James Henderson's nomination to the PA board by George Crosbie of the *Cork Examiner* in 1935. Crosbie was the son of George Crosbie who had served on the PA board 1907-17 and Henderson was the nephew of Charles Henderson who had succeeded him and served on the board between 1917-31. However, the mid-1930s seems to mark the beginnings of disengagement from the corporate aspects of the PA by newspapers from the independent Irish state.

It is interesting to note that the 1926 Note investment took place at a time when the Cumann na nGaedheal government (1922-32) in the independent Irish state was pursuing an economically orthodox and socially conservative policy agenda aimed at achieving stability in the fledgling state. This included continued fiscal and economic ties to Britain. The 1930s was a period when this policy was abandoned by Fianna Fáil. The early agenda of this new party of government (1932-48), including some socially more progressive policies, was characterised by the assertion of sovereignty through the 'economic war' and the systematic dismantling of the remaining constitutional ties to Britain. In this the behaviour of the mainstream Irish newspapers might be seen to be broadly reflecting developments in Ireland's two polities: the 1920s marking a period of continued economic connection to Britain and the pursuit of stability in the independent Irish state, and the 1930s one of disconnection from the remaining formal structures connecting it to Britain. Northern Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom, and here it is possibly worth noting that only newspapers from Northern Ireland invested in the 1935 Debentures to support the redevelopment of the PA and Reuters' London headquarters, Byron House.

How these trends would have developed without the intervention of World War II is impossible to say. Wartime conditions made travel between Ireland and Britain problematic. Therefore the limited representation of Irish newspapers at general meetings during this period should not necessarily be seen as a continuation of the trend tentatively identified in this study from the mid-1930s. Indeed the 1941 Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) held to discuss the sale of fifty percent of Reuters to the Newspaper Proprietors

Association (NPA) was notably well attended by Irish delegates. It is impossible to say how the majority of these delegates may have voted, but opponents of the sale were largely motivated by a fear that the PA might become dominated by London newspaper interests. It is worth considering here that the overly British-centric nature of the PA-Reuters service was a complaint that emerged in newspapers from the independent Irish state in the post-war period.

During World War II transport difficulties affected the distribution of British published newspapers in Ireland. This worked in conjunction with the particularly rigorous censorship regime instituted in the independent Irish state as part of the policy of neutrality to produce a significant decline in the circulation of British published newspapers in the state. As a product, by the end of World War II its citizens were increasingly served by their own national media. However, Donal Ó Drisceoil has argued that one of the effects of the conflict, and particularly the operation of censorship, was an adverse influence ‘on the development of a critical analysis in the media’.¹⁰

Towards the end of World War II the news agencies that represented the systems and structures of international news gathering and distribution in Britain and Ireland had concluded a series of agreements linked to post-war planning. These served to reinforce the process of integration and consolidation that had marked the inter-war period. Indeed the post-war regime was largely recognisable as that which had persisted throughout the twentieth century and in many ways since the beginning of the PA’s operations as a news agency in 1870. The mainstream Irish newspapers had been closely involved in the creation and in fostering the development of these systems and networks. They had provided share capital, directors for the agency and had invested in financial mechanisms to support its growth. In 1946 James Henderson of the *Belfast News Letter* was on the board and all the mainstream Irish daily newspapers were shareholders. A number invested in the Second Note issue designed to facilitate the upgrade of the PA’s distribution infrastructure in Britain and Ireland. This arguably represented a more pragmatic business decision than previous similar

¹⁰ Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland*, p. 285.

examples though. In addition Radio Éireann, the independent Irish state's state broadcaster, signed its first contract for international news supply with the British ETC, PA and Reuters agencies jointly. The mainstream Irish media appeared more integrated than ever into the London-based, British, systems and structures of international news supply.

However, at this time expressions of editorial dissatisfaction with the PA-Reuters service emerged in a number of newspapers from the independent Irish state. These attitudes had been foreshadowed in the requirements the *Irish Press*' first editor, Frank Gallagher, had sent to the BUP following his appointment in 1931. But even in this nationalist newspaper with strong connections to Fianna Fáil the PA-Reuters service had been dominant. Prior to 1946 such complaints were not apparent in the other mainstream newspapers in the independent Irish state and did not emerge among their Northern Irish contemporaries. These complaints primarily focused on the service being designed for British consumption and by extension not meeting Irish, national, news requirements. Their emergence was at least partially prompted by the aggressive entry into the marketplace of the United Press (UP). However, BUP had been present in the British and Irish news market since 1922 and had enjoyed only limited success in Ireland up to this point. This indicates that dissatisfaction with the PA-Reuters service, largely not present in the inter-war period, was probably a product in some way of the experience of World War II. This is consistent with wider findings that the post-war period marked a point where Irish identity became increasingly focused on the legislative and jurisdictional boundaries in Ireland. In this the Irish fourth estate can be seen to be reflecting these developments.

The presence of UP and the competitive challenge it posed in the Irish news marketplace enabled the media in the independent Irish state to secure commitments to greater consideration of Irish news requirements from PA-Reuters and AP. However, the establishment of the INA in 1950 was not welcomed by mainstream newspapers in the independent Irish state, and was widely ignored by those in Northern Ireland. The effect of British news agencies on the dissemination of news inconsistent with the aims of Irish nationalism had been identified as a problem by the post-1918 Dáil

Propaganda Department and successive post-independence Irish governments. One might have presumed that a national media, particularly the mainstream newspapers, increasingly reflecting the nation-state would have been sympathetic to the agency's aims. This was not the case and after Fianna Fáil returned to power in 1951 the INA received decreasing government support until it was eventually wound up in 1957.

This study has identified an all-Ireland news industry, operating as an incorporated part of a wider United Kingdom based industry at the turn of the twentieth century. In Ireland this gradually became two separate industries reflecting the two evolving states on the island. Indeed the developments that reflect this evolution are perhaps more closely allied to the constitutional developments than might normally be presumed. They also display a notable similarity to the developments in Irish trade unionism described by Emmet O'Connor during the same period.¹¹ In both instances the organisations developed, if imperfectly, from being part of an essentially British organisational structure to increasingly represent national structures reflecting the two Irish polities.

The coverage of international news events by Irish newspapers: case studies

The reason that the developments described above might be viewed with some surprise is the traditional confessional and political identities attributed to the mainstream Irish newspapers. Through this their role in the creation of modern concepts of Irish identity and nationality are frequently highlighted. These politico-religious definitions are justified by the published content of the newspapers and the case studies presented in the preceding chapters have largely confirmed their broad applicability. In Ireland, as elsewhere, during this period the presentation of international events and the comment provided was not necessarily restricted by the means of supply and a range of political and editorial positions could be supported by common, syndicated, news reports.¹²

¹¹ Emmet O'Connor, *A Labour History of Ireland 1824-1960* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1992), pp. 201-6.

¹² Simon J. Potter, *News and the British World: The Emergence of an Imperial Press System, 1876-1922* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), p. 212.

The coverage provided of the Delhi Durbar in 1911 followed a similar trajectory in all the newspapers examined. Notably though a comparison of the quantity of copy provided reveals more extensive coverage in the unionist-Protestant publications than their nationalist-Catholic contemporaries. This is consistent with an upsurge in the superficial and sentimental attachment to empire and imperial events within Irish unionism between 1911-14.¹³ What is perhaps surprising is the lack of comparison between Ireland and India as imperial possessions. This is particularly noteworthy considering the implications that the changes in Indian governance announced at the Durbar might have been seen to have in Ireland. The reversal of the partition of Bengal and moving of the Indian capital from Calcutta to Delhi and devolution of certain legislative responsibilities might have been seen to have parallels with Irish nationalist ambitions for Home Rule. Hopes that these ambitions were within reach had been encouraged by the 1911 Parliament Act, removing the ability of the House of Lords to veto the legislation. However, it was only the unionist *Belfast News Letter* that drew overt, and critical, comparisons. It has been suggested here that the lack of overt comparison between Ireland and India in this coverage was the product a number of factors. Firstly, there was a seeming unwillingness to identify Ireland and the Irish with the India and its 'native peoples' in the mainstream newspapers. This might be viewed with some surprise considering much contemporary scholarship that focuses on comparisons between Indian and Irish nationalism in an imperial context. It is perhaps worth noting that such comparisons did occasionally appear in more radical, non-mainstream, publications of the time. Secondly, the aim of Home Rule, within the British Empire, was an objective that could be more usefully achieved at this point by comparison with Britain's self-governing Dominions rather than India, which was unlikely to receive any form of self-government soon. Home Rule within the British Empire, and the opportunities for social and commercial advancement it presented, was broadly supported by the mainstream Irish nationalist newspapers. In

¹³ Alvin Jackson, 'Irish Unionists and the Empire, 1880-1920: Classes and Masses' in Keith Jeffrey (ed.) *'An Irish Empire'?* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1996), pp. 143.

addition, with the tantalising prospect of Home Rule being delivered they were perhaps unwilling to rock the imperial boat too much.

The coverage of the Gallipoli campaign in August 1915 has been seen to demonstrate a notable similarity in the mainstream Irish newspapers, in both copy and headlines, regardless of their politico-religious identities. In addition a surprising delay in the receipt of news agency reports has been identified. These findings can be attributed to the particularly stringent government control exercised through the 1914 Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) and the loss of skilled telegraph operators to military service. What has also been revealed is that the presence of the 10th (Irish) Division as part of the British military forces was highlighted, if imperfectly due to these disruptions to normal news agency services. They were not, however, particularly compared to soldiers from Britain's self-governing Dominions represented by the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZACs). Considering the deferred achievement of Home Rule this might have been expected. Instead the Irish troops were more clearly compared to those from Britain in English, Scottish and Welsh regiments. This broadly common coverage and British centred identification might be compared to the all-Ireland corporate and managerial behaviour within the British systems and networks of international news supply discussed above.

The case study on the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) demonstrated a recognisable departure from the all-Ireland behaviour and common patterns of coverage seen in the two previous case studies. This conflict had notable resonances in Ireland, particularly among the nationalist community. Reactions in Britain were primarily centred around anti-Fascism, a view largely shared by the unionist newspapers in Northern Ireland who saw it as a political matter for London to deal with and provided notably less coverage than their contemporaries. In the independent Irish state and among the nationalist community in Northern Ireland reactions focused around anti-communism and pro-Catholicism. These were key signifiers of Irish nationalist identity at this point. The traditionally nationalist *Cork Examiner*, *Irish News* and *Irish Independent* all adopted pro-Franco positions. The newcomer to the Irish newspapers market, the *Irish Press*, adopted editorial neutrality in keeping with its role as the semi-official

mouthpiece of the party of government, Fianna Fáil. The traditionally unionist, though by this time more accurately pro-British, *Irish Times* was energetically anti-Fascist, a position that it suffered from commercially due to lost Catholic advertising revenue. Its major nationalist contemporary, the *Irish Independent*, conversely benefitted financially through increased circulation of its pro-Franco coverage.

The Spanish Civil War case study has also identified a number of innovations in the gathering and presentation of news in the Irish newspapers studied. By-lines had first been seen in the coverage of Gallipoli but were now far more extensively used; the *Irish Press* had carried news on its front page from its launch in 1931. A trend to use news agency reports as the basis from which to write their own copy has been particularly noted in the Dublin newspapers at this time, as has the tendency to cite multiple, or no, agencies. It has also been pointed out in this case study that the Spanish Civil War marked a point of particular constriction in the international news supply provided to Irish newspapers. The PA opted not to provide a War Special, because of cost and a perceived lack of demand among its wider subscriber base. The AP World Service (APWS) had been lost in 1934 as a result of the collapse of the 'News Ring'. The Central News Agency was in decline at this point and its international news service was closed down following the ETC and PA's purchase of a joint controlling interest in the agency in 1937. In this light it is notable, paying due regard to the pitfalls of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, that this conflict marked the first time that newspapers from the independent Irish state, both before and after independence, sent their own correspondents to cover an international event. Lionel Fleming, of the *Irish Times*, and Gertrude Gaffney, of the *Irish Independent*, arguably represent the first Irish formal foreign correspondents. This breed of journalist was slow to develop in Irish newspapers compared to their major British and American contemporaries. However, due to the expense and danger of maintaining correspondents in the field, Fleming and Gaffney's presence in Spain was limited and news agency services remained important for Irish coverage of the conflict.

The Spanish Civil War then marked a point when the international news supplied to Irish newspapers was particularly constricted, but also

when their national (state) news requirements were, in some cases, out of step with their British contemporaries. Their traditional politico-religious definitions remain apparent and relevant, but the political edges can be seen to be softening. In addition state boundaries can be seen to be asserting influence in both coverage and comment of the conflict. With the exception of the *Irish Press*, their political positioning was not necessarily party-partisan though.

During World War II the independent Irish state's adoption of neutrality was seen to require the imposition of a particularly stringent censorship regime whose powers were extended and strengthened during the course of the conflict. The case studies comparing the coverage of the Dunkirk evacuation (1940) and D-Day landings (1944) have illustrated how this affected the newspapers studied. One of the Censor's requirements was a clear identification of all news sources. As a result the practice of using agency reports as the unattributed basis for the newspapers' own copy seen during the Spanish Civil War returned to clearer attribution. The majority of the newspapers in the independent Irish state broadly complied with the Censor's requirements; though that is not to say they did not fall foul of its powers. The *Irish Times* was the exception, engaging in some notable battles with the Censor under its famously idiosyncratic editor Robert 'Bertie' Smyllie. By the time of the D-Day landings it was required to submit all page proofs in full prior to publication and there was a notable muting of its pro-British and Commonwealth editorial opinions.

In Northern Ireland, as part of the United Kingdom, the newspapers were not subject to the same censorship regime as those in the independent Irish state. The traditionally unionist publications were fully supportive of their state's belligerent status, and some veiled criticism of the independent Irish state's neutrality has been identified in the *Belfast Telegraph's* editorial comment. The *Irish News* can be seen walking a careful line between its traditionally nationalist position and existence in a belligerent state. Whilst supportive of the independent state's neutrality it was critical of the Axis powers and supportive of the Allies, opinions its southern contemporaries were legally prevented from expressing through the operation of the Censor. In contrast to the newspapers in the independent

Irish state the practice of using news agency reports for their own copy and limited or no citation increased in the Northern Irish newspapers at this time. In both polities the use of by-lines increased. During this period the *Irish News*, *Irish Times* and *Northern Whig* all adopted the practice of carrying news on their front pages. In the first two cases this development is attached to policies of modernisation by Eamon Phoenix and Mark O'Brien respectively.¹⁴

The coverage and comment provided of international (war) news in mainstream Irish newspapers can be seen clearly adhering to state boundaries during World War II. This was largely the product of state legislation. But that, in itself, is a key point. The demonstration of the extent of sovereignty attained by the independent Irish state, of which neutrality was an expression, also enabled the creation of state based media controls to ensure (enforce) adherence to this policy in pursuit of the national good.

The aftermath of World War II saw the creation of the United Nations (UN) designed to prevent further conflicts like those that had twice convulsed the world in the twentieth century. The coverage of and comment on these events provided by the mainstream Irish newspapers in many ways conformed to their traditional politico-religious identities. The nationalist newspapers, in both the independent Irish state and Northern Ireland, highlighted the implications the new organisation had for small nations. Neither the *Irish News* nor *Irish Press* provided editorial comment on the first post-war meeting to plan the new body; this could be seen to be in line with the official ambivalence of the Dublin government at that time. In further coverage and comment they and the *Irish Independent* and *Cork Examiner* highlighted the implication for small nations. The *Irish Times* made specific reference to the British Commonwealth and by implication the independent Irish state's position within it. The Northern Irish unionist newspapers were far more focused on the roles of the victorious 'Big Powers', of which the United Kingdom was one.

¹⁴ Mark O'Brein, *The Irish Times: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008), p. 123; Eamon Phoenix, 'The History of a Newspaper: the *Irish News*, 1855-1995' in Eamon Phoenix (ed.) *A Century of Northern Life: The Irish News and 100 Years of Ulster History* (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 1995), p. 31.

In the coverage of James Dillon's question to de Valera in the Dáil on the possibilities of an Irish application to join the UN the traditional confessional identities of the mainstream Irish newspapers were still apparent. Dillon particularly focused on whether there should be a Catholic country present at the UN to propose policies consistent with Catholic philosophy. All the nationalist newspapers covered the debate and highlighted the Catholic angle. The *Irish Times* covered it but played down the Catholic element. The *Belfast News Letter* and *Belfast Telegraph* ignored the story entirely. The *Northern Whig* provided limited coverage that did not mention the Catholic element at all.

Though the traditional politico-religious identities of the newspapers were still apparent at this point their debates and coverage no longer focused on Ireland's relationship to the world but those of the two Irish polities. While retaining clear elements of their traditional identities the mainstream newspapers that comprised the Irish fourth estate, or estates, now reflected the constitutional state boundaries on the island. In addition, these boundaries were becoming increasingly relevant to concepts of national identity at this time.

At the turn of the twentieth century the Irish media, or fourth estate, were recognisable as an all-Ireland constituent part of a wider United Kingdom news industry with certain defining national, and political, characteristics. In the following five decades they came to increasingly reflect the constitutional boundaries that defined the two polities that emerged on the island. This is apparent in both their interactions with the systems and structures of international news supply and in many ways the published output of the mainstream daily newspapers. This development is particularly focused on the independent Irish state; the Northern Irish fourth estate essentially retained the British orientation that had persisted since the nineteenth century. But newspapers from the independent Irish state had originally shared this orientation.

Although Irish newspapers were reliant on news agencies for their coverage of international events during the first half of the twentieth century they should not be regarded as passive, powerless recipients of these

services. Through their involvement with the PA the mainstream Irish newspapers were fundamentally involved in the creation and development of the systems and structures that provided this news. From its creation the PA was based on a United Kingdom organisational model. The gradual disengagement of the mainstream Irish newspapers from this organisation, and particularly those from the independent Irish state, broadly reflected constitutional developments. The demand for greater awareness of Irish news requirements that emerged in the post-war period can be seen as the assertion of a form of ‘news sovereignty’. The mainstream newspapers in the independent Irish state asserting their uniqueness and independence within the international systems and structures of news supply, as the state asserted its independence and sovereignty in the realm of international politics and diplomacy.

In addition to domestic political and constitutional developments in Ireland the findings presented in this study should be considered in light of two further important, and in many ways connected, factors. These are that the media is an industry and its constituent elements, primarily the mainstream Irish daily newspapers in this case, are businesses. They were not solely, or perhaps even primarily, ideological institutions. Secondly, developments in the Irish media during this period should also be seen in light of those in the international media. (Indeed, the discussions in the preceding chapters indicate that a more detailed understanding of the PA’s historical role in the British and international, as well as Irish, news industries is also required.) The developments in the profession of journalism in Ireland and the methods of production, presentation, and financial models that supported them should be considered in terms of their development in the media of other nations, particularly Britain and America. Many of the significant innovations found in these developments appear to have been adopted later in Ireland. The post-war assertion of ‘news sovereignty’ was, at least in part, facilitated by UP’s aggressive entry into the Irish news marketplace. The competitive threat it posed enabled the Irish media to demand, and receive, international news from PA-Reuters and AP that was cognisant of specifically Irish requirements. Prior to 1934 the cartelised structure of the ‘News Ring’ restricted the availability of the

major international news agencies services. However, the PA never imposed exclusivity on its subscribers or members as was the case elsewhere and alternative sources of news were available. UP was able to offer a service, via BUP, from 1922 but this was not widely taken up by the Irish newspapers in the inter-war period. Further, the failure of the INA indicates that the mainstream newspapers in the independent Irish state did not desire a separatist model of news supply in the post-war period. There were admittedly financial implications in this reaction and the unenthusiastic reception the agency received from the established British suppliers, largely because of its state-backed nature but also because of its potential competitive threat, undoubtedly restricted its ability to provide an adequate service. The post-war ambition of the mainstream Irish newspapers was for inclusion in the established systems and structures of international news supply. In the case of those from the independent Irish state this inclusion required recognition of their individual character and requirements: distinct but incorporated. This is in many ways reflective of the post-war ambitions of the Irish nation-state.

During the first half of the twentieth century the all-Ireland media became the separate media of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. But in addition to these national characteristics they retained clear connections to, and were influenced by, the international media. This does reflect wider social, cultural, political and constitutional developments during the period, but in a way that has, perhaps, not been considered or fully understood before.

Appendix A

Irish delegates at Press Association Annual General Meetings (AGM) and Extraordinary General Meetings (EGM), 1899-1949.¹

* - denotes board membership.

Year	Newspaper	Delegate	Significant reference
1899 AGM	None		
1900 AGM	<i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Dublin) <i>Daily Express</i> (Dublin) <i>Belfast News Letter</i>	R.C. Annaud J.M. Gillies Sir Jas. Henderson	
1901 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	Sir Jas. Henderson	
1902 AGM	<i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>News Letter</i> (Belfast) <i>Ulster Echo</i> (Belfast)	R.H. Baird Charles Henderson A. McConagle	
1903 AGM	<i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>News Letter</i> (Belfast) <i>Daily Express</i> (Dublin) <i>Constitution</i> (Cork)	R.H. Baird Charles Henderson J.T. Robson H.L. Tivy	p. 47.
1904 AGM	<i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Examiner</i> (Cork) <i>Northern Whig</i> (Belfast) <i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Ulster Echo</i> (Belfast)	R.H.H. Baird G. Crosbie J. Fisher Sir J. Henderson A. McConagle	
1905 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	C. Henderson	
EGM	None		
1906 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Daily Express</i> (Dublin)	C.W. Henderson J.Y. McPeake	

¹ Guildhall Library Manuscripts Collection, London, MS 35365/6-15, Reports of Press Association General Meetings 1899-1949. Delegate names are as listed in the reports.

Year	Newspaper	Delegate	Significant reference
1907 AGM	<i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Irish Times</i> (Dublin)	George Crosbie* Capt. Baird R.H.H. Baird W.T. Brewster C.W. Henderson J.G. Simington	p. 47.
1908 AGM	<i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Irish Times</i> (Dublin)	George Crosbie* R.H.H. Baird W.T. Brewster C.W. Henderson J.G. Simington	
1909 AGM	<i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Belfast News Letter</i>	George Crosbie* R.H.H. Baird W.T. Brewster C.W. Henderson	
1910 AGM	<i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Belfast News Letter</i>	George Crosbie* R.H.H. Baird W.T. Brewster C.W. Henderson	
1911 AGM/ EGM	<i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Daily Express</i> (Dublin) <i>Irish Times</i> (Dublin)	George Crosbie* R.H.H. Baird W.T. Brewster J.T. Robson J.G. Simington	pp. 48-9.
1912 AGM	<i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Derry Sentinel</i> (Londonderry) <i>Belfast News Letter</i>	George Crosbie* Robt. H.H. Baird W.T. Brewster Wm. Colhoun C.W. Henderson	
1913 AGM	<i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Derry Sentinel</i> (Londonderry) <i>Belfast News Letter</i>	George Crosbie* R.H.H. Baird W.T. Brewster Wm. Colhoun C.W. Henderson	

Year	Newspaper	Delegate	Significant reference
1914 AGM	<i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Independent</i> (Dublin)	George Crosbie* W.T. Brewster	pp. 49-50.
1915 AGM	<i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Irish Daily Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Daily Express</i> (Dublin)	George Crosbie* R.H.H. Baird A.W. Stewart H.L. Tivy	p. 83.
1916 AGM	<i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Irish Daily Telegraph</i> (Belfast)	George Crosbie* R.H.H. Baird C.W. Henderson A.W. Stewart	p. 98.
1917 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Independent</i> (Dublin)	C.W. Henderson* W.T. Brewster	pp. 99- 100, 105.
1918 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Irish Times</i> (Dublin)	C.W. Henderson* W.T. Brewster T. Moles J.G. Simington	p. 84.
1919 AGM	None		p. 113.
1920 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Irish Daily Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Examiner</i> (Cork) <i>Independent</i> (Dublin)	C.W. Henderson* Robt. H.H. Baird W.T. Brewster George Crosbie W. Lombard Murphy	pp. 113-4.
EGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Evening Telegraph</i> (Belfast)	C.W. Henderson* E.N. Illingworth	p. 114.
1921 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Irish Times</i> (Dublin)	C.W. Henderson* W.T. Brewster E.W. Folkes W. Lombard Murphy J.G. Simington	p. 117.

Year	Newspaper	Delegate	Significant reference
1921 EGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	C.W. Henderson*	
1922 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Independent</i> (Dublin)	C.W. Henderson* W.T. Brewster W. Lombard Murphy	p. 163.
1923 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Irish Daily Telegraph</i> (Belfast) <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Independent</i> (Dublin)	C.W. Henderson* Sir Robt. H.H. Baird W.T. Brewster W. Lombard Murphy	
1924 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Irish Daily Telegraph</i> (Belfast)	C.W. Henderson* Sir Robt. H.H. Baird	
1925 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Independent</i> (Dublin) <i>Independent</i> (Dublin)	C.W. Henderson* James Donohoe W.L. Murphy	p. 163.
EGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	C.W. Henderson*	
EGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Independent</i> (Dublin)	C.W. Henderson* Gerald J. Murphy	
1926 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i> <i>Independent</i> (Dublin)	C.W. Henderson* J. McKaig Gerald J. Murphy	
EGM	None		
1927 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Independent</i> (Dublin)	C.W. Henderson* Gerald V. Murphy	
1928 AGM/ EGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	C.W. Henderson* Joseph McKaig	pp.163-4
1929 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	C.W. Henderson* Joseph McKaig	

Year	Newspaper	Delegate	Significant reference
1930 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	C.W. Henderson* James Henderson Joseph McKaig	
1931 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	C.W. Henderson James Henderson Joseph McKaig	
1932 AGM	<i>Belfast Telegraph</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i> <i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Belfast News Letter</i>	Sir Robert Baird William R. Baird George Crosbie J. Henderson	
1933 AGM	<i>Belfast Telegraph</i> <i>Belfast News Letter</i>	Sir Robert H.H. Baird KBE James Henderson	
1934 AGM	<i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Evening Echo (Cork)</i> <i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i> <i>Independent (Dublin)</i>	George Crosbie James Crosbie James Henderson Joseph McKaig C.J. Murphy	
1935 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Cork Examiner</i>	James Henderson* George Crosbie	p. 182.
1936 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	James Henderson* Joseph McKaig	
1937 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	James Henderson* G. Crosbie Joseph McKaig	
1938 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	James Henderson* Joseph McKaig	
1939 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Cork Examiner</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	James Henderson* G. Crosbie Joseph McKaig	

Year	Newspaper	Delegate	Significant reference
1940 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	James Henderson* Joseph McKaig	
1941 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	James Henderson* Joseph McKaig	
EGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Irish Times</i> (Dublin)) <i>Evening Mail</i> (Dublin)) <i>Irish Independent</i> <i>Northern Whig</i> (Belfast) <i>Belfast Telegraph</i> Thomas Crosbie & Co. Ltd. [<i>Cork Examiner</i>] <i>Irish News</i> (Belfast)	James Henderson* A.L. Colyer P.A. Cox E.J. Hayes Joseph McKaig A. Strachan W.H. Young	pp. 243-7.
1942 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	James Henderson* Joseph McKaig	
1943 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	James Henderson*	
1944 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	James Henderson*	
1945 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i> <i>Cork Examiner</i>	James Henderson* Thomas Crosbie	
1946 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	James Henderson*	
1947 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	James Henderson*	
1948 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	James Henderson*	
1949 AGM	<i>Belfast News Letter</i>	James Henderson*	

Appendix B

Summary of newspapers consulted in case studies

Title: *Belfast News Letter* (morning).

Publication: Belfast.

Dates: 1737-

Political affiliation: Unionist.

Associated Titles: Merged with the *Belfast Weekly News* (1855-1942) in 1942.

The *Belfast News Letter*, also sometimes the *Belfast News-Letter* or *Belfast Newsletter*, was first published in 1737 and can lay claim to being the oldest continuously published title in Britain and Ireland, still being in print today.¹ During the period covered by this study it was staunchly unionist and owned by the Henderson family, a number of whom were active on boards and at general meetings of the PA.

Title: *Belfast Telegraph* (evening).

Publication: Belfast.

Dates: 1870-

Political affiliation: Unionist.

Associated Titles: *Belfast Weekly Telegraph* (1873-1964); *Irish Daily Telegraph* (morning) (1904-18 and 1928-52) also known as the *Irish Telegraph* (1918-28).

The *Belfast Telegraph* was published as the *Belfast Evening Telegraph* from its foundation in 1870 until 1918 when it adopted the shorter title it still bears today. Started by two brothers, William Savage Baird and George Courtenay Baird,² the family continued to own it throughout the period covered by this study. Firmly unionist for most of its history it adopted a more liberal attitude from 1953 under the editorship of Jack Sayers.³

¹ Hugh Oram, *The Newspaper Book: A History of Newspapers in Ireland, 1649-1983* (Dublin: MO Books, 1983), p. 32.

² Ibid., pp. 71-3.

³ John Horgan, *Irish Media: A Critical History Since 1922* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 74.

Title: *Cork Examiner* (morning), continued as the *Examiner* (1996-2000),
the *Irish Examiner* (2000-)

Publication: Cork.

Dates: 1841-

Political affiliation: Nationalist.

Associated Titles: *Cork Weekly Examiner* (1895-1901), continued as *Cork Weekly Examiner and Weekly Herald* (1901-76), *Irish Weekly Examiner* (1976-81), *Cork Weekly Examiner* (1981); *Evening Echo* (1892-).

The *Cork Examiner* was established in 1841 by John Francis Maguire. On his death in 1872 Thomas Crosbie purchased it from his widow. Maguire had previously delegated much of the running of the paper to Crosbie.⁴ Espousing a moderate nationalism and socially conservative policy during the period covered by this study it remained in the hands of Crosbie's descendants. Crosbie himself was present at the first meeting held to discuss the formation of the PA and the family were active in the agency throughout the first half of the twentieth century. It continues to be primarily controlled by the Crosbie family and is today published as the *Irish Examiner*.

Title: *Freeman's Journal* (morning).

Publication: Dublin.

Dates: 1763-1924

Political affiliation: Nationalist.

Associated Titles: *Evening Telegraph* (1871-1924); *Weekly Freeman's Journal* (1818-1924).

The *Freeman's Journal*, more fully the *Freeman's Journal and Daily Commercial Advertiser*, was first published in 1763 as the *Public Register or Freeman*. Changing its title in 1806 it ceased publication in 1924. During the nineteenth century it became the foremost nationalist newspaper in Ireland.⁵ Between 1841-92 it was owned by the Gray family, who were involved in the establishment of the PA. It initially supported Charles Stewart Parnell when the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) split over his

⁴ John J. Horgan, 'A Cork Centenary', *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review*, Vol. 30, No. 120 (Dec., 1941), p. 575.

⁵ Felix M. Larkin, "'A Great Daily Organ': The Freeman's Journal 1763-1924", *History Ireland*, Vol. 14, No. 3, (2006), p. 44.

involvement in the O'Shea divorce proceedings. However it switched sides, fearing a threat to its circulation and predominance, when the anti-Parnellites launched the *Daily Nation*. The period 1893-1912 was one of relentless decline for the newspaper caught up in the divisions in Irish nationalism brought about by the fall of Parnell, which were replicated in the newspaper market.⁶ From 1912-19 it was subsidised by the IPP and became its semi-official mouthpiece. Bought by the Dublin wine-merchant Martin Fitzgerald in 1919 it failed to keep up with evolving Irish nationalism and developments in the news industry and finally closed in 1924. Its assets and titles were bought by its arch rival, the *Irish Independent*.⁷

Title: *Irish Independent* (morning).

Publication: Dublin.

Dates: 1891 -

Political affiliation: Nationalist.

Associated Titles: *Evening Herald* (1891-2013), continued as the *Herald* (2013-); *Irish Weekly Independent* (1893-1900) continued as *Irish Weekly Independent and Nation* (1900-01), *Illustrated Irish Weekly Independent and Nation* (1901-04), *Irish Weekly Independent* (1905-60); *Sunday Independent* (1905-).

The *Irish Independent* was a product of the divisions in Irish nationalism and their effects on the newspaper industry in the final decade of the nineteenth century. It was first published as the *Irish Daily Independent* in 1891, planned by Parnell in the final weeks of his life in response to the *Freeman's Journal's* switch of allegiance and combined opposition from the *Daily Nation*.⁸ Bought out of receivership by the Irish industrialist and former IPP MP William Martin Murphy in 1900 it was merged with the *Daily Nation* and continued under the combined title of the *Irish Daily Independent and Daily Nation* until 1904.⁹ In 1905 Murphy relaunched the newspaper as a half-penny daily based on the *Daily Mail*. Under its new title

⁶ Ibid., p. 47.

⁷ Ibid., p. 49.

⁸ Patrick Maume, 'Parnellite Politics and the Origins of Independent Newspapers' in Mark O'Brien and Kevin Rafter (eds.) *Independent Newspapers: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), p. 2.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 11-12.

of the *Irish Independent* it pursued a wider audience appeal adopting populist journalistic practices based on a more commercial model.¹⁰ Positioned as the voice of middle-class Irish nationalism¹¹ it would maintain a socially conservative, pro-Catholic nationalism throughout the period covered in this study. It was controlled by the Murphy family until 1973 and continues to publish under the same title to the present day.¹²

Title: *Irish News* (morning).

Publication: Belfast.

Dates: 1855-

Political affiliation: Nationalist.

Associated Titles: *Irish Weekly News* (1921-22).

The *Irish News* was in many ways also a product of the divisions within Irish nationalism in the final decade of the nineteenth century. It can trace its origins back to the *Belfast Morning News* which was launched by two brothers, Robert and Daniel Read, in 1855.¹³ Originally politically neutral it was bought by the Gray family in 1882 and became a pro-Parnell and IPP publication.¹⁴ Initially anti-Parnell in over the split in the party it switched sides on the instructions of the Grays. In 1892 the *Belfast Morning News* was bought by the company that controlled the *Irish News*, which had been set up in 1891 when the former switched to a pro-Parnell line.¹⁵ The two titles were merged and continued as the *Irish News and Belfast Morning News*. In 1905 supporters of IPP leader John Redmond gained control of the newspaper and it remained essentially a pro-Home Rule title into the 1920s.¹⁶ Forced to modernise due its financially precarious position in the

¹⁰ Patrick Maume, 'William Martin Murphy, the *Irish Independent* and Middle-Class Politics, 1905-1919' in Fintan Lane (ed.) *Politics, Society and the Middle Class in Modern Ireland*, p. 230; Thomas Morrissey S.J., *William Martin Murphy* (Dundalk: Dundalgan Press, Historical Association of Ireland, 1997), p. 32.

¹¹ Maume, 'William Martin Murphy, the *Irish Independent* and Middle-Class Politics', p. 230.

¹² Oram, *The Newspaper Book*, p. 321.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁴ Eamon Phoenix, 'The History of a Newspaper: the *Irish News*, 1855-1995' in Eamon Phoenix (ed.) *A Century of Northern Life: The Irish News and 100 Years of Ulster History* (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 1995), pp. 9-11.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-17.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-25.

late 1920s it adopted a moderate nationalist position. Having been initially critical of Eamon de Valera, by the mid-1930s it was supportive of the Fianna Fáil government in the independent Irish state. During World War II it offered ‘unswerving’ support for Irish neutrality.¹⁷ It continues to publish as the *Irish News* to the present day.

Title: *Irish Press* (morning).

Publication: Dublin.

Dates: 1931-1995

Political affiliation: Nationalist.

Associated Titles: *Evening Press*, also known as the *Evening Telegraph and Evening Press*, (1932, 1954-95); *Sunday Press* (1949-1995).

In 1931 the *Irish Press* was founded to re-establish de Valera’s political credentials and provide publicity for the newly established Fianna Fáil party.¹⁸ Its purpose was to provide ‘a forum for the dissemination of ideology to the masses while conversely giving supporters something practical to affiliate to’.¹⁹ A complicated company structure was established to administer funds raised to support the new paper and ‘to ensure that ultimate control of the company remained within the [de Valera] family’.²⁰ From its foundation to the end of the period covered here the *Irish Press* acted as the semi-official organ of the Fianna Fáil party, which was in government continuously between 1932-48. Indeed, as Mark O’Brien has commented, up until it ceased publication in 1995 ‘it retained the reputation of being the “kept paper” of the Fianna Fáil party’.²¹

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 27-31.

¹⁸ Mark O’Brien, *De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001), p. 1.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 2.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 23-4.

²¹ Ibid., p. 230.

Title: *Irish Times* (morning).

Publication: Dublin.

Dates: 1859 -

Political affiliation: Unionist but evolving to non-aligned liberal.

Associated Titles: From 1903 the *Irish Field* (weekly), began as *Irish Sportsman and Farmer* (1870-94) continued as *Irish Field and Gentleman's Gazette* (1894-1933), *Irish Field* (1933-); *Weekly Irish Times* (1875-1941), continued as *Times Pictorial* (1941-55); from 1960 *Evening Mail* (1928-62), began as *Dublin Evening Mail* (1823-1928).

The *Irish Times* was established by Lawrence E. Knox in 1859 'to champion the political and economic union of Great Britain and Ireland'.²² Following Knox's death in 1873 Sir John Arnott bought the newspaper from his widow. Originally from Scotland, Arnott had a number of other successful business interests including department stores, race courses, brewing and shipping.²³ The Arnott family continued to control the *Irish Times* until 1954 when the majority of their shareholding was sold.²⁴ In 1974 it became a trust 'and is, today, the country's authoritative newspaper of choice'.²⁵ During the period covered here the *Irish Times* went through a slow political evolution. It was opposed to Home Rule in the late nineteenth and first two decades of the twentieth century but was 'ultimately forced to make its peace with [the] independent state' in the 1920s.²⁶ From then on, though notably pro-British, it came to accept the new reality of the state in which it was published and in which its readership lived. Under its famously idiosyncratic editor, Robert 'Bertie' Smyllie, it had some memorable battles with the Censor during World War II, the most intensive period of censorship in the history of independent Irish state.²⁷ In the post-war period it 'moved beyond its traditional Protestant base to incorporate liberal thinkers from across the religious divide' by the 1950s.²⁸

²² Mark O'Brien, *The Irish Times: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008), p. 15.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Donal Ó Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland 1939-45: Neutrality, Politics and Society* (Cork: Cork UP, 1996), p. 284.

²⁸ O'Brien, *The Irish Times*, p. 131.

Title: *Northern Whig*.
Publication: Belfast.
Dates: 1824-1963
Political affiliation: Nationalist.
Associated Titles: None.

The *Northern Whig* was established in 1824. In 1919 it became the *Northern Whig and Belfast Post* under which title it continued to publish until it closed in 1963.²⁹ It was involved in setting up the PA through F.D. Finlay, who also served on the PA board in 1871, but there is little evidence of a single dominant family or ownership group. During the period covered in this study it was staunchly unionist.

²⁹ Oram, *The Newspaper Book*, pp. 291-2.

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