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Title	Emotions & social change in Ireland: Exploring habitus shift in liquid modernity
Author(s)	Heaney, Jonathan G.
Publication Date	2013-10-17
Item record	http://hdl.handle.net/10379/4454

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**EMOTIONS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
IRELAND: EXPLORING HABITUS SHIFT
IN LIQUID MODERNITY.**

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**A thesis submitted for the Degree of PhD to National
University of Ireland, Galway**

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October, 2013

Contents

Table of Figures	v
Abstract:	vi
Acknowledgements:	vii
Introduction	1
0.1. Introduction	1
0.2. Research Questions	2
0.3. Outline of the Structure	5
0.4. Conclusion	7
PART ONE: THEORETICAL	
1. Chapter One: Relational Becoming	8
1.1. Introduction	8
1.2. Process and Becoming	11
1.3. Whitehead: The Real is <i>Processual</i>	14
1.4. Relationalism: The Real is Relational	22
1.5. The Real is <i>Real</i> : Realism in Sociology	26
1.6. Conclusion: Relational Becoming	33
2. Chapter Two: Emotions & Power	37
2.1. Introduction	37
2.2. Emotional Twists and Turns in the Social Sciences	37
2.3. The Emotional Animal	47
2.4. Deep Sociality	49
2.5. Relational Views on Emotions	53
2.6. Emotions & Power: Conceptual Twins	56
2.7. Conclusion	69
3. Chapter Three: Habitus, Emotions and Social Change	71
3.1. Introduction	71
3.2. Conceptual Confusion	72
3.3. Dispositional Concepts	74
3.4. Emotions and Habitus	84
3.5. Emotional Habitus as Automatic Emotional Regulation	85
3.6. Habitus, Regimes and Climates	88
3.7. Tonality	92

3.8. Conclusion	94
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PART TWO: METHODOLOGICAL

4. Chapter Four: Narrative & Method. 95

4.1. Introduction	95
4.2. On Narrative	96
4.3. Emotions & Narrative: A Process-Relational View	99
4.4. The Design of the Study	105
4.5. The Method: BNIM	107
4.5.1. Subsession 1: The SQUIN	110
4.5.2. The Interlude	113
4.5.3. Subsession Two	114
4.5.4. Debriefing	116
4.5.5. Analysis/Interpretation	116
4.6. Reflections on the Method	123
4.7. Conclusion	127

PART THREE: EMPIRICAL

5. Chapter Five: Social Change in Ireland – Habitus Shift 128

5.1. Introduction	128
5.2. Liquid Modernity	132
5.3. Emotions and Power in Liquid Modernity	137
5.4. Heterogeneous Habitus	144
5.5. Social Change in Ireland	147
5.6. Ireland: 1900-1950	149
5.6.1. Nationalism	149
5.6.2. Catholicism	159
5.6.3. Homogeneous Habitus of Ireland in Solid Modernity	169
5.7. Towards a Liquid Modern Ireland: 1950-2000	172
5.7.1. Social Transformations	172
5.8. Conclusion	184

6. Chapter Six: Stories of Emotion, Emotional Stories- Exploring Habitus Shift 186

6.1. Introduction	186
6.2. Meet ‘Mickey’	189

6.2.1. Politics	195
6.2.2. Religion	198
6.2.3. Emotional Avoidance	200
6.3. Meet Eddie	202
6.3.1. An Overview of Eddie’s Lived Life	205
6.3.2. Key Themes and Events Across Social Domains	209
6.3.3. Family	210
6.3.4. Fraternity	220
6.3.5. Flames	233
6.4. Conclusion	242
7. Chapter Seven: The Dialectic of Emotional Enlightenment	244
7.1. Introduction	244
7.2. Whitehead Revisited: Habitus Reframed	246
7.3. Emotional Regime of Solid Modernity	252
7.4. Emotional Regime(s) of Liquid Modernity	256
7.4.1. The Therapeutic Mode	257
7.4.2. Emotional Excess	266
7.4.3. Neo-Repression	270
7.5. Discussion	273
7.6. Conclusion	282
Conclusion	285
8.1. Introduction	285
8.2. Thesis Statement	286
8.3. Contributions	290
8.4. Limitations	294
8.5. Future Work	296
8.6. Conclusion	297
Appendix I: Indicative analysis of Eddie’s Subsession One (extract)	300
Bibliography	303

Table of Figures

Figure 1. Cleopatra’s Needle Cleopatra’s Needle, London, England.....	16
Figure 2. . A Basic Prehension.....	19
Figure 3. The Habitus Process.....	76
Figure 4. The Process Model of Emotional Regulation (from Gross & Thompson, 2006)	87
Figure 5. The BNIM Interview Process.....	109
Figure 6. . SHEIOT Sheet (adapted from Wengraf (2001)).....	114
Figure 7. . Full BNIM Analysis/Interpretation Model. Adapted from Wengraf (2001, p.237)	118
Figure 8. Adapted DARNE Typology, including GINs and PINs. Adapted from Wengraf (2001 & 2009)	120
Figure 9. Pseudoscientific Racism in the 19th Century (Anon, 1862)	131
Figure 10. The Habitus Continuum.....	145
Figure 11. . World War One Recruitment Posters	153
Figure 12. The Rise and Fall of Catholicism in Ireland (1881-2011): adapted from CSO (Ireland, 2012)	160
Figure 13. GDP per capita: 1921-2009 (adapted from Bolt & Van Zanden, 2013) ...	173
Figure 14. Population in the Republic of Ireland: 1841-2011 from CSO (Ireland, 2012)	175
Figure 15. A Typology of Emotional Pathologies.....	246

Abstract:

Drawing on insights from a range of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, history, politics, but particularly sociology and sociological theory, this thesis explores the relationship between emotions and social change in late or 'liquid' modernity. It deploys the Republic of Ireland in the twentieth century as a case study. It argues that the Irish case is an ideal site for this research given the speed and scale of changes that have occurred there, particularly since the 1950's. The primary research question guiding the study is: What has been the effect of 'social change' in Ireland on the emotional lives of Irish people? The thesis is structured in three parts. Part one (chapters one to three) is primarily theoretical. It aims to develop a distinctive theoretical framework, process-relational realism, and argues that three concepts, properly treated, are central to answering the research question. These are emotion, power and (emotional) habitus. Part two is a bridging chapter, in which the empirical portion of the study, its design and method, are outlined. This study is based on a series of qualitative life-history interviews conducted using the Biographical Narrative Research Method. Part three is primarily empirical. The first chapter critically explores Bauman's concept of liquid modernity in relation to the Irish case and offers a short social history of the Irish twentieth century, which focuses on emotions and power. The second deploys two (ideal-type) interview cases to support the argument that Ireland experienced a habitus shift, from a relatively homogeneous to a heterogeneous habitus, and a corresponding shift from a relatively repressive emotional regime to a more expressive one, with significant effects on the emotional habitus. The final chapter takes a broader view of these changes, suggests that social change has been ambivalent, and outlines a new typology of emotional pathologies that the study suggests are characteristic of contemporary emotional life.

Acknowledgements:

There is an irony in the fact that the path to becoming a social scientist often requires that the researcher become increasingly anti-social themselves. Despite the self-imposed isolation that working on this thesis necessitated over many, many years there is nevertheless a large network of people to whom thanks and gratitude are due. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Mark Haugaard, for allowing me the freedom to explore the ideas that stand behind this thesis, and for offering support, encouragement and various opportunities to develop as an academic throughout the process. If not for his drive to get this thesis ‘over the line’, especially towards the end, it might never have seen the light. I would also like to thank all of the staff of the School of Political Science & Sociology for their kindness, encouragement and critical engagement toward myself and the thesis over the years, and for fostering a supportive and caring environment for students in general. In particular I am grateful to Dr. Kevin Ryan who offered supervisory advice and support in the early stages of the project, while Prof. Haugaard was on sabbatical. I would like to thank the members of the Power, Conflict and Ideologies Research Cluster, where some parts of this work got an airing, for critical comments and interesting discussions. I also thank the members of the Narrative Studies Group for helping me better understand and appreciate the importance of stories. I would like to especially thank my ‘co-combatants’, the other PhD students, in the department for their good humour and camaraderie. It takes a village, and there are too many villagers, staff and students, to thank individually, but I thank you all.

I am grateful to the Irish Research Council for funding this project from 2008 to 2011. I am also grateful to the Social Science Research Centre, NUI Galway, for providing me with office space and other support throughout the project. I am particularly grateful to the current and former postgraduates with whom I shared this space over the years, especially Daniel Savery and Dr. Oliver Feeney – it’s been...emotional. I’d like to also thank my friends in Kilkee, Galway and elsewhere for their support, especially David Crowley, and Paul Mulcahy. I think we’re due a night out.

I would like to thank my wonderful parents, Claire and Gilbert Heaney, and my brother, Raymond, for their unwavering support, encouragement and love throughout my whole life, and for forgiving my many absences during the long life of this project. It's done. I'll be home soon.

Finally, to my partner Fiona, who more than anyone else suffered this journey with me, and to Séadhna and Lughaidh - thank you for your love, support and endurance. I dedicate this thesis, and myself, to you.

Introduction

0.1. Introduction

This thesis is primarily a work of sociology. It is an attempt to explore the effect of social change on the emotional lives of people, particularly in late or liquid modernity. It uses the Republic of Ireland as a case study. Ireland is a particularly interesting site to explore this relationship because of the scale and speed of changes that occurred there in a relatively short time, over the twentieth century. The thesis is theoretically driven, developing a position grounded on a view of life as relational becoming, and argues that three core concepts are central to addressing the problem in question: emotion, power and habitus. It will argue that the emotional habitus is central to understanding this relationship. It also uses qualitative research, biographical-narrative life-history interviews, to access the emotional habitus of various individuals, in support of its argument.

Although it draws on a diverse body of work from across the disciplines, above all it is an attempt to embody the 'sociological imagination' as C. Wright Mills defined it, albeit in a different manner and using different concepts than Mills' himself used. In general, Mills saw this as a 'quality of mind', that would help us construct 'lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within' ourselves; a quality that is 'essential to grasp the interplay of man and society, of biography and history, of self and world' (Mills, 2000, pp.4-5). This orientation to social research is best encapsulated in his well-known phrase, that: 'the sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within society. That is its task and its promise...' (Mills, 2000, p.6). He continues to elaborate on this, suggesting three questions that work embodying this orientation should be concerned with. 'The first concerns 'social structure' – 'What is the structure of this particular society as a whole? What are its essential components, and how are they related to one another?'. The second asks where does it stand in history, and how is it changing; how does the particular feature we are interested in affect, and how is it affected by, the historical period in which it moves? The third asks what types of people do we see in the period, prevailing, or coming to prevail; how are they 'selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted?' (Mills, 2000, pp.6-7).

These are the very concerns of this project here, and the overall orientation driving it. It sets out to address the relationship between *history*, particularly in Ireland, and the *biographies* of individuals within that society. It attempts to trace the changes in social structure (*mutatis mutandis*) that have occurred there during the twentieth century. The particular feature that we are interested in are the emotions and emotional life, which, this thesis hopes to show, are central to the processes that have changed that social structure, and are, in turn, changed by those processes; they both affect and are affected by the historical period, as it develops. It also addresses the ‘types of people’ that are coming in to prominence and those who are ‘falling away’, asking particularly how they are made liberated and repressed, emotionally, by these changes.

Yet while the orientation is fundamentally sociological, it is pluralist in how it proceeds. I engage with and draw on a diverse range of work, from philosophy, psychology, history, politics, as well as sociology in constructing the arguments and analysis. The overall aim is toward synergy, to build links between these different perspectives and marshal them into a (more or less) coherent approach to address the central questions of this thesis. In what follows I will briefly outline these central research questions guiding this inquiry. I will offer some preliminary justifications for the need for this analysis at all. I will then offer an overview of how the argument is structured and how it will proceed. But the impetus and motivation behind this project has been to attempt to live up to the task and the promise that sociology offers.

0.2. Research Questions

While the analysis of and explanations for ‘social change’ is a standard and well-studied field within and without sociology, the relationship between emotions and social change has not been widely addressed. With the exception of Norbert Elias and his theory of ‘civilizing processes’ (2000), and others working within this frame, there is little by way of work that addresses this relationship directly. Even within those foundational approaches to the contemporary condition of ‘modernity’ – late, post, reflexive, second, liquid – emotional life is mentioned, but often only partially and in passing. Despite the centrality of emotions to social

life, and that ‘social change’ very much falls within the scope of the sociological field, this question has been neglected. It has been studied by some historians, and there is a growing sub-field on the history of emotions from which I draw on here, but the concerns and ways of the historian are not always the concerns and ways of the sociologist.

Within the sociology of Ireland, and in Ireland generally, ‘social change’ has become a national obsession. It is the focus of (seemingly endless, or endlessly mediocre) media discussions and commentary, parliamentary debate, even pub conversation; the perpetual interrogation of the national self has become a national pastime. The speed and extent of change that has occurred in this society, particularly since (roughly) the 1950’s, has been described by Keohane & Kuhling (2007) as ‘accelerated modernisation’. This has amounted to nothing short of a fundamental and radical transformation of this nation-state; of the relations of power and interdependence; of gender roles; of its position within and integration into the wider world; of its economy; its culture; its morality; and of everyday life. While there is some work that addressed aspects of this change more generally (though not as much as one might expect), the emotions and emotional life are almost exclusively omitted. There has not been a serious attempt to investigate the role of emotions in the social life of Ireland at all, or what effects these rapid and deep changes in Irish life have had on the emotional lives of individuals there. This latter is the lacuna that this project aims to begin to address.

This omission is all the more puzzling when we consider the renewed interest in emotions that has been taking place since the 1970’s. Under what is often called the ‘emotional turn’, there has been a widespread revaluation and recognition of emotions, and the fundamental role they play in social life. Today, emotions research is at the forefront of contemporary social science, across and between the disciplines, particularly in Europe (Barbalet, 2001, 2002; Hopkins et al, 2009, Demertzis, 2013), and the US (Stets & Turner, 2006, Turner & Stets, 2005). Yet, this ‘turn’ has appeared to pass Ireland by. None of the contemporary work in Irish sociology appears to address emotions at all, and certainly not in relation to social change.

There is a need, then, for this topic to be addressed and, by doing so, this project hopes to break new ground. To approach the problem, there are three key research questions that I have used to orientate and design the study. The primary research question of this thesis is:

1. What has been the effect of ‘social change’ in Ireland on the emotional lives of Irish people?

On this, there is an initial distinction to be made regarding the study of emotions and change. Social change, I will argue later, is a useful reification, and I use it here as a shorthand for a more complex process that needs to be teased out. Furthermore, there is a robust and well-known literature, within political sociology and the study of social movements in particular, on how emotions may act as ‘engines’ of social change. That is, such work asks how emotions are implicated in popular protest and resistance, and how the evocation and deployment of emotions can alter or destroy social structures in various ways. This is not the focus of our study here (though we touch on it). Rather, our question is, in a sense, in the other direction. How do the changes and transformations within a society affect the emotional lives of individuals within that society? How are our emotional lives *constituted*, and how does this change in the context of ‘social change’ - how are they *re-constituted*. To begin to answer this question, we need to ask and address two more. These are:

2. How do we best approach this question theoretically?
3. How do we access this empirically?

To answer our primary research question, we must first answer the second one. Part one of this thesis, comprising chapters one through three, attempts to outline the theoretical foundation for the thesis as a whole. We will ultimately argue that the habitus, and the emotional habitus in particular, when properly conceptualized, is the answer to question two. How we conceptualize the components of the question, and the processes involved, is vital to the answer we arrive at. Yet, as we will argue, such conceptualization rests on yet more fundamental ontological grounds, which, we suggest, must first be brought into the light before we can proceed. As such, we will move from ontology to theory, and from theory to methods, before we turn to the empirical case study itself.

The thesis is structured in three parts. Part one is concerned with theory. Part two is comprised of one chapter that deals with the method deployed in the empirical work:

Biographical Narrative Interpretive Method. Part three is primarily empirical, drawing on social theory, the social history of the Irish twentieth century, and a number of biographical, life-history, interviews. A very brief summary and overview of the thesis follows.

0.3. Outline of the Structure

Chapter one begins by defending the role of ontology in and for social research. It deploys a Spinoza-inspired metaphor of ‘lens grinding’ to account for the synergistic task it sets itself. This is to construct a distinctive and coherent theoretical lens through the ‘grinding’ (critically rubbing together) of established positions, to propose a position that is here called ‘process-relational realism’. Drawing on the process ontology of A.N.Whitehead (and others), relational sociology, and adopting a provisional realism, this chapter ends by suggesting that both the world and the individuals that comprise it, when viewed through this lens, should be considered in terms of *relational becoming*. This is a view that foregrounds process, is anti-dualistic, and suggests that experience is constitutive of bodies – that our ‘being is constituted by our becoming’ in Whitehead’s words.

Chapter two introduces two core concepts of our analysis: emotion and power. This chapter offers a critical review of both of these streams of research, and argues that both concepts, emotions *and* power, should be seen as ‘conceptual twins’, and kept in focus in social research. In addition, this chapter also seeks to clarify the concept of emotion, and defends other work that offer a more relational conception of emotionality.

Chapter three engages with the concept of habitus, and attempts to bring together all of the aspects mentioned in the first two chapters. It offers criticisms of some of the ways that this concept has been treated in the literature, suggesting that there has been some conceptual confusion that requires correction. It also establishes the concept of emotional habitus on this basis, contrasting it with similar concepts in other literature, particularly psychology. It draws on the concepts of emotional regimes and climates, and links them with habitus and how the habitus becomes emotionally constituted. It offers the concept of ‘tonality’ to integrate the two.

Chapter four is a bridging chapter, where the methods used and the empirical project in general are introduced. It begins by offering a process-relational view of both emotions and narratives, suggesting a structural homology and intimate connection between these two concepts. We go on to describe the design of the study, and outline the method used to collect and analyse data. This is a critical engagement with the Biographical Narrative Interpretive Method (BNIM), where I also offer some ways in which the method is lacking or problematic, and I return to these criticisms in later chapters.

Chapter five begins the empirical section of the thesis, offering a critical discussion of Bauman's liquid modernity. Rather than utilize Bauman's preferred concept of identity (which I am critical of), I suggest that the shift from solid to liquid modernity has resulted in a shift from a more *homogeneous* to a more fractured, *heterogeneous* habitus. In this chapter I also discuss social change in Ireland during the twentieth century. I suggest that the period from 1900-1950 can be presented as exhibiting a solid phase of modernity, with the period from 1950-2000 seeing the gradual emergence of a more liquid form. I defend and discuss these formulations using a brief overview of Irish social history (as a form of supporting, secondary research), arguing that, in the earlier period, the dominance of the state and the Catholic church, and their ideologies of conservative nationalism and Catholicism, gave rise to a repressive emotional regime, helping to produce a repressed emotional habitus. I go on to briefly address the changes that began to occur after 1950, in which Ireland becomes 'globalized' and begins to gradually enter liquid modernity. I concentrate on the interrelationships between emotions and power during this period in the challenging and changing of this solidity, suggesting that the result is a more complex social picture which is more open to external influences and discourses on emotions and sexuality, as well as a more heterogeneous, pluralised habitus. I suggest that the new emotional regime might be described as expressive.

Chapter six turns to the life history interviews themselves. I begin by introducing Mickey, and present him as (ideal-typically) embodying the homogeneous habitus and repressive emotional habitus, avoiding emotions and emotional expression. I then present Eddie's life

history, which offers a dramatic contrast with Mickey's, suggesting that it (ideal-typically) embodies the more heterogeneous and fractured habitus and the expressive emotional habitus.

Chapter seven, the final chapter, stands back and looks more generally at the effect of social change on emotional life in liquid modernity, and in Ireland. Here I argue that, while the general thrust of the emotional regime of the period might be said to be expressive, and has brought about a revaluation of emotions, that this process is fundamentally *ambivalent*. I argue that the emotional regime itself might be said to have fractured, and I outline a typology of emotional pathologies that appear to dominate the contemporary emotional ecology. The primary one of these is the 'therapeutic ethos', which (along with the modes of 'excess' and 'neo-repression') have amounted to a repathologization of emotion, and new forms of self-pathologization.

Chapter eight is a concluding chapter, in which I return to the core questions mentioned above and offer a distillation of the argument of this thesis. I also offer there what I consider to be the key contributions of the thesis, and what I consider to be its limitations.

0.4. Conclusion

Thus, this thesis is an attempt to address the question of emotions and social change 'from the ground up', using Ireland as a specific case. We begin with ontology, move through conceptualization and theory, to method, data collection, interpretation, presentation, and discussion. The aim is to have all of these different facets cohere and integrate as best we can. It is, as such, a work that aims to be both theoretically driven and empirically grounded. While it begins at quite an abstract level, it does so to construct a theoretical tool with which to approach and observe the concrete world. If I were to position it, it would be within a critical sociology of emotions. The criticism is 'rolling' and widely shared, but sharpens at the end.

Over all, the thesis hopes to be both constructive, and illuminating of a topic that has largely been left in darkness. It is ambitious, in that it asks big questions and tries to cover a lot of ground, but it should be also seen as exploratory; as a first rather than the last step.

1. Chapter One: Relational Becoming

1.1. Introduction

Too often social scientific research proceeds without any consideration of the nature of the reality in which it operates and purports to explain and understand. This is particularly true of much contemporary sociology, which all too often appears to consist of surface descriptions of the ‘social’ and its ‘actors’, without sufficiently attending to theory or the philosophical foundations upon which the research rests. Indeed, more often than not, some pre-packaged ‘theoretical framework’ is plucked from the proverbial shelf, half-heartedly de-cobwebbed, and hastily ‘slotted in’ before the ‘real’ research - data collection - can occur. For many, theory is considered an inconvenient ‘box’ that requires quick ‘ticking’. This is problematical for a number of reasons, not least, that all such research takes place upon implicit ontological foundations that are often not realised or articulated by the individuals involved. The assumptions that result from such implicit ontologies can steer and determine the ultimate outcome of the research process, often from ‘behind the researcher’s back’. This is not to heap scorn upon the individual researcher; rather, the pressures to complete, to compete for funding, and the product-orientated, managerial ethos of most educational institutions in this late capitalistic age have ensured the emergence of such a situation via the concerted devaluation of theory and philosophy in general, and its relevance to social scientific research in particular.¹ This is regrettably, often fatally, myopic, and only serves to further debase social research, reducing it in many cases to the status of journalism.² Indeed, despite my admiration for much of the work of Norbert Elias, a ‘post-philosophical sociology’, were it ever to truly materialise, would be a ghastly, impoverished endeavour (see Kilminster, 2007). To dismiss the entire philosophical tradition, rather than criticise its transcendentalism or solipsistic tendencies, is to throw the baby out unnecessarily.³

¹ Here one could cite the recent closures of philosophy department across the UK, such as Middlesex, and the difficulty of securing funding for theoretical research in the social sciences in many jurisdictions.

² On a more recent restatement of the perennial topic of crisis in theory see Turner, 2009, pp.1-16.

³ As Kilminster has recently noted, while Elias’s work does perhaps retain “trace elements” (p.32) of the fundamental ontologist’s (particularly Heidegger’s) formulations, his rejection of his erstwhile discipline (Elias did his D.Phil. in philosophy under the neo-Kantian Hönigswald which ended in acrimony-see Elias, 1994, pp.91-2) was complete. Sociology *replaces* philosophy for him but many of his intemperate remarks towards the discipline are too doctrinaire. For example, discussing the solipsism inherent in much philosophical discussion, he writes of the ‘long procession of books written on these lines, a tragic-comic masquerade of wasted lives, litters humankind’s trail. If the world *an sich* is unknowable, one wonders why their authors bother...to state their case.’ (Elias, 2007, p.125). Such a view appears to be the effect of the network within which Elias was embedded, as well as his individual biography, and in short methinks the sociologist doth protest too much and betrays an

To be sure, much philosophy is divorced from reality, and in need of a sociological critique. But sociology by itself does not have the tools to do ontology or metaphysics. It must be more modest in its outlook and pronouncements and be cognisant of its own limitations. All research rests on metaphysical foundations, whether we like it or not. What we must do is engage with philosophy and try to get our foundations sound before we proceed. As Giddens has written ‘the social sciences are lost if they are not directly related to philosophical problems by those who practise them. To demand that social scientists be alive to philosophical issues is not the same as driving social science into the arms of those who might claim that it is inherently speculative rather than empirical’ (Giddens, 1984, p.xvii). We must, in short (and as Elias himself wrote) ‘declare our baggage’ before we begin our journey. To this end, we must explore how best to conceptualise the social through an engagement with its ontology. This thesis thus attempts to unite both the ontological and the empirical.

In addition to ontology, and at a different (yet connected) level of analysis we require theory. In a recent companion to social theory Bryan Turner (2010) posits two useful metaphors with which to characterise approaches to theory. The first suggests a view of theory as *scaffold*, which ‘helps us explore data and move around social reality rather like workmen moving about the outside surface of an office block. Theoretical scaffolding permits us to examine social data from many angles, and in particular as a normative exercise to detect major faults in the social fabric’ (Turner, 2010, p.4). The second characterises theory, in more pragmatist terms, as *rhetoric* (or legal argument). Here theory is viewed as ‘an argument in which the social theorist strives to convince others about the nature of social reality by the use of evidence, narratives, hunches, concepts, and even material objects as “exhibits”’ (ibid, p. 5). To this I wish to add a third metaphor which I feel may be better still. It is in part inspired by Baruch de Spinoza, now considered to be one of the greatest philosophers in the ‘Western Cannon’, who’s star is currently on the rise, particularly in contemporary (continental) philosophy. Yet, throughout his controversial and ‘saintly’ life, Spinoza worked in relative isolation as a grinder of lenses. Indeed, despite being a relatively minor player, he was very well regarded in this field, by, for example, such luminaries as Huygens and others (Nadler, 2001).⁴ There is something in this idea of the philosopher/theorist as lens grinder, and of theories as lenses through which we view the world. In the place of glass, theorists must use concepts to

‘involvement’ that is both uncharacteristic and unwarranted. The extent to which Elias’s work remains within the philosophical idiom is a question that I return to later.

⁴ Recently I discovered a fascinating blog where the relationship between Spinoza’s lens making and his metaphysics is discussed in detail. There is a little overlap between what is written here on the philosopher as lens grinder, but not very much- <http://kvond.wordpress.com/spinozas-foci/>

construct their lenses. Often, such conceptual configurations require the ‘grinding’ or refinement of individual concepts to clarify (Latin: *clarificare*), to make them clearer, and to focus them to suit the particular use they will be put. They must also be ground to fit in with the rest of the conceptual apparatus that comprises the lens as a whole. That is, each component of the lens must be made commensurable with the others in the configuration.

All metaphors, of course, have limitations, and to speak of theory in terms of ‘lenses’ is commonplace. But to conceive of theory construction in terms of a process of lens *grinding* adds to the metaphor. It suggests a pluralism of theoretical approaches; there is no one lens for each and every question and no one approach with priority over the rest. As such, it is a more ‘democratic’ and open conceptualisation of theory and theorizing. Different lenses are better for some questions and not others. Different lenses give different views of the social and different configurations foreground some aspects relative to others. Furthermore, one can use different types of lenses for distinct levels of analysis, from microscopic to telescopic, and even ‘magnifying glasses’ for the mezzo level. This gives a dynamism to the metaphor which is absent from some others. Finally, such a view supports the notion of theorist as *bricoleur*, allowing the improvised use of diverse concepts, which, after grinding, may be constructed into one, more or less unified, theoretical device fit for a specific purpose. Thus lenses become a kind of conceptual tool that serve specific purposes, rather than an all-encompassing reified straightjacket, cannon or ‘faith’. Such an attribute further functions to support the *transdisciplinary* thrust of the project as a whole.⁵ In the spirit of Burkitt and others, I wish to act as a ‘synthesiser and bridge-builder’ within and between the various disciplines in question (Burkitt, 1991, p.3).

This chapter, then, is an attempt to grind out such a lens. But if theory is to be seen as a lens then ontology is the sand comprising the glass. There are three interconnected aspects to this construction, which I am calling here process-relational realism. Section one deals with *process* and outlines the processual nature of social relations, drawing on wider ontological work from ‘process philosophy’. Section two outlines the *relational* approach to sociology, which is the overall paradigm within which the project as a whole is placed. There has recently been an upsurge in interest in this approach, aspects of which will be discussed in detail. The final section outlines and defends a *provisional-realist* ontology influenced by, though not identical with, the critical realism of Bhaskar ([1975]2008, [1979]1998), Archer (1998) and others (e.g.

⁵ On transdisciplinarity see Steinmetz (2007), with whom I am in broad agreement.

Sayer, 2000). Here we also defend the need for ontology in social science against recent critics. Of course, all three approaches are well established in contemporary social thought in different forms. Indeed, each of the three aspects, particularly process and relations, are usually found together and subsumed under the rubric of ‘relationism’ and, more recently, what might be considered the emergent paradigm of ‘relational sociology’. I have separated them here for analytical reasons but will recombine them at the end. My hope in this chapter is to engage in a process of lens-grinding, of sanding and polishing established positions to create a coherent theoretical tool with which to view the core concern of the thesis, the relationship between emotions, power and social change. To pre-empt the conclusion, I will suggest that both the human actor and the social and natural environment in which she is embedded should be considered in terms of process - a process of *relational becoming*.

1.2. Process and Becoming

The universe it is never still. The character of reality, at every level of analysis, is dynamic. Continuous and perpetual change is occurring, even when we cannot perceive it. At the level of biological life this is now clear. Even the yogi, stock-still in silent meditation is a hive of internal activity; cadavers continue to change, seeds to germinate. We are told that the entire cellular make up of human individuals is replaced every six years or so.⁶ At a different level, and from the perspective of ‘deep time’, mountains move and dance across the landscape like sine waves. Atoms lose and gain electrons, attach and detach to form bonds of various sorts. ‘Superstrings’ are said to vibrate. To be in time is to be in a process of *becoming*. It is the argument of this section that sociological theories need to reflect this, and build process in to their construction from the beginning. In what follows I outline a process ontology, drawing on the ‘process metaphysics’ of Alfred North Whitehead, among others. Some implications of this perspective will also be suggested.

While the notion of process philosophy is most closely associated with Whitehead and his followers, it is possible to trace a general line of process-orientated predecessors within the Western philosophical cannon. The uniting notion within this line of thinking is the primacy of process; that ‘natural existence consists of and is best understood in terms of process rather than things - of modes of change rather than fixed stabilities’ (Rescher, 1996, p.7). The core idea has a long history, and has materialised in many ways via many avatars. The earliest

⁶ Which itself invokes the well-known Theseus paradox.

proponent of this view was possibly Heraclitus (ca. 535-475 BCE), the Ionian philosopher famed for a doctrine of perpetual flux ('panta rhei'), connected with the metaphor of fire: 'The ordered world, the same for all, no god or man made, but it always was, is and will be an everlasting fire, being kindled in measures and being put out in measures' (Fragment 30, Robinson, 1987, p.25). However, this popular perception of Heraclitus is controversial, and dispute rages over the attribution and accuracy of statements credited to him, and their interpretation.⁷ This situation is exacerbated because no copies of *On Nature*, if it existed at all, have survived, with the fragmented quotations of other authors now the main source for his work since the time of Plutarch (see Robinson, 1987). Despite this, there nevertheless appears to be a strong emphasis on becoming and process in this obscure philosophy, as fragment 12 suggests with the famous phrase: 'As they step into the same rivers, different and (still) different waters flow upon them' (Robinson, 1987, p.17).⁸ Because of these and other passages he has been called the 'founding father of process philosophy' (Rescher, 1999, p.9). Such a view may be clearly contrasted with the static, unchanging metaphysics of Parmenides and his followers⁹, the modern inheritors of which may be described as exhibiting a 'substantialist' perspective, in contrast to the processual view (Rescher, 1999; Emirbayer, 1997).

From these Heraclitean beginnings, Rescher (1999, 2000) traces a direct line of influence that includes Plato and (even) Aristotle, through to Leibniz's monads, Hegel's dialecticism, the Pragmatists Peirce, James and Dewey, Henri Bergson, continuing up to Whitehead himself and beyond (Rescher, 1999, pp.9-26, 2000). Despite this line, there is no one school or doctrine of process philosophy. There is, rather, what Rescher calls a 'tendency' or a 'mode of approach', in short, a *lens*, or family of lenses, that offers a few specific characteristics. Of these, as mentioned, the principal principle is the primacy of process. The stronger version of this position suggests an ontological reductionism, whereby all physical 'things' are reducible to physical process, while the weaker, 'conceptual' reductionism maintains that the notion of

⁷ The key problem is that, because of the obscurity of what remains, one finds a vast diversity of interpretations of the fragments. As Barnes writes, "the truth is that Heraclitus attracts exegetes as an empty jam pot wasps; and each new wasp discerns traces of his own favourite flavour" (Barnes, 1982, p. 44). This remains a common problem, and yet another reason to strive for clarity in the expression of theoretical thought.

⁸ There even appears to be a direct prefiguring of the *transactional* position of Dewey (see below) in fragment 90 - "The totality of things is an exchange for fire, and fire an exchange for all things, in the way goods (are an exchange) for gold, and gold for goods" (Robinson, 1987, p. 55). However, in this I may be guilty of becoming another of Barnes's 'wasps' mentioned above.

⁹ See Barnes, 1982, pp.120-181.

‘thing’ necessarily involves the recourse to processual ideas (Rescher, 1999, p.28). Thus, as Rescher writes:

The supposed predominance and permanence of “things” in nature is at best a useful fiction and at worst a misleading delusion. “Material objects” are ultimately comprised of energy that is in an ongoing state of flux and motion. All those supposedly constant things that seem to maintain a continuous identity through the vicissitudes of time and change are, in fact, little more than loci of comparative (and transitory) stability within a manifold of continual change, engaged in an inexorable transit leading from birth through maturation to decline and destruction (Rescher, ibid).

As such, the central themes of the process perspective involve time, becoming and change; processes are more (or at least, not less) important than things; and contingency, emergence, novelty and creativity are fundamental to ontological understanding (Rescher, 2000, p.7).

The conceptualisation of time is fundamental here, yet the human mind has inadequate apprehension in this department. Bergson, for example, draws a distinction between physical *time* and psychological *duration*. We, as humans, perceive discrete, separate steps in the world instead of continuous events. Our attention distinguishes and separates that which is, in reality, ‘an endless flow’ (Bergson, [1911]1944, p.5). This the mind does ‘artificially’, and is then obliged to ‘reunite them by an artificial bond’. It:

imagines, therefore, a formless ego, indifferent and unchangeable, on which it threads the psychic states which it has set up as independent entities...an artificial imitation of internal life, a static equivalent which will lend itself better to the requirements of logic and language (Bergson, [1911]1975, p.6).

Stasis, immobility, is, as such, illusory. We are wrong to say that a body has changed form since, for Bergson, ‘in reality, the body is changing form at every moment; or rather, there is no form, since form is immobile and the reality is movement. What is real is the continual change of form: *form is only a snapshot view of transition...our perception manages to solidify into discontinuous images the fluid continuity of the real*’ (Bergson, [1911]1944, p.328 original emphasis).¹⁰

¹⁰ He continues: ‘Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string them on a becoming, abstract, uniform and invisible, situated on the back of the apparatus of knowledge in order to imitate what there is that is characteristic in this

For many, Whitehead's view is even more radical.¹¹ To express the opinion that *Process and Reality* 'is a complex book' is to utter both a cliché and an understatement. However, for our present purposes, a full and comprehensive exegesis and discussion of his 'philosophy of organism' is unnecessary.¹² What I propose is a brief overview of some key aspects of his process ontology, which I cite as perhaps the most complete and sophisticated of its kind. Of process in general he writes:

That 'all things flow' is the first vague generalization which the unsystematized, barely analysed, intuition of men (sic) has produced...Without doubt, if we are to go back to that ultimate, integral experience, unwarped by the sophistications of theory, that experience whose elucidation is the final aim of philosophy, the flux of things is the one ultimate generalization around which we must weave our philosophical system (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.208).

In this he captures the ontological starting point for what follows and has more recently found (partial) expression in the relational sociology discussed below.

1.3. Whitehead: The Real is *Processual*

The end of the twentieth century has seen a veritable explosion of interest in the work of Alfred North Whitehead. He has been championed as an early example of a 'constructive postmodernism' (Griffin, 1993; Keller & Danniell, 2002), whose cosmology may be read as a precursor to the 'new' quantum theory that did not exist in his lifetime (Eastman & Keeton, 2004, Epperson, 2004). His work has influenced the development of the new, emergent field of 'speculative realism' within contemporary continental thought and the post-human, Object Oriented Ontology (OOO) of Bryant and others (Bryant et al, 2011). That his approach has been directly influential on and praised by Deleuze (1992), for whom he was 'the last great Anglo-American philosopher before Wittgenstein's disciples spread their misty confusion' is without doubt (Deleuze, 1992, p.76).¹³ Within social science and social theory in general, Whitehead is acclaimed by figures such as Latour (2005a, 2005b), Haraway (2008), Butler

becoming itself...*the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographic kind*' (Bergson, [1907]1944, 332 original emphasis).

¹¹ Indeed, he breaks with Bergson in a number of ways as, ultimately, he too bifurcates nature when he ascribes the 'spatialization' of the world to the mind (see below, and Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.321).

¹² See Sherburne (1981) for a very useful "key" to the book. Leclerc (1958) is also helpful. More recently Isabelle Stengers' book *Penser avec Whitehead* has been translated into English (Stengers, 2011).

¹³ On this influence and the overlap between Deleuze and Whitehead see Shaviro (2009), Halewood (2005a).

(2012) and has more recently been the subject of an extensive sociological treatment by Halewood (2011).

All of which only refers to his (post-Deleuzian) 'second life'. Before the Deleuzian flood (ante-Deleuzian?), Whitehead was quite widely cited by key sociological figures in post-classical period. His work was particularly influential on both Parsons and Homans, and could be considered the philosophical backdrop to both theorists' work (see Fararo, 2001). Indeed, Parsons' work in particular is littered with references to 'Professor Whitehead' (e.g. Parsons, [1937]1949), who was fundamental to the development of his 'analytical realism'. He writes, in reference to his epistemology, that '(t)he culmination of this conception came for me in A. N. Whitehead's work, especially his *Science and the Modern World*, including his illuminating discussion of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". Through channels such as these I arrived at a conception which I called "analytical realism," which treated the kind of theory I was interested in as inherently abstract but by no means as "fictitious" (Parsons, 1970, p.830). More recently Fararo, also a Whiteheadian, makes bolder claims regarding the process world view and the founding fathers of sociology.¹⁴ He argues that Mead, Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Simmel *all* share an underlying process ontology (Fararo, 2001). For Mead and Durkheim, this manifests as an 'evolutionary naturalism', for Simmel and Marx, as a 'dialectical process world view', while Weber reveals his process worldview in 'his discussion of scientific work as necessarily entailing limited analytical schemes that deal with a dynamic concrete reality through idealizations' (Fararo, 2001, p.52). As such, the process ontology I outline here might better be considered as the metaphysical ghost at the social theory banquet; a constant (if little acknowledged) companion rather than a recent, 'post-modern' addition. I will later argue that Elias, too, operates within an implicit processual ontology, his rejection of philosophy notwithstanding.

In any case, it is to Whitehead's we now turn. In his earlier work in the philosophy of science (Whitehead, [1919]2004) we see the germ of what is to follow in his later and more magisterial metaphysics. He begins by protesting against the 'bifurcation of nature' which has dominated Western science. This is the separation of reality in to two separate spheres, namely 'the nature apprehended in awareness and the nature which is the cause of awareness'; the separation of an objective, external realm and an internal, subjective one; the warmth and redness of the fire and the molecules and electrons in combustion (Whitehead, [1919]2004,

¹⁴ There are many more examples that could be deployed here. Recall that Merton gives the very first words of *Social Theory and Social Structure* (1968) to Whitehead, and also refers to him throughout.

p.30). This dualistic splitting of nature is problematic. There is, for him, *one nature* and this encompasses all existence. For the natural philosopher, he writes, ‘everything perceived is in nature. We may not pick and choose’ (Whitehead, [1919]2004, p.29). The redness of the sunset and the molecules and waves by which it is explained are all ‘nature’. The task is to show how they are relationally connected, not to set up two artificial autonomous realms of reality. Such a position is an instance of what DeLanda (2009) (and Latour) would call a ‘flat ontology’.

For the conventional scientists of his era, time and space would be expected to provide the ‘embracing relations’ for this unity of nature. However, these familiar notions are themselves abstractions from more fundamental elements of nature, which he here terms *events*. Against the still common absolute theories of time that were contemporaneously being challenged by Einstein, Whitehead advocates a relational conception in which time is understood as an abstraction from the passage of events Whitehead,[1919]2004, p.34). His position may become clearer when we look at a concrete example of this *eventful* conception of nature. One early example that he provides is that of Cleopatra’s Needle on the Charring Cross Road in London.




Figure 1. Cleopatra’s Needle Cleopatra’s Needle, London, England

When we look at a structure such as this, our immediate reflex is to perceive it and conceive of it as a thing. We have been conditioned to do as much. Yet, for Whitehead, it is more

properly conceived as an event (or, at least, a ‘society’ or stream of events), in the same way that a person getting knocked down by a car in front of the Needle might be considered an event. This is, of course, counter intuitive. Something so solid and static would seem to lack the ‘element of time and transitoriness’ so characteristic of the term ‘event’, such as a road accident (Whitehead, [1925]2004, p.166). But this is illusory, and dependant on the level of abstraction with which we address it. One million years ago, the needle did not exist. When Whitehead was a boy, it was not on the embankment. It was sculpted around 1450 BCE in Heliopolis, the inscriptions added around 1250 BCE by Ramses II, and moved by the Romans to Alexandria some 50 years later. It did not reach London until 1877 CE. At some point in the future it will be moved or destroyed. It is, as such, by no means ‘eternal’. But Whitehead goes much further than this. The obelisk is *itself* an event, a happening, an activity. He writes that:

Amidst the structure of events which form the medium within which the daily life of Londoners is passed we know how to identify a certain stream of events which maintain permanence of character, namely the character of the situations of Cleopatra’s Needle. Day by day and hour by hour we can find a certain chunk in the transitory life of nature and of that chunk we say, ‘there is Cleopatra’s Needle’...A physicist who looks upon that part of the life of nature as a dance of electrons will tell you that daily it has lost some molecules and gained others, and even the plain man can see that it gets dirtier and is occasionally washed. Thus the question of change in the Needle is a mere matter of definition. The more abstract your definition, the more permanent the Needle (Whitehead, [1929]2004, p.167).

Thus, as I look at the obelisk, rather than pointing and asserting ‘there is Cleopatra’s Needle’ it is more accurate from a Whiteheadian perspective to say something like ‘it is Needle-ing over there’. In the same manner, as I write this, my dog Lughaidh is sitting at my feet. At one level of abstraction it is fine to say that ‘the dog sits at my feet’ but, for the process philosopher, it is better to say that ‘it is Lughaidh-ing at my feet’, ‘it is cat-ing on the mat’, and so on. This represents a trans-formation from a noun-shaped, substantialist view of reality to that of a verb-shaped, processual one. In addition, the ‘I’ who gazes at the Needle is also engaged in a process of becoming, a stream of perishing events. Neither myself nor the obelisk is static. In short, you cannot, as Steven Shaviro wryly writes, ‘bump into the same obelisk twice’ (Shaviro, 2009, p.20).¹⁵

¹⁵ See also Merleau Ponty (2003), particularly his late essay ‘The Idea of Nature in Whitehead’.

All of which represents Whitehead's thought at its most basic. This eventful conception of reality becomes much more complex and nuanced in *Process and Reality* (Whitehead, [1929]1978). Within Whitehead's wider system, then, in place of events, the more fundamental building blocks of reality become, what he terms, 'actual occasions' or 'actual entities' (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.18).¹⁶ These are 'the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real' (ibid). This is his 'ontological principle'; actual occasions are 'complete existents', the basic units of being. Other than actual entities there is nothing, nonentity, nothingness; 'the rest is silence' (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.43). They are 'the ground from which all other types of existence are derivative and abstracted' (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.75).¹⁷ These actual occasions are not, and should not be taken to be substances.¹⁸ He writes, 'an actual entity is a process, and is not describable in terms of a morphology of a stuff' (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.41). Indeed, his entire project is to replace the substantialist ontology of most Western philosophy with a processual one, much like Leibniz does via his deployment of 'monads'.¹⁹ They are, rather, processual units, 'drops of experience, complex and interdependent' (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.18). 'Concrescence' is the name given to the process of becoming that *is* an actual occasion. It is the 'real internal constitution' of the actual occasion in question (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.212). Actual occasions 'appropriate' elements from the universe outside themselves and make them their own. This appropriation is termed a 'prehension' or, in its positive guise, a 'feeling'. Actual occasions are a mode of the process of feeling the world; they are constituted by their prehensions.

Thus, the notion of feeling, of prehending, is at the very root of Whitehead's metaphysics. Elsewhere, he writes that 'the basis of experience is emotional. Stated more generally, the basic fact is the rise of an affective tone originating from things whose relevance is given up'

¹⁶ More correctly, the term 'event' is used 'in the more general sense of a nexus of actual occasions, inter-related in some determinate fashion in one extensive quantum. An actual occasion is the limiting type of an event with only one member' (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.73).

¹⁷ As such, for Whitehead, god is an actual entity, and so is 'the most trivial puff of existence in far off empty space' (Whitehead, [1919]1978, p.18).


¹⁸ With a nod to William James, he writes: 'We find ourselves in a buzzing world, amid a democracy of fellow creatures; whereas, under some guise or other, orthodox philosophy can only introduce us to solitary substances, enjoying an illusory experience' (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.50). As such, Whitehead's system is set up in direct opposition to much of Western philosophy which hinges, in one way or another, around subject-predicate, substance-quality and particular-universal distinctions. In direct violation of Aristotle's notion that a substance is not present in a subject, and that particulars hold no relevance for other individual particulars, he writes that "an actual entity is present in other actual entities" (ibid). They are interdependent and interpenetrating. This is his "principle of relativity".

¹⁹ Indeed, Whitehead makes significant advance of Leibniz's monadology by, inter alia, 'putting windows' on the monads and allowing them to change.

(Whitehead, [1933]1967. P.176). This fundamentally *emotional* character of experience is applied to *all* types of experience, at *all levels* of existence. His metaphysics is grounded on a radical universalization of experience, characterised as ‘feeling’. Thus the flower ‘feels’ water at its roots and sunlight on its petals, the rock ‘feels’ the waves crash against it, the atom of hydrogen ‘feels’ the oxygen atom and so on. Note that this conception of feeling does not imply any suggestion of knowledge, sentience, or consciousness awareness. This is not a pan-psychism but rather a pan-experientialism. Indeed, unlike much of the Western tradition, experience is primary for Whitehead - ‘consciousness presupposes experience, and not experience consciousness’ (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.53). The position is decidedly *anti-anthropomorphic*, which is one reason for his influence in post-humanist circles. An actual entity is constituted by its feelings, its prehensions, which at higher grades of perception (such as the human) may become various senses like touch, smell and so on.²⁰ Thus, there are degrees of agency in Whitehead’s universe. We will return to this again in the next chapter.

It may help to elucidate the schema by showing what the most basic prehension entails.

Figure 2. . A Basic Prehension



In the diagram above, adapted from Sherburne (1966, p.10), the two circles are to indicate two actual entities.²¹ Here B is the subject of the prehension and A the initial datum. The simple physical feeling in question, X, is a result of the *ingression* of the simple feeling (N) in the

²⁰ Even here, at the higher phases of experience, ‘consciousness is no measure of the complexity of complete experience ...consciousness is the crown of experience, only occasionally attained, not necessarily its base’ (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.267).

²¹ This is very much simplified, and omits, *inter alia*, a treatment of negative prehensions.

objective datum A; the earlier subject A becomes objectified for the later subject B.²² This is a singular incident of becoming, a particular instant of *concrecence* - the growing together of the many in to the unity of the one. It depicts the *vector* transmission of an emotional feeling ('affective tone') from A to B, thereby re-constituting B. The end point of the process of concrecence is termed its 'satisfaction'. This is the coming together of a diverse collection of experiences into a novel unity. It marks the emergence of a new *superject*. Hence, the universe in seen as a creative advance in to novelty. The 'creativity of the world is the throbbing emotion of the past hurling itself into a new transcendent fact.'²³ It is the flying dart...hurled beyond the bounds of the world' (Whitehead, [1933]1967, p.177). Furthermore, for Whitehead, it is the 'how' of becoming that is key. His principle of process maintains that 'the *how* an actual entity *becomes* constitutes *what* the actual entity *is*...(i)t's "being" is constituted by its "becoming" (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.23, original emphasis). The constructive dynamism of becoming cannot be underestimated.

So far, so abstract. Actual entities represent the most fundamental level of analysis for Whitehead. They are similar to Leibniz's monads, yet fundamentally different in that they undergo change. Indeed, they perish; time itself is the perpetual perishing of actual entities.²⁴ But actual entities are atomic; they are real, individual and particular. This microscopic level is 'concerned with the formal constitution of an actual occasion, considered as a process of realizing an individual unity of experience'. At a macro level, the philosophy of organism is 'concerned with the givenness of the actual world, considered as the stubborn fact which at once limits and provides opportunity for the actual occasion (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.129). At this level, an aggregation of actual entities is called a 'nexus'. While the individual actual occasion may be considered a (speculative) metaphysical abstraction, a nexus (plural nexūs) is 'a set of actual entities in the unity of the relatedness constituted by their prehensions of each

²² Note that subject here should more properly be read as 'subject-superject'. It is fundamental to the philosophy of organism that 'the notion of an actual entity as the unchanging subject of change is completely abandoned. An actual entity is at once the subject experiencing and the superject of its experiences. It is the subject-superject, and neither half of this description can...be lost sight of...The ancient doctrine that no one crosses the same river twice is extended. No thinker thinks twice; and...no subject experiences twice (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.29).

²³ It is interesting to note in passing that the term 'creativity' was actually coined by Whitehead himself, and as recently as 1927, when he gave the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh, which were later published as *Process and Reality* (see Halewood, 2011, p.35). As Halewood, Shaviro and others point out, the contemporary ubiquity and banality of terms such as 'creativity' and 'novelty' mask the radical departure that Whitehead's philosophy represented at the time. And still represents.

²⁴ The past is past, the events which constitute the present no longer exist: 'In the philosophy of organism it is not 'substance' which is permanent, but 'form'. Forms suffer changing relations; actual entities "perpetually perish" subjectively, but are immortal objectively. Actuality in perishing acquires objectivity, while it loses subjective immediacy. It loses the final causation which is its internal principle of unrest, and it acquires efficient causation whereby it is a ground of obligation characterizing the creativity' (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.29).

other' (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.29). This unity emerges from a process of transmutation of simple physical feelings at the micro level and gives rise to the unified feeling of a whole. When a nexus displays certain criterion of 'social order' it is termed a 'society'.²⁵ We habitually treat such societies as if they were one unified actuality, such as (the span of life of) a tree. This is the world of electrons, rocks, chairs, birds, humans and stars. It is the typical level of human experience. It is in this sense that Stengers' suggests that, for Whitehead, 'it is always societies that we study. All is sociology' (Stengers, 2002, cited in Halewood, 2011, p.87).²⁶

There are a number of things that we might take from this brief and partial encounter with Whitehead.²⁷ Firstly, that process, becoming and perishing are the primary attributes of existence - the *really* real. Secondly, that creativity, the 'creative advance into novelty', implies a trajectory, a 'life history', a route of events at the micro level of actual occasions that construct the subject (superject), but without a teleology. Thirdly, that 'feeling', 'emotion' or 'affectivity' (all of which will be teased apart later) is the defining or primary characteristic of experience, and occurs in some form at every level of existence, and that they are constitutive of an emergent superjectivity. What Whitehead offers, above all, *contra* Kant, is a 'critique of pure feeling' (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.113).

Thus, the Whiteheadian universe has a *pulse*; it is dynamic and engaged in a process of becoming. All that is solid melts into events. Such speculative metaphysics is clearly not for everyone.²⁸ Yet I hope to show below how such an ontological grounding of process is of benefit to both social theory and the conceptual lenses we use to view the social world.

²⁵ There are many types of society, at various levels of complexity, such as corpuscular, structured etc.

²⁶ Fararo, in a similar vein, writes that Whitehead's philosophy is a kind of 'generalised sociology' (2001, p.66).

²⁷ One omission from this encounter is the role that 'God' plays in Whitehead's cosmology. God is the 'non-temporal actual entity' which provides 'the general potentiality of the universe' (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.46). His conception is avowedly *not* the traditional god of traditional religion, theology or philosophy (including Spinoza's) but amounts to a 'secularization of god'. The literature on this is vast but, for an 'anti-theological' reading, see Shaviro, 2009, ch.5.

²⁸ Popper, for instance, considered the book a prime example of Neo-Hegelian irrationalism. He writes: 'I just do not understand what its author wished to convey. Very likely this is my fault and not his. I do not belong to the number of the elect, and I fear that many others are in the same position' (Popper, [1945]2002, pp.520-26). He leaves it to the reader to judge the appropriateness of Kant's comments on metaphysics, who could only 'look with repugnance and something like hate upon the puffed-up pretentiousness of these volumes filled with wisdom' (Popper, *ibid*).

1.4. Relationalism: The Real is Relational

Of course Whitehead's philosophy of organism is fundamentally relational as well as processual. Indeed, the entire universe is for him 'an organic extensive community'. To be an actual occasion (an event) 'means that the entity in question is a relatum in this scheme of extensive connection' (Whitehead, [1929]1978, pp.288-9). At every given 'epoch' or instant, the universe is a complex of interrelated events, which is never complete. It is 'always passing beyond itself' in its creative advance (ibid). Such a relational view is now prominent within contemporary sociology. Indeed, it appears to be increasingly the dominant approach, if not yet an actual paradigm.²⁹ However, there remains much diversity in these relational approaches. One which is perhaps most indebted to Whitehead is that of ANT (Actor Network Theory), or at least, the variety (that used to be) promoted by Bruno Latour. His notion of assemblages has echoes of the radical relational processualism that Whitehead advances (Latour, 2005b).³⁰ More generally, much of contemporary sociology marches under a banner of 'relational sociology', in one form or another. Indeed, according to Mustafa Emirbayer, sociologists working today are faced with a fundamental dilemma: 'whether to conceive of the world as consisting primarily in substances or in processes, in static "things" or in dynamic, unfolding relations' (Emirbayer, 1997, 281). This division sets the contemporary debate.

Substantialism, which, as I mentioned, may have its origins in Parmenides, begins with substances of one variety or another, including things, beings or particularly essences, and considers those to be the fundamental units of reality. Substances are primary to and independent from relations; relations are supplementary and occur between these pre-formed

²⁹ Though see, for example, Donati (2011), who claims to have 'invented' the 'new paradigm' of relational sociology back in the 1980's. The irony of course is that the case of Donati is a prime example of why Kuhn considered the emergence of paradigms in the social sciences impossible. There is insufficient unity in definition, agreement over methods and so on, within sociology, to the extent that an individual can 're-invent' both relational sociology and critical realism alone, in Italy, in the 1980's.

³⁰ For example: 'an even more radical solution would be to consider these bundles of actor-networks in the same way that Whitehead considers the word 'society'. For him societies are not assemblages of social ties—in the way Durkheim or Weber could have imagined them—but are all the bundles of composite entities that endure in time and space. In his words, a society needs new associations in order to persist in its existence. And of course, such a labor requires the recruitment, mobilization, enrollment, and translation of many others—possibly of the whole universe. What is so striking in this generalized definition of societies is that the respective meanings of subjectivity and objectivity are entirely reshuffled. Is a subject whatever is present? Is an object whatever was present? So every assemblage that pays the price of its existence in the hard currency of recruiting and extending is, or rather, has subjectivity. This is true of a body, of an institution, even of some historical event which he also refers to as an organism. Subjectivity is not a property of human souls but of the gathering itself—provided it lasts of course. If we could retain this vastly expanded meaning of society, then we could again understand what Tarde meant when he said that everything is a society and that all things are society' (Latour, 2005a, p.218).

entities. Dewey and Bentley, cited in Emirbayer, offer a useful typology of such substantialist views. They distinguish between two main varieties, those concerned with *self-action* and those with *inter-action* (Emirbayer, 1997, pp. 283-286). In self action, things are seen as acting under their own powers, independently of other substances (Dewey & Bentley, 1949, p.132). Such a view was prominent in ancient and medieval philosophy, particularly that influenced by Aristotle's physics, in which things possess Being and continue eternally in some action or motion essential to this Being.³¹ Aquinas's view of the 'soul' is perhaps the epitome of this perspective. In modern philosophy, self-action persists within a variety of widely held doctrines, including methodological individualism (particularly rational choice theory and standard game theory), norm-following neo-Kantian perspectives (non-rational choice theories) found in some forms of critical theory and microsociology, and certain forms of holistic and structuralist thinking. Within the latter group for example, neofunctionalist or systems theorists often assume that structures, systems or societies are the 'durable, coherent entities that constitute the legitimate starting points of all sociological enquiry...not individual persons, but groups, nations, cultures and other reified substances do all of the acting in social life and account for its dynamism' (Emirbayer, 1997, p.285).³² The second type of substantialist perspective discussed is, perhaps controversially, that of inter-action, in which 'thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection' (Dewey & Bentley, 1949, p.132). Here, rather than generating action alone, such action occurs *between* entities, while remaining fixed and unchanging in themselves. Newtonian mechanics, that cold, closed system of the world in which billiard ball-like particles interact without alteration, represents the 'perfection' of this perspective, and finds its clearest sociological expression in the 'variable-centred approach' that 'explicitly or implicitly dominates much of contemporary sociology, from survey research to historical-comparative analysis' (Emirbayer, 1997, p.286, see also Clegg 1989).

The *trans-actional* or *relational* perspective, therefore, is presented as the antithesis of both forms of substantialism. Within this position, 'the very terms or units involved in a transaction derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the changing functional roles they play within that transaction' (Emirbayer, 1997, p.287). Discrete things or units like

³¹ See, for example, Cassirer, 1953, p.8: 'The category of relation especially is forced into a dependent and subordinate position by this fundamental metaphysical doctrine of Aristotle. Relation is not independent of the concept of real being; it can only add supplementary and external modifications to the latter, such as do not affect its real 'nature''. Cassirer has been very influential with relationsists, particularly Bourdieu and, more controversially, Elias (Maso, 1995, Kilminster & Wouters, 1995).

³² Though this does not apply necessarily to Luhmann's autopoietic systems theory (1996).

person, individual and society are rejected as the fundamental objects of sociological analysis in favour of the relations within which such units are embedded, which are themselves seen as dynamic, unfolding processes. As such, relationalism too purports to operate within an ontology of *becoming*, rather than one of being, although this is not always made explicit. For sociology, this position was probably given its first voice through Karl Marx when he writes in the *Grundrisse* that ‘society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand’ (Marx, 1857, p.239). Here, for Marx, to be a slave or a citizen is not a product of something inherent within the individual in question but is rather a product of the relations within which she is enmeshed.³³ What this expresses is a core feature of relational thinking. That is, relationalism is expressly anti-essentialist in outlook. In essentialism, a defining component of much substantialist thinking, things are what they are because of their intrinsic nature. By contrast, in relationism ‘things are what they are because of their location and movement in a network or system of forces; they do not assume a fixed or constant position in a network because of their essential properties’ (Fuchs, 2001, p.16).

Of course, relationalism is a very broad church, and far from being a homogeneous ‘paradigm’ within the social sciences, it remains as fractured as any (or every) other perspective. Individuals as diverse as Foucault, Peter Blau, Michael Mann, Pierre Bourdieu, Niklas Luhmann, and Charles Tilly, for example, can all be considered ‘relational’ thinkers. Perhaps its most influential proponents currently working and publishing are, what have been labelled, ‘formalists’ (Lizardo, 2009). Formal relational sociology has been associated with the founding theoretical work of Simmel, and is most recently being advanced under the banner of ‘social network analysis’ (Scott, 2000; Crossley, 2011). This formalism and (*faux*) scientificity of SNA has encouraged a renewed interest in sociology, particularly in the context of what is viewed as the new ubiquity of networks, from diverse disciplines. Increasingly an interdisciplinary movement of ‘network science’ appears to be taking shape, combining network structure and analysis at a variety of levels of existence, including the social, the technological, the neurological, the biological, and so on (Barbarisi, 2002; Buchanan, 2002). This is particularly true of ‘web science’ in its various forms. Engineers and students of new social media who study Twitter and Facebook, for example, often work (or seek to work) with sociologists and social network analysts in seeking to describe such online social networks, or analyse ‘sentiment’ across such networks. Furthermore, relations and emergence are at the

³³ He writes: ‘To be a slave, to be a citizen, are social characteristics, relations between human beings A and B. Human being A, as such, is not a slave. He is a slave in and through society’ (Marx, 1859, p.239).

centre of complexity science too, and often draw on similar vocabularies to describe and explain the social/natural worlds in terms of complex adaptive systems (Byrne, 1998; Jörg, 2011; Castellani & Hafferty, 2009).

Yet, while I wish to position this thesis within relational sociology and to make the case for a relational conception of social structure, the formalism of much network analysis is sociologically problematic. In many ways it represents a return to the structuralism that more recent sociology has attempted to extract itself from since the 1950's. While Black's (2000) 'dreams of a pure sociology' appear to be coming a reality in many areas, this mathematical formalism (and the attractive pictures that SNA produces) often occludes key aspects of the social world, such as agency, culture and the processual dynamism of actually existing social relations.³⁴ It remains fundamentally *dis*-embodied. While many lay claim to Simmel as the sociological founder of this formalism, his approach is more nuanced than the formalists suggest. Pyyhtinen (2010, 2009) for example make the case for reading Simmel in much more dynamic and processual terms. He argues that Simmel's relationalism often appears under the label of 'relativism' in his work, which has led to confusion in the secondary literature (Pyyhtinen, 2010, pp.38-67). Moreover, he suggests, Simmel's later work in metaphysics, his *Lebensanschauung*, or 'life philosophy', stresses the processual character of immanent transcendence in much the same vein as Whitehead (and, indeed, Elias). Hovering below the formal relations of association, such as the dyad or triad, is his more fundamental conception of life: 'it never *is*; it is always becoming' (Simmel, cited in Pyyhtinen, 2010, p.55).³⁵ For example, Simmel writes that:

aside from the connecting forms that are elevated to the level of those comprehensive organizations, this pulsating life which links human beings together displays countless other ones, which, as it were, remain in a fluid, transitory condition, but are no less agents connecting individuals to social existence (Simmel, cited in Pyyhtinen, 2010, p.57).

Thus, the more static, structuralist conceptions of the social deployed by some of Simmel's contemporary heirs, and indeed, those who criticise his apparent 'subjectivism', may both be guilty of partial readings. This is not to suggest that all relational sociology is inherently

³⁴ On pure sociology see Black (2000, 2003).

³⁵ Pyyhtinen writes: 'Even though it appears everywhere as the life of the individual, Simmel maintains that in itself, as a continuous, unrestricted flow, life is opposed to the self-enclosed form of the individual. Life not only exceeds but also produces all individual forms and, as such, it refers in Simmel to a more profound dimension beneath the surface of phenomena' (Pyyhtinen, 2010, p.55).

structuralist or static. Indeed, much contemporary work is aimed at studying relational *dynamics*, and culture and agency from a network perspective. This is particularly true within the study of social movements for example (Diani & McAdam, 2003). Yet, in the literature there remains a division between those who consider SNA as a method and those who consider it a theory (Mische, 2011). Or, perhaps more controversially, are those who wish to dispense with notions of the individual human person entirely (White, 1992).

For our purposes, it is the theoretical and ontological status of relationality that is of central concern. Specifically, we hope to show the *constitutive* role of relationality and networks; that the *embodied* individual is produced or constituted by her position in specific relational matrices or interdependent relations of power, meaning and emotionality. These may be considered as ‘processes-in-relations’, to use White’s well known phrase and, furthermore, as will be analysed in later chapters, such processes are also processes of *becoming* that often exhibit a *narrative* structure. As such, it is to the relationality of Elias, Burkitt, Somers and Tilly-none of whom deploy formal SNA- that we will later turn. For now, it is enough to say that the real is relational; that dynamic relations and transactions are the characteristics of the social world that characterise social subjectivity.

1.5. The Real is *Real*: Realism in Sociology

The final piece of the theoretical lens that I wish to grind is that of *realism*. I do not invoke such a troublesome word without trepidation. The very term has become the ‘emptiest’ and most contested of signifiers, giving rise to what might be called the ‘realism zoo’.³⁶ Yet it, too, like the concepts of process and relation, is undergoing a contemporary renewal. In recent years, particularly in Britain, this has been associated with the Critical Realism (CR) inspired by Roy Bhaskar’s work in the philosophy of science. In this section I will briefly and critically address the key tenets of CR, and will argue that despite its many advantages over other approaches, its full incorporation as ontological ‘under-labourer’ for sociology is problematic. I will also briefly discuss the ‘relational realism’ of Charles Tilly and Margaret Somers and suggest this ‘lighter’ realism might be a better alternative, suitably altered. I will conclude this

³⁶ The varieties of realism appear to be ever expanding. Even a cursory glance at an encyclopaedia entry for the term reveals a plethora of realisms, including (but not limited to) philosophical, scientific, critical, objective, hyper, literary, naïve, Platonic, moderate, constructive, quasi, modal, speculative, post and neo realisms. This polysemy means that, unless we are very clear about what we mean by realism, con-fusion and misunderstandings ensue. The key varieties discussed here are critical, relational and organic varieties.

section by attempting to unify this relational realism with the Whiteheadian ontology already discussed.

Roy Bhaskar begins his reconstruction of scientific realism with a *transcendental* form of argumentation. He asks, what must the world be like for science to be possible? (Bhaskar, [1975]2008). His answer is that an objective world independent of our knowledge of it is one, primary, prerequisite. Following this, the particular brand of scientific realism he outlined in 1975, transcendental realism, and the critical naturalism he proposed as a subsequent philosophy of social science, which would act as an ‘under-labourer’ for the social sciences in 1979, were subsequently combined to become Critical Realism (CR).³⁷ Here I will give a brief and partial overview of this approach. My focus will remain on his ‘pre-dialectic’ works mentioned above (Bhaskar, [1975]2008, [1979]1998) and will not address his later works at all, as there are beyond the scope of the argument here.³⁸

Transcendental Realism (TR) emerged as a critique of and response to the dominant philosophies of modern science, empiricism (or empirical realism) and positivism. In particular, all conceptions of science that depend, directly or indirectly, on Hume’s notion of the constant conjunction of events are seen to be flawed in some way, and causality is defended via the invocation of non-observable generative *mechanisms*. There are a number of key features of this restatement of scientific realism. His aim is to avoid, what he terms, the ‘epistemic fallacy’. This is the (post-Kantian) tendency in other philosophies of science to reduce questions of *being* to questions of *knowing*. What should be considered as ontological questions are (mis)translated in to epistemological questions.³⁹ This confines the pursuit of science to ‘actualism’, to the exclusive study of the observable, such as in positivism. It is against this position that TR is constructed, on the basis of a few core arguments. Firstly, there are two dimensions of knowledge in CR; the transitive and the intransitive. The latter refers to the objective world which exists independently of knowledge of it and does not depend on human activity. As Bhaskar writes, ‘if men ceased to exist sound would continue to travel and heavy bodies fall to the earth’ (Bhaskar, [1975]2008, p.21). The transitive

³⁷ I will henceforth refer to CR to refer to both, though there are distinctions between TR and CN.

³⁸ Indeed, I am not alone in this. A distinct split has emerged among critical realists themselves, with some following Bhaskar ever further into ‘meta Reality’ and the dialectic version of CR, while others, unable to follow, remain adherents to the original work. (see for example Elder-Vass, 2010, p.11).

³⁹ He writes that the epistemic fallacy consists in a position in which: ‘statements about being can be reduced or analysed in terms of statements about knowledge; i.e. that ontological questions can always be transposed into epistemological terms...that it is sufficient for philosophy to “treat only of the network and not what the network describes”, results in the systematic dissolution of the idea of a world...independent of but investigated by science’ (Bhaskar, [1979]1998, p.37).

dimension refers to the theories, models and methods, in short, the discourse of science (as a social activity) that exist and attempt (fallibly) to explain the world. The second feature is the ontologically stratified nature of this reality. For Bhaskar, reality is 'deep' and has three 'levels', the domains of the real, the actual and the empirical (Bhaskar, [1975]2008). The domain of the real, the 'lowest' level of reality, is the domain of generative *mechanisms*, which give rise to the structures and powers of objects in the world. The realm of the actual refers to the domain in which those powers are actualised or activated. For Bhaskar, this is the realm of *events*. The third domain is the empirical. This is the realm of sense *experience*. It is the mechanisms operating at the level of the real, which give rise to actual events, which may (or may not) be experienced empirically by observers. These are, implicitly, human observers, as Bhaskar is concerned with advocating scientific realism, with science understood as a fundamentally social affair. Thus, non-observable and intransitive causal mechanisms give rise to the events and structures of the observable world. The notions of emergence and causation are key.

This same theoretical model is later applied to the social sciences, in the form of critical naturalism (Bhaskar, [1979]1998). This model, what he calls the 'transformational model' of social action (TMSA), is fundamentally a relational conception of societies and the subject matter of social science (Bhaskar, [1979]1998, p.26). Sociology should not be concerned with either the individual social atom (methodological individualism) or the 'collectivist conception' (i.e. holism) of Durkheim, but rather, *the relation itself*. That is, it should be concerned, 'at least paradigmatically, with the persistent *relations* between individuals (and groups), and with the relations between these relations (and between such relations and nature and the products of such relations)' (Bhaskar, [1979]1998, p.28 original emphasis).⁴⁰ From such a position, the relationship between society and human action must possess a 'dual character', a duality of both structure and a duality of praxis. Individuals do not create society, but rather reproduce or transform it: 'Society is both the ever-present *condition* (material cause) and the continually reproduced *outcome* of human agency. And praxis is both work, that is, *production*, and (normally unconscious) *reproduction* of the conditions of production' (Bhaskar, [1979]1998, pp.34-5 original emphasis). As such, there is an 'ontological hiatus' between the individual and society, and this ontological separation must be maintained (p.37). Voluntarism (individualism) cannot adequately address structural constraint; holism cannot adequately

⁴⁰ It is this concentration on the relation itself that is to be found in Donati's relational sociology, and has been characterised by Archer and others as an example of spontaneous co-creation of Critical Realism by both himself and Bhaskar, unbeknownst to one another (Donati, 2011).

account for intentional human agency. The transformational model can account for both, based on a categorical distinction between people and societies. Thus, Bhaskar's social ontology is based on an ontology of emergent properties in open systems. Social structures are objectively real, and not reducible to individuals (Cruickshank, 2003, p.105).

This basic approach has been very influential in sociology. For example, in the work of Margaret Archer, we see the TMSA model critiqued and updated as 'morphogenesis' (Archer, 1982, 1995). Here Archer, maintaining the ontological distinction between agency and structure in Bhaskar, is highly critical of the approaches of both Giddens and Bourdieu. These are guilty of, what she calls, 'central conflation'. If Bhaskar is critical of individualists (Archer's downward-conflationists-there are actions but no conditions) and holists (upward-conflationists-there are conditions but no actions), Archer's ire is focused on those who conflate both structure and agency/action and constraint, particularly Giddens (Archer, 1995) and Bourdieu (Archer, 2000).⁴¹ She is also highly critical of the implicit presentism of Giddens' (in particular) version of structure and agency.

There is much to commend in the CR approach to both theorization and sociology in general. It offers a coherent, relational and dynamic view of the individual and her relationship to social structures, and how such structures change over time. Yet, rather than engage in a through-going critique, here I offer reasons for its incompatibility with my own position. The primary ontological objection to the approach advanced here is that CR is guilty of the 'bifurcation of nature' mentioned earlier. This is in evidence in two foundational contentions. Firstly, in the stratified conception of reality; its separation into the domains of the real, the actual and the empirical. Secondly, in the sharp separation of the social and the natural. Indeed, I suggest that the latter is perhaps more damning to advocates of a 'flat ontology', despite initial appearances, for it approaches the problem in precisely the wrong way. Regarding the former, the Whiteheadian approach can incorporate and does use the concept of emergence, without slicing the real into distinct layers. Indeed, this is what conrescence and the advance in to novelty is founded upon.⁴² I suggest that the threefold ontology could

⁴¹ It is interesting to note that Bhaskar himself originally considered his position quite close to Giddens': 'it is because the social structure is always given, from the perspective of intentional human agency, that I prefer to talk of reproduction and transformation rather than of structuration as Giddens does (though I believe our conceptions are very close). For me 'structuration' still retains voluntaristic connotations - social practice is always, so to speak, restructuration' (Bhaskar, 1983, cited in Archer, 1995, p.140). For a developed conceptualisation of restructuration see Haugaard, 1997).

⁴² Indeed, both Bhaskar's and Archer's accounts of emergence have both been subject to criticism (Sawyer, 2005). See also Elder-Vass (2010).

be reconfigured in terms of abstraction, in the Whiteheadian sense, as it is ‘the very business of philosophy to explain the emergence of abstract things from concrete things’ (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.20).

However, the distinction between the social and the natural cannot be so easily side-stepped. There is, from a process ontology perspective, *one* nature, a flat ontology. While the position could perhaps incorporate an *analytical* distinction between the two, the CR position is decidedly ontological. In addition, we are often reminded that the social and the natural are fundamentally different realms; indeed, this is the very ‘problem of naturalism’ that he wishes to address for the social sciences (Bhaskar, [1979]1998). This bifurcation is also found in the separation of the transitive and the intransitive. As Burkitt writes, ‘reality appears to be governed by its own laws in some independent realm that is distinct from humans, and transformational activity seems confined only to the social-epistemic’ (Burkitt, 1999, p.73). From the process perspective, this is a miss-step. Humans are as much of nature as atoms of oxygen, oranges, or anything else. This is also true for social relations and human knowledge. *The subject emerges from the world, not the other way round.*

One final criticism is that, by maintaining the distinct ontological status of social structures, and denying the importance of habitus, CR (as espoused by Archer) is incompatible with my approach here. The point of the use of narrative is to elicit the processual-relational nature of becoming of the human subject. In this sense, I would perhaps side more with Giddens, Bourdieu and, indeed, particularly Elias in their accounts of structure-agency, while retaining a theoretical and ontological distinction. Structures are processes, modes of becoming, which are indivisible from the becoming of the subjects that reproduce them. In later chapters, in the narrative interviews, what is captured is this process of becoming, this Whiteheadian flux, which is indivisible from the agents that constitute and narrate their life of structural reproduction and transformation. While Giddens (1985), for example, maintains that practical consciousness, which bears some similarity to habitus, is central to structural reproduction, he leaves underdeveloped the change of habitus that goes with the process of structuration. Furthermore, as we shall see, for my purposes, the emotional aspect of practical consciousness is also insufficiently developed. Arguably, both these relative absences have to do with Giddens’ problematic relationship with Elias.

Yet, where Bhaskar is undoubtedly correct is in his criticisms of other philosophies of science, particularly positivism and empiricism.⁴³ It also offers an expressly relational conception of society, and stresses that attention be focused on the relation itself. Within sociology there have been alternative conceptions of realism for the social sciences advanced by Tilly and Somers, loosely called ‘relational realism’. For Tilly, relational realism is the doctrine that ‘transactions, interactions, social ties and conversations constitute the central stuff of social life’ (Tilly, 2002, p.72). By adopting this approach, we begin to see that ‘a substantial part of social reality consists of transactions among social units, that those transactions crystalize into ties, that they shape the units involved that they concatenate into variable structures’ (Tilly, 2002, p.75). Somers approach is similar, and grounded on a critique of rational choice theory (1998). For both, the realism of their approach is ‘provisional’. This provisional realism is exactly what Whitehead himself recommends Whitehead, [1929]1978). It is this approach that we wish to advance here.

It is, finally, important to note that this version of light realism is in fact itself constructionist, and the two should not be considered in opposition. Indeed, Whitehead’s position is much closer to that of Kant than might be expected; his post-Kantianism retains many aspects of the former position. Indeed, he explicitly praises Kant for his ‘conception of an act of experience as a constructive functioning’ (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.156). For both thinkers there is ‘no possibility of knowing the world nonsubjectively or extraexperientially, *sub specie aeternitatis*’ (Shaviro, 2009, p.48). The whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the experience of subjects (or actants), and nothing else. Yet, for Kant, this experience is, and must be, shaped by the Categories, the (exclusively) human, rational, cognitive concepts of understanding. As such, ‘Kant in effect reaffirms the *cogito*: the Cartesian subject that is separated from, unconditioned by, and implicitly superior to the world that it only observes from a distance...Kant’s subject both monopolizes experience, and exempts itself from immersion in that experience’ (ibid). For Whitehead, this gets things the wrong way round. He writes:

Thus for Kant the process whereby there is experience is a process from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis, and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity, whereby the external world is a datum, to the subjectivity, whereby there is one individual experience. Thus,

⁴³ And, I stress, these criticisms do not apply to Whitehead, who is neither, from the Bhaskarian perspective. If Whitehead is an empiricist at all, he is a ‘radical empiricist’, along the lines of William James.

according to the philosophy of organism, in every act of experience there are objects for knowledge; but, apart from the inclusion of intellectual functioning in that act of experience, there is no knowledge (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.159).

Thus, the ‘external world’ exists as data and source of experience, but both exist in a dialectic, dynamic, processual relationship. This serves to overturn the dualism, the anthropomorphism and the excess subjectivity of the Kantian perspective, thereby ‘democratizing’ experience, theorised as feeling, across the universe. ‘Subjects’ for Whitehead, include electrons, molecules, grass, trees and stones. Each experience, each prehension, consists of three components: the ‘subject’ which is prehending, the ‘datum’ of that prehension, and crucially the ‘subjective form’, *how* the subject prehends the datum (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.23). It is this latter, this subjective form, that is key to the process - ‘the how an actual entity becomes constitutes what the actual entity is...It’s “being” is constituted by its “becoming”’ (ibid). If a nightingale sings in a forest, and there are no humans around to hear it, it doesn’t matter, because the wood is full of subjects of different grades, both organic and inorganic. The vibrations produced are nevertheless perceived, prehended or felt.⁴⁴ They are, as such, ‘real’. The world exists, independent of human knowledge, yet when humans come to experience that world, construction and perception are united in dynamic process. Indeed, we should be careful not to privilege either side. Whitehead suggests, somewhat ironically, that, if the (neo)Kantians (or strong constructionists) are correct, nature often gets ‘credit which should in truth be reserved for ourselves: the rose for its scent; the nightingale for his song; and the sun for its radiance. The poets are entirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics to themselves, and turn them into odes of self-congratulation on the excellency of the human mind’ (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.54). Recall that ours is a ‘buzzing world, amid a democracy of fellow creatures’. The buzz continues whether humans are there or not, and the creatures are legion.

But, for humans too, there is one nature, and the mistake of the philosophers has been to over-privilege the sense organs in the perception and experience within that nature. For Whitehead, ‘the living organ of experience is the living body as a whole. Every instability of any part of it...imposes an activity of readjustment throughout the whole organism’ (Whitehead, [1933]1967, p.225). This ‘whole body’ view of experience, moreover, cautions against reduction toward the brain, a reductionism that is currently in vogue in the various

⁴⁴ He writes, ‘There is nothing in the real world which is merely an inert fact. Every reality is there for feeling: it promotes feeling; and it is felt. Also there is nothing which belongs merely to the privacy of feeling of one individual actuality’ (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.310).

neurosciences, social and otherwise (Cacioppo et al, 2006). Such an approach is problematic as, ‘we cannot determine with what molecules the brain begins and the rest of the body ends...The truth is that the brain is continuous with the body, and the body is continuous with the rest of the natural world’ (ibid). While I also take this position, in the following chapters I hope to outline a more sociological conception of this ‘whole body’ approach which incorporates the symbolic, the emotions and the habitus.

1.6. Conclusion: Relational Becoming

The theoretical lens is now constructed. In this chapter I hope to have developed a distinctive theoretical approach, based on a coherent ontological conceptualisation of processes, relations and realism. The approach thus far has been primarily and explicitly *ontological*. I am suggesting a particular conception of both the universe and of social reality. Following Whitehead, I suggest that fundamental nature of this universe is *process*. It has the character of dynamic, unceasing flow, found first in the philosophy of Heraclitus and more recently captured in the poetry of Charles Olson and A.R. Ammons (1986).⁴⁵ Furthermore, from this perspective we are primed to conceive of the universe *actually* and *consistently* in anti-dualistic terms, rather than paying it lip-service. In other words, we must conceive of the world as *one* nature, and not as a bifurcation. Sociologically, this precludes any sharp divisions between ‘mankind’ and ‘nature’, but also between ‘mind’ and ‘body’ and ‘the social’ and ‘natural’, and ‘structure’ and ‘agency’. For Whitehead, human beings are complex hybrids, constellations of events (assemblages, ‘societies’) and co-creators of the nature from which they emerge. Humans grow from nature as apples grow on trees; while one may analytically distinguish between the part and the whole, there is nevertheless *one* tree, in an ontological sense. Human subjectivity, in addition, is constituted by experience, considered as fundamentally emotional

⁴⁵ See, for example, ‘Corsons Inlet’ (1965). Below is just one verse:
‘I have reached no conclusions, I have erected no boundaries,
Shutting out and shutting in, separating inside
from outside: I have
drawn no lines:
as
manifold events of sand
change the dune’s shape that will not be the same shape
tomorrow,
so I am willing to go along, to accept
the becoming
thought, to stake off no beginnings or ends, establish
no walls.’ (Ammons, 1986, p.44).

affecting, in a ceaseless process of becoming. Furthermore, the human level of reality is characterised by relationships, by its embedding in relational networks of interdependence. Thus, the individual is an (loosely-bounded, porous) assemblage, embedded in a wider assemblage which is itself engaged in a process of becoming, and cannot be understood in isolationist, individualist terms. Finally, we adopt a provisional realism, which holds that the world exists independently of human knowledge and, while for us it is mediated through (social) symbols and discourse, *it is not reducible* to such discourse. Human consciousness is an embodied and on-going co-creation between objectivity and subjectivity, such that the two can never be sharply distinguished. Yet, where they meet is the active, relationally embedded human body. Later I will suggest that the habitus, itself conceived as embodied and processual, is the concept to capture the relative mutable stability of the relationally situated individual.

I began this chapter defending ontology. Such an ontological position here outlined is not uncontroversial. Recently Kivinen and Piirainen, for example, (2004, 2006) have launched a spirited critique of the various forms of relational ontology, some of which are mentioned above, suggesting that it is fruitless to think of anything, but particularly relationism, as an ontological doctrine at all. To do so is to engage in the ‘philosophizing’ of sociology. They write that, from their pragmatist perspective, ‘it is hard to see why a social scientist should build his or her inquiries on such metaphysical assumptions that by definition “are beyond ...those capable of being tackled by methods of science”’ (Kivinen & Piirainen, 2006, p.306). Practically all of the relationists are dismissed for their metaphysical weaknesses, including Emirbayer, Somers, Tilly, Bhaskar and Archer, and even those who describe themselves as ‘pragmatist realists’, such as Hack, Harré, Putnam and Rescher. ‘Proper’ pragmatists, and social scientists, should have no truck with either ontology or epistemology, they contend, citing Rorty (p.309). These are merely socially constructed ‘language games’, specific to particular networks. What they promote instead is thus the ‘sociologizing of philosophy’, and the replacement of ontological relationism with methodological relationism. Yet, I suggest, and hope to have shown, the social construction of knowledge is not, in fact, incompatible with an explicit social ontology. One, perhaps glib, response to the pragmatist’s call for methodological over ontological commitments is that this is, itself, a language game. What matter the label? If we conduct our research with a commitment to relationism then it is the commitment that ‘works’, not the source the source of that commitment. Besides this, most

often in social science, as I said at the beginning of this chapter, work proceeds on the basis of *implicit* ontological assumptions, rarely if ever admitted or interrogated. But all propositions presuppose a context, a systematic environment, a universe in which to operate. The difficulty with the strong constructionist or even the ‘pragmatic’ objection is that, even if they don’t want to (or can’t) engage with that environment, most of their positions implicitly rest on the existence of such a context. Ontology is always provisional and speculative. Speculation need not be a dirty word. What little progress we have made as a species has been on the back of imaginative, speculative endeavours, tentative attempts at generalization, later held up to the light of observation and experience; ultimately, the ontological foundations must be compatible with practice:

Whatever is found in 'practice' must lie within the scope of the metaphysical description. When the description fails to include the 'practice,' the metaphysics is inadequate and requires revision. There can be no appeal to practice to supplement metaphysics, so long as we remain contented with our metaphysical doctrines. Metaphysics is nothing but the description of the generalities which apply to all the details of practice (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.13).

Thus, our ontology is always a ‘working’ ontology, always revisable, always provisional. I suggest that the generalities discussed this far, and collected under the label process-relational realism, do indeed apply to all the details of practice. That philosophy has repeatedly been found wanting, that the discipline has been characterised by over-statement and dogmatism, does not invalidate the attempt.⁴⁶ Nor should it be answered by a sociological dogmatism in return.

Finally, there is the tragedy of social theory to be accounted for. Social or sociological theory can scarcely be said to exist at present. There are very few ‘social theorists’ left worldwide, and very few academic positions advertising for ‘theorists’ in the social sciences. It is, in general, a poorly taught and more poorly understood field; for researchers, an inconvenient obstacle to data collection (‘real research’), professionally, theory (certainly with a large ‘T’) is in ruins. In its more general, ‘social’ (as opposed to sociological), key, it appears

⁴⁶ On this widespread ‘dogmatic fallacy’ Whitehead has said: ‘The Universe is vast. Nothing is more curious than the self-satisfied dogmatism with which mankind at each period of its history cherishes the delusion of the finality its existing modes of knowledge. Skeptic and believers are all alike. At this moment scientists and skeptics are the leading dogmatists. Advance in detail is admitted; fundamental novelty is barred. This dogmatic common sense is the death of philosophic adventure. The Universe is vast.’(Whitehead & Price, 2001, p.5).

indistinguishable from philosophy (if not always as rigorous); in its ‘sociological’ key it appears as a series of disconnected funkholes, creating theory within its own bunkers, with nothing to suggest for those without. It is for these reasons that I favour interdisciplinarity, and tentatively aim toward synthesis. But to do this requires a vision of the universe, of reality. In this chapter I have attempted to make this ontological position clear.

The position that this approach gives rise to I wish to label relational becoming; life, for humans (and everything else) should be considered as *relational becoming*. In the following chapter we begin to explore this relational becoming, and turn our lens on to the emotions and our shared, relational social-emotional life. In doing so, I will turn to the work of Norbert Elias in particular. It might be supposed that the approach here outlined, concerned with process, relations and realism, is similar to the approach of Elias and his ‘process’ or ‘figurational’ sociology’. And it is. This project began many years ago with Elias and his notion of ‘decivilizing process’ in particular. Yet, the direction has changed and the scope now wider. While I find myself in agreement with much of the Eliasian position, I do not wish to position myself as an Eliasian. I will later outline some disagreements while acknowledging the intellectual debt. The next chapter, then, will mostly be concerned with the concepts of emotion and power. Beginning with a brief review of the sociology of emotions literature, and the power literature, the chapter argues that these two concepts should be seen as ‘conceptual twins’, and both are fundamental to the constitution of social life. We later, in chapter three, build on this to develop a conceptualization of the emotional habitus, drawing on the relationship between emotions and power. This notion of emotional habitus is key to the empirical part of the thesis to follow and, I will suggest, is what the biographical narrative interviews in fact reveals. But all of the following will, I hope, bear the imprint of the ontological scheme outlined in this chapter. Throughout what follows Whitehead will remain our companion.

2. Chapter Two: Emotions & Power

2.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter we outlined the process-relational view of the world, based on a flat ontology, in which the basis experience is ‘emotional’. We suggested that social life should be considered as social or relational becoming. With Whitehead, we saw the democratising of both feeling and social relations to the extent that both encompass the entire universe, for both organic and inorganic entities, at all levels of sophistication. While the last chapter was philosophical and (positively, I hope) abstract, in this chapter we focus our attention on the human level. In other words, we turn to what is usually understood by the term ‘sociological’, but in doing so I hope that the more fundamental ontology is not entirely lost. As the universe as a whole can be considered in process-relational terms, and understood as a creative unfolding, a becoming, so too should ‘the social’. As emotion was considered central to the very process of that universal becoming, so it should be considered in relation to human becoming. Indeed, in what follows I hope to foreground a constitutive, relational and embodied conception of ‘social structure’ and social becoming.⁴⁷

In particular, here we turn our attention to emotions and emotionality. We begin by briefly reviewing the literature, with a particular focus on emotions in social theory and the sociology of emotions literature. We will then make the case for a process-relational conception of emotions based upon the previous chapter and, also, drawing on a number of other fields. We also discuss the relationship between emotions and power. In doing so, we will again turn to the work of Norbert Elias and his theory of civilizing processes. The outcome of which will lead up to a treatment and clarification of the notion of emotional habitus, which will be elaborated on in the following chapter.

2.2. Emotional Twists and Turns in the Social Sciences

The last number of years has seen an explosion of interest in emotion within the humanities and social sciences, to the extent that the advent of an ‘emotional’ or ‘affective turn’ is

⁴⁷ Parts of this chapter have been published in Heaney (2011).

repeatedly proclaimed (e.g. Clough and Halley, 2007). While such phraseology is both clichéd and problematic, that the emotions are receiving increased academic attention is undeniable. The end of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of such a proliferation of different and often competing ‘turns’ within the social and human sciences (the linguistic, the historical, the biographical etc.), such that one is tempted speak in terms of the ‘turns’ turn. While such language may be figuratively appealing, it is semantically unfortunate. It fosters the impression that the changes taking place are in some way essential, or that the reified discipline in question has agentic intent of its own, rather than viewing such ‘turns’ as resulting from the strategic actions of groups and individuals who organize and inculcate such changes across academic networks. As such, it may be more accurate, if not more appropriate, to describe such ‘turns’ as ‘movements’.

This aside, evidence of renewed interest can be found within a variety of disciplines, such as philosophy (Solomon, 2003), psychology (Lewis & Haviland-Jones, 2004), geography (Davidson et al., 2005), history (Reddy, 2001, 2009) political science (Elster, 1999; Berezin, 2002) and organization studies (Fineman, 2008). Even economics, that last bastion of the rational self-interested actor, has witnessed a dramatic upsurge in interest in emotion, from a range of perspectives (Frank, 1993, Elster, 1998, Pixely, 2004; Berezin, 2009). Increasingly emotions and emotionality are at the forefront of contemporary research, both empirical and theoretical. Today emotions matter, and are seen to matter.

This was not always so. It is widely perceived that, for most of western history, the emotions have either been ignored, or worse, explicitly derided, particularly by Enlightenment-inspired thinkers and scientists since the seventeenth century, and labelled ‘the other’ of reason and the enemy of science. Within this tradition, the story runs, the emotions were cast on the losing side of a binary opposition that characterized the dualistic nature of modern thought (see Bauman, 1991, p. 14) which, in its quest for order, sought to ‘divorce body from mind, nature from culture, reason from emotion, and public from private’ (Bendlow and Williams, 1998, p. xv). Emotions have been presented as the very antithesis of the rational and objective scientific mind, and ‘dismissed as private, ‘irrational’, inner sensations, which have been tied historically to women’s ‘dangerous desires and ‘hysterical bodies’” (ibid, p. xv).

This is the standard story and like most standard stories is partial and debatable. Dixon (2003), for example, offers a valuable critique of such views, particularly the position of the philosopher Robert Solomon (2003). Here the reason-emotion dichotomy is problematized and presented as a departure from more traditional views on the ‘passions’, which were often viewed as rational. Dixon shows that ‘the emotions’ as a category may themselves be viewed as a recent invention, stemming from the secularization and professionalization of psychology. He writes:

Prior to the creation of the emotions as an over-arching category, more subtlety had been possible on these questions. The “affections”, and the “moral sentiments”, for example, could be understood as both rational and voluntary movements of the soul, while still being subjectively warm and lively psychological states. It is not the case that prior to the 1970’s no one had realised that thinking, willing and feeling were (and should be) intertwined in one way or another. Almost everybody had realised this. (Dixon, 2003, p.3).

However, despite Dixon’s valuable reminder of the danger of ‘standard stories’, the emotions *have* had a troubled time throughout western intellectual history, particularly from a social perspective. It is not the case that emotions were not discussed, rather that they were often and at length, but usually in negative terms. Most of the ancient philosophers elaborated theories in which emotions played a decisive, albeit negative, part. Plato’s depiction of a tripartite soul, for example, discussed in both the Republic and the Phaedrus, uses the well-known ‘Chariot allegory’ of rider and horses to discuss the ‘parts’ of the personality. Here the passions are depicted as the ignoble ‘dark horse’ of the appetites, which the charioteer of reason must struggle to control. This perhaps remains the dominant trope in the literature contrasting emotions and reason, from Descartes to Kant, and from the logical positivists to some contemporary cognitive scientists.⁴⁸ It represents what Jack Barbalet (2001) has called the ‘conventional approach’ to emotionality within the western tradition. The division of mind and body found in Descartes ([1641] 1996) and formulated with the *cogito* is founded on a subversive view of emotion, in which individuals are not responsible for their feelings, as these are something ‘done’ to them by their bodies. This, for Barbalet, is ‘the other side of the cogito; namely that persons have no control over the emotions which subvert their thoughts and reason. If I am because I think, then I am undone if I feel’ (Barbalet 1998, p. 34). Even Spinoza, who devoted so much systematic attention to the affects in his *Ethics*, is a proponent

⁴⁸ This is perhaps most prominent in Kant, for whom both affects and passions were ‘illnesses of the mind’, with the latter depicted as ‘cancerous sores for pure practical reason’ (Kant, 2006, p.166).

of this view when he writes that ‘man’s lack of power to moderate and restrain the affects I call bondage’ (Spinoza [1677] 1996, p. 113).

Such a view has dominated *sociological* thinking on emotions until very recently.⁴⁹ While there is a ‘hidden history’ to some extent, particularly evident in the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment such as Smith and Ferguson, the emotions were largely ignored, or at least, not systematically or explicitly studied within sociology until the 1970s. Of course, all of the nineteenth century founding fathers of the discipline discussed the emotions in one way or another, but this aspect of their work was later to drop out of favour. Each of what Dawe has called the ‘two sociologies’ have dealt with emotion in different ways (Dawe, 1970, Shilling, 2002). On the ‘order’ side, Comte discussed ‘emotional fetishism’, and his new science of sociology was not blind to the role of the emotions, particularly ‘love’ (Comte, 1853). Durkheim’s analysis of religion, ritual and social solidarity is peppered with references to the emotions, which are seen as fundamental to the emergence of morality in society. Concepts such as collective effervescence and even anomie are inherently emotional in character, and are examples of what Randall Collins has called ‘the underground wing’ of Durkheim’s work (cited Shilling and Mellor, 1998, p. 194). For both thinkers, the emotions are discussed as group phenomena, rather than exclusively individual. For Marx, too, the workers’ alienation resulting from the capitalist mode of production is first and foremost an *emotional* suffering (Marx and Engels, 1973).

Of the classical theorists, Weber’s work is most clearly associated with theories of power. His treatment of emotions, however, is ambivalent and he has been more directly involved in the ‘expulsion of emotions from sociology’ (Barbalet, 1998, pp. 13–20; Shilling, 2002, p. 28). As an action theorist, like Simmel⁵⁰, Weber considers emotions primarily from an individual perspective, but they are ‘normatively devalued as an exclusive motivator for action, and eroded by a rationalised social system’ (Shilling, 2002, p. 23). Under the strong influence of

⁴⁹ Dixon’s account, mentioned earlier, deals with philosophy and psychology only. While there is an overlap, the path of sociology is a little different to the analysis he offers for those disciplines. Indeed, the influence of Parsons and the general “inferiority complex” within the discipline perhaps precluded the inclusion of emotions until the latter quarter of the 20th century. See, for example, Barbalet (2001) and Shilling (2002).

⁵⁰ Simmel also seems to be ambivalent toward emotion in social life and discusses it only rarely, for example, in the relation of shame to fashion (see [1904] 1957, [1903] 2009) or when the rational, ‘blasé’ outlook of the metropolitans is contrasted with the ‘emotional relationships’ of the rural dwellers ([1903] 1976). Flam (2009) offers a more positive interpretation of Simmel in this context.

both Descartes and Kant, Weber characterizes ‘mere’ emotions as inherently irrational and vague experiences, which ‘cannot be conceptually articulated’ (cited Barbalet, 1998, p. 36). Despite this reproduction of the conventional opposition between reason and emotion in Weber, other aspects of his work suggest alternative roles for emotions in social life, such as the ‘charisma’ of the charismatic leader, the fear and self-doubt of the Calvinists as functional to the emergence of modernity, and his definition of nationalism as a ‘community of sentiment’ (Weber, [1922] 1946, p. 176). Moreover, in a more recent study on the role of emotion in Weber’s work, Barbalet (2008) discovers an ‘early’ and a ‘late’ Weber, whose attitude to emotions changes throughout his career. Thus, in the Protestant ethic (1905), the practice of Beruf or ‘calling’ is deemed rational and achieved via the suppression of emotions, while in the Vocation Lectures (1919), Beruf is founded upon emotion and not opposed to it (Barbalet, 2008, pp. 46-74).⁵¹

Nevertheless, it is the ‘early’ Weber who has had most influence on the fortunes of the emotions within sociology, and, furthermore, regarding the understanding of power within social science. One key source for this influence was Parsons’ translation and incorporation of Weber’s writings into the emergent American sociology of the 1930s. This cognitive-rationalistic emphasis in US sociology from the 1930s to the 1970s, in which the emotions were regarded as irrational and irrelevant, ensured their marginalization for much of the twentieth century (Barbalet, 1998, pp. 16–20; Shilling 2002, p. 28). ‘Affective neutrality’ was of primary importance within structural-functionalism, with affectivity (its twin ‘pattern variable’) seen as either irrelevant to systems of instrumental action, or disruptive to normal social functioning. This is not to suggest that Parsons denies the presence of emotions in society *tout court*, but rather that they are relegated to the private sphere of family and friendships, with their public manifestation interpreted as a ‘strain’ on the social system. As Barbalet writes, ‘Parsons does allow for emotion in society, but only as a flea on the dog’ (Barbalet, 1998, p. 18).⁵²

⁵¹ For example, in *Politics as a vocation* ([1919] 1946) the three decisive qualities of the politician are ‘passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion’ (Weber 1946, p. 115). Note that passion here for Weber is meant in the sense of ‘matter-of-factness, of passionate devotion to a cause’, rather than in the sense of an ‘inner bearing... of “sterile excitation”’ (Ibid, see also Barbalet 2008, p. 61).

⁵² Fish (2004) offers an alternative reading of Parsons on emotion, particularly in the structure of social action (1968), but does not, in my view, save Parsons from the charge. This also points to Parson’s partial and incomplete incorporation of Whitehead into his work.

Already we can observe the complicity of two canonical theorists, Weber and Parsons, in the expulsion of emotion as a viable concept within sociology.⁵³ For most of this cognitivist period the concept was orphaned out, and emotions were ‘regulated to the fringes of scientific work, the property of quasi-scientific disciplines such as psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology (Kemper 1990, p. 3). It is not until the 1970s that we see a renewed interest in emotions emerging. Indeed, while Arlie Russell Hochschild is correct when she writes that ‘the field of sociology of emotion might be said to have existed for a long time without a name’, it is most likely that she herself named it, in her own 1975 essay, and thereby called it into being (Hochschild, 1975, also 2009, p. 29). Other key events in this watershed year include the publication of Collins’ Conflict sociology (1975) and the first session on emotions at the American Sociological Association’s annual conference (see Kemper, 1990). Since then an ever growing literature has developed from these humble origins and the sociology of emotion now stands as one of the most vibrant sub-disciplines within sociology, particularly in the US and Europe. A number of comprehensive reviews and a handbook, albeit with an American bias, have recently been published (Turner & Stets, 2005; Stets & Turner, 2006).⁵⁴ Perhaps the most theoretically sophisticated and influential efforts here are Hochschild’s own analysis of emotional management and ‘emotional labour’ in late capitalism (Hochschild 1983), Collins’ theory of ‘interaction ritual chains’, based on flows of ‘emotional energy’ (Collins, 2004), and Turner’s attempt at a full and formal sociological theory of emotions, from a social interactionist and Freudian perspective (Turner, 2007).

This emotional movement within sociology has reaffirmed the importance of the concept of emotion to an understanding of social life. It has been associated with the rise of feminism, and a reappraisal of the body and embodiment within social science (e.g. Featherstone et al., 1991, Burkitt, 1999). The effects of this movement have spilled over to related disciplines, such as politics and even political theory. Here, the motivating role of emotions has more recently been acknowledged by some, who agree that the concept has led ‘a shadow existence for the last three decades, with no place in the rational, structural and organisational models that dominate academic political analysis’ (Goodwin et al., 2001, p. 1). Again, the rational, self-interested model of mankind has dominated the discipline, with the emotions either

⁵³ Both, of course, key theorists of power (see below).

⁵⁴ In the US, sociology in general but particularly of the emotions is largely conducted within a social psychology framework. In Europe, work is concentrated in Germany in particular, and in the UK to a lesser extent. A recent publication from the ESA ‘emotions network’ is Hopkins et al. (2009). While they interpenetrate each other, they remain distinct approaches to emotions with different styles of engagement.

considered irrational or simply ignored outright.⁵⁵ This more nuanced, culturally informed position has emerged in reference to the study of social movements, in particular. Against the rationalist aspirations of resource mobilization theorists, proponents of the New Social Movement thesis advocate a ‘passionate politics’ (Goodwin et al., 2001) in which the emotions are once again ‘brought back in’ to become a key concern of political analysis

Social movements and the politics of protest have been one of the primary agents of social change in the modern world (Flam & King, 2005). From universal suffrage for women to the abolition of slavery; from gay rights to the environmental movements of the twentieth century, individuals across the globe (and in Ireland) have been involved in coordinated collective action to effect profound changes to the structures and practices of their societies and our world. Such movements should not be dismissed, as has been the case in the past, as the irrational ‘madness of crowds’, nor their motivations reduced to the cold calculation of cost and benefit. Rather, they should be seen as fundamentally *emotional* movements, effecting social changes because of anger at prevailing conditions, class resentment, or moral outrage at perceived wrongs incurred, particularly by marginalized outsider groups against institutionalized political establishments. It is also via emotional arousal that the collective identities of such groups are formed. These ‘communities of feelings’ (Berezin, 2002, p. 39) often engage in events which reflect Collins’ theory of interaction rituals chains, in which ‘emotional energy’ is created that serves to reinforce group solidarity and produce a particularized cultural capital for those within the group (Collins 2004). Thus, positive and negative emotions are implicated in the activities of social movements and, by extension, to the changes that such movements bring about.

David Ost goes further, suggesting that (big P) politics itself should be more accurately conceived in emotional terms, as the ‘mobilisation of anger’ (Ost, 2004). Rather than being seen as incidental to politics, or relevant only to social movements, emotions are ‘central to all politics, governments and mainstream parties included’ (Ost, 2004, p.240). The association of emotion primarily with social movements is further evidence of their continued ghettoization

⁵⁵ Ironically of course, the whole of rational choice theory is predicated on a conceptualization of action in which agents attempt to *maximise* the emotion of happiness, which, through some form of cognitive disavowal is transmuted into the de-emotionalized and much more scientific-sounding concept of utility.

and the perpetuation of the old dichotomies.⁵⁶ Mainstream political parties also need to mobilise emotions to get people to vote for them, as well as to show what they are against, framing themselves and their policies in a positive emotional light while framing the opposition using a discourse of anger and fear.⁵⁷ Indeed, in addition to anger, the deployment of fear-inducing discourse by political parties and elites is perhaps as important as that of anger in the formation of the friend-enemy distinction in contemporary politics. For Ost, then, the emotions are implicated in all aspects of the political process, both for elite parties and mass movements.

If we move from politics to political theory, the notion of an abstract, disembodied and universal reason still holds sway, to the denigration of emotion. The work of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas is perhaps paradigmatic in this regard. Here, emotion operates as, what Margaret Somers calls (with reference to narrative), an ‘epistemological other’ that, like other ‘others’, is to be controlled, ignored or banished (Somers, 1994a). Rationality remains fetishized to the detriment of the problematic ‘passions’. Yet, despite this, and as I will argue below in relation to theories of power, emotions often play an unacknowledged, ‘underlabouring’ role within most political theories and much of political science. While on the surface emotions are omitted in favour of an abstract ‘political reason’, ‘rationality’ or ‘reasonableness’, they are often ‘smuggled in’, disguised under more rationalistic-sounding signs, such as ‘interests’, ‘moral values’, ‘commitment’ or ‘utility’. Thus, while much of the political theory discourse remains *alexithymic* (without words for emotions) on the surface, this, again, seems more like a cognitive disavowal of emotion and the implicit role emotions play (and must play) with their theories.⁵⁸ The exclusion is illusory rather than actual. The point here is not to denigrate rationality, but rather to suggest that its separation from emotional processes is problematic and unnecessary.

⁵⁶ He writes that to view emotions: ‘only in relation to opposition movements is to stigmatize movements as less rational than formal politics. Once again, then, we have the same old dualism: official (“normal”) politics understandable in the language of interests and rationality, versus movement (“abnormal”) politics where emotions remain key. Once again, we are back at the view that emotions are necessary for “the masses!”’ (Ost, 2004, p.236).

⁵⁷ He writes, ‘the pursuit of power requires an almost constant mobilisation of emotion in order to solidify partisan identification among the electorate...and by proffering an enemy that they identify as the cause of the grievances held by the voters’ (Ost, 2004, pp.237-8).

⁵⁸ Alexithymia is deficiency in understanding, processing, or describing emotions common to around 85% of people on the autism spectrum. Stenner (2004), for example, uses the term to describe Luhmann’s systems theory.

Within account of nationalism and national identity the same dichotomies already mentioned have traditionally held sway and even when attempts have been made to transcend them the results have been problematic. These dichotomies reflect the ones mentioned earlier and add a few peculiar to the literature in question. So, for example, we find the following dualisms: Western vs. Eastern nationalism, liberal vs. illiberal, universal vs. particularistic, civic vs. ethnic, and so on (Spencer & Wollman, 2002; Calhoun, 2007). The conventional position and opposition of reason and emotion remain in place, with an implicit or explicit normative assumption of ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’. Tamir (1999), for instance, suggests the same, and writes that, ‘on the one pole is reason, which is equated with universalizing principles, and on the other passion, which is identified with unstructured emotions and paralleled with nationalism. The clear conclusion is that nationalism is a social force that lies beyond theoretical analysis’ (Tamir, 1999, p.70). In this literature, the history of such oppositions is usually tied to a historical opposition between Enlightenment thought and its counter-enlightenment, Romantic backlash, most usually associated with Herder (Gellner, 1997). Let us briefly take the widespread civic/ethnic dichotomy, often attributed to Kohn (Calhoun, 2007), as a typical example; one which often subsumes the rest of the dichotomies under its wings in any case.⁵⁹ Ethnic nationalism is usually depicted as being normatively ‘bad’, irrational, exclusionary (as it is based on ties of blood) and, above all, emotionally based (‘atavistic emotions’ etc). It is associated with the ‘return of the repressed’ (Ignatief, 1999), the ‘starkest political shame of the twentieth century’ (Dunn, 1999) and so on. Civic nationalism, by contrast, has traditionally been viewed as normatively ‘good’, and associated with a chosen, inclusionary, and above all, *rational* citizenship.

Of course, this bipolar conception of the debate has more recently been questioned and re-evaluated (Zimmer, 2003, Brubaker, 2004). This is to be welcomed as, even if taken on their own terms and one wished to maintain the dichotomy, each side of the pole is problematic. One could suggest that ‘rational’ attachment to civic virtues is often fundamentally ‘emotional’ in character, while to form an ethnic attachment based on kinship may be ‘rational’ in certain contexts etc. Yet, this is to merely retain the dichotomy in another form, and to operate with outmoded conceptualizations of both emotion and reason which are no longer germane. Indeed, more pertinently, there appears to be two discursive registers in which civic

⁵⁹ Kohn quotes Milton thusly: ‘If men within themselves would be governed by reason, and not generally give up their understanding to a double tyranny, of Custom from without, and blind affection within, they would discern better, what it is to favor and uphold the Tyrant of a Nation’ (Kohn, cited in Calhoun, 2007).

nationalism is discussed and a distinction needs to be made between them. On the one hand, there is the discourse of actual civic nationalists; discourses of practice. On the other are theoretical accounts of (or analytical or normative theories for) such discourses by social and political theorists. Both appear to eschew references to emotions and emotionality, yet both, in different ways, are laden with implicit emotional references. In particular, words such as 'solidarity' are used in both registers to 'slip emotions in' without fully acknowledging them, keeping the 'rationality' of the position to the fore. For civic nationalism to be a 'pure' and 'rational' ideology, untainted by 'mere sentiment' of other, less liberal programmes, both theorists and advocates are forced to deny the emotional basis of their position.

But even if we agree with Brubaker (2004) that there are 'analytical' and 'normative ambiguities' in the ethnic/civic distinction, the emotions, too, remain problematic and ambiguous within the nationalism literature more generally. For example, Anderson's conception of the 'imagined community', while it certainly captures certain features of the processes of national identification, operates almost exclusively on a cognitive level, with little regard to the emotional dimensions to such a process (Anderson, 1983). That is, of course, despite the fact that his aim in the book is to understand nationality and 'nation-ness', and that, as he writes, to do so properly 'we need to consider carefully how they have come into historical being, in what ways their meaning have changed over time and why, today, they command such a profound *emotional* legitimacy' (Anderson, 1991, p.4, emphasis added). Unfortunately, the later question remains either under-addressed in his analysis, or emotion acts as unspecified 'under-labourer', implicitly subsumed under notions of 'comradeship' or 'community'.

As these few examples illustrate, the treatment of the emotions within the nationalism literature has been problematic. Three general approaches appear to emerge. The first reduces nationalism to emotion. It is either negatively dismissed *tout court* as 'mere sentiment', or positively praised and lauded as 'collective sentiment'. A second approach reproduces the reason/emotion dichotomy, particularly under the guise of a civic/ethnic distinction, which down-plays or denigrates emotions while simultaneously deploying words with an implicit

emotional content. A third approach is expressively cognitive in orientation and either ignores emotion entirely, or offers a tokenistic treatment.⁶⁰

Thus, what this brief tour of the recent adventures of emotions in the social science shows is both positive and negative, from our perspective here. While there is no doubt that emotions are garnering more attention, in many quarters the old dichotomies and dualisms continue to be found. Furthermore, even some of those who have given most attention to the emotions and are actively involved in emotions movements, their treatment of emotions remains problematic. In what follows I wish to develop a specific approach to the emotions based on the process relational perspective outlined in the last chapter. But to do this we have to, in a sense, ‘go back’ to ‘go forward’. It is central to my position that the non-dualistic relationality is fundamental to the higher-order emotionality that we experience as human beings, and that is an *evolved* relationality. Indeed, I suggest that our deep emotionality and our deep sociality are inextricably linked, and evolved/emergent co-creations between ourselves and our environment, which of course should be considered as two sides of the same ‘nature’.

2.3. The Emotional Animal

The ‘emotional turn’ has thus made significant progress in establishing the centrality of emotions to social life. We have seen how many of the false dualisms already mentioned, some of which are being challenged, are arguably grounded on a more fundamental one, the division between mind and body (see, for example, Burkitt, 1999). In recent years, the social sciences have attempted to incorporate aspects of our bodily existence and the turn toward emotions may be seen as an off-shoot of this trend. However, within sociology in particular, while ‘the body’ as a social and cultural construction has a large and vibrant literature associated with it, the question of *biology* remains beyond the pale for most (Burkitt, 1999, Shilling, 1993). There are, of course, many reasons for this. The spectre of socio-biology and the ensuing ‘scientific racism’ that it engendered stands as a cautionary tale and the human sciences undoubtedly has a poor track record in reconciling the two domains. For sociology, biology became a ‘Pandora’s box’, unleashing untold misery on a host of individuals and groups via eugenics and Social Darwinism (see for example Ryan, 2007). The response was to

⁶⁰ I have defended a conception of national habitus against national identity, drawing on this material elsewhere. See Heaney (2013a).

turn this Pandora's Box into a 'black box' and, for most of the latter half of the twentieth century, biological and evolutionary thinking was mostly debarred from sociological thinking. However, some recent developments have given voice to calls, and hopes, for reconciliation. For some sociologists the 'black box' of biology is cautiously being re-opened. Yet, as Massey has written, sociologists in general remain 'woefully ignorant of even the most elementary precepts of biological science. If we think about biology at all it is usually in terms of discredited eugenic arguments and crude evolutionary theorizing long since discredited in the natural sciences' (Massey, 2002, p.1).

In this section we will briefly look at some aspects of the origins of our species unique emotionality. The argument is made that exclusively constructionist or materialist accounts of our emotionality are erroneous. Determinism, in all its forms, must be replaced by a relational and processual account of 'the whole creature' (Wheeler, 2006), the human being in the round, who exists and develops in symbiotic relationship to (or complex interdependence with) specific environments and contexts. The aim, again, is to transcend dualistic thinking in all its guises, while avoiding the reduction of human emotionality to either nature or culture alone. Such a perspective can, for example, be found in Raymond Williams's classic, *The Long Revolution*, in which he writes that we must think of human experience as 'both objective and subjective, in one inseparable process' (Williams, 1961, p.36, see also Wheeler, 2006) He goes on to cite the Marxist Christopher Cuadwell, who writes that:

Body and environment are in constant determining relations. Perception is not the decoding of tappings on the skin. It is a determining relation between neural and environmental electrons. Every part of the body not only affects the other parts but is also in determining relations with the rest of reality. It is determined by it and determines it, this interchange producing development-the constantly changing series of interlocking events...Of this multitude of relations...we distinguish a certain group, changing as the world changes, not with it or separately from it but in mutually determining interaction with it (Williams, 1961, p.36-7).

This chimes particularly well with the process-relational perspective outlined previously and will have implications for the section on 'structures of feeling' and 'emotional habitus' later. The position is that, when we turn to human emotions, explanations in terms of nature *or* nurture no longer apply. Social and biological approaches can and should be viewed as complementary within a multi-level and interdisciplinary analysis, not antagonistically.

Emotions, it has been said, are the key interface between the social and cognitive neurosciences, psychology, sociology and social theory (Von Scheve & Von Leude, 2005). One reason that they have achieved this position lies in the origins of our species emotionality. Furthermore, I wish to show how human's sociality and emotionality are inextricably linked, giving further weight to the argument for both a sociological and specifically *relational* understanding of emotions, which will be outlined later. To ignore biology is to construct to another false dualism, a false separation between 'human' and 'animal', 'social' and 'natural', 'society' and 'nature'.

A critic may suggest that, by invoking the body, the biological organism, we are returning to the very substantialism we wish to avoid. This is not correct. The body is an ongoing, dynamic process, embedded within a dynamic and relational environment-relational becoming. The organism is in a constant process of reproduction and transformation, of becoming, and, as we argued in the previous chapter, echoing the words of Plato, things that are always becoming never really are. Nick Crossley is entirely correct, then, when he writes that: 'Life, in the biological sense, is a contingent process in which random genetic mutations either flourish or perish in accordance with the environment they engage with. Nothing is necessary and everything is subject to change. The substantialist would find no refuge in "the organism"' (Crossley, 2011, p.20). Yet, more than this, from the Whiteheadian perspective, there is only *one* nature. To separate the social from the biological is to bifurcate reality unnecessarily. This is not to suggest that sociologists must become trained biologists to engage in social research, but rather to advocate a move toward synthesis, even 'consilience' in Wilson's sense of that term (1998).

2.4. Deep Sociality

Within the sociology of emotions a (small) number of theorists have addressed the biological origins of human emotionality (Turner, 2002, 2007; Turner & Stets, 2005; Hammond, 2006). For these evolutionary thinkers, to explain human emotions sociologically entails that we begin with our species' evolution, for this is where our, human-level, emotionality comes from. Within this literature, as in many others, there are 'strong' and 'weak' varieties. An example of the former is the theory of William Wentworth (and colleagues), while Jonathan

H. Turner is considered a proponent of the ‘strong’ program (Hammond, 2006). To speak of evolution in this context, however, is not to imply a return to simplistic evolutionary thinking in the analysis of social or cultural systems, nor to endorse a unidirectional (and ethnocentric) notion of ‘progress’ for sociology. It is, rather, an attempt to acknowledge and give an account of the emergence of human’s unique emotionality from the perspective of ‘deep history’. As with all such accounts, there is always an element of the aetiological myth, of the ‘just so’ stories along the lines of the leopard attaining his spots.⁶¹ But despite this, that the emotional palate of *Homo sapiens* is richer and more complex than our nearest primate relative is undeniable. As Hammond acknowledges, criticism of this sort is unavoidable ‘because we are at the end and the beginning is so distant that it cannot be studied directly (Hammond, 2006, p.369). But more than this, what such stories underscore is the need for relational thinking; that an ontological interdependence has shaped both our bodies and our societies, and that emotions are at the very heart of that story.

For Wentworth and his co-authors, the ‘weak’ perspective involves a rapprochement between the biological and social constructionist approaches (Wentworth & Yardly, 1994, Turner & Stets, 2005, Hammond, 2006). Emotions do have a biological basis and there is an, albeit small, ‘innate’ palate of primal emotions consisting of anger, disgust, fear, hatred and sadness. These are associated with the tendencies for, what he calls, the ‘flight, fight, fuck, feed, and startle’ reactions (cited in Turner & Stets, 2007, p. 263). Yet biology is ultimately secondary to the impact that the social construction of emotions has for humans (Hammond, 2006, p.371). Drawing on neurology, Wentworth suggests that the emotions were the primary form of communication for our ancestors and preceded the acquisition of language. Emotions were ‘the primal language of sociality, of mutual sensitivity’ and were ‘fitness enhancing’ in that they, firstly, allow for rapid alerting and orientation within the group and, secondly, are contagious and thus form the basis of reciprocity (Turner & Stets, 2007, p. 263). As such, they are the foundation for the evolution of human intelligence, culture and complex social organisation. For a species so dependent on learning, the rapid (and schematic) retrieval of emotionally tagged information was crucial to survival. Thus emotionality is the reason for the ‘deep sociality’ in humans, the source of the social bond and the ‘language of the body and the body social’ (Turner & Stets, 2007, p.265). Thus, the elaboration of complex human

⁶¹ Burkitt, following Smith, speaks of ‘fictions of emergence’ in a similar context (Burkitt, 1999, p.30).

emotionality, while it has a biological basis, is much more associated with social and cultural forces for these writers.

Jonathan H. Turner draws on the work of Wentworth and his colleagues to develop a more sophisticated theory based on the emergence of emotions as an adaptive strategy to environmental pressure. Turner is a self-described and unabashed armchair theorist who advocates a division of labour between theory construction and empirical research, and his work is decidedly 'grand theoretical' in focus (Turner, 2002, 2007). The core of Turner's project is to construct a formal theoretical model of human society, operating at different levels of social reality, which draws on already existing theories from a wide variety of disciplines and theoretical standpoints, in which human the emotions are central. Foremost amongst these are the symbolic interactionist and psychoanalytic traditions. The most recent and perhaps the most complete iteration of his conceptual scheme consists of three large volumes, detailing a general theory of social organization at the macro, meso and micro levels of reality; his *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*. Here, we will focus on his theory of human emotions specifically, as outlined in Turner, 2007. In this account of human emotions, and based on this conceptual scheme, Turner derives seventeen highly abstract propositions, which form the basis of his theory.

Emotions, for Turner, form the basis of social bonds, create and sustain commitments to social structures and cultures, and may also contribute to the destruction of all three dimensions of human existence. As he writes, 'Just about every dimension of society is thus held together or ripped apart by emotional arousal' (Turner, 2007, p. 1). As such, Turner's theory of human emotions seeks to explain a two-way, dialectic process – how do social structure and culture affect emotional arousal, and vice versa. Thus, Turner's central question is: 'what sociological conditions arouse what emotions to what effects on human behaviour, interaction and social organisation?' (Turner, 2007, p. 1).

Turner begins by discussing human emotions in general which are said to have biological, cognitive and cultural aspects. From a brief review of the literature, Turner posits four primary emotions (satisfaction-happiness, aversion-fear, assertion-anger and disappointment-sadness) which are thought to be hard-wired in human anatomy and, following Robert

Plutchik's model, hypothesises the 'mixing' of these emotions to produce 'first order' and 'second order' elaborations, which give rise to the vast 'emotional palette' of humanity. Hence, for example, the first order elaborations of 'pride', 'wonder' and 'reverence' are produced via the 'mixing' of a greater amount of satisfaction-happiness with a lesser amount of aversion-fear. However, more important for his theory are the second-order elaborations that result from the 'mixing' of all three negative primary emotions to produce shame, guilt and alienation.

For Turner, the key reason that humans are 'the most emotional animals on earth' lies in our evolution via natural selection. His basic point, which incorporates the 'cladistic analysis' of biologist Alexandra Maryanski and the neurological work of Joseph LeDoux (inter alia), suggests, briefly, that modern apes and the common ancestor of apes and humans actually evidenced *weak* social ties, fluid group structures and high levels of individualism. While this was fitness-enhancing in an arboreal habitat, around 16 million years ago the African forests began to recede, forcing many species of primates onto the savannah, where such traits became a liability. Thus, the need to adapt to a new habitat meant that natural selection 'rewired' the primate brain to enhance emotionality as a means to increase ties and forge higher levels of solidarity and cooperation among apes to aid survival. Indeed, Turner writes, emotions were 'the *only strategy* for survival of a low- sociality ape on the African savannah' (Turner, 2007, p. 28; original emphasis). Thus, contra Wentworth et al, the 'deep sociality' of modern humans is itself an evolutionary adaptation to environmental pressures and occurred much later than others might suggest. That is, our 'deep sociality' is itself an emergent property born of environmental pressures. In fact, according to Turner, it is possible that the human ancestor was actually pushed to the margins of the arboreal habitat by highly social, and thus larger, monkey groups. He writes that 'it may seem less than noble, if not embarrassing, to realize that humans are descendants of a species that lost out in competition with monkeys, but such appears to have been the case' (Turner, 2007, p.23). Turner goes on to argue that the evidence for this position can be found in the neurology of the sub-cortex and neo-cortex of the brain and that the first language (for visually dominant primates) was 'the language of emotions', onto which the facility of speech later 'piggy-backed' (Turner, 2007, p.36). Thus, the development of emotionality was connected with communicative and

cooperative adaptations to changes in the environment.⁶² As such, they cannot be treated in biological reductionist terms alone, and have always been sociological.

2.5. Relational Views on Emotions

These accounts of the origins and evolution of human emotionality suggest a number of implications. Despite assumptions to the contrary, biological and sociological account of emotions need not be incompatible. In fact, far from the fears of reductionism and the eclipsing of sociology by biology, we find good arguments for the need for sociological analysis and the sociological imagination; that sociology (or at least sociality) is actually inscribed onto the body at the most basic level in our history. In short, that *we are social, all the way down, and most of the way back*. Further, we find good explanations for the emergence our shared sociality that underscores the need for a relational approach to both humans and human emotions. We, finally, see the fundamentality of such emotions to the constitution and development of our species.

In this section we will look at specifically relational approaches to emotions within the sociological literature. In doing so, we will be somewhat selective, and focus on those approaches that most fully accord with our own approach and that are explicitly relational and processual in orientation. These include the work of Elias and Burkitt in particular. In doing so, there are a number of approaches that might be considered ‘relational’ that we will not discuss. These include what have been labelled ‘exchange’ theories of emotions, such as the work of Blau, Hommans and Edward Lawler, and much of the ‘structuralist’ theories (see Turner & Stets, 2005, Stets & Turner, 2007). The reasons for this are methodological. Most of these theories operate on the basis of assumptions that are anathema to the theoretical perspective defended here. For example, Edward Lawler’s ‘affect theory of social exchange’ contains a theory of emotions which is based on the instrumentalist assumption of self-interested actors, who seek to maximize rewards from exchange. He writes, for example, that ‘the goal of the actors is to generate more valued goods, profit, and utility than they currently have, which makes it possible for them to consummate exchanges that provide each with more benefit than otherwise, but that are suboptimal’ (Lawler, 2001, p.324). Thus, while the

⁶² For a longer critical review of Turner’s book, that include the theory of emotions that builds upon these foundations see Heaney (2010).

theory is 'relational' and discusses networks and transactions, its conception of the actor is much closer to the 'calculating robot' of economic theories than to the sociological conception presented here. What follows, then, is not an exhaustive account of relational theories of emotions per se, but one conducted from within the 'process-relational' perspective.

The argument is that the gap between constructionist and biological accounts of emotions and emotionality can be collapsed from this perspective. Norbert Elias's essay on emotions (1987), perhaps the longest exclusive attention to the topic within his oeuvre, is a key case in point. For Elias, the emotions and their 'expression' are an indication that 'human beings are by nature constituted for life in the company of others, for life in society (Elias, 1987, p. 361). When a process sociologist, Elias suggests, turns to look at the emotions, they should explore both the uniquely human aspects and those emotional characteristics they share with other animals. The paper begins by outlining two dominant trends in the human sciences that do not take this approach. One side, in attempting to attain the status of the 'natural' sciences, only focus on the latter, the shared characteristics with other species, while the other, which includes history and sociology, treat their subject matter as something 'set apart' from nature and are 'thus in effect dualistic and isolationist' (Elias, 1987, p.340). This 'split world' view is, he says, the 'symbolic manifestation of an ontological belief' that usually goes unmentioned and is taken for granted (Elias, 1987, p.340). This situation occurs because of an inability to understand the nature of processes. Such individuals are: 'still trapped by a powerful conceptual heritage which forces people to represent in static terms sets of events that that can be reorganized and understood only if they are perceived as parts or aspects of processes, as events in a condition of structured flux' (Elias, 1987, p.341).

Elias's process model, intended to correct this problem, is presented as a series of hypotheses. The first suggests that, while many species combine learned and unlearned behaviour, human beings represent an evolutionary breakthrough in this regard, as the balance of power between these two forms of conduct has tipped in favour of learned forms in the human case. This is combined with his second hypothesis; that not only *can* humans learn more than other species, they *must* do so. They have become 'totally dependent on learned forms of knowledge for their dominant form of communication and for their orientation in the world' (Elias, 1987, p.345). We are, in fact, biologically constituted thusly. The 'hinge' between the two realms,

for there are still two realms for Elias, human nature and human society, is the intertwining of two processes, the biological process of maturation and the social process of learning (Elias, 1987, p.347). There is a functional dependence between the two processes and the steering of conduct in adults is always the result of an ‘intimate interweaving of learned and unlearned processes’ Elias, 1987, (p.349). I return to Elias below.

Drawing on Elias, and on Gergen, Burkitt (1997, 1999) offers a treatment of the emotions perhaps most in line with the one I wish to peruse. Here emotions are presented as complexes that cannot be separated from their relational context, nor from their biological substrate. He argues that relationships are central to the understanding of emotions, as well as embodied practices and discourses (Burkitt, 1999, p.112). He writes that they are complexes constituted in relations:

emotions are multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to biology, relations or discourses alone, but belong to all these dimensions as they are constituted in ongoing relational practices. As such, the focus of the study of emotions cannot be on objects understood as ‘things’, and instead we must reconceptualise emotions as complexes composed of different dimensions of embodied, interdependent human existence (Burkitt, 1999, p.115).

This conception is very much in line with the relational view of emotions and emotional life that I wish to defend in this study. I would, however, argue that what is needed to link all of these aspects of emotion is an explicit reinscription of this account within an ontological framework of relational becoming that I have outlined earlier. By approaching the complex of emotions from the process-relational perspective that draws on the insights of Whitehead, all of these dimensions may be integrated – relations, embodiment and discourse – within an overarching theoretical framework. Indeed, as I will argue later, and more thoroughly in the next chapter, the key to this unification is the emotional habitus, a concept that Burkitt himself uses. Central too to both Burkitt’s and the approach developed here is the constitutive role of power to both emotional life and habitus. Indeed, I will argue that power and emotions are key to the constitution of our ‘social selves’, but that these concepts are still in need of deeper integration.

2.6. Emotions & Power: Conceptual Twins

In this section I wish to explore the neglected relationship between two of the key concepts within the social sciences, emotions and power. While the existence of an ‘emotional turn’ within the social sciences, as we have seen, is now widely acknowledged, some areas have garnered less specific attention than others. Perhaps the most significant absence within this literature is an explicit exploration of the relationship between emotions and relations of power and domination. This section will attempt such an endeavour. In doing so, I will draw on some key work from within the sociology of emotions, such as Barbalet, Collins, Kemper and Turner, and from the power literature within social theory more generally, including Dahl, Elias, Foucault, Giddens, Gramsci and Lukes. The main thrust of the argument is that power and emotion are conceptual twins in need of a serious theoretical reunion, and that emotions have played a largely unacknowledged, ‘under-labouring’ role within most theories of power. The need for a more unified approach to these two concepts is highlighted. What will emerge from the following, and where the argument is going, will be to suggest that a *constitutive* conception of power relations should be primary, from the relational perspective, and that the effect of the reunification of emotions and power entails the deployment of a specific conception of social habitus. I will develop the notion of habitus later, but it is this concept that will be key to the study as a whole. Power and emotion are fundamental to the constitution of social reality and social subjectivity. Both concepts need to be considered together.

For now, we turn to power. In their introduction to the recent Sage handbook of power, Clegg and Haugaard make the case that power, or the cluster of concepts to which it refers, should be seen as ‘the central concept of the social sciences’ (2009, p. 1). Here I wish to make a similar case for a different conceptual category that could well be even more fundamental to social and political life: the emotions. Unfortunately, my task is perhaps even more onerous than theirs. While they had the advantage of only dealing with one concept, I must address both. My difficulties are further compounded by my theoretical position: I see emotion and power as conceptual twins, both of which are essential to any understanding of social and political life. Yet, if they are twins, they have been separated at birth and raised by different families. With very few exceptions, generations of theorists of power have ignored

emotionality, silently shunning it as an ‘epistemological other’.⁶³ Likewise, theorists of emotion have for the most part failed to address questions of power adequately, if at all. Both streams have suffered because of their failure to include the other. But if all social relations are seen to imply relations of power then, I contend, they should also be seen to imply relations of emotion: relations of power are emotionally valanced. To echo Elias’ famous phrase, if power is to be seen as a ‘structural characteristic of...all human relationships’, then so too should the emotions (1978, p.74). To theorize one without the other may no longer suffice. Here I briefly explore the power literature for traces of emotionality, and offer some reasons for its scarcity. What I am building toward is a process-relational conceptualisation of emotions that will necessarily include relations of power.

So, given this centrality of emotions to the human condition, their relationship to relations and structures of power and to the maintenance or destruction of social order, it is puzzling that the concept has not received more attention within the power literature itself, which is devoted to the study of these very topics. The reasons for this are complex, but, as in the emotions literature itself, the fetishization of rationality, which opens a dichotomous gulf between reason and emotion, must be seen as a primary one. Indeed, I would argue that this rationalistic bias is particularly pronounced within theories of power, which, in addition to other aspects of dualistic thinking that have dominated the social sciences, has perhaps ensured its marginalization more than anything. Coupled with this are the related historical factors mentioned already, such as the influence of Weber and Parsons on the power literature, and the co-incidence of the rise of cognitivism with the heyday of the power debates. To this I would add the focus on rational action and the influence of rational choice theory, either directly or indirectly, on the systematic study of power.⁶⁴ For many (mostly male) theorists of the early- to mid-twentieth century (at least) the incorporation of, or serious engagement with questions of emotion was simply not an option. The dominant ‘knowledge culture’, in the shadow of the Cartesian discipline, would not permit it; emotion operated as an ‘epistemological other’ and like other ‘others’, was to be controlled, ignored or banished. Social science, qua science, was impossible if it dealt with passions. Power, by contrast, was a respectable area of intellectual endeavour; rational, serious and prestigious.

⁶³ The phrase borrowed from Margaret Somers (Somers, 1994).

⁶⁴ Ironically of course, the whole of rational choice theory is predicated on a conceptualization of action in which agents attempt to maximize the emotion of happiness, which, through some form of cognitive disavowal is transmuted into the de-emotionalized and much more scientific-sounding concept of utility.

This is not to suggest that emotions were completely debarred from the power discourse. To the contrary, here too there is evidence of an implicit, 'hidden history', with emotions playing a vital, if backstage, role within many conceptual schemes. Hobbes, for instance, offers us a short but comprehensive overview of the passions in *Leviathan* ([1651] 1996, pp. 33-42, pp. 48-54), while fear of death in the state of nature is the root cause behind the formation of the commonwealth. For Machiavelli's Prince it is famously 'better to be feared than loved, if you cannot be both', and one should try to avoid being hated at all costs (Machiavelli [1532] 2003, pp.55-56). References to emotion literally litter Bertrand Russell's now largely ignored work on power. The 'traditional power' of kings and priests is based on 'sentiments' of respect; the source of 'naked power' is fear and insecurity; the power of propaganda gives rise to 'national feelings' etc. (Russell [1938] 1996). In Gramsci, too, feeling plays a fundamental role in the construction of an 'organic ideology' prior to the formation of a 'historic bloc' (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 375-377). Indeed, to know something politically and socially is to know it with feeling and passion: 'The knowledge of intellectuals becomes life and politics only when linked to the feeling/passion of the people (Fontana 2006, p. 41). More recently, the role of trust in the binding of time-space within Giddens' theory of structuration is a bodily felt emotion, which 'operates against the background of diffuse anxiety, control of which suggests itself as the most generalized motivational origin of human conduct' (Giddens 1984, p. 54). As such, the act of structuration itself, in which social structures are reproduced, is in actual fact an unintended outcome of the agent's profoundly emotional need for 'ontological security' (see Haugaard 1997, 2003).⁶⁵ The extent to which emotion might be considered under the rubric of 'authoritative resources' is not explored in Giddens' theory of power (Giddens, 1984, pp. 258-262).

The point here is that the concept of emotion has often played a decisive, if unacknowledged 'under-labouring' role within many theories of power, but its importance is not widely appreciated. For other theories of power however the concept seems to be entirely absent. Within Habermas' oeuvre, emotion appears to garner practically no attention. This is problematic, given his focus on communication, which itself can be viewed as 'a process of mutual affecting in which interlocutors make emotional as well as cognitive appeals' to each other (Crossley, 1998, p. 18). The same lack of an emotional dimension is apparent in the key

⁶⁵ See also Callahan, 2004, in which he attempts to reintroduce the notion of emotion in to structuration theory.

power (over) debates of the mid-twentieth century.⁶⁶ C. Wright Mill's passionate and polemical *The Power Elite* (1956) does not discuss them, despite the role that feelings play in his other work. Certainly, the formalism of Dahl's conceptualization of power ([1957] 1994), evident even in his definition, does not lend itself to the inclusion of an emotional dimension. Yet, I would argue, if the dyadic power relation 'A has power over B to the extent that she can get B to do something that she would not otherwise do' is to be considered a power relation at all (and Morriss 2002 has some issues with this), then surely it must have an emotional element at the very least. How are A's ends to be effected? How is B affected? The inattention to the emotional valences of power is prevalent throughout the, so-called, 'three dimensional power' debate (Lukes, 2005), despite the fact that it is a conflictual model of power concerned with 'grievances' (Haugaard 1997, 2003). The reduction of the parameters, by Dahl and the pluralists, to overt decisions not only precludes the admitting of 'non-decisions' but also occludes the emotional process through which actual decisions are often made on contentious issues.

The work of Steven Lukes is central to contemporary debates on power, yet it is also paradigmatic of the problems under discussion here. Lukes' third dimension offers more scope for an emotional element, when he writes, 'is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?' (Lukes, [1974]2005, p. 27). However, this latent possibility is never realized and the question remains: what about the emotions? Compliance is secured via the controlling of these more than anything else. Despite the role of socialization in the reproduction of structures of domination that Lukes suggests, an explicit inclusion of emotions in maintenance of such structures remains beyond the pale. Indeed, this exclusion is continued, and perhaps somewhat compounded, in the more recent second edition of *Power: a radical view* (Lukes [1974] 2005). Here, his more recent restatement of the central issue of his book (i.e. 'how is willing compliance to domination secured?') invokes Spinoza in connection with reason rather than emotion in defence of his views. Power, he writes, may impede a subject's ability to use reason correctly and can 'induce or encourage failures of rationality' (Lukes [1974] 2005, p. 115). The dominant reason/emotion dichotomy appears to be implicitly reproduced; freedom is derived from the ability to make judgements, which is to be rational. The role of emotion in such evaluative judgments which, for example,

⁶⁶ With the possible exception of Floyd Hunter's discussion of 'elite fear' in *Community power structure: a study of decision makers* (1953) (cited in Barbalet 1998, p. 163).

Martha Nussbaum (2001) discusses at length (and whose work is discussed by Lukes in this very chapter), and the intimate relationship between reason and emotion remains unexplored.

The two theorists of power that offer some hope for the sociologist of emotion are Foucault and Elias. There are many similarities between their works: both have a relational conception of power; have delved into historical records and use the past to explain the present; both focus on the body, and on how it is 'controlled' or 'disciplined' in modernity; and both use functional argument in defence of their positions, and so on. Both, in short, offer explanations for the emergence of the modern social subject. In Foucault's genealogy, this is characterized by the shift from sovereign power to disciplinary power; in Elias' historical sociology, by the shift from *Fremdzwänge* to *Selbstzwänge*, or social constraint to self-restraint. As such, both share a 'positive' (i.e. constitutive) and relational conception of power. Yet, for all that, there remain significant differences in their respective projects and a number of commentators have compared their approaches, particularly in relation to power (see van Krieken, 1990; Burkitt, 1993; Smith, 1999, and Spierenburg, 2004). Ian Burkitt, for example, praises Elias' sociological conception over that of Foucault's philosophical one, suggesting that the latter retains a 'metaphysics of conflict' derived from its reliance on Nietzsche's notion of the *agon* (Burkitt 1993, 1999).

One clear difference is that Foucault does not address emotions directly at all. Yet, they are implicit in much of what he writes, particularly in relation to discipline, bio-power and the normalizing society (Foucault, 1977, 1978); as they are exercised on the body they are exercised on the emotions (Burkitt, 1993). As such, Foucault's conception of power as networks of force and strategy which constitute the subject could be conceptualized as producing emotional structures within the individual. Alternatively, a Foucauldian perspective could be deployed in critiquing the new discourse of emotions in late modernity, via the 'rise of the therapeutic society', for example, in which the sociology of emotions itself could be seen as facilitative to even newer strategies of power and control. However, despite this potential for a Foucauldian conception of power being deployed in relation to emotions, Foucault remains a marginal figure in the literature.⁶⁷ Indeed, this is perhaps to be expected.

⁶⁷ Becker et al., (2009) uses Foucault to critique the dominant modernization discourse surrounding emotions, for example. Burkitt (2002, p.165) also briefly discusses Foucault's conception of power in a manner in line with the argument here.

Part of Foucault's project was to problematize the individual and her 'inner self'. It is likely that he would view a focus on emotions as yet another manifestation of the contemporary 'Californian cult of the self', which was historically contingent and highly problematic from his perspective.⁶⁸

Elias, on the other hand, looms rather large in emotions circles but for some, particularly those who study power, his inclusion here as a theorist of power may appear, at first blush, to be questionable. Most of the mainstream power theorists do not mention him at all and, though there are some exceptions (e.g. Dean, 1999; Haugaard, 1997), his work remains relatively marginal within the power literature. Yet, I would argue, this is a mistake. Even a cursory glance at Elias' oeuvre reveals the central role that power plays in his work; indeed, a more central role than the emotions do (Elias, 1978, 1987, 1991, 2008). His exclusion from the mainstream power debates is arguably symptomatic of the very problem under discussion here. Elias has often been seen, where he is seen at all, as a theorist of emotion and manners by those interested in power and, therefore, of little relevance to their concerns. Furthermore, his work has also not yet successfully penetrated the collective consciousness of the established American academy to the extent that it has in Europe, the reasons for which are themselves interesting.⁶⁹

What then is Elias's conception of power? As a paradigmatic relational-process sociologist (Emirbayer, 1997) he had a relational conception of power. I read Elias primarily as a complexity theorist *avant la lettre*, whose main concern was the study of 'figurations' or networks of interdependent human beings, at the core of which he saw 'a fluctuating, tensile equilibrium, a balance of power moving to and fro' (Elias, 1978, p.131). For Elias, power is truly ubiquitous, and is a structural characteristic of all human relationships. Thus, the baby has power over its parents, 'the master has power over his slave but the slave also has power over his master... But whether the power differentials are large or small, balances of power

⁶⁸ He writes: 'In the Californian cult of the self, one is supposed to discover one's true self, to separate it from that which might obscure or alienate it, to decipher its truth thanks to psychological or psychoanalytic science, which is supposed to be able to tell you what your true self is' (Foucault 1984, p. 361). I am grateful to Dr. Kate Kenny for this quotation. What Foucault did not, and perhaps could not, consider was that a more relational conception of emotion was possible.

⁶⁹ Elias' work defies simple characterization but the 'developmental' nature of his sociology, coupled with his focus on very long term historical processes are among the reasons for his neglect. On the 'patchy' reception of Elias' work in the US see Mennell (1998, pp. 278–284).

are always present whenever there is functional interdependence between people' (Elias, 1978, p. 74). He goes on to outline a series of 'game models' which display the key, relational features of his theoretical conception of power (Elias, 1978, pp. 76–103), and in which the fundamentally processual and dynamic character of those relationships is to the fore. Elias, then, was a theorist of power and should be seen as one. His omission from the power literature is unjustified and should be corrected. As Mennell has written recently, 'power relationships are at least as central to his entire thought as is his famous notion of civilising processes' (Mennell, 2008, p. 132). His further incorporation into the power literature would, along with the emotions, enrich the field.

Yet, unlike most other theorists of power, the relationship between relations of power and emotions are centre stage in his work. In his magnum opus of 1939, Elias charts how the increased complexity of European society gave rise to a 'civilizing process' in which a structural transformation of human relations, connected with the formation of nation-states, gives rise to a more restrained psychological make up for individuals. The twin processes at work here are, what he calls, sociogenesis and psychogenesis (Elias, [1939] 2000). The key structural changes that shaped this process of conscience-formation are those which marked the transition from feudalism to the emergence of the state, via the court society of the absolutist kings. As a centripetal impetus began to take hold in Europe, increases in the social differentiation of society (including an increased division of labour and functions, increased competition between different social positions and groups) gave rise to a process of state formation, in which three key mechanisms resulted in increased interdependence within and the (internal) pacification of the societies concerned.⁷⁰ The result of this blind power-process is a shift from social constraint to self-restraint.

This new pattern of self-control is connected with increased foresight for Elias. Different aspects of the process result in increased identification between people and the transformations of the individual's 'affect-economy': she is forced to become more attuned to the actions of others, so that her perception of others changes; it becomes more nuanced and complex as she becomes less emotionally spontaneous in her interaction with them. Reactions to others become more dispassionate, measured, and considered, as more observation, of both

⁷⁰ The mechanisms in question are the monopoly mechanism, the royal mechanism and the functional democratization.

self and others, is required (see Elias, [1939] 2000, pp. 399–402). Further, the advancement of the thresholds in shame and embarrassment become more noticeable in the social habitus from the sixteenth century onwards. This is reflected in the ‘history of manners’ in which shame advances in line with the shift from external to internal restraint (Elias, [1939] 2000, p. 415).

Relations of power, then, actually *constitute* the emotional habitus of modern European states in this analysis. With Elias we see, for the first time, the incorporation of both concepts, emotion and power, within an explanatory theoretical framework. And, I would argue, against many of Elias’ commentators, this is primarily done within a theory of *complexity*, rather than a theory of distinction. While distinction does play a significant part in Elias’ treatment, the status competition and manners-displays operating at the court society, and the capital created therein that becomes emulated by the emergent bourgeoisie, is only one instantiation, one local figuration, within a wider, more fundamental process. Of course, there are many problems with Elias’ theory, and it has been dismissed and attacked by a host of critics, both justly and unjustly.⁷¹ Its inclusion here, however, is less to do with its various merits or demerits, but rather to cite it as a perhaps the premier example of a theory that addresses both power and emotion in a serious manner within sociology.

We have seen that, while the concept of emotion has been given short shrift within the power literature in general, it has often played an implicit, backstage role. The concept of power has fared a little better with theorists focused on emotions. Hochschild (1983), for example, draws on Goffman and Marx in her dramaturgical theory of emotions in *The managed heart* (1983). Here, cultural scripts or ‘emotional ideologies’ give rise to two types of emotion norm: ‘feeling rules’, which specify what feelings individuals should experience in a given situation, and ‘display rules’, which specify the appropriate overt expression of emotion in a given situation (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 37). Very often people are forced to engage in ‘surface’ or ‘deep acting’ to conform to these ideologies, which Hochschild labels ‘emotion work’, or ‘emotional labour’ when it occurs for a wage. This often results in alienation, or

⁷¹ Rosenwein (2006, 2010), for example, reviews and offers her own criticisms of Elias’ ‘grand narrative’ from a historical perspective, suggesting (*inter alia*) that he read the manners books and other documents naively, without an eye to irony, nuance or to how they may have been received, as well as exhibiting a flawed (and now outmoded) ‘hydraulic theory’ of emotionality, based on Freudian psychology.

‘estrangement’, at the cost of their ‘authentic’ selves (Hochschild, 1983, p. 188).⁷² This commercialization of emotions in late capitalism is particularly biased toward women, especially those in the service industry, such as flight attendants, who must ‘put on a face’ and enhance the status of the customer, at the risk of losing their jobs. The emotional inauthenticity that results is thus framed in terms of power and domination. Many other sociologists of emotions working from a feminist perspective, or concerned with gender, deploy concepts of power and status in their work (see Shields et al. 2006).

Jack Barbalet, an erstwhile contributor to the power literature and well known for his criticism of Giddens’ conception of power, addresses the relationship between power and emotions from a number of perspectives in his later work (Barbalet, 1985, 1998). Defending a macro-level analysis of emotions, Barbalet discusses the power/emotion nexus in relation to class inequality and resentment, the role of confidence to theories of action, shame and conformity, and the relationship between fear and change (Barbalet, 1998). As such, he has gone some way in reuniting the concepts of power and emotion, and our understanding of how their interpenetration defines the dynamics of social life. One salient example is his discussion of rights in relation to resentment and vengefulness (Barbalet, 1998, pp. 126–148). Here he makes a distinction. Vengefulness, he writes, ‘is an emotion of power relations. It functions to correct imbalanced or disjointed power relationships’ and is concerned with the restoration of abrogated rights (Barbalet, 1998, p. 136). Resentment, on the other hand, which may also be concerned with rights, is different in that it is ‘implicated in non-coercive relations rather than only in power relations... The object of resentment, in fact, is not power but normative elements of social order’ (Barbalet, 1998, pp. 136–137). However, he has been criticized for not developing a systematic theory of emotions or macrostructures (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 252), nor, I would add, of power. Despite Barbalet’s pioneering and admirable work, the need for a unified theory of emotions and power remains.

Theodore Kemper has perhaps done more than anyone to realize such an endeavour. His power and status theory of emotion was first outlined in 1978, but has been subject to a number of developments and revisions since (Kemper, 1990b; Kemper and Collins, 1990; Kemper, 2006). Kemper begins with Empedocles, and his depiction of ‘love’ and ‘strife’ as

⁷² Wouters (1989) offers a valuable criticism of this approach, from an Eliasian perspective.

the source of dynamism and change in the world. From here, and drawing upon the factor analysis of the early twentieth century (e.g. Spearman, Thurstone and particularly Carter, cited in Kemper 2006, pp. 88–89), he derives ‘power’ and ‘status-accord’ as the fundamental, constituting dimensions of social relations (Kemper, 2006, p. 88). His conception of power is basically Weber’s and is defined as such, with those who have power in a relationship described as able to ‘coerce others to do what one wants them to do even when they don’t want to do it’ (Kemper, 2006, p. 89). Power is thus defined as power-over, though not explicitly. Important also here is the question of intensity of power relations, ranging from an extreme high end, which includes the infliction of physical pain, through to emotional violence (screaming, shouting, verbal abuse), down to less apparent verbal tactics of power (interrupting, talking over), including the ‘silent treatment’ (Kemper, 2006, p. 90). All of these tactics of power may be initiated or threatened, but once compliance is achieved the power relation is stabilized, with power acts becoming relatively rare. Kemper also discusses ‘indirect’ forms of power to bring about compliance, such as lies, gossip and rumour (Kemper, 2006, p. 90). In addition to the social relations of power described above, compliance or deference may be voluntarily granted in social relationships, as ‘status-conferral’ or status: ‘Actors willingly and gladly defer to, accept, approve, support, respect, admire, and, ultimately, love others without compulsion or coercion... an actor with high status is one who receives many benefits and rewards from the other actor in the relationship’ (Kemper, 2006, p. 91, 1990, p. 211).

Because of the influence of factor analysis within Kemper’s theory, the two dimensions of power and status can be represented as orthogonal axes in a two-dimensional Cartesian plane, with power as the ordinate and status as the abscissa. Within such a space, any social relationship can be discursively depicted based on Kemper’s model. For example, in a master-slave relationship, neither party affords the other much by way of voluntary status conferral but one of the actors has great power over the other, while the other has virtually none. In the parent-child dyad, the former has very high power, but is accorded little status by the (powerless) infant, but the adult confers very high status on the child. From here, Kemper derives a theory of emotions. It is derived from a proposition that ‘a large class of emotions results from real, imagined, or anticipated outcomes in social relationships’ (Kemper, 2006, p. 96). Social relationships are power-status relationships that have power-status outcomes. The actual detail of the theory cannot detain us here but, in general, when individuals have or gain in power or status, they experience positive emotions such as satisfaction, happiness,

confidence and security. When they lose or have little, they experience negative emotions, such as fear, anxiety or loss of confidence. Kemper also posits three different categories of emotion: 'structural emotions' are affective states aroused by the individual's relative position within the social structure, and derived from her own power, her own status; the other's own power and the other's own status. 'Anticipatory emotions' are aroused by the individual's expectation for power or status, and are derived from optimism-pessimism, and confidence-lack of confidence (Kemper, 2006, p. 101). Finally, 'consequent emotions' are emotions that result from the immediate outcomes of interaction. Such emotions 'constitute the surface flux of emotional life', e.g. A threatens B; B feels fear (Kemper, 2006, p. 97).

In this way Kemper attempts to conjoin the concepts of power and emotion within a structural, social-interactionist theory. It has been very influential, and significant aspects of it have been incorporated into Turner's more recent and even more elaborate theory of human emotions (Turner, 2007). Kemper himself views it as a 'standard sociological social-psychological' approach to the question, namely, social independent variables (social interaction outcomes) are used to predict dependent variables (emotions)' (Kemper, 1990b, p. 231). Yet, despite its comprehensiveness, it remains inadequate to the unified theory of emotion and power which I have in mind. For one, it deals only with power-over, without addressing questions of power-to and constitutive power, or the power literature in general, at all. Thus, the conceptualization of power that results could be described as relatively thin and, its structuralist overtones notwithstanding, too microscopic in focus and too formalized in execution. Kemper's untroubled positivism is another problematic issue, resulting in an a-historic and exclusively quantitative perspective that places reductive objective limits on the social study of emotions and power. This is not to suggest that Kemper's efforts are unimpressive, rather that they are incomplete.

It is a core aspect of the argument in this thesis that the sociological approach to emotions, particularly from a relational-process perspective, is inseparable from questions of power. I suggest that these are conceptual twins, the study of which needs to be united. In reflecting on such unification, then, we must return to the three language games that have framed the debate within the field of power, and to the relations between them-power-to, power-over and constitutive power. We will begin with *power-to*. This is understood to refer to the capacity of actors to achieve desired ends. Pitkin (1972), for one, has stressed that this should not *in itself*

be considered a social relation, as it refers to the ability to act autonomously, while it might involve other people, it need not (Pitkin 1972, cited in Göhler 2009). This is fine as far as it goes, but it and other conceptualizations of power appear to ignore the importance of *context* in which such a capacity is derived. While power-to in itself, as a *capacity*, need not be considered in relational terms, it is a capacity which is formed by and structured within a given historical, cultural and social-relational matrix. It cannot be considered in essentialist, a-historical terms as a ‘natural kind’. It is in considering how this disposition to act is formed for individuals that we see the link to emotions, and to constitutive power. I suggest that, for individuals raised in or exposed to an emotional climate which is consistently negative, and gives rise to sustained negative emotional arousal, the probability is that their capacity for action will be negatively affected. Power-to, in this scenario, is weakened due to low self-esteem, lack of confidence, or a fearful and timid being-in-the-world. Those raised in a positive emotional climate, and who experience consistently positive emotional arousal, have a higher probability of enjoying a high self-esteem, high confidence, and so on. The capacity to achieve ends is here significantly enhanced for such individuals. They have more power to achieve ends as a result. Both examples here could be considered opposite poles in a continuum of emotional contexts in which individuals are socialized. As such, power-to cannot be separated from constitutive power, and the disposition to act cannot be separated from the emotional disposition, or emotional habitus.

Emotion is also implicated in the *exercise* of power-to, as well as its formation. For example, imagine a working class child who learns all the educational skills necessary to do well in society. However, in order to realize that capital, to convert power resources into actual power-to, she has to live and work with people from a different social class whose manners, or cultural capital, makes them feel ill at ease and anxious, like ‘a fish out of water’, to invert Bourdieu’s phrase (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 127). Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that this high class group are actually all very broad-minded and do not deliberately exclude this person because of her lack of social capital; they do not exercise power over her. In fact, they welcome the membership of someone different, from the working class. Yet, the feelings of insecurity and fear are *real*, to the extent that the person opts to forgo the full exploitation of her educational resources, in order to socialize and work with her habitus peers. This actor fails to realize her full potentiality, or agency, not because power is exercised over her, nor because she lacks the appropriate resources. She fails to realize power-to, which is in her grasp, because of an emotional insecurity brought about by having to socialize in a

social circle which entails a different habitus to her own. Thus, in this instance, emotions have affected the actor's ability to effect a desired outcome.

Emotions are even more fundamental to power-over. As we have seen, Kemper has detailed how emotion can be seen as an effect of the exercise of power-over in face-to-face relations. He has less to say about how such effects can constitute a person and their interpretive horizon over iterated encounters. Barbalet (1998) and Collins (2004) looked at questions of power, emotion and social stratification, the former in macro terms, the latter more in micro. Emotions also enjoy significant attention in the social movements literature, where they are described as engines of resistance. More needs to be done on how emotions are implicated in the manufacture of consent in societies, and on the emotional bases of social order. The emotion of shame has long been linked to social conformity, and there is a lot of work on shame and its effects on individuals in society. Scheff, following Goffman and Elias, has perhaps given most attention to it, calling it 'the master emotion' both in terms of social control and because of its (acknowledged and unacknowledged) effects on individuals lives (Scheff, 1994). The emotional costs of powerlessness, on stigmatized outsider groups or the poor, for example, are associated with shame, resentment, anger and fear, which are more than 'significantly affecting' for individuals.

Perhaps, then, the foundation of any proposed theory would have to lie in the bedrock of a *constitutive* conception of power and emotion, of the type found in the work of Elias, (*in potentia*) in Foucault, and more recently in the work of Burkitt (1999). In this view, relations of power can be seen as being emotionally valenced, and constitutive of individual subjectivity in specific and changing relational configurations, or networks of interdependence. As such it would be possible to discuss and describe structures of feeling and standards of emotional display and regulation in terms of the relations of power that co-exist with and co-determine them. Within such a view, the relationship between emotions, power-over and power-to, becomes nested within this more fundamental framework, as representing different domains of analysis within an integrative and multilevel theoretical structure. Emotional arousal within each of these other levels, then, either functions to maintain or transform these foundations, recursively impacting back on the relations of power and emotion from which they sprang. The process-relational realism, and the approach of relational becoming, I suggest, is perhaps the best way in which this integration may be achieved. This is what the argument thus far has

suggested, and which I will build on in the next chapter on habitus, where I hope to unite these different aspects under the conception of emotional habitus.

2.7. Conclusion

By way of conclusion here I wish to attempt to draw a number of strands together to offer a renewed conception of our position on emotions. This is both a relational and constitutive position, which will be further elaborated on in the next chapter on habitus. Such a constitutive view may be seen as an extension of the Whiteheadian ontology, under-laboring for the theoretical approach. Yet, within Whitehead's ontology, affects, feelings and emotions are all used, more or less, interchangeably. Let us attempt to tease these apart here. Recall that the experience of events within nature constitutes the subject-superject. For humans, while relations of power are a vital part of this constitution, they are not the only relations operating on the lived body. The life that is the assemblage of the individual human is characterised by its advance in to novelty, it's becoming, but it is constituted by its life history, it's 'objective' context and it's past. This includes, but is not limited to relations of power. The social environment also includes discursive meaning in the form of symbols, and the material environment itself. All of these aspects are constitutive of the individual human being.

Affect, then, might be considered as closest to experience, the whole body *ingression* of events and environment into the individual. This 'environment' at the human level consists of relationships with and between other people, characterized by power; culture, in the form of the symbolic and discursive; and the rest of material reality. Emotions could be considered in complex interplay with affect, suggesting a reaction of the body to experience in context, but cannot be separated from that context. Feelings, then, might be the conscious label we ascribe to the bodily processes, these movements of the body, drawing on the meaningful symbols of culture.

Thus, within this view, individual human lives are engaged in a process of relational becoming, a creative advance into novelty, along with the rest of existence. Yet, they are also embedded in overlapping dynamic networks with other human individuals (and the rest of nature). These social relations are primarily characterized by power relationships. That is, other people

(power relationships) and culture (shared symbolic meaning) and material reality ('nature') are the primary environment or 'world' for human individuals. What I will later call (borrowing from Bourdieu) 'affective transactions' with this environment produces emotions, bodily responses to the happenings and events of this world. Both power and emotions are fundamental to the existence, maintenance and destruction of these relational bonds that connect us to one another

In the next chapter, I attempt to unite all of these aspects in to an account of the social habitus, and the emotional habitus in particular. It is here, within the habitus (properly conceived as processual) that all of the aspects previously discussed, the constitutive relations of emotions and power, considered in non-dualistic, process-relational perspective, will be united. For the aim of this study is the analysis of the emotional aspects of social change. In the following chapters we will see how narratives of the life story reveal the habitus, and how different relational contexts constitute different emotional habitus' within participants.

3. Chapter Three: Habitus, Emotions and Social Change

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter I wish to introduce and discuss the notion of habitus. This is the key operative concept of the thesis as a whole, and, I suggest, fundamental to the study of emotions and social change. In the next chapter I will argue that it is this that is revealed in the narrative, life history interviews of the participants of the empirical study that forms part of this thesis. It is in the habitus that we will see the culmination and synthesis of all that has been discussed up until now. Yet, our approach to habitus theory will be dependent on the process-relational approach outlined earlier, but will differ in ways from the more prevalent views widespread in the sociological literature. This literature is itself quite substantial, and the concept has been subjected to a number of critiques, which will be discussed below. Because of the central role this concept plays in the overall project, I wish to be very clear about the approach I am taking here and the manner in which I deploy it. Too often, I fear, the concept is used in sociological research in a somewhat slipshod manner, to the extent that it is seen in some quarters as a clichéd construction, of limited theoretical worth. Thus, my conception will draw to an extent on many of the major theoretical incarnations abroad in the literature, yet, I hope, will not be identical to any.

That the concept might be seen today as a cliché is itself remarkable. As recently as 1986, in a very widely cited review of 'habit' in sociology, Camic (1986) could write that 'contemporary sociology has virtually dispensed with the concept' (Camic, 1986, p.1040, see also Burkitt, 2002). Yet, writing in 2004, Diane Reay can title her well known paper '(i)t's call becoming a habitus', suggesting that the term had become a sort of "intellectual hairspray"...bestowing gravitas without doing any intellectual work' (Reay, 2004, p.432). Both perspectives are, in a sense, correct. There *has* been an explosion in the use of the concept of habitus over the last twenty years, largely due to the influence of Bourdieu, his followers, and their particular conceptualization. Yet the concept itself is rarely explored in any great detail. It is yet another 'sociological tool', picked up 'ready-made' from Bourdieu's 'tool-box' (i.e. quotations from his main works), and dropped into theoretical frameworks in the on-going Ikefication of sociological research. There are, however, almost as many objectors to this specific version of habitus as 'fans', and the fact that other conceptualizations are both possible and readily

available, within and without the sociological literature, is often over looked. In what follows I wish to re-address the conceptual confusion surrounding the notion of habitus, from a process-relation perspective. In doing so I will discuss the approaches of Bourdieu and Elias in particular, but also suggest that an alternative may be derived from process philosophy and the work of Whitehead. In the final section I will turn the notion of emotional habitus, attempting to both delineate and clarify this concept and its use in the study as a whole.

3.2. Conceptual Confusion

For as long as long as there has been reflection on human behaviour there has been an acknowledgement of the role of habit in human affairs, behaviour and action. Yet, in part, because of this, there is a wide variety of quite different (and often incommensurable) conceptualizations of both habit and habitus, the vestiges of which still haunt the sociological landscape. This conceptual confusion has led many to either over-state the effectiveness and pervasiveness of habitus, leading to a sociological determinism, or to reject the notion (almost) outright in favour of agency or reflexivity. Here I wish to suggest that both extremes are incorrect and rest on problematic treatments or formulation of the concept. Indeed, despite the fact that habitus is most often associated with ostensibly relational conceptions of the social, what is needed is a re-framed conceptualization, based on the process-relational realism outlined in chapter one. To achieve this, what is first required is an analysis of what the habitus is.

In my view, habitus should be seen as emergent from social becoming. It is an embodied *sedimentation* of experience and training, giving rise to constellation of *dispositions*, an *organization of the body*, the amalgamation of which we might call character.⁷³ The habitus *becomes*, and is the product of our relational becoming. I will argue below that such a constellation of dispositions should in no way imply an incompatibility with conscious deliberation, reflexivity or emo-rationality.⁷⁴ Indeed, to suggest as much is to fail to understand what dispositions actually are and how they operate.

⁷³ By sedimentation here I mean a 'settling in', a *concrecence* of history.

⁷⁴ I prefer this construction, which evokes and helps us to recall the inexplicable link between emotions and rationality that we now know exists, avoiding antinomies.

It is peculiar that, despite the fact that habitus is repeatedly defined in terms of dispositions, that the characteristics of dispositions and dispositional concepts are hardly ever addressed in the literature. This is one source of the conceptual confusion surrounding the concept. All of Bourdieu's writings on the topic define habitus in this way. In an early, perhaps best known, formulation, for example, he writes that:

The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively "regulated" and "regular" without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor (Bourdieu, 1977, 72, original emphasis).

Thus, for Bourdieu, the notion of disposition is central to his formulation, yet rarely (in English) does he discuss the problems and conceptualizations of dispositions themselves, in any real detail, except to say that he is aware that they are regularly (and ritualistically) condemned (Bourdieu, 2000, p.136). This is left to the philosophers, and indeed, would probably be considered a 'scholastic' exercise by him in any case. Yet, I suggest that, because of this, confusion arises here and elsewhere. A few words, *pace* Bourdieu, are needed on dispositions before we continue.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ However, there may be linguistic difficulties to be accounted for here. As mentioned, Bourdieu defines the habitus as a system of dispositions. Yet, in this earlier work *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977), in relation to the earlier definition, Bourdieu includes a more elaborate footnote on the concept of dispositions, which, he says, has three distinct meanings. It can express, 'the result of an organizing action', or outcomes approximating to 'structure'; a 'way of being, a habitual state (particularly of the body)' and 'in particular, a predisposition, a tendency, a propensity or inclination' (Bourdieu, 1977, p.214). However, as Jenkins has noted, these are a 'not an uncontradictory cluster of meanings' (Jenkins, 1992, p.76). Indeed, the first designation is a clear case of the exercise fallacy, defining dispositions with their outcomes or results (of which, more below). However, as the translator of this work notes in this very footnote, the 'semantic cluster of disposition' is wider in French than in English, but the words offered are a good approximation (ibid). My French is too poor to adjudicate here, but the problem of translation is worth bearing in mind, particular for readers in English.

3.3. Dispositional Concepts

Dispositions and dispositional concepts have been hotly debated in philosophy, and analytical philosophy in particular (see Choi & Fara, 2012 for a detailed review). Indeed, for the most part, they have been seen in negative terms, particularly by positivists, as unscientific because non-observable. One useful discussion on the nature of dispositions is found in Morriss, specifically in relation to concepts of power (1985, second edition, 2002). Morriss begins with the distinction between dispositional and episodic concepts - the sugar cube is soluble (dispositional), the sugar cube is dissolving (episodic). The former refers to ‘relatively enduring capacities’, the latter ‘report happenings or events’ (Morriss, 2002, p.14). Thus, common examples refer to the ‘fragility’ of the China cup as being a disposition or, as Morriss (following Kenny) suggests, the intoxicating capacity of whiskey is also a disposition (see also Choi & Fara, 2012). There are, he says, two primary confusions that attach to dispositional concepts: the exercise fallacy and the vehicle fallacy. The former, I think, particularly relevant here; it is the confusion of a disposition with its exercise, which Morriss very effectively demonstrates in relation to power (also a dispositional concept, he argues). One can never observe a disposition, merely its manifestations, which is why operationalization in science can be problematic. Dispositions are potentialities, and these can never be observed.⁷⁶ Dispositions can remain forever unmanifest. A fragile cup remains fragile, even if it never breaks, a sugar lump retains the disposition to be soluble on Mars, in the absence of (liquid) water. The deployment of dispositional concepts is always a reference to a *hypothetical event* and is thus, as such, unobservable. The whiskey in the bottle retains the capacity, the disposition, to intoxicate and the possession of that capacity should not be equated to its exercise, the drinking of the whiskey. Neither should we confuse this capacity with its vehicle, the alcohol.

What can such a discussion suggest to us regarding the habitus and the more complex level of humanity? Well, if we consider the habitus as a dispositional concept, then charges of determinism appear to be misplaced. Dispositions may exist but go unexercised and remain unmanifest. Let us imagine that I am disposed to shyness; that it is part of my habitus. But I may be a shy person and not feel shy when with my family or in each and every social situation. To suggest otherwise is to reduce shyness into a reflex, an automatic determined

⁷⁶ He writes that it is ‘incoherent to apply an operationalist approach to evidence to dispositional terms. Operationalism demands that the only terms that can be used that refer to direct or indirect observations, which is not what dispositional concepts are about (Morriss, 2002, p.16).

response to a stimulus, like blinking in bright light, or to translate a disposition to the status of either a reflex, or a law. But this is not what we usually wish to convey when we deploy the term *habitus*. Rather, my disposition to manifest shyness (via blushing, say) is conditional on a variety of factors, such as my more generalised feelings of confidence and wellbeing on a particular day, the specific actions I am engaged in, the number and composition of the people in the situation, the situation itself etc. That my shyness is not exercised in a specific situation does not mean that I am *not* a shy person, but that I am prone to shyness in certain situations and not others. It is a question of *probability* rather than one of certitude or mechanical necessity. As Ryle writes, dispositional concepts and statements act as ‘inference tickets’, allowing us to expect or even (occasionally) predict certain (re)actions by certain individuals in certain circumstances (Ryle, [1949]2000, p.119).⁷⁷ Yet, there is a difference between the simple dispositions of sugar cubes, what he calls ‘single track dispositions’, and the higher-grades of dispositions surrounding human ‘second nature’, such as gregariousness, the ‘the exercises of which are indefinitely heterogeneous’ (Ryle, 2000, p.44).

Thus, that one may be disposed to a certain type of action should not be considered in any way to be deterministic. Rather, it is a question of probability - a shy person is more *likely* to manifest shyness in a given situation than a non-shy person. Therefore, to consider the *habitus* as being, in some way, *inherently* deterministic appears to be mistaken if *habitus* is considered a disposition or a dispositional concept. To this, what we might call, *intensional* confusion regarding *habitus*, there are further confusions regarding the *extension* of the term. In the literature it is usual to conflate a variety of thinkers and terms under the rubric of *habitus*. Yet, here too, there can be slippage between these different uses of the term and more clarity is required regarding the concepts *scope*. Camic (1986) suggests us a useful continuum for thinking about how the notion of ‘habit’ has been deployed in the social sciences. At the ‘lower’ end, habit is deployed in (arguably) its everyday usage, suggesting the repetition of relatively simple, more or less automatic, actions. Here Camic cites William James on our tendency to put our right sock on before the left one, or the habits of writing, and so on (Camic, 1986, p.1045).⁷⁸ At the next level, Camic describes ‘the vast middle range’,

⁷⁷ He elsewhere writes that ‘(t)o possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realised. The same is true about specifically human dispositions such as qualities of character (Ryle, 2000, p.43). See also Ryle’s discussion of the distinction between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’, and, indeed, his treatment of dispositional concepts throughout the book.

⁷⁸ Of course for James habit, which was famously ‘the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent’ is of central importance to human action and life (1890, pp.112-42). Indeed, much of his writing prefigures Bourdieu and other *habitus* thinkers. He writes that the ‘hell to be endured hereafter, of which

in which habit is used to describe the repetition and reproduction of more complex behaviours. Here he discusses habitus of economic, religious or political behaviour, the habit of obedience to rules, and so on. Finally, at the upper limit, he refers to habit as ‘character’. This is perhaps the deployment that is closest to Bourdieu’s and the contemporary sociological notion of habitus. He writes that, in this usage:

Habit is the durable and generalized disposition that suffuses a person's action throughout an entire domain of life or, in the extreme instance, throughout all of life - in which case the term comes to mean the whole manner, turn, cast, or mold of the personality. Today the word "character" probably comes closest to evoking this nearly forgotten meaning of habit although even "character" tends to suggest a system made up of numerous, more specific personality attributes, whereas the point of using habit in its broadest sense is to denote not a sum of parts but a more nearly all-encompassing modality of action that (if one may borrow out of context a vivid formulation from the Grundrisse) then assigns rank and influence to other components of the personality (Camic, 1986, p.1046).




Figure 3. The Habitus Process

Thus, following Camic, we may discern three more or less distinct *modes* of habitus. These I will call habit, disposition and character. Within much of the historical literature on these issues, there has been a con-fusion of all three meanings of the term; a slippage between one register and another, with various individuals talking past one another, because of this

theology tells, is no worse than the hell we make for ourselves in this world by habitually fashioning our characters in the wrong way. Could the young but realize how soon they will become mere walking bundles of habits, they would give more heed to their conduct while in the plastic state. We are spinning our own fates, good or evil, and never to be undone. Every smallest stroke of virtue or of vice leaves its never so little scar’ (James, 1890, p.127). Of course, we would disagree that the habitus becomes as calcified and unchangeable in adults as he suggests, particularly in late modernity.

slippage. Here I wish to suggest that the notion of habitus can encompass all three of these relatively distinct referents, along with the notion of *hexis*. In other words, I wish to offer an encompassing conceptualization of habitus, while stressing the distinctions between the levels, and its fundamentally *embodied* nature. Thus, habitus can refer to the most basic automatic patterns of behaviour, such as sleeping on the right or left side or the habit of flicking one's hair, though this level is perhaps the least interesting, sociologically.

At the second level, dispositions incorporate the *tendential*, the situated propensity to certain circumscribed practices, actions and reactions. The third, character, incorporates the aspects of habitus cited by Camic above, suggesting the cast of the individual personality as a whole. I furthermore wish to incorporate *hexis* within our treatment of habitus, which most users of the concept tend to do, (but there is more to follow on this). *Hexis* is often contrasted with habitus in that it usually refers to bodily comportment, rather than dispositions for action, but I wish to use habitus to cover both aspects. It is important to note that all three dimensions of the habitus, habit, disposition and character refer not to single attributes but rather to constellations or, better, *configurations*; configurations of habits, dispositions and even characters or, at least, *aspects* of character, none of which are necessarily compatible or cohesive (Burkitt (2002) makes a similar point). Difficulties with the notion, then, are rife within the literature. Such difficulty is not solely derived from the critics of the habitus, often writing from overly-voluntaristic theoretical perspectives, such as Archer. Indeed, if Bourdieu can be said to exaggerate the pervasiveness of the habitus, then the context of his writing, with RAT (rational actor theory) so dominant in the social sciences, must be taken in to account. Below, I wish to briefly outline, or *grind*, a conceptualization of the habitus from a process-relational, Whiteheadian perspective.

Whitehead, of course, does not address the notion of habitus directly. Nevertheless, I suggest, one may be derived from his writings. As we have seen in chapter one, Whitehead offers a decidedly *constitutive* conception of the whole reality, which applies equally well to human social reality. The subject-superject is effectively emergent from its experience of its environment. Recall the principle of process, which maintains that 'the *how* an actual entity *becomes* constitutes *what* the actual entity *is...*(i)t's "being" is constituted by its "becoming" (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.23, original emphasis). In the case of humans, rather than speaking

of actual entities, we are to speak of ‘societies’. Recall also that the macroscopic entities of everyday experience are collections of actual occasions, called *nexūs* (plural). When such a nexus exhibits social order, it is called a ‘society’ (though the terms are often used interchangeably). This social order is derived from a ‘common element of form’ shared by its constituent occasions whose prehensions impose a ‘condition of reproduction’. When the members of the society enjoy, what he calls, a ‘genetic relatedness’⁷⁹, this gives rise to a serial ordering. He writes that ‘the nexus forms a single line of inheritance of its defining characteristic. Such a nexus is called an “enduring object”. It might have been termed a person in the legal sense of that term...The nexus “sustains a character” and this is one of the meanings of the Latin term *persona*’ (Whitehead, [1929]1978, pp.34-5, Whitehead, [1933]1967, pp.201-8). Thus, the human being is such a society for Whitehead, and fundamentally, an *embodied* one. It is by ‘reason of the body that, with its miracle of order, that the treasures of the past environment are poured into the living occasion’ (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.339). The implication is that, here too, at the macro-level, *how* a body *becomes constitutes what* a person is. Elsewhere, the ‘genetic character’, which I consider to be suggestive of habitus, is the key to endurance for higher organisms. He writes:

Owing to the delicate organization of the body, there is a returned influence, an inheritance of character derived from the presiding occasion and modifying the subsequent occasions through the rest of the body. We must remember the extreme generality of the notion of an enduring object - a genetic character inherited through a historic route of actual occasions...Thus the question as to whether to call an enduring object a transition of matter or of character is very much a verbal question as to where you draw the line...Thus in an animal body the presiding occasion...is the final node, or intersection, of a complex structure of many enduring objects. Such a structure pervades the human body. The harmonised relations of the parts of the body constitute this wealth of inheritance into a harmony of contrasts, issuing into intensity of experience...The endurance of the mind is only one more example of the general principle on which the body is constructed (Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.109, emphasis added).

I wish to suggest that the habitus is the *means* (or the process) by which the past - past experience - is transmitted and relative endurance is maintained in the context of process and flux. In other words, that Whitehead in fact *has* a theory of habitus in all but name, which, like

⁷⁹ Genetic in the sense of both shared origins, and generative, in that one produces the other.

other theories, is considered as an *organization of the body*; this habitus is of a genetic character and a complex structure. This is not to conceive of the habitus in terms of a substance, or as an unchanging ‘ghost in the machine’.⁸⁰ Nor is such a position suggestive of determination - life, for Whitehead, is always and everywhere the bid for freedom and a creative advance into novelty. Rather, this habitus itself should be considered in processual terms; as a locus of relatively enduring relative stability, which itself undergoes change. In the same way that a wave-pattern can be considered as a dynamic process that nevertheless maintains a relatively stable structure, so the habitus itself should be considered a structured process; a transmission from past experience to future practice. The process is on-going and iterative.

If we return to the origins of habitus, the *hexis* of Aristotle, we can perhaps get a clearer account of this. For Aristotle, the word *hexis* (ἕξις) refers to a type of acquired, active disposition of the body, often translated as a ‘possession’ or a ‘having’. He writes that by disposition he means an ‘arrangement of that which has parts, either in space (*topos*) or in potentiality (*dunamis*) or in form (*eidōs*). It must be a kind of position (*thesis*), as indeed is clear from the word “disposition” (*diathesis*)’ (Aristotle, Met. 5.1022b).⁸¹

As Burkitt argues, following Aristotle, along with Mauss and Foucault, these ‘arrangements’ are the product of various ‘technologies of the self’, particularly (and crucially) technologies of power, acting on the body, and giving rise to habitus as ‘acquired ability or faculty rather than an acquired habit to act in a routine way (Burkitt, 2002, p.225, see also 1999), though, as we have suggested, habit itself may be incorporated into an expanded conception. This relationship between the habitus and power is of paramount importance, and a fact often obscured in some analysis of the habitus. Notable exceptions remain Burkitt (2002) and Haugaard (2008). For the former, the ‘social relations that create the habitus...are therefore relations of power, and these are deeply inscribed in our personal dispositions...Social power works through human bodies by inscribing in them certain dispositions and capacities which enable people to act in certain ways’ (Burkitt, 2002, p.87). Haugaard makes a similar argument, stating that the ‘most basic way in which the habitus relates to power is relative to

⁸⁰ Though Bergson, in his commentary on Ravaisson, describes habit as ‘the fossilized residue of a spiritual activity’, in keeping with the spiritualist and vitalist thrust of his philosophy (Bergson, 2007, p.198.)

⁸¹ The quote is from the Perseus site, based on the translation by Hugh Trednick (1933). *Hexis* is, like most things in Aristotle, connected with virtue and good conduct. See his *Nicomachean Ethics* for a discussion.

empowerment or *power to*' (Haugaard, 2008, p.194). Combining these positions, we can suggest that the social 'environment' that Whitehead speaks of consists of relations of power, which give rise to a cluster of embodied dispositions and capacities for action, or *power to*. It is such a capacity that is 'transmitted' from the past occasion in to the present one. However, as I argued in the last chapter, what should not be omitted from this model is that these very relations of power are themselves characterized by emotionality; that they take place within what De Ravera calls an 'emotional climate' (and under what I will later call, following Reddy, (2001)) an 'emotional regime') and are themselves emotionally valenced (Heaney, 2011). This emotional aspect is fundamental for Whitehead too. Thus, I suggest, it is both emotions *and* power that give rise to this active organization of the body, which in turn give rise to our power (capacity) to act (or lack of such a capacity) - in short, practice.

Habitus, then, is a constitution, or organization, of the body as well as a means of temporal endurance. Dewey, too, for whom 'man is a creature of habit, not of reason nor yet of instinct' considers habitus a type of 'organization' and as 'active means'. He writes:

All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. In any intelligible sense of the word will, they are will. They form our effective desires and they furnish us with our working capacities. They rule our thoughts, determining which shall appear and be strong and which shall pass from light in to day...They are active means, means that project themselves, energetic and dominating ways of acting (Dewey, [1922], pp.25-6).

These 'working capacities' are power-to, in all but name. Furthermore, habitus, for Dewey, can only be actualized in practice, through dynamic interaction with the environment, particularly via the use of tools. He writes that, except in a 'contingent sense, with an "if", neither external materials nor bodily and mental organs are themselves means. They have to be employed in coordinated conjunction with one another to be actual means, or habits (Dewey, 1922, p.26, see also Burkitt, 2002, 1998).⁸² Thus, this *latent* Whiteheadian conception

⁸² Indeed, elsewhere, in tones redolent of Whitehead, Dewey writes that, for humans: 'what is done is conditioned by consequences of prior activities; we find the fact of learning or habit-formation. In consequence, an organism acts with reference to a timespread, a serial order of events, as a unit, just as it does in reference to a unified spatial variety. Thus an environment both extensive and enduring is immediately implicated in present behaviour. Operatively speaking, the remote and the past are "in" behaviour making it what it is. The action

of habitus shares certain features with the original, Aristotelian version, and the pragmatist version of Dewey. It is a complex organization of the body, derived from (socially situated) past experience, which constitutes the social self and social practice.

What, then, of those better-known conceptualizations, particularly those of Bourdieu and Elias? Well, while there is general agreement on the basic issue of habitus as embodied disposition, some problems remain. Bourdieu's conception changed throughout his career and, perhaps, because he spent so much time redefining his version, as Jenkins suggested, incompatibilities between the different definitions can be discerned. And, we have suggested, that because of his avoidance of the 'scholastic' exercise of engaging with the nature of dispositional concepts, and given the dominating context of (Sartreian) methodological individualism and rational action accounts of social behaviour (which he strenuously wished to avoid), he often appears to speak in overly-deterministic ways about the habitus that belie its dispositional status. As we have shown above, such a view is mistaken.

Of course, Bourdieu has many answers to this critique. For example: 'On the "durability" of habitus and the charge of "determinism" which goes with it' he writes that, firstly, 'habitus realizes itself, becomes active only *in the relation to* a field, and the same habitus can lead to very different practices and stances depending on the state of the field. Secondly, habitus, as the product of social conditionings, and thus of a history . . . is endlessly transformed either in a direction that reinforces it . . . or in a direction that transforms it (Bourdieu, 1990, p.116). While I could happily endorse the second point, the first is problematic. On this basis, no one should deploy a Bourdieuan conception of habitus *without reference to* a field, and a specific field at that (see also Maton, 2008)⁸³. To do so is to render oneself open to the charge of determinism (or fetishism), yet this practice is quite common in the literature.

Furthermore, much of his treatment is overtly (at times overly) cognitive, suggesting that habitus applies only to 'mentalities', cognitive schema or consciousness. This is an argument

called "organic" is not just that of internal structures; it is an integration of organic-environmental connections' (Dewey, 1929, p.279 and *passim*).

⁸³ Maton writes that to 'talk of habitus without field and to claim to analyse 'habitus' without analysing 'field' are thus to fetishise habitus, abstracting it from the very contexts which give it meaning and in which it works' (Maton, 2008, p.61).

that Omar Lizardo (2004) makes quite clearly, showing how the position is derived from Piaget and his work, rather than phenomenology. It is only in his later writings that a more corporeal, embodied notion of the habitus emerges (see particularly Bourdieu, 2000). This is also true of Giddens' cognate conception of 'practical consciousness knowledge' (Giddens, 1985, Haugaard, 2008). Yet, in these later writings, especially in (for me, his masterpiece) *Pascalian Meditations* (2000) there are suggestions of a view compatible with the one outlined above. Here, at times, Bourdieu too sounds almost Whiteheadian, to the extent that emotion and affectivity get a (very rare) mention (Bourdieu, 2000, pp.129-163 in particular). Given the relative scarcity of references to emotion in Bourdieu's oeuvre, I will cite one example. We are, he writes, echoing Marx⁸⁴:

disposed because we are exposed. It is because the body is exposed and endangered in the world, faced with the risk of emotion, lesion, suffering, sometimes death and therefore obliged to take the world seriously (and nothing is more serious than emotion, which touches the depths of our organic being) that it is able to acquire dispositions that are themselves an openness to the world, to the very structures of the world of which they are an incorporated form...We learn bodily. The social order inscribes itself in bodies through this permanent confrontation, which may be more or less dramatic but it is always largely marked by affectivity and, more precisely, by affective transactions with the environment (Bourdieu, 2000, p..140-1, original emphasis).⁸⁵

Thus here too, as in Whitehead, we see the individual subjectivity as constituted by 'affective transactions with the environment' (though of course for Whitehead the border between the body and the environment is fuzzy).⁸⁶ Bourdieu appears here to endorse the process ontologist's view that the basis of experience is 'emotional'; elsewhere this emotional dimension is absent. Yet, as we have suggested previously, there are problems with his theory of fields, and a sometimes static and monolithic depiction of the habitus that is incompatible with the approach offered here (Crossley, 2011, Bottero & Crossley, 2011). We can,

⁸⁴ The human being 'as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a *suffering* being, and because he experiences this suffering (Leiden), he is also a *passionate* being (*leidenschaftliches*)'. (Marx, [1844]1992, p. 118).

⁸⁵ That such mention of emotionality is rare is itself remarkable (or perhaps explicable) because, prior to his 'conversion' to sociology, Bourdieu's primary philosophical interest was in the phenomenology of emotions (Bourdieu, 2008a, pp.59-60, 2008b, pp.2-3). This unfinished PhD thesis, 'The Temporal Structures of Emotional Life' was supervised by Canguilhem and is mentioned in the 'grey literature' (1955) of the HyperBourdieu online bibliography (see also Bourdieu, 1990, pp.5-7).

⁸⁶ For example, he writes that our 'knowledge of the body places it as a complex unity of happenings within the larger field of nature. But its demarcation from the rest of nature is vague in the extreme. The body consists of the coordinated functionings of billions of molecules. It belongs to the structural essence of the body that, in an indefinite number of ways, it is always losing molecules and gaining molecules. When we consider the question with microscopic accuracy, there is no definite boundary to determine where the body begins and external nature ends' (Whitehead, [1938]1968, p.221).

nevertheless, take much from Bourdieu's approach. He is particularly good at analysing discrimination and operations of power at work between habitus and social position, and the way in which distinction operates to naturalise arbitrary differences between classes (see also Haugaard, 2008).

This, too, is found in Elias's treatment of the habitus. If Bourdieu can be said to, at times, *over*-theorise the concept, then arguably Elias is guilty of the opposite. For Elias, as we saw in the previous chapter, the habitus is described usually as 'second nature', or perhaps because of poor translation of his earlier work, 'personality structure' (Elias, 2000, Mennell, 1992). But here, too, there is evolution in the use of the term in evidence. In the earlier work the habitus is used interchangeably with 'feeling structure' as well as 'personality structure', but is also conflated with 'conscience' and 'super ego'.⁸⁷ This Freudian aspect of his work becomes less pronounced in the later treatments of the habitus, but these are not an 'un-contradictory cluster' either. Furthermore, like Bourdieu, there appears to be some ambivalence in Elias' writings regarding the question of determination. In the last chapter we discussed his treatment of the 'civilizing process' as a shift from *Fremdzwänge* to *Selbstzwänge*, in which 'zwänge' is almost universally translated as 'restraint'. However, a more accurate translation would possibly be 'compulsion', and, if so, what Elias is suggesting here becomes a shift from 'other-compulsion' to 'self-compulsion', with the latter being a defining aspect of the social habitus. It is perhaps redundant to say that 'compulsion' appears to be a deterministic rendering of the habitus, an *irresistible* urge.

Yet, Elias may dispute that his conception is deterministic. Of this second nature he writes: 'something grows out of the common language which the individual shares with others and which is certainly a component of the social habitus - a more or less individual style, what might be called an unmistakable individual handwriting that grows out of the social script' (Elias, 1991, p.182). Furthermore, his sociology of knowledge suggests a continuum of being between *involvement* and *detachment*, with the civilizing process representing a shift from more spontaneous *emotional* expression stemming from a more direct involvement in the world, to increased emotional regulation and a more detached and regulated emotional habitus. It is to the emotional habitus and this conception of habitus as regulation that we now turn.

⁸⁷ Again, here too, translation issues in the original have played a part in differing interpretations of Elias's treatment.

3.4. Emotions and Habitus

Thus far, I hope to have clarified the concept of the habitus and suggested a move (with a little pushing and shoving) toward something of a convergence in its conceptualization. It is an acquired, dynamic organization or arrangement of the body, derived from experience and training in specific (historical, cultural, social, relational) contexts, giving rise to ‘character’ and disposition to action, thought and feeling, in context. This view is at once processual and relational⁸⁸; the habitus is active, a dynamic capacity, rather the static product of (over) socialization. All of the thinkers discussed thus far could, I think, agree with this typification of the concept. In addition, I have suggested that Whitehead’s work contains such a conception of habitus, albeit in latent form, as derived from experience, the basis of which is emotional. His conception of habitus is that of a *means of transmission of embodied experience through time*, akin to what Merleau Ponty referred to as ‘the general synthesis of one’s own body’, the basis of which is emotional (Merleau Ponty, [1945]2002, p.175). As such, all of the thinkers, to a greater or lesser degree, suggest emotionality as an aspect of the social habitus or speak of emotional habitus directly. Yet this distinction between habitus and emotional habitus is predominantly an analytical one. Below I wish to turn to the concept of emotional habitus directly, in the hopes of clarifying that concept.

Followers of Bourdieu, in particular, might object to such a distinction. Again, Maton (2008) makes the case clearly when he writes:

Used alone, habitus is often little more than theoretical icing on an empirical cake. The concept can be removed from such accounts without any loss of explanatory power. A second effect is the tendency for habitus to proliferate adjectives. This adjectival addition (e.g. ‘emotional habitus’) often compensates for the lack of an analysis of the field - the adjective highlights the area of social life in which its effects are being proclaimed - or to denote the kind of actor being studied (e.g. ‘institutional habitus’). The proliferation of habituses illustrates the versatility of the concept. It also reflects a temptation to decontextualise habitus from the approach which gives

⁸⁸ As Rescher writes, against overtly existentialist views of the self: ‘For processists, the processual unity of the person has a distinctly social aspect. As it sees the matter, the self-definitional activity of persons proceeds in the of interaction with one another. The processual dispositions that define the person as he or she is pre-eminently include those dispositions that characterize the person as part of the social order of communicative relationships’ (Rescher, 1996, p.110).

the concept meaning and to adopt instead an empiricist lens - naming parts of a habitus distinguishes empirical features of practices rather than their underlying generative principles (Maton, 2008, p.63).

Maton is in a sense, correct, as far as it goes. If one is following a Bourdieuan approach then one should deploy the master's full toolbox, or there is danger of determinism and contradiction. But what I hoped to have shown here is that one is not required to follow this approach. The concept of habitus pre-exists Pierre Bourdieu, and rather than adopting the flat-packed theoretical lens on offer, (with its own scratches and blind spots) one can (and should) attempt to grind a lens of one's own. What matters is the use to which the lens is put and what it helps us to see. Below I wish to further grind the habitus concept, and introduce a new concept, borrowed from music theory, in relation to habitus and emotions. This is the concept of 'tonality'.

3.5. Emotional Habitus as Automatic Emotional Regulation

Before this, I wish to mention regulation. One key insight from the sociology of emotions is that emotions are not solely individual phenomena but are rather always embedded in and gain meaning via social relationships and context. To be in 'society', (and who can not be?), requires that individual selves must (or at least *should*) normatively conform to certain standards and behaviours, given by culture and context. Part of what the habitus is concerned to capture, then, is a form of socially mediated *self-regulation*, with emotional habitus specifically refereeing to a more or less automatic emotional regulation. This is certainly Elias' conception, particularly in the Civilizing Process, which describes it, for example, as an 'automatic, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control' (Elias, 2000, p.367). Within psychology and neuroscience, there is a rich and empirically grounded literature that addresses these very concepts, yet this has largely been ignored by sociologists. And, as Gross (1999) argues, while our biologically-evolved emotional responses have remained more or less the same throughout our species' history, the social and environmental context has changed beyond recognition. Indeed, what Elias (2000) demonstrates best is that such changes require a different and ever-evolving capacity to manage or regulate our emotions given these changing contexts. One cannot hope to understand such regulation without reference to that sociological context. For von Scheve and von Lude, who call for an integrative and

interdisciplinary approach to the study of emotion, these fields ‘turn out to be vital sources of knowledge for any social scientist interested in the study of emotions, particularly those concerned with social structural analyses’ but, they stress, these insights are largely ignored by other sociologists (Von Scheve & Von Leude, 2005, p.306). This literature on emotional regulation is now vast, with a few apparent attempts toward the integrative, multilevel and transdisciplinary now in existence (see for example, Vandekerckhove et al, 2008; Röttger-Rössler & Markowitsch, 2009).⁸⁹ While these moves are encouraging and to be welcomed, some difficulties remain. Here I will briefly outline one approach (withholding criticisms until later) that is perhaps most promising, put from by J.J. Gross (and others) on Automatic Emotional Regulation (AER). The argument is that, while there are strong similarities between emotional habitus and AER, the philosophical and methodological divergences remain as significant barriers to full integration, at present. Yet, it is hubristic to ignore the work in these other disciplines outright, as so many sociologists of emotion appear to do.

For Gross and his various co-authors, the very term ‘emotional regulation’ is inherently ambiguous, in that it can refer to both to the regulation of self *by* emotions, or to the regulation *of* emotions themselves (Gross & Thompson, 2007, p.9, Mauss et al, 2007 & 2008).⁹⁰ Both they, and we, are primarily interested in the latter, and in the ‘process model’ of emotional regulation in particular, which they put forward. As good positivists, these authors begin with various definitions, of emotions⁹¹, and of emotional regulation⁹² in general but, as is usually the case with such definitions, these tell us very little. They frame their discussion within a ‘process’ or ‘modal model’ of emotion which suggests an (abstract and simplified, yet dynamic and processual) ‘situation-attention-appraisal-response’ sequence of processes, which has the additional benefit of placing the social situation at its centre.

⁸⁹ It is interesting that both of these publications aimed at transcending disciplinary boundaries on emotions and emotional regulation have come from Germany, and the Research Group “Emotions as Bio- Cultural Processes” that was in residence at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF) at the University of Bielefeld from 2004 to 2005. Similar work, with many of the same scientists is currently ongoing in Berlin, under the Languages of Emotion Cluster of Excellence (LoE).

⁹⁰ Though see Kappas (2008), who argues that this distinction between emotion and emotional regulation is essentially impossible.

⁹¹ For example, as ‘multifaceted whole-organism responses that involve changes in the domains of *subjective experience, behaviour, and physiology*’ (Mauss et al, 2008, p.40).

⁹² For example, ‘emotional regulation may be defined as individuals’ deliberate or automatic attempts to influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how these emotions are experienced or expressed’ (Mauss et al, 2007, p. 2).




Figure 4. The Process Model of Emotional Regulation (from Gross & Thompson, 2006)

Emotion here is a subset of ‘affect’, which also includes mood, stress and impulse, and emotion regulation is a subset of ‘affect regulation’, along with mood regulation (mood), coping (stress) and psychological defences (impulse) (Gross & Thompson, 2007).⁹³ There are various types of emotional regulation discussed, such as automatic or deliberate, and response-focused (RF) or antecedent-focused (AF). RF regulation is directed toward the regulation of emotions *after* they have been generated, such as denial, suppression or the masking of emotions which one is feeling (Mauss et al, 2008). AF regulatory process occur *earlier* in the overall chain, and can involve situation selection or modification (e.g. exit), the (re)-deployment of attention in a situation (such as ignoring or not attending to the situation/event), or cognitive change (such as changing the meaning of the emotional situation) (ibid, p.41). In general, the empirical work in this vein suggests that RF is usually ‘maladaptive’, psychologically, in that the emotional response has already been generated, but cannot be expressed, giving rise to ‘pervasive and divergent effects on individuals’ wellbeing, social and cognitive functioning and health’ because these already-existing emotional responses must be kept ‘under control’ (Mauss, 2008, p.41). AF, by contrast, is generally seen as being a beneficial form of regulation, because it is an intervention earlier in the process, thereby ‘proactively alter(s) all downstream components’ of the emotional response (Mauss et al, 2008, p.41). In short, if we exit the situation or divert our gaze the emotional response is not generated and thus does not need to be later controlled.

These authors argue further that, while most of the contemporary psychological work (especially those deploying dual process models of emotion) has been on the deliberate

⁹³ This is a different conception of ‘affect’ than that outlined earlier, based on a different ontology.

regulation of emotions, it is the automatic regulation that is most interesting and in need of attention. One definition offered for automatic emotional regulation (AER) is that it refers to ‘changes, (either increases or decreases) to any aspect of one’s emotion without making a conscious decision to do so, without paying attention to the process of regulating one’s emotions and without engaging in deliberate control’ (Mauss et al, 2008, p.43). And unlike its deliberate alternative, AER is ‘initiated by simple registration of sensory inputs, which in turn activates *knowledge structures* (schemas, scripts, or concepts) that shape other psychological functions’ (ibid, p.42, emphasis added). Thus, AER is a function of the deployment of non-conscious knowledge structures, which are shaped by socio-cultural context. One could suggest that this appears to offer a definition of the emotional habitus in all but name, or at least, to the more common, cognitivist conception of the habitus widely deployed.

Yet, these writers remain largely silent about sociology, including the (large, largely positivistic and US-based) sociological social psychology literature that address emotions sociologically (see Turner & Stets, 2007). Not even Bourdieu, ‘the world’s most cited sociologist’ gets a mention. Yet could it not be the case that it is broader and more sociologically nuanced concept of habitus might be the explanation for the observed behaviour? Rather than AER ‘activating knowledge structures’, that the habitus itself, which is ‘always on’ is the reason for the regulation. AER as it is currently constructed remains a false dawn, a potential correlate to emotional habitus rather than an adequate line of investigation for the sociologist of emotion. The work ultimately reduces to neural correlates, while the ‘empirical rigour’ is derived from increasingly controversial ‘priming experiments’ (Mauss et al, 2007).⁹⁴ The philosophical barriers to true interdisciplinary are more profound than has been acknowledged.

3.6. Habitus, Regimes and Climates

A better approach to this question of emotional regulation than the positivistic one just discussed is found in the (historical) sociology of emotions itself. In this section I wish to offer a preliminary outline the relationship between emotional habitus and social change. Of course, as I have stressed, the universe is so characterised by perpetual process and change,

⁹⁴ In 2012 the robustness and replicability of priming research was thrown in to considerable controversy after a well known study by Baugh failed to be successfully replicated, leading to the Nobel-prize winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman writing a widely discussed ‘open letter’ to social psychologists in crisis.

that to speak of ‘social change’ might itself be considered a reification, or an example of process reduction. Yet, the terminology is useful to the extent that it allows us to specify macro-level changes in social relationships, culture and ‘social structure’. It should here be understood as a short hand term for these, rather than a unified ‘thing’ in itself. Drawing on the sociology of emotions literature, I will argue that part of what changes in the context of ‘social change’ are emotional regimes (or emotional tonalities), which are both a product of practices governed by specific emotional habitus, but that also change those habituses over time. That is that, changes in social structure, particularly in the relations of power and interdependence within a society give rise to specific emotional regimes within which particular individuals’ experience of emotion and emotional propriety are structured. These give rise to specific and bounded ‘structures of feeling’ or an emotional habitus making one disposed to feel and be emotional in a certain way. In this, the argument is clearly in line with that of Elias, even if there are differences in the detail. What I wish to add is a notion of tonality, which may help explain this.

The notion of an emotional regime belongs to historian, William Reddy (1997, 2001). Reddy is a historian of emotion who has introduced his own anti-constructionist theory of ‘emotives’, which builds on Austin’s theory of speech acts (Austin, 1962). Rather than drown in the sea of moral relativism that constructionism gives rise to, according to Reddy, he argues that emotions are ‘the real world anchor of signs’ (Reddy, 1997, p.331). Drawing on, though significantly different from poststructuralist accounts, he suggests that ‘there is a feeling that goes with every sign; emotion generates *parole* against the backdrop of *langue* (ibid). Emotives are first person speech acts, poorly captured by either ‘practice’ or ‘discourse’, and distinct from (but sharing features with) both ‘constative’ and ‘performative’ utterances (Reddy, 1997, p.327). They are emotion talk and gestures that ‘alter the state of the speaker from whom they derive’ (ibid). The phrase ‘I am angry’ is an example. Such a phrase as this might be considered to be descriptive or constative in Austin’s sense, but this is not correct. Emotives are not ‘mere reports’ but rather are efforts by the speaker to offer an interpretation of something that is not observable to others (Reddy, 1997, p.331). As such they impact directly on the very feelings in question. One can for example feel more angry by virtue of expressing the statement ‘I am angry’. Like performatives, emotives ‘actually do things to the world’ but they are not self-referential in the way performatives are. Unlike the performative phrase ‘I refuse’, in which the act of refusal is the utterance itself, the anger does not reside in the

utterance of the word ‘anger’. Yet emotives are more similar to performatives than to constatives in that they also change the world and are ‘instruments for directly changing, building, hiding, intensifying emotions. There is an “inner” dimension to emotion but it is never merely “represented” by statements or actions. It is the necessary (relative) failure of all efforts to represent feeling that makes for (and sets limits on) our plasticity (Reddy, 1997, p. 331).⁹⁵

Reddy goes on to tie this concept to his key notion of emotional regimes. In general, individuals are forced to draw on conventional expectations about what emotives are appropriate, while at the same time being embedded in ‘vital relationships’ that confer upon such utterances the status of ‘contractual commitments’ (e.g. ‘you frighten me’) (Reddy, 1997, p.332). Drawing on cognitive psychology, particularly the work of Isen and Diamond, he stresses the automatic, habitual and thereby fundamentally social aspect of ‘affect’. From this perspective, affect itself is a ‘deeply ingrained, overlearned habit’ (Isen & Diamond, 1989, cited in Reddy, 1997, p.333).⁹⁶ This suggests that emotions are fundamentally learned, and can be unlearned, albeit with some difficulty. This connects emotives with power. He writes that there is good reason to ‘attribute extensive power to the conventional emotives authorized in a given community to shape members’ sense of identity and self-awareness, members’ manner of confronting contingencies and routine’ (Reddy, 1997, p.333). Emotives have their greatest effect (and failures) in situations of, what he calls, ‘intense ambivalence’, in which cultural patterns produce both ambivalent situations and the felicitous route by which to navigate them. It is to the extent that social conventions demand the use of emotives to manage such ambivalence that groups may be said to have emotional styles or emotional regimes. Thus, it is emotional management or emotional control that becomes ‘the real site of the exercise of power: politics is just a process of determining who must repress as illegitimate, who must foreground as valuable, the feelings and desires that come up for them in given contexts and relationships’ (Reddy, 1997, p.335). Yet, Reddy prefers the metaphor of ‘navigation’ to that of

⁹⁵ Note that the emotive effect itself derives from this failure of representation; if it did not fail then all emotional utterances would be constative or accurate descriptions. We can say that emotives can be felicitous or infelicitous, like performatives, if the effects are appropriate, in which case an emotive may be called ‘sincere’ or ‘hypocritical’, for example (Reddy, 1997, p.332; Austin, 1962; see also Reddy, 1999).

⁹⁶ In connection to young boys, who are trained to get mad rather than sad when they are angry, this quote continues: ‘Thus, people may be able to regulate their feelings, through their focus and through changing what they learn in given situations. Similarly, they may be able to change the impact of certain kinds of feelings, again by directing thoughts along certain lines. In this way, problem emotions, even though they feel automatic and uncontrollable, may be alterable. This does not mean that unwanted affective reactions will be easy to change (old habits die hard), but it does suggest that change may be possible (cited in Reddy, 1997, p.332).

management. The capacity of self to manage emotions (via emotives) in the context of a specific regime depends on the capacity for the self to 'change course' and make corrections in line with goals-what he calls the 'navigation of feeling' (Reddy, 1999). In this context, he defines 'emotional liberty' as 'the freedom to change goals in response to bewildering, ambivalent thought activations that exceed the capacity of attention and challenge the reign of high-level goals currently guiding the self' (Reddy, 1999, p.272). Emotional suffering, then, results from acute emotional goal conflict. For example, for a person being tortured, the high-priority goals of maintaining bodily health and avoiding pain are in conflict with the loyalty and commitments to group secrecy. In this way, he suggests that a 'normative style of emotional management is a fundamental element of every political regime, of every cultural hegemony' (Reddy, 1999, p.271). Political regimes may be placed on a spectrum of 'strict' and 'loose' emotional regimes, and thus 'very roughly', one might 'generalize that strict regimes offer strong emotional management tools at the expense of allowing greater scope for self-exploration and navigation. Loose regimes allow for navigation and allow diverse sets of management tools to be fashioned locally, individually, or through robust subgroup formation' (Reddy, 1999, p.274).

Reddy does not discuss habitus directly, yet his work and concept of emotional regime may be helpful to an analysis of emotional habitus. He does, positively, mention Williams' notion of 'structures of feeling', which are broadly in line with regimes. Other concepts in the literature that attempt to grasp similar phenomena to regimes are 'emotional climate' and 'emotional culture' (de Rivera, 1992). For de Rivera, emotional climate refers to an objective group phenomenon that can be 'palpably sensed-as when one enters a party or a city and feels an atmosphere of gaiety or depression, openness or fear-only, as the term "climate" implies' (de Rivera, 1992, p.2). These are, he says, distinct from both emotional atmospheres (though he defines climates in terms of atmospheres) and emotional cultures, in that the former are transitory and the latter are dynamically stable. Emotional cultures are usually 'held in place by a network of socialization practices and ordinarily only changes when a culture is transformed over generations of people. Climates, on the other hand, are more dependent on political, religious, economic and educational factors and may change within the course of a single generation' (de Rivera, 1992, p.4). Yet these conceptions are somewhat problematic. Are not political, religious and educational 'factors' themselves networks of socialization? Despite these conceptual issues, the notion of an emotional regime or (or perhaps less satisfactorily)

climate captures something fundamental to the understanding of emotional habitus. What is missing from Reddy's interesting account of emotional regimes is a full conception of the habitus. In conclusion, I wish to briefly discuss this in terms of *tonality*, which may better capture this aspect of the habitus. This is a theme I will return to in later chapters.

3.7. Tonality

Tonality, like our conception of the habitus above, refers, first and foremost, to organization; here the organization of music. It is the 'principle of organizing musical compositions around a central note, the tonic. Generally, any Western or non-Western music periodically returning to a central, or focal, tone exhibits tonality. More specifically, tonality refers to the particular *system of relationships* between notes, chords, and keys (sets of notes and chords) that dominated most Western music from c. 1650 to c. 1900 and that continues to regulate much music' (Encyclopædia Britannica Online).⁹⁷ This is, I think, a useful metaphor to use in relation to the habitus and emotions. Recall that, within the process-relational view, the habitus is described as an organization of the body derived from the individual's relational becoming within specific social structures. In a sense, it is a derived tonality, a 'keying' that the relational environment and personal experience inscribes on the body. When one's habitus resonates or vibrates *with* the relational setting in which it was formed, there is a situation of *consonance* or harmony. The individual is like Bourdieu's famous 'fish in water'. The alternative is a situation of *dissonance* or disharmony. One is out of key with the world. At the micro-level, situations may be characterised as displaying a specific emotional tone, within which a certain range of speech acts, gestures and behaviours may be consonant or in tune with; such as happiness at a fun-filled party. Likewise one may act in a way discordant to the situational tone, such as laughing at a funeral. At the macro-level, a whole society may develop a more or less defined emotional tonality, dominated by a more or less repressive or liberal emotional tone. Individuals socialized within such a relational matrix embody the emotional habitus or constellation of dispositions consonant with that range of emotional tonality. This dominant tonality emerges from the relations of power within the society; fluctuations in these relations change the overall tonality. But there is in most societies a relatively enduring 'tonic', a central

⁹⁷ Tonality. 2013. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Retrieved 10 February, 2013, from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/599046/tonality>

or focal tone that endures over time and changes slowly, around which individual notes fluctuate.

Within societies there are, of course, variations on the dominant tonality at different levels. Depending on social position or class, the range of practices that might be considered harmonious changes, within limits. Yet, there is always room for resistance. If one is able to endure the dissonance and the sanctions that attach to rebellion, one may break out of one's ascribed position-one may 'pull out all the stops', as it were. An individual or group may militate and mobilize to change a societies tone and its process of becoming; to instigate change and promote certain notes and chords, certain aspects of emotional being-in-the-world, over others: to engage in the politics of re/de-legitimization. And an individual's emotional tone also undergoes changes in line with experience, though the effects of primary 'tuning' run deep and resist alteration.

In later chapters I will suggest that the Republic of Ireland began the twentieth century with a dominant and repressive emotional tone that underwent profound and relatively rapid changes as the century progressed. I will further suggest that this state produced (and continued to produce) a corresponding emotional tone in the majority of its citizens and that this emotional tone or habitus may be discerned in the life histories of those interviewed. For some, particularly some elders, the present represents a discordant world with which they are no longer in harmony -a process akin to the 'hysteresis effect' that Bourdieu and others mention (and to which I return later). For the younger groups, the situation is radically different. The emotional tone of late or 'liquid' modernity is wickedly complex. Indeed, in the context of the metaphor in question, it might best be described as 'post-tonal' or 'atonal'. The very notions of consonance and dissonance are being transformed, inverted and reinvented. There is a deep ambiguity that attaches to these changes, which we will show later.

3.8. Conclusion

This chapter has aimed at a critical engagement with habitus theory. I hope to have outlined and clarified a conception of the habitus that is itself in harmony with the wider perspective of relational becoming. I have defended an encompassing conception, which aimed to bring clarity to the intensional and extensional confusions that surround it. I have also suggested that a latent conception of the habitus may be discerned from Whitehead's writings. Despite calls for a greater *rapprochement* with more positivistic disciplines such as neuroscience, and in spite of the work being done on emotional regulation that some sociologists of emotion are keen to address, philosophical and theoretical barriers remain that need to be surmounted, or broken down. Drawing on the concept of emotional regimes, I have discussed emotional habitus and its relationship to social change. I have suggested a metaphor of emotional tonality to characterize this process. I will draw upon this in later chapters.

In the next chapter I outline both the method and the methodology for the empirical part of the project. I will focus on the relationship between emotions and narrative, and critically defend the use of the life history as an appropriate 'way' to the emotional habitus.

4. Chapter Four: Narrative & Method.

4.1. Introduction

So far we have shown how the process-relational view suggests a certain understanding of emotions and emotionality, particularly in relation to habitus. In this chapter I wish to introduce narrative, and make the case for the narrative study and understanding of emotions. This is largely a methodological endeavour and this is thus a ‘methodological’ chapter. In doing so, I draw on the literature from both the narrative and emotions movements within the social sciences in particular. Yet, I also wish to go beyond the purely methodological to explore a deeper homology between these two features of social life. The argument is couched within a process-relational theoretical perspective and attempts to unite narrative and emotions in light of this framework. The dynamic, processual and relational character of both narrative and emotions will be outlined, and linked to the notion of emotional habitus. The third section then outlines the actual design of the study, and briefly recounts the evolution in this over the course of the project. Section four then details the method used in the study. Here, I describe the Biographical Narrative Interpretive Method (BNIM), as adapted by Tom Wengraf and Prue Chamberlyne in particular (e.g. Wengraf, 2001). However, our engagement with this method, and its deployment, is not ‘pure’. In other words, while I found the interview technique and *aspects* of analytical apparatus and underlying methodology particularly suitable to the concerns of this project, I found other aspects associated with BNIM somewhat problematic. I therefore did not use the BNIM programme in full. This critique will comprise section three, where I will outline the more *abductive* interpretive technique used in the particular study here, partly based on BNIM, which is itself partly based on Scheff’s ‘part/whole’ analysis.

These decisions on method and methodology are not arbitrary. Indeed, I wish to stress that the choice of method is in fact driven by the theoretical and particularly ontological commitments discussed in the earlier chapters. The project aspires, ultimately, to be an expression of the sociological imagination as Mills defined it. That is, it aims to grasp ‘history and biography and the relations between the two in society’, but with both conceived as intersecting processes of becoming (Mills, 1959, p.12). In this context, I suggest that the emotional habitus may be accessed via the elicitation of biographical narrative interviews.

What the interviews reveal is this *relational becoming* of both the individual and the wider society in which she is embedded.

Before moving to the method, I wish to say something about emotions and narrative as concepts. Despite the advent of the so-called ‘narrative turn’ and ‘emotions turn’, both narrative and emotions have had a troubled, and similar history in the social sciences. Margaret Somers, for example, has described narrative as the social science’s ‘epistemological other’; a concept framed by the dominant knowledge culture in binary terms, and viewed as being ‘idiographic verses nomothetic, particularist verses generalizable, or description verses theory’ (Somers, 1994, p.613). Emotions too, as we have seen, were cast on the losing side of the binary opposition, usually opposed to reason (Barbalet, 1998). As such, emotion and narrative have suffered similar fates within the social sciences and have only recently been reframed in a more positive light. They are, I suggest, epistemological brothers in their epistemological otherness. In what follows, I hope to show how they have much more in common than this shared history of enmity and indifference.

4.2. On Narrative

But before we proceed on to this, we must ask the question: what do we mean by narrative? Hayden White has suggested that raising the question of the nature of narrative is ‘to invite reflection on the very nature of culture and, possibly, even on the nature of humanity itself. So natural is the impulse to narrate, so inevitable is the form of narrative for any report of the way things really happened, that narrativity could appear problematical only in a culture in which it was absent...or programmatically refused’ (White, 1980, p.5). This ‘*ubiquity* of narrative’ thesis is also found in Barthes (Barthes & Duisit, 1975), for whom narrative exists in an infinite variety of forms and is present at all times, in all places and in all societies (Barthes & Duisit, 1975, p.237). He writes:

indeed, narrative starts with the very history of mankind; there is not, there has never been anywhere, any people without narrative; all classes, all human groups, have their stories, and very often those stories are enjoyed by men of different and even opposite cultural backgrounds...Like life itself, it is there, international, transhistorical, transcultural. Are we to infer from such universality that narrative is insignificant? (Barthes & Duisit, 1975, *ibid*).

Here is an encapsulation of a common view: narratives are universal features of human existence, much like emotionality. Yet, despite this apparent ubiquity, narrative was devalued and discredited within the social sciences for most of the 20th century, again, much like emotionality. The difficulties of approaching something so universal and pervasive, so taken for granted and seemingly ‘natural’ as narrative (and, indeed, emotion) are numerous. Therefore, we must begin by getting a handle on what narrative is.

At its most fundamental, I wish to suggest, narratives, too, have the character of becoming. Their very structure is a temporal sequence of events, which could be taken as a restatement of Whitehead’s core concerns. Indeed, if Whitehead’s universe is anything, it is a narrative universe, displaying some of the key features of narrative structure. Both the organic and the inorganic enjoy ‘life-histories’ in his cosmology. One useful, if somewhat dry, definition of narrative, suggesting an association with becoming, is offered by Hinchman & Hinchman (1997). They write that: ‘narratives (stories) in the human sciences should be defined provisionally as discourses with a clear sequential order that connect events in a meaningful way for a definite audience and thus offer insights about the world and/or people’s experiences of it’ (Hinchman & Hinchman, 1997, cited in Elliott, 2006). Labov and Waletzky (1967) offer an informal definition of narrative as ‘one method of *recapitulating* past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events that actually occurred (Labov & Waletzky, 1967, p.20 emphasis added).⁹⁸ In Toolan’s minimalist definition, they are a ‘perceived sequence of non-randomly connected events’ (Toolan, 1988, p.7). In fact, almost all definitions of narrative suggest that, at their core, narratives consist of a structured sequence of events.⁹⁹ I contend that such view of narrative implies that they are, in themselves, structured as processes of becoming and, as narrative accounts of the life story, are accounts of the socially situated process of becoming of individual agents. It is this aspect of narrative (in general) that suggests it as a suitable for the process-relational approach, from both a methodological and a theoretical view.

But there is more to the story of story. Not every sequence of events should be considered a narrative. In addition to this *eventful* character of narrative, a story’s content is also closely related to its structure. A random chronology is not a narrative. The key to narrative is plot

⁹⁸ I return to the status of narrative texts and the question of recapitulation or representation/construction later.

⁹⁹ See Franzosi (1998) for a useful review.

or *emplotment* (Somers, 1994). In Aristotle's work, for whom narrative must have a beginning, middle and end, a *plot* is the key organizing structure of narrative. The elements of a narrative must not only be temporally connected but also display some form of logical connection and coherence.¹⁰⁰ As Franzosi puts it, 'the temporal ordering of events in a story is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of a story' (Franzosi, 1998, p.520-1). One common and much analysed aspect of this aspect of emplotment is the 'reversal', or the 'turn' in the story; what Aristotle referred to as the 'peripeteia' (see Bruner, 2002, p.5). If this reversal is positive, the outcome is comedy; if negative, tragedy. Thus, narrative at its purest consists not only in succession but also *transformation*; a change in the 'natural order', a jump between zero and one. A becoming.

All of which might apply to narrative in general. Yet, what we are concerned with here are, what I will call, *socio-personal narratives*, rather than literary ones. Narratology is undoubtedly a multi-disciplinary, and often inter-disciplinary endeavour, militating against sharp disciplinary divisions. In what follows however, rather than attempt to address all approaches to narrative in the social sciences, I wish to be very specific, and to concentrate on those approaches that are commensurable with the process-relational approach of the project. As I have suggested, for a long time the notion of narrative was devalued in the social sciences and considered unscientific.¹⁰¹ This has gradually changed and narrative inquiry has become a legitimate, and growing, form of (specifically) *social* research (Elliot, 2006).

Indeed, for many, there has been a shift in conceptions of narrative from one in which it is (merely) a mode of *representation*, to that of an *ontological* narrativity. In this reframed view, as Somers, for example, suggests, social life is itself seen as storied, and narrative is an ontological condition of social life (Somers, 1994, p.614). She writes, citing supporting research that shows how 'stories guide action; that people construct identities (however multiple and changing) by locating themselves or being located within a repertoire of emplotted stories; that 'experience' is constituted through narratives; that people make sense of what has happened

¹⁰⁰ More recently this coherence thesis has been subject to renewed critique. See, for example, Hyvärinen et al, 2010.

¹⁰¹ For one well known objection towards a narrative approach see Read Bain (1935) who wrote that sociology would: 'forever remain a bastard discipline...containing...a hodge podge of pretentious words, random observations, speculations, opinions, pious hopes and fears, attitudes, wishes, sophisticated logic and literary purple patches...(s)hould a sociologist be a Zola or a Quetelet?' (Bain, 1935, cited in Ewick & Silbey, 1995, p.198).

and is happening to them by attempting to assemble or...integrate these happenings within one or more narratives' (Somers, *ibid*). We live, from this perspective, in 'story-shaped worlds' (Sarbin, 2001, p.218) and, for Somers, have 'narrative identities' (*op cit*).

4.3. Emotions & Narrative: A Process-Relational View

In this ontological view, narrative is inherently relational and processual. Indeed, the etymology of the word 'narration' itself comes from the Latin 'gnarus' (to know) and 'narro', to *re-late*, to tell, to establish a relationship between (see White, 1980). Narratives, I suggest, are inherently relational, in a number of ways. They are *internally* relational; in that they are discursive processes which consist of sequentially ordered meaningful events. The parts of the story must be connected together to *be* a story. Most narratologists agree that narratives contain a number of specific features. These include temporality, selectivity, sequence, place and causal employment (Elliot, 2005, Somers, 1994, Abbott, 2001). Thus narratives can be seen as *constellations of relationships* (connected parts), embedded in time and space, constituted by such causal employment: 'narrativity demands that we discern the meaning of any single event only in spatial and temporal relationship to other events. Indeed, the chief characteristic of narrative is that renders understanding only by *connecting* (however unstably) *parts* to a constructed *configuration* or a *social network* of relationships' (Somers, 1994, p.616 original emphasis). This plotted and embedded relationality effectively turns *events* into *episodes* (*ibid*).

However, not all narrativists are equal, from a process-relational perspective. Some definitions in the literature display a stronger 'substantialist stamp' than that of Somers. By concentrating on only the *internal* characteristics of narrative, the dialogic and externally relational aspects are lost or omitted. Such an approach 'ignores the processual, contingent and collaborative aspects and downplays the transactional features...Narratives are fluid, continuous, dynamic and always constructed interactively - with an audience and within a context - out of the stuff of other narratives' (Ewick & Silbey, 2003, pp.1342-3). Thus a formalistic, non-transactional or non-social conception retains the *internal* relationality of narrative to the detriment, or exclusion of, this *external* relationality. They are guilty of what Elias called 'process reduction', they reify and make static that which should be seen as processual and dynamic. Stories, to *be* stories, need to be told and heard/read, and are

constructed to be so. Narratives, then, are relational, processual, and, for many, ubiquitous features of the human condition. Social narratives or *transactional* storytelling (as opposed to literary narratives) are also an *embodied* process. They are both embodied in the sense that they rely on biological and neurological processes of memory, imagination and emotion, but also, the actual telling of a story has a corporeal, somatic aspect. We use our bodies when we tell our stories, and a whole level of meaning and communication goes on at the level of the body (including voice, hexis, comportment, body language etc). These embodied aspects of social narrative processes have perhaps not received the attention they deserve.

Yet, aspects of this ontological narrative perspective appear over-stated. Strawson (2004), for example, offers some valuable criticisms of the ‘life as narrative’ approach in the work of Bruner and others.¹⁰² With him I tend to agree that not *everyone* is a ‘natural story teller’ and not every narrative offers the linear coherence that many narratologists expect. This assumption of stable and coherent narratives in life histories as the productions of stable, coherent selves is problematic. The over-enthusiastic promotion of anything, including narrative, may lead us to ignore important aspects of our study. There is in ‘story’, as Craib (2000) reminds us, always the danger of ‘bad faith’, of overt or self-deception in the recounting of stories, or in the rationalizations that insulate the self from criticism or deny agency.¹⁰³ Further, as Torn (2011) and others show, coherence may not be a feature of the narratives of the mentally ill, or I would add, others in situations of crisis or distress.¹⁰⁴ To fetishize coherence and linearity is to remain trapped in a modernist mode of thinking. Indeed, as I will suggest later, fragmented and less coherent narratives may be a defining feature of our liquid modern lives. Furthermore, as Gergen (1994) writes, self-narratives are always forms of ‘social accounting or public discourse’; they are co-creations of a specific time and context and a specific situation with the researcher.

Narratives, moreover, are complex. They do not exist as free-floating stories, but are themselves embedded in and intertwine with other stories; in the flow of events and

¹⁰² In particular, he suggests that there may be two ‘types’ of people, narrative and episodic, which he thinks may be based on genetic differences. Despite the problematic determinism, Strawson may have a point in that, even in the interviews conducted for this project, not all participants were particularly good at ‘telling stories’ and, indeed, actively resisted it. I return to this later.

¹⁰³ This is not to suggest agreement with Craib’s position as a whole, such as his discussion of the ‘inner life’ etc.

¹⁰⁴ Torn (2011) offers an insightful analysis of Mary Barnes’ account of her ‘journey through madness’, written with her psychiatrist, drawing on Bakhtin’s notion of the ‘chronotope’.

experiences. As Abbott writes: "Every event lies in many narratives at once. Every event has multiple narrative antecedents as well as multiple narrative consequences. That is, the full social process, when viewed in narrative terms, makes up a network of stories flowing into the present and future" (Abbott, 1992, p.438). Thus, in addition to questions of coherence, narratives themselves are interconnected and complex. All of these elements need to be kept in mind when discussing narratives.

One other critic of both biography and life history, though rarely mentioned, is Bourdieu. For him, life history is 'one of those common-sense notions which has been smuggled into the learned universe, first with little noise among anthropologists, and then with a lot of noise among sociologists' (Bourdieu, [1987]2000). He suggests that both the researcher and the participant have an interest in the co-production of intelligibility and coherence; that the researcher is complicit in making the interviewee 'the ideologist of (her) own life, through the selection of a few significant events with a view to elucidating an overall purpose, and through the creation of causal or final links between them which will make them coherent' (Bourdieu, [1987]2000, p.298). This, he calls the 'biographical illusion'; a rhetorical trick and an 'artificial creation of meaning' (ibid)¹⁰⁵ Such a production of self leads to the construction of a 'trajectory'; as:

a series of successively occupied positions by the same agent...in a space which itself is constantly evolving and which is subject to incessant transformations. Trying to understand a life as a unique and self-sufficient series of successive events (sufficient unto itself), and without ties other than the association to a 'subject' whose constancy is probably just that of a proper name, is nearly as absurd as trying to make sense out of a subway route without taking into account the network structure, that is the matrix of objective relations between the different stations...In other words one can understand a trajectory...only on condition of having previously constructed the successive states of the field through which the trajectory has progressed (Bourdieu, [1987]2000, pp.301-2).

This criticism of Bourdieu has largely been ignored by narrative sociologists, which is particularly problematic for those who deploy other Bourdieusian concepts and frameworks, like his version of habitus and capital. Yet, here too, Bourdieu's remarks are over-stated. As we suggested in the last chapter, following Crossley (2011), the notion of 'objective relations'

¹⁰⁵ Interestingly, even in his *Sketch for a Self-Analysis* (2004), the first words are 'this is not an autobiography'.

is problematic in itself. Yet, beyond that, I would suggest that the broader, and less rigid, conceptualization of habitus discussed in the last chapter is part of the actors ongoing stability through time, rather than merely one's 'proper name'. Furthermore, rather than denouncing the attempts toward coherence by the fragile individual, embedded in structured chaos ('chaosmos' in Delueze's terms, or at least, his description of Whitehead's universe), efforts toward a life history should be better conceived positively, as an effort towards reflexive self-understanding, as well as presentation of self. As Ricoeur suggests, such life histories are perhaps better understood as both historical and fictional creations, rather than 'illusions'; as 'historical fictions' (Ricoeur, 1992, p.114).¹⁰⁶ There is quite a difference between the two. As such, the narratives (if given in 'good faith') offer an interpretation of the life events and experiences but also reveal the contexts from which those experiences emerged; the relational and cultural context. Furthermore, given that this project is using a BNIM-style approach to analysis of these life histories, a study of the 'objective' biographic data, while not necessarily of fields, is conducted alongside the analysis of the 'told' story. And both are placed in the context of an overall becoming of the national state, and the wider world. Thus, against Bourdieu and his often-repeated disdain for 'lived experience', as I discussed in relation to Whitehead earlier, I wish to champion lived experience as constitutive of both relational becoming, character and habitus. Efforts at coherence in narratives are themselves sociological facts, and the 'success' at narrative (or lack thereof), should be treated as data, rather than illusion.

Nevertheless, if the ubiquity and coherence of narratives has been exaggerated in places, narrative can still be said to be an immensely important aspect of the human condition. So too, as we have seen, are the emotions. Within the narrative literature a number of thinkers suggest that narratives have a closer relationship with emotions, as well as having shared a similar history within the social sciences. I suggest this is best characterized as a structural homology. They are both ('internal') relational process constituted by, and inextricably linked to, an individual's embeddedness in specific collective process-relational context (or networks of interdependence). While much has been written about how social relations are typified by relations of power, as I discussed earlier, such relations of power are always emotionally

¹⁰⁶ He writes: 'self-understanding is an interpretation; interpretation of the self, in turn, finds in the narrative, among other signs and symbols, a privileged form of mediation; the latter borrows from history as well as from fiction, making a life story a fictional history or, if one prefers, a historical fiction' (ibid). See also Truc (2011) for a fascinating comparison between the two Frenchmen on this very issue. While I agree with much of what Truc suggests, he retains a conceptualization of 'identity' that I continue to find problematic.

valanced (see also Heaney, 2011). That is, emotions and power are the structural (or structuring) features of *all* human relationships. As Emirbayer and Goldberg write, following Dewey, '(a)ctors are always implicated in relations with other actors, and emotions cannot be extricated from those relations or seen as the properties of some disengaged or disembedded subjectivity' (Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005, p.490; Burkitt, 1999). I would add, as outlined in the last chapter, this relational perspective further suggests a relationship between emotions and power. E-motion, *emovere* is always a moving outward, or a removal from, toward or away from an object, a situation, another person in a social transaction or, indeed, the memory of such transactions. The standards and codes surrounding such emotional responses, and the standards of their regulation and management, as Elias, and, indeed, Wouters, have shown, are of course contingent on the socio-historical, cultural and emotional matrix in which the actor finds herself and has been raised. The point is that the emotions are fundamentally relational in character and, for the sociologist, transpersonal rather than individual. Emotions, too, are processual in character, as we have seen in chapter two. And, like narrative, they are *embodied* processes. Elias, as mentioned, was very aware of the biological aspects of emotional process and the relationship between the learned and unlearned in their manifestations: we are 'by nature constituted for life in the company of others, for life in society' (Elias, 1987, p.361).

Yet, here too, there are potential problems for the process-relational perspective. As Sarbin has suggested, most of the literature ultimately speaks of emotions as *things*. In tones redolent of Elias, Sarbin (2001) decries the nominative form in which we tend to discuss discrete emotions at all. It is, he writes, based on an outmoded ontology: 'in every list, ancient or modern, the authors have preferred to label emotions with nouns...[which reflects a]...passion for reification, for taking complex human actions denoted by verb forms and transforming them into literal entities denoted by nouns, with an implication of thingness' (Sarbin, 2001, p.218). He suggests that we study 'emotional life' instead, itself seen as a *narrative* construction and reconstruction, in which the terms anger, fear, shame, and so on, are understood as the names of 'narrative plots'. Embodiment in this perspective refers to the bodily expression that arises from the actor placing herself in a particular narrative, for example, in a sadness narrative we embody tears and weeping. Rather than focusing on specific emotions, we should instead investigate specific situations, or the relational settings in which these emotional/narrative plotments are played out. I suggest below that this is what the biographical-narrative can give rise to, in that they narrative both the relational

setting and the emotional life that emerges from that setting. This narrative view of emotions is also evident in other, more cognitive views, such as those of Nausbaum, and De Sousa, who discuss 'paradigm stories' and 'paradigm scenarios' to express a similar aspect of emotionality. That is, its narrative nature.

So far, I hoped to have shown how a relational-process conceptualisation of narrative and emotions reveals deep similarities between both. Both are processual and relational in character, both are embodied, and both can be considered as 'structured fluxes' (Elias): emotions can be seen as narratively structured and narratives as emotionally structured. A recent paper by Jochen Kleres (2010) addresses this complex relationship, the emotional nature of narrative and the narrative nature of emotions, very well. He suggests that a narrative approach to the *study* of emotions:

grants us access to human experience as it is inextricably meaningful and emotional at the same time. The very nature of emotional experience can be conceptualized as essentially narrative in nature (rather than (only) mediated by narratives) and vice versa: narratives essentially are emotionally structured. Emotions emerge from this as essentially narrative configurations, scenarios or gestalt. Rather than existing as discrete, isolated, reifiable things, they exist in the very sets of narrative elements that make up a specific instance of emotional experience, that is a specific configuration of actors, objects, conditions, actions, events, etc. (Kleres, 2010, p.7).

Thus, though he doesn't really elaborate on this, if we see emotions as narrative processes then our emotional experiences are constituted by the relational process, (or configurations, or situational circumstances, events and conditions) as they *matter* for the emoting subject (ibid, p.8). As such, in what follows, I hope to show how one form of narrative inquiry, the Biographical-Narrative approach to interviewing, provides an excellent method with which to reveal the emotions, the emotional habitus and the relational matrix in which specific individuals are embedded.

4.4. The Design of the Study

The empirical study used in this project is predominately qualitative and consists of a series of biographical-narrative interviews. The actual design evolved over the duration of the project, reflecting a number of key changes in orientation for the project as a whole, aspects of which will be detailed here. At the beginning of the project my initial plan was to conduct six biographical interviews, using the full BNIM approach on just three of these. The original criteria for inclusion was based on three age profiles: 16-19 year olds, 20-64, and over 65's. However, in 2010, I was informed of the 'Life History and Social Change Project' in NUI Maynooth.¹⁰⁷ This is a large database which contains 200 life history interviews, collected between 1994 and 2001 with participants of the 'Living in Ireland' Survey. This database was about to come on stream and made available to interested researchers in Ireland and elsewhere. I redesigned to the study, intending to perform secondary analysis on these data, as well as conducting my own BNIM interviews and then comparing between the two sets. In this study, the birth cohorts used are the group: 1925-1934; 1945-1954 and 1965-1974. These three cohorts thus enabled them to interview people reaching adulthood in the crucial decades of the 1950s (an era of socio-economic decline), the 1970s (an era of initial 'modernisation') and the 1990s (the 'Celtic Tiger' boom) and I altered my design to match theirs. However, to this I added an additional cohort to capture the younger age profile, born between 1985-1994, which are omitted from the Maynooth study.

Thus, the revised design included four cohorts, with four members from each cohort being interviewed (half male, half female) for a total of 16 BNIM interviews. This revised design facilitated a greater clarity regarding inclusion and exclusion. The new inclusion criteria for each cohort became clearer as a result. Participants had to be Irish citizens who have been raised, schooled and socialised in the Irish Republic. This means that they cannot have spent more than one year consecutively outside of the Irish State prior to reaching maturity (i.e. 16 years old), and that the Irish state, Irish school system, Irish family structures, and Irish media have been the primary pillars of socialisation to which they have been exposed.¹⁰⁸ Anyone not falling within the specific birth cohorts was excluded, as were those from 'vulnerable groups', such as people with known learning difficulties, 'psychological disorders' or intellectual

¹⁰⁷ See here: <http://na-srv-1dv.nuim.ie/iqda/archive/view/iqda:10028>

¹⁰⁸ This 'one year' rule is of course somewhat arbitrary but I felt that some inclusion/exclusion criteria should be applied if, for nothing else, to save time.

disabilities sufficiently severe to warrant sustained medical attention or medication. For example, an inability to read and understand the participant information material and the consent form would deem that person ineligible. Irish citizens who have not been socialized in the Irish state are also excluded, along with those who have spent in excess of one year in another jurisdiction prior to reaching maturity. Thus, for example, a 19-year-old black Irish male with African parents who was born, reared and schooled in Ireland could be included in this study, while a 65-year-old white Irish female who taught Irish in Connemara for twenty years but lived in South Africa until she was 10 would be excluded.

Eventually I was granted access to the first tranche of the dataset at the end of November, 2010, containing the interviews of the older cohort. However, having read these over the following months, and after conducting some preliminary analysis, I became concerned that the divergence between these semi-structured interviews, displaying a very high degree of interviewer interaction, and the BNIM approach of little or no interaction would be methodologically problematic to compare. Eventually, after much deliberation and advice, I decided not to use the dataset. The data collection proceeded using the revised design as planned.

Sixteen interviews is, of course, far too many to be included in a BNIM-based project. Given the vast amounts of data produced and the labour intensive analysis and interpretation procedures, a single researcher could never handle this volume of data alone. Therefore, as this aspect of project was again going to be deeper rather than broad, this project is now based on eight such interviews. About two of these could be considered 'pilot' interviews, as my technique was far from perfect in the beginning. Therefore, in the following chapters I will be drawing on the data from six biographical-narrative interviews. Three of these were analysed in detail, though not using the 'full' BNIM procedure, as I detail below. The sampling method used could be considered as a theoretically-driven quota sampling, which is not statistically representative or generalizable. As such, the project is in this sense exploratory, and does not aim at probabilistic generalizability. Rather, what it does aim for is a weaving of the historical and the biographical in to a type of part/whole analysis; to use the concrete cases to explore aspects of social change and habitus and the reciprocal interchange between history and biography in late or liquid modernity. The cases used later are, as such, 'ideal types'.

Regarding the recruitment of individual participants, a number of strategies were attempted, with varying degrees of success at different stages of the process. A number of those interviewed from the younger cohorts were university students or friends of university students. Recruitment here consisted of announcements at lectures, emails and a (short-lived and rather unsuccessful) poster campaign. For the older participants there was more of a snowball or chain sampling effect at work. For example, one friend of mine suggested that I interview his acquaintance 'Harry' (who we meet in chapter seven). Harry, drawing on his tacit knowledge of the area, told me about 'Mickey' (who we meet in the next chapter) a bachelor-farmer in his eighties that 'I simply must talk to', given my interest in social change in Ireland. Without this local knowledge and contact I would not have had the opportunity to access this rich, but relatively hidden, participant (from a difficult-to-access population). As this project does not aspire to be representative or generalizable, the problems of such a method of recruitment do not cause me undue trouble. Other participants were recruited by myself directly. For example, I contacted a number of active retirement groups, sent them on participant information sheets and recruited some participants here. I will discuss the selection of the 'golden cases', Eddie and Mickey, in the next chapter.

4.5. The Method: BNIM

Here I wish to outline the method used in the study. This decision on method was neither an easy nor arbitrary one, and in fact follows on directly from the ontological and theoretical commitments to which the project as a whole adheres. Recall that the 'object' of my inquiry is the emotional habitus of the participants, the acquired 'structure of feeling' that is the processual reflection of the network within which the individual is embedded. In what follows I wish to argue for the suitability of a narrative approach to the exploration of both habitus, and relational matrix; in effect that the narrative 'speaks' both the network and the subjective structure of feeling. I will further suggest that the method is compatible with the process-relational approach outlined in the preceding chapters. As such, I am using BNIM more as a *method*, rather than a full methodology, and I am selectively appropriating aspects of that method, rather than the full programme. I feel that the methodological heavy lifting has already been achieved. What remains is to make the case for their commensurability.

Prior to doing so, I will outline the method itself. The Biographical Narrative Interpretive Method (BNIM) is a form of very lightly-structured depth interviewing and analysis. The approach was developed by Gabriele Rosenthal (1993) and Wolfram Fischer-Rosenthal (2000) in Germany in the 1970's, drawing on the work of linguists, such as Labov and Waletzky, the methodological approach of Fritz Schütze, with elements of both 'grounded theory' and phenomenological sociology (e.g. Alfred Schütz) (see Wengraf, 2001, Chamberlayne et al, 2000).¹⁰⁹ The particular method adopted here is based on the 'English translation' of this approach, based on the work and training offered by Prue Chamberlyne and Tom Wengraf in the UK and elsewhere.¹¹⁰ This particular approach has been used in a number of large-scale, internationally comparative research projects, such as the 'Cultures of Care' project (Chamberlayne & King, 2000) and the Social Strategies in Risk Societies (SOSTRIS) project (see Chamberlayne et al. 2002).¹¹¹ In this project the authors contend that their life history method enabled them to 'track the processes of "structuration" as it takes place within an individual's life...(and) is primarily interested in processes of change in individuals lives over sequences of time' (Chamberlayne et al, 2002, p.9). All of which suggests that BNIM be considered as part of the wider 'biographical turn' in the social sciences.

BNIM has a very specific structure and complex methods of data analysis and interpretation. This method is concerned, it is claimed:

to clarify both (evolving) situations and (evolving) subjectivities by exploring locally-historically 'situated subjectivities' through eliciting and interpreting biographic narratives through clear (and largely auditable) procedures... Assuming that "biographic narrative expression" is expressive both of conscious concerns and also of unconscious cultural, societal and individual presuppositions and processes, BNIM supports research into the complexities of the lived experience of individuals and collectives. It facilitates understanding both the 'inner' and the 'outer' worlds of 'historically-evolving persons in historically-evolving situations', and particularly the interactivity of such inner and outer world dynamics (Wengraf, 2009, p.36).

¹⁰⁹ This early work in Germany was concerned with the witnesses to and participants as soldiers in the Nazi army of WW2. This was largely centered around the QUATEXT group in Berlin (i.e. QuaText - Institut für qualitative Sozialforschung). See the site: http://www.quatext.de/Englisch/index_e.htm.

¹¹⁰ I attended a 5-day intensive training in BNIM in 2009 which was conducted by Chamberlyne and Wengraf. This took place at the Burren College of Art, Ballyvaughan Co. Clare, from 19-25th November. This was a week-long intensive training course was attended by members of the NUIG narrative studies group, as well as by visiting participants from the University of Limerick, University College Dublin, and the University of Sheffield, UK.

¹¹¹ This was EU-funded, three-year multi-country study comparing the social strategies of people in disadvantaged categories across Europe coping, or attempting to cope, with 'modernization' and the 'risk society'.

Thus, what the method aims to uncover is both experience and events; conscious concerns and, what I would label, habitus.¹¹² I will later argue that these ‘situated subjectivities’ are revealing of the embodied emotional habitus of the participants. As such, this is an ideal method with which to test the core questions of the research project. There are two main components to this method: the interview and the analysis/interpretation. The interview consists of two or three *subsessions*, with each participant. The first day consists of subsession one and two, which are separated by a short interlude. Some projects using BNIM also conduct a third subsession, which is based on a more traditional semi-structured interview rather than a specifically narrative/life history one, and this occurs up to four weeks later. Prior to the interview, each participant will have read the participant information sheet and signed the consent form; and had time to reflect on their participation. Below is a depiction of the steps involved in the BNIM interview process, after which I offer a short description of each.




Figure 5. The BNIM Interview Process

¹¹² Some researchers make a sharp distinction between ‘event’ based narratives and ‘experience’ based ones. The former is considered to continue a move Labovian and structuralist approach to analysis (Patterson, 2008), while the latter is more ‘culturally-orientated, phenomenological and hermeneutic (Squire, 2008). I think the difference is a little over-stated, but suggest that BNIM attempts to unify the two in both the elicitation and the analysis of the interviews.

4.5.1. Subsession 1: The SQUIN

On meeting the participant, I first ensure that they are fully satisfied with what is involved. I reiterate the key points in the participant information sheet and make sure that they are willing for the data to be recorded, and are happy to have me publish material from the transcripts. I stress that they can change their minds and stop proceedings at any time. When the participant is comfortable and happy to proceed I begin subsession one. This involves the asking of a SQUIN-a 'single question aimed at inducing narrative'. The SQUIN used for most of the interviews conducted was:

As you know, I'm researching social change in Ireland. In a minute I'm going to ask you to tell me your life story. All the experiences and the events which were important for you, up to now. You can start wherever you like, I'll listen first, I won't interrupt, I'll just take some notes for later. So, when you are ready, can you please tell me your life story?

The participant then tells their story, uninterrupted, structuring the story themselves with the most minimal intervention possible on behalf of the researcher. During this period, the researcher does not ask any more questions and remains almost passive throughout, only facilitating further narrative should the participant stop or get stuck. As the interviewee speaks the researcher takes very brief notes of key topics, focusing on the specific words used by the participant (*'cue phrases'*). This session can go on for an hour or longer in some cases, for minutes in others. It is important to allow the participant to end the interview themselves. BNIM also recommends asking 'anything else, anything you would like to add' when the narrative is finished, which often produces further narrative emerging (which can be very fruitful). It is the participant who decides when they are finished.

There are a few points to note about this subsession. Firstly, the design and wording of the SQUIN, despite appearances, was subject to much revision. One difficulty of emotions research in general, and I think this is particularly true in an Irish context, is that many participants are apprehensive of emotions talk or being 'interrogated' about their emotional lives. Indeed, as I will suggest later, some participants were at pains, despite my best efforts, to assure me that they had 'no major emotional upset in their lives' or no major 'issues', and

so on, despite my best efforts.¹¹³ This fear of pathologization, or its inverted twin, self-pathologisation is particular problem of late modernity, a topic I return to in detail in chapter seven. Popular discourse is littered with poorly understood and often outmoded psychoanalytical categories and words, and individuals often either flee from therapeutic discourse or seek to wrap it around themselves as a protective mist. It is, as such, difficult to research emotions and social change, head on, as it were; we must *sidle up* on the emotional habitus. Thus, after a number of revisions and discussions (at the BNIM training week and elsewhere) I decided to use the broadest and least structured form of SQUIN: the classic ‘life history’.

The life history has its own life history within the social sciences (Bertaux & Kohli, 1984). Here I wish to briefly offer some reasons for the decision to use this *particular* form of interview. For some, there are difficulties with such a broad approach, both methodologically and from the perspective of the participants. Some researchers prefer to focus on a particular stage or passage of life, or to loosely structure the elicitation by suggesting a theme or metaphor (‘I like you to tell me the story of your *working life*’ or ‘I’d like you to tell me about the *transitions* in your life’, ‘your life as a *woman*’ etc). Others use tools like the ‘life grid’, or some other structuring tool (Elliott, 2006, p.31).¹¹⁴ For some participants, this lack of structure in the (full) BNIM approach can be disconcerting, as it was for a number of my own participants. For example, ‘Cathy’, a 21 year old female student, found it especially difficult. Her subsession one only lasted three minutes, much of which consisted of her wracking her brains, looking for ‘relevant’ material. She said: ‘let me think...what’s relevant in my life...it’s all too vague for me now...I’d prefer something specific...if you’ll direct me I’ll find it easier’ (Cathy, SS1). This resistance to the unstructured life history is perhaps quite widespread and, as such, make this quite a risky method of data collection.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, the researcher must, in a very real sense, ‘bracket’ or remove their research question from the process for the process to work; a difficult and risky strategy. Yet, from my perspective, the benefits

¹¹³ In some of the earlier interviews the SQUIN began: ‘As you know, I am researching *emotions* and social change in Ireland...’ but later chose to drop the reference to emotions here, because of this effect. Participants still knew my research topic from the information sheets, but the omission of a direct reference to emotions proved useful.

¹¹⁴ Elliott writes: ‘some individuals might find it very difficult to respond if simply asked to produce an account of their life. This is a particular problem if the focus of the research is on the broad life course or on experiences (such as education and training or employment) that may span a great many years. As was mentioned above, respondents are likely to find it easier to talk about specific times and situations rather than being asked about a very wide time frame’ (Elliott, 2006, p.31).

¹¹⁵ Despite the problems with SS1, SS2 went better with Cathy, and lasted over an hour.

outweigh the risks. It is important that the interviewee structure the process of their relational becoming themselves. This emergent structure is itself part of the data and, I suggest, one aspect of habitus disclosure. Furthermore, in addition to how the participant reacts, how precisely they structure their account is even more important. The 'fuzzy framing' of the question allows this structuring to occur. It is *their* spontaneous *gestalt* that is crucial in this method. In addition, there is the question of power in the interview. The interview relation, like all relations, is characterized by power and emotion. The goal of the SQUIN, and the BNIM interview process as a whole, is to make this power relation *as asymmetric as possible* in favour of the participant (Wengraf, 2001, p.113). This is in sharp contradistinction to the more usual interview process, where the 'expert' interrogates (what used to be called) the 'subject', with the interviewer having and exercising 'power over' the respondent. The method used here empowers the participant; it is she who decides the what, how, when of the life story to present, based on her own 'systems of relevancy' (Wengraf, 2001, p.124). From the perspective of the power literature discussed in the last chapter, it is the interviewee in this scenario that has '2-D' power, in that they 'set the agenda' themselves. This is of course not to suggest that such elicited narratives do not reflect the hegemonic relations of power in wider society; the point is that they do, and arguably more effectively than direct, 'on the nose' questioning can achieve. I will return to these issues later.

Finally, and relatedly, once the SQUIN is asked, the interviewer is not supposed to intervene until the participant has completed their life history. This, too, is a more difficult process than it might sound, requiring a large degree of self-restraint on behalf of the researcher. The aim is to maintain a stance of 'non-directional facilitative support' during sub-session one, which has similarities with Freud's 'free association' and Carl Rogers' 'non-directive counselling' (Wengraf, 2001, p.125, see also Holloway & Jefferson, 2000).¹¹⁶ While I do not wish to place this study within a psychoanalytical frame (a topic I return to later), there is much to commend this open and non-directional approach, in some cases at least. But the stance is 'unnatural' and does not come easily. The 'normal' reaction in such a situation if someone is stumbling in their account or seeking direction or affirmation is, for most of us, to engage in Goffmanian 'repair work'. This is certainly my habitual response. To resist this response, while simultaneously engaged in highly focused 'active listening' and rapid note taking, can be

¹¹⁶ Holloway & Jefferson (2000, p.36) write: 'the art and skill of the exercise is to assist narrators to say more about their lives (to assist the emergence of Gestalts) without at the same time offering interpretations, judgements or otherwise imposing the interviewer's own relevancies, which would thus destroy the interviewee's Gestalt.'

cognitively straining, particularly over the course of a long interview. Yet, when it ‘works’ the results are impressive. I will later add the notion of habitus to the notion of gestalt used by the BNIM practitioners. Above all the life history is both processual and reflective of the relational becoming of the socially situated individual. As Rosenthal writes:

A life story does not consist of an atomistic chain of experiences, whose meaning is created at the moment of their articulation, but is rather a process taking place simultaneously against the backdrop of a biographical structure of meaning, which determines the selection of the individual episodes presented, and within the context of the interaction with a listener or imaginary audience. This texture of meaning is constantly reaffirmed and transformed in the ‘flux of life’. It is constituted by the interweaving of socially prefabricated and given patterns of planning and interpretation of the ‘normal’ life, together with the biographically relevant events and experiences and their on-going reinterpretations. (Rosenthal, 1993, p.3).

By using the SQUIN and not, as much as possible, structuring the interview, the process facilitates the participant’s structuring of their own life story, with both the events and experiences and the (more or less) tacit interpretation of that experience. Neither we as scientists nor our participants can escape interpretation. As Whitehead suggests, ‘our habitual experience is a complex of failure and success in the enterprise of interpretation. If we desire a record of uninterrupted experience, we must ask a stone to record its autobiography’(Whitehead, [1929]1978, p.15). It is both our experience and our account of that experience that is revealing of the habitus, and of the wider societal emotional regimes.

4.5.2. The Interlude

So, after asking the SQUIN, while the participant is giving their initial ‘life story’, the researcher takes notes continually, while engaged in ‘active listening’. The notes taken are ‘topic notes’, which record the list of topics that the participant raised during their initial narrative. It is important to the method that the topic phrases or words are the actual words used by the participant, specific to the idiom and dialect of the participant. Once the narrative is over, including the coda, there is a short break of around 15 minutes. During this time the researcher selects a number of topic notes which will be used to ask narrative-seeking questions in sub-session two; and, for each of these, to select which particular formulation of your narrative-seeking question to ask based on the BNIM ‘rules’. Here again, one must use the first and last topic raised, in keeping with the commitment to the gestalt. This process too

requires practice. One cannot use each topic, there are usually too many, and a process of abductive selection takes place very quickly.¹¹⁷ To each topic chosen the researcher attempts to add an orientating word from the SHIEOT notepad, of which, more below.

4.5.3. Subsession Two

The aim of Subsession two is to use the topics raised by the participant to construct narrative-seeking questions, to get her to recount specific events or episodes from their relational becoming in more detail. We do this by converting the ‘cue phrases’ in to topic questions (TQUINs) during the interlude. To help formulate these questions, BNIM uses a SHIEOT sheet. SHEIOT stands for: *situation, happening, event, incident, occasion, time*. The interviewer writes their topics on a sheet with the following structure:




Figure 6. . SHEIOT Sheet (adapted from Wengraf (2001))

Thus, using *the exact words* used by the participant, and *in the exact, sequential order* in which the participant raises the topics, the interviewer phrases the narrative-seeking questions as above. The aim is to get to questions using phrases that will elicit ‘particular incident’ narratives, or PINs, using the words on the right. It may not always be possible to launch in to this type of question directly, in which case questions phrased using the more general (‘narrative tolerating’) key words of the central panel are used. The aim is to move from the central to the right hand panel in your questioning. To ‘push for PINs’ in the jargon of BNIM. Below is an example from one interview.

¹¹⁷ In the case of Mickey, who will feature later, there was no interlude as such, and I had to choose the topics/cue phrases ‘on the fly’ or I would have lost him.

Eddie interview:

Int: Yeah...You said, you said earlier that you were slapped, that you remember being slapped in school?

Resp: Hmmm yeah...

Int: Can you tell me any more about that particular incident...?

Resp: Yeah yeah, it was lashing rain on the day and ah, at lunchtime, if it's raining, we all have to go in to the...the PE hall, d'youknow like, the big assembly hall in the SCHOOL for...just...you had to sit in the floor...its so stupid what they think like...it like ok, now kids, you've been sittin' on your arse for four, for four hours, go in, sit on your arse and DON'T make a mess' like. You know, 'don't stand up and play or anything, just sit there and talk' like. What did they think we were going to talk about like? So am, there was like, all the gym equipment, all the play equipment that was there, that would be there for PE like. Like one of these...you know...crash mats or whatever, for falling on, for gymnastics or whatever. And I climbed up on some laddery thing and was trying to pull one of the mats down, you know, so we could play on it. And I get this *slap* on the arse....And I turn around and...I think her name was Sister A. or something...slap on the arse, and I turned around, shocked, who slapped me on the ass like?! Turned around shocked anyway and then just got a straight smack on the face...(angry) '*you were told not to...horse on the equipment*'...I was just like-'oh my god', y'know? I never...I don't think I ever told my parents, maybe I told them...more recently, you know but. It was just...I felt like, I knew I was...disobeying the rules, you know, but I was-'you can slap me'!?' (Laughing)...didn't know that was allowed!...

In this example, Eddie (21) during subsession one mentioned that he was once hit by a teacher at school.¹¹⁸ During subsession two, then, the exchange above took place. During their response, the interviewer continues making notes of the *new* cue-phrases that emerge in their response. One may then probe further and further in to the particular experience, all the while 'pushing for PINs'. If the researcher decides to pursue these new topics, they are obliged to follow the same pattern of non-reversible sequence. For example, from Eddie's account above I could have (but I did not) asked more about Sister A, in the format: 'you said that you were slapped by Sister A., do you remember incidents in school between yourself and Sister A?', which could have led to a new narrative of events etc. The aim is to get as rich a narrative of that particular incident as possible, in which the situated subjectivity of the respondent is most pronounced. The sequence of asking is determined by the participant and the researcher cannot go back to an earlier story once they have passed it. It is important to the gestalt-based thinking of the method that this order of sequence is maintained because,

¹¹⁸ The from SS1 reads:...*I went to a local primary school, I lived in the very centre of the town and ah, walking distance to the school, ah a Christian school... and all the, I had experiences with all the Sisters (nuns) there, you know, they were very strict and I remember, very funny instances of where they'd be rappin' children on knuckles and, I remember once that ah, I was climbing on gym equipment and getting a slap on the ass and then I turned around and getting a slap on the face and this is the kind of thing I, you know, ah, I never really experienced like. You know?.*

within the BNIM parlance, 'once you back the gestalt goes crack'. This process continues until the cue-phrases from session one are exhausted.¹¹⁹

4.5.4. Debriefing

After the interview the recording stops and the participant is debriefed. The researcher once again suggests that if the interviewee has been upset or distressed by anything during the interview, there is support available. The interviewer remains with the participant until she feels ready to leave, sometimes for an hour or more. It is essential that the participant knows that she is free to contact the researcher after the interview. It is usual at this point to arrange a third subsession for a future date, usually 2-3 weeks later, if one is planned. It is also recommended to contact the participant either the next day, or a couple of days later to see how they are, or if they have been affected by the experience in any way.

Immediately after the session the interviewer also debriefs themselves, writing a freely-associated reflection of the experience, which forms part of the field notes for the study. The process can impact on the researcher as well as the participant and this tool can aid the expression of their own emotions as well as being an analytical tool. These spontaneous reflections are themselves data within this method. In my particular interviews I recorded my immediate thoughts after the participant left the room and found these exceptionally helpful later when thinking about the process. These notes contained my own impressions and feelings about how the interview progressed, and my initial impressions/analysis of the data.

4.5.5. Analysis/Interpretation

For this project I chose not to use the third subsession interview. These are a number of reasons for this. Recall that this is a more conventional, semi structured interview that usually occurs 3 weeks after the initial meeting. It is used to get more specific background information and to address some of the questions raised on the first day. My primary reason for not using this is theoretical. The hypothesis was that the unstructured narrative account of the participant is the best route to the habitus, rather than the semi-structured, non-narrative interviews. Furthermore, in many cases, this additional information is redundant, as you have

¹¹⁹ I will discuss the ethics of this approach later.

more than enough information from the initial interview. There is also the inconvenience to the participant to consider. For these and other reasons many adopting the BNIM approach choose not to use the additional interview.

Perhaps my overall reason is concerned with data saturation. Many of those who use BNIM base their projects on the analysis of very small sample, often of one or two participants. It is more common for these projects to avail of the additional session. For my purposes, involving (in excess of) eight interviews in total, the level of data produced was already unwieldy *without* sub-session three. For example, Eddie's interview quoted above resulted in a transcript of in excess of thirty thousand words based on two sub-sessions alone. This is just the raw transcript, independent of any analysis or interpretation. It is simply neither possible (nor, I will argue later, desirable) for an independent researcher with little or no funding to engage in this process, particularly if they intended to interview three or more people.

Regarding this analysis and interpretation, as I mentioned already, my deployment of the BNIM procedure has been 'impure'. Figure five depicts the 'full' BNIM analysis procedure. The first step consists of a full verbatim transcription of the interviews. This transcript, along with any additional field notes and the debriefing notes, form the basis of the data, along with the other social and historical data involved in the project. As the flow chart shows, this data is then divided in to two 'tracks': the 'living of the lived life' track and the 'telling of the told story' track. For my project I chose not to use the BNIM panel system of interpreting the data, nor much of the hypothesis-generating Grounded Theory approach used in the final stages of the procedure. Below I outline the 'full' BNIM programme, after which I will offer critical justification of these decisions.




Figure 7. . Full BNIM Analysis/Interpretation Model. Adapted from Wengraf (2001, p.237)

The first, the 'living of the lived life' track, abstracts the 'objective' ('hard') biographical data of the participants to be studied from the transcripts and elsewhere. This data is then broken into 'chunks' to form the 'Biographical Data Chronology'. For those using the full BNIM model, they then convene the first BNIM interpretive panel of three to four people, who are presented with this information, chunk by chunk and future blind. They derive various hypotheses on each chunk, based on its significance for the subject and speculate as to what happens next. All of these are written up on flipcharts as a record. Towards the end of the session, the panel is urged to develop 'structural hypotheses' about what the pattern of the living of the lived life might best be said to be. Alternative versions are recorded. Then, finally, the panel develops contrasting hypotheses, suggesting different ways this story might be told. These are also written-up. After this the researcher continues the process of analysis on their own, not necessarily future-blind, not necessarily in chunks.

The second track is called 'the telling of the told story' track. A 'text structure sequentialization' or TSS is abstracted from the data. The concept of the TSS is unique to this approach and, unlike the biographical chronology, requires explanation. The aim is to evoke from the transcript, not the events of the life history but rather 'the way in which those events and actions were experienced *and are now understood from the perspective of the person giving the interview*' (Wengraf, 2001, p.239, original emphasis, see also Rosenthal, 1993). To do so, the transcript must be processed into a TSS when there is:

1. A change of speaker.
2. A change of topic.
3. A 'textsort' change.

While the first two of these are, I think, self-explanatory, the third requires some explanation. By 'textsort' change means the change in the way a specific topic is treated by the participant. For this project I deployed the DARNE-typology used by Wengraf (see 2001 and elsewhere), which distinguishes between five basic types of textsort. These are: Description, Argumentation, Report, Narrative and Evaluation. However this typology has undergone a number of revisions. By the time of my training in 2009, this has become: 'DARNE it! We're going from GINs to PINs, DEAR!' (Wengraf, 2009). What this (admittedly rather daft) formulation is intended to express is the evolution of the typology over time. Effectively, the

'N' of DARNE has been disaggregated into to specific types of narrative, namely the 'general incident narrative' (GIN) and the 'particular incident narrative' (PIN), with DEAR representing the remains of the DARNE typology.




Figure 8. Adapted DARNE Typology, including GINs and PINs. Adapted from Wengraf (2001 & 2009)

In practice, however, these should be considered as 'ideal types'. In reality, any individual's speech is a much messier affair, often involving the mixing of these and other types of speech acts, making neat characterization aspirational. Furthermore, within the BNIM system, the specific components appear to be in a state of perpetual revision, with each new edition of the 'guide' adding more and more to the already quite Baroque edifice. What I was most interested in was the narrative component of the interview material, particularly those stories

which relate emotional experiences or the regulation of emotions in situations as they emerged from the life story. It is at this point that I dispensed with the BNIM approach in its pure form.

However, in the full programme, the TSS is refined and separated in to segments ('chunks') and presented to another panel, much like the first track, one by one and future blind. Often, at this second panel session, the refined text incorporates aspects of the BDC as well as the TSS. The typical type of question is: 'At this point in their life, why, in this interview, did the participant improvise their telling of the story in the way they did?'. The panel members again engage in hypotheses. After the 3-hour panel – which is not likely to deal with more than 6-12 chunks of the telling of the told story – the researcher continues on their own, not necessarily future-blind, not necessarily in chunks.

The next step is to bring the two tracks together. The guiding question is 'Why did the person who lived their life in the pattern suggested by the procedure in the first panel come to tell their story now in the pattern suggested by the second?'. The researcher attempts to develop strong 'connecting structural hypothesis' that makes best sense of the connection/disjunction between the pattern suggested in the analysis of the living of the lived life and that suggested by the telling of the told story in the interview in the current moment of that life. To think and to present your understanding of the historically-(re)situated subjectivity under examination and interpretation, a typical device is to construct a narrative of your own: your account of the evolution of the case, a case-history. It is also possible to perform a micro-analysis of specific 'chunks' of transcript, using another panel to aid this process. From here, the comparison of cases and the significance of the material for the given project's core research hypotheses begin for the researcher alone.

As I said, I departed with the BNIM approach after the creation of the TSS. Here I will briefly recount the more abductive process of interpretation that I did engage in, prior to comparing cases.¹²⁰ Afterwards I will offer some criticisms of the BNIM approach, yet, one of these is that, with such an obsession with detail, with the subjectivity of one participant, it

¹²⁰ There is an extract from one case showing part of the analytical procedure used in the appendices.

often inadequately accounts for the relational ‘situatedness’ that it purports to include. As we will see in the next chapter, the aim of this project is the exploration of emotions and social change in the Irish twentieth century. It is this social and historical context that is key, rather than an over-reliance on speculations, usually concerned with an individual’s psychodynamics.

For a number of the interviews conducted I analysed the transcripts abductively, with an eye to both narrative and emotionality. I found it useful to produce a full Biographical Data Chronology and a Text Structure Sequentialization for three of the interviews. I was primarily interested in the narrative aspects of texts and engaged in a more conventional narrative analysis, drawing on Scheff’s notion of ‘part/whole’ analysis (Scheff, 1997). It is these narrative elements, I suggest, that best reveal both the network in which the actor is embedded and the social and emotional habitus. Nick Crossley has recently criticised qualitative, interview-based research ‘which abstracts actors from their contexts and elicits reflective accounts of their experiences’ suggesting that relational sociology should capture the social world in interaction, as a ‘*process arising between social actors*’ (Crossley, 2011, p.21 original emphasis). This might be considered one of the flaws of BNIM. However, I suggest that this is not necessarily so. By focusing on specifically *narrative* aspects of interviews, I suggest that these capture the process-in-relations that Crossley is advocating. Narratives are full of characters, of friends and family members, of lovers and enemies. It is in stories that we see the individual ‘in action’, actively engaged in relational becoming. Such narratives, furthermore, convey *what matters* to the individual; what they are concerned about and concerned to communicate. It is part of their presentation of self, but also reflective of their contextual social world(s). In the next chapter I will use vignettes from these stories to elucidate specific examples of different ways of emotional ‘being-in-the-world’ in the context of profound social change.

My position toward the data, then, and its interpretation, attempts to be both realist and constructivist. As I outlined in chapter one, from my theoretical perspective, and drawing on Whitehead, these two are not mutually exclusive. I suggest that these life histories both reflect or ‘recapitulate’, in Labov’s terms, the lived reality of the individuals concerned, but from their own relative position, *and* that that the accounts are always an interpretation, a reconstruction of those events. To claim too sharp a distinction between the two is to bifurcate nature, as we

have seen. Yet, those interpretations are also either reflections of larger, cultural narratives or challenges to those dominant narratives. Such an approach is predicated on the theoretical commitments of *this* project, rather than a reflection of the methodology of BNIM, or anything else. I come to the data from the perspective of process relational realism, not the Grounded Theory/Structural Hermeneutics of the BNIM analysis.

4.6. Reflections on the Method

We are continually reminded of the need to be ‘reflexive’ in our practice of social research. Indeed, reflexivity has become a kind of ‘holy water’; a little is to be shaken over every PhD thesis in sociology to dispel the daemons of ‘subjectivity’. Yet, confusion abounds as to what the concept actually means (Lynch, 2000). One version appears to imply a sort of hyper-objectivity, an ability to ‘step outside’ and critically evaluate one’s own position from a position of detached indifference. Though is it perhaps remarkable that many those who stress the need for such reflexivity most strenuously are often those for whom ‘objectivity’ is either an impossible or unnecessary goal, and who’s methodological commitments are based on that very impossibility. In practice, of course, reflexivity usually amounts to the enumeration of a few vaguely self-critical remarks toward one’s own work and practice. But not too critical. I will attempt to exorcise my own daemons later in the conclusion but, for now, I wish to offer some criticisms of the BMIM approach and offer some reasons for not employing the ‘full’ method here. Suffice to say, as a method of data *collection* I found it excellent. I am particularly in favour of the open nature of the interview process and that the participant structures their account themselves, rather than having their own accounts of themselves imposed or structured ‘from above’. When it works, and whether it does depends in part on the participant’s ability or disposition to engage in narrative accounts, it is an exceptionally illuminating procedure.¹²¹

But not all aspects of the process are, to my mind, as beneficial.. The use of panels in the interpretation of the data I found particularly problematic. Recall that the full BNIM

¹²¹ I am of course aware that the apparent inability of some of my participants to engage in narrative is perhaps a result of my inability to elicit such accounts, but I do not think this is so in all cases. The SQUIN was (more or less) the same for all participants and, as I mentioned, the more universalizing ontological accounts of narrative may be over stated. The inability to ‘do’ narrative may itself be sociologically interesting.

procedure consists of a number of panels of 4-6 people who analyse the data from the BDC and the TSS, which has been separated into ‘chunks’ and displayed to the group ‘future blind’.¹²² These individuals then engage in the construction of original hypotheses, counter-hypotheses and tangential hypotheses on the basis of this material (see Wengraf, 2001). Acknowledging the work involved in this procedure, BNIM suggests that this process is used only in a few, ‘golden’, cases. Yet, even taking this in to account, problems remain. Wengraf (2009, p.284) suggests that:

The function of the panel and the recording of its deliberations is to overcome the distorting effects of the blindspots and the hotspots, the defended subjectivity, of you as individual researcher...and to widen your imagination – hopefully irreversibly - for your own post-panel work. This is especially important for the lone researcher.

Yet, having been trained in this procedure I was not convinced of the merits of the approach and this was not ameliorated on later reading PhD theses and other works that adopt the panel approach. My intention was to use the panels, and this remained my intention until after I had conducted the interviews. I decided, eventually, that I did not want to overcome my own ‘blind spots and hot spots’ at all in my interpretation and engagement with the data. One wonders why everyone else’s interpretive processes are considered valuable, from (‘ad hoc non-specialist’) panel members to participants, *except* the lone researcher. Surely it is the researcher’s, always partial, always biased, always perspectival, interpretation, which draws on the theoretical framework, concepts, and philosophical commitments of the project at hand, that matters.

On reflection, perhaps one of the chief objections to the use of the panels is the psychoanalytical assumption of ‘defended subjects’ and ‘defended subjectivity’. This appears, repeatedly, as the ultimate justification for the use of the panel procedure in BNIM, and something that the lone researcher especially must seek to avoid in herself. Indeed, their use is seen as *essential* in overcoming ‘the solitary autism’ of the (poor, pathologized) researcher (Wengraf, 2009, p.284).¹²³ But, rather than being so easily assumed, the ontological concept of

¹²² This can incur nine panels or more, depending on the individual projects and the number of ‘golden cases’ being analysed in this way.

¹²³ While simultaneously avoiding the dangers of ‘group-think’ at the panels themselves via the process of hypothesis and counter hypothesis etc.

the defended subject is much more problematic from a sociological perspective, and particularly from the theoretical position advanced in this thesis. The roots of the concept lie in the work of Melanie Klein who developed and built on the work of Freud and his view of the ‘split’ or divided self. For Klein, and for Hollway and Jefferson (2000), and presumably advocates of BNIM panels, anxiety is the universal, timeless (ahistorical) and essential ground of our species-being. Beginning with the human infant, such anxiety necessitates the defensive splitting of the self (ego), and the ‘projection’ of negatives (‘bads’) and positives on to external objects or persons (the splitting of the object), resulting, for Klein, in a ‘paranoid-schizoid’ self (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, esp. pp.19-25). I reject the assumption of defended subjectivity, and the deeper assumptions on which it rests, on a number of grounds. Firstly, and despite the insistence by Hollway and Jefferson that their usage is psychosocial rather than psychoanalytical, the claims for intersubjectivity ring somewhat hollow.¹²⁴ The concept rests on the essentialist psychological grounds of anxiety. I do not agree that anxiety is the ground of being, nor that our selves are merely epiphenomena that result from the management of that anxiety. Furthermore, from the perspective of process-relational realism, to invoke Whitehead again, such an assumption bifurcates nature – it sets an ontological separation between the human and nature and maintains a Freudian form of dualism that we have attempted to overcome. As such, for this project, operating on different, incompatible assumptions (in this regard at least) the overriding need for panels to kick-start interpretation is removed.

Moreover, my expectations about what my (or any) interpretations can achieve are somewhat more modest. I accept that my interpretations, as a solitary social researcher, are partial and incomplete. I am not convinced that such partiality can be overcome, even if we were to accept the concept of defended subjectivity, cumulatively, by the addition of more and other defended subjective interpretations hypothesising about a case. I wish to defend the *sole* researcher, and the *sociological* imagination – the analysis of history and biography, and their relations – using my own sociological lens, the theories and concepts that I bring to bear on the data. To dismiss this endeavour, and presumably all interpretive work *not* done in panels, as ‘autistic’ seems misplaced. There appears to be some form of skewed empiricism at work

¹²⁴ They write: ‘Though we hope our notion of the psychosocial defended subject is clear by now, it is important that you, the reader, remember (a) not to confuse it with traditional Freudian psychoanalysis since it owes more to post-Freudian developments, especially those inspired by the work of Melanie Klein, and their stress on intersubjectivity; and (b) to hang on to the other link to the social, the one inspired pre-eminently by the work of Foucault with its emphasis on power / knowledge / discourse...’(Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p.81).

behind the panel process – that if we get a sufficient number of sufficiently different individuals speculating about a case that we will converge toward some form of objective (T)ruth about that case.

Furthermore, what occurs in the actual panels is itself problematic. While it is no doubt fun to participate in guessing games about ‘what happens next’ in a person’s life on the basis of snippets of her life or story data, I suggest that this in fact tells us more about the panel members than the actual case in question. What emerges from the process are often the biases and habituses of the participants involved, thus suggesting itself as an alternative form of data *collection* rather than analysis. This is not even to engage with the ethical difficulties involved in the process.

This again points towards an imbalance between ‘psych’ and ‘social’ during the panel process itself. By feeding the panel members these snippets, chunk by chunk, future blind, many, if not all of the hypotheses that emerge suggest psychodynamic interpretations of the events of the individual’s life. Indeed, I suggest the process in fact implicitly *forces you toward* such an interpretation. When shown a data segment stating, for example, ‘Mary left home at 16 and had her first child one year later’, many of the hypotheses suggested by the panel will often be couched in a pre-reflexive, psychodynamic language, suggesting ‘issues’ with her mother, say, or ‘repressed anger’ at her father. My experience of the panel used in training is reflective of this, and I found myself engaging in the same procedure. The fact that many of these psychoanalytic categories are either discredited or, at least, open to challenge, and as I argued earlier, form such a ubiquitous part of the lazy lexicon of late modernity should give us pause. Reproducing conceptual clichés should not be confused with analytical insight. It promotes the pathologization of both the life history and the life story of the participant’s involved, often involving outrageous and ethically questionable claims being aimed at the participant’s data for very limited results.¹²⁵ Such an approach, further, is of limited use if one is more interested in the social/sociological aspects of the cases rather than the more formally psychological. Later I will argue that the penetration of the contemporary (Western) emotional regime by the ‘therapeutic ethos’ is perhaps one reason that many of the ‘hypotheses’ of the panel members are couched in psychodynamic discourse, and if the process casts light on

¹²⁵ I would also question the extent to which the participant’s consent is based on a partial or incomplete understanding of the procedure.

anything it is the emotional regime and habitus of the panellists themselves, rather than the interviewee.

4.7. Conclusion

I do not wish to over-state my objections here. I found the training and the literature surrounding the BNIM procedure both illuminating intellectually and helpful in forming my own position. In the end, I am simply not convinced that the full programme is ‘worth the candle’, given the scale of the labour-intensive work involved, the results it produces, and the assumptions on which it rests. This is particularly true for my own project, which comes to the data with its own theoretical lens already developed and a primary interest on the ‘social’ over the ‘psychological’. In this chapter I hope to have given an outline of the research method used in the collection of narrative-based data and its analysis. This forms one aspect of the project, and I will have more reflexive and critical assessments to make on this later. For now, I wish to suggest that the argument (or hypothesis) is that the narrative aspects of individual’s interviews are revealing of the habitus, particularly emotional habitus of those individuals; that biographical-narratives render the relational becoming of the individual, and their societies, intelligible (Chamberlayne et al, 2000), p.8). In the next chapters I attempt to weave these stories and the story of social change in Ireland together, to help us understand how history and biography intersect. This begins, in the next chapter, with a brief discussion of the concept of habitus, followed in chapter five with an account of social change in Ireland during the twentieth century, where I suggest that Bauman’s (2000) metaphor of ‘liquidity’ best captures the recent character of social becoming there. This will be an intermingling of social theory and social history, with an argument (or narrative) suggesting what the key processes and mechanisms of these rapid and profound changes were, and their implications. The following chapter will then return to the life histories. Yet, what must be remembered when dealing with all narratives, social or individual, is that they are all partial, all more fragmented and polysemous, in short, more ambiguous than either theorists or biographers suggest. This ambiguity and the ambivalence of social change will be explicated later.

5. Chapter Five: Social Change in Ireland – Habitus Shift

5.1. Introduction

We have covered quite a lot of ground so far, and the way, at times, has been heavy. The first three chapters can be seen as an attempt to grind out the theoretical lens of relational becoming, and a corresponding account of emotions, power and habitus. In the last chapter I began to outline the empirical portion of the project. There I discussed narrative in terms of the process-relational perspective and I made the case for narrative-based, life-history interviews as appropriate for the study of habitus, and emotional habitus. I outlined the design of the empirical study, and the specific method deployed to collect and, in part, analyse, the data, BMIM. In this chapter I turn toward more substantive territory. In what follows I wish to address ‘social change’ in Ireland, as a precursor to looking at ‘the data’ themselves. This will provide context for the discussion and analysis of the specific interviewees and their stories. By Ireland here I am referring to the Republic of Ireland exclusively. This nation state, the twenty six counties that comprise the Republic, is the site and focus of this project and the empirical case being used. I am omitting Northern Ireland completely from the analysis. The sociology of the North, given its unique, dark ‘sonderweg’, is substantially different to that of the South; the mechanisms and social processes at work there have been shaped by very different relations of emotions and power, and very different emotional regimes, giving rise to a different emotional tonality (or habitus). While it might be interesting to conduct a comparison between the two states, this has to wait for future work.

The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin with a discussion of social theory, and the question surrounding modernity/late modernity in particular. This should be considered a treatment of the question of social change at its most general. The argument I propose is that aspects of Bauman’s notion of ‘liquid modernity’ may best capture the most recent social changes and the contemporary character of the Irish Republic. Yet, our approach is tempered by our more fundamental theoretical commitments. ‘Social change’, as I have previously mentioned, is a useful reification. The character and constitution of social life is at all times and places one of social, relational becoming – an on-going, dynamic *process*. Thus, the process-relational perspective remains the dominant theory, which I will place into dialogue with these others, in the hopes of modifying and improving both. These considerations will frame a brief overview

of the key processes and features of social change in Irish twentieth century, the temporal focus of the project, highlighting the fundamental role of two powerful institutions, the church and the state, and their ideologies, Catholicism and Nationalism. This analysis may be split in to that of a pre-1950, and a post-1950, with the social relations (of power and emotions) within the former period giving rise to a more repressive emotional regime and emotional habitus, and the relations of the second becoming increasingly liberalized, displaying the features of liquid modernity as the decades pass. This process might be described, I argue, as ‘habitus shift’. Following a discussion of the (relatively scanty) sociological analysis of this period of ‘accelerated modernization’ (Kuhling & Keohane, 2007) I outline an explanatory framework that incorporates the conceptualizations emotions, power and habitus that have been developed earlier. In this, I will continue to highlight the role of emotions, both as ‘engines’ of social changes and emotional tone/habitus as the effect of such social changes. In later chapters I discuss how this habitus shift might be characterized, and stress the fundamental ambiguity of this shift to liquid modernity, drawing on notions of cultural trauma, precaritization and pathologization.

The focus, then, is the twentieth century, roughly from independence to the turn of the new millennium. There are many reasons to delimit the historical period to this, but the foremost reason is a concern with an over-reliance on discourse analysis, which is ultimately what the investigation into a longer historical span would necessitate and amount to. This is not to discredit discourse analysis or historical sociology, and I hope to draw on both in what follows. Indeed, and of course, the analysis of interviews is itself a form of this. Rather, what I was concerned to do, or attempt, was an investigation of habitus using actually living, experiencing, feeling and embodied people; to attempt to access their habitus and via their lived experience, rather than archival records. I will, however, draw on historical work to support the argument, as a form of secondary data.

Had I widened the lens to include the nineteenth, or even the eighteenth centuries, I could perhaps suggest that emotions have *always* been problematic in Ireland.¹²⁶ Indeed, most often,

¹²⁶ Indeed one could trace such depictions of the barbaric Irish much further back. The well-known work of Gerald of Wales (*Giraldus Cambrensis*), particularly the *Topographica Hibernica*, written around 1188, not long after the Norman invasion of Ireland set the template for much of the future literature. For example he writes: ‘This people then, is truly barbarous... indeed, all their habits are barbarisms. But habits are formed by mutual intercourse; and as these people inhabit a country so remote from the rest of the world and lying at its furthest

the depictions of the Irish and the framing of ‘the Irish question’ itself was fundamentally an emotional framing, suggesting racist depictions of an irrational and barbarian native who was prone to rage and violence, on the one hand, or mawkish sentimentality on the other. Examples of this racialization of the Irish and Irish stereotyping in general forms part of a wider dichotomous modality of thinking that we have seen in earlier chapters; one in which reason is opposed to emotion, masculine to feminine, barbaric to civilized. There is no shortage of examples placing the Irish and their ‘character’ on the ‘losing’ side of the binary, from Mr Punch’s famous cartoons in Britain to *Harpers* magazine in the US, and the various so-called scientific racism tracts from the Victorian period.¹²⁷ In much of this work, even that which is ostensibly positive, the old reason/emotion dichotomy is to be found – the Irish are ‘guided more by passion than reason, more by sentiment than calculation’ and this is the ultimate source of their misery and their trouble, to themselves and to others (Nelson, 2012, p.31). A typical example comes from James Anthony Froude, who viewed the Irish as ‘passionate in everything-passionate in their patriotism, passionate in their religion, passionately courageous, passionately loyal and affectionate’, but are simultaneously emasculated because of this passion: ‘they are without the manliness which give strength and solidity to the sentimental part of their dispositions’ (Froude, 1872, cited in Nelson, 2012, p.31). As Nelson suggests, manliness here means above all the ‘capacity for reason and self-control and therefore a capacity to govern self and society’ (Nelson, 2012, p.31). The intimate relationship between power and emotion is again displayed, with the powerful standing on the side of reason and manliness, while the powerless others are ‘other’.

Yet, such depictions, patronizing as they are, appear positively glowing in comparison to the other side of the spectrum. Take, for example, the anonymous tract of 1862 *What Science Is Saying About Ireland* (and note, this is ‘sociological’ science as well as the ‘science of hereditary’), in which the Irish are depicted as mis-evolved savages living in a state of barbarism, closer to animals than humans. This author writes:

extremity, forming as it were, another world, and are thus excluded from civilised nations, they learn nothing and practise nothing, but the barbarism in which they are born and bred and which sticks to them like a second nature. Whatever natural gifts they possess are excellent, in whatever requires industry they are worthless (Cambrensis, Chapter X [c1188] in Wright, 1913, pp.125-6).

¹²⁷ See, for example, De Nie (2004) on the stereotypical ‘Paddy’ in the British Press from 1798-1882, Foster (1993) on Punch magazine in particular and Ignatiev (1995) on ‘how the Irish became white’ in America.

Some men of science consider some of the agricultural negroes of Africa to be higher than the aboriginal Irish Celt. They look on these negroes as representing humanity in a state of childhood, developed only a short way, but still so far rightly developed by ages of comparatively easy life in a sunny climate, and with plenty of good food whilst they look on the aboriginal Irish Celt as being wrongly developed by ages of hard life in a gloomy climate and with bad food (Anon, 1862, p.15).

The picture presented below, which comes from this ‘sociological’ study, and compares the ‘abroiginal Irish Celt’ with a ‘negro’, and both with the superior features of Sir Isaac Newton, is also found decades later in the American periodical *Harpers Weekly*. In this later depiction the characters compared are an ‘Irish Iberian’ and a ‘Negro’ contrasted to the higher ‘Anglo-Teutonic’.¹²⁸




Figure 9. Pseudoscientific Racism in the 19th Century (Anon, 1862)

This type of racialist stereotyping continues well into the 20th century. Again and again the Irish are depicted as irrational (animals or children), emotional, and lacking in self-control. To

¹²⁸ The caption on the *Harpers* picture reads: *The Iberians are believed to have been originally an African race, who thousands of years ago spread themselves through Spain over Western Europe. Their remains are found in the barrows, or burying places, in sundry parts of these countries. The skulls are of low prognathous type. They came to Ireland and mixed with the natives of the South and West, who themselves are supposed to have been of low type and descendants of savages of the Stone Age, who, in consequence of isolation from the rest of the world, had never been out-competed in the healthy struggle of life, and thus made way, according to the laws of nature, for superior races* (See http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Scientific_racism_irish.jpg).

alter Senghor's famous dichotomy, used in relation to the 'negro', I might suggest: *l'émotion est Irlandais, comme la raison est hellène* - emotion is Irish, while reason is Greek (Fanon, 1952). While this is of course bound up with questions of power and power relations, especially but not exclusively between Ireland and Britain, and as De Nie suggests, questions of ethnicity, class and religion (De Nie, 2004), it is also inextricably bound up with emotions. Yet, the history of emotions in Ireland has yet to be written. Studies like those completed by Stearns, Rosenwein, Dixon, or indeed, the Irish civilizing process itself, remain to be written.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, it is impossible to understand the story of emotions and social change in Ireland in the following century without even a rudimentary understanding of this nineteenth century historical context. It is in the face of such stereotypes that the new Irish Free State, and the wider society, began the process of self-determination and the writing of public and social policy. This is the context for the development of the emotional regime that later emerged.

I choose to view this particular glass as half-full; it is an exciting time to be a social scientist of emotion in or about Ireland, given the limited attention they have, so far, received. There is much to be done. In what follows I limit the analysis to a defined time - the Irish twentieth century; such a limitation was necessary for this project and its concerns. It is, as such, a first step, a modest attempt to explore a demarked time and place and does not claim to be either comprehensive or definitive. It is self-consciously and clearly 'exploratory' research, a first rather than the last word.

5.2. Liquid Modernity

Before we get to the specifics of the Irish case, in this section I wish to engage with what might be described as 'high' social theory. It concerns the question of modernity and the extent to which the contemporary condition represents a break with, or a continuation of, modernity. In particular, I aim to explore the relationship between the emotions and modernity, and the question of social change in Ireland in particular. I will argue that Bauman's conception of liquid modernity is the one that best captures the key changes in the Republic, particularly since the 1950's. Such typifications or attempts to re-categorize

¹²⁹ Some limited efforts in this general direction include McVeigh & Rolston (2009), Dolan & Connolly (2009) on the civilizing of Irish sport, and work by Inglis that I return to later.

modernity, which were very much in vogue towards the end of the last millennium, appear to have petered out. This petering out is interesting in itself. Indeed, one explanation for the proliferation of approaches – post, high, neo, late, reflexive, liquid, multiple etc – within social theory at that time might be considered a form of millennialism. If so, Giddens, Beck, Lasch, Bauman and the others might be considered a type of trans-modern millenarian group, formed around a series of ‘sacred texts’ predicting the ‘end of history’ in one form or another, and based on a self-referential and self-legitimizing discursive-citation network.

This aside, it is clear that such thinkers were also attempting to capture and explain actual changes that were evident in the contemporary condition, while avoiding the bolder claims of discontinuity implied by ‘postmodernity’. In what follows I will argue that Bauman’s approach of liquidity, although problematic, best captures the processes of social change as they apply to Ireland. This is not to suggest that aspects of the alternative approaches were not also in evidence, but rather that his perspective better captures aspects of the Irish case, for historical reasons.¹³⁰ As we have already argued, the key to understanding these processes of change and their constitutive effects on the social habitus are relations of power and emotions. Of course, any attempt to understand such processes is fraught with difficulties and dangers. Time, itself always ‘liquid’, flows; the present is necessarily transitory and elusive. It changes while we speak of it and is different before our ink is dry. Life, both individual and collective, is a dynamic process of relational becoming, a creative advance into novelty; it is, in this sense, Whiteheadian. As such, to speak in terms of sharp discontinuities is not appropriate.

To be fair to Bauman, it is precisely on the basis of *not* seeing a sharp discontinuity between contemporary and industrial modernity that his thesis of liquid modernity emerges. His position on the contemporary condition has been further elaborated, since the publication of *Liquid Modernity* (2000) itself, in a number of monographs on specific aspects or themes of this new reality (e.g. Bauman, 2006, 2007 etc). Of the numerous contexts of this work, perhaps the most significant is the demise of the postmodern discourse within social theory. For a writer who has been labelled the ‘prophet of postmodernity’, this may be seen as a departure of sorts from his earlier work. Yet, as has been recently observed, ‘postmodernism is

¹³⁰ The extent to which such an approach is appropriate as a general, global diagnosis is more problematic.

gone...in some senses it never was' (Matthewman and Hoey, 2006, p.542). Practically everyone associated with it denies and castigates the label; to the extent that it appears now at all, it is usually predicated with the prefix 'after' (ibid).¹³¹ It is within this 'post'-postmodern climate that the renewed efforts to engage with modernity, such as Beck's 'reflexive modernisation' and Giddens' 'post-traditional' society have emerged (Adams, 2007, Burkitt, 2008). To this Bauman has added fluidity as the leading metaphor for the present stage of the modern era (Bauman, 2000, p.2). This exchange of liquid for post modernity is in effect declaring that the modern era is not yet over and we are not limited to a condition of '*différence*', relativism and nihilism that much postmodern theory resulted in (Lee, 2006, p.357).

This fluid phase of modernity is contrasted with the earlier *solid* phase and unlike solids, liquids are connected with lightness, flow, slippage, spillage, dissolving, melting and mobility; they neither fix space or time nor hold their shape in the way solids do (Bauman, 2000, p.2). Solids are heavy, rigid, immobile; bound to space and resistant to change. Such solidity was typical of the earlier phase of modernity, what others have called industrial modernity. For Bauman, this type of modernity was in evidence until the last decades of the 20th century. From around the 1970's, a process of 'liquefaction', resulting from the complex confluence of technological advances, globalization and political and economic developments, has begun to undermine and transform the foundations of solid modernity, with significant results for the social world.

This earlier modernity is defined by 'heavy' capitalism. Here solid modernity and the form of its mode of production are typified by order, control, Fordist factories and Taylor's rational mechanization. But more than this, for Bauman, the Fordist model set the frame of reference for the phase as a whole; it was an epistemological building site on which the whole world view was erected, or the self-consciousness of modernity in its solid, bulky, immobile stage (Bauman, 2000, pp.56-7). This heavy modernity is characterized by a *trust* in collective, societal progress (Bauman, 2000, p.133). For Bauman, the beginning of modernity is in effect the beginning of the history of time: modernity is the time when time had a history (Bauman, 2000, p.110). In 'hardware' modernity time was the dynamic partner of 'time/space' that

¹³¹ Or 'post', 'meta', 'hyper', 'digi', etc. The neologisms continue to proliferate, which is partly a result of the logic of competition and ranking in academia which forces researchers to publish ever-more ever-new (seeming) work in high ranking journals. In this debasement of research neologisms help give the illusion of innovation and a better chance at publication.

could be manipulated by technological advance and used as a tool for spatial expansion. This accelerated action, coupled with instrumental rationality was the very essence of 'progress' and in solid modernity, progress meant growing in size (Bauman, 2000, pp.113-15). This is the era of massive factories and workforces, of bulky trains and 'titanic' ocean liners; an obsession with territoriality and conquest, borders, land and empire (Bauman, 2000, p.114). It is a time of authorities and leaders; life is organized around production which is normatively regulating, limiting and stresses conformity (Bauman, 2000, p.76). The great antagonists of the age, both capital and labour, are 'riveted' together and are characterized as being in a 'till death do us part' type of marriage...in which (d)ivorce was out of the question' (Bauman, 2000, p.116). This 'marriage' was born of the mutuality of their dependency, one had to buy, the other sell, labour. Both partners in this industrial dance are earth bound and big, though labour is perhaps the more immobilized. This is the era of the 'job for life', of 'job security' and the comforting structure of routine and norms.¹³² Workers were empowered by strong labour movements that practiced collective action and were protected by a welfare state. Managing this 'war of attrition' became the principle function and concern of politics-with a capital P, the state (Bauman, 2000, pp.146-7). Within solid modernity, the model of community, and the central political agent that is most prevalent was the nation-state. It is the nation-state that, via its promotion of encompassing ethnic unity and homogeneity that was 'the only success story of community in modern times, or rather, the sole entity which made the bid to community status with any degree of conviction or effect' (Bauman, 2000, p.173).

Bauman's depiction of liquid modernity is by now well known. Here, rather than reviewing all of the aspects of this transformation, I will mainly confine myself to the discussion of power and emotions. Yet key wider features of the process of 'liquification' are *related* to both power and emotions. We are all more free, but it is an individualized freedom and this individualization of freedom is an ambivalent blessing for Bauman (Bauman, 2000, p.18). We must 'abandon all hope of totality' in liquid modernity; social norms and universal principles, the bonds that defined us as social beings and ordered our social action in the past have been washed away. Though certain aspects of earlier modernity are indistinguishable from now,

¹³² Bauman cites Richard Sennett on the function of routine and habit in this regard: 'Routine can demean, but it can also protect...To imagine a life of momentary impulses, of short-term action, devoid of sustainable routines, a life without habitus, is to imagine indeed a mindless existence' (Sennett, cited in Bauman, 2001, p.21). Sennett more recently sees habit(us) as central to the cultivation of craftsmanship – 'Missing in these analyses is a reconstruction of the workshops of the master—more precisely, one element that has irretrievably gone missing. This is the absorption into tacit knowledge, unspoken and uncodified in words, that occurred there and became a matter of habit, the thousand little everyday moves that add up in sum to a practice' (Sennett, 2008, p.77).

liquid modernity has two novel features: the collapse of a teleological discourse, a final end of history or a perfect future 'good society', and the deregulation and privatization of the modernizing tasks and duties (Bauman, 2000, p.29). These tasks of improvement and progress have been relegated to the self-assertion of the individual who now bears full responsibility for their implementation and consequences (ibid). Hence liquid modernity becomes the age of 'life politics'. The new individualization 'transforms human identity from a 'given' in to a 'task' and charging the actor with responsibility for performing that task and for the consequences...of their performance' (Bauman, 2000, pp.31-2). Yet this perpetual task of self creation must be undertaken without the guiding norms, leadership, principles or *telos* of before. Thus, the emergence of Beck's *Risikogesellschaft* and the uncertainty and ambivalence of the contemporary condition. Individualization and identity politics also threaten collective action; individual grievances are rarely transmuted into 'shared interests' or a 'common cause' as the most common troubles of individuals-by-fate are these days non-additive. The indifference that this process engenders leads to the corrosion and disintegration of citizenship (Bauman, 2000, p.36). This antagonism between the individual and the citizen leads to the colonization of the 'public' by the 'private' sphere, where 'public life is narrowed to the public display of private affairs and public confessions of private sentiments (the more intimate the better)' (Bauman, 2000, p.37).

In liquid modernity, these individuals are to be understood primarily as consumers, rather than producers, in a world where capital travels light, symbolised by the mobile phone and the laptop computer (Bauman, 2000, p.58). It is the age of unfettered movement of global capital, ruled by elusive Houdini-like 'escapes artists' whose speed of movement has put them at the pinnacle of the new hierarchy of domination (Bauman, 2000, p.151). This is the "software" capitalism of the information age, where ideas rather than material objects are the main sources of profit. Indeed, the very vocabulary of the cognitive frame that was once determined by the bulky, solid Fordist self-consciousness has been replaced to reflect the new, fluid forms of organisation and the exterritoriality and volatility of capital and the new elites. Words like 'surfing', 'networks', 'plastic' and 'chaotic' reflect the new motility of this modality. The marriage between labour and capital is recast as cohabitation, their former mutual dependency now replaced by a unilateral disengagement by the 'absentee landlords' of capital (Bauman, 2000, p.149). Indeed, in the information age of 'downsizing' and 'outsourcing', the labour force is but a secondary consideration now dominated and 'remote controlled'...in a

new way (Bauman, 2000, pp.151-155). The very world of work is now more precarious and insecure; concepts like ‘career’ seem nebulous and out of place in a company like Microsoft compared to one like Ford. Trust in progress is replaced by risk of unemployment due to technological advance or outsourcing. Progress itself has become privatized and individualized (Bauman, 2000, p. 135). Space, once the object of progress has lost its ‘strategic value’, the instantaneity of software time declares the new irrelevance of space, masquerading as the annihilation of time (Bauman, 2000, p.117). Privatization may also be seen in the shift from single to multiple authorities and the demise of the ‘leader’ which was the product of a teleological world view. The liquid world is goal obsessed and becomes an infinite collection of possibilities, more than any single life can explore, but from which a ‘life’ must be chosen without the normative or regulatory structures of before. Leaders become councillors who show by example but the responsibility for success or failure lies solely with the individual; there would be no more salvation by a society in which normative and protective networks (like the welfare state) were being hollowed out (Bauman, 2000, p.64).

5.3. Emotions and Power in Liquid Modernity

Emotions and power are, rightly, fundamentally (albeit, often, implicitly) linked in Bauman’s analysis and, as the synthesising concepts of *this* thesis, deserve a little explicit attention here.¹³³ Reading Bauman, it is clear that the emotions of solid modernity, painful as they were, fear-laden as they were, nevertheless were based on *certainties*, on the possibility of progress and the transcendence of adversity; on trust in institutions (political, religious, scientific), and if all of these were to fail, in the end, in some god or another, in salvation. By contrast, the lived affective condition of liquid modernity is characterised by profound *uncertainty*, risk, insecurity, fear, loneliness, ambiguity and alienation (Bauman, 2000, 2006). The key bonds that have been melted for Bauman are the bonds that unite us in our social cohabitation – ‘frailty of human bonds is a prominent, indeed the defining attribute of liquid modernity’ (Bauman, 2006, p.45). The atomized and individualized of this phase of development long for a sense

¹³³ Yet, despite the fact that Bauman’s work is peppered with reference to emotions, his treatment of them occasionally appears somewhat problematic, or at least (perhaps ironically), ambiguous. For example, in *Liquid Fear* (2006) he writes: ‘Emotions are fidgety and flicker, they quickly run out of steam, they tend to be drawn away from the target by the slightest distraction. To put it briefly, they are untrustworthy and unreliable...Emotions are many and speak in different, often discordant voices; reason is one and has only one voice’ (Bauman, 2006, pp.61-3). While he is ostensibly attributing such a view of emotions to ‘the moderns’ and modern (particularly Nazi) bureaucracy, because of his rhetorical writing and lack of clear treatment, there is a sense in which the dichotomy between reason and emotion is, *de facto*, implied in his own view.

of community, the last relic of the old time utopias of the good society and a haven from these fears (Bauman, 2000, p.92). Intimate relationships, and ‘emotions’ like love, are all liquid now too, marked by provisionality and held, if held at all, in a state of ‘until further notice’. Long-term commitments are seen as traps, to be avoided or negotiated, replaced by ‘semi-detached’ couples, and online dating (Bauman, 2003). Following Hochschild (1997, 2003), Bauman describes how some TNCs prefer their employees to have ‘zero drag’, unburdened by the ‘friction’ of families, children and the retarding responsibilities of intimate emotional relationships. The lower your ‘drag coefficient’, the more employable you become (Bauman, 2007, p.10). Emotions themselves are another commodity, to be consumed and discarded at will.

All of which is bound up in changes in the character of power and power relations. Power is discussed throughout Bauman’s liquid modern work, in at least three distinct yet interconnected ways. For the new power elite, it is determined by speed and mobility; this power is both global in its reach and instantaneous in its communication and effect. These new, nomadic elites have disengaged from the dominated; the bonds between capital and labour have been sundered, and the prime technique of power is now ‘escape, slippage, elision and avoidance’ (Bauman, 2000, p.11). Power in liquid modernity is exterritorial - the weak remain tied to the earth. In a more recent treatment of liquid power (Bauman & Haugaard, 2008), Bauman draws on Foucault to restate his position. Foucault (and Elias before him, I would add) was correct in seeing power as ubiquitous (and therefore unnoticed) in human relations and not ‘an object stocked in governmental safes that can be acquired by revolutionaries storming and occupying the Winter Palace; it cannot be ‘taken over’ by assaulting and removing its present holders ‘on high’ (Bauman & Haugaard, 2008, p.112).¹³⁴ Where Foucault needs to be updated is in relation to ‘panoptical power’. In liquid modernity, rather than the few watching the many, the many now watch the few, and the *panopticon* has become a *synopticon*. He writes:

A substantive change in the nature of domination: obtaining discipline through ‘precarization’, deepening the uncertainty under which the subjects of power choose, decide and act, rather than through ‘management’ –

¹³⁴ He continues: ‘It is present in every tissue and cell of society – and it is also constantly reproduced and replenished by daily routine conduct. And so the perpetual modern ambition of ‘changing society’ or ‘creating New Man’ is unlikely to be fulfilled by changing the occupants of the ‘seats of power’. Thus, Foucault’s insight was a reflection on the ever-more-evident bankruptcy of numerous totalitarian and authoritarian experiments in building ‘New Orders’ and re-shaping society by force and by design. I believe that this insight retains in full its validity... (i)t grasps a universal feature of all societies at all times (Bauman & Haugaard, 2008, p.112).

surveillance, coercion and punishment. In other words, we move from cutting down the options to multiplying them, from making the setting of actions more 'transparent' and predictable to making it, on the contrary, more opaque and less calculable. It is because of the haunting uncertainty and insecurity that the subjects are inclined to engage in 'synoptical' endeavours and are growing increasingly sensitive to PR and its temptations. If the flipside of the 'solid modern' domination-through-order-building was the totalitarian tendency, the flipside of the 'liquid modern' domination-through-uncertainty is the state of ambient insecurity, anxiety and fear (Bauman & Haugaard, 2008, p.112).

As such, for Bauman, it is the relations of emotions and power that determine the key character of liquid modernity. A shift in the nature of societal relations of power give rise to an emotional climate of fear and anxiety, which in turn recursively reinforces the relations of power in evidence. The final, and connected, way that power is discussed is in the way that (political) power has been divorced from politics. The problems and powers that shape the contemporary condition are global, while democratic politics and political decision-making remain local and parochial. Increasingly, and in light of the global economic and environmental (etc) crises, Bauman appears to be advocating a return to 'big P' politics, but on a global scale, rather than at the level of nation-states, along the model of the European Union (which is currently trapped between politics and power) (Bauman, 2013).¹³⁵

The result of these processes of emotion and power on social agents is that our individual worlds and, above all, our *identities* become *fractured*. We lose our sense of self, our narrative or existential coherence as *persons*, is liquefied too. Our lives become fragmented and episodic, our selves splintered: '(i)n our liquid modern times the world around us is sliced into poorly coordinated fragments while our individual lives are cut into a succession of ill-connected episodes' (Bauman, 2004, pp.12-3, see also Bauman,1995).

Bauman's depiction of the contemporary condition has, of course, been subject to a host of criticisms (e.g. Adams, 2007, Elliott, 2007, Burkitt, 2005a, 2008). His position is certainly open to challenge. One could churlishly suggest that he has been writing the same book, with minor variations, since the 1990's. Further, the originality of this position is also questionable,

¹³⁵ This is from the online journal Social Europe. See here: <http://www.social-europe.eu/2013/05/europe-is-trapped-between-power-and-politics/>.

but theoretical amnesia is perhaps itself a product of liquid modernity. For example, a forgotten giant of twentieth century sociology, Piriram Sokorin, appears to have scooped Bauman by some forty years when he writes of *his* own society, with its declining ‘sensate’, transitional, and ‘temporal’ mentality:

Nothing has sufficient time to crystallize. Everything is in a liquid state. Nothing has a chance to be tested for its good or bad qualities. We really do not know which of the incessantly changing “models” and values are good and which are poor. Therefore the whole social life and the whole mentality are also in a liquid state, formless, shapeless, foggy, like a primeval protoplasm or a crowd of fleeting shadows. One would look in vain, in this fog of shadows, for clear-cut boundary lines between the sinister and the benevolent, the good and bad, the true and false, the beautiful and ugly, the wholesome and harmful, right and wrong. The shadow values are so crowded, so foggy, they come and go so fast, that no such lines can be established. Hence the supreme reign of relativism in our mentality and culture — relativism of everything. Hence a lack of any certainty, stability, and security in our mental and social life. In this atmosphere of queer, dancing shadow values nobody can feel secure; nobody can have firm ground under his feet. We try our best to “adjust” ourselves to this continuous change. A hopeless task, more hopeless than that of Sisyphus. The only result of this desperate “adjustment of maladjustments” is exhaustion, fatigue, and the senseless state of “being busy doing nothing” (Sorokin, [1957]1970, p.320).

Of course, Sorokin is writing from the position of his ‘social cycle’ theory, and of the mid (rather than late) twentieth century, but had I said that this quote came from an as yet unpublished Bauman book, most would believe me. Perhaps relatedly, the style of Bauman’s sociology (to the extent that it *is* accepted as sociology by his critics) is *light* on empirical evidence and *heavy* on metaphor. Indeed, for some, it is closer to literature than social science, particularly poetry. Metaphors of society (liquid, solid), of people (vagabonds, tourists) of social order (gardener, hunters) stalk his theoretical landscape, but very little by way of methodology, or data appears (Jacobsen & Marshman, 2008). Bauman is more likely to reach for Borges before Bourdieu, or Calvito, rather than the ESRC, to support a point. This is sociology as rhetoric.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ Which is not to say that rhetoric is entirely avoidable in social theory, sociology and all the other disciplines. The point is that Bauman’s theorizing is definitively and (almost) exclusively rhetorical. Despite some notable examples, such as Edmondson (1984) and more recently Jasper & Young (2007), the role of rhetoric in sociology and theory deserves further study. Particularly in the European tradition, less so in the American, rhetoric seems to be the defining feature of social theory, yet this appears to be under-acknowledged and accounted for.

From our theoretical perspective, there are other, more troublesome features. Despite the proliferation of liquefying and dynamic metaphors, Bauman's approach is nevertheless not processual *enough*. His work is fundamentally dualistic; it is a tapestry of binary oppositions, between solid/liquid, heavy/light, and so on. This antinomic approach is itself rhetorical, but because of this, it leads him in to rhetorical exaggeration and over-generalization (which is noted by Burkitt (2008) and others). If Bauman were fully correct in his diagnosis, the liquid modern world would be mostly populated with three types or categories of people: a minority of super-wealthy trans-global elites, a (growing) minority of 'wasted' poor, and a majority of postemotional hipsters, whose very postemotionalism, consumption and ironic detachment is a product of their deep-seated anxiety and lack of central, core identity. The problem isn't that all of these categories exist, they surely do, but rather that the diagnosis omits as much as it includes, and is, in the final analysis, reductive, one-dimensional and tends, at times, towards caricature.

Interestingly, the key descriptor used in the original book, 'liquefaction', has a few related, yet distinct meanings. Bauman is quite correct to use it in relation to the 'melting of solids' (Bauman, 2000, p.3 and *passim*). It may also, somewhat wonderfully, refer to 'the melting of the soul by religious ardour' (OED). Another, related example of liquefaction refers to soil mechanics and earthquakes: 'a phenomenon where by a saturated or partially saturated soil substantially loses strength and stiffness in response to an applied stress, usually earthquake shaking or other sudden change in stress condition, causing it to behave like a liquid'.¹³⁷ When such a process occurs, such as during the 1964 Niigata earthquake, and in other areas of the world with particularly sandy soil, when earthquakes strike, the sand undergoes a process of 'liquefaction' in which it turns to quick-sand. Buildings and other solid structures sink and subside causing massive destruction. Some are swallowed totally, but, invariably, others remain, weakened, partially submerged but jutting their *solidity* defiantly toward the sky. Though a process of liquefaction may occur its destruction is rarely total. Islands of solidity remain and persist along with, and in defiance of, such processes of dissolution and destruction. In such ways is 'liquid modernity' more 'lumpy' than Bauman suggests. His own position appears to be under-mined by his rhetorical strategy, forcing him in to a play of binaries that glosses-over complicating nuance and resulting in over-statement.

¹³⁷ From 'Soil liquefaction' (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soil_liquefaction).

One final problem from my perspective is the reliance on the concept of identity, rather than that of habitus. The concept of identity has recently been subjected to a series of criticisms from thinkers such as Brubaker (2004) and Malešević (2007, 2011). For the former, drawing on Bourdieu, social analysis is trapped in an ‘identity crisis’, deploying the concept in a variety of contradictory and fundamentally ambiguous ways; identity talk is a ‘blunt, flat, undifferentiated vocabulary’ (Brubaker, 2004, p.29).¹³⁸ He suggests that we must go ‘beyond identity’, and that analysts should demolish substantialist, essentialist and reifying conceptions of ‘identity’, replacing them with more appropriate, processual, and dynamic constructions, such as ‘*identification*’ (Brubaker, 2004).¹³⁹ In addition to these criticisms Malešević (2011), has recently argued that identity, particularly national identity, is a ‘conceptual chimera not worthy of serious analytical pursuit’ (Malešević, 2011, p.1). He goes on to suggest that this ‘conceptual monstrosity’ is a theoretically vague, reifying, fuzzy and static concept, lacking clear empirical referents, giving examples from both micro level and macro level studies (Malešević, 2011). Instead of such a futile and fashionable concept, he suggests that scholars deploy the well-established yet under-utilised notions of ‘ideology’ and ‘solidarity’, particularly in the study of nationalism, and in explaining *why* social actors claim to have (and find ontological security in) ‘national identities’. He writes:

(w)hen dealing with nations the attention should focus on the ideological processes through which nationhood becomes our second nature, through which human beings naturalise and normalise nationhood as the self-evident and only legitimate way of comprehending the world in which we live. Hence, rather than taking the existence of ‘national identity’ as given and unproblematic, the idea is to explore how this ideological process of making nations emotionally equivalent to families operates. (Malešević, 2011, p.12 emphasis added).

In Malešević’s wider work, he endeavours to explain, not the emergence of ‘national identities’, but rather to account for the structural emergence of national ‘solidarity’. (Malešević, 2010).

¹³⁸ He writes: ‘Social analysis-including the analysis of identity politics-requires relatively unambiguous analytical categories. Whatever its suggestiveness, whatever its indispensability in certain practical contexts, "identity" is too ambiguous, too torn between "hard" and "soft" meanings, essentialist connotations and constructivist qualifiers, to serve well the demands of social analysis (Brubaker, 2004, p.

¹³⁹ The question to ask, is: ‘what work the concept is supposed to do, and how well it does it. We have argued that the concept is deployed to do a great deal of analytical work, much of it legitimate and important. "Identity," however, is ill suited to perform this work, for it is riddled with ambiguity, riven with contradictory meanings, and encumbered by reifying connotations. Qualifying the noun with strings of adjectives-specifying that identity is multiple, fluid, constantly renegotiated, and so on-does not solve the problem. It yields little more than a suggestive oxymoron-a multiple singularity, a fluid crystallization-and begs the question of why one should use the same term to designate all this and more (Brubaker, 2004, p.61). For me, it is much more theoretically robust to speak in terms of habitus, even adjectivized versions like ‘fractured’ or ‘heterogeneous’, than identity.

Both critics, I would argue, in their own ways, converge in their criticism of identity, but also in their proposed solutions to this ‘crisis’. Malešević, by making ideology ‘second nature’, Brubaker by invoking Bourdieu’s ‘self-understanding’. This later is:

A dispositional term that designates what might be called “situated subjectivity”: ones sense of who one is, of one’s social location, and of how, (given the first two) one is prepared to act. As a dispositional term, it belongs to what Pierre Bourdieu...has called sens pratique, the practical sense - at once cognitive and emotional - that persons have of themselves and their social world (Brubaker, 2004, p.44).

For Bourdieu, I suggest, this *sens pratique* is (effectively) synonymous with habitus (Bourdieu, 1990, p.66), yet Brubaker shies away from the notion here. More precisely, practical sense is the emergent property of the meeting of habitus and world, a ‘proleptic adjustment to the demands of the field’, or a ‘feel for the game’, a ‘quasi-bodily involvement with the world’ (ibid). Indeed, I suggest that the concept of habitus in fact *better captures* what Brubaker is getting at, i.e. the dispositional, situated subjectivity of individual agents that is only manifested in specific contexts, and in a state of relational reciprocity with those contexts. And that this ‘situated subjectivity’ is precisely what is captured in the narrative, life history interviews discussed in the next chapter.

Thus, the concept of habitus appears to address some of the criticisms levelled at the notion of identity. It is both relational and processual, and embodied, avoiding (when deployed correctly) both the Charybdis of reification and the Scylla of substantialism. Yet Bauman assiduously avoids any and all reference to the concept, preferring identity to dispositions. This is perhaps a product of his philosophical roots. As Blackshaw suggests:

Bauman’s reliance on this existential version of human consciousness means that his sociology has little use for the concept of habitus.... Without being inattentive to the point that some people ‘are freer than others, some in being free in effect structure the world for others’, Bauman’s sociology suggests that the concept of habitus is of limited efficacy for understanding individual identity formation in liquid modernity because it fails to recognize that social actors today are hardly ever inhibited in their pursuit of their individual freedom. Consequently, he replaces habitus with the concept of habitat (Blackshaw, 2005, pp.89-90).

In short, even if something like habitus was a feature of solid modernity, liquid modernity has made the notion obsolete. But, to the extent that this is an accurate representation of

Bauman's thoughts on habitus, this is a flawed conception of the habitus. To the extent that habitus is conceived here as being, in some way, *given*, while 'identity' is seen as an active construction, Bauman's existentialism may dispense with the former. Now, individualization means that 'social identity' or social definition has ceased to be *zuhause* and become *vorhanden* instead (Bauman, 2001, p.124).¹⁴⁰

In this interpretation, I think Bauman is partially correct in his diagnosis, but wrong about both identity and habitus, conceptually. Just because the 'discourse of identity' is the near-ubiquitous vocabulary in which individuals themselves discuss contemporary selfhood does not make it the correct one. There is the danger, as Brubaker reminds us, of confusing a category of practice for (or with) a category of analysis (Brubaker, 2004). Just because identity is widely deployed does not mean that it *should* be deployed, particularly by sociologists, given the problems with the concept (and its deployment) and while a far better concept (when properly articulated), that of habitus, is already to hand. As I argued in an earlier chapter, habitus is a robust, processual and relational concept that should not be viewed in static, unchanging or deterministic terms. The question then becomes, how do we account for and reconcile the good work done by Bauman in his diagnosis of the contemporary condition within the vocabulary of habitus, rather than identity? As I have shown earlier, and hope to reinforce later with the data, habitus is a more complex concept than Bauman's philosophy can appreciate.

5.4. Heterogeneous Habitus

I suggest that, despite the problems I have outlined with Bauman's account, his insightful work does indeed capture key features of the condition of late modernity; that the metaphor of liquidity is accurate and useful in *specific* contexts, while the precarious complexity of social life has had profound effects on our social selves in those contexts. In the shift from solid to liquid modernity I agree that there has been a process akin to the 'fracturing of identities', that

¹⁴⁰ He writes: 'What the idea of 'individualisation' informs of, is the emancipation of the individual from his or her ascribed, inherited and inborn determination of social character: a departure rightly seen as a most conspicuous and seminal feature of modern condition. To put it in a nutshell, 'individualisation' consists in transforming human 'identity' from a 'given' into a 'task', and charging the actors with the responsibility for performing that task and for the consequences (and also the side effects) of their performance; in other words, it consists in establishing a *de jure* autonomy (though not necessarily the *de facto* one). One's place in society, one's 'social definition', has ceased to be *zuhause* and become *vorhanden* instead (Bauman, 2001, p.124).

our social selves and roles have indeed shifted from being ‘givens’ to ‘tasks’, but I wish to recast it in terms of a fractured, or I will call *heterogeneous* habitus.

This proposed shift from homogeneous to heterogeneous habitus in late modernity should not be taken in an absolutist or binary sense. Some depictions of the habitus have been overly monolithic, suggesting an excessively one-dimensional view of the concept. Here I would rather depict the complexity of the habitus as a scalar phenomenon (Haugaard, 1997), as a continuum between ideal types that are never seen in reality. Thus, an infinitely homogeneous habitus might describe someone who was exposed to one, and one only, source of socialization, giving rise to one-track or one-dimensional habitus; while an infinitely heterogeneous habitus would result from an infinite-track socialization process, both of which are clearly fictitious. It is obvious that every human being lies somewhere between these poles. The argument which follows will suggest that, as societies become increasingly complex, the more the sources of socialization and the complexity of social worlds increase and become more fragmented, the more individuals with complex, multi-dimensional habituses emerge.




Figure 10. The Habitus Continuum

This notion of a heterogeneous habitus has a few conceptual forebears. Mark Haugaard, for example, discusses a similar phenomenon, using a slightly different, more cognitive, vocabulary, with his concept of ‘multiple interpretive horizons’ (Haugaard, 1997). For Haugaard, an individual’s social consciousness results from split-socialization processes in different, interlocking social spheres, giving the social actor the knowledge to be socially competent in different social fields.¹⁴¹ Rather than a unified self, local socialization processes give rise to a local interpretive horizon in the mind of the actor who then ‘switches’

¹⁴¹ He writes: ‘I would suggest that the self is not unified. The practical and discursive consciousness knowledge of individuals is composed of many interpretive horizons each of which is built up within different spheres of social life. By interpretive horizon we mean both the perceptions (the way things appear) and ways of thinking about the world. An interpretive horizon is a local way of life (Haugaard, 1997, p.179).

interpretive horizons from context to context (Haugaard, 1997, p.179-80).¹⁴² For Haugaard too, the existence and multiplicity of these horizons has increased in late modernity. A key aspect of this is that multiple horizons can give social actors ‘relative autonomy’ from the specific environment they find themselves in; they may gain critical distance on a particular situation by ‘stepping out’ or switching between horizons (in addition to the autonomy gained from the transfer of practical to discursive consciousness knowledge) (Haugaard, 1997, p.183).

Bernard Lahire (2011), whose work I discovered at the very end of this project, also suggests something similar with his notion of the ‘plural actor’.¹⁴³ For Lahire, advocating a new sociology of the individual, or a ‘psychological sociology’, Bourdieu’s work is both stimulus and foil. Operating as a critique of this work, and of most of Bourdieu’s contemporary followers, Lahire argues against, what he sees as, the over-generalization and overly-homogeneous characterizations of the habitus that proliferate in recent sociology. The concept, he suggests, was never intended or crafted for the work it has been put to, and it is largely misunderstood. This singleness, durability, transposability and homogeneity of the habitus, as conceived by both Durkheim and, initially, by Bourdieu, was a feature of very specific sociological conditions – boarding schools (for the former) and *traditional* societies with very low levels of differentiation (for both) (Lahire, 2011, p.20). The paradox, for Bourdieusians, he writes ‘lies in the fact of having at the end of the day retained a model of the habitus adapted to an approach to weakly differentiated societies (pre-industrial, pre-capitalist) in order to study societies that are highly differentiated, and which by definition necessarily produce actors that are more differentiated both between one another and internally’ (Lahire, 2011, p.21). The contemporary socio-historical conditions, well captured by Bauman’s notion of liquidity, give rise to multi-determined and multi-socialized ‘plural actors’, operating on the basis of a multiplicity of *dispositions*, rather than identities: ‘And so we are plural, different in the different situations of ordinary life, foreign to other parts of ourselves when we are engaged in this or that domain of social existence’ (Lahire, 2011, p.35).

¹⁴² I would suggest that Haugaard’s notion of ‘switching’ between interpretive horizons shares some similarity with White’s (2008) ‘switching’ between *netdoms*, though, again, in a different theoretical language. For example: ‘Identities trigger out of events— that is to say, out of switches in surroundings—seeking control over uncertainty and thus over fellow identities. Identities build and articulate ties to other identities in network-domains, *netdoms* for short. However, *netdoms* themselves remain subject to interruption from further switching with attendant *netdoms*. Thus, the world comes from identities attempting control within their relations to other identities. In their search for control, identities switch from *netdom* to *netdom*, and each switching is at once a decoupling *from* somewhere and an embedding *into* somewhere’ (White, 2008, p.2 original emphasis).

¹⁴³ The book was originally written in French in 2001, but only translated in 2011. I came across it, accidentally, in 2013, when most of this thesis had been written. Had I discovered it earlier it would possibly have featured more prominently here, but this, fuller, engagement must wait for future work.

Furthermore, this fractioning of embodied experience should not be understood in terms of a psychoanalytical ‘divided-self’, suffering and ‘conflicted’, it is rather most usually compatible with the ‘well-founded-illusion of personal coherence and identity with oneself’ (Lahire, 2011, p.37).¹⁴⁴

In their different ways both Haugaard and Lahire would agree with the argument that increased complexity in late modernity alters the conditions within which habitus develops, resulting in a more multiple, complex, heterogeneous habitus. Indeed, I could go further and suggest that the habitus was *always* multiple, never *fully* monolithic and homogeneous; there were always strains between different embodied dispositions, affecting action in specific contexts. The habitus is processual, not static, and is derived via experience in specific relational contexts, within specific emotional regimes. These embodied dispositions are manifested, via (and never in isolation from) different and specific actions, practices, thoughts, emotions, in different relational contexts or situations. What we observe, then, emerging in liquid modern societies (to the extent that they are such), in line with more complex social environments, characterized by more intricate and over-lapping relations of power is a more complex and pluralistic form of habitus, in general, and emotional habitus in particular. In the next section I will begin to examine these processes for a given case: the Republic of Ireland in the twentieth century.

5.5. Social Change in Ireland

The literature on social change in Ireland is not as vast as one would imagine, despite the speed and scale of that change.¹⁴⁵ While popular and media discussion of the changes in Irish society have become something of a national obsession, academic, and particularly sociological analysis, has been relatively scarce. One exception to this has been analysis by economists, of which there has been many, but these bring their own problems and limitations, with the key questions that concern us here, power and emotions, usually omitted. Others, such as

¹⁴⁴ Those who do suffer from a ‘splitting of the ego’ are special cases, such as upwardly declassed class *transfuges*, what Bourdieu (also referring to himself) called ‘universal strangers’, where there is a direct and profound conflict (contradiction) between two embodied dispositions (working class family, upper class education) (ibid).

¹⁴⁵ The standard undergraduate textbook by Tovey, Share and Corcoren (2011) discusses some of the approaches.

journalists like David McWilliams, offer shallow, pseudo-sociological accounts of the changes in Irish society which are highly problematic from a sociological perspective. Indeed, much of this work has focused on the so called 'economic miracle' of the 1990's that is usually referred to as the 'Celtic tiger'. Of course, the historians, economic and social, have also written much on the Irish twentieth century, and we will bolster our analysis with some of this work. This is not to suggest that the economic development is not relevant to what I have to say, it is a key part of the processes of change, but rather that our focus is different. As such, in what follows I will attempt to construct an argument to account for and outline what the key factors of social change in Ireland are that do concern us. In this, I will split the century into a pre-1950's and a post-1950's division. The division, while somewhat arbitrary, aims to help us superimpose Bauman's work on liquid modernity onto the period in question, and to present a picture of Ireland in its 'solid' and 'liquid' varieties of modernity.

The existing sociological literature that does address social change falls into a number of categories, reflecting the key trends within the discipline here.¹⁴⁶ The traditional way to account for change in Ireland used to be modernization theory, particularly in the last decades of the century. Occasionally, there has been reference to Frank's 'dependency theory' but more recently the discourse of 'globalization' has replaced this, echoing the influence of economic perspectives within the academy. Sociology has always been the 'poor relation' in the Irish social sciences, its perennial crisis even more pronounced than that of the discipline more generally, in other jurisdictions. Rather than recount these perspectives, the account here will deploy Bauman's framework of solid and liquid, and try to keep the argument focused and confined to the interrelation of power and emotions in the production of habitus.

One approach that is particularly useful here is that of Kuhling and Keohane (2007) and their deployment of the concept of 'accelerated modernization'. All commentators would agree that Ireland was a late comer to 'modernity' and is often labelled a 'late moderniser' (Share, Tovey & Corcoran, 2007). While this is essentially true, there are unique historical factors to the Irish situation that must be accounted for, such as its relationship with the UK and the prevailing 'social structure' of the early twentieth century. In what follows, then, I will present a picture of the social relations that dominated the Ireland of 1900-1950's, suggesting that the key determinants of the prevailing power relations were nationalism and Catholicism; church and state. This interrelated dominance was both homogenizing, and gave rise to a

¹⁴⁶ On the history of sociology in Ireland, and its unusual Catholic origins, see Conway (2006).

conservative cultural milieux and a repressive emotional regime that acted on the bodies of individuals in that society, resulting in a widespread and pervasive repressed emotional habitus. To the extent that Ireland became 'modern' during this period, it is a modernity that is marked by its *solidity*. After the 1950's, gradually and slowly, a more liberal society began to emerge. While the focus might be considered to be too parochial and inward looking, and some analysis has been of this nature, foregrounding Irish exceptionalism, it is important to state clearly that all of these developments, in *both* time periods, cannot be fully understood unless seen in a wider, European and global, context. Irish history is embedded in world history, and economic and social bonds, cultural production, ideologies and developments of all types have always been inextricably linked to developments outside of Ireland. This includes, but is in no way limited to, the Irish diaspora. To suggest that Ireland became 'globalized' after 1950 should not be read to imply that it was somehow cut off from the world before this, a 'country in a bottle'.

5.6. Ireland: 1900-1950

5.6.1. Nationalism

While I wish to depict and will argue that the period before the 1950's in Ireland falls within Bauman's conception of 'solid' modernity, this solidification was itself a process that emerged. The conservatism and homogenization that characterise the period result from key changes in the relations of power and specific historical processes. While the early decades of the century were marked by poverty, uncertainty and precarity, the austere and pervasive conservatism that characterized much of the period is a crystallization of events and relations, which, I suggest, *increases after* independence. The reality of 1900 was much more heterogeneous and open than what would follow, as the literature of the time shows. The Irish Parliamentary Party was attempting to reunite under Redmond after the schism that followed the disgrace and death of Parnell in 1891 and the defeat of the second Home Rule Bill in 1893. Protestants and the 'Anglo Irish'¹⁴⁷ occupy key positions within the political and literary

¹⁴⁷ The phrase 'Anglo Irish' is not one I care for as it sets up an discursive boundary and attempts to delineate a 'group' that is much more complex and heterogeneous than the phrase allows for. Many of those labelled as such considered themselves (and were) Irish, *fully* Irish, even if many were Protestant and (nominally) members of the 'ascendancy' class). Any assumption that members of this category were universally unionist is ahistorical; indeed, key figures in the fight for either Home Rule or independence were protestant nationalists like Grattan,

culture, many of whom are agitating for either independence, devolution, or Home Rule. Indeed, a majority of people on the island of Ireland in 1900 appeared happy to maintain the Act of Union of 1800, and even most nationalists aspired to Home Rule (staying within the empire), rather than full independence (Ferriter, 2004). This is by no means limited to the Unionist of the North. James Connolly has returned and founded his (small) Irish Socialist Republican Party, critiquing Irish capital and history via his Marxist intellectual output in print and in person, and unionization was developing under James Larkin and others in urban centres, especially Dublin. While there was still a grinding poverty in evidence in both urban centres and rural Ireland, there were also signs of optimism and development.¹⁴⁸ Gerald Balfour, Chief Secretary and head of the Irish administration, based in Dublin Castle in 1900, engaged in a programme of economic reforms in infrastructure and local government, while probably aimed at ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’, were nevertheless signs of growth and dynamism. The great and tragic upheavals of the 19th century, including but not limited to the Great Irish Famine (1845-9) which reduced the population from eight million to four and a half million in 1901, were largely at an end, even though emigration, ever the pressure valve in Irish life, was among the highest in Europe in 1899.

The key point here is that the events that were to follow were by no means easily or obviously predicable at the dawn of the twentieth century. While Irish nationalism was always strong, key figures were involved with a cultural and linguistic revival, via the actions of the Gaelic League and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). Much work was being done to revive and re-educate people about a (highly romanticized, and fictitious) ancient Gaelic and Celtic culture and tradition, centred around the Irish language but the majority of people, particularly the newly emergent Irish (Catholic) middle classes had embodied many of the trappings of Victorian culture and sensibility. The aspiration was for a strong and educated Irish ‘identity’, under Home Rule, while existing as a key, leading part of the wider empire. The objectives of the revivalists and Gaelicists were primarily cultural, rather than political (Foster, 1989). Indeed, much of their impetus came as a response to the anti-Irish, racist discrimination that I mentioned earlier.¹⁴⁹ As one of the key members of the cultural revival, Eoin McNeil,

Tone, Emmett and even Parnell himself. This is before we even mention the likes of Yeats, Synge, Shaw, Beckett etc. Yet, the term is used widely in the literature and I reluctantly include it here.

¹⁴⁸ Dublin, in particular, was one of the poorest cities in Europe, with slums and disease (such as TB) widespread in the city centre.

¹⁴⁹ For example, the manifesto of the (largely ‘Anglo Irish’) Irish Literary Theatre (founded 1890) states directly: ‘We will show that Ireland is not the home of buffoonery and of easy sentiment, as has been represented, but the home of an ancient idealism’ (cited in Foster, 1989, p.452).

articulated: 'In theory I suppose I am a separatist, in practice I would accept any settlement that would enable Irishmen (sic) to freely control their own affairs. If the truth were known, I think that this represents the political views of ninety-nine out of every hundred nationalists' (McNeil, cited in Foster, 1989, p.456).

Despite McNeil's insight, it would be the 'one per cent' that would prevail. That Irish nationalism became radicalized, ultimately leading to a return to 'physical force' insurrection with the Easter Rising of 1916, is due to complex concatenation of processes and events. I cannot recount the details of these processes here, and there are many, high quality volumes that address this (e.g. Foster, 1989, Lee, 1989, Martin, 1976). What I wish to offer is a more sociological argument that, rather than focusing on the 'great men' of the time, will recount some key aspects of the process.

Power relations between the north, (predominantly) protestant Ulster, and the majority, Catholic south are central. Ulster Unionists were rattled by the prospect of Home Rule, fearing a devolved united Ireland in which they would be ruled from Dublin by an inferior 'race' of Gaels, and Catholics. For these Home Rule amounted to 'Rome rule' (Lee, 1989, p.8). The Parliament Act of 1911 removed the power of the House of Lords to veto Commons' legislation and thereby removed the 'last parliamentary bulwark against Home Rule legislation for Ireland' which, for Lee at least, 'outraged Irish unionists, whose infuriated reaction to the threat of home rule unleashed violence in to twentieth-century politics (Lee, 1989, p.1). In April 1912 the third Home Rule Bill was introduced. Lee makes much of the racial undertones of the Unionist rhetoric, suggesting that Ulster protestants felt an inalienable superiority over Catholics, enjoying, in sociological language, both power-over and symbolic and cultural capital in the province. For Lee it better resembled a 'Herrenvolk democracy' and mentality than a truly liberal one (Lee, 1989, pp.3-14).¹⁵⁰ As such, the prospect of Home Rule, being under the yoke of Catholics in Dublin, was anathema to unionists. In 1913 the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a physical force unionist paramilitary organization, was established and quickly enrolled over 100,000 men. More significantly, in April 1914, the UVF imported almost twenty five thousand rifles and three million rounds of ammunition (Lee, 1989, Foster, 1989). The precedent was set. The Irish Volunteers emerged into existence in response,

¹⁵⁰ This is not an uncontroversial position, but I gloss over the historical disputes here.

largely from a unification of a number of low-level disparate groups in existence in 1914, and began, somewhat shambolically, importing arms too (Foster, 1989, pp.468-9). But even now, as Lee notes: ‘republicanism was still a fringe ideology in 1913. The bulk of the Irish volunteers were simply home rulers’ (Lee, 1989, p.20).

The Home Rule Bill was on the statute books by September 1914, but was put into suspension prior to enactment because of World War 1 (WW1). The Lords had tried to attach an amendment on the partition of Ulster, but all would have to wait until the guns stopped, which, at the time, practically everyone thought would be a matter of months. The Great War is central to the course of Irish history, yet, until recently (especially the last decades of the twentieth, into the early twenty-first centuries), the involvement of the Irish in that war and its impact were effectively airbrushed out. Redmond was faced with a dilemma: to offer Irish support for the British war effort or take a neutral stance. The latter option would surely have put paid to the prospects of a united Ireland and copper-fasten the partition of Ulster. He chose, and had to choose, the former, expressing Irish support in the Commons for the war effort and later, more significantly, in a speech in Wicklow in September, urged Irish people to volunteer for the British army.¹⁵¹ This pledge would prove to be a critical mistake. Foster writes: ‘if Irish history has turning points, Redmond’s misjudgement at Woodenbridge may reasonably be seen as one: for it led directly to a split between moderate and advanced nationalists in the Volunteer ranks’ (Foster, 1989, p.473). While a majority of these supported him, with c. 150,000 becoming the National Volunteers, a minority of up to 10,000 retained the Irish Volunteers name. These represented the more militant, IRB-based element within the movement and, as the war dragged on well past the few months it was expected to last, this anti-war wing flourished while the National Volunteers became demoralized and suffered declining numbers (Foster, *ibid*). This extension of the war, day by day, strengthened the hand of the militants at the expense of the constitutionalists. What good was a Home Rule Bill locked in a drawer in London? Why should Irishmen fight and die in an oppressors army? As the time drew on, less and less of the southern Irish enlisted, despite extensive recruitment and poster campaigns, many aimed at *shaming* Irish males into action. These were countered with an anti-recruitment campaign by the newly invigorated Sinn Féin.

¹⁵¹ His gamble was intended to show that an Ireland under Home Rule was not a threat to either the British, or more importantly, to the unionist minority in the north of the island. He believed that ‘joint action against Germany would wed Irishmen together’ (Foster, 1989, p.472). Initially, his suggestion was that British troops be recalled from Ireland and that their tasks would be taken up by the Irish Volunteers. His critical later mistake was to pledge that these same volunteers would support the war ‘wherever needed’, i.e. Flanders.



Figure 11. . World War One Recruitment Posters

Thus, the war acted as a complex catalyst for the rising in 1916. It transformed the power relations within the nationalist movement, with increased impetus and capacity accruing to the militant, separatist minority mobilizing against conscription, the threat of an armed private army in Ulster, and the opportunity of a distracted empire, looking eastward. But it is the rising itself, and its legacy, that would have an even more decisive effect on the course of the period.

The Easter Rising was a shambles from the outset, made by a ‘minority of a minority’ with the nationalist movement (aided by some expatriates in the US) and doomed from its inception (Foster, 1989, p.477). Organized and spear-headed by a handful (seven) members of the Military Council of the IRB and led by Patrick Pearse, on the 24th of April, 1916 around 1900 men (and two hundred women) in total¹⁵² took over key buildings in Dublin, centred on the General post Office (GPO) on O’Connell Street. Pearse would proclaim the republic in

¹⁵² Approximately 1600 Irish Volunteer, led by Pearse, and 300 from Connolly’s Irish Citizen Army, aided by around two hundred women from Cumman na mBan. The British had around 16,000 and around 1,000 armed police in Dublin by the end of the week.

poetic terms, in the name of the Provisional Government'.¹⁵³ After a week of bitter fighting around 450 were dead and 2614 wounded, while 116 soldiers and 16 policemen were killed. I cannot recount the details here but suffice to say, the action shocked and even dumbfounded most of Dublin and the rest of the country, even those within the nationalist movement.¹⁵⁴ The timing was inopportune, the insurrection under-planned and the whole enterprise had no chance of succeeding. But it is the reaction to the rising by the British and the nationalists that would prove decisive in swaying popular opinion (or 'sentiment') toward a more widespread militancy.

But, here also, we enter more contested historical water. There is an ongoing debate within Irish public and historical discourse on whether the rising should be interpreted within the frame of a 'blood sacrifice ritual' (Lee, 1989, Foster, 1989, Bew, 2007). This is the position of the 'revisionists', such as Foster. Here I wish to skip over this particular controversy, eschewing any serious attempt to 'get into the minds of the rebels'. It is, nevertheless, true that some pronouncements of Pearse suggest that this may have been in *his* mind at least, and such rhetoric of blood sacrifice was widespread in Europe at the time.¹⁵⁵ Regardless of their intentions, what did help unify popular opinion and lead to a more militant and separatist version of nationalism emerging after 1916 is the executions of the main rebel leaders that followed in May. This, along with the other draconian measures introduced by Dublin Castle, such as the imposition of martial law and the internment (in camps in England and Wales) of around 1500 nationalists, many of whom had nothing to do with the insurrection,

¹⁵³ The text of the 'Proclamation' is cited in full in Foster (1989, pp.597-8). Note that the 'cause' of the Irish republic is here placed under the protection of the 'most high God', and will prove itself worthy of its 'august destiny' through its 'valour, discipline, and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good' (ibid).

¹⁵⁴ Lee (1989) give a fascinating account of the immediate contemporary reaction (to the extent that it can be gauged, with full reports not appearing until May), both in Dublin and in the regions to the rising. The rumours trickling out from Dublin was that the 'foolish' or 'romantic' uprising was in actual fact either the first stage of a German invasion and a German plot, or a Socialist plot (via Connolly or Larkin), or some combination of both. Majority opinion (albeit based on scant information) appears to have been against the rebels, either dismissing them as hopeless romantics – 'a Poet's Rebellion with too much literature about it' according to the Wicklow People – or a German/Socialist Plot (Lee, 1989, pp.29-38). The reaction of working class inner city Dublin included 'epic feats of looting' (Foster, 1989, p.482).

¹⁵⁵ One famous example from Pearse comes towards the end of his panegyric at the graveside of O'Donovan Rossa:

Life springs from death: and from the graves of patriot men and women spring living nations. The Defenders of this Realm have worked well in secret and in the open. They think that they have pacified Ireland. They think that they have purchased half of us and intimidated the other half. They think that they have foreseen everything, think that they have provided against everything; but the fools, the fools, the fools! — they have left us our Fenian dead, and, while Ireland holds these graves, Ireland unfree shall never be at peace (cited in Moran, 1997, p.146).

There are other such bellicose and sacrificial statements which litter his other writings and poems (see, for example, Augusteijn, 2010).

compounded Anglophobia and resentment. This created martyrs, around which nationalist propaganda and rhetoric could coalesce: afterwards, the executed leaders were both prayed for and even *to* – ‘on every level martyroyalty had taken over’ (Foster, 1989, p.487). In the words of Yeats, from his poem ‘Easter 1916’ commemorating this event:

MacDonagh and MacBride

And Connolly and Pearse

Now and in time to be,

Wherever green is worn,

Are changed, changed utterly:

A terrible beauty is born

(Yeats, [1916]1956).

The terrible beauty, and the narrative of its gestation and birth, the politics of memory that followed, all had profound effects on the becoming of the Irish state. If the rising, then, can be seen to engender an (albeit virtual) Irish Republic, and the germ around which a more militant and generalized nationalism would coalesce, the reaction to it by the British authorities would compound matters, to the benefit of Sinn Féin and Eamon de Valera. The short but bitter Anglo-Irish war (1919-1921) was one direct outcome. On the ground, the continued attacks by nationalists on police, and the general and growing intimidation of Sinn Féin led to the deployment of reinforcements, the notoriously brutal ‘Black and Tans’, whose draconian powers and oppressive tactics, the sacking of villages and killings, helped to cement the image of Sinn Féin as heroes and liberators.¹⁵⁶ The hearts and minds of the people were increasingly with the nationalists and for independence and ‘sovereignty’. When a truce was called in July, 1921, this was the victory for the IRA and Sinn Féin – the plucky underdogs who had fought the ‘good fight’ against the brutal and unjust imperial ‘oppressor’ and brought it, against the odds, to its knees. This was the narrative, at least, and, as I have shown already, such narratives have untold power, not least, the symbolic power of ‘world making’ that

¹⁵⁶ Growing up in the 1980’s, stories of the brutality of ‘the Tans’ and mythic tales of resistance were still being conveyed at firesides by grandparents and often in schools. They became new nationalist legends, imparted with pride and seriousness, feeding in to the cultivation of a nationalist habitus.

Bourdieu discusses. The 'Republic' itself began to take on a mythic symbolic existence, a promised land, in which all of the problems of the past could and would be put right.

The ensuing treaty, and the short, bitter Civil War that it led to, need not detain us long. Michael Collins, the key intelligence and commander of the guerilla war sent by de Valera to negotiate, signed it as a stepping-stone to a full republic, enshrining the partition of the six counties of the north (which was a reality in any case by 1920) and, perhaps more significantly, containing an oath of fidelity to the king for the new Free State dominion (Foster, 1989, pp.505-6). This failure to deliver 'the Republic', coupled with the oath, would have profound effects. This split Sinn Féin and led to the civil war of 1922-3, between those nationalists who were pro and those anti-treaty. As Foster writes, this war was perhaps more traumatic and influential than the previous Anglo Irish war. It 'created a caesura across Irish history, separating parties, interests and even families' with profound effects on the course of Irish politics (Foster, 1989, p.511). De Valera opposed the treaty and campaigned against it in the referendum that followed. That the treaty was ratified by a two-thirds majority did nothing to prevent the war. After the 'irreconcilables' took the Four Courts in Dublin, erstwhile co-combatants fought each other in a bitter struggle that soon spread throughout the country. The eventual response of the new provisional government was to be as draconian as anything seen earlier, ordering summary executions without trial, assassinations and brutal retaliations to attacks on police and the new government ministers (including Collins himself). The government was set on imposing order, and was largely supported in this endeavour, in spite of the brutal methods used. In the early years of the new Free State, the question of order was paramount. All other questions, such as Labour and the left, had been subsumed under the national question, and demoted. This conservative hostility to the left would continue. It continues still.

Indeed, the conservatism would become yet still more entrenched in the 1930's. The 'plasticity' of the fledgling state that Yeats elsewhere wrote of, the quantum wave function of ideological and symbolic possibility, was about to collapse. By 1932 de Valera and his Fianna Fáil party, the losers of the civil war, came to power with the support of Labour. This was followed by a snap election in 1933, in which Fianna Fáil won a majority and remained in power for the first of its stints of sixteen-year single party rule. This would precipitate a yet

more conservative, yet more insular, yet more backward-looking period in the Irish story, that was to have profound effects on the emotions and habitus formation of the people. But a key ideology behind this was nationalism, a specific, reactionary and romantic nationalism that emerged and became widespread *because of* the actions and reactions of the previous decades. As Foster writes: ‘The rigorous conservatism of the Irish Free State has become a cliché; what matters most about the atmosphere and mentality of the twenty-six-county Ireland...is that the predominant occupation of the regime was self-definition against Britain – cultural and political’ (Foster, 1989, p.516). This is central to the development of the emotional habitus and, I suggest, cannot be understood until this historical context is taken into account. With de Valera, this process would become still more entrenched and authoritarian, spreading to a protectionist, separatist and still more pervasive economic nationalism that would have long-lasting effects. On coming to power de Valera instigated what amounted to an economic war with Britain, ending the free trade policies that the (also conservative) Cumann na Gael government (who would join with some smaller parties to become Fine Gael in 1933) had followed. His aim was to establish national self-sufficiency via cultural and economic protectionism, beginning by erecting high tariff walls around Ireland and withholding some annuities to Britain established under the treaty. That he could do this, effectively cutting Ireland off economically from the rest of the world to the detriment of many sectors of the economy, is testament to the popular pervasiveness of the nationalist ideology. The rhetoric extolled the virtues of another ‘crack at the old enemy’, and the cultural exceptionalism of the pure, ‘decent’ and Catholic Gaelic Celt. DeValera’s vision for the new Ireland was anti-new, anti-modern, anti-materialist, and anti-British. That vision is encapsulated in his often-quoted radio speech from 1943, commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Gaelic League (and primarily aimed at an international, particularly American, audience):

The ideal Ireland that we would have, the Ireland that we dreamed of, would be the home of a people who valued material wealth only as a basis for right living, of a people who, satisfied with frugal comfort, devoted their leisure to the things of the spirit – a land whose countryside would be bright with cosy homesteads, whose fields and villages would be joyous with the sounds of industry, with the romping of sturdy children, the contest of athletic youths and the laughter of happy maidens, whose firesides would be forums for the wisdom of serene old age. The home, in short, of a people living the life that God desires that men should live. (de Valera, 1947, cited in Brown, 2004, p.134).

This autarkic ‘dream’, and the conservative nationalism that it represents, was almost ubiquitous in Ireland by the ‘30’s. Fused with linguistic and other aspects of cultural revival,

and fused with an exclusively and rigorous Catholic religiosity (see below), this nationalism dominated the life of schools, media discourse and political rhetoric in Free State Ireland. Constantly harking back to a romantic, mythic, Celtic and Gaelic past, Ireland recoiled from the present; modernism in all its forms was abhorred.¹⁵⁷ The more open and liberal voices from the pre-revolutionary years, particularly those of the Anglo-Irish, and the progressive left, were reduced by emigration and drowned out.¹⁵⁸ This retreat from the present, a sort of ideological and psychological enclosure, reached its apogee in Ireland's reaction to WW2. Instead of a war, Ireland had an 'emergency'; the policy of neutrality being another aspect of the insecurity that attached to Irish sovereignty. Of course, this neutrality was not the pro-Nazi stance that is often (still) imagined. Particularly after America entered the war Dublin was neutral on the side of the Allies – 'at war but sulking' in Churchill's mind – but certainly supporting the anti-German war effort in terms of intelligence and other strategic ways (Foster, 1989, pp.559-562).¹⁵⁹

Yet, if Irish insularity can be seen to reach its nadir in the interwar years, the period also acted as a watershed for this orientation (Brown, 2004). In 1948 Éire is finally declared a republic and leaves the commonwealth. At the same time, increased opposition and resistance to the policies and nationalism of de Valera begin to appear. Before turning to these changes, the beginnings of the habitus shift, I will briefly outline the other determining influence on the formation of habitus during the period along with this conservative nationalism - Catholicism. The argument is that both of these power blocs, the church and the state, and their ideologies, became embodied by the population at large in the form of a repressed and conservative habitus, giving rise to an exceptionally repressive emotional regime, which would have significant effects on the emotional lives of the members of that society prior to the 1950's,

¹⁵⁷ The work of the Censorship Board in the period is illustrative of the tendency. Between 1930-39 1,200 books and 140 periodicals were banned (Brown, 2004, p.137). The hand of the Catholic secret society, the Knights of Columbanus, was behind most of these decisions (Brown, 2004, p.441; Garvin, 2004, p.255).

¹⁵⁸ By 1930 the proportion of protestants in the twenty six counties had fallen to 7.4% (Foster, 1989, p.534).

¹⁵⁹ There is still much popular confusion on Éire's neutral stance during the war, with many conflating and exaggerating a tiny minority's pro-German sentiment with a more widespread attitude. The vast majority of Irish opinion was pro-Ally, and over 50,000 citizens of the state joined the British army to fight against the Nazis. While those who returned were often treated or viewed ambiguously because of this choice, this should not be seen as an implicit pro-German attitude but rather as an aspect of the deep-seated Anglophobia that remained part of the national attitude. This produced a few isolated incidents of overt pro-Nazi behaviour on behalf of the IRA, for example, and one anti-Semitic rant by TD Oliver J. Flannigan in the Dáil, but these are not typical or representative of wider opinion. Recent documents released by Royal Irish Academy's Documents on Irish Foreign Policy (Volume VI) give clear primary evidence of the complexities (and precariousness) of the Irish position.

and afterwards. These homogenous symbolic and material constructions gave rise to a homogeneous habitus.

5.6.2. Catholicism

The issue of religion is a complex and wide-ranging one in any social site, but this is particularly true for the Irish case. In this section I cannot do justice to those complexities here. While the dominant position and role of the Catholic Church in Irish life is widely acknowledged, a full account of religion and social change is not what I intend to offer. Here I wish to confine myself to brief account of the pervasive effects it had on the process of habitus formation, and particularly on the extent to which it came to characterize the emotional regime and emotional habitus of the period prior to 1950. The most influential sociological work on the Catholic Church in Ireland is that of Tom Inglis (1998, 2007, 2008), and I will draw on his work in particular. In his main book *Moral Monopoly*, Inglis (1998, is the second edition) tracks the rise and fall of the Catholic Church in modern Ireland, from the mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century. It is one of the rare, theoretically sophisticated works of Irish sociology that draws on Bourdieu, Elias and Foucault, and concepts such as (Bourdieu's) habitus and capital in its analysis. It is also attentive to the notion of power and its role in Irish society.

The question of the power of the church in Ireland is central to any understanding of the becoming of the country, at both a macro and a micro, individual-level (of analysis). In short, Catholicism, already dominant, also became *increasingly* dominant in Ireland, from the mid-nineteenth century, with the proportion of people identifying as Catholic increasing after independence, reaching a highpoint of 95% in 1961. This trend, as depicted in table 1 below, is remarkable for a number of reasons. Firstly, the sheer monopoly position of the Catholic Church has been (indeed, continues to be) remarkable by international comparisons, with the most recent figures (2011) showing the 'all-time low' of identification at the comparatively very high proportion of 85% of the population. We can also see, as discussed in the last section, the flight of the (always a minority, once enjoying disproportionate power) Church of Ireland/Protestant population after independence, following its high point in 1891 of 8.3%. We also see a steady rise, and ultimate fall in the numbers identifying as Catholic after 1961,

with a corresponding rise in what I labelled ‘others’ here.¹⁶⁰ The picture for the period in question, up to the 1950’s, then, is again increased homogeneity in terms of religion, which in turn helped to homogenize the habitus of the period.




Figure 12. The Rise and Fall of Catholicism in Ireland (1881-2011): adapted from CSO (Ireland, 2012)

The power and pervasiveness of the church during the period, the degree to which its teaching impacted on the daily lives of people, on their bodies (‘hearts and minds’), as well as those in high office, is difficult to appreciate at this remove. The Irish way of religion was different, and remained different to other Western nations until very recently, though it has being evangelized since the 5th century . This difference is not only manifest in the numbers identifying as Catholic, relative to other denominations, but also in relation to the practice of religious devotion, such as mass attendance, prayer, confession, fasting, which the Irish of the period under discussion adhered to in remarkably high numbers.

¹⁶⁰ The figures for these ‘others’ are so small as to not warrant inclusion for most of the period in question. Most of the growth in their numbers come from the categories of no religion, atheists and agnostics, which increased more than fourfold between 1991 and 2011 to stand at 277,237. The largest proportionate increase was in atheism which has grown from 320 to 3,905 over those twenty years (CSO, 2012). The largest increase in religious groupings come from the Orthodox community as a result of immigration. I will discuss this later period below.

Yet, because of the widespread fusion of Catholicism and Irishness – a process reinforced in the Irish solid modernity – it is often popularly (or stereotypically) assumed that this power and pervasiveness is in some sense ‘ancient’ or indeed essential (the famous ‘island of saints and scholars’ rhetoric). However, this dominance in both institutional power and devotional practice is the product of another complex becoming. In the 17th century, for example, the institutional church was really quite disorganized and informal, while local, Gaelic religious practice was marked by ‘vagueness and laxity’ (Foster, 1989, pp.45-49).¹⁶¹ The Irish are no more ‘inherently’ or ‘essentially’ religious or ‘spiritual’ than anyone else: that religiosity became more pronounced in Irish life and in the Irish habitus is a product of changes in social relations, re-formations of relations of power and emotions. The power that the church would eventually wield is much more a product of the nineteenth century, as Inglis (1998) and others attest. Both that power, and its effects, are a product of the unique civilizing process that occurred in Ireland in which religion played a much more central role than Elias’s account (2000) suggests for mainland Europe.

This process is a key aspect of Inglis’ rich and complex argument for the emergent dominance of the church in the twentieth century. The origins for what he calls the ‘radical shift’ in Irish Catholicism lie in the nineteenth century, during which the organizational and symbolic power of the church was to grow significantly. This process emerged from a series of failed attempts by the British to civilize and Protestantize the Catholic population.¹⁶² Under the Penal Laws, a legalized form of class warfare that involved the subjugation of the majority to the benefit of the minority Ascendancy via a series of punitive laws and exclusions, Catholics were banned from teaching children (Inglis, 1998, p.105).¹⁶³ This led to the emergence of the famous Irish Hedge Schools ‘system’ in which, to varying degrees of success, Catholic children were given a basic education (usually through Irish), that often stretched to include a knowledge of the

¹⁶¹ Foster writes: ‘The very ideas of communion, catechism and confession were – in their Tridentine sense – unfamiliar. Kinship relations predominated over religious identification: irregular marriages were a commonplace, local pilgrimages provided great occasions of levity, and the Irish celebration of death supplied a very different social activity from those approved by Counter-Reformation puritanism’ (Foster, 1989, p.46).

¹⁶² And the size of this population is central. At the beginning of the 1820’s (before the famine) the population of Ireland stood at almost 7 million; as Inglis reminds us, this represents about a third of the population of the British Isles, a more than half the population of England (Inglis, 1998, p.107). The need to pacify and ‘civilize’ (which would amount to ‘Protestantize’) a recalcitrant population of this size was of serious issue.

¹⁶³ Other examples of these laws include the Gavelkind Act (when a Roman Catholic died, his estate was divided equally among his sons, unless the eldest son converted to the Protestant faith, in which case he could inherit all the land) which succeeded in reducing Catholic ownership of land to 5% by 1776; Catholics lost the franchise until 1793; Catholics were barred from public office, and so on. There is dispute over the extent to which these laws were enforced in practice (see Foster, 1989), but the overall aim was a demoralization and subjectivization of the Catholic Irish.

classics, Latin and Greek.¹⁶⁴ To combat this, the state attempted a civilizing mission via the Charter Schools which was doomed to failure. By the middle of the eighteenth century a new alliance between the church and the state began to emerge that aimed to succeed in this civilizing mission. The church began to win minor battles and the balance of power between it and the state began to shift, including, for example, the Relief Act of 1782 which repealed the law banning Catholics to teach, and the repeated failures of Protestant societies to gain popular ground within the educational arena. This power shifted further with Catholic Emancipation in 1829, via Daniel O’Connell and the Catholic Association, but with the popular mobilization that helped to bring it about largely coordinated by priests.¹⁶⁵ Church power over schools would culminate in the establishment of a new National School system from 1831 which, for Inglis, marked the last battle between the two blocs for the moral and social control of the Irish population (Inglis, 1998, p.124).¹⁶⁶ These schools, which would replace the ‘pay school’ system across the country, while ostensibly non-denominational, were almost invariably managed by priests, who controlled the hiring of teachers and the curriculum. For Inglis, by this time the British priority was for a pacified, disciplined and civilized Ireland, and it no longer much cared who accomplished it. These national schools and later the secondary school system, also run by priests, nuns and Christian Brothers, would prove to be successful in this regard, though with profound effects for both the British state and the emotional lives of the individuals themselves.

These developments would have profound effects on the development of the social and emotional habitus in Ireland. As I said earlier, the Eliasian story of the civilizing process in Ireland has yet to be written. But Inglis (1998) get closest to this. He writes that what was different about Ireland, in addition to the process arriving later than elsewhere in Europe, was that ‘the civilization of the Irish body was a state-sponsored project, operated by the church through Irish schools...It was through the schools that bodily discipline, shame, guilt and modesty were instilled into the Irish Catholic’ (Inglis, 1998, p.157). An example of the process as it was instilled, in a particularly Eliasian sense, in secondary schools run by Christian

¹⁶⁴ A situation that features in Brain Friel’s play *Translations* and apocryphally at least evokes images of barefoot (uncivil, illmannered) peasants reciting Homer in the Fields (see Inglis, 1998, p.105).

¹⁶⁵ Foster writes that, with this, ‘A Catholic middle class ‘ascendency’, already in the making was given a vital psychological boost’. He goes on to quote Wellington, who suggests that the Catholic clergy, nobility, lawyers and gentry as ‘a sort of theocracy’, to whom the exclusion of formal power under the Penal Laws had not restricted their social power (Foster, 1989, p.302).

¹⁶⁶ And, significantly, the desertion of the protestant church by the state (ibid).

Brothers is mentioned briefly by Inglis (1998, pp.154-6).¹⁶⁷ This is the use of the book *Christian Politeness* (1937), largely a translation of De Salle's textbook on civility widely used in France from the eighteenth century.¹⁶⁸ As Inglis shows, what these instructions are about is the production of docile and civilized bodies. In addition to the extracts Inglis uses, there are others that specifically refer to habitus and emotions. For example:

The source of true politeness is in the heart in which there should exist much goodwill to men and a sincere desire to promote their happiness. When politeness is practised in early life, it becomes a habit, and its exercise, like that of other habits, will be easy and agreeable. It should begin under the parental roof and be cultivated in the daily intercourse of domestic life. There, the passions, as they gradually rise, can be placed under due restraint; the kindly feelings can be most frequently exercised; the constant interchange of good offices promoted; and the manners formed to gentleness and courtesy. (Christain Brothers, 1937, P. 3).

The book is aimed, like the manners books that Elias uses, to inscribe control on the bodies of the children. As Inglis writes: 'The essence of modern civility is that the body be controlled by the heart which has been cleansed of its individual passion. This control comes from the head...The body without a soul is an uncontrollable mass of passions and instincts'. Through the modern civilizing process it became an object of private guilt and public shame. It was to be hidden (Inglis, 1998, pp.155-6).

There is a bitter irony in reading *Christian Politeness* at this remove. While these brothers preached piety and civility, they also engaged in harsh corporal punishment, often routinely beating children with belts and sticks. We know now that there was also endemic sexual, physical and emotional abuse perpetrated by the clergy, particularly in reform and industrial schools largely run by the brothers, on tens of thousands of children; that thousands more women were incarcerated in draconian 'total institutions', the Magdalen Laundries, run by the nuns, many of whom were also abused; and that thousands more children suffered sexual abuse at the hands of priests in their parishes. The Ryan Report (Ireland, 2009) in particular investigated abuse in the industrial schools, run by the Christian Brothers. The reports of abuse and the all-pervasive 'climate of fear' described by the victims makes for harrowing

¹⁶⁷ Inglis cites this passage: 'In Holy Writ, the eyes are called the windows of the soul because its various feelings and emotions are easily discernible through them. Therefore, their movements should be regulated with great care. The looks of the modest and humble are ever mild, peaceful, and reserved; those of the proud and overbearing are insolent, haughty, and bold. To turn the eyes lightly from side to side, without fixing them on anything, is a sign of a giddy and unsteady character' (Christian Brothers, 1937, p.19 cited in Inglis, 1998, p.155).

¹⁶⁸ In the Irish version all references to sexuality in the original French version are omitted, suggesting the inability for the topic to be broached, to be spoken of, even in prohibition.

reading.¹⁶⁹ One child in Letterfrack Industrial School, to take an example, was forced to eat his own excrement in front of the other boys:

Br Sorel made the shocking admission that he forced a boy to eat his own excrement. The boy was not a complainant to the Investigation Committee but the incident was recounted by a complainant who had witnessed it. The Brother in his written response to the Investigation Committee accepted that the allegation was true. In evidence he told the Committee: 'Well the ... thing has haunted me all my life. It should never have happened. Actually he didn't eat the excrement, he spat it into the basin, that doesn't matter, it was wrong, totally wrong, and I accept that. I accept full responsibility for it. It was cruel. When asked by the Committee why he did it, he said that he was stressed by having to cope with boys who soiled themselves, particularly during the night. He asked colleagues what he should do about one particular boy: A few days before I mentioned this to some of the staff, "what will I do", I couldn't get any help from anybody. One of them quite cynically said, "make him eat his own shit". When I think now on this particular morning, he did it right out in the floor in front of everybody and I saw red, I saw anger, I thought he was doing it purposefully to ridicule me. I think that was the reason (Ireland, 2009, v.1, p.305).

Children were raped, beaten and abused. They lived in constant terror and suffered sustained emotional abuse and neglect. Corporal punishment was also a commonplace in the mainstream national and secondary schools of the era, often at the hands of clerics but also lay teachers and staff, all in the name of discipline – 'to put manners' on them. This was cloaked in a veil of silence, with the wider community complicit through inaction; turning a blind eye. It will come as no surprise that there is a clear class element to all of this abuse. The orphans in the industrial schools were raped the most, those from 'lower' socioeconomic classes were beaten more severally and more often, given the worst jobs (the industrial schools and laundries were also akin to work camps), and subjected to more sustained public ridicule and shaming. All of which should be seen, and these total institutions should be seen, not as an aberration, but the extreme end of a more general authoritarian regime that extended beyond their high stone walls in to society in general. Repression was endemic (*en-demos* – within the people/place), and the source and justification for most of it came from the Catholic Church.

¹⁶⁹ The forms of physical abuse reported by witnesses to the Committee included 'punching, flogging, assault and bodily attacks, hitting with the hand, kicking, ear pulling, hair pulling, head shaving, beating on the soles of the feet, burning, scalding, stabbing, severe beatings with or without clothes, being made to kneel and stand in fixed positions for lengthy periods, made to sleep outside overnight, being forced into cold or excessively hot baths and showers, hosed down with cold water before being beaten, beaten while hanging from hooks on the wall, being set upon by dogs, being restrained in order to be beaten, physical assaults by more than one person, and having objects thrown at them' (Ireland, 2009, vol3, p,56).

Thus, the church came to have a ‘moral monopoly’ over the population, but with a particularly rigorous form of Catholicism that was strict, confessional and all-pervasive. While schools became the primary site of this new socialization, the church itself, its mass and its sacraments (or the threat of the denial of these) were also important. The church and its representative, the priest, were bastions of symbolic power, to be both feared and emulated. Their monopolistic hold on moral power was based on coercion, denial of salvation and loss of social status (Inglis, 1998, p.47). A state’s monopoly on violence is merely based on a physical form coercion; the church’s was both physical and *meta*-physical. Inglis suggests a number of formal and informal mechanisms of control used by the church in this endeavour. Some of the informal ones depend on the priest himself, as both a model of proper conduct, and his ability to transform from a religious functionary (magical mediator between the people and the supreme being) officiating at key life events (births, deaths, marriages) into a rigorous disciplinarian, supervising and surveiling in the home through pastoral visitations, confessions and in everyday life at sporting events, dances and other social occasions (Inglis, 1998, p.140-142). There were also formal mechanisms of control, such as the threat of excommunication. Another part of the hold on and fear instilled in the imaginations of the people came from the threat of hell and eternal damnation, propounded in ‘hell fire’ sermons, and in general. The body itself, particularly its sexuality, were presented as sinful, ‘dirty’, the ultimate source of shame (see also Inglis, 1998b, and 2005). Whether we describe the discourse of Irish Catholicism as Jansenistic or not (there is confusion on this matter) it was nevertheless a discourse that focused on the fundamentally ‘fallen’ nature of humans; on sin, on the evil and corruption of the body, on doctrine, on obedience.

Attendance at church can be read as an interaction ritual (IR), using Collins’ terms (Collins, 2004). Collins’ theory is well known, and while he appears to reject the concept of habitus (in Bourdieu’s formulation at least)¹⁷⁰, his approach is nevertheless illustrative of the micro processes that operate in religious ceremonies, particularly at an emotional level. The success

¹⁷⁰ Collins rejects habitus as too individualistic. He sees Bourdieu’s work, for example, as a continuance of Levi-Strauss’ ‘code-seeking’ program, with the former substituting habitus as a replacement for the latter’s ‘code’ (‘its component as internalized in Individuals’), and dismisses his theory of stratification, saying that ‘Bourdieu’s mechanistic cycle of cultural capital permeating individual habitus and reproducing the field of economic power bypasses situational interaction; not surprisingly, it is an image promoted by a survey researcher collecting data on individuals and arraying it in an abstract hierarchical space...The image is an old-fashioned one (Collins, 2004, pp.379 & 288-9).

of an IR depends on situational (not individual) factors, such as bodily co-presence, the exclusion of ‘outsiders’, a mutual focus of attention and a shared emotional mood (all of which feedback on each other (Collins, 2004, p.48 and *passim*). These give rise to a ‘collective effervescence’:

As the persons become more tightly focused on their common activity, more aware of what each other is doing and feeling, and more aware of each other's awareness, they experience their shared emotion more intensely, as it comes to dominate their awareness. Members of a cheering crowd become more enthusiastic, just as participants at a religious service become more respectful and solemn, or at a funeral become more sorrowful, than before they began...The key process is participants' mutual entrainment of emotion and attention, producing a shared emotional/cognitive experience. What Durkheim called collective consciousness is this micro-situational production of moments of intersubjectivity (Collins, 2004, p.48).

The outcomes of this process are shared feelings of group solidarity, the production of emotional energy (longer-term emotional states like elation, confidence or depression that either ‘pump up or ‘depress’ individuals), the creation of ‘sacred’ group symbols, and moral feelings (Collins, 2004). All of which become interaction ritual *chains* as they are repeated, producing increasingly integrated and cohesive societies. Collins has more recently suggested that religious interaction rituals are distinctive in terms of the emotions involved, which are usually stronger than secular ones, and in terms of the symbols involved (2010). They are also distinctive in terms of time; they self-consciously link the community backwards to ‘primordial time’ in terms of content but also an awareness of the rituals themselves existing in an ‘unbroken succession, thereby reminding members of the community stretching across the ages, and implying its own transcendence of the present by continuing into the future until the end of the world’ (Collins, 2010, p.4). This latter aspect is particularly significant for the Irish context, I think, in that it offers one, primary source for the fatalism instilled in to the Irish habitus at the time, as well as naturalizing social cohesion. It is another facet of the backward-looking invocation of tradition and continuity with a long and august past, in the face of oppression. When combined with the solemn, sometimes extreme fear and shame-inducing emotions produced in these rituals in Ireland, focused on the evils of the body, on hell and damnation, on purgatory, we get another indication of the dominant emotional regime. For us, if not for Collins, this would be central to the process of habitus formation in the period, and the problematic relationship with emotions in general.

Another fundamental component of this advance in the power of the church was grounded in an advancement in the bureaucratic organization and material resources that began in the nineteenth century. This included a radical restructuring of the internal hierarchies within the church in which the ecclesiastical bureaucracy became more ordered, streamlined and disciplined, particularly after Archbishop Paul Cullen was appointed in 1850 (Inglis, 1998, p.43). It was also aided by an increase in the physical resources, the material 'bricks and mortar' capital of churches, church-owned schools, charitable institutions, hospitals, and other buildings and lands. The church was further aided and supported by the rise of lay institutions, such as the Legion of Mary, Opus Dei and others (Inglis, 1998, pp.53-55). Some of these institutions would come to have a significant (albeit often occluded) influence on politics and policy, particularly via the civil service, the Censorship Board and other state bodies, and in the universities. Thus, the power of the church was rooted in a 'physical and political control of social structures...(it) was not just ideological' (Inglis, 1998, p.64). He continues: 'It's ability to limit what people did and said; to imbue the Irish habitus with its moral ethos and sensibilities; and to form good Catholic personalities, was founded on an ownership and control of physical resources which were operated by a well-trained, disciplined and devoted team and priests, nuns and brothers' (ibid). The (near) monopolistic control over the key sites of socialization – the school, the church, the hospital, even the home – gave rise to the pervasiveness, power and penetration of the Catholic Church in Ireland over the social and emotional lives of the population.

All of these processes were to intensify after independence. With the exodus of large swathes of the Protestant population, the somewhat more liberalizing influence that they had over the social and civic life in Ireland (especially in the towns) evaporated. The new Free State had inherited the structures of the British one, including the dominant (dominating) position of the church. This made the church in independent Ireland 'a powerful and autonomous agency which for many purposes operated like a second government or a state within a state' (Garvin, 2004, p.3).¹⁷¹ Yet this structural, institutional aspect of the monopolization process is only half the story. Using a Bourdieusian framework, Inglis explores how being a 'good Catholic', and being seen to be so, was central to the power dynamics at the individual level as well,

¹⁷¹ Garvin continues: 'Within the areas of health, education and much of public ideological discourse, the power of the church was enormous. Above all, the church attempted to control, some would say enslave, much of the intellectual and emotional life of the entire country' (Garvin, 2004, p.3).

central to the maintenance of respect and social status. Throughout, what Inglis terms ‘the long nineteenth century’ of Irish Catholicism ‘religious capital’ becomes a key component of cultural capital that could be converted in to other forms of capital, economic, political, social and particularly symbolic, in a variety of social fields (Inglis, 1998, pp.65-76). This, in a large part, can explain how the moral monopoly of the church could be maintained and transmitted so pervasively outside of the religious field. Adherence to Catholic rules and regulation, attendance at mass, engaging (and being seen to engage in) the practices of the church was a source of respect and prestige. But it also involves a submission, a sublimation of the self to the community, to be seen as the same as everyone else, to conform. This also means that harmonious social relations must be maintained, that contention and conflict are avoided. Breaches of convention, quarrelsome or argumentative individuals (especially women) would face social sanctions. Individualistic behaviour or attitudes – ‘getting notions’ about oneself, putting oneself before the community – incurred penalties and social sanctions. Respect accrued to those who were deemed to be ‘decent’ (pronounced *daycent* in most of Ireland). A ‘daycent’ man would stop for a chat, or help his neighbour plough a field; a ‘daycent’ woman made sure her children were well turned out at Sunday mass, and that they were kept in line while there. Decency was deployed to maintain the status quo in social and economic matters. Materialism and ambition were to be shunned as indecent; we are born with original sin and to suffer, as Christ suffered, for our sins – people should accept their god given position in the social hierarchy, to ‘offer it up’ for Jesus. In this, Inglis writes, ‘Catholicism was the opium of the Irish working class in that it maintained the status quo, and did little to reduce the economic divisions in society’ (Inglis, 1998, p.76).

The final aspect of this period of church dominance that I will mention is that of the family home. This is perhaps an even more fundamental site of socialization and habitus formation, and here, too, we see homogenizing processes at work. Inglis, again deploying the arguments of Bourdieu, foregrounds the Irish mother as central to the process (Inglis, 1998, chapter 8). Irish homes of the period were filled with the symbols of religion, such as crucifixes, holy water and pictures of the ‘Sacred Heart’. Homes were also social sites for the practice of religion, and families would regularly pray together in the evenings, particularly saying the Rosary, and children (and adults) would pray before or in bed. Such rituals of the home were ordered by the mother. For Inglis, there are historical reasons for why the Irish mother became allied with the priest. In the nineteenth century changes in farming practices from

tillage to livestock, coupled with technological changes in the production of linen removed a key economic resource from women-run cottage industries, who turned to religion as the only form of social and moral power available to them. But they were also held responsible for the transgressions of their children, in schools or elsewhere; if they were unruly, unkempt or unclean. They came to, in effect, represent the church in the newly privatized space of the home. The new (segregated) national schools system further produced chaste and modest girls, who became mothers tasked with the temporal regulation of the household, the instilling into her children church-orientated civility and the corresponding moral and emotional education. They were constituted to emulate and ally themselves with the priests and it was through the 'imitation of their celibate lifestyle, their body discipline and morality, that the mother inculcated a sexual and emotional repression which was crucial to the attainment of postponed marriages, permanent celibacy and emigration' (Inglis, 1998, p.193).¹⁷²

5.6.3. Homogeneous Habitus of Ireland in Solid Modernity

Thus, in all of the key sites of socialization in pre-1950's Ireland, the church, the school, the home the power and influence of the Catholic Church was to the fore. This occurred not because of a material or institutional power, but rather the way that power flowed through various overlapping relational networks of people, particularly priests, teachers, mothers and children. This is a *constitutive* type of power, which inscribes itself, via experience, onto bodies - emotions and minds; it gives rise modes of seeing, thinking and feeling. What is striking about the Ireland of the period in question is the lack of alternative voices, perspectives and ideologies. The experience is both homogeneous and homogenizing, reinforcing sameness, conformity and denial. When this rigorous Catholicism is fused with a conservative and insular nationalism, the result is a type of solidifying stagnation. Most of those in the political domain and the civil service shared and embodied this type of Catholicism. Both became fused in the rhetoric and reality of public and private life. Catholicism was symbolically enshrined in the constitution in 1937 which 'embodied the language of popular sovereignty, with strong theocratic implications' (Foster, 1998, p.544).¹⁷³ Divorce, which had been possible under the empire, was prohibited; the notion of working mothers was denounced, and so on (ibid). In policy terms the influence of the church over the social and moral was exceptional

¹⁷² These are key features of the 'stem family' structure so prevalent in Ireland up to the 1950's.

¹⁷³ Which recognised the 'special position of the holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens' (see Inglis, 1998, p.79, Foster, 1998, p.544).

for any definition of a republic, and would continue, albeit more contested, up to the end of the century, with profound effects on public and private life. But up to and including the 1950's there was little or no opposition to the church, or separation of powers between church and state.¹⁷⁴ This was symbolically echoed in private houses, in which the symbols and pictures that adorned Irish homes during the period usually consisted of images of the Sacred Heart and Our Lady, and some of the martyrology of the rising, or Collins or De Valera. They also hung in the schools, alongside copies of the 'proclamation' reinforced through tales of the heroic and romantic Gaelic past, a glorious rebellion, and religious indoctrination (all brutally enforced).

Resistance, to the extent that it was publicly evident in the period, was mostly confined to literature, artists, and a few intellectuals, but their work was not widely read and often banned. The writer and critic Séan Ó Faoláin is one prominent example. A former activist during the rising and the War of Independence, his disillusionment with the material and symbolic state of Ireland, as well as the emotional climate featured in both his short stories, and in his periodical *The Bell*. Yet most of the potential opposing voices, particularly those of the angry young men and women, had emigrated. This was a sapping of the vitality of the country, and the cohort where future opposition would later arise from. There were, of course, everyday micro-resistances and transgressions of the emotional and moral order; lovers still loved, children still laughed and played; people committed 'sins', both venial and mortal. Yet they did so under a (near) constant threat of discovery and censure, from priests, from parents or the community.¹⁷⁵ This was tied to social sanction and loss of status (particularly for the emergent middle classes), but also, in certain cases (for the poor), it resulted in confinement. The Magdalen Laundries mentioned previously effectively imprisoned 'fallen' women who became pregnant out of wedlock; the Industrial Schools imprisoned the neglected or the unruly 'delinquent'.

The picture I am painting, then, *is* a 'repressive hypothesis'. We can agree with Foucault's rhetoric that this 'repression' is double edged, that what is at once a prohibition on sex and

¹⁷⁴ Inglis cites the Bishop of Cork who said, in relation to the Health Bill of 1953 that the bishops position was that 'they were the final arbiters of right and wrong even in political matters' (cited in Inglis, 1998, p.80).

¹⁷⁵ The figure of the priest stalking the boreens and laneways of rural Ireland at night, carrying a blackthorn stick to chase off 'courting couples' looms large in folk memory and in oral history. There are also stories of priests surveilling at dances, using rulers to measure the distance between dancing partners.

emotionality (and the body in general) also involves an explosion in discourse about these very things (Foucault, 1978). That while we have constant, repeated and reinforced injunctions to manage and control emotions, that this injunction is achieved via the deployment and creation of emotions; through fear, anger, shame, guilt. But discourse is not enough to capture these processes. The wild-eyed Christian Brother who abandons self-control by savagely beating self-control into a child, this vile performative contradiction, cannot be fully understood in terms of discourse alone. The inscription of emotional repression on to the habitus is a fundamentally *material* and *embodied* process as well. It is a result of our ‘affective transactions with the environment’, in Bourdieu’s words; it is an acquired, dynamic organization or arrangement of the *body*, derived from experience and training in specific (historical, cultural, social, relational) contexts, giving rise to ‘character’ and dispositions to action, thought and feeling, in context. In our relational and processual construction of the habitus, detailed earlier, it is an active, a dynamic *capacity*, or indeed, *incapacity*, rather the static product of (over) socialization. What is perhaps most striking about the process of habitus formation in Ireland after independence is the level of coherence and unity that operated across the overlapping networks of power. These produced an oppressive emotional regime, in which emotions were to be disavowed, pushed down, controlled, ignored, banished. Interiority itself, our internal conversations, and our very bodies were to be seen as repositories of sin and filth, impurity and impropriety. Yet the most obscene transgressions of these very doctrines were conducted by those with most power within the network, the clergy and the emergent Catholic bourgeoisie, and hidden behind walls of silence.

Thus, the period is solid from a variety of perspectives. Solid in terms of the panoptical types of power that Bauman sees as central to solid modernity; solid in that roles are ascribed, and fixed, within the hierarchy; solid in terms of the control of time and space. But it is also solid in terms of the habitus that it produces. There is a freezing of the emotional life of the individual, a setting in stone, or ‘petrification’ that results from being petrified of the priest, the teacher, the mother, hell and damnation. As we will see in the next section, this solidity would soon be challenged, as the relations of power that dominated society were about to be reordered.

5.7. Towards a Liquid Modern Ireland: 1950-2000

In the last section I depicted the period of Irish history, roughly between 1900-1950, as corresponding to a Baumanian conception of solid modernity. Of course, there are aspects to this depiction that do not strictly fit with Bauman's metaphor. The industrialization that Bauman associates with this phase, for example, is largely absent from the Irish case until later, and even then does not follow the same pattern as elsewhere. By the same token, for the period that I will discuss here, in which the Republic becomes increasingly more liquid, the fit is again imperfect. Despite this, the metaphor in general is illustrative of the processes at work – the Ireland that stands at the end of this half-century treated below does indeed, in significant ways, approximate to a phase of liquidity. I will return to this question of 'fit' towards the end.

The overall argument that I wish to make is that over this period we see a profound and rapid transformation of social relations, especially power relations, in Irish society, that results in a gradual 'opening up' or liberalization, which changes the emotional regime, and eventually, the emotional habitus. I have called this process a habitus shift. However, the societal picture here is complex, much more complex than for the previous period, and to cover at least partially the increased range of factors at work I must perforce sacrifice some of the depth in how they are treated. In what follows I will very briefly discuss key changes in general before I return to the core concerns of this thesis, emotions, power and habitus. The short answer to the question about how Ireland changed in these fifty years in 'globalization' – that Ireland became 'globalized'. While of course this word is problematic in itself, it nevertheless captures the general thrust of the processes at work. Indeed, much of what I will say here is already well known. My contribution will be to return to the core concepts, and attempt to keep both power and emotion in focus for our discussion here. In many ways, Ireland became more like other rich 'Western', particularly Anglophone nations. Yet, there are differences in the Irish story and the national relational becoming that occurred, and continues to occur, here.

5.7.1. Social Transformations

One key area that has perhaps received most treatment in the social scientific literature is that of the economy. Following on from the protectionist policies of de Valera earlier discussed,

Ireland entered the 1950's in a state of economic stagnation. Emigration was rife, with around four hundred thousand people leaving the country over the decade. The rest of the world was still experiencing a post-war boom, while Ireland foundered. Table 2 gives one overall picture of the economy from 1921-2009:¹⁷⁶




Figure 13. GDP per capita: 1921-2009 (adapted from Bolt & Van Zanden, 2013)

However, all of this began to change in the 1950's when recognition of the failures of this policy could no longer be ignored. The Industrial Development Authority (IDA) was set up in 1949 to attempt to change the fortunes of Irish industry. However, it was the work of T.K.Whittiker in the Department of Finance, who drafted a key document *Economic Development* in 1957, that paved the way for economic liberalization and free trade. This, in essence, recommended a shift from a concentration on agriculture to industry and especially services, and attempted to bring about the opening of the Irish economy to foreign direct investment, using attractive tax incentives and other means to attract companies, especially from the US and Europe. Economic growth was to become the new priority. There is an

¹⁷⁶ I place this data here merely to paint a picture rather than overdraw any conclusions from it. GDP, even per capita, is a poor indicator of the real state of an economy, and this is exacerbated in the Irish context where, due to the dependence on FDI the GDP figure is inflated. GNP is the better, though still flawed measure for the Irish context, but these data are not readily available for a long enough historical period. These data here are from the Maddison Project (Bolt & van Zanden 2013), and are available here: <http://www.ggdcc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm>.

irony noted by Garvin (2004), that politically, this dismantling of protectionism was undertaken by its chief political architect, Sean Lemass, who was largely behind the policy in the 1930's with de Valera and reversed it as Taoiseach in 1959 and after (p.7). These policies were somewhat successful and paved the way for Ireland's opening up to the world in general. The Anglo Irish Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1965, and Ireland eventually became of full member of the EEC in 1973. The decades of the 1960's in particular saw a sustained period of growth, with over 350 new foreign-owned companies to Ireland during the decade (Brown, 2004, p.230). There were also increases in the state's influence on and share of the economy, with investment in education and an increase in state and semi-state bodies and firms. This became a period of economic 'modernization'. Relations of power are vital to this process, with the balance of elite power shifting from the traditionalists to the modernizers. As Garvin writes: 'those complacent about Ireland's stasis and who even wished to preserve and protect it were gradually being defeated...Modernity had previously been conceived as traditional social relations augmented by modern gadgets like the telephone or the aircraft; the idea that it entailed a complete transformation of social and power relationships was not completely grasped; in some cases, that proposition was comprehended and its consequences feared (Garvin, 2004, p.141).

Coupled with this revived economic outlook, other related factors of change were increases in urbanization. In 1921, for example, only 32% of the population lived in towns of over fifteen hundred people; this was almost 42% by 1951, almost 50% by 1966 and was over 52% by 1971. By 1979 over a third of the whole population lived in the greater Dublin area alone (Brown, 2004, p.245). The population itself began to grow again after 1961, where it hit a low of 2.8 million. By 1986 it had risen to over 3.5 million, and by 2006 it stood at 4.23 (Fahy, 2007). Table three shows the overall trend for pre and post-independence, twenty six county Ireland.




Figure 14. Population in the Republic of Ireland: 1841-2011 from CSO (Ireland, 2012)

However, by the 1970's there is a reduction in economic growth, which is connected to a global recession and compounded by the oil crises towards the end of the decade. These problems were exacerbated by high taxation policies and high unemployment for much of the 1980's. The financial magazine *The Economist*, for example, labelled Ireland 'the poorest of the rich' in a cover-story (depicting a beggar on a street in Dublin as its cover) in 1988, and (unsurprisingly perhaps) blamed the attempt to maintain a European-style social welfare system with a small and fragile Irish economy to be the prime source of Irish hardship. Yet, less than ten years later this same publication declared Ireland to be 'Europe's shining light' and praised the reversal of Irish fortunes that the (so called) Celtic Tiger appeared to augur. By the end of the 80's foreign firms make up over 75% of total manufacturing exports. Annual growth rates between 1995 and 2000, the actual 'Tiger' years, were almost 10%, but continued to exceed 5% until the crash in 2008, which is clear to see in table two above. In 1922, the independent Ireland with which we began this chapter, almost 60% of working males were employed in agriculture. By 2005, the structure of the economy was: 66% in services, 28% in industry and only 5% in agriculture (Share et al, 2007). In a sense, because this economic restructuring occurred so late relative to other nations, Ireland effectively 'skipped over' industrialization, and transformed itself from a primarily agricultural economy to a service-based one. Its capitalism is, as such, 'light' in Bauman's terms, and became very light very quickly.

The details of the economic picture are well known and operate here merely as a backdrop to the other processes that are perhaps more important to the changes that we are interested in. This is, of course, an *essential* backdrop. The liberalization of the economy that first began in the fifties prefigures and would have a profound effect on social relations generally, as well as the everyday lives of individuals in Ireland. By some measures Ireland has gone from being an insular, traditional and agriculturally based economy to become ‘the most’, or among the most globalized nations in the world, within a generation. The economic story is a key part of that overall narrative, and one that has impacted other areas.

Yet, as I have suggested, social change is inherently ambivalent. While per capita incomes have no doubt been rising in general, albeit punctuated by reversals and recessions, so too has social inequality been increasing in Ireland. By 2004, for example, almost 20% of individuals in Ireland were ‘at risk’ of poverty (including social transfers, double, if these are discounted), higher than the EU-15 average, and almost 7% were living in consistent poverty (CSO, 2004). There are also measured inequalities in access to education (Clancy, 2007), access to housing, to health and other measures. Furthermore, as we know now, much of the later growth in the economy was unstable, based on an inflated and overheating housing market, that the combined incompetence of various governments who fuelled the boom with tax incentives, banks who lent recklessly, blind, inactive regulators, and a reckless media who fanned the flames of frenzy, all contributing to the eventual collapse. Yet, to focus only on the Celtic Tiger is to ignore the fundamental instability and insecurity inherent in the Irish ‘economic model’. As a small open economy, indeed one of the smallest and ‘most open’ economies in the world, it has based its entire economic future on its ability to continue to attract (i.e. buy, with tax breaks, grants, and an English-speaking, educated workforce) foreign direct investment from large international corporations (for whom it acts as a tax-clearing house and an export platform). As recent history shows, this dependent globalization model is almost entirely at the mercy of international flows of capital and a self-regarding transnational plutocratic elite who base decisions on profit maximizing criteria, not romantic notions of ‘good will’ nor historic links to a nation-state. In short, economically, Ireland is embedded in the liquid modern world, but is tiny, inconsequential player in that world. The position is entirely precarious. These TNCs are mobile and global, organizational embodiments of the very ‘Houdini-like ‘escape-artist’ skills’ that Bauman suggests are characteristic of liquid

modernity (Bauman, 2000, p.151). Self-congratulatory political back-slappery notwithstanding, the very companies that Ireland prides itself in attracting, Intel, Google, Facebook, Pfizer and so on, are both quick and powerful, the nation-state is slow and without much power in the liquid modern world. Nevertheless, this economic ‘opening’ that began in the 1960’s is a precursor to the ‘opening’ of the society in general.

In the last section we saw the dominance of the Irish Catholic Church on the institutional structures and everyday lives in what I am calling Ireland’s solid modernity. Indeed, their power rivalled the state and was perhaps more influential on the development of the social and emotional habitus of individuals raised during those decades. Yet, the general ‘secularization thesis’ that is explanatory for other states does not quite suit the Irish case. As we saw in table 2 earlier, the proportion of the population identifying as Catholic actually reached its highest point of 95% in 1961 and, while the most recent figures do show a decline, the figure for 2011 is nevertheless 84%. More than this, in social life Catholic ethos and morality last well into the period in question. For example the practice of *Ne Temere*, in which children of ‘mixed marriages’ be brought up Catholic (accelerating the decline of the Protestant minority) continued and in 1961 it is estimated that 30% of ‘other denomination’ grooms and 20% of brides married Catholics in Catholic ceremonies (Inglis, 1998, p.19). Furthermore, it was Catholic opposition and teaching that ensued that contraception was illegal in Ireland until 1979, and that homosexuality was not decriminalized until 1993. Up to 1990, surveys suggest that 85% of Irish Catholics attended weekly mass, the highest in the world at that time (Inglis, 1998, p.209). What, then, happened to religion in Ireland?

The short answer is that the balance of power shifted from the church in key institutional sites, such as politics, media and education (Inglis, 1998; Garvin, 2004; Share et al, 2007). A growing number of the emergent, educated and ostensibly Catholic middle classes became increasingly dissatisfied with the control that the church wielded over Irish life. The media itself played a vital role in this. While most of Irish towns had electricity in the 1930’s, rural electrification really only began in earnest in the 1950’s and was completed by the 1970’s. With electricity came widespread access to radio and then television. While parts of the east of the country received television from the UK in the 1950’s, the Irish public service broadcaster RTE began in 1961. While initially the church had considerable control here as in

other parts of the media, this began to gradually erode and Irish viewers could see challenges to church orthodoxy as well as alternative ways of life being broadcast into their homes. As the decades passed this would continue to undermine church teaching, as well as fostering a turn toward a more consumerist society. As Inglis writes:

The arrival of television brought a new symbolic structure, habitus and practice to Irish homes. The alternative conceptions of self to which filmgoers had been exposed on an occasional basis, now began to be broadcast nightly into people's homes. The language, symbols and lifestyles portrayed in the programmes imported from the United States and Britain were incompatible with the way the Catholic Church represented the world. Television, radio and the media in general encouraged self-realization and self-expression while the message of the church was essentially of self-abnegation and denial (Inglis, 1998, p.232).

Other aspects of the media reinforced this, with the increasingly liberal newspapers giving voice to emergent and critical intellectuals who challenged the prevailing doxa. The media itself became the new site of public contestation in which discussion, debate and heterodox opinion took place. The church's pious pronouncements came increasingly to be seen as *passé*, indeed, occasionally, laughable (Garvin, 2004). They began to lose the symbolic struggle, and to be seen to be losing it, which ultimately reduced the symbolic power that the church once wielded.¹⁷⁷ The media was central too to the diffusion of more liberal attitudes more generally, and to the incorporation of Irish people in to a globalized, mediated and consumerist world. By the 1990's, when satellite services began to beam into Irish homes, young people in particular began to consume increasing amounts of American and other cultural output. The cultural lexicon for many of my own generation was generated primarily from outside Ireland. It included Seattle grunge music, hardcore rap, *The Simpsons*, and US and British graphic novels.

Moreover, the practice of devotion in Ireland also changed. Drawing on survey research Inglis (2007) suggests that, while the vast majority of the population still identify as Catholic, this is increasingly more about 'belonging' than 'believing', and there is evidence of an institutional detachment from the church. For example, in the early '70's, almost half of

¹⁷⁷ Practically all commentators cite the 'Bishop and the Nightie' 'scandal' as an example of this. In 1966 on the most popular TV show in Ireland *The Late Late Show*, hosted by Gay Byrne a woman (jokingly) suggested, when asked if she could remember the colour of her nightdress on her wedding night intimated that perhaps she hadn't actually been wearing one at all, to laughter and applause. A bishop, disgusted by this 'filth' wrote a telegram to RTE complaining about the immoral content, and denounced the programme from the altar. The *Late Late* would continue to be an outlet for alternative views and lifestyles (contraception, feminism, homosexuality etc) and the source of public debate.

Catholics attended Confession once a month; by 1995 this had fallen to 14% (Inglis, 1998, p.209; Inglis, 2007, p.208). While mass attendance, as I have suggested, remains comparatively high, Sunday mass (or Saturday night mass) is a social occasion in much of rural Ireland; a place where friends meet, gossip and perhaps attend a sporting event or the pub afterwards. Bald statistical comparisons don't capture this 'thicker' aspect of church attendance, and the social/communal role it plays in individual's lives. More recently, Inglis has suggest a 'Protestantization thesis' regarding many of those who continue to identify as Catholic, despite holding beliefs not in line with formal, institutional church teaching (see also Forster, 2007). He has suggested (2007) a (tentative) typology of belief. This includes 'orthodox' Catholics, who remain loyal to the institutional church; these are proud and public Catholics, and their numbers are in decline. The second group are called 'creative Catholics'. These include both *a la carte* type Catholics who identify *as* Catholics, and attend services, but do not accept the church's teaching on a range on issues, such as sex before marriage or contraception, or fully believe in core areas of church teaching, such as confession or Papal infallibility. Under this heading he also includes a newer variety of this trend, what he calls 'smorgasbord Catholics', who mix their Catholicism with other forms of spirituality like Buddhism or New Age practices. These are adventurous blenders, who both 'believe and belong' (Inglis, 2007, p.214). The third group, 'cultural Catholics', are more detached from the institutional church, and identify with the heritage and 'the identity' of being Catholic. They may be critical of the church, but they show no desire to change religious 'identity': 'Cultural Catholics are not passionate about their identity. It is a coat they have always worn and feel comfortable in; they do not look for any other, because, in their eyes, no other coat would fit or suit their needs' (Inglis, 2007, p.216). Finally, Inglis describes 'individualist Catholics', who, while identifying themselves as Catholics, do not believe in some of the Church's fundamental teachings. Around half of those Irish Catholics surveyed in 1999 do not believe in hell, for example. These appear to express a trend toward 'belonging but not believing' (Inglis, 2007, p.216; Inglis, 2007b). Thus, for all, except those of declining orthodox group, in various ways Irish Catholics are becoming more individualistic in their religious practice, less in need of the institutional church to act as an intermediary between them and their god, and less willing to follow church teaching in relation to morality and sexual practices. In short, they are turning in to Protestants (Inglis, 1998, 2007; Forster, 2007, Garvin, 2004).¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ Elsewhere Inglis writes: 'It is not that Catholics are leaving the Church to join other Christian churches and sects. It is more that in becoming detached from the institutional church, in developing their own relationship with god, and in deciding more for themselves what is right and wrong, they are, in terms of their religiosity,

Of course, there are changes within the church itself to be accounted for too, not least the Second Vatican Council of the mid-sixties, and some movements with the Irish hierarchy to attempt to modernize (Brown, 2004; Garvin, 2004). But despite this, the scandals that emerged in the 1990's put paid to any real claims to power of the Catholic Church in Ireland. We have discussed aspects of this already and it is well-known. To add insult to injury, child-rape, and in-human brutality, what was perhaps even more shocking to the Irish public in the late nineties was what emerged about the manner in which the church hierarchy responded to claims and accusations of abuse, often doing little more than moving a child-rapist from one parish to another after a report was made to a bishop (where many of them repeatedly reoffended), or pressurizing children to remain silent. By the beginning of the new millennium, the symbolic power that derived from religious capital in the previous phase, the social prestige that attached to being 'a good Catholic' was fundamentally ruptured. Yet what these processes of change surrounding religion in Ireland suggest is the fracturing of the habitus that occurs in late modernity. As Inglis' typology points toward above all is a shift from a homogeneous habitus and embodied religiosity to a more heterogeneous habitus emerging from increased complexity in Irish society and shift in relations of power. Thus the high figures claiming to be Catholic in Ireland are, in many ways, misleading.

Another central aspect of these shifts concern the position of women in Irish society. Ireland in solid modernity was expressly patriarchal. As we have seen, a woman's place was in the home, and her role was the raising of 'good, Catholic' children. Indeed the Irish state, and the constitution of 1937 enshrined patriarchy into the legal and political fabric of independent Ireland. Irish politics has always been rich in tokenism while avoiding genuine or radical changes. Thus, while Irish women (initially, over 21 years of age) were enfranchised as early as 1922, the role and lot of women actually disimproved, like much else, after independence. Yet, there has been a tendency, as Connolly (2003) has argued, to frame Irish women and the Irish women's movement as being 'backward' or 'late developers', who only begin to 'catch up' with the rest of the world in the 1960's. This is simplified and problematic, and as we have seen from Inglis earlier, Irish women wielded quite a lot of power within the domestic field in the solid period, and were the 'lynchpin' of the Catholic church in Irish homes (Inglis,

becoming more like Protestants....This is what I mean by the individualization of Catholic Ireland' (Inglis, 2007b, p. 69).

1998). Furthermore, there were Irish suffragettes and ‘first wave’ (and earlier) feminists in Ireland that provided a context for the ‘second wave’ that emerged to contest institutionalized gender inequality and patriarchy in Irish society. It not appear *ex nihilo*, and again points to the fact that Irish society, even in its solid phase, was embedded in ideational and material flows with the wider world.¹⁷⁹ That said, the 1970’s do show a particular advancement in the women’s movement. Following an *ad hoc* meeting in 1968, the First Commission on the Status of Women was established in 1970, and the Council for the Status of Women (CSW) following in 1972 (Connolly, 2003, Garvin, 2004, Ferriter, 2004). In the decades that followed, groups such as the Irish Women’s Liberation Movement (IWLM), and others, would agitate and contest for equal rights for women across a range of issues. Much of the movement coalesced around reproductive rights in particular, such as the issue of contraception and family planning. Contraception was illegal in Ireland from 1935, and really only became liberalized for free purchase by over-eighteens in 1985. In 1971 members of the IWLM such as Mary Kenny travelled by train to Belfast and returned to Dublin laden with contraceptives to distribute freely. The role of the media in the diffusion of these feminists ideas (which scandalized the Catholic church and other conservative elites, I might add) was central. As Connolly again shows both television (RTE) and the print media (particularly the *Irish Times*) were vital to the movements successes (2003, pp.124-9). Again, the *Late Late Show* in particular proved to be an outlet for this movement in making their case for more equal treatment, and highlighting the inequalities that existed for women within the state institutional framework and in Irish society more generally. This processes continued throughout the ‘70s with a new movement, Irishwomen United (IU) emerging in 1975, where the issues of rape, work, and particularly abortion and divorce in the 1980’s. While the details of all these issues cannot detain us here, what I wish to stress is that these various movements should be seen as fundamentally *emotional* movements. They began as ‘emotional communities’ who mobilize and deploy emotions, such as anger and moral indignation, to seek justice and to change the prevailing power relations within Irish society (Goodwin et al, 2001; Flam & King, 2005). Here again we see how emotions and power are fundamental to understanding how societies change. Emotions, and their deployment, are the very engines of many social changes, and profoundly reordered relations of power in Ireland, producing a more liberal, open and equal society.

¹⁷⁹ Connolly (2003) traces the history of the Irish women’s movement in pre and post independent Ireland.

The women's movement was central to challenging the prevailing conservative and Catholic ethos that dominated Irish life up to the 1950's and beyond.¹⁸⁰ There were victories for the movement: the notorious 'marriage bar', which forced women working in the civil service to give up their jobs after they got married, for example, was removed in 1973; the anti-discrimination pay Act came in to force in 1977; divorce (albeit a restrictive version) became legal in 1997. There was, of course, conservative backlash to both the women's movement(s) throughout the period. The issue of abortion was perhaps the most contentious, and remains so in 2013 where perhaps the most restrictive version of abortion law in the Western world was finally passed, only allowing abortion if the *life*, not the health of the mother is at risk. Homosexuality was eventually decriminalized in Ireland, but not until 1993.

Yet Ireland is still an unequal society, and societal change has been ambivalent here too. There remains much to be done, particularly for working class women in Ireland. While there have been some advances for women in public life in Ireland (such as women's rights activist Mary Robinson becoming the first female president of Ireland in 1990), much of this has been tokenistic or partial. Women continued to be underrepresented in positions of power in Irish society, such as politics¹⁸¹, and in managerial and professional positions, and overrepresented in low-paid, part-time and precarious service work (O'Sullivan, 2007, Share et al, 2007). There is, of course, a distinct class dimension to this too. But women did increasingly begin to *go* to work, outside the home, during this period. Indeed, it has been shown that increases in labour market participation by women in Ireland contributed significantly to the economic growth that occurred, especially in recent decades. This, in part, changed the fundamentally familial orientation of Irish society, and family structure, when compared to the structure that existed previously.

A key aspect to the women's movement and to social change more generally was education. In the last section I suggested that a key force for production of a repressed emotional habitus was education. Central to the economic development, and a product of that development, is

¹⁸⁰ Which is not to suggest that this movement was univocal either ideologically or otherwise. The women's movement in Ireland as elsewhere contained a range of views and perspectives, some more conservative and Catholic, others radical and socialist. The history of the movement is fractious, as Connolly (2003) shows.

¹⁸¹ Despite the fact that half the Irish population are women, in the current parliament only 15% of members are female (a record high), giving Ireland the 79th position in world rankings on this issue (<http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>).

the rise in access to education. Up until the 1960's the Irish educational system remained more or less identical to that left by the British. This included the church-controlled (state financed) primary schools system which offered 'obligatory' basic mass education up to the age of fourteen, and (also predominantly church run) fee-paying secondary schools. These were authoritarian and often brutal institutions that inculcated nationalism and Catholicism in to the population at large. It became clear in the 1960's that this system was ineffectual and unsuitable to the new post-war content and the economic 'model' that the state began to peruse. In 1966 a damning report that investigated the system (supported by the Department of Education and, significantly, the OECD) reflected a 'radical ideological departure' in Irish educational thinking and precipitating a shift towards more 'child-centred education (Brown, 2004, p.238; Garvin, 2004, p.199, Ferriter, 2004, p.596-8). More importantly, and to the surprise of his party colleagues, Minister for Education Donough O'Malley announced the abolition of secondary school fees in 1967 (along with the provision of free transport for some children). This had a profound effect on enrolment numbers. For example, between 1967-8 around 119 thousand pupils were enrolled in just under 600 schools in Ireland; by 1973 this had risen to 167 thousand (Brown, 2004, p.240). By 1999, this has risen to over 350 thousand student (Unesco, 2002). Other changes had the effect of diminishing the hold that the church had over education from the 1960's. Co-educational comprehensive (1963) or community schools (from 1972), controlled by boards of management began to be set up and now account for around 15% of all secondary schools. Even more profound changes occurred in the third level sector, with significant expansion in access occurring since the 70's. One key aspect of this in the 70's was the creation of nine regional technical colleges, which would later become Institutes of Technology. Overall, numbers in the third level sector (universities, ITs, teacher-training colleges) grew from 18,500 in 1965 to more than 120,000 in 1999 (Unesco, 2000). A key motivating factor to this expansion has been the provision of student grants by the state, but more recently the 'free fees' initiative in the mid-nineties, which saw the abolition of undergraduate college fees.¹⁸² This has been central to the overall development in Ireland, but particularly for the individualization and liberalization that has occurred there as this period continued.

At the same time there remain significant inequalities in education in Ireland. Education itself has become yet another commodity, to be consumed. Far from the anti-materialist 'vision' for

¹⁸² This 'free fees' initiative has more recently still been eroded by increases in college 'registration fees' amounting to a reintroduction of fees by the back door.

Ireland that de Valera piously intoned in the earlier section, Ireland has taken to consumerism and the new materialism with a fervour rarely surpassed elsewhere. From junk-food to alcohol, cars and foreign holidays, and above all, houses, the Irish, like most of the 'globalized' world define themselves increasingly by what they consume (Inglis, 2008; Kuhling & Keohane, 2007, Share et al, 2007). As Inglis in particular writes, consumption is perhaps what unites and homogenizes individuals across the globalized world, and is, for him, a key aspect of the 'sameness' inherent in that world. He suggests the emergence of a shared 'global habitus' where there are similar patterns of working, living, communicating, eating, travelling, that is tied to the spread of global capitalism and the drive toward consumption, abetted by advertisers and marketing corporations: 'consumerism is the cocaine of the people' (Inglis, 2008, p.27-8). It is perhaps by now trite to make the comparison between Sunday worship and Sunday shopping, and to remark that the shift from church to Ritzer's 'Temples of Consumption' has occurred here too. But in Ireland everything is shopped for, food, clothes, shoes, books but also health, relationship advice, internet dating, personality. Ireland perhaps became more integrated into a global consumer society than elsewhere, because of the scale and speed of social change. In the absence or erosion of the old certainties, people began increasingly to 'shop-around' for security, for ways of publicly defining themselves and their membership in one or other neo-tribe, to search for status and capital in their purchases, to be recognized.

5.8. Conclusion

What this, admittedly quick-march through some of the key social transformations shows is the way in which the relational becoming of the Irish Republic changed, utterly, from the solid state of modernity in which it congealed into after independence. All of these changes are of course well known and I claim no originality for this partial list here. In the next chapters I return to this change from the perspective of emotions and the emotional habitus, which is my focus and contribution. Yet, I suggest that the metaphor of liquid modernity best describes the result of these processes. Precisely the features that I discussed at the beginning of this chapter begin to gradually emerge in the Irish context from the 1950's. The solidity of the former phase, the influence of Catholicism and Nationalism, and the relations of power within the society were transformed. Ireland became more secular, more individualized, more consumerist, more liberal, more globalized; in short, more complex, and less repressive. As

such, the contexts within which the individual came to be socialized, and the social environment with which she conducted her 'affective transactions' became more heterogeneous. This, as I hope to show in the following chapters, led to the development of more heterogeneous habitus. Yet, I have also suggested that social change is ambivalent. In tandem with the 'positive' aspects of these changes such as increased freedom, higher standards of living, more equality, better education and life chances, there also comes more insecurity, anxiety and the other, well-known and uglier sides to 'progress' (Kuhling & Keohane, 2007). This ambivalence is central to the arguments that follow when I turn directly to the emotional life and habitus of liquid modernity.

6. Chapter Six: Stories of Emotion, Emotional Stories-Exploring Habitus Shift

6.1. Introduction

In the last chapter I gave an account of the key processes of social change that dominated the socio-historical landscape of the Irish twentieth century. I characterized this shift in a number of distinct, yet interconnected ways, keeping relations of power and emotions to the fore. I, firstly, suggested that, in spite of some problems in the detail and manner of Bauman's diagnosis of the contemporary condition, the metaphor of liquidity, and the shift from solid to liquid modernity, captures the primary processes affecting socialization in the Irish context. Yet, rather than deploy Bauman's preferred concept of identity, I attempted to recast and develop these insights in terms of our preferred concept of habitus. Following Bauman, and Haugaard, Lahire and others, I introduced the notion of a fractured, or heterogeneous habitus, in place of the more common 'identity', arguing that it is a more robust, process-relational concept that better captures the complexities of the transition in question. I then gave a brief overview of the process of change in Ireland from the founding of the state to the present day. Key processes determining facets of socialization of the more homogeneous habitus of the 'solid' phase of Irish modernity (up to the 1950's) included Catholicism and Nationalism. These were affective of the habitus directly, but I suggested, also indirectly, by their pervasiveness in Irish society and their connection to dominant relations of power; via education; via families; via media. These institutions (or perhaps ideologies) largely, not exclusively, structured the relations of emotions and power in that society, giving rise to a repressive emotional regime and a repressive (and repressed), relatively homogeneous habitus. For the period after the 1950's I outlined the key processes giving rise to, what I called, a habitus shift. This is a shift from a more repressive, less complex socio-affective matrix to an increasingly more-liberal, more complex one, resulting in the emergence of more heterogeneous habitus. Fundamental to these processes were changes in the relations of power, and the increasingly-connected, globalized context. The 'opening up' of the nation-state is mirrored in the opening up of the individual and embodied habitus of the Irish people.

In this chapter I wish to 'flesh out' this somewhat abstract argument by drawing on a number of cases. These cases are based on the life history interviews, the methodological details of

which are specified in chapter four. The aim in my deployment of these cases is to show, specifically, the intersection of history and biography that lies at the heart of the sociological imagination, and how the processes governing that interconnection change through time. If the last chapter was history, this one is concerned with biography. Narratives, I have argued, are central to this. They are the window into both the habitus, that embodied history, and the struggle for selfhood and ‘self-identity’, that necessary illusion of coherence that makes itself true. They are also revealing of the social relations and social sites within which the individual is embedded.

These interviews, of course, are not generalizable to the population as a whole. They do not aspire to be. Rather, in what follows, I wish to draw on aspects what Scheff calls ‘part-whole analysis’, particularly the use of a few detailed case studies to explore the wider questions I have set out to explore.¹⁸³ But I am also, above all, testing theory, and rather than offering a fully verified and statistically significant account of emotions and social change, I am engaged in a process of conceptual clarification and theory generation. I will return to these matters in the next chapter. The point is that I am, as the chapter title says, *exploring* habitus shift, rather than conclusively demonstrating it. Yet, I am attempting to do this in a concrete, relational and historical context, by placing these interviews, these *texts*, in the *con-text* of Irish history, and attempting to interpret their *meaning*. And these three things, meaning, text and context are central to Scheff’s method. They are also central to Mills’ conception of the how the social imagination should operate.

Therefore, this chapter is interpretivist in its orientation. It deploys the method of narrative solicitation derived from BNIM, the SQUIN, and some aspects of textual analysis and interpretation associated with that approach, discussed more fully earlier. I particularly focused on PINs. But I was also focused on the analysis of emotions within the life stories; how individuals were emotionally in the interview itself, how they present themselves and their emotions in the stories themselves, how these stories reflect, above all, their emotional habitus. Below I will discuss two cases in particular, that have been subjected to the deepest

¹⁸³ Though, of course, Scheff’s actual, full programme appears to be little utilized, and the question of ‘validity’ usually disappears in qualitative studies. But his approach has three stages: exploration (using qualitative methods), morphology (micro analysis of cases, comparison, theory generation) AND verification (in the form of quantitative methods). As this final stage is beyond the scope of this study, it remains exploratory. Indeed, it is more concerned with theory generation and conceptual clarification at this stage.

analysis. The decision to use these two cases was the result of a complex process of deliberation. The primary reason is that they were the most interesting cases, given our theoretical concerns. They are, as will become clear, very different, with one representing the homogeneous habitus of solid modernity, and the other embodying the heterogenous habitus that I outlined in the last chapter. They are used precisely because of the extent to which they differ; as contrasting cases. They should be read as ‘ideal types’ of emotional habitus from different social relational contexts, and different emotional regimes.

I also decided not to ‘clean up’ the transcripts. All interview situations are themselves relational, and are as such characterized by relations of power and emotions. This is what Mishler (1986) has called the ‘hidden problem of power’ (p.117). He writes that: ‘in the mainstream tradition the interviewee interviewer relationship is marked by a striking asymmetry of power; this is the central structuring feature of interviews as research contexts’ (ibid, p.118). I have attempted to reorientate the balance of power back toward the participant by, firstly, using the BNIM-type SQUIN, which is designed to empower the teller rather than the hearer. The researcher must, particularly if using the life history approach, largely relinquish their own control over the research situation. It is the interviewee who ‘sets the agenda’ and the researcher cannot ask about anything that they don’t bring up. We come to the interview situation with one, and only one, question. In subsession two there is *some* scope in the choice of topics for further inquiry, but this is much more limited than other approaches, like surveys and even semi-structured interviews, that force a shape on to the process. The BNIM interviewer much also, to the maximal extent possible, remain quiet as the interview progresses. They must allow the participant to speak, to actively drive the dialogue, while remaining as passive as possible. This too empowers the participant, and allows *them* to tell *their* story in *their* way. This is useful to the seeker of habitus in that, I suggest, when it works (and as I have argued earlier, it does not always work and should be considered a ‘high risk’ research strategy) it allows for the actors own habitual ‘way of being in the world’ to emerge. It is, as such, both a political and ethical choice for the researcher that can greatly benefit the research process. For those participants who are disposed to be ‘open’ this empowerment facilitates openness and engagement. A trust builds in the situation, when they realise that they will be allowed to speak. The decision not to substantively alter the words and modes of expression of the participant is also an aspect of this empowerment. I wish to respect, and be faithful to, the trust they have placed in me and in the process. To edit

is to alter, and while some form of this is inevitable, I have tried to keep it to a minimum. If this occasionally gives rise to imperfect expression derived from the flow of the narrative, so be it. I prefer to mildly irritate my readers than do violence to my participant's prose. Furthermore, to 'clean' a transcript too much means that aspects of nuance and expression are also lost. Narratives, and their telling, are embodied processes, and respondents often use a whole range of bodily and para-linguistic techniques that are both revealing of habitus in themselves and aid the performance of storytelling. In the cases that follow I hope to have retained as much of these features as possible, and to have kept the 'violence' inflicted on the participants to a minimum. It is a privilege to hear someone's life story, and I am grateful to all my participants that they have allowed me to listen to them, and to use their words in my research. There are also emotions within the interview relationship itself, but I will turn to these later.

6.2. Meet 'Mickey'

Walking in to Mickey's house, I had to stoop a little, to avoid hitting my head. I had just interviewed 'Harry', who had help set up this meeting with his older, bachelor neighbour. As we enter, my usual, mild nervousness on such occasions burbles away just beneath my sternum, Mickey returns, slightly hunched, to his armchair. His brother, who shares the house with Mickey, also a bachelor, wordless and with speed, makes a bee-line for the door and is gone as soon as we arrive. The house is small; simple but well cleaned. The room we are in serves as kitchen and sitting room: a small table in the centre; an old-style, black Stanley range against the back wall; small windows, little light; a radio on the windowsill, off; an old black television, 'fat screen', not flat, also off. There are (presumably) two small bedrooms and a bathroom, through the door, next to the range. There is a bustle, and a nervous energy around all three of us – this is an unusual occasion. 'Harry' is making the introductions, speaking loudly to Mickey, telling him how much he enjoyed his own interview just a while ago as I take a chair opposite Mickey: 'Now, you're to take this *slowly* now Mickey...*enjoy* this now! You're going to start this now and...it's very good...', I try to put Mickey at ease a little, 'ah sure, we'll work it out'. Harry continues, 'yeah yeah, I'll see you later. Enjoy this now Mickey, *enjoy* this now! 'Cause this is a great thing to do. It's lovely. It brings back memories you you you, you'd have kind of forgotten about'. 'But there's no pressure', I say, smiling, making light of it all, 'give him the drugs now!' says Harry, and we all three of us laugh,

warmly, if a little nervously. ‘I can’t’, I say, ‘I’ve used them all on you already’, to further laughter. ‘Alright, enjoy this now Mickey!. Right, good luck now, good luck Jonathan’. As soon as Harry closes the door, Mickey starts to talk – ‘you’ll see him in a short time now because I haven’t a lot at all. I was born in...’ ‘I haven’t asked my bloody SQUIN yet’, I’m thinking, and his voice is low, nasal, with the flat accent of the rural, mid-West of Ireland. I jump in, panicking a little, ‘I’ll tell you first what I’m interested in, first, so you’ll know, maybe, why I’m here at all...?’.

The SQUIN is the same one I asked, more or less, all the participants of the project:

As you know, I’m researching social change in Ireland. In a minute I’m going to ask you to tell me your life story. All the experiences and the events which were important for you, up to now. You can start wherever you like, I’ll listen first, I won’t interrupt, I’ll just take some notes for later. So, when you are ready, can you please tell me your life story?

Part of the reason for this structure – the focus on social change – is to avoid a direct reference to the emotions. For reasons I will discuss later, I decided to frame the discussion in terms of something ‘public’, social change only, rather than being about something personal, intimate and ‘private’, such as emotions. In most of the interviews conducted, the telling of the life story was all about emotions. Particularly for younger cohorts, the ‘beats’ of the narrative, the key events that stand out for particular mention (and the source of most of the PINs) are highly emotional events, situations or transitions. For Mickey, as for many others of his generation, what will become clear is that this emotionally-based rhythm, these ‘beats’ are fundamentally different. Indeed, what is most striking in this case is the lack of, what the philosophers might call, *interiority*. All stories, to the extent that narrative appears at all, are ‘externalized’. His account of his life story is, for the most part, delivered in a deep, rich but fundamentally mono-tone. Even before we begin, his discourse is minimizing and self-deprecating, and not in some ironic, falsely modest way. True to his word, the interview is short, with the total interview taking some thirty six minutes. Eddie’s (who we turn to in the next section) subsession one was exactly the same duration. It is so short, I quote it in its entirety:

Resp: I was born, not in this house now, but down in the house below...I went to school then, to the national school there in K (village name), here...at the Shell station...And I was there until I was fourteen. I *stopped* on the date of fourteen and I went to school no further. Then I was workin' on the land with me father. That was ploughin' and harrowin' and horsework that time and the horsework went on then while he was alive until he died. And then we changed up here then in 1948 into this house...1948 into this house then. And t'was ploughin' and harrowin' then until all along, and he died in 1949. And I took over the job of growin' the bit of land... The horse was giving then and myself and another... two more got a tractor between us in 1969...and that was going along then...the tick...the bulldozer came in and went bulldozin' on the land, and it wasn't fit for ploughin' either with horse or tractor...on the small amount of ground it made up.....And I...cut into...bigger bits of ground and then the rock, the rock...the rocky piece within the...land, the field that was tilled had to be bulldozed out and levelled so...t'wasn't fit for to be ploughed...with the tractor...So we held on to the tractor for roughly thirteen years...and I left it to them then when I got a 35 of me own in 1982. I went on then...Ploughin' went completely out then, there was no tillage at all then. In this village. So it was hay and a few stock that went on...to that then. Then I had the 35 I bought in '82 and it's still there on the land now...

Int: Still going?

Resp: Yes. Still goin'. T'was a Ferguson 35...X...and that was motorin' along that way then...so I used to keep a lock of cattle and sheep then and I got out of the sheep then and I used to cut the hay and things...like that, and go to the fairs in G (town)...and...I used to go to the fairs in the earlier time in K, and then...the fairs went and then t'was the mart, after the factory and that way. And I'm hagin' here, as the man said, since. Rattlin' around...

Int: Lovey....that's great!

Resp: Now...

Int: We'll just keep going...I suppose...If it's all right with you?

Resp: Yeah.

This represents one of the shortest subsession one I have encountered. Yet, in spite of this, the second subsession lasted seven times the duration, even on this merger, initial basis. I think Mickey expected us to finish, more or less, at this point.¹⁸⁴ That, as such, *was* his life story. What is most relevant, however, from the view of BNIM and the hunt for PINs – particular incident narratives – is that such features, and indeed, narrative at all, is mostly absent from Mickey's account of his life story. Again and again, in subsession two as I attempt to 'push for PINs', rather than offering particular narratives of events, Mickey speaks in description and argumentation. The closest are more general, generic narratives (GINs) of what 'used to happen all the time'. Again and again I try to get a PIN from the conversation using the techniques of BNIM, with little or no success. For example, as you can see in the subsession one extract, Mickey left school at 14 years of age in 1949, which was a common

¹⁸⁴ Indeed, rather than taking the usual break at this point, in which I choose specific points of the life story to explore further, I felt it best to do this 'on the fly' for fear of losing Mickey entirely. As this section was so short, I could adapt and choose to run the two subsessions together.

practice in rural Ireland at the time. I later attempt to push for a PIN on the day he left school:

15. Int: And ah, you said then a little after you went to school, you went to national school. And you were there until you were fourteen. Do you remember the day you left school?
16. Resp: Well, I actually didn't, because I was fourteen on the 9th of July and you were supposed to go on until the end of the quarter. When the holidays came then I didn't go back after the holidays.
17. Int: And, do you remember anything specific about school? Do you remember any day, lets say? Or a teacher?
18. Resp: No I never liked going to school because it was rough in school that time. M (teacher) was in it that time and he was a rough teacher, I'll say that now.
19. Int: Yeah...do you remember any particular day he was rough with people.
20. Resp: As a matter of fact, to me anyway, he was rough *everyday*.
21. Int: Everyday, and what, you'd get a clatter everyday?
22. Resp: Yeah...because...their system was wrong that time...there was three teachers here, M, D, and KM and they were only fit for Ballinasloe (*reference to St. Brigids, a notorious mental asylum there). Because, whether it was their system of learning or their system of starting t'was nathin' I'd imagine only pounding into a lad...You'd never pound anything into any lad excepting that he must learn it on his own accord.
23. Int: Jesus, and what, did they have sticks or...the belt or...?
24. Resp: A stick...

This pattern is typical of the interview as a whole. Yet, rather than see it as a 'failed interview', an aberration, my reading is that this avoidance of narrative is, in fact, typical of Micky's sociological position and disposition, his habitus and emotional habitus. It represents a disavowal, and dis-association, with interiority and emotionality. To cast oneself as a central character, the 'star of the show', in a series of scenes is anathema to this habitus. I suggest that this requires a level of individualism, an orientation toward the self and the 'we-I balance' (Elias) that is largely absent in Mickey.

Mickey is a bachelor farmer from rural County Galway in the west of Ireland. He lives with his brother in a small cottage and, at the time of the interview, had a couple of cows and a few 'weanlings'. He was born in 1931. After leaving school at 14 in 1945, he worked the few acres with his father, 'ploughin' and harrowin' and horsework that time', until his father died

in 1949. In 1948 they moved up to the new house.¹⁸⁵ After that he ‘took over the job of growin’ the bit of land’ himself, and looking after ‘the mother’. The new house was originally thatched, and had come with some sheds and outhouses, until hurricane Debbie (the most powerful cyclone to strike Ireland) in 1961 demolished those. The house was roofed in 1966. Key highlights of his story involved the purchase of two tractors. The first, which he bought in partnership with two others in ‘the month of June’ 1969, was a Ferguson TE20. This lasted between them until 1982, at which time he ‘left it to them’ and bought his own Massey Ferguson 35. This is still ‘there on the land now...still goin’. Mickey also drives a Honda 50 motorbike, at the age of 81, for which he is noted in the locality.¹⁸⁶ He rarely leaves the area, except to go to (local) fairs, and marts. Cycling was his favourite pastime growing up; he used to cycle as far as Galway City, Ennis, to relations in Spiddal. He has been to Athlone, and as far as Dublin ‘a couple of times’, for GAA matches. He is still working. When asking him about this he says, using a beautiful, evocative phrase (with those long, drawn out vowels):

Resp: Well, as the lads says, ‘tisin’t workin’ I am now, I’ll say, only drawing to the headlands (*‘dhrawhn* to the headlands’) and that’s it, because I’m getting too old . I’ve a couple of cows, and a few weenlings (*‘waanlings’*), that’s all, however long I’ll stay at that.
 Int: And...did you enjoy it?
 Resp: I did sure, because I had nothing better to go at and I *had* to stay at it (laughs gently)... some way with it...

Mickey’s dialect and accent are rich; in aspect and idiom he is from another time. Some of his phrases are idiomatic, Hiberno-English phrases and constructions that I heard growing up (in West Clare) but are passing away, along with the ‘form of life’ that they typify. This one, for example, ‘drawing to the headlands’, beautifully captures a type of fatalism, both in relation to approaching death, and in relation to his life overall. The headland, here, refer not to coastal headlands but to agricultural ones, those areas of a field where you start, and finish, ploughing; where farm machinery is turned, and stored. The quotes, here in transcription, don’t really capture this richness. I have left in what I thought reasonable, but, in person, the phonetic cadences of the dialect are earthy and rich; words like school are pronounced ‘shchool’,

¹⁸⁵ They here refers to Mickey, ‘the mother’ and ‘the brother’, the implication is that the father did not move up with them. He died the following year, in 1949, so either he was hospitalized, or he stayed ‘below’ in the ‘old’ house by himself. The transcript is unclear on this.

¹⁸⁶ It is difficult to invoke the cultural significance of the Honda 50 for rural Ireland in the 20th century. They are, or were, such a ubiquitous feature of the rural landscape songs have been written about them.

‘shtick’ for stick, and so on. When, for example, he says ‘in co’ he is referring to the practice of ‘cooring’:

The ol’ the man that was in this house then he was in co with me father, he was Quinn, Quinn then changed in to L (town), he took out of this house in to L. Quinn used to be with me father then. God rest them all. Quinn is dead now. And ah, I went in co then with the neighbour, then, with the horse, JF there below. I went with JW, there was another man, JW, he died off then. And when he died off I went with JF and we worked in co then until we got the tractor between us.

The word ‘cooring’ is, or perhaps was, a practice of reciprocal help and partnership between members of a community in relation to farm work. Here it is mostly ploughing each other’s fields using the one horse. Arensberg & Kimball ([1940]2001), in their seminal study of family and community in 1930’s County Clare suggest that it is a direct borrowing from the Irish word *comhair*, which originally meant cotillage but now, more usually, means partnership (Arensberg & Kimball, [1940]2001, pp.72-4). This is the world that Mickey comes from and was socialized into.¹⁸⁷ It is a fundamentally *relational* existence, embedded in social bonds of reciprocity and obligation, to family, to kin, to neighbours.¹⁸⁸ The analysis of bachelor farmers has come to be neglected in Irish social science, but there are a few significant, earlier studies, in addition to Arensberg & Kimball, dealing with this grouping that include Brody (1973) and, more controversially, Scheper-Hughes (1979). These latter two studies depict bachelorhood mainly as a pathological existence, and connect it with unhappiness, loneliness, drunkenness and psychiatric illness. A more relevant treatment, with regard to Mickey’s case, is the study by Curtin and Varley (1987), which explores these ‘marginal men’ in North Clare in the 1980’s. On this issue of cooring, which has largely died out, and was in decline even in the ‘30’s, solitary bachelor farmers tended to be left out of these informal exchange networks, unless another bachelor brother was at home too, as in Mickey’s case (Curtin & Varley, 1984, p.295). Mickey, by contrast, seems closer to the bachelors observed by Curtin and Varley, adapting to their status, and ‘buying in to’ the gender stereotype of tough, confidant and self-reliant manhood, allied to a strong, almost puritan, Catholic moral standard (Curtin & Varley, 1984, p.304). This ties in with the key themes discussed in the last chapter, nationalism and

¹⁸⁷ Mickey was born in the summer (July 9th) of 1931, precisely the same time that Warner arrived in Ireland to begin his preliminary survey of the twenty six counties for the Harvard Study, from which Clare was chosen to be the site of the ethnographic work undertaken by Arensberg and Kimball ([1940]2001).

¹⁸⁸ Another related practice to ‘cooring’ is the ‘meitheal’(Arensberg & Kimball, [1940]2001, p.254). As the editors of the third edition of this book write: “Cooring”, like “meitheal”...replaces the tedium of solitary work with “a pleasant and variegated rhythm which works up an emotional satisfaction which can counteract fatigue and monotony” (p.259). This constantly intertwined nature of individuals’ with their relations’ lives is explored in terms of a ‘give-and-take’ between them...which delineates their system of values (Byrne et al., 2001, p.70).

Catholicism, and their role in the formation of the 'solid', homogeneous habitus. Both of these emerge, in some detail, in Mickey's story.

6.2.1. Politics

Mickey, at the time of the interview, seemed to be very disillusioned with politics in post-Celtic Tiger, recession Ireland, and doubtful about the future ('whatever'll become now with the two...'). He is a life-long Fianna Fáil (FF) supporter ('I was FF always') but is critical of both the main parties (the 'two' he refers to), particularly Fine Gael (FG) (which he pronounces *Fine* Gael, rather than 'fe-ne'): 'now FG was doin' an awful lot until they got FF out, but sure they're in now and they're going back on what they are sayin'...How do you know who's who and what's what?', he asks in exasperation. I ask him if, growing up, politics was important, did he remember people talking about the civil war and so on. His answer, despite not being narrative, is nevertheless, revealing. It is argumentation, justifying his preference for FF, but also being critical with the whole system. His objections are fundamentally *moral* objections, centred on the executions that occurred during the civil war. He 'was' FF because of the immoral and disloyal actions of Cumman na Gael during the civil war, which I discussed earlier. On 7 December, 1922, Anti-Treaty (later FF) IRA gunmen shot Sean Hales and Pádraic Ó Máille, in Dublin. As an act of direct retaliation, the Free State government executed four prominent Republicans, Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellows, Richard Barrett and Joe McKelvey, on December, 1922. What Mickey finds especially disloyal is the fact that O'Connor and Kevin O'Higgins were close friends, and O'Connor had been best man at O'Higgins' wedding just a few months previously. O'Higgins, a key member of the Pro-Treaty government eventually signed the order, authorizing the killing of the four men, including 'the man that stood for him' at his wedding. O'Higgins would ultimately go on to sign between 77-80 (official) execution orders before the civil war ended in 1923. What O'Higgins 'got out of it in the end' was that he was eventually assassinated on the 27th of July, 1927 on his way to mass in Dublin.

Resp: Well the point about it was...no, there wouldn't be much, a lot of talk about it now, in my time, because people were getting' fed up of it...do you see...they fought to get England out, do you see, in 1916, and then they they ah...they fought to get England out in 1916 but what advantage was it then, do you see? They got England out and then they had a civil war between themselves...as the man says, FF or FG or Cumman na Gael, as it was and then it went on through the civil war, didn't know what executions and things.../...so my belief now, whether I'm right or wrong is.../.../...I was FF, the thing I had against FG was...do you see Mellows there now, his statue in Galway (*statue of Liam Mellows, member of the original IRA executive, executed in 1922 by provisional in Eyre Square*)? Macelvy and the four of them that was executed in the 8th of December 19...what was it, 22?

Int: 19...22 I think, yeah...

Resp: Well, couldn't they have let them go off until after Christmas? And then did you see what Kevin O'Higgins got out of it then, in the end? And wasn't he going to mass in 1927 and wasn't he tumbled, he was the minister for Justice...and didn't he execute the man that stood for him, didn't he?

Int: He did...

Resp: Well sure, you see? *That was very bad loyalty among themselves* and now both FF and FG is, they're...you have a crowd now, Sinn Féin (SF) and they want to get the 26 counties...well, if you were in England, if you were down in the North now would you go in with the 26 counties now? Would you?

Int: Would I?

Resp: Yeah...

Int: I, I, I wouldn't, not today!

Resp: Sure that's the ticket! Because both of them now are arguing with one another, they remind me now of nothing more, both parties, this minute, as if a man had 26 acres of land and he doin' nathin' with it, and he looking at 6 more beside him and he wantin' to get that 6 in with his own.

Int: Sure at least, there's a lot going on in the 6 at least...

Resp: That's the ticket. So I don't know how they're going to manage now or what they're going to do with the budget!

The actions of the civil war were, then, fundamentally, *indecent* to Mickey. Even if they *had* to execute Mellows and the others, to do it so close to Christmas, or to shoot O'Higgins on the way to (rather than from?) mass, are immoral, sinful actions. The ease and accuracy with which Mickey can recall these historical dates is remarkable. This politics, these stories, along with his (Catholic) outrage, are fundamental aspects of his habitus. They are also public issues, issues to be discussed, rather than private ones; matters of historical fact. Here too we see the fusion of nationalism and Catholicism in the modes of thinking and feeling.

This strong, moral sense of propriety and fairness is evident in other ‘public’ issues too. For example, Mickey shows a similar, indignant, moral anger toward what he considers to be ‘the biggest change’ he’s seen:

Well the only thing that changed, or went too far and came back too much was this...buyin’ up of land. And the houses. Don’t you see houses now, weren’t they asking a half a million for them, aren’t they down now to 210 thousand...sure ‘tis a very smart man now that’ll, the only the only thing now that the like of me lost out on then, that when the land was goin’ dear (expensive) we didn’t sell the land...Had a one sold the land he could sit back...

He continues:

But the only people I'm very sorry for now, we'll say for instance is, for a couple to get married and take a mortgage on a house then and...isn't there one wages gone then to pay the house with...and then, if one of the house has a job then...look at all that's in trouble with mortgages. But there's one thing that shouldn't be. None of them should be put out of a house. *None of them should be put out of a house.* If they aren't able to pay, leave them in the house. Because if NAMA and this thing take over the house and put them out of the house, where, what good is it?...when...they won't get what they got for the house...What they paid for it. And wouldn't they be as well off try and leave them be in it, whatever bit, and cut down that terrible interest in it, and the banks then threw out money then...

Here again, we see the same moral indignation towards the unfairness of the current economic crisis on young couples and families. Putting people out of a house, or people off their land, remains a sensitive issue in rural Ireland. The idea of ‘evictions’, for one of Mickey’s generation, contains echoes of a dark historical past, and of fireside stories, and school-room narratives, of national oppression at the hands of ‘the English’. The banks, and NAMA, have taken the place of the landlords. One story of a particular banker, in the news at the time of the interview comes in for particular scorn: ‘And sure Jaysus sure that fella threw out money the same as you'd be throwin’ rubbish out of a house’. The banks trapped people in to taking the loans. The people were tricked, fooled into debt and indenture.

This is the new nationalism, which the nationalism of old has been transmuted into. It is for the people, for the land, against the bankers, against the politicians. It is old, agrarian and

populist. This sense of moral anger against the prevailing elites is strong in Mickey, and its source is in his habitus. Mickey's politics are on the side of the nation, rather than the state; he would (and does) oppose the state to protect the nation, like others from his social position did, and do.

6.2.2. Religion

The second theme that emerges from Mickey's interview is that of religion. His religion is bound up with his habitus and sense of selfhood. It is part of his practice, in that he goes to mass every week and prays regularly:

Well I always go to mass and I always...right there's people...but now, here, in this village here, there's very few now going to mass, a lot have stopped...I always went to mass I and still go to mass every Sunday...well, not now, because it's Saturday night now...Saturday night now...

I try to probe how it was when he was growing up. Was he forced to go as a child? He was and he wasn't – the question doesn't really make sense. Going to mass was the 'general rule', everyone went. Not going, or the idea of not going, just didn't come up:

The general rule all that time was everyone would go to mass, because when I was growin' up now I used to see old people walkin' to mass and they'd go out the worst of stormy, wet days, and snowy days and frosty days and all, and they'd be all at mass...all during my growin' up...except the man that'd have arthritis that wouldn't be able to walk...

The old and infirm went to mass, in all weather. Only the truly old or sick would be exempt, and even then, priests would often come to the houses of the infirm to give communion: 'Oh they'd want to be, as the man says, I'd want to be a real *crock* before I'd...Jack (quit).

And what of the church itself? I wondered how he found them, what he thought of them now, given all of the scandals. The church were 'all right' in general, though they 'push too far at times'. The priests, when he was growing up were not so much harsh as 'bossy', but other than that he'd have 'no...obstruction against them or no...nathin'...they were all right'.

Mickey has ‘no obstruction’ against the church, despite all of the crimes and atrocities that they committed, because he cannot offer one. The church is as much a part of him as his own hand. Throughout his life, at home, at school, at church itself, religion and religiosity were ever present, defining what was right and what was wrong, what was decent and what was indecent. It’s Mickey’s *decency* that stops him commenting on those who do not go, the ‘people’ of his ‘right there’s people’ above. He stops himself from chiding them for not attending, but they are committing a mortal sin by not going. But in this exchange also, each time I try to press for PINs, I am answered with generalities and argumentation.

Connected with his Catholicism is his relationship to alcohol. Like many of his generation Mickey never drank at all in his life. He was and is a ‘pioneer’, a member of the Pioneer Total Abstinence Association of the Sacred Heart (or PTAA), an Irish organisation for Catholic teetotallers, and the largest lay Catholic movement in Ireland for most of the twentieth century (Ferriter, 1998). Founded in 1898, the pioneer movement reached its peak in the 1950’s, attracting almost half a million members, though membership has been declining at an increasing rate since the 1970’s. Like in other aspects of Irish Catholic life, a person ‘offered up’ the drink to the Sacred Heart, as a sign of piety, moderation and temperance. To symbolize this, pioneers used to wear the ‘pioneer pin’, a lapel pin with an image of the Sacred Heart on it to display membership and dissuade others from offering the wearer alcohol. Again here, strong, conservative notions of moderation, combined with religious self-sacrifice, are found in Mickey’s account.

Mickey still has ‘the pin’, though it has gone out of fashion, but he would wear it if he was going anywhere (such as a social occasion where there would be alcohol served). He is keen to stress that he has no objection to the moderate use of alcohol, but does object to drunkenness and ‘awkwardness’ (i.e. people getting contrary or rowdy). His father is praised as a moderate drinker. His brother, who he lives with, doesn’t ‘bother’ with drink anymore, though he used to take ‘an odd drink one time’. Again, it is a discourse of control, of moderate and decent behaviour, contrasted with excess and indecency.

Int: Yeah...And did you, do ever take a drink yourself?
 Resp: No no no, I never drank at all.
 Int: You never drank at all?
 Resp: No, at all at all.
 Int: And did you ever have the pin like, the old pioneer pin?
 Resp: Oh I had I had, I have the pioneer pin all the time.
 Int: And you still have it?
 Resp: I do I do.
 Int: And you wear it?
 Resp: Well, very seldom because 'tis gone out of fashion now. But if I was goin' anywhere I would...
 Int: Yeah...very good. And did you find it tough, did you find not drinkin', were you treated differently for not drinkin' or...
 Resp: No no no . I often, met people and went in and...had a mineral with them, not drinking here and there and everything. The only thing that put me against drink was I used to do a (inaudible) to Connemara and I have no objection to a man or a woman takin' drink...but hold to a drink, or a couple of drinks but that sort of drinkin' pints of porter and getting' half drunk and awkward sort of thing, t'would sicken anything...
 Int: And do you think it gone...overboard altogether now?
 Resp: well the money's plenty anyhow...but they still drank it. Me father now, god rest him, he used to drink a pint or two of porter and he'd do with that then and he was often workin' down the end of the village there and he'd go in and he'd cross a couple of fields and he'd get a pint of porter and he'd, maybe if he was workin' he'd bring back a bottle of porter and he'd have the cork taken out and he drink it away. And I'd have no objection to that nor to any man drinkin a few...drinks...
 Int: But I suppose there used to be a lot more of people who didn't drink...
 Resp: Oh there was, there was a lot more.

6.2.3. Emotional Avoidance

The final aspect of Mickey's that I wish to look at for now relates to what I consider to be a key aspects of his habitus. This is in relation to his emotions or, more accurately, his avoidance of emotions and emotional expression. With the exception of (mild) moral indignation at unfairness or injustice, Mickey's narrative is almost a-motional, without emotion. In fact, on each occasion of potential or expected emotional expression, Mickey's answer become monosyllabic, formal, detached. This, I suggest, is an avoidance of emotionality, an aspect of a habitus and processes of socialization in which emotions are pathologized (in one way) and repressed (in, I stress, a literal rather than a psychodynamic way). This is what I called the emotional repressive hypothesis, in the last chapter, and one aspect of the pathologization of the body and of emotions.

For example, I attempted to probe him on a key aspect of his life, his decision not to marry:

Int: Aand...you never married?
 Resp: No.../.../
 Int:: And are you...sorry you didn't or...(ha) happy you didn't?
 Resp: Well I don't know if I am or I amn't ...I couldn't give any...any explanation for that...
 Int: Did you nearly get married at any stage or...?
 Resp: No.
 Int: Had you a kind of a girlfriend or was it...?
 Resp: No I...went straight through a few in me time...that's all...nothing more than that.../.../.../.../...

The dots and dashes (.../.../...) represent long pauses. I was allowing the silence to fill the space, hoping to draw more out of him. The issue was clearly important to Mickey, in ways, the defining feature of his life. But head-on, like this, he couldn't give any explanation for it, was uncomfortable that the topic was broached and would not be drawn on it. I changed the subject but later, when we spoke of emigration, he offered some reasons for his position and situation. A lot of people of his generation would have left, gone to England or, worse, to America, and stayed gone.¹⁸⁹ I ask, 'and you never thought to go yourself?':

Resp: No.../.../At one time I...I didn't then, I couldn't leave the mother...the brother S was workin' then, here and there around about...
 Int: And you had to look after the mother...
 Resp: And then the auld bit a land.../...
 Int: And you don't regret not going? Or do you?
 Resp: No...no I don't.

From the tone of his final words here, 'no...no I don't', it is far from clear that he doesn't. There is a plaintive, almost yearning feeling to how he says these words. This, again, is 'public' information. Unlike questions about marriage, this is about emigration, a reasonable question given the numbers who did leave in Mickey's lifetime. These may also be the reasons that he never married, or have a steady relationship. It fell to him, as the eldest, to look after the

¹⁸⁹ 220. Int: And you were...were you happy growing up?

221. Resp: I was... 'cause...all around here, any place there was a mug and cup in a house, they always ate for England. Sure only for England they were lost in America. And then the...thing about this village here, the most of them went to America...maybe one out of every household came back the rest of them never came back...Stayed gone...

222. Int: And you would have known a lot of people then, that you grew up with, been in school with that went? Do you remember anyone is particular, their going?

223. Resp: Oh yeah...

mother and the bit of land. There is an impression that he also looks after 'the brother' quite a bit too. Mickey's loyalty, the very quality he accuses the politicians of the civil war for lacking, his sense of duty, obedience and decency are the reasons, I suggest, that he neither married nor emigrated. His is a story of sacrifice; the sacrifice of selfhood and individuality for family, decency, and heimat. He '*had* to stay at it'.

These qualities are embodied, via experience, into habitus. The sources of these values of socialization - nationalism, Catholicism - with their homogeneous and homogenizing discourses and ritual events, in various sites, like school, sport, family, media, combine to produce a habitus in which individuality, and emotionality, are disavowed. After they moved up to the new house in 1948, 'the father' passed away in 1949. Here again, emotional expression is replaced by formality: 'he died in AD '49. He died suddenly'. That is all Mickey has or wants to say on the subject. He is reporting an event. Mickey is happy to talk about his father laying the rails in America, but about his passing, no more than 8 words.

Int: And who moved up, was it yourself and the brother just or...mam and dad.
Resp: No, the mother and the brother and meself moved into this house.
Int: Yeah...And that was in '48. Your father passed away then in '49.
Resp: Yeah...
Int: You said...the year after...Do you remember him passing?
Resp: Yeah, he died in AD 1949. He died suddenly.
Int: .../.../...Suddenly.../...And...what kind of a man was he?
Resp: Nice. He was very good to us anyhow.../.../...He spent a while in America

The contrast between this habitus and a more recent habitus makes for a sharp comparison. In the next section I turn to the case of Eddie, which displays a very different, at times opposite, system of dispositions. A habitus shift.

6.3. Meet Eddie

I have chosen Eddie's interview as a paradigmatic case for a number of reasons. It, firstly, was the 'best' of the interviews from a methodological perspective. It was, by far, the richest of the interviews in terms of both narrative, particularly PINs, and in terms of emotions.

Secondly, because of this, it provides the best, clearest contrast with the case of Mickey. Whereas the latter case, as we have seen, is characterized by taciturnity and emotional disavowal, Eddie's case is *expressive* - verbally, narratively and emotionally. In short, it best embodies the shift in habitus that, I have argued, has occurred in Ireland. Before I discuss both cases together, I wish to outline the case itself in some detail. This section proceeds as follows. I will first give some details of the interview setting and process itself. I will then briefly give some contextual details of the lived life of the case and an overview of the case as a whole. In short, I will recount the 'shape' of the 'life story' as I have it; the flow or becoming, without analysis or interpretation. Thirdly, I will explore a number of key themes and, what I will show to be, 'paradigmatic stories' that will illustrate the argument of habitus shift. The point with this is *not*, I stress, to psychoanalyze Eddie and 'reveal' the occluded psychodynamics that his case may or may not contain. As I argued earlier, this is a problem I perceived in the BNIM approach; that it (in effect) forced the researcher down a psychoanalytical route of interpretation. My aim here is to reveal the habitus, particularly the emotional habitus, and to show an example of its pluralized and heterogeneous character in liquid modern Ireland. In the next chapter I will return to the question of psychoanalytical categories, and the extent to which they have diffused into popular culture, becoming almost ubiquitous and unquestioned, doxic, if little-understood, devices to understand or pathologize, oneself.

At the time of our interview Eddie was a student in university, studying social science. He was 21 years old. We met in my office on campus, and both subsessions lasted just over three hours. His speech is quick and bears slight traces of the accent common among 'townies' from his hometown – flat and nasal – but showing evidence of cultivation.¹⁹⁰ I must also say something on the mode of expression used in the interview. In particular, what is most striking in the relating of the various stories told is the use of, what linguists call the 'quotative like'. This usage has been subject to much discussion in recent years, with traditionalists decrying it as an irritating, lazy or trivial form of speech used by the young. Others have defended its use as part of the creative evolution of the language, and creative in its own right (Carey, 2013; Durham et al, 2012).¹⁹¹ Eddie's use of this divisive construction is itself

¹⁹⁰ Indeed, his accent changes, at times, depending on the context and content of the story he is telling, with 'drug' stories (for example) displaying a more pronounced 'townie' accent, while stories of university displaying a more cultivated accent.

¹⁹¹ Stan Carey's blog post on the topic (2013) gives a particularly interesting defence of the usage. He writes that 'Online and off, used with images or micro-performances, quotative like is not a lazy crutch of semi-literate teens

indicative of the rapid changes in Irish society and the diffusion of American culture that is such a feature of Irish (and other) globalization(s). The ‘be like’ construction is used in speech as an indicator of direct quotation. To take typical example from Eddie to illustrate the point:

*So we walked into town anyway, and ah, went to the school where we used to hang out, the primary school, there was some young lads there, **and we were like** ‘where’s...’, what’s his first name now...oh, J(name)... ‘where’s J.’, and ah, **they were like**, ‘oh, he’s up home’, and we were ‘oh, where’s he live’, and they were, ‘oh, why do you want to know’, and we were, ‘oh, we just want to call up’, go for a game of soccer or whatever. And they told us he lived on the church road...and we ah, walk into the house, or we walked up the road and knocked on the door...and he’s little sister opened the door **and I was like** ‘is J. home?’ and ah, **she was like** ‘oh no, he’s not no, but come in’ like. She was ten or something.*

From the perspective of BNIM and the narrative search for PINs, the use of the quotative like is actually to be welcomed. It certainly enriched Eddie’s narrative in a way that the more conventional use of ‘said’ to report direct speech would not, because the construction is much more *performative*. Throughout the interview, which was packed full of PINs, Eddie was able to perform the stories he was telling in rich, exquisite and expressive narrative detail. It very much aided the expression of the ‘situated subjectivity’ of the participant, and expresses the (emotional) habitus. It is both linguistic and para-linguistic, facilitating the more complete *embodying* of the narrative, the use of gestures, the mimicking of speech and tone others used, and so on. Yet, there are also complexities to be noted in the use of the word ‘like’ in general in the data. Quotative like is only one usage. Another distinct aspect of the diffusion of ‘like’ is its use in expressing unexpressed thoughts – ‘And then she said she couldn’t go to the gig and I was like, ‘oh oh’ – and not direct speech. A third complication specific to Eddie is the idiomatic use of ‘like’ that is a feature of the town he grew up in. Here and in some other parts of the Ireland ‘like’ is used in a variety of ways that have nothing to do with direct speech – ‘and what was I supposed to do like’, ‘like you know’, and so on. This quotation features a variety of ‘likes’ which will illustrate the point:

*We used to, I really felt that you shouldn’t sell cigarettes to people that were younger. Now I knew...smokin’ was bad and all that but I really...**like**...a lot of young people smoked **like** and there was...this young lad we hung out with a lot, you know, he used to get so angry, he attacked me once because I wouldn’t sell him cigarettes. Bloody addiction for ya, you know. I was **like** ‘no, I’m not selling you cigarettes, relax like’ he was just going to go buy them for €6 when I could have sold them for...€2.50 **like**.../ ...But ah, we used to*

but a handy and highly functional addition to our lexicon – and to our paralinguistic repertoire. No wonder it has caught on’ (Carey, 2013).

*sell...we began selling **like** because of older friends who made...and ah, they were also... clientel **like**. I remember I used to go down on the evening and sell to houses, to these lads, and they were indoor stoners **like**. Not scumbags or anything, but **like**, lads playin' Xbox, or guitar or, you know, really cool lads, really .../...and ah, go down and you'd give them the hash and hang out for the evening and go home...of course, no homework was factored in to this equation **like**, you know, it was too much...or else I just wouldn't go to school...*

Thus, 'like' is used in its quotative sense, but also has a sort of linguistic place holder and an expresser of unexpressed thoughts and feelings. All of these uses, but particularly the quotative use indicating, I suggest, PINs, will feature in the discussion that follows. I wish to draw attention to this feature from the outset. The comparison with Mickey's mode of speech should also be clear and, while I do not wish to resurrect the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis of linguistic relativity, these modes of expression are in themselves indicative of the shift in habitus that I am proposing. While Eddie's speech is expressive, performative, narratively rich and emotional, Mickey's is characterized by a lack of expressiveness, performance and narrative and not only a lack but an avoidance of emotionality.

6.3.1. An Overview of Eddie's Lived Life

Eddie was born in Copenhagen but returned to Ireland when he was still a baby, nine months old. He described himself as being raised 'basically middle class', but his parents were quite poor when he was young. After they returned from Denmark they moved around a lot, Dublin, Kilkenny, Waterford before settling in a county town in the west of Ireland.¹⁹² Both of Eddie's parents appear to be educated professionals, and he has one, younger brother. Soon after moving to what would become his home town, his father was teaching maths part-time in a nearby college and trying to sell electronics kits (which 'ultimately failed like, 'cause...nobody buys electronic sets'). His mother wasn't around at lot at this time, as international travel formed a large part of her work. His childhood is presented as being happy, helping his father on their land, growing potatoes, and holidays in a caravan in West Clare. He has a few early memories of this pre-school time but his earliest one is of an accident on a seesaw:

¹⁹² Population of this town in 2011 was c. 25,000.

Resp: And I remember once am, my earliest memory I'd say is probably on a seesaw on the back of that and they guy who was on the seesaw jumped off and it shot me off, and I ah, hit my mouth off ah...I landed on a rock and cut the inside of my mouth (*pulls down bottom lip*) and I had to go for stiches...The...traumatic experiences you remember...from childhood.

Int: You said that you had to go in for stiches, do you remember actually getting the stiches?

Resp: I do yeah, I remember getting the stiches and I remember where we went as well. It was the...you see, it would have been one of the places on the market, the main market square in TOWN, and it was some old man, and a really dark room and I remember getting them anyway and just been totally numb afterwards and then going and been given, going up and my parents put me in their bed, sat me in the bed, you know, to make you feel better. And ah, my mother had come back at that time. She was all worry, you know-'oh my god, my poor baby'-you know? And ah, (*smiling*) I was been given...ah...mushy Wheatabix, with loads of water so it was all mushed up so I could eat it like and ah, they kept making me laugh, you know, and I was laughing so hard I was crying because the stiches were busting, you know...(laughing) I remember that...

His memories of primary school are also predominantly happy ones, despite the occasional use of corporal punishment by the nuns who ran it ('I remember thinking-'oh, school is great' like, y'know! And then subsequently, five or six years later-'oh school is terrible' like, y'know?').¹⁹³ His was the second year that boys were allowed to attend what had been an all-girls school, and he was always popular with the girls, even then.¹⁹⁴

Secondary school, as we will see, was a much more difficult time for Eddie. There are, of course, positive events, such as going to the Gaeltacht or holidays, but conflict, violence and 'trouble' begin to feature in the narrative from here. Eddie has his first cigarette at around 15, and his first marijuana joint around the same time. Pretty soon Eddie 'got into the stoner culture', was smoking daily and then started selling hashish to friends. Between third year and

¹⁹³ I used this story in chapter four to describe the processes of subsession two.

¹⁹⁴ Even in primary school 'the girls used to make lists, you know, with the 'cute boys' in the class...and I was always up near one or two, you know, so it was great for the auld confidence like, you know,. But it's only because...y'know, it's all about, it's not what you look like, it's all the way you are and confidence is the key and I learned that very young like'.

fourth year of secondary school (2005-6) he and his friends, mostly older, mostly from Eastern Europe, were selling quite a lot of drugs, including speed, 'outside the school' and in the town. There are also stories of violence, fights with 'travellers' and others. In final year one of his best friends was arrested for possession with intent to supply, and would ultimately spend time in jail. He stopped selling drugs at this stage, at least for a while. Some other friends committed suicide. He was now behind with school work, 'mitching' school (i.e. truancy) to smoke dope and hang out with friends outside the school. The Leaving Cert. exams were looming, and his parents were putting pressure on him to study. He was caught mitching after Christmas by the school and was threatened with expulsion. His parents tried to get him to 'knuckle down' and he began to study. He also met his 'first real girlfriend' at this time. She 'hated' drugs and he stopped smoking hash. His pre-Leaving Cert. 'mock' examination results were poor (150 points), so Eddie removed himself from 'the scene' to study, lived 'clean', except for a brief two-day binge after his girlfriend broke up with him, a few weeks before the tests. Despite this, Eddie did exceptionally well in his exams (all things considered), achieving 440 points, which was more than enough for him to get his place in university.¹⁹⁵ That summer he worked in a restaurant, and supplemented his income again by selling hash (but only hash now).

He started university in 2007, and lived in the 'on campus' accommodation for his first year. He was arrested on his first night after a party for 'messaging around' and spent the night in a cell (with the endorsement of his parents). Yet, university itself marks a key turning point for Eddie. While first year itself was mostly occupied with drinking, partying, and 'hooking up' with 'random women', he soon tired of this scene too. At home in TOWN for the summer working he met a woman a few years older than him (24) with a four year old son. As his parents were in Canada for the summer, they, all three, ended up living together in his parents' house for the summer months, even though he didn't really see a future in it. He worked in a restaurant:

I'd be getting' up for work at nine o'clock and she'd have my shirt ironed and there'd be a kid jumpin' up and down on the bed and...It was just a totally parallel universe like, really. And then there was one stage, I was just coming down the stairs, doing my dickeybow up for work...And the little kid...was like-'daddy Eddie,

¹⁹⁵ Well enough, indeed, to get into his first choice of course in psychology, but he hadn't applied for this because he didn't expect to get close to enough points. He ended up studying psychological studies, politics and sociology for his BA.

what are you doing today?' you know. He called me 'daddy Eddie' and this was just, you know, my heart almost dropped and she almost started crying like, in fear that I'd run away.

This was, he says, one 'the most pivotal points' in his life, it 'just taught me a lot about how... you should be careful and...how it was like to be old, d'you know?'. But he did 'run away', and returned to college in September. After a few disinterested flings, Eddie 'met the love of his life' at the start of second year (whom he was still with at the time of the interview).¹⁹⁶ After Christmas he applied to the Erasmus Programme, and did well enough to get accepted to a university in The Netherlands, where he would spend the following year. That summer, before Holland, he and K. lived together on the west coast, where she was lifeguarding and he was 'busking and selling weed'. They choose to stay together, even while he was moving away for a year. Holland was another pivotal experience, both intellectually and in terms of his own becoming. He was alone, and enjoyed being alone, but also mixing with a diverse international group of fellow students. The second semester there would be more eventful. K. came to visit him after Christmas and they travelled around. When he returned to Ireland for Easter, K. announced that she was pregnant.

This too would prove to be another pivotal event. After some discussion, and after he told his parents, K. decided that the best thing for them both was to have an abortion. This decision has a profound effect on Eddie; perhaps the most significant event in his life thus far. He struggled to support her decision, which for him *is* her decision, and his own wish to have the baby. But he had to return to Holland soon after the decision was made. It transpired that one of the best places to have an abortion (which was illegal in Ireland at the time) in Europe was the very city that he was living in. The day they went to the clinic was 'probably one of the worst days of my life'. At the same time his younger brother had developed a serious drug problem and there was turmoil at home. He would spend that summer in Holland, working as a teaching assistant. A week after he came back, his parents had been offered some trial lecturing work in India, and they asked him to come along to 'keep an eye' on his brother. K. was not pleased, and it nearly 'destroyed the relationship'. He was in India for almost two months, and ended up smoking joints with his brother. After they came back (the job didn't work out for his parents) he found that he had less and less in common with

¹⁹⁶ He 'met K. at a political debate or something along those lines, you know yourself. You're supposed to meet the love of your life playing bridge or something, or a night club...(laughs)...and...we just had an amazin' year that first year. Well, we broke up after Christmas, and back together, and all that kind of...ups and downs like...?'

his old friends. He wasn't in to the drug scene any more. He stopped smoking cigarettes and hash in September, in the run up to his final year in university. For the last year he really put effort into study, and did very well in his exams in semester one:

I worked really hard for the exams and ended up getting my first A in university and...A's across the board so...I was delighted with that. Finally, you know, putting in work and finally it pays off. That kinda drove...that kind of buoyed me like, you know.

The last thing Eddie mentions is that he has taken up Judo again. He used to practice it as a child but stopped. He has gotten 'back in to it now and it's one of the things that...balance me as a person, really it does, because I've always lived to fight... but yeah, Judo has really balanced me out...I fight every week, it keeps the testosterone down and keeps you, keeps you on the cards like'.

In what follows I will return to specific events and narratives in more detail to discuss what I think these stories and their telling suggest about Eddie's emotional habitus. But the over-all shape of the life does resemble a type of *Bildungsroman*, a coming of age story which begins in light, turns into darkness, and rises gradually towards a 'happy ending', of sorts. But such an interpretation is not what I have in mind here; it harkens back to a much too solid form of modernity, of a 'true essence' or 'soul' being revealed and so on. Yet this nevertheless appears to be the shape that Eddie projects, or wishes to project, on to it. Rather, what I will suggest is that the narratives, and the narrative structure as a whole reveal, is a much more fractured, plural and multifaceted form of relational becoming, and a habitus that is much more heterogeneous than those of earlier decades.

6.3.2. Key Themes and Events Across Social Domains

In this section I wish to outline and discuss a number of the core themes and stories that constituted Eddie's interview. Unfortunately I cannot discuss all of the possible themes, nor follow every thread; the interview was too long and too narratively rich to facilitate this. What I am aiming to do, by contrast, is construct an argument. The argument is that this material represents the change in social and emotional habitus that occurred in Ireland during the twentieth century (in an ideal-typical sense) and the choice of extracts is aimed at illustrating

this. I will later return to compare this case with that of Mickey, and comment on how these differences show the habitus shift we propose. For now, I wish to give an indication of the case in question under a number of headings. These are ‘family’, ‘fraternity’ and ‘flames’, which represent a variety of different relational domains in which Eddie lives and interacts. By fraternity I mean his close, especially male friends, rather than his actual brother, who I include under the ‘family’ heading. I am using the term ‘domain’ to avoid using Bourdieu’s ‘field’, which, as we have seen, refers to objective relations between abstracted capital, and not living, flesh and blood human beings. The term domain has much more in common with Elias’ ‘figurations’, Crossley’s (or Becker’s) ‘social worlds’ (2011) and White’s ‘netdoms’ (2008) (though I also wish to avoid ‘identity’). What the different domains, or networks, represent are different ways of being, doing and feeling; they both constitute and draw out in behaviour, different aspects of the fractured, heterogeneous habitus, demanding different, even contradictory, modes of affective regulation. These different social sites give rise to different sociological positions and dispositions, but that ambiguity (an ambiguity born of social changes) of how to ‘go on’, how to be and feel, are the constant feature of the narratives. But what the narrative reveals above all in the relational context of the life are the relationships and the attendant emotions of relational becoming. In analysing the life story, then, I have paid particular attention to those stories that reveal the emotional habitus in particular. What is most readily noticeable is that there are so many stories that do this; so many PINs, so much emotionality, almost to the point of excess. I will explore this in more detail under the headings below, and in the next chapter.

6.3.3. Family

Stories involving Eddie’s family, his father, brother and mother, and the theme of family and emotions, feature strongly in the narrative as a whole. If there is a narrative arc to the family stories, it is one of happy beginnings that get increasingly troubled and problematic as the story progresses. Eddie repeatedly reminds me that they are ‘middle class’. That despite his life as a ‘street urchin’ selling drugs, he was never a ‘knacker’ or a ‘real scumbag’, and that his parents never knew he ever sold drugs. It is clear that Eddie loves and respects his parents, but he feels guilty about many aspects of his life and the choices he has made. Some of his happiest memories are from his early life and involve his parents. He is keen to emphasise

that he comes from a 'good family' and that he was given solid foundations and support, but that he has betrayed that, letting them down, 'so badly', again and again.

Some of his earliest memories involve his father. He is proud of his father, a graduate of Trinity College (Dublin) with a degree in physics, and later a businessman and lecturer. Around the same time that he cut his lip, mentioned earlier, when he was around 5 or so, his mother was working away a lot and he spent a lot of time with his father. This time is remembered fondly: 'He used to bring me on the bar of the bike like, and he tied a, you know, pipe insulation, you know, the foam? And he wrapped it around the bar of the bike so I could sit on the bar of the bike and it'd be more comfortable like, 'cause I'd out grown the baby seat like, on the back. And...he used to always bring me in on that'. He has another vivid memory of 'helping' his dad in the garden¹⁹⁷:

Int: So, you said, at this time it was mostly yourself and your father, do you remember...a particular day with yourself and your father at this time?

Resp: Yeah, I do yeah yeah...ah...We have a good lot of land in TOWN like, youknow. It was the old County Council Man's house like, the B's. And ah, they moved in next door anyway so, we got a nice place...and ah, we...my father was big in to potatoes and, youknow, having self-sufficiency and all that kind of thing. So from a very young age I was digging troughs with him and planting onions and all this kind of thing...and ah, we were working in the garden one day anyway, and ah, I was hassling him, running around, throwing things at him or whatever...and he was like-'You'll stop now or I'll string you up from that tree'-and I was like (laughs) you know, running around, whatever I was doing, you know, probably hassling the chickens or whatever...and ah, he was like-'Alright, I'm going to string you up from the tree'-and I was like-(*high pitched child's voice*)-'ya, sure, go ahead, show me'. And he got a length of the blue, blue cord...strung it around my ankles and threw it over the tree tied me up! That was it! Left me there for like half an hour!

Int: hahahaha...

Resp: I ended up untying the knot with a 50p coin, like you know, with the jagged edge?

Int: Yeah Yeah...

Resp: Yeah, that's what I remember anyway from...living at home...

Int: Do you, do you actually remember being up on the tree?

Resp: I remember, I remember being upside down...I would have been, I don't know, five or something...five or six...(laughing)...

¹⁹⁷197 His parents had been helped out by his grandfather, allowing them to live in this house. The precise arrangement is not entirely clear from the interview, but the families fortunes are beginning to improve by this time.

The happiest stories related throughout the interview are those that involve his childhood and his parents. Other examples come from holidays they enjoyed on the west coast at a caravan park by the sea, where they have been going for twenty years. But this is presented as a lost utopia – ‘The most beautiful caravan park in the world like’ - but as the years went by the park got bigger and lost that sense of community and closeness.

all throughout my childhood we had a caravan out in the west coast and every summer we'd go out and stay in this caravan, on the beach like. And this was an amazing amazing place like, because, when I was small enough there would have been twenty caravans on the campsite and now subsequently there's one hundred or two hundred. But originally it was such a close-knit community that like, you'd go there and know everyone like, and it was such a nice thing, all the doors were left open and there'd be, the parents would have barbeques in the evenings and the young lads would be running around. So you ended up growing up with these people during the summer...

As one of the longest-term members of this community, Eddie and his family were respected here. He recounts warm memories of water-sports, rock-pool fishing, fishing in his dad's dingy, and community barbeques, where musicians played around campfires and all of the adults, including his parents, would sit around, drinking wine and chatting about politics:

...and I remember that, the idea of...everyone being on hand like, I mean, if you wanted a canoe you went to the S's (surname) like, and they had loads of kayaks, you borrowed them...and when you went fishing, you'd catch twenty mackerel and give them five mackerel like...and you'd go around to the caravans and give them in some fish like, the elderly lads next door, you'd give them the fish, they'd give you fish when they went fishing...it still happens like, my father has a little sailing dingy, we'd go out on it and sometimes you'd rake in forty mackerel and a few pollock on the side and you'd be down on the slipway and people would come looking...not as much as they used to, but people would rush down, you know, people would come down and the kids'd be-'aw, show us the fish' ...but ah, and ah...you know, you'd give 'em away..., usually you'd just give them away on the campsite...it as that kind of...but you don't really see it any more, its not the same any more like, when we bring in the boat now, full of fish, someone come up but we don't *know* him, you know...he'd be all-'oh, how did ye do, what did ye get', but we don't know him like, you know, he's just someone walking his dog or...and half the people on the campsite you don't know...there's whole new swarms of young children...but they're having a great time, they're developing a new community, but its not the...its not the small-scale thing that we used to have, you know....

These times are presented, again and again, as especially secure, warm and nourishing. It was here also that Eddie first learned of, what he calls, 'social groupings', or a distinction between the older children, who often went off drinking by themselves or kissing girls, where he was not allowed to go, because he was too young. This may be the reason that would later favour older friends. These older guys:

would still play soccer together and hang out and all of that...then there was the times when they'd get beer and go off and do their own thing and I remember the first time feeling that...kind of being left out of things...being kind of 'I wish I was older' like...you know...and I think that...for a long time, I always choose older friends...because you find with younger people, you kind of get restricted a little...

This aspect will become more central in the next section, but there is a revealing feature that concerns another distinction between social groupings, as he puts it. Later, as a teenager, Eddie brings some of his 'town' friends down to the holiday site. Here, I suggest, we get a clear indication of the splitting or compartmentalization of the habitus that I have argued is a feature of the liquid modern habitus. This passage represents the failed meeting of two social/relational worlds, two sites requiring a different set of dispositions:

there is one memory I remember, like, it changed a lot...my time in HOLIDAY CAMPSITE because...friends from TOWN started coming out, we'd camp out there and all like, and that was a very strange thing, because I had my friends at the camp site, who I had for years and years and years, and then I

have my, my, d'you know, my summer friends and my, you know, school friends...my town friends. And there was never, they never joined up like. We went drinking once or twice, you know, but they never really like...it was hard to put the two groups together like. They never really fit. And they'd be asking, 'why are you hanging out with an Iraqi? A Moldovan, a Latvian? Where'd you find these lads like?! And ah, I remember we used to, we were selling a bit of hash to someone out there. And there was a lad...

This holiday space represent a family space, an idealized space of childhood with a specific mode of habitus very different to the habitus from the friends space of TOWN, where he and his mates were dealing drugs and taking drugs. The former is safe, secure, where he is a child; the latter is insecure, violent, in which he is an adult. Here, the two worlds collide, and there is a clash between the demands placed on the habitus; two different modes of thinking, feeling and being. As the key 'node' uniting these two networks (with highest 'betweenness centrality' in the jargon) that would not otherwise be joined. In short, there is conflict between the expectations and norms between these two domains, leading to a feeling of being out of phase – 'a very strange thing'. The 'codes' and rules of the game from the town don't fit in the country, and vice versa. This is exasperated when one of the rural guys steals some hashish, about €30 worth, and they track him down. The violence against him (he is given a head-butt and threatened) is distasteful to Eddie in *this* setting, and another example of the failure to bring the domains together. In the TOWN context, however, this is a common occurrence, and one he is inured to.

But, as we have suggested, as Eddie becomes increasingly embedded in the life of the town, selling drugs, taking drugs, getting into fights, 'mitching' school, there is also an increasing sense of guilt and shame at the thought that he is letting himself and his parents down. He insists, on a number of occasions, that they never knew the full extent of what he was up to, particularly the drugs, another indication of his ability to compartmentalize himself (*'it's important to say, they had no idea about my drug use or selling drugs or any, anything like that'*). But it is his perception of his influence on his younger brother that perhaps weighs most heavily on him, and is a primary source of feelings of guilt and shame.

Eddie told a number of 'family' stories that feature his brother, with himself filling the role of guiding 'older brother'. For example, when his brother is being picked on in primary school

by 'traveller' children, something that happened to Eddie himself (and had a profound effect on him), he intervenes. He says:

My brother had similar problems. My brother was robbed a good few times and, when he went to the PRIMARY SCHOOL, there was lad there that used to rob him and he's come home with blood on his face and he says, 'oh, I was just messing in the playground' or whatever, but ah, I talked to him once and he was, like, crying after school and ah, I was like, 'what happened' and he was like 'I was robbed' and I was like, 'alright so...where are they now like?'...'they're still down at the school'. And I said, 'lets go down to the school' and there were these three young travellers and...coincidentally they were travellers, I don't want to make any assumptions or anything like, I have some...great traveller friends like...and ah, I went up and I was, like, 'oh you, you've four Euros belonging to my brother' and he was like, 'no, I don't, and my brother'll be down here and he'll sort you out too' and I was like, 'go on, get your brother, get your brother'. The brother came down and thanks be to Jesus! I used to sell him hash. So we were ok, we were ok. So he was like, 'is my brother causing your brother problems' and all this kind of thing like and ah...it ended up, my brother...fought the other lad and...it was scrappy, I wouldn't say my brother won like, but he held his own and...there was never any problems in school after that, you know. That kind of thing, you know, I told him, 'always keep your head high, never look down. If someone comes up to you don't look like a cowardly little fella, and if they do go for ya don't just retreat and take it 'cause you're going to end up taking it for the rest of your life then'...

Here we see Eddie as mentor to his brother. Given his own experiences on the 'street' as it were, and the habitus required to 'survive' where violence, or the danger of violence, is perceived to be an ever-present possibility, this is good advice from Eddie's perspective. It is also a coaching in (hetero-normative) masculinity. Life has taught Eddie that you have to stand up for yourself, to not let yourself be pushed around by anyone. In the next section we will see where this perspective comes from. But here, I suggest, he is participating in a 'paradigmatic story', the narrative of the 'older brother' helping his younger brother to grow up, to be strong; to be a man. He is here being a 'good brother'. This is a source of pride for him. He wants to be 'an example' for him, but is (painfully) aware that his lifestyle is not an example for anyone.

In subsession one Eddie mentions his brother again. It is later in the narrative, after his partner K. has made the decision to have the abortion and he is living in Holland. While this is going on:

And...at the same time, you know all these 'head shops', head shops were the big thing...my brother was...heee's...sixteen now, he would have been fifteen then. He was hooked on am Methadrone and various BZP substrates and that. And ah, he ended up kinda falling in to bouts of schizophrenia and that...And tearing the house apart like and my parents jus/would/just two brothers in the family and ah. Ended up tearing the house apart and...it was really hard on...my parents, you know and...the pregnancy thing was hard on me and...I couldn't...I felt like I should be at home both for K. and my brother, you know, keep tabs on him like. But ah, he just went off, went off the chain...just stopped going to school...I don't think he was selling like, you know, 'cause I know most of the dealers in town and I've vetoed him like. He can't, he can't get anything ...if, ah, if I've anything to say about it. But am, yeah it was very tough on the family anyway and am...

When we return to this topic later in session two, the full extent of the effect this is having on him becomes apparent. Yet, his guilt about possibly being a 'bad' influence on his brother cannot be understood without the context of the wider relational pattern within the family. In subsession two Eddie ran two very emotional stories together, one concerning his brother, and the other of his telling his parents about the pregnancy. This is before he met with his partner and the decision to terminate had not yet being made. He had just been talking about his time in Europe, how much he loved the independence of it and of the interesting people he met. I said that I was going to ask him about the abortion, and that he might not like this, but that I was going to ask him anyway. He said 'well, it's the biggest thing that happened in my life'; that I couldn't *not* ask about it. While I wish to leave the specifics of this event until later, it nevertheless penetrates into all the other relationships that Eddie has. In liquid modernity relational matrices overlap and events in one have 'spill over effects' into others; these domains are only semi-detached. I wish to focus on how he related this in terms of his immediate family. He framed this latter as the 'first time I saw my father cry'. He has just arranged to meet with K. in two days' time to discuss their options:

Resp: We were sitting there and we were getting nowhere talking together, you know? It was all tears and all this kinda and I was like, alright, let's take two days, I'll call you in two days and we'll meet up. We'll talk about it with fresh minds. That's grand yeah. Aaand, midway through the second I was like, whatever has to happen has to happen, and I'm going to need money. If we keep the baby I'm going to need a lot of money. If we're getting the abortion, I need money.

And aam, so, I went in and my parents were working in the office at home, and I was like 'I need to talk to ya' and they were like 'oh, we were just going to get coffee anyway'. So we went in to the living room, and we were sitting on these lovely chairs we have and ah, and I was like: this is really important, I need to tell ya. And my mother was like 'oh my god', you know? (laughs). And she was like getting scared already like. And I was like relax relax relax...K's pregnant ...And ah, I was thinking all day how I was going to say it, you know? There's only one way to say it, you know? 'K's pregnant...and we don't know what to do'. My mother was 'oh oh oh', she let out a little whimper, you know, and I looked over at my father and he was like, d'you know, rubbing his hand across his face, kinda like that, you know? (rubs face). And I was like, ok, well, it happened like when, K. was over to visit, she was over on Valentine's Day, you know. And she found out there a week ago, and we're debating keeping the baby or an abortion and then I saw my fa, my father, shoulders shaking a little bit, you know (begins to get moved himself now, broken voice).../...my mother was like, 'am, ok, well, you know we're going to support you in whatever you want to do, and we'll help you get whatever information you need. And if K. needs any money or anything, we'll fully, we'll pay for the whole thing, I'll mind, I'll mind the baby if you need help, you know, if you want to keep on at college, d'you know, well pitch in'...this was amazing for her to say because when I was growing up she always said if you have a baby you're on your own, you know. And I said, ah ha, we might be having a baby! and she said, yeah, well, this is it, I'll help, I'll mind the baby, we don't...(FATHER) can keep the business on his own, you know. And, my father was pure teary eyed, you know, he was kinda, well, he wasn't balling or anything, you could see he was, as far as you'd get, like. A lot of men get to that point and, my father, I don't know if he said anything in the whole conversation like.../...yeah, I don't know, was he.../...proud, or was he ...sad or shocked that I was...old, d'youknow?...And ah...

I've seen him similar to that since. Which was am, my brother. It's been very tough. And ah, he's been seeing therapists. And ah, he's damaged his spine with the amount of drugs he's taken. And ah, he's definitely damaged his brain. And am, but my father is seeing counsellors as a result of it, not just my brother. It's affecting the whole family.

The emphasised areas this segment, and the one below, are from (one, continuous) section, and highlight a particularly emotional part of the PIN, where Eddie gets quite emotional himself. I wish to represent it in full here to illustrate the flow of the stories, the richness of the PINs, but also to highlight the association between the two events. The detail of the narrative reconstruction, the way the emotions and performance invokes the scene, the way Eddie embodies the story are all very moving. In the first part, when he tells them of the pregnancy, he is somewhat surprised by his mother's immediate supportive reaction. But he is also fascinated by his father's emotion. Remember, this episode is framed as the first time he saw his father cry, but he is 'not balling or anything'. He is, rather, as 'close as you'd get'. This image of his father, who he looks up to and who he looks to for affirmation and status, shoulders shaking – is he proud of me? Have I made him proud? We could speculate that the father's emotions could be disappointment, in both his son and himself, but this hardly occurs to Eddie. He continues:

INT: Sure, sure...

RESP: My mother wanted to leave, she wanted to leave the family, like, it was so hard on her like. And ah, I let them down sooo badly like (voice breaks) you know, when you let your parents down like...They were gone away for the weekend and I was supposed to be minding my brother and they gave me fifty quid and said ok just pay for food or whatever. Just keep an eye on him. And I was like, grand. On the Saturday night then, all his friends were over and I made them a big carbonara, you know, garlic bread, fed them well. Some of my mates were coming over for beers like...It ended up with about 30 of my mates being there, like you know, it ended up with, it exploded a little bit, d'you know. And my brother was there...and, he asked us to buy him booze, my brother was 16 at the time...I was ah, I said no. And the lads were like, 'ah come on, he's 16!' You know, my mates like. 'What were we doing at 16?!' Joke joke, kid kid, like. And I was like, grand, d'you know, and I went up to the offie (*off-licence) and I got them...and I was like, what d'you want to drink and they were like Jagermeister. And I said *no*. (laughs). Then they said Vodka and I says 'alright, I'll get ye a shoulder of vodka and some cans for ye to drink', you know, thinkin', it was fairly, light enough, you know. And ah, it turns out they were getting stoned up as well up there, you know. And ah, one of the lads got sick or something and...the place was a mess. **My parents came home early from where they were gone, they were on a relaxing weekend away and they came back and the house was in bits! My brother was hungover. There was drunk women sleeping in the beds. It was just a shambles like. And my parents just roared me out of it like. Which I, like, accept. I mean, I let them down SOOO much...you're a disgrace to this family and how dare you, with the way this family is, we just want a weekend away...I was in bits. I went up to my room, I almost cried myself. I was so ashamed. I just packed up my stuff and came back (to college). And ah, didn't see them for 3 weeks. Didn't hear from them in 3 weeks. Sent an email to my father saying, ahhh, I'm thinking of coming down this weekend. I didn't hear anything back. Left it a month. And ah, then I came back. I didn't say anything I just turned up. My mother saw me at the door and turned around and walked away. I went in to the house, brought my bag up to the room like and ah, and ah, my father came up to me. And was like, 'ok, you've disgraced yourself, you've disgraced your family name, and you've severely threatened the health of your younger brother'...and I was...and I (tearful) what can you say to these things? Nothing like. 'Sorry'. And he was like, 'we're so proud of you, as a son (voice cracks).../...and...just...to let us down like that you know, I'm so proud of you, you've achieved so much in school, and you've a great girlfriend and a great life and...just.../...I don't know'. He was so upset. That's two times I've seen my father...upset. I was in bits, I was balling my eyes out like, y'know?**

This yearning for paternal affirmation immediately evokes the other time that Eddie saw his father cry.¹⁹⁸ Indeed, he becomes quite upset in the second half of this passage, his voice breaking, his emotions breaking through, when he says 'I let them down sooo badly like'. This story of the party offers a glimpse into the relations of power, status and emotions within the family domain. This regret at letting his parents down, the guilt and shame at not living up to the norms and expectations, of not being a 'good son', occur throughout the interview, but are perhaps most evident here. The 'shambles' that he has allowed to occur in their absence (under pressure to fulfil the demands of his other, fraternal network, acting from the wellsprings of this, different habitus) and the effect that it and he may be having on his brother, the fact that he has disappointed his parents, and not lived up to the narrative of the 'good son', bring him to tears. These are tears of guilt and shame, his actions, *he*, has made a bad situation worse. Eddie's reconstruction of his father's words are most revealing of this.

¹⁹⁸ It is notable that Eddie has cried more in this interview than he has witnessed his father do in his life time, another sign of a difference in habitus.

He is *so proud* of him *as a son*, he is doing so well, and now *this*. It is at once the affirmation that he is seeking, and its negation; pride and disappointment. Increasingly this aspect of his self, the drinking, drug-taking, partying side of his habitus that has here so damaged the social bond, and Eddie's status within the family, becomes less pronounced. His experiences lead him away, more and more, from this way of life. Here, he is crushed. He was 'balling his eyes out', this tough, drug-dealing street fighter. And he cries in the retelling. His respect for his parents is key. Elsewhere he says: *they have achieved sooo much coming from nothing like, my father came from nothing, absolutely nothing like, and now they are successful, self-employed...* He, and his brother, at the moment, are letting them and themselves down.

This narrative of failing to live up to the role of the 'good son' is tied to the narrative role of the 'good brother', and are the primary narratives of the family domain. Yet, after this event, there is further emotional turmoil associated with his negative influence on his brother, and the guilt he feels about this. His brother's drug problems have gotten worse, as we have seen earlier. He is 'hooked' on the 'legal highs' sold in the 'head shops', such as methadone.¹⁹⁹ There is another story which displays this. When his parents get work in India, they bring Eddie's brother with them: 'they were going to take my brother 'cause my brother was a junkie and they were like, 'we need to do something about him, take him out of the environment', 'cause, if you can't change the person you change the environment.../...so they're like-'take him to India, am, we need someone to keep an eye on BROTHER in India while we're at work'. Yet, while there, Eddie spends some time smoking hash with his brother. By 'yokes' he is referring to ecstasy tablets:

¹⁹⁹ 'Head Shops' here refers to retail outlets selling various items of drug paraphernalia, such as pipes, rolling papers, but also 'legal highs', psychotropic substances, 'party powders' (often labelled as bathsalts) and other items. They exist across the world but have had a particular and controversial history in Ireland. In 2010 they were said to be growing at a rate of about one per week. This year also marked a sea-change in official attitude towards these shops, with their legality, and the legal loopholes they were exploiting, becoming the centre of political attention, resulting in the new *Criminal Justice (Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010*. This reduced the numbers of shop from 112 to 12, as most of the products being sold were now illegal.

So ah, we came back anyway...and ah.../...my ah..my...something I'm really ashamed of actually is ah, smoking joints with my brother. When...but, at the same time he's 16 and sure I was taking 'yokes' when I was 15 and I felt like, he's not at that worst stage and he wasn't suffering really bad from withdrawals from the...amphetamines like. So, had a few spliffs with him over in India and ah...but yeah, its something I'm really ashamed of, when I came back like my mother was like-'did BROTHER seem dopey to you over the holidays' like, and I was like, Jesus Christ, what have I done like, you know? I made it the norm, I made it OK for him to have like you know...And am...then we ah, came back anyway and BROTHER was up to his old tricks. Headshops were closed down-were they closed down at that stage?-they were closed down around then anyway. But sure, the market was flooded with it like....

In addition to holding on to guilt feelings arising from the disjuncture between his parent's image and expectations of him, and the reality of his daily life with his friends, Eddie blames himself for his brother's drug problems. He 'made it the norm', and this fact, and the turmoil that it has caused within the family domain is also perceived to be his fault. He has been a 'bad influence', a 'bad brother'. Unfortunately we did not get to return to this topic in subsession two.

Thus, we see already, within the relational domain of the family, evidence of a pluralized habitus in conflict (again, not in a strict psychodynamic sense). We live (in late modernity) embedded in multiple, but overlapping, relational domains, where the habitus formed via experience *from* and *for* one context impacts on the habitus expectations in the others. The results of this conflict here are various, powerful (so-called) 'negative' emotions of guilt and shame that they engender and produce. But within this domain there are also 'positive' emotions, and the striving for 'positive' emotions and status; the love and happiness of childhood, pride and the striving for pride and self-confirmation; of making your family proud of you; of being a 'good son', and a 'good brother'. What is also notable is the level of detail, the narrative richness, and above all, the level of emotionality in the presentation of self that occurs throughout the interview.

6.3.4. Fraternity

Under this section I will look at the relational domain of friendship, and at the habitus process operative within relational networks of, for Eddie, mostly male, peers. This is the sense of 'fraternity' I wish to invoke, rather than the literal meaning. It is within this domain that violence and drugs become a prominent part of Eddie's life. But within this story arc there is

development and evolution, a shift from the relative innocence and security of primary school into the more violent period in secondary school, where he made new friends. Here also, there is a further turn when he moves to university.

I will start with some stories of the casual violence that this domain is characterized by. One of his earliest experiences of violence, which would have a long-lasting effect on his attitudes towards fighting, happened when he was around twelve, at the end of primary school. He and some of his ('middle class') friends are attacked by a three 'travellers' of around the same age on their way home from a (cancelled) training session. This was 'one of his very early experiences':

And ah, we were half way back through the GREEN and **these four lads came up to us, similar age, and ah, and they were like: 'well laads, what's the craic? What are ye doin' like? Have ye got the time?' And my friend was wearing a watch like and we were like 'oh yeah yeah, it's like, whatever, three o'clock'. And they like, 'oh d'youknow, show, show us the watch, show us the watch'. And my friend was like 'no no' and they were pushing on us and all this...and then they're like...one of them goes to me, 'what size boot are you? What size shoe are you?'. And I was like, 'what the hell' like, and I didn't answer like...and he was like-'I'll fight you for your boots, I'll fight you for your boots'...And I remember this really clearly like...he was like, 'I'll fight you for your boots' and I didn't want to fight like. I'd fought loads of times but not in a serious kind of like, d'youknow. And he was like, 'It'll be grand, one punch and it'll be over! One punch-bang bang-one punch and you'll hit the ground and it'll be over. The first one to hit the ground loses', like. And then I was like, 'no, no, no' and he was like, 'well, if you don't fight, we're going to fight you'. You know, 'you fight one of us or you fight all of us' like. And my mates were like, absolutely shitting it like. You know, they were from like, (middle class area) and that and this was...like...totally alien to them like. I had known travellers like, I had gone to school with a few travellers like, actually in PRIMARY SCHOOL they separated travellers from settled people...and they taught them separately...which was very strange I thought...**but am, then they...I ended up fighting this lad...and ah, of course it never works out the way people say...you know, I was like, right, grand, yeah, we fought a little bit, he was a really fast boxer, they're always really fast boxers, always really good. Ended up grabbing him and we both fall to the ground and of course the rules fall out the window and the lads start kicking me while I was on the ground and so my mates went for them. So anyway, we ended up breaking it and the three of us *pegging* it across the field, ran straight to the courthouse and we stood straight outside the courthouse like-stood there - HAHAHAHA! We stood there for ages-haha-just outside the front door of the court house where the solicitors were standing and we just stood there...and hahaha that was it, we just stood there for hours and hours...****

This, and other experiences like it, are the source, or one of the sources, of Eddie's 'hardman', survivalist, 'take no shit' attitude, and the context for the advice he gives to his brother. He learns here and especially in secondary school that if you don't stand up for yourself, don't stand your ground, you will be seen as a victim and picked on for the rest of your life. Again, we see the dynamic between security and insecurity. He refers to this experience on a number of occasions throughout the interview, suggesting that it was one of the first, most frightening

and most formative of experiences of his early teens. But such stories soon become more commonplace in secondary school. Fighting was just par for the course, though not always very serious: ‘well like, we used to always fight before a class, I don’t know, it’s just what we did, you know, young lads, there used always be scrapping like (laughs)’. A more serious event happens some years later, when Eddie is around 17. He has been ‘dealing’ for a while now, and is embedded in a network of close friends, mostly of Eastern European origins, such as FRIEND1, FRIEND2, and others. This event is introduced as ‘one of my most...terrifying experiences actually’. It occurs in a construction site in the town where young people go to hangout, drink and take drugs (some nights there would be thirty to forty people there, in disused prefabs, because it was warm and they had no houses to go to). Eddie and his friends had been at a lakeside area outside the town, where they had ‘a few beers, smoked a few splifs (joints) and had a massive bong’ and went in to this meeting place for teenagers afterwards.

...we were down there anyway and we heard this (loud)-‘Well laaaads!’... You know, and people’s...ears would pop up, like you know, what’s goin’ on?...and...I’m in no means, no means to fight anybody...and these four lads come up, and they’d be a bit older than us, almost twenty I’d say...JAM and JBM, these are big lads who were...renowned...JBM, ‘boots’ because he cracked a guys skull with his boots, you know, scary lads...two other travellers I didn’t know like...and ah, they arrived anyway, and I was like...alright... and there was four of them and there’s about twenty people in the prefab and I was like-‘we’re grand! Don’t worry about it. We have ‘em outnumbered’. And I was like...just sitting there quiet just having a beer or whatever, ignoring what was happening and ah, one of the lads R...and they said something to him and he was like ‘whatever’ and your man got a two-by-four and cracked him-straight in the head with a two-by-four like...Your man crumpled to the ground...the girlfriend was screaming like. The girls started screaming... and one of the other girls picked him up and dragged him out of the prefab. A few other people get slapped around, and then: *blink blink blink*-(clicks fingers)-there’s me and my three mates. Me and my four mates and these four knackers. Everyone else is gone. That’s it.

After Eddie and his friends are left with these older men, the violence, and the fear, becomes even more pronounced. They are robbed and beaten by these ‘travellers’ in the construction site.

Everyone's gone. You know. And then this is just a sinking like, you know, you're like 'ooh my god!'. Like, this is in the middle of a construction site....it's a good run to get out of it, you know? And we're cornered in this shed and ah, they came up to us anyway and said-'throw us out your wallet'. And my friend FRIEND2...had about two hundred Euros from just after selling like two ounces (of hash) or something like that and...they come up to him and are like-'empty your pockets' you know...and he's like 'no' and they're 'empty your pockets' and *crack!* Headbutt. Emptied the pockets, took the money. He said-'oh, it's my mother's money, it's my mother's money', you know, close to tears... Then, he came up, he came up to me and he was like 'throw us out your money' and I was like, 'I ain't got no money'. Took out a box of fags, I had three fags in the box, he took one...I was like, you know, I just looked at him. He kinda knew my face and I was Irish and they hate the foreigners as well like you know. I...took the fags back anyway... And then they went to FRIEND1 and FRIEND1 had a digital camera he'd just gotten and it was inside the pocket of his jacket. And it was worth, you know, back when digital cameras were new, you know, probably two hundred euros, two three hundred Euros something like that and ah, so ah, they were like...FRIEND1 you know, he was always a strong lad like but he's...you're not stupid, you know, he's like 'empty your pockets'-emptied the pocket, gave him whatever, two Euro's he had, and a nice turbo lighter. Emptied the other pockets, nothing in 'em. And he's like, 'that's all I have'. And he like 'open this pocket, open the top pocket' and he's like, 'no'. 'open the pocket like' and he's 'no' so one of them grabbed him and just headbutted him and just dragged him out in to the, this open area...and this is JAM who's...now in prison for GBH but...and he had a stick and he's going-'empty your pocket' and FRIEND1 is 'no' and he'd go hitting him with the stick and he just put up his hand and caught the stick in his hand and they pull it up and he caught it with his hand again, you know...and I was just standing there going, 'oh shit' like and FRIEND2, was talking to one of the lads we kinda knew from the OTHER SCHOOL like and he's like, 'aw man, come on man, leave us alone leave us alone leave us alone' and he got a backhand-(mimed slap)-you know, sent in to the wall, you know. And I was like, what are we going to do? We can't fight these lads, we're going to get our heads kicked in. And one of them had me by the scruff of the neck like...I was like-'shit, *guards guards!* And they were like, one of them turned around and was like 'what! What!' Guards? And I was like, 'fucking hell, I see lights I see lights!', and he's like, 'don't bullshit me' and he went crack!

All of this occurs in one, fast, continuous flow. Eddie relates the story dramatically, embodying the narrative, using his body and 'sound effects' to create the atmosphere.

And I got such a punch, I've never been punched like that...since or beforehand...and just stars fell on my eyes...I stayed standing but I was just leaning against the thing and I was like, 'what's going to happen' and I just looked and FRIEND1 was there with these three knackers around him, one of them hitting him with a stick, shouting at him 'empty your pocket! Empty your pocket!' and he wasn't going to fight back because there was only one of them hitting him but if you hit him that was it. You were going to be beaten in to the ground, d'you know.../....and...Anyway, I screamed out 'Guards! Guards!' and one of them started running and then-*blink!* They were all gone. The four of us left there. FRIEND1 cradling his arm-fractured in three places-it was out like a massive lump the next day... and we were like, 'ok, let's go home' you know.

This event had a lasting effect on Eddie. These attackers were serious players, while he and his friends were sixteen-year-old, small-time dealers, still attending school. But it is the helplessness that he felt that seems to have traumatized him above all. After all of this narrative flow, again so rich in PINs, Eddie follows with some argumentation and evaluation comments.

It was just-the most terrifying ordeal...I've played that back in my mind so many times, you know, just one of those experiences you play back so many times and you know...The extent to which I hated those lads were that...if had a pistol at the time you could put a bullet in their heads, 'cause they haven't contributed anything to this society, they go around robbing people all the time, they beat their girlfriends, you know, they're horrible horrible people and I just hated them and that experience for such a long time-it clouded my judgement for a very long time as well.../...with regard to...people of...a lower socioeconomic class, 'scumbags', or whatever. Y'see a scumbag you'd be-oh-(raises fists)-up in arms, straight away, you know. And ah...Hit first, ask questions later like. Since then, a lad comes up to me and goes-("rough accent") 'well man, what's in your pocket like?'-I'd hit him. Straight. Don't ask him any questions. Hit him in the face. And then savage him. And then he won't come up to you again. I did, that happened once or twice and FRIEND1 like has done similar things, if a lad comes up and causes trouble...make m'make m'micemeat of him. That's it like. You know, no one will come up to you, unless they are going to seriously challenge you, they're not going to come up to you to get a free phone out a ya like, 'cause if you give it to them like they'll come up to you again...

Habitus is born of experience. Within this domain, this world of his friends on the streets, fear is one of the dominant emotions that Eddie expresses. It expresses a way of life and a habitus all of its own; one that is shared by others who grow up in similar contexts. Being frightened, beaten and terrified legitimizes the use of violence. But it is not just violence against the self that hardens a person to becoming more violent, or prone to violence. As Collins' recent work (2008) suggests, humans are not particularly good at 'doing' violence. And while he would put the *situation* rather than the individual at the centre of his analysis, even here, it is also seeing one's peers and friends, one's comrades, being subjected to violence that can push us over into violent actions ourselves. It is the solidarity of the group that is being threatened, of watching violence being inflicted on those you love and admire that often forces individuals into a more conflictual, aggressive orientation to the world (when in violent contexts). And against Collins' account, from the perspective of habitus theory, we can see how a disposition towards violence can be produced from sustained experience of violence, even if the actual violence that a person engages in is usually inefficient, short-lived and

cloaked in a fog of exaggeration and bluster. What is most evident from Eddie's account here is the fear felt, the terror that comes from being attacked and seeing your friends attacked, and the way it can affect your worldview. The actual violence that he personally receives here is small, compared with the emotional violence of witnessing your friends being beaten.

There are other stories of violence in Eddie's story, some connected with his involvement in the drug trade. His route in to selling drugs is, like it is for many others, almost accidental. He smoked his first joint when he was around fifteen (at the caravan park), but very quickly, he got in to the 'stoner culture'. But, because they were so young, with little money, he and his friends would club together, chipping in a few Euros each to get 'a quarter of hash, cut it in half and then sell half of it...so you'd buy it for €30, sell a bit for €20 and get your own bit for €10'. This gradually 'escalated into larger quantities'. Around this same time Eddie meets his core group of friends, including FRIENDS 1 and 2. They sold drugs to their classmates and older students (never younger) from school, but also to 'older lads' around the town. He says that, for this, older 'clientele' he would go directly to their houses and sell them hash – 'they were indoor stoners like. Not scumbags or anything, but like, lads playin' Xbox, or guitar or, you know, really cool lads, really.../...and you'd give them the hash and hang out for the evening and go home...of course, no homework was factored in to this equation like...'.²⁰⁰ There is something revealing even here, in Eddie's depiction of these older, indoor stoners as 'cool', and it is clear from the context that he enjoyed 'hanging out' with them, being in with this older crowd, feeling mature and grown up. It underscores how very young he was at the time, and this immature 'situated subjectivity' of the habitus *then* seeps through. Because they were so young they were 'robbed a few times' by older, more serious and more dangerous criminals, and Eddie tells a few of these stories in detail too, but I think the picture is already clear.

²⁰⁰ He tells one story of a time when one of these 'older lads': I used to sell to him a good bit like, and he called me once at around one o'clock, which was lunchtime, saying 'oh, could I get a half ounce off ya?'. And I said grand and I went up, a friend lived up the road and we used to keep it in a shed around the back and got it and met up with him. I walked up to him and just his eyes popped open...he was like, 'you're wearing a school uniform', I was like 'yeah', he said 'how old are you?', '16' and he was 'what?!' He thought I was, d'youknow, just lurkin' around, some lad selling hash, and didn't know I was...and it was a little bit...But I went back the next day, the lads were like...'you're a kid'. You know, and this kind of thing...and I was like, well, you know, whatever, if you don't want hash or weed its grand with me like...'

Of these two friends, FRIEND1 is perhaps the most influential on Eddie, and the one he still has most respect for. He 'ended up being my best friend and still to this day he's a best friend of mine'. Eddie claims that FRIEND1 had a tough upbringing, that his father was a 'gangster' from Europe but that, because of this, he brought a different attitude to the group:

us, being scared of travellers and scumbags and that 'cause, they'd be trying to rob you and that, in the street and, you know, you'd have to protect yourself, he saw these guys as being complete wasters and he brought a real ethos to the group of being like 'don't take shit from anybody' like...and ah, he was a great friend to have really, I mean, he was a really smart lad...

Elsewhere, Eddie repeats this, saying that 'I had a lot of fear towards travellers until FRIEND1 came along...and ah, showed me that they weren't impenetrable'. The extent to which he looks up to this friend in particular is again revealing of a yearning to be stronger, less fearful, more confident in himself. With this renewed or reinvigorated or reflected or perhaps false confidence, they begin selling more drugs and also start selling 'speed', which is more expensive and more addictive than hashish.²⁰¹ On this, in subsession one, Eddie says that they became quite 'hooked' on speed. FRIEND2, in particular, developed quite a problem with the drug, stole money from FRIEND1 (who 'beat him to a pulp') and was caught in possession a serious amount of drugs and jailed for three years.²⁰²

This had a profound effect on Eddie (who was supposed to be in the car with him) and the group, to the extent that he stops selling drugs (almost) altogether for a while and begins to start buckling to the pressure to study for his exams. In subsession two he recalls in detail visiting his friend in jail. He feels guilty, though, that, after his friend is moved from a nearby city to a distant, minimum security institution, he doesn't visit him again. He did write him letters however, 'I'm probably the only man that wrote letters to him...?'

²⁰¹ They sourced the drugs mostly from Eastern Europeans too. He says: 'it's handy having Eastern European friends 'cause they get cheap cigarettes and they speak Russian, and ah...some of the most reliable dealers in Ireland at the moment are Eastern European, 'cause they know business and they're not volatile, like, travellers...you know...dealing with travellers you're never going to get anywhere really because you know they can just...increase loans and all these kind of mad things and turn up to your house, and all these kind of things but, you know, the lads who come over from Latvia, Russia, Lithuania, they're...I don't want to say mafia, but they're business minded...criminals. And you get good quality and if you don't get good quality you get your money back...it's that kind of, you know, much more reasonable...'

²⁰² Eddie recounts stories of visiting him while in prison that are interesting but I don't have the space to detail it here.

This event hit Eddie and the group 'like a tank'. There is a realisation, perhaps for the first time, that what they were doing was serious and dangerous. The balance between the excitement, exhilaration and increased status within the wider network of the drugs subculture within TOWN, and the fear of prison now made real, tilts. When coupled with the increased pressure from home, and school, and a new girlfriend who hated drugs, this marks the beginning of a turn in Eddie's tale. He is in his Leaving Cert. year, the year of the final secondary school exams, which determine a college placement. He was caught 'mitching' school after Christmas (which he was doing all the time to sell or take drugs) and the school threatened to expel him, but, at that point, it was easier for them just to let him do the exams ('there'd be less paperwork'). He had also met his first real girlfriend, whose brother had a cocaine addiction and hated drugs. She was, he says, 'really a force on me saying "stop taking drugs"'. His parents too, like many parents, were also trying to get him to study, even to the point of bribery.²⁰³ Eventually he put his 'head down anyway and started studying like a dog, trying to get whatever it was, 350 points it was for the Leaving Cert. and ah, I got (laughs) in my mock I got like 150 points. And ah, that was, not good...So I ended up quittin' all my friends, you know, telling them I'd be gone for a few months like. And ah, sat down, got the study in, ah, the girlfriend ended up breaking up with me, two weeks before the leaving cert and I went on a few-day binge then...ah. Got back to the books, sat the leavin', got 440 points'. This was more than enough to study Arts in university (though not enough for (pure) psychology, his first choice).

Yet, the turn is not yet complete. Eddie and his best friend FRIEND1 (a 'great lad', 'a very smart lad', 'such a good mate like') who would be studying in the same city for college, are arrested on the first night of university. Eddie tells this story in great detail as another long PIN²⁰⁴:

²⁰³ About which Eddie tells a funny story: 'A very funny story, my father said, 'if you get over 400 points I'll buy you a car'. And I was like-'oh Jesus, this is amazing like'!. Some incentive, I really wanted a car. I was like-damn-I'll go for it like. Got the 440 points and I called my mother and was like-'got the 440, its great' like you know, and I didn't think about the car at all for a few days like. And then I said to my father-'do you remember that car you promised me?' you know, and he was like 'oh Jesus'. A few days past, my mother came and put an Alfa Romeo key-ring on the table. Jeez, I almost shat my pants like, y'know. And then she was like-'actually we're not going to get you a car, we didn't think you could get it, we didn't think you could get your points'. And I just, you know, soo disenfranchised, I was like-'how could ya lie to me? You had no belief in me at all', y'know'.

²⁰⁴ 'Bucky', below, refers to Buckfast tonic wine, a (vile) cheep, strong, sweet drink favoured by students in Ireland and Scotland in particular. The term 'bean Garda' was used to describe female members of the Irish police force ('bean', pronounced 'ban' or 'bon' meaning 'woman' in Irish) but is now considered sexist.

I didn't do well in first year. I passed my courses and that like, you know. And ah, I was arrested the first night of am, of ah, of college. I was ah,...there was a big party on the first night when I moved in. My parents dropped me off and about five hours later, one bottle of 'Bucky' and four cans like, we were all like, 'big party in the housing estate', and ah. The guards came down...and ah, my friend, my friend FRIEND1 was around and we were like, talking and...lurking around the paddy wagon, and they were clearing people away. And we were just...playin'...d'youknow, I didn't want to go home like! And they were like-'get out of here, get out of here' like you know and am...My mate was like, messing around. He pretended to like-'whoick' (spitting noise), pretended to spit on the paddy wagon like, you know. One of the lads just collared him. Put him in the back of the van, you know, and then I was like-'ah please!'. There was a women there, a female Guard, and I was like-'ah please 'ban Garda', and she was like-'don't call me 'ban Garda!'-and I was-'please, guard...please mam', you know. I said 'sorry love', and she was like-'oh my god' (eyes to heaven)...This was going terribly like...So I walked back to the, walked back to the ah, to the edge of the wall. And I was just standing there and I was like-'what the hell am I going to do?' And I was like...FRIEND1 had a hundred Euros worth of weed on him there as well, and I was like-'what are we going to do?'. It was a terrible auld situation...So I called him up on his phone. And he answered the phone and was like-'aw Jesus, Eddie man, get me out of here! I can't be here for the night like!'. And then I was like-'alright alright, we'll see what we can do. I'll go down to the Garda Station and try to get you out'. And he was like-'no no no! Get me out of the van now! Get me out of the van now!' So I was like-'don't be an idiot like! I can't get you out of the paddy wagon!' And ah...all the guards that were around, there was maybe three or four guards and they, they chased after some young lads, so the van was empty like. And I was like-'alright, wait a minute'. Turned off the phone and I opened the back of the paddy wagon. And there was two doors, the main doors and then the inside door, and I opened that, and ah. And then I looked and ah, who was there, in his handcuffs, and another lad, and the two trying to squeeze through this tiny little gap, at the same time! And I was like-'Aww Jesus!'. So I turned around, took out my phone, pretended to be texting nonchalantly. Turn around, get a crack of a baton across the side of the head, dragged up, and handcuffed and thrown in to the back of the van!...

Eddie relates the story in a light hearted manner, he is telling a funny story. He is thrown into the back of the van himself: *So then, it's myself and FRIEND1 and he was like-'sorry' and I was like-'what the fuck!?' You should'a told me you had handcuffs! What were we gonna do like!?' Run down the road with handcuffs like!?'.../And my parents said-'keep him in overnight. Teach him a lesson...*

When we return to this in session two I ask specifically about what it was like, the night in the cell. And while he gave this account in great detail, it is the phone call to his parents that is the central memory about the incident. He is still seventeen, which is why they had to be called:

This is when my stomach dropped like. I don't mind a night in the cell but parents being called?...They brought me out in to the reception and took my ah...they sat me down handcuffed to the seat...took the number and called...would have been about one or two in the morning, my parents were woken anyway...my father on the phone, I could hear him...and ah, they're 'oh your son...this is Garda Station, he's been arrested. Do you want to talk to him?' So, 'No'. 'What do you want me to do with him, are you going to come up? 'No'. And he was like 'well, ok, you'll get a letter in the post with regard to proceedings and stuff' and I was just sitting there and I almost felt like crying like. I just felt so ashamed. My parents had driven me up, settled me in...six hours later maybe I'm sitting in a feckin' Garda station like, because of...stupidity...but am, anyway, 'you're staying the night, your parents want you to stay the night...' and I was like, 'ok, fair enough'. I wasn't expecting anything different. Take you shoes take your belt take your ring take your chain take your phone take everything off ya, and ah, frogmarch you down...pure yellow toilet on the floor, with a hole in the corner, and a concrete slab for sleeping on...

More shame, more 'letting them down'; the funny anecdote has become a lot more sombre. But it is also the last of the stories like this that Eddie recounts.

In university, Eddie is increasingly removed from his hometown and the life that it means for him. As second year progressed, and especially after he met K. he is increasingly taking college and studying more seriously. Applying to do an Erasmus year to study in Europe, and getting it, is another significant step in his maturation and turn away from drugs. The pregnancy and the abortion will be discussed in the next section, but they have obviously had a profound effect on this too. Yet, while he is in university, reading Marx and Gramsci, psychology and political theory, most of his old friends in TOWN are still doing the same things, with the additional temptation of the 'Head Shop' drugs that had so affected his brother. He is becoming increasingly estranged from this domain. He outlines this stress, this conflict, in subsession one:

It was hard to...all my mates actually became, all my friends that didn't go to university in TOWN became hooked on the stuff as well. Because it was so widely available-'what'll we do for the evening, will we get a six pack or will we get a bag of powder and go raving for the night?' like. So it became very very...and when I'd go home like...like final year I took it really really seriously and a lot of my friends up here are serious, very serious academics like. And ah, I'd go back to TOWN for the weekend and my mates would be either skagged or they'd be wired and, d'youknow, it really seemed that I had *nothing* in common with them at all, you know? They'd be going like-'oh, do you want some speed?' and I'm like-'no no no, I've a paper due' or whatever, d'youknow? And I went, I stopped smoking fags in September along with spliff and ah, this was all in the run up for the final year, exams and that...And ah, every time I'd come back they'd just felt that I was like, some **imposter**, coming in. My heads awash with social bloody theory and they are talking about getting a bag of MDMA or whatever and I didn't really care about it like (smiling). But ah, well, actually, I went to a rave for my friend's birthday. You can't, you can't (smiling)...and I had a bit of MD like...that's a very clean drug in comparison to the headshop stuff, which I completely disagree with.../...But am, anyway the lads ah...yeah, FRIEND2, who came out of prison, after three years, and rehab, fell back in to drugs ...which is very sad...everytime I go back now himself and his girlfriend are wired like. Or or...worse! Not wired! (haha)...and ah, but then for the last semester then was ah, final year. The first semester in final year was ah, hard work like. I really went for it.

This aspect of Eddie's 'told story' encapsulates the narrative arc that he sees for himself. In university, he has gradually changed; he has surrounded himself with 'serious' students, others who want to do well, to get 'firsts'. His values have changed and his habitus, or aspects of it, are changing, shifting. But it also describes a process of alienation from his earlier life and the domain of TOWN. He has less in common with this old group. He is not interested in

getting high or 'wasted', but mourns the loss that this alienation entails. The loss of camaraderie:

It's a drawn out process you know...it's when they say 'do you wanna go in on a bag of weed' and it's 'not really, no', do you know. Or it's 'do you want to come to the rave at the weekend' and I'm like 'no, I've a paper due'...spending the evening together and the lads are taking coke(cocaine) and they are 'do you want a bit of coke?' and it's like 'no thanks' you know, I have to wake up tomorrow and help my father in the garden...the kind of things I would have blown off back when I was taking drugs...and those kind of things you slowly become alienated from your friends because you are not part of the buzzing group, you know, there is a hell of a lot of camaraderie with getting like, really high with people you know, there's the whole 'love drug' 'love buzz' and you feel like soul mates and that sort of thing, so when everyone is buzzing except for you, you are the outsider. And that happening loads and loads of times is, it kind of distanced me a bit like. They're still my best friends like...

There is a suffering that occurs because of this social distancing; in the shift from one world, that of the street, to that of the academy, something akin to what Bourdieu has attempted to capture (and thereby salvage his conceptualization) with the notion of a 'cleft or tormented habitus' (Bourdieu, 2000, p.64). Yet, unlike Bourdieu's usual mode of describing this process (one that he himself suffered from) this is not quite the same. Eddie was born into a 'middle class', university-educated family. This is not the torment of a working class child who finds himself in an elite (French) university, a *class transfuge*, but more like the Bourdieu who returns to Béarn. For Bourdieu the story is, of course, different, as he was at boarding school. For Eddie, who grew up in TOWN, played sports there, lived and partied there, this is a pseudo-'upclassing'. He feels like an 'imposter' when he meets his old gang, and he misses the camaraderie, but has no intention of returning to this life. He has acquired new forms of cultural capital that he cannot share with his friends (except for FRIEND1, who has also gone to college). This form of capital has changed how he views the world, and altered his values and practices. It has also made him more reflexive. He wants to think that he can go back if he so chooses, that if he 'turns up at the door with a bag of speed and says cut that up there and sell it' that he can be 'straight back in there'. I think this is illusory. He is in the process of acquiring a new, and different, habitus. He no longer 'fits' in there.

This ties in to Eddie's overall arc, the *Bildungsroman* structure that *he* imposes on the told story. He has grown and developed, they have not. They are caught, back there, doing the same

things and telling the same stories, wallowing in nostalgia and inaction, getting ‘wired’. Eddie, now, is all about *balance*. This is why he has returned to judo. He uses it as a technology of the self; as a means (and symbol) of self-discipline. The fighter, the street, is still a part of him, but now, he has learned to control it. This notion of balance is the last thing that he speaks about. It operates as an overall evaluation of the story as a whole. At the very end of subsession one he says:

I started Judo again. I started...I fought Judo when I was younger...and ah, in first year in college and then fell out of it, with all the drink and that. And got back in to it now and it's one of the things that...balance me as a person, really it does, because I've always lived to fight. And it could be because of all the time that I've been attacked like...you know like? People...in TOWN like, people try to mug you an awful lot like. Especially if you're a street urchin selling speed like...Not really a street urchin (smirking)...that's a bold thing to say, I'm from a middle class family but...you know, hanging around on the street all the time you're bound to increase your risk like. So I ended up fighting a lot when I was younger and I had a lot of fear towards 'travellers' until FREIND1 came along...ah, but yeah, Judo has really balanced me out...I fight every week, it keeps the testosterone down and keeps you, keeps you on the cards like...So, that's up until now, I do believe.

This turn toward self-discipline, towards control and restraint, is intended to symbolize the change that university has brought about. But it is also presented as a *return*. In subsession two we explore this more fully. He speaks of the new-found control that he has gained because of judo. He mentions one story where a friend of his is accused of ‘ratting out’ some dealers to the police. This friend (FRIEND5), mentioned for the first time here is older, and is presented as different to the others: *he's about three years older than me, he said once that if we were in school together we would have been best mates. And since, once I've grown up, we are best mates to an extent. When he's in CITY he gives me a call and we go for pints and that...and he doesn't take drugs hardcore as the other lads do, but he does dabble...he used to deal a lot but he was lifted a few times and got scared, so he cut that...*

This event is cited later as an example of his new-found control that he has because of judo:

But ah one time we were in the pub himself and myself were having drinks and two lads...came in and came up to him and were saying that they had been raided the day before and whatever train of thought they were in, they were taking a lot of speed at the time, they thought that he had ratted them. So these two lads confronted us in the smoking area...I was standing there off to the side and your man was like...the jaws were chewing off him...he was irrational, you know, 'it was you it was you' and FRIEND5 was like 'ok, it wasn't me, who'd you hear this off?'...and one of the lads was turning a glass around in his hand like...and I was standing there like, ready, ready to go, you know...and I tapped two lads behind me on the shoulder and I was like...'watch this situation please'...anyway, it kind of escalated escalated escalated...your man went for him with the glass, and I was watching this glass in his hand like the whole time through the conversation and I caught it and I got him in the face with my elbow and threw him, got him on to the ground anyway...the two lads I had tapped on the shoulder jumped on the other lad...and this is out local pub so the bouncer knows us the staff knows us, these were strangers. They were dragged out and left on the street...Standing there afterwards with FRIEND5 and I was 'this is not what I want to do' like...I was here for a quiet pint chatting to your man, you know, how is his new woman...then we have lads coming in talking about 'shades' (police), and 'rats' and all this kind of crap, and your like – phew! – you know, go back up to CITY you know, sit with my girlfriend and go out to (pub)...that was one of the stages where I was like...just getting in those situations like, I avoid them now. I avoid going to parties like. I went to a party there...a while ago...and...he had a bag of MD(MA) and I was like 'just don't offer me any', you know, I knew I was going to go out and get drunk. Went out, got drunk, I asked for it! What can you do...if you are in the situation...you know, tunes are blaring party is class, you know...but then you wake up in the morning and you're in bits and you're like 'what have I done' and you're narky to your parents and everything like...

Even the language of the old world, the slang and idiom of the street has become distasteful. Now, even when he 'dabbles' in his old world, by taking drugs at a party, the guilt is framed in terms of his parents, that he might be 'narky' with them while hungover.

We then learn more of this new balance, and the connection between judo and his father. He is becoming, finally, the 'good son':

That time in the pub, for example, I wanted to hit him, the guy, he was up in FRIEND5's face, calling him a rat and a pussy. Three years ago I would have just...lashed in to him...these lads are not like, they're fairly...about my age like but not backed up by any massive...travellers...or anything like that they're just small-time dealers. I was like...just beat the crap out of them like. But, I'd already fought ten men that week. I've no need to fight, you know? Like, I always...like, for a very long time my FRIEND1 has terrible problems with aggression like and he's been arrested countless times, and he's so promising, he'll be a great career boy at some stage but he's been arrested and been up in court countless times...for fighting after pubs and stuff...he started kick boxing...and it stopped. You know? Just a bit of exercise, healthy body healthy mind, you know, and I believe that completely and truly...And just, the level of regret I experience sometimes...**My father was judo, up until brown belt, and we always, he used always teach me things when I was younger and then there was no club in TOWN and when I went to college I was like, great, I'll start straight away. And it was real...pride thing, I was wearing my father's old judo suit and everything...I had great time for a few weeks and then I was distracted by ah, the parties and everything.../...So I started again this year, just started with a new determination...I hit the gym pretty hard last year, and I was playing soccer every week over in Holland with some friends like. I just felt...it just balances you out so much like...makes it easier to sleep like, you eat better, you look better...it's just, the regret I have for judo is the same as the regret I have for the GAA, that haven't kept it on, and soccer clubs that I...but then my soccer career was tainted by being attacked by travellers after (laughs)...**

Thus, doing judo, wearing his father's suit (assuming his father's mantle), and being proud to wear it, is associated with this new found balance in Eddie's life. He is 'coming good' and

growing up. The end of the interview connects up all of the domains in to a sort of grand narrative, from Eddie's perspective. There is an evaluation at work, a summing up of the story, and a form of 'nostos' or homecoming.²⁰⁵ The narrative journey is complete. He is becoming the 'good son' that he always wanted to be, that he feels he should have been, that he regrets not being sooner. One is left with the impression that this newfound balance is as much a product of this *nostos* as it is of exercise; the pride of having circumnavigated the dangers of the middle period of his teens, an overcoming, an Odyssey. In the next section we will see the most painful life event that Eddie is still trying to overcome. But here, the turn away from the fraternal relational network of TOWN should be seen as offering a yet more complex view of the complexities of the habitus complex.

6.3.5. Flames

The final theme I wish to explore is that of love or intimate relationships – 'flames', old and new. Throughout the interview Eddie mentions quite a few but here, I will restrict myself to two 'pivotal' ones that have had most profound effect on his relational becoming. To do this, I must skip over other key events, such as his first 'real' girlfriend, his first sexual experiences, and other interesting facets of his story. These too were important, had import, for Eddie. But I must be selective. Even within the two intimate relationships that I will discuss, I must also be selective. What I will look at is his experience of living with an older woman and her son for some months, during the first summer after he started college. The second experience I will address is the abortion. I have wrestled with the ethics of using this material here. In telling me about it, Eddie really does 'break down', expressing a profound grief, crying openly on a few occasions, once for a number of minutes. It is painful to listen to such deep pain, and using it for the purposes of research, literally exploiting it, requires justification. At the end I will attempt to provide this. Wrestling with this, however, also prompted me to return to thinking about the pathologization of emotions. Do my qualms come from my (unconscious) tendency to see such expressions as pathological; that the expression of grief should not be discussed because it is somehow wrong, off, beyond the pale of scientific

²⁰⁵ As the late Irish mystic John Moriarty says in one of his own autobiographical books, titled *Nostos*, the word is perhaps a little 'too grand' or 'too big' for the purpose I am putting it to here. He writes: 'In epic involvement, *nostos* referred to the homecoming of the Greek heros from Troy. It referred to the homecoming of Menelaus to Sparta, of Agamemnon to Mycenae, of Odysseus to Ithica. Little wonder, therefore, that I knew it and remembered it as a good word. Good in that it has knowledge of the perils, the dangers, the enchantments, the seductions and the contrary winds that boats coming home will run in to. Good in that it knows that the home we leave is, almost never, the home we come home to' (Moriarty, 2001, p.62).

analysis? This question of emotional expression as pathology led me to reconsider the position of emotions in liquid modernity more fully. I will return to this in detail in the next chapter.

First I will turn to what Eddie describes as: *One of the most pivotal points in my life was living with a woman and her child...just taught me a lot about how, like, how you should be careful and...how...it was like to be old, d'you know*. Here too we see intersections with some other themes that crop up again and again in the narrative, fatherhood, being a son, having a son, doing the right thing. This woman is introduced into the flow of the story in sub-session one just as Eddie begins to describe a turning away from the 'hooking up' culture of college in first year. He has grown tired of 'playing the whole game, you know, going out, pulling (women) in the pub and whatever'. He had not met anyone he 'really cared about' and was tired of meeting 'these random women I didn't give a shit about'. At home for the summer in TOWN Eddie was working (split shifts) in a restaurant, when he meets this girl, a friend of a friend, who has moved over from England. He is eighteen, she is twenty four. Her son is two.

We were getting' on great like. And then she was like-'I want you to meet my son'. So she had a two year old son...and I was like, alright...this was within a few days of meeting like, you know. And we were hanging around, sleeping together and this kind of thing and am...she was like-'what are we doing here?'-you know-'you're not seeing anyone else, why don't we just kind of make a go of it' you know. And I knew, in my heart like, I didn't really want to be in a long term relationship with this twenty four year old woman and her son...So ah, but I was, sure! I've nothin' to, she's a lovely girl and we get on, y'know.

So we spent the summer together anyway...and ah, I was working and...(laughs) It was an amazing experience like. See, my parents were away in Canada for the summer and I was living at home and GIRLFRIEND1 was living with me, with her son. So it was the case that I'd be getting' up for work at nine o'clock and she'd have my shirt ironed and there'd be a kid jumpin' up and down on the bed and...It was just a totally parallel universe like, really.

Within this 'parallel universe' Eddie goes on to describe one poignant PIN when the boy calls him 'daddy Eddie':

And then there was one stage, I was just coming down the stairs, doing my dicky bow up for work...And the little kid...was like-'daddy Eddie, what are you doing today?', you know. He called me daddy Eddie and this was just, you know, my heart almost dropped and she almost started crying like, in fear that I'd run away. I didn't *then* like, I was like, whatever. She called, she called an uncle daddy, daddy Tom or whatever. Just 'cause, he didn't have a father figure in his life like. And ah, near the end of the summer it was like, I'm going back to college, she works in TOWN like, its kinda incompatible like. I felt myself it wasn't going to work like. But I never really had the balls to break up with her like. Never broke up with a girl really like...Just force them to break up with you, it's always much easier...and ah...So she was, she was saying-'whats this, you don't feel happy about it'. She fairly much forced my hand in saying...she was like, madly in love with me and I had.../...reasonable feelings for her but I'd like...I didn't feel...like investing in it like, you know. So she was like-'we're better off' like you know-'it hurts me but we'll finish it'. So that was it, it was finished. But I'd say I learnt the most from that relationship.

What seems clear is that Eddie was simply too young for this level of commitment and domesticity; this was all a little 'too real' for him, at eighteen. But it also describes a longing; for a relationship between a son and a father, and a good son, and a good father. Here was a glimpse into a life very different from the life he was then living. An adult life, of work and children and walks in the park and Bob the Builder, but this is a life that he is not yet ready for. He knew that, he says: *we could really spend the rest of our lives, you know, that kind of...it probably scarred me a little bit...I am too young for that...despite saying in first year that I'm sick of random encounters with drunk women...* He still misses the child though, and says: *I love that kid and I miss him now...* Even after they had broken up and they had moved back to the UK, the child still calls him 'daddy Eddie' on the phone, and talks about the toy he had given him. There is a wistful sadness here, the sadness of a road not travelled.

This, too, is a relational domain, a figuration in Elias' terms, and as Elias reminds us, power is a feature of all such figurations. Eddie, in his telling, appears to have more power, but it is a power he does not know how to wield. Indeed, the child too has power. In the next section, when we look at the abortion, the experience of being in *this* relational domain; of being a 'father' for this brief time and the love that he felt for this child, will return.

Eddie met 'the love of his life' in college, and at the time of the interview, they were still, firmly, together. He was studying Arts, she was in Science. They met 'at a political debate or something', in the autumn term following the 'family' experience just discussed. They had their 'ups and downs', broke up after Christmas, he was planning to apply to do Erasmus in Holland, she supported him in doing that. They spent most of the summer of their second

year in college in the west, where she was a lifeguard and he busked and sold ‘a little weed’.²⁰⁶ They discussed, and decided, that they would try and stay together during his year away: ‘we ended up deciding we’d go for the long distance thing’. Despite occasional temptation, Eddie stayed faithful to K. during the first term in Holland. She came to visit him over Valentine’s Weekend, and they had ‘a beautiful weekend, we’ve never had so much fun together like’. When he came back for Easter break, she told him she was pregnant. This was, he says: ‘a kick in the sack. An absolute, you know... we’d always been on the pill and, you know they say-‘99.98% effective’ and...evidently...we were the .02 or whatever’. In subsession one Eddie discusses the abortion in two stages. The first one is concerned with the decision to actually have the abortion:

We were, we didn’t know what to do. I was, I, I was like we can keep the baby like. But you know...I’ll finish my bachelor and I can get some work. They were training me as a chef. I was working as a dish washer and I ended making great contacts with the people in the restaurant in Holland. And I was like...I can be trained as a chef here and I can chef back in Ireland.../...And she was like-‘I’m not sure I’m not sure’-like she has ideas to do a PhD with her bachelor of science and all that.../...so we...debated a little bit and we said...we wouldn’t see each other for two days and think about what we wanted to do. Came back and...she was there with pamphlets for abortions...and we...‘I’m going to get an abortion’. And this was am...I felt that, d’you know... it wasn’t really what I wanted like, you know. But at the same time, I didn’t know whether I really wanted for her to have the child.../...I felt like I was kinda...like I didn’t have any...equal decision like. It wasn’t fifty-fifty and can’t be really, ‘cause the woman owns her body so it’s more of a sixty-forty like, or whatever, you know. Forty can be ignored...if needs be... and that’s, this...I was like yeah, that’s grand.../...We’ll do that then...And ah, after these massive conversations I’m getting on a flight, I’m headin’ back to Holland now. It was soo hard on the relationship, d’you know...crying on the phone until all hours of the morning and...all these horrible horrible things like...

The second is the actual event itself:

²⁰⁶ On this, he stresses that this was a little and only because there was no jobs: ‘because there was no jobs like. I went around to everywhere in the town like, and there was nowhere, no, no one...But then there’s an entire community of surfers, you know, who like pot so ...I didn’t see any problem with it really like’.

...[So we]...organised the abortion...it turns out the best abortion clinic for am...in Europe, is in DUTCH CITY so...she came over to DUTCH CITY which was very nice...you know, that I could be there for everything.../.../...and ah.../.../...yeah, that was probably one of the worst days of my life anyway, in the clinic...and ah...for a very long time...and on the day I thought we were making a mistake.../...its only recently like...maybe last...December that I've decided that we did make the right decision. But am...it was just something that was like...it was a plague on our relationship and...I just, I really felt that we just shouldn't have done it like...like every time you see a child...everytime you go to a playground, d'you know...it was jus/it was absolute misery and toil like. D'you know. She was...you know they say you get slight PTSD from...abortions and she was fairly shook from it at the same time. But she was standing up to it a lot better. She was certain in her decision. Which was quite different to how I was like.../... But ah...yeah, at the time now...And at the time I was/I took a masters course on the psychology of religion and I was writing an essay about child abuse in the church and I was reading these horrible articles of raping children and everything, at the same time I had just aborted a child and it was all...madness, you know. I had to stop smoking dope actually, that was pushing it a wee bit over the edge like...

It is clear that both of these events are deeply painful for Eddie. Even here, in subsession one, as he is speaking freely and unprompted, he is clearly 'emotional'. I had (obviously) no idea that this would come up, and I was a little taken aback by his candour, and the manner in which he articulated his feelings about both of these events. I was compelled to probe deeper in subsession two. When I began to broach the topic I said: 'So, ok, now, you mightn't like this, but I'm going to ask you about the abortion'. He immediately replied: 'Well, it's the biggest thing that happened in my life, so...', clearly communicating that he fully expected to be asked about it, as he had brought it up in the first subsession. I asked him first about his telling his parents and the first time he saw his father cry, which we looked at earlier. He recounted that story. I then ask him about the decision, does he remember the moment of the decision. He does. On the day they were to meet, he had been out with one of his friends for tea (a strategy he began to use to avoid houses and drugs was to invite his friends out and buy them tea), had told him that K. was pregnant and heard this friends' own 'pregnancy scare' stories. Afterwards, on his way home, he gets a text message:

...got a text message and it said: 'Oh well love, Manchester seems to be the closest place for an abortion but DUTCH CITY is also a pretty good option. Prices similar, I'm looking in to flights'. (Visibly moved).../...And I just saw that and burst in to tears. She had made the decision like, y'know. You know, it wasn't, it wasn't that I'd thought, was that...we'd come back with serious decisions, we'd come back and debate the decision...and just you know (voice breaks).../...And I got there and she was, she was, she'd like, a joint rolled and...and I was like, then, that was it, like. You can't smoke a joint if you're going to have a baby, and that's it, you know (voice very low).../...And I just, y'know, we met at my back, we went to my back garden, sat on the bench, privacy like...and ah...she was...ok, right so I think we should have the abortion'. And I was like, 'well, I can see by your text message, y'know. It wasn't quite...abstract thought, it was looking on the internet...this is *this*, this is *this*, this is *this*, you know.

Which is exactly how she is, you know, and its great 'cause we'd never get anywhere without that kinda.../...planning. But ah, she made the decision. What can you say really? I was like 'Are you sure?', you know, 'my parents said they'd support us'. And she was like, 'you told your parents?' and I said 'of course I told my parents' (laughs)...she didn't, she didn't tell her parents. And aam...she told her mother...she told her mother. She never told her father. Her father would...kill me, I think. He probably would kill me. He likes me...at the moment, let's leave it at that.../...But aam, yeah the day of the decision was...aam...empty.../...I felt sick for the whole day.../...She...seemed fairly sure of herself and happy with the decision she'd made and I wasn't gonna...question it. Or I wasn't going to say 'I want a baby, I want a *son*'. (Upset on 'son')...But my memory of being with GIRLFRIEND1'S SON.../...was so nice, you know? Having a son is so nice, having a child...is so nice.../...and...just...to throw one away...like that (throws hands in the air)...when they are given to you...it seems like a waste.

Here again, there is a real conflict for Eddie. Part of him wants, really wants, to keep the baby, the other part of him realizes that they are too young, that a baby would be too restrictive. He knows it is his girlfriend's decision – 'it's never fifty fifty' – it's the woman's choice, it is the woman's body. He is, he says, pro-choice and despises the anti-choice lobby (still quite vocal in Ireland).

I'm all for pro-choice like...but...and the pro-life thing I think is just disgraceful but...I'm all pro-choice.../...but I often think that there is pro-choice in necessary in situations where there is no money, rape is involved, or abuse of some sort is involved, like. But I think, like, if you're...if it's going to come in to a circle of love, you know? The, why not? You know? I've subsequently grown, you know, I had a...bit of breakdown there in September/October. Where I kind of stopped functioning, socially. And emotionally. And ah, K. didn't know what was going on. We practically broke up at one stage. And ah, I was just...not talking to her or anything and then I just, I felt...the baby would have been born in November, it would have been born pretty much the exact date as my birthday. And at my birthday, my 21st, it was *aaaalll* I thought about.../...this baby who would be arriving into the world.../...And ah, you know, she ended up, she brought me into my room, you know, and she's like 'Eddie, you need to tell me what the fuck is going on, or else..'. So, you know, feckin' broke down again! More tears in a year than in the whole of my life! It was ah, you know, we talked through it, you know. She was still sure of her decision. She was like, 'alright', you know, 'sure I've thought about it', you know, she's had night of tears when she thinks she's made a mistake. But, look at us, you know, we're students...We want to go to Korea and teach English, we want to go to China, you know, we want to go live in New Zealand for a while. It just doesn't work with a baby, you know. It, it ties you down and you can bring the (upset)...yeah.../...who, you know...but you don't want to be selfish at the same time. That's the, the toss up, isn't it?

What Eddie appears to be expressing here, in addition to his own grief, is a wider feature of liquid modernity. All of the old sources of certainty are gone, there is nowhere to go to ask advice, he does not have the blueprint of belief to turn to. His is a habitus 'divided against

itself. He knows what he is *supposed* to say, as a ‘good’, educated liberal but the reality of the decision, and the powerlessness at having the decision taken away from him, is complicating his reaction. This type of conflict, where the pressures of political affiliation and class position are at odds with the reality of life choices, is itself a feature of the liquid modern constellation.

He tries to explain his emotions away. He says that ‘it will happen again’ and that, considering all the drugs he has taken, he actually thought he was sterile until this happened. But even in this, he cannot escape his emotions:

What if I was to be sterile....ten years down the line, when I want to have a baby and I can't have a baby...what's that going to be like, that kind of like...ten years down the line that baby would be 10.....And I can't help but think...(upset) every birthday I have...well, this is what was going through my mind...when I...collapsed...was that every birthday I have is going to be another year that the baby is not alive and am...

Of course, back in Holland, he speaks to some of his international friends about it. Two of his close female friends from Spain and Portugal have both had abortions in the past, he learns. He finds he knows increasingly more people who either had an abortion themselves, or were the partners of women who had. This helps Eddie to contextualise the decision. The degree to which this topic is still cloaked in silence in Ireland is not typical. The claws of old morality still cling on in many of us, even those who do not believe, like Eddie. Liquid modernity is lumpy, islands of solidity remain, even ‘within’ the most liquid of us.

When I ask Eddie about the event itself, the day of the abortion, he recounts it in the same rich narrative detail that characterize the rest of his life story. Indeed, it, again, comes out as one long extended PIN:

The day...K. came over to DUTCH CITY she planned a week trip. We had it planned that shed have a day to settle in and then the abortion and then four days...so that it's much better than having four days, abortion, leave. So am, she arrived all smiles, hugs and kisses, no word about it. Went home...ah, K love the weed. Weed is a lovely drug sometimes, to relax you, to chill out and watch a film. So we had a few spliffs and watched a film and ah...went to bed, we had to be up early. That was the only time it was ever discussed, we had to be up – , 'who set the alarm? Did you set your alarm' that kind of thing, and it was, 'we have an appointment tomorrow'. So we went in anyway...we walked down, usually you'd cycle...but, you know she might be sore afterwards so...we walked and ah a lovely day, sun shining, in the middle of spring...daffodils, tulips everywhere along the canal, you know, beautiful country...walked down anyway, to the building...They were *very nice* in the building, they were really nice, the women were really nice and ah we sat in the waiting room for a while. There were a few women sitting there, a few women...there was one other couple, you know, and ah, his girl was taken and I was kinda like 'how does this work now, do I go with you or...?' and she was like 'I'd like you to come with me' not for the procedure but to be there for the run up and the prep and all that...

There is a mix up and Eddie doesn't go with her when he should:

...as far as I can...I wanted to be there too, you know...and ah, she was staying brave, as she does...and then she was called up, her name was called, and she stood up and the nurse took her out and I was like 'what happens now?' like, is that just a private thing or whatever...and I walked up and I was like...I waited for a while, your man was waiting there too like...it's it's the most awkward time of my life you know...the decisions done, the wheels in motion...and I went up to the counter and I was like 'where is my girlfriend' after half an hour she's like 'in' you know 'in...preparation' and I was like 'oh I wanted to be with her' and was like 'oh you should have gone with her there' like you know. So we'd missed, I'd missed that chance...and I was like 'where can I find her' and she was like 'go two floor down, knock on the door there'...and so I ran down anyway...I ran down and I banged on the door and ah, an elderly Dutch woman answered and I was like 'I'm looking for NAME and ah, then ah, she was like 'and who are you?' and I was like 'her boyfriend' like, kinda like...closed the door a bit, thinking like...they needed a lot of security...unpleasant events.

For the next segment of the story, Eddie breaks down and begins crying hard for a few minutes. It was painful to experience as an interviewer, and is still painful to listen to on the recording. It is unvarnished, raw grief, prompted by the narrative retelling. It reflects the 'situated subjectivity' of Eddie at the time. He is back there, in the room, with his girlfriend.

like...sometimes everything is an argument...it's so hard...I ended up going back so often. I just had to go back...

At one point he cancels a trip to Spain and travels to Ireland to give her support during a bad patch. She still doesn't know that he did this. At the very end of this story, he tells me that it all occurred during the 'volcano eruption' that caused such havoc across European airspace. They nearly had to keep the baby because her flight was delayed and if she hadn't made it they would have been too late for a termination. His humour shows through here also:

that was one of the things that really...I'm not a religious man, and at the time I was reading about the horrible scandals and outrageous actions of the church and I'm not a religious man but when my girlfriend is pregnant and we have three or so weeks to get a...and a volcano arrives...stopping flights!? I mean...you can talk about signs from god but a feckin' volcano!?

I thank Eddie for sharing his story. The very last lines of this exchange are:

Int: Thank you for sharing that...

Resp: Well there are very few people I can share it with, you know, it's a secret...

Thus, in this story we see Eddie express his emotions most clearly and deeply. He feels and cries openly, expressing his grief, but also his attempts to deal with that grief and to use narrative to maintain or create a form of coherence. The richness of the narrative, the detail and the embodying of the experience, related through story, are all significant features.

6.4. Conclusion

Eddie's interview is so rich there is quite a lot of scope for commentary and interpretation, some of which I have already offered. In my presentation of it I hope I have done it justice. My wider reflections will follow in the next chapter. For now, I wish to stress a number of features relevant to my research questions and to this thesis specifically. Firstly, the contrast between Eddie's and Mickey's interviews, though built on the same initial question, is stark. They grew up less than fifty kilometres from each other, in different times, and completely different worlds.

From the perspective of habitus, what emerges from Mickey's account of himself is an instantiation of, what I earlier called, the 'repressive hypothesis'. His account is 'closed'. There is a lack of narrative and PINs, a lack of emotionality, and a lack of selfhood or attention to individualism; indeed, a sacrificing of the 'I' to the 'we'. There is a flow when it comes to public matters - tractors, politics, church - and evidence that these two relational networks have had a profound effect on his life history and habitus, but an avoidance of private matters, an avoidance of the 'risk of emotion'. This is one of the pathologies of emotion that I will discuss later. Eddie's life history is characterized by expressiveness; there is a surfeit of PINs, a surfeit of emotionality, a surfeit of individualism, a straining to provide a narrative coherence to the fragments of the life - to create a *Bildungsroman*, indeed, a 'civilizing process' of sorts. His account is 'open'. There are aspects of another, different pathology of emotion at work here.

For Mickey, there is an expression of a more solid, homogenous habitus; for Eddie, a more fractured, heterogeneous one. In the next chapter I will turn to the question of how emotions continue to be pathologized in liquid modernity, in different ways. I will continue to draw on these two cases, but will also draw on others, to explore liquid modern emotions in our liquid modern times.

7. Chapter Seven: The Dialectic of Emotional Enlightenment

7.1. Introduction

In this chapter I wish to stand back and look at the arc of emotions and social change as a whole in liquid modernity. In the last chapters I have made the case, and demonstrated with two examples, that in Ireland we have seen a shift from a homo to a hetero habitus, and a corresponding shift from a closed and repressed way with emotions to an open, liberal way, that mirrors the shift in social relations that occurred throughout the twentieth century. Here I wish to continue this analysis, but with more focus on the contemporary situation. In this I will argue that, rather than viewing this emotional liberation in an entirely positive light, it should rather be viewed as a fundamentally *ambivalent* process. I will go on to suggest that what we are seeing is, rather, a new pathologization of emotion, one that echoes the pathologization of previous times, existing in tandem with more ‘positive’ emotional styles. This is connected with the fragmentation and increased complexity of social life in late modernity. I will construct a new typology of emotional pathology, drawing on interviews and also on contemporary literature that addresses these concerns. In the next chapter, the conclusion, I will draw on this to offer some remarks about contemporary selfhood, in light of the fragmentation I am suggesting,

In general, in late or liquid modernity emotions have been raised to a ‘category of value’²⁰⁷ and emotions, and their display, are a much more ubiquitous feature of contemporary life than they were in the past. This is certainly true of ‘The West’ (an admittedly nebulous category) and Ireland, at least. The picture is complex, more fractured and, as we have stressed, liquid modernity is not uniformly ‘liquid’, but is ‘lumpier’ that Bauman allows for. In short, that history is not (*pace* Foucault) discontinuous, but is better characterized as a process of becoming. Within the creative advance in to novelty there is resistance; the features and habitus of the past can endure or ‘hang around’ in various forms of life. The past and the

²⁰⁷ *Homo Sentimentalis* cannot be defined as a man with feelings (for we all have feelings), but as a man who has raised feelings to a category of value. As soon as feelings are seen as a value, everyone wants to feel; and because we all like to pride ourselves on our values, we have a tendency to show off our feelings...As soon as we want to feel...feeling is no longer feeling but an imitation of feeling, a show of feeling. This is commonly called hysteria (Kundera, 1991, pp.218-9).

future, like *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*, can co-exist, even if the former is often confined to the margins and symbolically devalued.

In what follows I will discuss this fracturing of emotional styles and emotional habitus that contemporary life contains, constructing a typology of pathologies. I will draw on some literature that discusses these issues, such as Eva Illouz (2007, 2008), and notions of ‘emotional capital’. I will also draw on the interviews I discussed in the last chapter, as well as others conducted as part of this project. Below I offer a schematic overview of this typology. I will then work critically through the different aspects and arguments that this typology suggests about emotions and social change. These are by no means exhaustive. The overall point is this: rather than treating the new, expressive regime of emotional life as an unalloyed good, a form of progress that the word ‘liberalization’ might suggest, it is instead fundamentally ambivalent. It also, in fact, contains within it, older and additional forms of pathologization. Most of the emotional styles and norms that dominate the contemporary period are better conceived as new, more subtle forms of pathologization, and a means towards self-pathologization. These I will treat under a number of headings. The first, perhaps the most dominant, is concerned with the rise and diffusion of a ‘therapeutic discourse’ surrounding emotions, connected with ‘emotional capitalism’. The other two modes are connected also, and are, in ways, responses to this dominant mode. The second aspect of this process, ‘excess’, involves increased visibility and norms of excessive emotionality, which I connect with Elias’ notion of ‘decivilizing’. The final mode of pathologization involves a new form of ‘denial’ of emotions that, in part, is a result of the first two. This involves a new, more reflexive form of self-repression or neo-repression (or ‘apatheia’). All of which connects to a broader argument about the fundamentally ambivalent nature of social change and everyday life in late modernity. These are, it must be remembered, analytical distinctions. In reality, all three overlap in significant ways in popular culture and in everyday life.




Figure 15. A Typology of Emotional Pathologies.

7.2 Whitehead Revisited: Habitus Reframed

Before turning to the substantive issues of this chapter I wish first to revisit, restate and foreground the core concepts being deployed, and how they interrelate. That is, I wish to briefly consolidate and clarify the conceptual apparatus and reconnect it with the underlying theoretical orientation. In this section I will attempt to, firstly, restate the conceptualization of emotional habitus being deployed, showing how it is draws from, but is distinct to, the more familiar approach of Bourdieu. I will go on to restate the process by which emotional habitus and emotional regimes are related, drawing on the previous chapters. I will, finally, attempt to

clarify the manner in which concepts like ‘repression’, ‘expression’ and ‘pathologization’ are being used, which is in an explicitly non-psychoanalytic register. Throughout I will attempt to stress the process-relational ontology that is acting as under-labourer for the thesis as a whole.

As I hope to have shown throughout, but especially in the first three chapters, my use of the concept of habitus is influenced by Bourdieu but not identical with his conception. In chapter three in particular I attempted to offer a reframed conceptualization from the perspective of process-relational realism, and suggested that habitus (in general) is a cluster of active, acquired dispositions; an organization of the body, derived from *experience* and giving rise to practice. As we saw there, Bourdieu’s approach, and particularly his theory of fields, has been subject to criticism from a number of quarters, and for a strictly Bourdieusian approach (as Maton was at pains to stress) habitus should not be used without reference to a specified field (see page 84 of chapter three). As such, within this strict, restrictive frame of ‘objective relations’, we should never ‘adjectivise’ the habitus, thereby debarring all reference to ‘emotional’ (or any other) habitus, lest the concept become decontextualized and fetishized. Thus, as an initial comment, *emotional* habitus and Bourdieu are incompatible because of his apparent insistence on ‘objective relations’ and the splitting of the habitus that this adjectivization entails.

However, the recent debates within (or over) relational sociology that I mentioned previously that criticise (for example Bottero & Crossley (2011), Crossley (2011), Murphy (2011)) or defend (Fox (2014)) Bourdieu, and his fields, are in danger of descending into dialogues of the deaf. Bourdieu’s own comments are often less than helpful. In his earlier work he dismisses or underplays ‘interactionism’ and ‘social networks’ in favour of fields by saying, in addition to ‘the real is relational’, that ‘what exists in the social world are relations – not interactions between agents or intersubjective ties between individuals, but objective relations...’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.97). For Crossley (and others) Bourdieu’s position might be guilty of, what Whitehead calls, the ‘fallacy of misplaced abstraction’ – the field is a metaphorical or theoretical space occupied by ‘positions’ and varying amounts of ‘capital’, insufficiently inattentive to actually interacting, flesh and blood, individuals and their mutual influencing. Indeed, for Bourdieu, these objective relations structure and condition the interactions, which are secondary. On the other hand, Crossley’s network analysis might be

charged by Bourdieu as exhibiting the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’; that a focus on the present ‘real interactions’ occludes the abstract, vertical hierarchies at work (and deployed) in terms power derived from position in social space and cultural, economic, social and symbolic resources.²⁰⁸

The trouble from the perspective of process-relational realism, that I am defending here, is that I wish to foreground (wholly) *embodied experience* as vital to the constitution of habitus via relational becoming. As I have stressed, all along, following Whitehead, how an individual becomes constitutes their habitus as embodied dispositions and capacities. This is, for me, a fundamentally *affective* process. Indeed, for the later Bourdieu (as I have suggested), our dispositions result from ‘affective transactions with the environment’ (see page 95 and Bourdieu, 2000, p.141). Crossley’s complaint is that the *mechanism* for the transmission of this, for the transmission of culture, say, is occluded at the abstract level of fields, and such transmission requires mutually interacting and influencing individuals from whom we learn and embody social structures. Of course, as Lahire has rightly observed, it is not really ‘social structures’ that we embody at all. He writes:

Saying that ‘social structure’ is embodied is a metaphor that can rapidly prove an encumbrance when we study the construction process of schemes of action...What the child, adolescent, and eventual adult embody are not, properly speaking, ‘social structures’ but rather corporeal, cognitive, evaluative, appreciative, etc, habits - i.e. schemes of action, ways of doing, thinking, feeling and saying that are adapted (and sometimes limited) to specific social contexts. They internalize modes of action, interaction, reaction, appreciation, orientation, perception, categorization etc., by entering step by step into social relations of interdependence with other actors, or by maintaining, through the mediation of other actors, relationships with multiple objects whose mode or modes of use and appreciation they learn (Lahire, 2011, p.176, original emphasis).

²⁰⁸ Whitehead writes: ‘The advantage of confining attention to a definite group of abstractions, is that you confine your thoughts to clear-cut definite things, with clear-cut definite relations. Accordingly, if you have a logical head, you can deduce a variety of conclusions respecting the relationships between these abstract entities. Furthermore, if the abstractions are well-founded, that is to say, if they do not abstract from everything that is important in experience, the scientific thought which confines itself to these abstractions will arrive at a variety of important truths relating to our experience of nature. We all know those clear-cut trenchant intellects, immovably encased in a hard shell of abstractions. They hold you to their abstractions by the sheer grip of personality. The disadvantage of exclusive attention to a group of abstractions, however well-founded, is that, by the nature of the case, you have abstracted from the remainder of things. In so far as the excluded things are important in your experience, your modes of thought are not fitted to deal with them. You cannot think without abstractions; accordingly, it is of the utmost importance to be vigilant in critically revising your modes of abstraction’ (Whitehead, 2008, p.59).

As such, it is difficult to connect the abstract and metaphorical ‘movements of the fields’, comprised of metaphorical positions and metaphorical capital, with the physical embodiment of dispositions, learned from and through other actors, within (and in part comprising) the environment with which we transact and become. As I stated earlier, within my relational ontology, individual human lives are engaged in a process of relational becoming, a creative advance into novelty, along with the rest of existence. At the human level this involves being embedded in overlapping dynamic networks with other human individuals (and the rest of nature). These social relations are primarily characterized by power relationships. That is, other people (power relationships), culture (shared symbolic meaning) and material reality (‘nature’) are the primary environment or ‘world’ for human individuals. This is the social environment with which we, as humans, transact, which produces emotions as bodily responses to the happenings and events of this world. Habitus thus is the means by which culture is transmitted, and practices structured. The field, as abstraction, fails to capture the praise and blame, the positive and negative sanctions, the soft voices or sharp looks, the observances and ignorances that go in to the socialization of children, embedded in networks of independences; all the implicit and explicit instruction that occurs, through habitus, between people.

But this is not to dismiss the notion of field, and the use of abstractions, *tout court*. Indeed, and as Bourdieu’s work has shown, to abstract to the level of fields and capital, as his analysis in *Distinction* and elsewhere demonstrates, can be very illuminating at the statistical level. Yet, particularly in his earlier work, the notion of field appears to be all encompassing, and his dismissal of ‘occasionalist’ interaction bends the stick too far. His later work, again, and especially, *Pascalian Meditations* appears to soften this insistence. Here, for example, he uses the more general phrase ‘the social world’ on seventy occasions, and variations on the phrase ‘social world *or* the field’ repeatedly. Thus, I would suggest, is not the case that the field is wrong or incorrect as such but rather that the *level of analysis* is different. Bourdieu does not want us to get fooled by the Goffmanian situation into thinking that *this* occasion in which we find ourselves is all that is in play in the play of interaction, thereby forgetting the history of inequality and inequality of history; that prior rank, position, power and pecking order may all be occluded but manifest in our habitus-based practices. But I suggest we can still deploy habitus, power and class without abstracting to the field or objective relations. The relational context (social world or figuration) is where socialization takes place, where habitus is formed

and class and culture ‘transmitted’. Our approach to habitus can and has taken much from the work of Bourdieu, but it has been combined with the approaches of others, especially Whitehead, and grounded in a distinctive theoretical perspective that operates at a different level of abstraction. In a sense, there is no real conflict here. Habitus is formed for both myself and (especially the later) Bourdieu on *bodies by experience*; affective transactions with the environment. Indeed, his concept of symbolic violence operates largely through bodily emotion (e.g. ‘shame, timidity, anxiety, guilt’, Bourdieu, 2000, p.169). This is a central point. These ‘mere’ interactions of concrete individuals are not, ever, devoid of power, but as I argued in chapter two, following Elias and others, actually existing social relations and interactions are saturated with power – they are power relations. Furthermore, as such, they have emotional ‘outcomes’ – relations of power are emotionally valenced. For Bourdieu, the struggles of the field are played out in interactions, for capital, and via habitus, but at this level of analysis the interaction order itself, the toing and froing of power and their emotional effects are lost. I think the positions are actually much closer than the disputants realise, but they have failed to account for the differing level of abstraction in operation.²⁰⁹ Nevertheless, my use of habitus, as I have tried to show, and especially emotional habitus, is not Bourdieusian *per se*, but draws on alternative readings of habitus, and attempts to ground it in an alternative theoretical apparatus. Because of this, I am happy to focus on and deploy the adjectivised ‘emotional’ habitus as a component of the social habitus, much like Elias, the Eliasians and many others not operating within a strict Bourdieusian frame.

Thus, in my use of habitus and emotional habitus I wish to foreground interacting networks of interdependent individuals, social worlds rather than specific and abstract fields. Central to the structuring of that emotional habitus, then, and my reframed conception, is the (more or less) shared, (more or less) dominant emotional culture within which the individual is embedded and socialized, which forms part of the cultural environment for that individual. As we saw in earlier chapters, there have been a number of concepts deployed to capture to this emotional culture, such as Reddy’s (2001) ‘emotional regimes’, De Rivera’s (1992) ‘emotional climates’, Rosenwein’s (2006) ‘emotional communities’ and, most recently, Gammerl’s (2012) ‘emotional styles’. All of these related yet distinct concepts have their own merits and demerits, some of which have been discussed by the latter, and in the recent

²⁰⁹ There are other questions we could ask about the concept of field – is there any interaction ‘outside’ a field, is the family context a field etc? Perhaps the field metaphor operates best when it is restricted to discussion and analysis of professional arenas and contexts, such as the education field, the field of law, the field of politics etc.

history of emotions literature more generally. In chapter three I tentatively offered my own metaphor of ‘tonality’ to attempt to capture the same phenomena. The trouble is that none of them, except my own, are constructed with an eye to habitus. Both Gammerl (2012, p163) and Rosenwein (2006, p.25) do note that their concepts are themselves somewhat similar to habitus (though not ‘emotional’ habitus), neither clearly captures the relationship to relations of power enough.²¹⁰

Reddy’s notion of ‘emotional regime’ is better at capturing this. It is not, I think, extraordinary to claim that all communities and societies of individuals – forms of life - have emotional norms, or ideals or styles. The benefit of using regime(s) over the others, perhaps including my own metaphor of tone, is that it suggests or foregrounds the *normative* dimension of emotional styles within a polity, which is the case I wish to address for the Republic of Ireland. Recall his definition: an emotional regime refers to the ‘set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them’ which are seen as a necessary underpinning for any ‘stable’ political regime (Reddy, 2001, p.129). More recently he has suggested that: “‘Style’ becomes ‘regime’ when the sum of the penalties and exclusions adds up to a coherent structure’ (Plamper, 2010). It is this ability to grasp the political; that emotional styles are enforced via sanctions, penalties, exclusions; that non-conformity is punished (and conformity rewarded); in short, that emotional regimes are bound up with, and are expressions of, relations of power that suggest their deployment here. This is not to argue that there is one unified and unifying regime operating throughout a given community. As I will stress below, there will always be alternative regimes in operation (especially as populations get larger), and, what Reddy calls, ‘emotional refuges’ (and Rosenwein calls ‘emotional communities’) where non-conformists congregate, will emerge (see below). What I wish to discuss for the Irish case is what I see as the dominant, rather than the all-encompassing, emotional regime of solid modernity (which I have called

²¹⁰ “Thus emotional communities are in some ways what Foucault called a common “discourse”: shared vocabularies and ways of thinking that have a controlling function, a disciplining function. Emotional communities are similar as well to Bourdieu’s notion of “habitus”: internalized norms that determine how we think and act and that may be different in different groups. Some sociologists speak of “group styles:” in which “implicit, culturally patterned styles of membership filter collective representations” that may include “vocabularies, symbols, or codes?” I use the term “communities” in order to stress the social and relational nature of emotions; to allow room for Reddy’s very useful notion of “emotives:” which change the discourse and the habitus by their very existence; and to emphasize some people’s adaptability to different sorts of emotional conventions as they move from one group to another’ (p.25).

repressive), and the fracturing of that regime as life became more liquid, which is nevertheless predominantly expressive.

Finally, I wish to offer a few more clarifying words on the terminology being deployed here, and below, especially ‘repression’ and ‘expression’. These should be understood *not* in a psychodynamic or psychoanalytical register but within the specific theoretical context in which I am using them here. When I write of a ‘repressed emotional habitus’, this should be understood in the context of, and as an expression of, a repressive emotional regime. That is, it means that those individuals who have been socialized within a regime in which there were strict controls on the expression of emotion (such as pre-1950’s Ireland) they tend to habitually not express (i.e. repress) their emotions in practice. This is absolutely *not* to suggest that such individuals are *not emotional* – as human beings we are *never* not emotional – but that the expression of that emotion (especially those considered troublesome by dominant power holders) is habitually (and more or less automatically) inhibited. I do not mean ‘repression’ as a defence mechanism and I wish to eschew psychodynamic explanations in favour of more sociological ones. ‘Suppression’, to my ear at least, implies a more conscious process than I wish to capture here. Repression, thus, is to be understood as a mirror of the repressive emotional regime; a form of life or community or society that advocates strict controls on emotional expression. An expressive emotional regime, and an expressive emotional habitus, means the opposite. I realise it is difficult, given (as I discuss in detail below) how far the therapeutic ethos and discourses have penetrated our collective contemporary lexicon to read a word like ‘repression’ without interpreting it psychologically. Hopefully these provisos here will stave off any confusion. I will clarify my use of pathologization a little later.

7.3. Emotional Regime of Solid Modernity

While the focus of this chapter is on the more recent period, then, I begin by recapping some features of the previous emotional regime of solid modernity. I have suggested earlier that solid modernity was characterized, in general, by a dominant emotional regime typified by emotional repression. In this view, which has a longer history than modernity, emotions are pathological disturbances – ‘illness of the mind’ in Kant’s view – that are associated with the body, and were to be controlled, banished, ignored and repressed. I have suggested here that

'repression' should be considered the dominant emotional regime associated with solid modernity. However, dominance should not imply total hegemony. There are always, as I have said, however small and marginal, alternative emotional 'communities' or 'refuges' in which alternatives and deviations from the dominant emotional regime are possible (Rosenwein, 2006, Reddy, 2001). If Mickey, as I depicted his interview, can be seen as, if not typical, then perhaps ideal-typical of the repressive emotional regime and the disavowal of emotions in Ireland generally, then perhaps the tiny Jewish Community of Dublin in the early decades of the twentieth century can be seen as an alternative 'emotional community', with different emotional norms and emotional habitus than that of the majority Catholic population. There is a 'hidden history' of emotions in both Ireland and in solid modernity more generally, but this is more limited in the Irish case due to the homogeneity of the relational and constitutive forces at work here. Elsewhere, outside of Ireland, I suggest, the picture even in solid modernity was even more complex regarding emotional styles. Reddy, for example, writes of 'emotional refuges', defined as relationships, rituals or organizations that provide 'safe relief from prevailing emotional norms and allows relaxation of emotional effort...which may shore up or threaten the existing emotional regime' (Reddy, 2001, p.129). In Ireland in the early decades of the last century we can speculate that some of the artistic and literary groups could be seen in these terms, or, indeed, the brothels depicted so well in Joyce's Dublin. Or, indeed, those later groups and movements, such as the women's movement, whose emotions would become key motors for the social change discussed earlier, crystalized around such emotional refuges. But all of these were minority figurations, tiny in comparison with the mainstream, dominant regime.

Yet, it must be remembered that even though I am suggesting Mickey as indicative of the 'official' emotional regime of the pre-1950's, I interviewed him in the twenty first century. His emotional habitus, and habitus in general, to the extent that it does indeed embody this history, could be read *now* as an example of what Bourdieu called the 'hysteresis' effect. This refers to the inertia of the habitus when the conditions of its constitution are no longer the conditions within which it is practiced. He writes that:

Thus as a result of the hysteresis effect necessarily implied in the logic of the constitution of habitus, practices are always liable to incur negative sanctions when the environment with which they are actually confronted is too distant from that to which they are objectively fitted. This is why generation conflicts oppose not age-classes separated by natural properties, but habitus which have been produced by different modes of generation, that is,

by conditions of existence which, in imposing different definitions of the impossible, the possible, and the probable, cause one group to experience as natural or reasonable practices or aspirations which another group finds unthinkable or scandalous, and vice versa (Bourdieu, 1977, p.78).

Thus, Mickey's way with emotions is different not *simply* because he is older, or is different in nature to Eddie, but that they have different habituses. Elsewhere, he writes of it as 'the Don Quixote effect', in which 'dispositions are out of line with the field and with the 'collective expectations' which are constitutive of its normality. This is the case, in particular, when a field undergoes a major crisis and its regularities (even its rules) are profoundly changed; 'habitus may...be confronted with conditions of actualization different from those in which they were produced. This is true in particular whenever agents perpetuate dispositions made obsolete by transformations of the objective conditions (social ageing)...' (Bourdieu, 2000, pp.160-161). As such (and bearing in mind our earlier criticisms of Bourdieu's 'objective relations'), the rapid and profound social changes that occurred in Ireland in the latter half of the twentieth century provide the ideal 'breeding ground' for the hysteresis effect. Hysteresis is a word widely used in physics, engineering and even economics to describe the dependence of a system on its past environment as well as its current one. Etymologically, it is derived from ὑστέρησις, an ancient Greek word meaning 'deficiency', a 'lagging behind'; a 'coming short', a 'short coming'.²¹¹ From the perspective of liquid modernity and the (dominant) liquid modern emotions regime, Mickey can be said to embody the hysteresis effect. His emotional habitus was produced in and for a very different social environment; he is emotionally 'out of phase' with the new norms of emotional expression.

I would also suggest, though I cannot demonstrate it here, that this hysteresis effect is actually quite widespread. Not only in relation to emotions but also in relation to sexuality; in attitudes to marriage; to gender roles; to church attendance, prayer and religious practice, and to more liberal mores and ways more generally, there are many men and women of 'old Ireland' that also display this hysteresis. Indeed, it would make for an interesting study to investigate the extent to which this effect, and the experience of social change for older people, could be described within the frame of social or cultural (as opposed to psychological or psychoanalytical) trauma (Alexander et al, 2004). Cultural trauma involves the shattering of

²¹¹ Online Etymology Dictionary

collective meaning. In Sztompka's conception it is the 'culturally interpreted wound to the cultural tissue itself' that may occur following rapid social change (such as war or revolution, or I would argue, the accelerated modernization that occurred in Ireland) (Sztompka, 2000, p.458).²¹² In the Irish context, given the rapid replacement of core tenets of life, particularly those associated with religion which had previously been so dominant, it is likely that something akin to this form of trauma is being experienced by (at least) some of those who once identified strongly with the previous regime they were born under. Yet, *because* of the hysteresis effect, it is also likely that the very means necessary to both recognise this as trauma, and to articulate it; the modes of expression necessary to communicate the emotions involved, are not present. It would therefore go unrecognised, the trauma unexpressed. Mickey goes about his business in much the same manner as he always did. He goes to mass, to the odd match, he walks the land, he rides his motor bike, he 'rattles around'; he sacrificed his own ambition on the altar of duty, but as he 'draws to the headland' both the sacrifice and the values it represents have become less meaningful; much like the contemporary liquid world that surrounds him. He was built by and for a relational world that no longer exists.²¹³

Thus, we see that the emotional habitus of solid modernity can still persist in the liquid. The old, repressed habitus born of a repressive emotional regime co-exists with the new ones, albeit, in a relatively small number of cases, and usually at the margins. It should nevertheless be included in any typology of those new forms, and as a pathology, in the sense I will next describe.

²¹² He continues: 'In the aftermath of rapid, radical social change the 'duality of culture' will manifest itself in a peculiar way: traumatizing events that are themselves meaningful, endowed with meaning by the members of the collectivity, may disturb the very same universe of meanings. If a disturbance occurs, the symbols start to mean something other than they normally do; values become valueless, or demand unrealizable goals; norms prescribe unfeasible actions; gestures and words signify something different from what they meant before; beliefs are refuted, faith undermined, trust breached; charisma collapses, idols fall. I believe cultural trauma is most threatening, because like all cultural phenomena it has the strongest inertia...' (Sztompka, 2000, p.458).

²¹³ Mickey's case also raises an interesting issue regarding children and child rearing. It is, I think, probable that *some* of those with children are required to engage with and (to some extent) adapt to changes in social structures, necessitating revisions to the older embodied habitus. As a bachelor, Mickey has no such reasons for doing so. My interviews didn't really speak to this however.

7.4. Emotional Regime(s) of Liquid Modernity

Repression then, in its solid modern guise remains a feature of the liquid modern regime, particularly via the hysteresis effect embodied in (some) older people. Expression, however, has become the dominant form. Before I outline the new forms of emotional expression, I wish to say something about pathology and my use of the term. In general usage, of course, pathology refers to the ‘science of diseases’. Its roots, however, are in Greek – pathos, ology – the study or science of pathos. Pathos, we are told, comes from Greek too: “suffering, feeling, emotion, calamity,” literally “what befalls one,” related to *paskhein* “to suffer,” and *penthos* “grief, sorrow;” from PIE root **kwent(h)-* “to suffer, endure” (cf. Old Irish *cessaim* “I suffer,” Lithuanian *kenčiu* “to suffer,” *pakanta* “patience”).²¹⁴ As such, etymologically at least, the whole study of emotion could be said to be pathological; to pathologize is to study suffering.²¹⁵ Yet I wish to suggest that, though emotional expression appears to be the dominant regime of the contemporary era, like much else in liquid modernity, it is more fractured and appears in a number of overlapping but distinctive modes. The key point is that, within each of these modes emotions are still being pathologized in various ways, within various discourses. They are often implicated in the pathologization of individuals and groups, and in related processes of self-pathologization. There is, then, a *deep ambivalence* about the new emotional regime. Far from representing a shift from pathology to ‘health’ in our deployment, understanding, discussions or treatments of emotion, what we see emerging is the re-pathologization of emotions and emotional life in new, more subtle and insidious forms.

In the past, they were (openly) pathologized as disturbances, opposed to reason, connected with ‘barbarism’ and a lack of ‘civilization’, and the feminine. In short, the losing side of the old binary oppositions discussed in chapter two. They were connected with ‘wildness’, lack of control and normatively devalued. They were, as such, repressed (in the strict sense in which I am using it here). People were taught to control, and not to express them, which constituted a repressed emotional habitus.

²¹⁴ From the online etymology dictionary.

²¹⁵ Also, as I said earlier, there is a connection here with the way of expressing emotions in the Irish language that still retains this Proto Indo European root: ‘*tá eagla orm*’, fear is upon me, ‘*tá áthas orm*’, happiness is upon me (I am happy). Irish emotions, linguistically, are as such passions, something that befalls us; something we suffer.

The contemporary rhetoric around emotions suggests that all of this has been left far behind. Indeed, we are living in a period in which we are encouraged and *compelled* to express our emotions; that the former way, to repress, is itself considered the pathological. We live, in a sense, in the ‘age of emotion’; the ‘emotional Enlightenment’.²¹⁶ Emotions and emotions-talk are everywhere, from the minutiae of our daily interactions within the family, in intimate relations, at work; but also on our media, on radio, on TV, online, in social media; in politics; in culture; in academia. There has been a Copernican shift in emotions discourse; in their display and expression, an explosion. Therefore I suggest that the dominant emotional regime of late modernity is expressive. Yet, the reality is more complex and ambivalent than this, and the new emotional regime can be said to have fractured in to a number of modes. This regime may be *as* pathological as the previous one, if not more so, in that it often insists on processes of *self*-pathologization on the basis of emotionality. This is particularly true of the first of these new modes that I will discuss - the therapeutic. But to pathologize is always to diagnose, to posit an (arbitrary) ‘normal’ and then measure distance, in either direction, from that ‘centre’. As such, pathologization and power are also inherently intertwined. In what follows I aim to offer a type of ‘immanent critique’ of these new forms of pathologization from the perspective of a critical sociology of emotions. I do not intend to be prescriptive, nor offer a ‘solution’; I do not have a full programme for how to live a ‘non-pathological’ life. Indeed, that so many do is itself part of the problem.

7.4.1. The Therapeutic Mode

Perhaps the dominant mode of emotional expression, and the dominant discourse surrounding it, comes from in the form of the therapeutic. Here I will briefly outline the origins of this mode, and the implications for both how we speak about our emotions and understand them. It is, of course, tied to the emergence and diffusion of psychoanalytical language and categories from their initial formulation by Freud and others. Indeed, I would argue that this form of speaking is near-ubiquitous in the contemporary era. It is now almost impossible to discuss the self or emotions without using or hearing references to ‘issues’, ‘denial’ ‘transference’, ‘sublimation’ and of course, ‘repression’. I have used some these terms

²¹⁶ Our motto could now be *Sentire aude!* Dare to feel! We have turned Kant on his head; his was the ‘nonage’ and immature time after all (Kant, [1798]1996, pp.17-22). Yet, we must also listen to Foucault, when he tells us (of Kant’s Enlightenment) that we must refuse and ‘free ourselves from the intellectual blackmail of being for or against the Enlightenment’ (Foucault, 1984, p.45). In what follows I do not wish to be ‘for or against’ this emotional enlightenment, but to stress its fundamental ambivalence.

quite liberally myself, but I have tried to use them (as I have stressed) in a non-psychodynamic sense so that, for example, when I write of a repressive emotional regime I mean it in its original sense of being put down, held back, confined and restricted, without its Freudian baggage. But even ‘baggage’ itself is coloured by its therapeutic connotations. The therapeutic register is now so diffused into our everyday modes of expression that it is very difficult to avoid it. Yet, the veracity and usefulness of these categories is far from universally accepted and, from the sociological point of view, may in fact be unhelpful in our efforts to understand and explain the social world.

Eva Illouz, a cultural sociologist affiliated with the Frankfurt School²¹⁷, has articulated this diffusion and the problems with this diffusion most clearly (2007, 2008). She suggests that the modern emotional style has been shaped by the language of therapy which emerged during the inter-war period, and (echoing the late Robert Bellah) that ‘therapeutic discourse has “reformulated the deepest levels of identity symbols” and it is through such identity symbols that the reformulation of a new emotional style took place’ (Illouz, 2007, p.7). These categories have shifted from being the preserve of medical professionals used in specific therapeutic settings to become the near-default mode of emotional expression and self-understanding, but with little evidence to support this shift in register. This diffusion has occurred via the ‘culture industry’, globally, and in various forms, such as self-help books and advice literature, periodicals and magazines, television talk shows (such as Oprah) and drama series, radio phone-in shows, the expansion of counselling services, human resources training, workshops, novels and literature; in short, within the globalized and globalizing mass media and various institutional sites, the language of psychology and psychodynamics became central to the liquid modern ways of defining the self. For Illouz, this has become a new ‘knowledge culture’ (in Knorr-Cetina’s and Somers’ sense) and her core argument is that ‘(k)nowledge and symbolic systems have come to shape who we are because they are enacted within social institutions that bestow authority on certain ways of knowing and speaking and routinize them so that they may become the invisible semiotic codes that organize ordinary conduct and structure the interaction rituals of the self’ (Illouz, 2008, p.7). It offered, and became, a new way to narratively emplot the self, backed by the symbolic legitimacy of medicine and science. But under this new knowledge culture, the old clear lines between ‘normality’ and ‘pathology’ became blurred. We were all now riddled with pathologies and neuroses; normality, sexual or

²¹⁷ And I am grateful to Prof. Axel Honneth for suggesting this work to me some years ago in Frankfurt.

emotional, became something that the individual must consciously strive for; it became an *achievement*. Yet, it is an achievement that is never actually achieved; the 'finish line' is ever-receding in to the horizon, and the definition of what constitutes the normal or the healthy is in constant flux. The formation and success of this new knowledge culture is fundamentally connected with power.

Power enters this story in a number of ways. Firstly, it is via institutional power that a psychological understanding (broadly defined) of emotional life and self-hood spread from universities into popular culture (in the United States in particular) from the 1950's.²¹⁸ The self-help and advice industries were a primary conduit of this, especially following the 'paperback revolution' in books which allowed mass access to cheap 'pop psychology' publications offering solutions to the contradictions that individuals were facing in their own lives during the social turmoil of the post-war years. These were usually aimed squarely at the individual, offering programmes for 'self-actualization' or 'self-realization', with the onus and diagnosis for their lives, troubles and anxieties placed firmly on their own shoulders. This advocacy of a 'new therapeutic emotional style' had the backing and legitimation of institutional science and medicine; books emblazoned with the embossed letters 'PhD' littered the houses of Americans from all social classes, even (or especially) those who could not afford the services of an actual therapist. Their focus was on the individual and the family in particular; on the everyday intimate lives of individuals and their sexuality. But this discourse also found its way in to Hollywood, into the advertising industry, and from there into the cinemas and homes of individual families, telling them to resolve their inner conflicts by using *this* brand of lipstick, or to reduce their anxiety by chewing Wriggles Gum.²¹⁹ As the 'American Century' progressed and the world became increasingly 'globalized', the diffusion became global too. This power of therapy thus became a form of symbolic power in Bourdieu's sense; it acquired the power of 'world-making'.

²¹⁸ Illouz posits Freud's Clarke Lectures in America in 1909 as a key to the fortunes of psychoanalysis, suggesting that the US was a receptive and fertile ground for his ideas. She writes that: 'Freudian psychological models spread throughout society, not only because they addressed central problems of American selfhood, but also because they expressed them in a hybrid language that combined the tropes of popular healing and myth with the legitimizing language of medicine and scientific rationality. Further, they addressed the private sphere, a sphere that was facing new strains due to the democratization of gender relations. This, in a nutshell, is the reason for Freud's uncanny popular success in America...Freud's ideas worked at several levels: they confronted prevalent sexual *norms*; they offered new *narrative* models to make sense of and shape life stories; and they deployed a battery of metaphors to grasp the nature of human conflict (Illouz, 2008, p.36).

²¹⁹ Ernest Dichter was central to this diffusion and adoption of Freudian ideas by the advertising industry in the US during the 1960's.

Thus, liquid modernity became saturated with therapeutic discourse, via the market, the state and civil society, all backed by the (scientific) authority of psychological experts (Illouz, 2008, pp.161-71). Built on a hermeneutics of suspicion, this new knowledge culture insinuated itself into key social sites to become the primary route to self-understanding and psychological well-being. The self became refashioned as a hidden vortex of desires, inner conflicts, ‘issues’, ‘complexes’, ‘repressed memories and emotions’, all of which had to be expressed and communicated to attain an always-nebulous and ever-changing definition of ‘health’. Indeed, emotional health became a commodity itself, to be bought and sold. This is the source of the imperatives toward ‘self-realization’ and ‘authenticity’, as well as the (empty) notion of ‘identity’ discussed earlier, and is both a product of and constitutive of the ‘new individualism’.²²⁰ The individual human is presented as a hive of emotional pathologies and, because the ideal of normality or health is an ever-changing ‘empty signifier’, everything, all behaviour, all emotions, can be rendered pathological, dysfunctional or neurotic at one time or another, or from one context to another.

But here too, there is a contradiction in the imperative. The new emotional style co-evolves with the new consumerism and the shift in economic production from industry to services.²²¹ This has become particularly prominent, and the subject of much recent research in organization studies (Fineman et al, 2008, Fineman, 2004, Fineman, 2006). We all now recognize that we are embedded in networks of interdependence, at home, at work, within intimate relationships, and are compelled to communicate and express our emotions, but only in the ‘right’ way.²²² This involves a new type of control-imperative, and a new hierarchy of emotional expression. We should not, for example, *be* angry with our boss or our lover. We should rather *communicate* our anger objectively; for example we should say, in as detached, cool and non-confrontational manner as possible: ‘when you were late for the meeting we had, that made me feel angry’, rather than actually *being angry*, raising our voices, banging the table and so on. Indeed, to do the latter is to reveal a ‘sick’ self, an emotional dysfunction or immaturity. It is to threaten our sociability, our ability to correctly interact with relational others in line with the therapeutic regime, one of the key requirements of the new world of

²²⁰ Aspects of this process have been well documented in Adam Curtis’ documentary *The Century of the Self* (2004).

²²¹ However, within industry too consumer goods, particularly technological ones, are built on the basis on ‘emotional design’, perhaps the dominant form of design used in computer and smartphone manufacture (iPhones, Xboxes, even video games), which are built on the basis of their emotional effects on the consumer (see Norman, 2004).

²²² Illouz follows Boltanski in calling this ‘connectionist capitalism’

work.²²³ At best, we are labelled as ‘difficult’ or ‘awkward’, at worst ‘sick’ or ‘neurotic’.²²⁴ This is also what the modern originator of the sociology of emotions, Arlie Hochschild, addresses with her concept of ‘feeling rules’ within organizations and in social life (Hochschild, 1983).

Furthermore, to communicate ‘properly’, in the socially sanctioned and appropriate manner, can put these ‘feelings’ beyond question or criticism. To express emotions using the correct mode can become a sort of ideological ‘trump card’: this is what I feel, and I have expressed it in a ‘rational’, ‘cool’ and ‘healthy’ manner, therefore it is not subject to interrogation or rebuttal. This is not a problem of emotions per se, but of the dominant emotional regime in its therapeutic mode. Emotions now must be objectified, externalized and rationally deployed, following individual introspection of our ‘inner selves’. This is the case within work organizations and corporations in particular, where the language of therapy came to have an inordinate effect on workers lives through new management programmes that focused explicitly on emotions, and via various forms of ‘testing’ (like personality tests, the Mayers-Briggs), or more recently the concept of ‘emotional intelligence’.

The point is that through this process, emotions have increasingly become a key component of new forms of social stratification and classification, another way in which power intersects with this emotional regime. With ‘emotional intelligence’ (EI) for example, individuals are encouraged (or required) to train themselves to be better able to identify, assess and control their own emotions as well as the emotions of others. EI involves the strategic deployment of emotions for one’s own (rational) self-interest; to further one’s career, to achieve ‘success’; all smeared with the patina of scienticity, particularly from neuroscience (or ‘neurobollocks’ as Steven Poolman calls it). Those who can display emotional intelligence make for ‘better’ employees (or students, or lovers). Emotions here are subject(ified) to objectivization and rational control, and can thus be ‘objectively’ evaluated and, crucially, compared to the

²²³ This also exists well outside the work place too and, as Helena Flam has recently argued, this therapeutic emotional regime is one of the dominant imperatives imposed on victims of atrocity in various legal arenas, such as truth and reconciliation tribunals or the International Criminal Court (Flam,2013). Victim of rape and genocide are not supposed to actually express their anger at these proceedings, but are urged to forgive and move towards reconciliation. Displays of strong emotion are discouraged or sanctioned; deemed pathological.

²²⁴ Illouz writes that this new emotional control: ‘points to a model of sociability in which one must display the ability to remove oneself from the reach of others in order to better cooperate with them. The emotional control of the type propounded by the therapeutic persuasion is at once the mark of a *disengaged self* (busy with self-mastery and control) and of a *sociable self*—bracketing emotions for the sake of entering into relations with others (Illouz, 2008, p.174).

emotions of others. There are parallel processes, in part deriving from the ‘positive psychology’ movement advocating optimism, positive thinking and ‘positive emotions’, again gaining legitimacy through experts and the deployment of fMRI brain scan images. This later has recently been subjected to critique by Barbara Ehrenreich, in her book *Smile or Die* (2009), who, after contracting breast cancer and was receiving treatment, was urged to see her cancer as a ‘gift’ and was censured for expressing anger at her condition. She goes on to excoriate this positive thinking trend in relation to religion, business, medicine and academia, even suggesting that it was a key contributor to the global financial crash – ‘what was market fundamentalism other than runaway positive thinking?’ (Ehrenreich, 2009, p.192). What indeed.

Both EI and positive psychology are culminations of a process that has developed over the twentieth century. What all of these examples point to is the emergence of, what Illouz calls, ‘emotional capitalism’ (2007, 2008). Under this: ‘emotional and economic discourses mutually shape one another so that affect is made an essential aspect of economic behaviour, and emotional life, especially that of the middle classes, follows the logic of economic relations and exchange’ (Illouz, 2008, p.60).

But more than this, emotion and ‘emotional competence’ itself becomes a *form of capital*, for Illouz, in a Bourdieusian sense. Indeed, Illouz deploys the notions of emotional capitalism, emotional habitus and the emergence of an ‘emotional field’ in her analysis.²²⁵ Yet here, and following our earlier discussion of the notion of the field, I would suggest a more interactionist conception of emotional capital, without abstracting to the field. We must remember that capital is a fiction, a metaphor. What is embodied as habitus is not capital, but a learned habit of doing, thinking, feeling and saying; a mode or modes of becoming. These modes are acquired, via socialization, through the experiencing of others and the culture of the network of interdependence within which we become. What we mean when we say that an individual ‘has high emotional capital’ is that increased power and status accrue to them interactionally when such capital is made manifest, via habitus. For such emotional capital (fluency or competence) to be capital it must be seen to be ‘positive’, i.e. status-enhancing,

²²⁵ She describes this emotional field as ‘a sphere of social life in which the state, academia. Different segments of industries, groups of professionals accredited by the state and university and the large market of medications and popular culture intersected to create a domain of action and discourse with its own rules, objects and boundaries’ (Illouz, 2007, p.63).

which is decided on the basis of the dominant emotional regime (itself a manifestation of power relations). Such ‘capital’ can then be converted into other types of capital, such as economic and symbolic in particular, on the basis of network or figural effects, in specific relational contexts. The ability to be seen as ‘emotionally competent’, of having high emotional capital, is increasingly central to professional success, but it is also a key contributor to social status in general. I would stress that the relational context within which habitus is manifested, rather than the abstract field, is central to the dynamic, and the creative advance into novelty.

This new regime of competence is, however, inherently ambivalent. It produces emotional ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, those who better embody this new normative imperative to objectify their emotions and rationally control them, and those who cannot. This is inherently connected to class and economic stratification. That is, those with higher economic capital can ‘purchase’ emotional capital, by attending workshops in EI, by seeing a therapist, by engaging in cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) to alter their behaviour etc, as well as buying books, CDs, videos and so on. On the other hand, those who already have high emotional capital, whose way with emotions or emotional habitus is already congruent with the dominant regime (because they derive from powerful sectors of society, say) are more likely to gain employment in large corporations, hired by managers who have been trained in and to recognise ‘the signs’ of EI. In short, the new emotional capital and power become synonymous.

Thus, the commodification, rationalization and objectification of emotions become part and parcel of the contemporary striving for emotional health and the performance of self-hood. Indeed, this transformation of emotions and emotional relations in part gives rise to the very liquidity that Bauman (2000) describes. When intimacy becomes rationalized and emotions objectified in this manner, bonds between equals striving for emotional fulfilment, self-realization and ‘authenticity’, become permanently revisable – what am I getting out of this relationship? Is this good for me? Are my emotional needs being met? Is this relationship dysfunctional? - When intimate and other social bonds become subject to this kind of perpetual cost-benefit analysis, they become permanently provisional, reversible and

retractable.²²⁶ They are always, in Bauman's words, 'until further notice'. And when relationships do break down they can become further enveloped and explained in therapeutic discourse as further proof of personal failure and a further source of suffering: I sabotage all of these relationships unconsciously on purpose – I am a 'commitment phobe', because my mother was absent when I was a child etc. As Illouz says, such narratives are 'retrospectively emplotted', my present predicament becomes the 'beginning' of the story, from which I must move backwards to find its (mythical) source, and thus:

we arrive here at an extraordinary paradox: therapeutic culture - the primary vocation of which is to heal - must generate a narrative structure in which suffering and victimhood actually define the self. Indeed, the therapeutic narrative functions only by conceiving of life events as the markers of failed or thwarted opportunities for self-development. Thus the narrative of self-help is fundamentally sustained by a narrative of suffering. This is because suffering is the central "knot" of the narrative, what initiates and motivates it, helps it unfold, and makes it "work." Therapeutic storytelling is thus inherently circular: to tell a story is to tell a story about a "diseased self" (Illouz, 2008, p.172).

These insights relate not only to our contemporary selves, but also to the BNIM interviews and particularly the interpretation techniques associated with the full BNIM approach I have criticised already, but I will return to this at the end. But the point is that these self-help narratives are at one and the same time narratives of health and narratives of disease. They are fundamentally ambivalent. They are also the narratives that dominate our media-saturated lives, on talk shows, in movies and in politics.

Finally, the new regime is being increasingly inculcated via the state in schools, both primary and secondary.²²⁷ While these trends are perhaps more developed in other states, such as the SEAL programme in the UK, cognate programmes are becoming ever-more prevalent in the Irish context. There have been reforms and education bills, teacher-training programmes, the introduction of new subject areas in secondary school (such as Social Personal and Health

²²⁶ Giddens' (1992) touches on this, with his notion of the 'pure relationship' but there are problems with Giddens' approach, in that he at times takes over and accepts uncritically the assumptions of the psychoanalysts he discusses, downgrading the sociological impact of what he writes.

²²⁷ See for example *The dangerous rise of therapeutic education* by Ecclestone and Hayes (2009) for an extend discussion of this process.

Education – SPHE -)²²⁸, and so on. In short, a new ‘emotional field’, in Bourdieu’s sense and level of abstraction, involving the state, educators, ‘experts’ and pupils promoting ‘social and emotional literacy’ is gradually emerging here. But despite the tokenistic inclusion of the word ‘social’, the understanding of emotions and the advocacy of ‘emotional intelligence’ at work in this field is fundamentally *psychological* in orientation. For example, the National Behaviour Support Service (NBSS) was established by the Department of Education & Skills in 2006, has recently published a document for schools in Ireland recommending resources for teachers and schools in the promotion of these ‘skills’. They write that the NBSS in its work ‘uses the term social and emotional literacy and supports schools in developing the social and emotional skills that help promote positive behaviour and effective learning. Skills such as self-awareness, managing feelings, motivation, empathy and social skills’ are focused on and developed with students (NBSS, 2013, p.2). The next line is a citation from Goleman (EI guru), which states that children that are ‘anxious, angry or depressed don’t learn’ (Goleman, cited in NBSS, p.2). It goes on to list a series of books and resources for schools, with titles such as *Emotional Intelligence in the Classroom*, *Emotional Coaching*, *Becoming Emotionally Intelligent*, and so on. In practice, what this colonization of the classroom by the therapeutic industry amounts to is a new form of social exclusion and a new form of domination, ‘with a human face’. ‘Problem children’, children and teens with ‘anger management issues’, ‘angry boys’ or ‘sad girls’ are framed and symbolically labelled as deficient; as ‘lacking emotional intelligence’, as emotionally ‘illiterate’. Both themselves and their expression of ‘negative emotions’ such as anger are pathologized. The expression of anger in particular is never allowed. Furthermore, such stigmatized children are often ostracized by their peers and more often spatially segregated by their teachers to ‘special areas’, ‘calm circles’ or ‘naughty chairs’. Schools and teachers have the power of definition, the power to physically separate, the power to symbolically categorise non-conforming children as deviant: *plus ça change?* Under the banner of ending social exclusion this therapeutic ethos of emotions entails new and perhaps more insidious forms exclusion.

What this amounts to is a state-sponsored process of habitus formation in which emotions ambivalently become at once the source and solution to all of life’s problems. It begins with an assumption of vulnerability, a diminished or sick self, and reinforces this programmatically via daily repeated education rituals. This expansion of the ‘emotional state’ and the

²²⁸ On which, see the website: <http://www.sphe.ie/Default.aspx>

encroachment of the therapeutic ethos into schools and children, while quite a recent development from the perspective of (Irish) social policy, is in fact the result of the process that began a hundred years ago, when Freud got on a boat for America to deliver his Clarke Lectures. And it is a fundamentally ambivalent process. While at one level, teachers are expected to have a more sensitive, caring and inclusive orientation to their pupils, on another we see new forms of exclusion, stigma and labelling. And these trends are in evidence at all levels of education, primary, secondary and tertiary. The question for the future, then, for those who think in terms of habitus, is what kind of emotional habitus will this process result in or contribute to?

7.4.2. Emotional Excess

The other two facets to this new, expressive emotional regime that I wish to discuss here can be read as paths out of, or in opposition to, the therapeutic. They will, as such, receive shorter treatment. The first of these I am calling emotional excess. There are two aspects to this, both of which could be deemed pathological. The first of these refer to those who I have mentioned above that defined as *lacking* emotional intelligence. They are said to suffer from an *excess* of emotionality. They are not able to ‘properly’ regulate themselves in line with the dominant regime. The second are those who, consciously or unconsciously reject the new regime; who refuse to be inscribed in the categories and labels applied to them.

Both of these are also fundamentally connected with power. Those, whether children in schools or workers, who are deemed to have low emotional capital face disempowerment, exclusion and reduced opportunities. Their way with emotions is deemed pathological, they become ‘toxic’. They are, as such, defined by their emotional excess and surplus – they have ‘anger management issues’, they are ‘too negative’, they are ‘depressive’. Yet, the diagnosis of these pathologies is based on questionable ‘evidence’ and an even more questionable conceptualization of emotions. The evidence and measures for EI usually come in the form of self-questionnaires, an inherently problematic form of data collection in their own right. But the latter, conceptualization problem is the underlying difficulty. For proponents of EI and the (pop) psychological compliers of these tests, emotions become clearly definable and recognizable internal states. The complexity of emotions and emotional life; their relational

nature; the mixing and contradictory processes involved in the flow of experience, are hollowed-out, become de-socialized and simplified. Furthermore, they come to the test with a neat polarization between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ emotions already built in. This bias, relegating ‘negative’ emotions such as anger to the losing side of a pre-established binary in a significant way predetermines the outcome. If whole swathes of the emotional palate are considered pathological while such tests are being formulated, then test results (that involve the difficult, if not impossible, task of disentangling singular unit-emotions and decontextualizing them in any case) in the form of clear-cut numbers are hopelessly misleading, because of, not in spite of, this simplification. They are, *precisely*, meaningless. Nevertheless, those who have the normative evaluation of ‘excess’ imposed upon them from ‘above’ should nevertheless be considered part of the new emotional regime complex.

Some of these so labelled as suffering this pathological excess may accept and embody that symbolic categorization, pathologizing themselves, and aiming to find (by which I mean purchase) a ‘cure’ – therapy, CBT, workshops etc. Others, however, may reject the categorization. This is the second aspect of emotional excess. For some, the dominance of the therapeutic and related modes of emotional discourse results in turning away from all talk of regulation and management. These celebrate their emotional excess. This is connected with what I earlier called ‘emotional communities’ or ‘refuges’. It can also be understood in terms of what Maffesoli calls ‘neo-tribalism’ (1996). Thus, some New Age groups, religious groups and cults, anti-psychiatric groups, drug-use groups, right-wing extremists, football ‘hooligans’, various sexual groups, some queer and trans groups, may engage in emotional displays and rituals that the therapeutic ethos would deem pathological. Some more ‘formal’ social movements could be considered in these terms also. They valorize the devalued emotions within the dominant regime, such as anger, shame etc. But part of the motivation for doing so is because it is deemed deviant; it is taboo. It is bound up with a rejection of the dominant culture and the ‘values’ that go with it. This may be akin to the ‘liminal experiences’ that Foucault discussed (and pursued), experiences that are built around transgressive emotions and the ‘quest for excitement’ that is gained through conscious disobedience and ‘deviancy’. In a sense, they are nevertheless defined by the dominant regime, even if only in opposition.

The example of football gang fights worldwide is illustrative of this (Collins, 2008; Redhead, 2008; Dunning, 1999). These are often highly organized gangs or 'firms' who (ostensibly) support one football club and engage in planned or spontaneous violence with rival team gangs, especially when on tour, and often involving hundreds of individuals on either side.²²⁹ Indeed, the term 'ultras' is often used in Europe and elsewhere for these gangs, indicating the gangs in-group identification with the 'extreme', in opposition to the 'normal' or quotidian. Status accrues within this relational matrix to those who best embody those deviant emotional displays, such as rage, hatred, and so on. This example also raises other interesting questions regarding gender. As well as being predominantly 'working class' (though see Collins, 2008) these gangs are usually defined as 'hyper-masculine', and their sites are areas where extreme ends of stereotypical 'male' behaviour are played out. For some, the dominant emotional regime of (proprietary) expression, especially in its therapeutic mode, is associated with the feminine and rejected as such by these 'real' men. This also ties in with the more generalized thesis that the new regime is behind the much purported 'feminization' of boys thesis, but there is a tendency (on all sides) to naturalize gender difference in this debate.

Yet, this old debate deployed by Maffesoli and others, and the opposing ways of characterizing modernity as being between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, reason and order vs emotion and chaos, will not do us here (Williams, 2001). What I would suggest, more constructively, is that liquid modernity gives rise to a *fractured or heterogeneous habitus*, within which opposing or even contradictory positions may be sustained. Because of the heterogeneity of the habitus now, some may be at once an 'emotionally competent' worker between nine and five, and still be a 'football hooligan' on Friday night. The relational context is key to the expression of habitus, and as the individual moves from one relational space to the other, different facets of the fractured habitus come in to play. The former view tends to reduce or ignore the complexity inherent in liquid modern selfhood, and the heterogeneous habitus that it constitutes.

²²⁹ These gangs and the associated violence are to be distinguished from other forms of spontaneous violence than can occur in football matches. Gang fights are usually organized, more recently online with rival gangs beforehand. These are pre-meditated 'battles', and the gangs are often associated with extreme right wings groups, like 'Combat 18' (1=A(dolf), 8=H(itler)), who violently disrupted an international match between Ireland and England in 1995 (see Dunning, 1999, p.156).

Returning to the Eliasian frame, such transgressive behaviour could be considered in terms of either Cas Wouters concept of 'informalization' or as an aspect of the 'decivilizing' process (Elias, 1999, Wouters, 2007).²³⁰ Yet, there are problems here too. While, as I have suggested, there is much to admire in Elias' approach, his overall scheme of the civilizing process is based on uncertain historical ground. As Rosenwein has argued, Elias read and extrapolated from the manners books and literature of the Middle Ages without any trace of irony or nuance, thereby overdrawing the contrast between the modern and the pre-modern in terms of restraint (2006). But, even with this aside, the notion of decivilization, while he stressed that it could coexist within larger processes of increased restraint, should really be reserved for a more pervasive trend than I am discussing here (Elias, 1999).²³¹ Informalization appears to suggest an advance on this. Wouters' argument is that, since the 1960's (in the West) there was a limited relaxation in self-restraint and emotions, which was tied to changes in power relations. He has analysed this in a variety of ways, from more informal ways of speaking and address (the acceptance of the informal 'tu' in many languages) to sexual behaviour, all connected with increased equality, changes in the 'we-I' balance, and in power relations. Yet these are considered as extension of the overall civilizing process when viewed in the very long term, and amount to 'a highly controlled decontrolling of emotional controls' rather than a reversal of the overall process (Wouters, 1986, 1998, 2007). More recently Wouters (2007) writes of 'spirals of informalization and reformalization', suggesting that the informality and increased expressiveness in evidence from the 1960's was replaced with a trend toward increased formalization during the 1980's and 1990's. Yet, despite its advancement on Elias' treatment, it nevertheless clings too much to some problematic aspects of the earlier framework, not least, its Freudian model of id, ego and superego, and their interactions, that are difficult to sustain (claims to have 'sociologized Freud' notwithstanding). The difficulty here, it seems, may be that the overall theory in which the work is embedded in is not sufficiently questioned. His introduction of the concept of a 'third nature' personality type is an advancement on Elias' treatment and is suggestive of what Sweetman (2003) calls a 'reflective habitus'. He writes:

The term 'second nature' refers to a self-regulating conscience that functions to a great extent automatically. The term 'third nature' is indicative of a development from this 'second-nature' self-regulation in the direction of

²³⁰ Indeed, Dunning (1999 and elsewhere) address football hooliganism from a figurational perspective

²³¹ He writes in this regard of 'decivilizing spurts', but it takes a form of special pleading to use this concept in the context I am addressing here (Elias, 1999).

a more reflexive and flexible one. Ideally, for someone operating on the basis of third nature, ego functions have become dominant to the extent that it becomes 'natural' to attune oneself to the pulls and pushes of both first and second nature as well as the dangers and chances, short term and long term, of any particular situation or relation. As national, continental, and global integration processes exert pressure towards increasingly differentiated regimes of manners, they also exert pressure towards increasingly reflexive and flexible regimes of self-regulation. The term 'third nature' refers to a level of consciousness and calculation in which all types of constraints and possibilities are taken into account (Wouters, 2007, p.213).

Yet, this concept remains somewhat underdeveloped. And, as I suggested earlier, if the habitus is conceptualized as a truly dispositional concept, there is no need to 'reflexify' it. Habitus and conscious reflection are not antithetical, and they never were.²³² Habitus, incorporating emotional habitus, describe a proneness, a tendency to act and behave in certain ways, in certain contexts, and not others. It suggests but does not compel action.

In this section I have addressed a contemporary mode of emotional expression that I am characterizing as *excessive*. I do not mean this normatively, but descriptively, and only by comparison to the normative demands of the dominant regime. Such excessiveness is pathologized in liquid modernity, on that basis. It is also a form of resistance to that regime.

7.4.3. Neo-Repression

The final mode of emotional expression is actually more of a rejection of that mode, but in a different register. Unlike the denial of emotions that I suggested for solid modernity (which was a denial 'in tune' with the dominant regime), this is a form of denial that knows the dominant regime, the new rules of the emotional game, and rejects it. It could be considered a type of stoic reaction to the compulsion to express emotions, the deploying of emotions as capital, but is a form of emotional capital itself. It is, as such, a form of neo-repression that is unlike the former regime (and antithetical to the excessive one).

²³² I have mentioned previously that Elias' conception of habitus is problematic, in that it has a wide range of (not entirely synonymous) referents, such as 'second nature', 'conscience', 'superego', 'personality structure', 'feeling structure', and so on.

This too is a reaction to the therapeutic mode, and it comes in a number of sub-forms. For many, it is a self-consciously cool form of detachment from emotions; a studied control and a general refusal to emote, to speak of emotions or get emotional in public with others. This is, of course, not to suggest that these people are not emotional *as such* (again, we are never not emotional), but rather than membership of certain relational ‘groups’, usually young, educated (perhaps intelligent), and middle class, has turned them against the new normative compulsion to be ‘emotional all the time’, expressively and strategically. This is a distinct orientation from Wouters’ reformalization. It is also not the same as Mestrovic’s ‘postemotionalism’ (1996), which describes the generalized ‘McDonaldization’ of emotions in contemporary society that, to the extent that it is descriptive, appears to describe the therapeutic ethos itself. For these individuals, rather, ‘apathy’ is perhaps a better word. By this I do not mean apathy in its everyday sense of indifference or impassivity (though this may well be a feature of the contemporary emotional mosaic too), but rather in its original Greek sense of ‘apatheia’, ἀπάθεια; from ‘a - "without" and pathos "suffering" or "passion"’.²³³ For the stoics, ‘apatheia’ is a virtue, a freedom from passion, a key component of *eudaimonia* (happiness or ‘human flourishing’).²³⁴ It is better considered a form of *dis*-passion, or equanimity (evenness of mind, composure), a desirable state of indifference to events outside of one’s control, and a core aspect of wisdom. Epictetus, for example, in his *Handbook*, suggests that we only have ‘power’ over our own minds and our moral character.²³⁵ We must, therefore, control our ‘impressions’, so that, if we visit the baths, we must remember what sort of places bathhouses are – ‘there will be those who splash you, those who will jostle you, some will be abusive to you, and others will steal from you...For thus, if anything should happen that interferes with your bathing, be ready to say, “Oh well, it was not only this that I wanted, but also to keep my moral character in accordance with nature, and I cannot do that if I am irritated by things that happen”’ (Epictetus, chapter 4, in Seddon, 2005, p.48). On this, Seddon writes in his commentary:

The worst thing that can happen is that we fall prey to the passions and become angry, frustrated and irritated; that is the only harm we need ever fear. So when we face irritation, disappointments and failures, such as what

²³³ See the online etymology dictionary (<http://etymonline.com/?term=apathy>).

²³⁴ On the stoic view of the passions, which sometimes amounted to their complete ‘extirpation’ see Nussbaum (1996, 2001).

²³⁵ He begins his handbook with: ‘On the one hand, there are things that are in our power, whereas other things are not in our power. In our power are opinion, impulse, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever is our own doing. Things not in our power include our body, our possessions, our reputations, our status, and, in a word, whatever is not our own doing’ (Epictetus, in Seddon, 2005, p.31).

happened at the baths, we should be able quite spontaneously to affirm that what we prefer is for our undertakings to succeed, but what we want is for affairs to transpire as Zeus wills, even if this frustrates our preferences, and for our moral characters to maintain a disposition unaffected by passion (apatheia), distress (alupia), fear (aphobia), and troubles (ataraxia), and therefore free (eleutheros; Discourses 4.3.8). All we have to do to achieve this state of mind is to use our impressions properly, and upon hearing an insult, or seeing that our clothes have gone, to immediately and automatically refuse to assent to the judgement that anything bad is at hand, for it is not (Seddon, 2005, p.51).

Thus, I wish to suggest that this form of stoic dispassion, a form of neo-repression of emotion, is a result and a response to the dominant emotional regime that has raised emotional expression (particularly under a therapeutic ethos) into a value, perhaps the defining value, of our liquid modern times. Those who engage in this type of emotion management are well versed in that dominant regime, and attempt to consciously reject it by rejecting emotions (or, at least, emotional display and talk) altogether, and striving to maintain a cool detachment and composure. Overtime, this can become habitual. It is, as such, very different from the repression of emotions that was prevalent in solid modernity. The source of this mode of denial is a critical stance toward therapy, and the emotionalization of all aspects of life. It is, as such, or can be, a form of resistance; a resistance to being psychoanalysed, or forced in to psychodynamic explanations or narratives of their lives. As such, this too may be pathologized under the auspices of the dominant regime and explained away as a form of psychological repression, enfolded within the therapeutic interpretation – they ‘obviously’ have ‘issues’ with emotions, they are ‘cold fish’ etc. There are of course degrees of this denial. For some, it may resemble little more than the blasé attitude of Simmel; for others it may be a more encompassing aspect of the habitus and a generalized orientation to action. It too, however, is a reaction to the dominant regime and, to the extent that cool detachment and apatheia may be considered itself as an affective stance or expression, it remains part of the mosaic of the overall expressive regime.²³⁶

²³⁶ And I would argue that it is an affective stance and, as such, a form of emotional expression. Unlike the stoics, I do not consider emotions as disturbances or enemies of judgement; nor, like Nussbaum, do I consider them forms of judgement, but rather that, as humans, we are *always* emotional. They never ‘switch off’, but are an integral (and evaluative) component of the flow of experience. As such the apathetic stance is itself, and must be, an emotional (rather than amotional) stance.

7.5. Discussion

These, then, are what I suggest are the primary modes through which the expressive emotional regime of liquid modernity are manifested. Here I would like to deploy some examples from the interviews I conducted in support and as examples of this typology I am presenting. Practically all of the interviewees spoke using the words and idioms of the therapeutic ethos I have suggested as dominant. A typical example of this, comes from Andy, who tells a story of being caught in a fire when he was very young. He says: 'I can remember...vague memories of...standing in the fire, being caught in the fire. And ah...I don't remember the pain of it to be honest, I think that's just suppressed (sic) within my memory and that that, aam, to that degree you just won't remember those things. Aam...so that area would be definitely suppressed...aam from there then I can remember waking up in a hospital. Aam, I was in a private room...'. The point to note is not the content of the quote itself, but rather the casual and doxic understanding of the repression of painful memories or experiences.

Such discourse is also common in Eddie's interview, some of which we have seen already. This is both explicitly and implicitly. The explicit references are, again, casual and taken for granted. For example, he mentions trauma, and the 'traumatic experiences you remember...from childhood', 'PTSD', 'I kind of stopped functioning, socially and emotionally', and so on. In another sense, however, Eddie's story as a whole contain elements of the 'self-realization' narrative that I have associated with the therapeutic mode. His narrative arc is that of development and self 'actualization', the bildungsroman. This is a common feature of therapeutic narratives in general, and shows the penetration of this mode into the narrative structure itself. But above all, in Eddie's case what stands out most of all is the degree of emotional expression itself. The entire interview displays the dominant mode of emotions in its clearest form. Practically nothing is 'held back'. Behind his expressed relationships with his father, his brother, and his current girlfriend hangs the shadow of a psychological understanding of selfhood. He has, of course, studied psychology himself, so is perhaps more 'primed' than others to have embodied this into his habitus. But I think it is more pervasive and representative than this. His interview, then, is revelling of both the fractured or heterogeneous habitus, and the dominant emotional regime of liquid modernity. There is also a tendency toward self-pathologization in his narrative. He has been a 'bad son'

in the past, he has 'let his parents down', but central to this process is the expressing of those emotions of guilt and shame, again and again. He also never really felt guilty selling drugs: 'I've never felt guilty. The only time I ever felt guilty was when I was selling speed and saw a load of lads getting addicted to it'. He *expresses* shame for smoking joints with his brother in India, he 'just felt so ashamed' sitting in the Garda Station on the first night of college. Shame is articulated because we are urged to articulate it; this is 'healthy'.

Which begs a central question: to what extent is this a product of the BNIM interview process itself? As I have suggested already, I became quite critical of the full BNIM 'package', especially the panels and interpretation methods. Indeed, I would argue that, rather than revealing insights about the interview under discussion, what the BNIM panel process actually reveals is the penetration of the therapeutic mode into our everyday understanding of emotions and individuals. In the training sessions I attended, in the BNIM literature and theses I have read, what the panels produce is, more than anything, snap psychodynamic responses and interpretations from panel members. When faced with decontextualized extracts from 'lived life' and 'told story' of BNIM interviews, individuals 'naturally' and 'spontaneously' tend toward such hypotheses: 'she obviously has issues with her father', 'he has repressed those painful memories', 'he might be addicted to sex', 'she's in denial', and so on. As such, what the panels might actually reveal is not an interpretation of the interview under discussion, but rather the emotional habitus of the panel members themselves, and the extent to which such a discourse has become unquestioned, automatic and 'second nature'. Despite the claims to both 'psycho' and 'social' in the BNIM literature, both, including the 'social' are subjected to a type of 'lay interpretation' that is suffused, I suggest, with the therapeutic ethos. This, as I have argued, is a 'pathologizing' code; here it pathologizes the individual under scrutiny and *exposes* them, 'chunk-by-chunk and future-blind' to (pop) therapeutic interpretation, but appears blind to the fact that what is actually exposed far more clearly are the dispositions of the interpreters themselves. The interview is a 'hook' upon which the default settings of *the panel* are hung. As such, the pathologization is reversed. It is the *panel* who are expressing *their* habitus, spontaneously; chunk-by-chunk and future blind, but are blind to the fact.

Does this, then, also damn the interview technique? This case could be made. The BNIM SQUIN and interview do share many of the features of a therapeutic interview. Indeed, the very assumptions of the technique derive from Freudian ‘free association’ and *Gestalt* psychology (Wengraf, 2001, p.69). In particular, the core concept in the elicitation, ‘non-directional facilitative support’ is ‘merely a rewriting of Freud’s original concept of “free association”’ and the ‘non-directional counselling’ of Carl Rogers (Wengraf, 2001, p.125). Yet, Wengraf continues:

While Freud and Rogers are concerned to promote the therapeutic experience, this is definitely not the concern of the BNIM researcher. We deviate from the free association rule by framing the interaction as a research interview rather than a session of psychoanalysis or of therapy or of counselling. We also deviate because we start the first session by a request not for any free association but for a very specific type of account: a biographical narrative (Wengraf, 2001, p.125, emphasis added).

Yet, despite this ‘disavowal’, just five lines later he writes that, after asking the SQUIN, ‘we then shift to something rather like the role prescribed by Freud and Rogers. We avoid giving any further directions to the interviewee in order that their spontaneous *gestalt* is given the space to express itself’ (ibid). From Illouz’s perspective, then, and despite these protestations, the interview too appears to be a therapeutic one, in all but name, which would fit with the assumptions (of defended subjectivity and so on) which undergird it.

Yet, nevertheless, it can, I feel, be a useful method to explore the habitus *sociologically*. What the life history also represent, as I have argued earlier, is both the individual disposition(s) and the relational settings in which those dispositions are formed and enacted. It allows for a ‘thick description’ of the life story in *context* that, when combined with an overview of the social relations and social structure, can be used in the true service of the sociological imagination – history and biography. It is the task and promise of the *sociologist* to trace the relations between the two. And we have seen this, I hope, in both Mickey’s and particularly Eddie’s stories. But this can be achieved only by extracting the interview from the interpretive techniques. Nor do I think that the form or structure of the interview process impose a therapeutic frame onto the interviewee. Rather, I think, the therapeutic frame is so widespread that it is there before the interview begins, for most, but by no means all, individuals. As such the SQUIN and the limited amount of interviewer involvement merely

allows for the emotional habitus itself to be expressed. The therapeutic code is there already, and is expressed, rather than resulting from, the interview technique itself.

But the technique also facilitates the other modes of emotional expression I have discussed here. In particular, some interviewees displayed a resistance to open-ended and depth of the interview process, which revealed the mode of expression I am characterizing as denial. Cathy, a university student, encapsulates this rejection of the emotional expression, and all that she thinks it entails. In subsession one, which lasted just over three minutes, she says:

My parents are divorced since I was two, well, separated since I was two, divorce wasn't legal at that time...they divorced years later and that hasn't affected me on any emotional level whatsoever because I lived with my mother and spent the weekend with my father and when I go home I visit...

She continues, struggling with the entire format of the process:

I don't have anything momentous, my life is sublime! There's nothing wrong with my life, everything's perfect...

I say that I'm not looking for 'wrong' necessarily. She answers: *wrong, good, nothing momentous I've done...ab...my dog died, two years ago...ab.../.../...ob is it emotions you are looking for?*

I say not really, just your life story. I'm looking at social change mainly, but yes, emotions too, but really, just your life story. She replies *well, that's too vague for me now. I need something specific...aam....ab...I don't know now...ab.../...if you can direct me then maybe...*

Here we see Cathy is at pains *not* to play the emotions game. This is not because she doesn't know the 'rules of this game', (she has been 'reading psychology books since she was eleven') but rather, that she rejects it. In subsession two, Cathy is cautious when speaking of her early childhood. She reminds me of the possibility of 'false memories', of how we might 'recall' something that we have seen in a home video or a picture, rather than an actual memory. Her interview continues for over an hour in subsession two, and is rich in PINs, and GINs, but she is resistant to the process, particularly any time she feels the narrative is heading toward ('negative') emotions - 'I'm not great at emotions', she tells me – though she is quite happy to relate happy or funny stories, such as a cousin putting her in a tumble dryer or working with her mom in a B&B. Her parents' divorce, on the other hand, 'was never an issue'. Her mum is 'amazing...I'd talk about her for hours'. But her dad was always around. Perhaps her older brother might have some issues about it 'unconsciously', she 'really genuinely' doesn't. The

one occasion she does talk about being 'upset' is in relation to a dog that passed away. He had been sick for a while and one day he was particularly sick so they:

...took him to the vet and...genuinely...I couldn't say I've cried before...it's funny people say that it's usually a person, when a person dies, you know, takes one thing to break the...chain and then you're able to release emotions after that...Previous to last year I wasn't an emotional person *at all*...like, especially for a female, not very emotional at all at all, but am, then I remember when he was sick myself and my mum took him to the vets and they just ushered us into the back room straight away 'cause they could see straight away, these two blond heads coming in, tears rolling down their face, carrying a dog in a blanket, d'you know, and there is other people in the waiting room, it looked terrible to just let us in...and we said to them, which is best, if he's suffering we'll just put him down, happily, or we'll pay whatever we can to get medication to make it better, you know...[....]...but he just kept getting sick and then I was away for the weekend and this is when I'm raging with my mum and my brother, they didn't tell me he'd died, until the next day...and am...I knew it was coming sort of anyway but ah...and she was on the phone saying BROTHER is after burying DOG and I was like 'what?!' (laughing) you know, I was like horrified and I started balling crying. I was with, most of my friends would be guys anyway, but I was with one of the fellas and they'd never seen me, like, they never even seen me say I loved something, never mind, like, being emotional, and then I started crying and he'd never seen me crying before or even get upset by sad movies or anything. And so he's like 'what the hell?!', d'you know? And ah, anyway he knew then the dog was dead I said 'take me in to the nightclub' and I went in to the nightclub straight away, 'cause I knew if I went in that I wouldn't be able to cry, too many people around, or they'd probably think I was druggin' if I did...but am, I went in there because I wouldn't cry when there is other people around but...yeah...that's that...that's my dog...

However, this event, this breaking of the chain, she returns to again later. Despite the fact that she does embody this denial mode, the reality for her (and all of us) is more complex. There is, in a sense, an implicit struggle going on between her 'former self', a tomboy who does not express her emotions because she refuse to be characterized by the dominant regime, and a 'newer' self she is (consciously) trying to become. There is, I suggest, a repudiation of the code of emotional expression, especially in its therapeutic mode, that is fundamentally tied to gender and the gender expectations she feels she should be expressing.

Harry provides a further interesting example of this denial mode, but it is a less clear example.²³⁷ While Cathy knows very well what the dominant regime is, particularly, as a woman, that she is expected to be expressive of her emotions, Harry is older (52 at the time of the interview) and from a different social position. Yet, his position is not a typical one. At the very beginning of the interview he is keen to stress the 'lack of normality' in his

²³⁷ Harry's interview was fascinating, rich in PINs, but it was a little disjointed. I interviewed him in his own house, but his partner came in on a few occasions during the interview, and engaged in the storytelling to an extent. As well as this, because of his social position and the uniqueness of his case, he is a bit of an outlier relative to the other interviews. I hope to use this interview material in a later project more fully.

upbringing. He is, in his sister's words, 'Anglo Irish', but this is not a term he likes to use. His mother was a Protestant from New Zealand and his father, a Catholic was educated 'outside the country'. He comes from a farming background but one much different to Mickey. Harry's family's farm, the home place, was 'a couple of hundred acres' and was, in reality, an estate rather than a farm. He had been talking to his sister on the morning of our interview and she said:

'oh, that's going to be interesting thing now...what it'll actually bring up' because my mother is from New Zealand. So that removed us from...a lot of the normality in the growing up, and ah, she...and my dad was educated am, a lot outside the country...So, we didn't really fit in to the...and this is an interesting thing for you in a sense...you know, talking...my sister would use the word but I try and stay well away from it. And she's 'oh are you going to talk about, the sort of Anglo Irish aspect of your bringing up?' and I...have always had difficulty with that. And we're not going to, as I said, we're not going into the psychological side of this, the shrink side of it, but it has, I suppose it has been a major part of my life story so in that it has to be mentioned...because, and you might find this interesting in a sense because...you went to school in Kilkee (interviewers hometown in Clare)...I went to school in the brothers for a year and we were...there was a governess at home for a year before I went to the national, and then I went to the brothers for a year. So having missed the very primary school we were immediately removed from...the... 'who are you?', you know, and we spoke kind of differently so...it was a lot, it was a very interesting...situation to find oneself in as a kid and am...as a result that kind of shaped a large part of how I grew up because you never really fitted in with the locality...

I will speak in the conclusion about the importance of place to the way individuals maintain or attempt to maintain a sense of selfhood and unity, despite the fracturing of the habitus. Harry's interview resonates especially well with this and place, both the 'home place' and his home that he has built now, in recent years, are inextricably linked to this. Here, we see Harry explicitly eschewing the whole 'shrink' side of things. He is aware of, and is keen to avoid, any slippage into a psychological or psychodynamic language; or of me 'poking around' in there, particularly when it comes to his family.

Yet, he occasionally slips into this register himself, which is why his case is *interstitial* in a number of ways. Mickey avoids emotions and troubling stories of family without any knowledge of Freud; Cathy knows the psychology, and denies emotions with and because of that knowledge; Harry appears to both know about the 'shrink stuff', to deny it, and still engage in it nonetheless. And while being interstitial, it also represents the increased heterogeneity of the habitus and the 'lumpiness' of liquid modernity mentioned previously.

He went to boarding school when he was *eight*: ‘which would be unheard of nowadays...you'd nearly be brought up to a child tribunal, children abuse! So it was just tears and tears and tears and tear and *major* feckin’ trauma’. He would only come home from boarding school three times a year. This meant that his ‘outsider’ status was continually reaffirmed; he came back to in the locality ‘a complete stranger’. He was in two boarding schools in total until he was seventeen: ‘a bad, bad experience of education’. His potential was never explored in school because, coming from a farming background, it was assumed that you would return to the farm after school. The only things that kept him going in school were that he was tall and strong, six foot two, and he played rugby (‘I lost myself in sport’). In reality, because of this interstitial betweenness, he felt he didn’t really fit in anywhere. Except the home place: ‘It was an interesting way of growing up because we were like, in an egg...the farm, because it was well in off the road it was its own little...cosmos...or eco-climate, eco-sphere or whatever, you know...we lived in that little planet for...that’s really where I grew up’. Better to have played GAA, because then he could possibly have felt some sense community that his social position, his ‘otherness’, denied him.

There is a sharp disjuncture between the perception that the locality had (and has now, in a different context, or at least, Harry perceived they had) of Harry and his family, and the reality of life on the estate. From the outside the family were perceived to be rich, landed and different; internally, they were broke: ‘So I grew up...never knowing what it was like to have money, and yet coming from a place that people assume there was money. I mean we were *broke*...(laughs)...we were fucking broke...’.

So I guess in a sense, I'm not sure if paradox is the right word but it was a strange situation going to boarding school where the money was borrowed to pay for it...so the whole thing didn't really make sense, it couldn't really justify it...I think it's all very confused, the result of it. On the one hand you were going to school, and on the other you were going back and there was nothing (laughs)...so for the fifteen years after it was just head down. The one thing that was a saviour in all that was sport

A number of times Harry (and his partner) mention the ‘bleakness’ of the place in the eighties. Every day was a struggle to keep the place from falling apart. From the outside it is this beautiful old estate; from the back it was mud and broken machinery. It was a once great house in decline. ‘It really needed a huge injection’. Harry and his brother got the finances in

order gradually, over fifteen years, through hard work. Yet his twin brother eventually inherited the place:

we were farming for about fifteen years...and ah...I guess from my perspective, my life story [...] there was six in our family. There's five now. Am...I had, I have a twin brother. He inherited the farm. We won't go in to those sort of details 'cause that's his life. That's another part...but ah...he inherited the farm. All, all very amicably. I was farming the farm with an elder brother. The one thing about our growing up is...everything was very fair.

The fifteen years of work was 'like being in jail', they were cut off from community; everything was about the farm and they were contained within it, a monster that had to be continually tended to and fed. But, here too, we see ambivalence: the farm gave him the connection and integration, the place and purpose he strived for; but it was also like 'Groundhog Day'.

you see, when you work in a place like that, you're so much a part of that little world, you're an integral part of that world, so you're really needed in that world and...it is your purpose. It is your purpose. And when you come out you realize that no one really gives a shit about you, life's just going on all around. It was so safe there. We were broke, but we were never ever hungry. We were never ever ever hungry, and we never wanted for anything. We never had money in our pockets but we never wanted for anything...because we worked. We were with animals every day. Nature has to be, if you want to work with it, you work with it every day. You don't go away from it. So we were an integral part of that world. You know? Now granted, you could walk away from that world and the land is quite happy and it just goes to fallow, nothing happens to it. But if you've got something going it is a part of, you are part of keeping that...system going. You're an integral part of it. So we felt really needed.

For Harry, as indeed, for most of us in this complex world, there is an intimate connection between habitus and habitat (or heimat); between self and place. This is perhaps more pronounced, or articulated through the life story in Harry's case because it is, in a sense, gone from him. His twin brother runs the home place, and after his father left it to him, he and his other brother said 'sayonara' at that point. They got out of 'jail', but a part of him longs to go back.

There are lots of other aspects to this story that I will not dwell on here, such as his joining the Irish army for a year, contracting of Brucellosis (which made him very depressed, even suicidal), working in diamond mines in Australia, driving tourists in Asia, and so on, all of which represent his prolonged (and perhaps, at times, painful) extraction from this life and place into a life and place of his own. There is a self-realization type of narrative at work here, a striving for independence ('suddenly I could be respected for what I did, and I had my own standing') but it is coupled with a continued haunting by the old place and the interstitial

position within the wider society. Here again, we witness heterogeneity and liquidity, but coupled with a longing for solidity and grounding.

Harry ends the interview by returning to two themes. Some years after he left the farm (he was still going up and down to the home place to help his twin brother – ‘I found it very hard to cut the ties, I was very lost as to know where to go’), he eventually began building his own house in a different county to the home farm. His partner was key to this happening. They rented a house for two years and then started thinking ‘maybe it’s time to build a nest’. He didn’t realize that this was something that would be ‘so important, or feel as good. I had no idea what it was like to have your own house...I never thought it would be as good. I *love* having my own place’. He built a lot of it himself, for them, designed by them. It is *his* place. It ties you down, more than renting does – there is always something to be done. On the positive side, there is always something to be done:

I had no idea that this would be such a powerful feeling. Even sitting here talking to you in my place. I never thought I’d even say that – this is my place. How it develops one, how it develops your confidence, your sense of [aesthetics]. I never thought had a sense of aesthetics...[...]...where I am now, it’s a good spot...

There is here, in Harry’s narrative, a *fixing* of biography and self, associated with the *fixing* of place.²³⁸ Place becomes the root of belonging, the site of relational anchorage in the face of the fracturing of liquid modernity. The striving for belonging and the ending of interstitiality has been constructed as a response to the liquidity, and suggests another aspect to the ‘lumpiness’ of late modernity. For Bauman, rootedness to place is a punishment and condition of the poor; the rich and powerful are free-floating. But in Harry’s case the opposite appears to be true. Here place and rootedness have become the sources of meaning and emotional fulfilment – a strategy and force for the reconstruction of self in the face of fragmentation and fluidity. Harry *loves* nature, and the area that he has built his place in. He has a good quality of life, loves to cycle in the surrounding area. He is, he says, basically unemployable, and as a self-employed man in his fifties who has only ever worked with his hands on the farm or off it, he is sometimes scarred of not being able to work in the future. But overall, he believes that everything will be alright. Yet, still:

²³⁸ This is a feature that Burkitt observed in his interview with ‘Paul’ (2005a).

As my sister said...the Anglo Irish thing. It's an interesting one. It puts you in a funny spot here, you know, even now people say 'oh where, where are you from, your accent, I can't trace the accent, are you from England?' And I'll go over to New Zealand now and everyone will say 'Oh, your Irish accent is lovely' you know...Going back to the childhood thing, you know, here I am at fifty two, still facing the same problems of not fitting in. At fifty fucking two...Every, not every day but it's a constant reminder of your background. At fifty two. So I feel that there is still something that I haven't cracked, and that really pisses me off, you know, at fifty two your still fighting this...juxtaposition or this...who you are or who you're not. Because I've never felt part of *that* side of it you know, that Anglo Irish side, I've never...(sigh)...I've never felt...I've always removed myself from it and yet only the day before yesterday – 'oh, I can't place your accent...where are you from'...(ironically, through gritted teeth) I'm from fucking Tipperary! (Laughs)... I really feel I have to take out me gumboots or me wellies and my passport and say 'look! That's what I've done, you know. So...it goes on and you just accept it. But that's where I am and that's who I am.

Here again, at the end, there is something akin to an expression of a cleft habitus that is possibly shared by others in the 'Anglo-Irish' minority in Ireland now. This is a depreciated and declining form of symbolic capital and 'identity'. Literally, a hyphenated one, in which individuals fit into neither side, the Anglo or the Irish. Yet most of what's left of this group are simply Irish, citizens of a diverse (and at least, nominal) republic. This interstitial social position has significantly affected Harry's life, his feelings of security and confidence, and his relationship to place. He *feels* Irish, but is still, fifty two years later, treated as an 'other'. All his life there has been a disjuncture between his 'I' and his 'me', his subjective feelings of selfhood and how he is perceived by others. I am sure he is not alone in this.²³⁹ Yet place, *his* place, may yet become the base of his biography.

7.6. Conclusion

In this chapter I have outlined a typology of ways in which emotional life has been pathologized in liquid modern life. It is obviously schematic, but rather than aspiring to completeness, my aim was to attempt to delineate or trace what I perceive to be the main directions into which the liquid modern emotional regime has splintered, and some of the consequences of this. My argument was that the entire process, and the processes and outcomes of social change themselves, are inherently ambivalent. While on one side there is,

²³⁹ Though I cannot find much sociological work exploring the Anglo-Irish habitus or their struggles with this mis-fitting in contemporary Ireland. It may be one more possibility of future work coming out of this thesis.

for some, greater emotional freedom and benefits that derive from the expression of emotions that characterize this regime overall, there is a significant negative side to this process too. This has manifested itself in aspects of the therapeutic mode or understanding of emotions, which is perhaps the most prevalent aspect of the wider process. Within this register there is a neat polarization between the expression of 'positive' and 'desirable' emotions, and more 'negative' ones. Furthermore, emotions have become increasingly rationalized, objectified and commoditized as the century progressed, with this reaching its (current) apogee under the banner of emotional intelligence and positive psychology. I suggested that this triple-headed process has been facilitated by the 'triple-backed beast' of social life, the market, civil society, and particularly the state, resulting in a generalized emotionalization of social life. This, I suggested, is a significant source of the 'liquidity' that Bauman proposes, in that liquidity is premised on a fluidity of relational and intimate bonds, which the cost-benefit analysis of emotional life that the therapeutic mode affirms and produces. What this mode does, above all, is to lead new forms of pathologization. We are trained to view ourselves, our lives and our emotions as 'sick', full of complexes, issues, repressed memories and dark desires, and consumption is the cure. Those who cannot 'live up' to these new emotional norms, of 'good' and 'open' emotional expression, and not 'bad' and 'negative' emotions which must be regulated and not expressed, become symbolically devalued and directly pathologized, with emotional disorders. And we have seen, again, how intimately power and emotions are bound up and entangled. There is the power of institutions in proscribing new 'normalities', new yardsticks by which we are measured and with which we measure ourselves. But power is also implicitly implicated in the pathologization of negative emotions in particular. In the new emotionally intelligent classroom, corporation and home, anger is not allowed. But, as Flam (2005) has written, negative emotions, such as anger, have traditionally been the preserve of the dominant. She writes that, usually: '(p)ositive feelings flow up and negative feelings flow down the social hierarchy. We find the same pattern in corporations and in gender relations. Corporate 'feeling rule number one' is that 'subordinates should not display anger, since it is a power prerogative and an instrument of power of the bosses' (Flam, 2005, p.22). The extent to which negative emotions have been (are being) pathologized, especially in children, may give rise to a new form passivity and quietism; a future of well-trained, 'emotionally intelligent' adults, with the 'happy consciousness' that facilitate their own domination. Rather than have it pathologized, I would like to see much *more* anger in our fragile, unequal world.

I also suggested two routes out of the therapeutic. The first, which I bundle under the label 'excess' refers to those who are either diagnosed as pathological by the therapeutic regime, as lacking in emotional intelligence, and therefore exhibiting an excess of emotions. The other form of emotional excess refers to those who consciously reject the therapeutic mode, often from within emotional refuges or neo-tribes, where they engage in emotional excesses against the dictates of the therapeutic mode (e.g. hooligans). The second route I described as a form of neo-repression, and I connected it with the stoic notion of 'apatheia'. This involves a rejection of the therapeutic mode in the other direction, and rather than engaging in excess, emotions and emotions-talk are avoided.

In the next chapter, the conclusion, I will return to these issues again, and to the question of selfhood in liquid modernity, the connection to place, and to questions of what endures throughout the relational becoming.

Conclusion

8.1. Introduction

It is said that one never actually finishes a PhD thesis, but that it is abandoned at what is hoped to be the least-worst time. One of the ‘issues’ with this abandonment here, and for the writing of a conclusion for a theory-heavy qualitative project of this sort, is that it cannot be conclusive. Certainly from a ‘scientific’ or positivistic perspective, given the lack of generalizability, the ‘small N’ used in the study, it would be foolhardy to attempt to offer confident pronouncements along the lines of ‘what this study has proved’. I would have had to conduct around 600 life history interviews on one measure (at a 95% confidence and 4% confidence interval) from the population of around four million, but even then, it would not be generalizable. But generalizability was not the aim of this thesis. Rather, the project was self-consciously explorative, and the work involved even in small-scale work of this sort for (the poor, old) ‘lone researcher’ is not insignificant. Neither, indeed, is it so for the lone reader.

Therefore, with these provisos in mind, in what follows I will structure my concluding remarks under four headings. The first section will attempt to summarize the ‘thesis statement’ in as distilled and parsimonious a manner as possible. I will then outline what I think the *contributions* of the study are. Some of the more formulaic advice literature on ‘how to do a PhD’ suggests that the researcher should reinforce this aspect *ad nauseum* as the thesis progresses. I have consciously avoided this, preferring to wait until the end to offer my thoughts on what the contributions are when taken together. And, I will argue, there have been a number of contributions made, both theoretically and empirically. Following this, and while the reader is still reeling from the force of these contributions, I will discuss what I consider to be the main *limitations* of the study, in the hopes that they will appear tiny by comparison. This is a reflexive section where I will, as I said in a previous chapter, attempt to ‘exorcise my daemons’ but also offer reasons for some of the gaps, lacunae or problems with the study, as I see it now. The road to this conclusion has been fraught with problems, changes in direction, disasters, but also joys, revelations, amazement; this is part of the warp and weave of life and learning (and a PhD is about learning). In the final section I will turn

toward some *future work* that might emerge from this study. All three sections, taken together, will offer both a critical, reflexive reading of the project, and a defence.

Some of the notions I have addressed already are very relevant to the practice of research. As an individual can be considered to be engaged in a process of relational becoming, so too can the researcher and the research project. The latter is embedded in a semantic and conceptual relational network, itself in flux, and it changes and grows over time as a result of its transactions with this environment. So too is the researcher embedded in a relational network of academics, fellow researchers, participants, family and friends. Emotions and power are central to both. The researcher, as their habitus changes by virtue of this becoming, experiences a variety of positions in relation to power, but also a range of emotions. In a very real sense the researcher is *re-constituted* through the process of research. Research is a fundamentally emotional business. Emotions flow as the project has its ups and downs. Fear, doubt, anger, shame, embarrassment, despondency, even depression and hatred, from part of the experience of this process. But so too does happiness, joy, love, pride, confidence, and exhilaration. As this project ‘draws to the headland’ (in Mickey’s poignant words) what is striking is that this too, like the processes of social change I have examined, is a fundamentally ambivalent process itself.

8.2. Thesis Statement

How, then, might I encapsulate what this thesis has argued overall? What follows is a short distillation of what the argument as a whole has been. Returning to our overarching research question, I asked:

1. What has been the effect of social change in Ireland on the emotional lives of Irish people?
2. How do we best approach this theoretically?
3. How do we access this empirically?

As I discussed in the introduction, we must address the second question to answer the first. This thesis has argued that the answer to the second question lies in a conception of the *habitus*. That emotions and emotional life are fundamentally embodied phenomena, produced

and created through *experience*, or affective transactions with the environment in which that body is embedded. For humans, this environment is social, cultural and ‘natural’ – other people (and animals), symbolic meaning and material reality. In short, that we *feel* the world (are affected) and are *moved* by the feeling of the world (emotion). This requires, I argue, a clear conception of the ontological situation of our reality. I presented such a scheme, drawing on a diverse range of views, to *grind* a new lens to view this reality through. This I called process-relational realism, which aimed to combine the process ontology of Whitehead (and others), relational sociology, and a provisional realism.

When this theoretical lens is trained on the world we see that individual human lives are engaged in a process of relational becoming, a creative advance into novelty, along with the rest of existence. Yet, they are also embedded in overlapping dynamic networks with other human individuals (and the rest of nature). These social relations are primarily characterized by power relationships. That is, other people (power relationships) and culture (shared symbolic meaning) are the primary environment or ‘world’ for human individuals (along with material reality). Affective transactions with this environment produces emotions, bodily responses to the happenings and events of this world. Both power and emotions are fundamental to the existence, maintenance and destruction of these relational bonds that connect us to one another. In fact, I went further to suggest that they are actually constitutive of our social selves; that positions within these networks and their cultures give rise to our embodied dispositions, or habitus. This habitus is an acquired organization of the body that is dynamic, processual, derived from experience, giving rise to practice. A large part of this habitus concerns emotions, our automatic ‘way’ with emotion, our emotional-being-in-the-world. The cultures of the worlds in which we are embedded have specific emotional regimes. These regimes are reflective of the power relationships within societies, and favour the powerful. Emotional regimes may be strict (normatively repressive of emotional expression) or loose (allowing for emotional expressiveness) but are usually in between. For individuals raised within (i.e. experience, i.e. are socialized) either type of emotional regime, there is a tendency to develop an emotional habitus in line with the prevailing regime, a ‘proleptic adjustment’ to the demands of the emotional regime, which is itself a reflection of prevailing power relationships. They learn *bodily*; they *embody* their history. Mostly, not always and not everyone; there are emotional refuges and communities that may act as sites of and seeds for resistance.

How, then, given all this, can we access this emotional habitus? From the process-relational perspective, I argued first that emotions are also related to narratives or stories. As we are engaged in processes of becoming, and the world we are in is engaged in a process of becoming, we tend to experience that becoming as meaningful. That is, we integrate our affective experience of the world as emplotted, as a meaningfully connected series of events. Thus our emotional lives and narratives are intimately intertwined. Narratives can reveal both our relational lives (the networks we are embedded in; our meaningful shared social relations) and our emotional lives at once. Particularly in the stories that we relate when telling our own life histories, when they are allowed to flow as freely as possible, they reveal the emotional habitus, as well as the process-in-relations within which we are embedded.

So, we may now return to our primary research question. Recall that this asks: what was the effect of social change in Ireland on the emotional lives of Irish people? The Irish example provides a particularly interesting case study, because of the scale and speed with which that society has changed, but the question of emotional life has not been asked until now. I began by suggesting that the best way to depict this social change in Ireland during the twentieth century was via Bauman's metaphor of liquid modernity, though I was critical of some aspects of this. In particular, I aimed to eschew his use of 'identity', which I sought to replace with habitus. I suggested (perhaps hypothesised, though I dislike the term) in general that solid modernity tended to produce what I termed a 'homogeneous' habitus, and that the shift to a more complex, liquefied modernity has resulted in a more 'heterogeneous' habitus (to replace Bauman's notion of the fracturing of identities). I presented a short social history of Ireland from (roughly) 1900-1950, suggesting that this period represented Ireland's solid modernity. I argued that this solidity primarily resulted from the dominance of two key power holders in that society, the state and the Catholic church, their ideologies of nationalism and Catholicism (especially in schools, but also in the home), and a generalised conservative, strict and repressive emotional regime. I suggest that this resulted in the prevalence of a homogeneous habitus in general, and a repressed emotional habitus in particular. In short that the emotional life of individuals socialized during this time would be characterized by a lack of emotional expression, and a distrust and avoidance of emotions (expression and talk) in general. I later deployed Mickey's case as an (ideal)typical embodiment of both of these forms of habitus.

I went on to very briefly outline what I considered to be the better known story of social change from the 1950's on. In short, Ireland became 'globalized' and entered liquid

modernity. I paid particular attention to the role of emotions as engines driving these social changes (such as the anger of the women's movement), which gradually (and painfully) changed the relations of power, and thereby the culture of the country. By entering a liquid modern phase of becoming, the emotional regime began to gradually change. Tracking changes occurring elsewhere, the new regime stressed that emotions should now be expressed. As society became more complex, instead of the homogeneous habitus of the previous phase, we see the emergence of a more fractured habitus, more insecurity, more emotions talk and expression. I deployed the case of Eddie as an (ideal)typical embodiment of these forms of habitus.

Finally, I fleshed out this period of liquid modernity in terms of emotions in more detail. I argued that these changes were a fundamentally ambivalent process, resulting at once in new forms of freedom and liberation, but also accompanied by new forms of pathologization, and self-pathologization. While the overall emotional regime might be said to be expressive, it, too has fractured, producing a more fractured picture of the emotional habitus, as well as the habitus more generally. I critically engaged with what I called the 'therapeutic ethos' or aspect of the emotional regime, stressing that it, too, was an ambivalent gift, as well as two alternatives (excess and neo-repression). I went on to deploy some additional interviews, in relation to these three aspects of the expressive regime.

To put it as baldly as possible: the effects of social change on emotional life in Ireland has been ambivalent. It has presented new ways for emotional liberation and expression, which can simultaneously be new forms entrapment and repression. It has replaced visible forms of domination with invisible forms. It has de-pathologized emotions, only to re-pathologized them in more insidious, commercial and commoditized ways. As such, this new 'emotional Enlightenment' has its own 'dialectic'; it is at once a new dawn, and a false dawn. The relationship between emotions and power still favours the powerful, and the need for a critical sociology of emotions is more acute than ever.

8.3. Contributions

In this section I will outline what I consider to be the key contributions of the thesis as a whole. I have attempted to make a number of contributions, to a variety of areas of scholarship, including sociological theory, the (critical and political) sociology of emotions and to the sociology of Ireland. While the orientation of the project is exploratory, and does not aim at the creation of statistically significant empirical conclusions, I feel it points the way toward future work in which generalizability may be achievable, though this is, I realise, far from a universal desire. The key question regarding contribution is whether, or to what extent, the project has achieved the task it was intended to.

Regarding theory, there have been a number of advancements offered, particularly in part one. Firstly, the thesis has defended the need for an ontological underpinning to social research. This is a current and often heated debate, and there are differences in how the question is approached in different jurisdictions.²⁴⁰ In the United States, for example, because of the influence of Pragmatist philosophy on intellectual life in general, and sociology in particular, most mainstream work eschews any talk of ontology or metaphysics (even if the pragmatists themselves didn't really do this). So too do positivists, and others. In Europe too, ontology (while perhaps more acceptable than in the US) is dismissed from a range of approaches, by anti-foundationalist postmodernists, anti-postmodernist positivists, and 'post-philosophical sociologists' alike (strange bedfellows indeed). In chapter one I attempted to defend the need to engage ontology in social science to avoid getting trapped by the implicit ontological commitments that operate 'behind our backs' as researchers. I called this fallibilist approach to the question a 'provisional realism'. I went on to elaborate an approach to social theory, by 'grinding' various approaches together to construct a theoretical lens, that I called 'process-relational realism'. The point was not to claim or offer a 'brand new' and fully-formed 'system' of theorizing, but rather the more modest one of synthesizing a number of interrelated perspectives and constructing them into a coherent theoretical approach. This drew on the work of Whitehead and others to suggest that there is one nature (a 'flat', anti-dualistic ontology) and that the fundamental character of this nature is process. Drawing on relational sociology, I went on to suggest that substantialism must be avoided and that human

²⁴⁰ See, for example, the recent and heated exchanges about the (re)introduction of Critical Realism to the US on the blog Orgtheory.net.

reality is defined by its relationality. And, from a critical engagement with Critical Realism, I hoped to clarify the provisional realism I have mentioned. What it amounted to was a characterization of human reality as best conceived in terms of relational becoming.

There are a number of implications that are drawn from this approach for social research. All human individuals are embedded in dynamic relations with other humans and the rest of nature. That experiences, from a specific position within these relations, are constitutive of our bodily existence – that our being is constituted by our becoming. This means that static, individualistic and dualistic approaches to social life must be avoided. It also returns the investigation of habitus, properly conceptualized, to a primary position for sociological research.

In chapter two I engaged with two core concepts that I see as necessary to this constitution: emotions and power. I suggested that, while Whitehead used experience, affect, emotion and feeling interchangeably, that an analytic distinction could be made for sociology between these terms. Affect is the full-bodied experience or ‘taking in’ of the world from our transactions with nature (material, social etc), which are constitutive of our selves. Emotion is how the body is affected by that experience. Feeling, though I do occasionally use them interchangeably, could be considered the bringing of those feelings into consciousness. From here I went on to critically engage with and review the sociology of emotions literature and the power literature. I argued that these concepts should be considered to be ‘conceptual twins’, and criticised both streams for not sufficiently addressing these concepts taken together. I have published a paper along these lines (Heaney, 2011) and, more recently, I co-edited (with Helena Flam) a special issue that had this reconciliation between emotion and power as its theme (Heaney & Flam, 2013).²⁴¹ As such, these are concrete contributions emerging from this thesis that I hope to build on in future work.

The third theoretical contribution concerns how both the theoretical approach, and these two concepts in particular might inform our conception of the habitus. I offered a critique of existing elaborations of the concept, and attempted to reformulate a distinctive one based on the theoretical commitments of the project, drawing again on Whitehead and process. I also

²⁴¹ This special will now also appear as part of Routledge’s ‘Special Issue as Book’ Series in August, 2014 (see Heaney & Flam, 2014).

attempted to clarify the relationship between emotions and habitus, deploying the concepts of emotional regime (and climate) and introducing the metaphor of tonality to encapsulate my position. Here too, the use of Whitehead in relation to habitus is innovative, and there is again potential for future work in this area. Also, I defended and clarified a conception of emotional habitus in particular, contrasting it with (seemingly) related concepts in psychology, but found these latter wanting. I later deployed this conception of habitus in relation to social change and explored it concretely in relation to the interview material. There is more to be done to integrate Whitehead into the sociology in general, and to the sociology of emotions in particular.

If part one was primarily theoretical, the single chapter comprising part two was methodological, and a bridge between part one and part three. Regarding the method used, the contribution has been primarily critical. I was especially captious regarding the interpretive aspect of the BNIM programme, while praising it (primarily the SQUIN) as a form of data collection, and as an empirical route (methodos – meta (after), hodos (way)) to the habitus. Others, of course, have been critical of BNIM before me. Yet, I am not aware of any work making the critical link between the panel process and the therapeutic ethos; that, rather than offering insight on the interview material being dissected, it is in fact more reflective of the dominant emotional regime embodied in the panellists, rather than the interviewee.

Part three offers its own, albeit small-scale and incomplete, contribution towards a more complete sociology of Ireland. The relationship between emotions and social change is understudied in general. While there is a robust and growing literature (within the social movements literature especially) on how emotions contribute to and effect social change (“upwardly”), there is much less work on how they are affected by processes of change. Elias was one exception, and I have attempted to lean on his work and the work of others to develop my own position here. That the emotions have been (and continue to be) sorely neglected in Irish sociology is undeniable.²⁴² This work as a whole marks the first attempt to analyse social change in Ireland from the perspective of the sociology of emotions. I have attempted to re-read the last hundred years (or so) of social history from the perspective of

²⁴² As I edit and revise this chapter, Rebecca Chiyoko King-O’Riain of National University of Ireland, Maynooth has a paper forthcoming on the globalization of love, and Skype due for publication in late 2013. Tom Inglis discusses emotions (as I have said) but this is usually within an Eliasian frame, and his focus has been religion.

relational becoming. I offered a (partial, incomplete, tentative) step towards an explanation of this process and its effects on the emotional habitus. The contribution, such as it is, is derived from keeping both concepts – emotions and power – in *focus*, and to show how they are constitutive of habitus. Obviously, the interviews and my interpretations of them from this perspective, are original and my own. Moreover, and drawing on recent criticisms of the concept of identity, I characterized, and hope that the interviews show (to the extent they can), the shift from a homo-geneous to a more fractured hetero-geneous habitus. I also discussed the hysteresis effect, in this regard.

Finally, in the last chapter I offered a broader interpretation of these trends in relation to liquid modernity, and in Ireland as part of that world, more generally. I have thus suggested that the relationship between emotions and social change, and the purported shift from a regime of repression to expression, has been fundamentally ambivalent. I outlined a (partial) typology of emotional pathologies within this new expressive regime, and suggested that the influence of the therapeutic ethos in particular has resulted in new forms of (re)pathologization of emotions, and in processes of self-pathologization. I also suggested some alternative, and potentially resistant responses to this new regime, from the perspective of ‘excess’ and ‘apatheia’.

As a thirty five year old Irish male, I am not comfortable with praise or aggrandisement of any sort, but particularly in relation to myself (it is not part of my habitus). And honestly, when I look at the thesis now, all I can see are problems. However, I think I have attempted to make a contribution to knowledge along the lines here listed. It is for others to judge the extent of the contribution, if any. There is always more to say, and better ways to say it. In that it marks the first attempt to analyse and explain social change in Ireland from the specific perspective of emotions and power, it breaks new ground. It has also attempted to construct or assemble a theoretical lens from the ground up, and turn it to a specific problem, while constructively criticising more established views and positions. It perhaps raises more questions than it answers, but surely this is what exploratory research is supposed to do.

8.4. Limitations

In this section I will outline what I consider to be the main limitations of the study. These will not be exhaustive, but will point to the primary problems or lacunae as I perceive them now. This is, of course, a moveable feast, and has changed over the course of the project. The point of doing this is to acknowledge, reflexively, what I think needs improvement or could have been done better, to better reform my own practice as a researcher.

The first, and (for me) the most glaring limitation of the study concerns gender. When I began this project I expected that I would devote quite substantial portion of the empirical part of the thesis to the question of, and differences in, gender, habitus and social change. However, the project just didn't 'pan out' that way. While I have discussed gender in general in relation to social change in Ireland, and particularly the role of the 'women's movement' (as an 'emotional community') in the bringing about aspects of that change through the deployment of emotions, they do not feature enough in the interviews. Except for Cathy, all the other voices are male. There are a number of reasons for this outcome. I did interviews with three women. One of these was an older woman, who I had hoped to compare with Mickey's material in particular. However, I interviewed Mary in her own house in Co. Clare. Her daughter (my contact) was present and remained in the room for (almost) the entire interview. In fact, though I didn't realize it at the time, when I listened back to the recording, Mary's daughter actually features more than Mary herself. This effectively broke the gestalt of the interview irreparably. The actual material gained was directed by the daughter, who repeatedly answered for her mother, prompting her, and when the prompts were not succeeding, took to telling some of the stories herself. I felt, eventually, that I just could not stand over this material, methodologically.

The other interview is a different case. This was, I thought, a great interview, filled with PINs, rich in detail and emotions. But as the interview developed, the woman became increasingly disturbed. Eventually, she told me a story about herself involving rape. This was a harrowing, upsetting story. At the end of the interview she assured me that she did not mind my using this material for my project. I felt uncomfortable, but the ethical defence of the BNIM programme suggests that it is the participant that volunteers and directs the interview; that if

they share dark material, or get upset, they have signed information forms and are free to stop at any time etc. This is a legalistic version of ethics that I do not subscribe to. Nevertheless, initially, I proceed to transcribe the interview, and started doing initial analysis. My disquiet grew. I contacted the woman, asking her if she was sure about me using this material (and to check if she was OK) and she said it had been on her mind and if it wasn't 'too big a deal' could I not use it. I of course assured her that I wouldn't use it. Frankly, I felt relieved.

My attempts to secure more female participants foundered. The project was already late, I was out of funding, a number of other contacts did not materialize, for a variety of reasons. I proceeded with the interviews I had. I think that the contrast between Micky's and Eddie's interviews is interesting enough for the position I have given them here. But the thesis, while not blind to gender (certainly not through oversight), has turned out to be more or less silent about it. This is the biggest limitation that I perceive. I will return to this when I discuss future work.

Other limitations are perhaps less central. Methodologically, I wish I had known more about social network analysis (SNA) before I began the project. While I do not entirely agree with Crossley (2011), that relational sociologists should not only rely on qualitative material, I think the project would have been strengthened by conducting SNA on at least some of the participants. SNA on its own is not enough either, but combined with 'thick', life history interviews such as Eddie's, I think the results could be very revealing. I have since learned a little more about this (via a Coursera course and in other ways) and it too may be one way to expand out from here.

I think the theoretical aspect of the project could do with refinement. More work could be done on making the different aspects that I have discussed – relational becoming, emotion and power, habitus, emotions – cohere a little better than they do at present. I have revised them substantially as the thesis has progressed, but here too, as everywhere, more could be done.

Finally, and I have mentioned this already, the study is not generalizable, and was never intended to be. Researchers differ on this point, but I think a large-scale project on emotions and social change, one that is large enough to be statistically significant, and combined with other methods like SNA, surveys, diaries and so on, would be an excellent endeavour. In particular, the combination of qualitative and quantitative data that new technologies now afford us opens up new routes to gain insight into social life. For example, using the Experience Sampling Method, installed on phone apps, to take the hourly subjective emotional and other self-reports, as well as context, combined with SNA and depth interviews, would lead to rich and multi-layered data for potentially very high numbers of participants. One of the problems, of course, is resources – time and money. Yet, technology does make the collection and analysis of very large scale data much easier, suggesting an exciting future for the possibility to have statistically significant emotions research that is not confined to ‘happiness’ studies.

8.5. Future Work

All of which might be said to lead in to future work. I intend to use this project as a spring-board into a range of other projects. Some of this has already, albeit tentatively, begun. I am, for example, continuing to work some of these chapters up to submit them to journals. I also have plans to develop and expand the material on emotions and power into a more expanded research agenda. There are also plans to develop Whitehead’s ontology for sociology. In particular, I wish to bring the process ontology of A. N. Whitehead into dialogue with the sociology of emotions and outline what a Whiteheadian sociology of emotion might look like. As we have discussed, Whitehead is currently enjoying a cross-disciplinary ‘second’ (or ‘third’) life, with recent work exploring links between process ontology and social theory (Halewood, 2011). Indeed, Whitehead is arguably the most sociological of philosophers, and some (not all) of the usual criticisms levelled against philosophy do not apply. Yet, within work on emotions, and unlike other philosophers (like Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty etc) Whitehead has not really made an impact. There is scope for future integration here. I would also welcome the opportunity to address the gender issue more thoroughly than I have here. And to expand the methodological approach used here by integrating SNA and other methods, discussed above.

There is also potential to explore, using the framework developed here, the hysteresis effect more generally within the sociology of ageing in Ireland. There is a growing literature on aging and social gerontology in Ireland, but much of this appears to be policy orientated. There is, to my knowledge, little by way of theoretically-driven sociological work that focuses on both habitus, social change and emotions within the ageing cohort exclusively. Here, as I speculated earlier, the gender differences in the prevalence of this effect could again be illuminating. Furthermore, one interesting research question might be framed around the extent to which raising children might compel individuals into processes of readapting the habitus, in an ongoing process of adjustment that children might bring. There is also scope to use this framework to explore the effect in those either married, and without children, and those who are unmarried.

Another potential project could use the framework of this thesis to explore the habitus of the 'Anglo-Irish' as a minority population in Ireland. As Harry's interview showed, the interstitial position of this group, a minority with a long and complex history, are often embedded within different relational spaces, with alternative constitutive forces at work, to the Catholic majority. Again, the frame of emotions, power and habitus could provide a distinctive lens through which to investigate comparative differences with the (ostensibly) Catholic majority, and the possibility of an alternative emotional habitus at work. It would be interesting to see how their interstitial position has affected their individual and shared relational becoming, and their emotional lives.

8.6. Conclusion

As we all know, Isaiah Berlin in a famous essay half-seriously offered a characterization of two different types of thinker, corresponding to two more or less distinct modes of engagement with the world. Citing the Greek poet Archilochus, Berlin suggests that these correspond to the fox and the hedgehog, and that: 'The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing'. He writes that:

taken figuratively, the words can be made to yield a sense in which they mark one of the deepest differences which divide writers and thinkers, and, it may be, human beings in general. For there exists a great chasm between those, on one side, who relate everything to a single central vision, one system, less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which they understand, think and feel – a single, universal, organising principle in terms of which alone all that they are and say has significance – and, on the other side, those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way, for some psychological or physiological cause, related to no moral or aesthetic principle. These last lead lives, perform acts and entertain ideas that are centrifugal rather than centripetal; their thought is scattered or diffused, moving on many levels, seizing upon the essence of a vast variety of experiences and objects for what they are in themselves, without, consciously or unconsciously, seeking to fit them into, or exclude them from, any one unchanging, all-embracing, sometimes self-contradictory and incomplete, at times fanatical, unitary inner vision. The first kind of intellectual and artistic personality belongs to the hedgehogs; the second to the foxes... (Berlin, 1998, pp.436-7).

As I come to the end of this study, these words by Berlin came into my mind, unbidden. Am I, or is this thesis, the work of a fox or a hedgehog? I have for many years described the processes of PhD work in terms of a famous Russian animation by Yuriy Norshteyn called *Hedgehog in the Fog* (1975).²⁴³ This is an allegorical story, based on a Russian folk tale, about a little hedgehog who, on his way to visit the little bear one evening, as he does every evening, to drink tea and ‘count the stars’, he gets lost on his way, in the woods, as a dense fog descends. He is bringing a pot of jam (the PhD thesis or idea) but, as the fog thickens and lightens, he becomes frightened, misrecognises shapes and other animals, eventually loses his jam pot altogether, before it is returned to him by a dog, who he was initially frightened of. I think it encapsulates the PhD process very well: as a journey through fog, where we lose and find ourselves, and our precious jampots; that we meet ‘weirdoes’; that the journey is at times overwhelming; that help often comes from unexpected places; that moments of enlightenment are wonderful, but fickle and transient, and that we often fall in the river just before the finish line. And above all that, by the time we get to the bear’s house, we are changed.

²⁴³ This was voted to be the ‘best animation of all time’ in Japan in 2003, and I agree. I urge everyone to watch it (on Youtube), especially graduate students.

In this sense, then, I am perhaps a hedgehog twice over. I have in this thesis tried to ‘relate everything to a single central vision...less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which they understand, think and feel’ and I have called this relational becoming. From this one idea, I have tried to construct a coherent approach to sociological research that foregrounds process, relations, realism, habitus, emotions and power. I have attempted to use this apparatus to study one (big) question in one (big) specific case, emotions and social change in the Irish context. The answer offered is that this process has been ambivalent, but this answer is itself incomplete. More work is required to expand on this initial step toward an answer to the question posed. Yet, the approach has also been ‘foxy’, in that it has sought to investigate, integrate and synthesize a broad range of perspectives and fields in its attempt to address the question. It has attempted to tie both theory and research coherently together. Above all, I have attempted to embody a variety of the sociological imagination, as C.W. Mills (that wild half-Irishman) described it long ago. I have attempted to ‘grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within society’, and fulfil the promise of that calling and craft.

the Gaeltacht. Now, I remember that very clearly as being a very...amazing experience where like, after a week **I was dreaming in Irish** and all this kind of thing. And I had previously thought of Irish as being a completely alien concept and ah, you'd be learning your modh coinníollach (conditional mood) and driving your head through the wall trying to learn these things like. And I remember, year, **then kissing the girls after the dances** and all that kind of thing. So it was great craic. Aam...lets see then...going in to leaving cert cycle now and ah...when I was in third year I remember smoking **my first fag when I was in third year and ah, with the boys in the jacks like**, you know, the lads'd always be smoking in the jacks like. And around the same time I smoked my **first joint**...and ah, we were down like...all throughout my childhood we had a caravan out in the west coast and every summer we'd go out and stay in this **caravan**, on the beach like. And this was an amazing amazing place like, because, when I was small enough there would have been twenty caravans on the campsite and now subsequently there's one hundred or two hundred. **But originally it was such a close-knit community that like, you'd go there and know everyone like, and it was such a nice thing, all the doors were left open and there'd be, the parents would have barbeques in the evenings and the young lads would be running around. So you ended up growing up with these people during the summer. And it was always very strange 'cause you'd come back summer after not seen them-they'd be from CITY3 or CITY1 or whatever-and you'd come back at summer and you'd be, d'youknow, back, best mates again, rockpool fishing and all that kinda thing.../...Now where was I now...oh yeah, the first joint I smoked was at the MUSIC FESTIVAL week in COUNTY. And I remember, very specifically cause it was just after we'd been robbed by some travellers, the travellers always come down to the caravan site, and ah, during the MUSIC FESTIVAL week and ah, we got in a fight with these travellers and they took some of our money like....and ah...yeah, we ended up a friend of ours gave us a few smokes of a joint like, to calm us down. We were only kids, we didn't know what to do like, you know? But am, that kind of ah, I got in to the stoner culture you could say, like you know, and started smoking fairly regularly like you know, but it was very expensive so what we used to do, myself and a few friends, we'd am...get like a quarter of hash, cut it in half and then sell half it...d'know, so you'd buy it for thirty euro, **sell a bit for twenty then you'd get your own bit for ten**. And this way you'd chip in two euros each and you'd get...yourself without go... breaking the bank like. So we ended up doing this for years like...and ah, my... well now, for a wee while and it slowly escalated to larger quantities and that you know. And ah, one of the lads I lived with, or one of my good friends at the time, was ah, a bit of a loose cannon, my parents hated him like. **And the two of us when we were together we were absolute/ chem/ chemistry like, you know, just getting up to all sorts of bother like you know.** And it was himself and myself used to sell the hash...and then ah...actually, at **the end of third year** a massive thing, once of my best friends... he was an MIDDLE EAST, his mother died of cancer, and ah, he moved to USA with the rest of his family over there, you know? I remember that was my first time ever experiencing someone...you know...close to the family dying like, other than my grandfather who...**died of a stroke ultimately, when I was in sixth class.** But am...yeah, he died**

E
R

E

R

P-TIN

R

A

A/E

Pin

Gins/tins

Kissing girls at dances

LC cycle-school

First fag

First joint
Miltown

Caravan

Close knit
community

FIRST JOINT

*ROBBED BY
TRAVELLERS*

FIGHT

JOINT

*STONER
CULTURE*

SELLING HASH
SMALL TIME

END THIRD YEAR
FRIENDS GRAN
DIES

OWN
GRANDFATHER

<p>and the following year I met a EASTERN EUROPE kid who moved over, and he had zero English but he ended up, he was in my class like. So we were...we'd end up chattin' and ah...he ended up, "FRIEND1"...being my best friend and still to this day he's a best friend of mine. But ah myself, FRIEND1 and FRIEND2, we would have been/A, who's father was a gangster from EUROPE, so FRIEND1 grew up, he had an amazing experiences of seeing people getting shot in the housing estates where mafias ran the areas and stuff like that. So he came over and us, being scared of travellers and scumbags and that 'cause, they'd be trying to rob you and that, in the street and, you know, you'd have to protect yourself, he saw these guys being, as complete wasters and he brought a real ethos to the group of being like 'don't take shit from anybody' like...and ah, he was a great friend to have really, I mean he was a really smart lad...he's after a four year architecture degree now like, but am...We were selling a lot of hash together and ah, then one of my friends, "FRIEND3" he am...he...started taking speed like, a lot so then we were all taking speed, at the time. This was about fourth year...and ah, again, it's a very expensive substance, and, its highly addictive, so we were all kinda slightly hooked on it, needing the money, so we started getting it in quantities and selling it. And ah, it ended up actually, that we were selling, we'd never sell on school premises 'cause that gets you in all sorts of trouble like, so we used always sell outside the school. And ah, to lads in our own year and ah, to people who were finished school and that, you know...it was booming for a while like, you know, and then...we would have been going in to final year now...and ah...FRIEND3 was arrested, he was caught with about a...a half a kilo of speed he was bringing for us like, so he went in to prison for three years...and ah, this was with hash and everything, he was caught with loads in a subsequent search. So he left the group and that was it, you know, we were all like, this hit us like a tank, you know, what we were doing was, bloody dangerous like. So we stopped/well/to an extent we stopped, you'd stay away from big quantities and that like...And ah, final year, this was in final year now so...my parents were...up my ass, you know, saying 'what are you going to do with your life' and all this kinda thing. I didn't really know, I went to career counsellors and they gave me all these aptitude tests and they said 'do Arts' so...I ended up putting Arts on my ah...CAO form but ah, at the time id been mitching school the whole time like, d'you know, 'cause id be out smoking joints or, d'you know? Most of my friends were outside of school so ah, id meet up with them and id hop on yerman's motorbike and wed go off playin' pitch and putt for the day or whatever, selling a few bags of weed, so...I really wasn't in the whole, I wasn't getting on well in school and anytime I was there I was being given' out to for what I hadn't done. So...I was caught then, in like mitching study and all that, just after Christmas...they were like 'we can easily kick you out of school but there's only a few months left so...there'd be less paper work for you just to do your leaving cert.../...My parents, so, knuckled down anyway, and ah, at the time I had my first girlfriend, well my first real girl..</p>	<p>R</p> <p>PIN?</p> <p>PIN?</p>	<p>DIES 6TH CLASS</p> <p>EUROPEAN KID-FRIEND-"1" BEST FRIEND</p> <p>F1 &2 F1's DAD GANGSTAR</p> <p>A ETHOS TO GROUP-DON'T TAKE SHIT</p> <p>STILL SELLING DRUGS</p> <p>Friend3</p> <p>SPEED-4TH YEAR</p> <p>KINDA SORTA HOOKED ON IT-SELLING MORE-OUTSIDE SCHOOL</p> <p>FINAL YEAR-F3 ARRESTED POSSESSION</p> <p>HIT US LIKE A TANK</p> <p>WE STOPPED-TO AN EXTENT</p>
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