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Contextualizing the ‘Other’: Parliamentary Discourses on Genocide and Rape in late nineteenth and late twentieth century Britain

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Abstract

Contextualizing the ‘Other’: Parliamentary Discourses on Genocide and Rape in late nineteenth and late twentieth century Britain*

This thesis argues that parliamentary discourses on genocide and rape have experienced continuity throughout the twentieth century. This is evident from the repetition of discursive categories within the British Houses of Parliament during the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the Bosnian War (1992-1995), despite the fact that both conflicts occurred in extremely different political and social contexts.

In other words, while historical contexts have changed, certain parliamentary discourses have not. This renders these discourses impractical and inadequate in the face of the current social and political environment. In identifying this trend, this thesis argues that the ‘Other’, the antithesis to the norm, ensures that certain acts are not recognised as genocide or rape. This in turn means these cases cannot be grieved or redressed because they do not exist as crimes, having not conformed to norms of recognition, thus failing to reach the established ‘threshold of authenticity’.

Using qualitative research methods, a poststructuralist framework, and a gender frame of analysis throughout, this thesis demonstrates this discursive continuity through a comparative analysis of British parliamentary debates during both wars.

Overall, this thesis examines how the parliamentary discourses of these two wars have helped establish and reinforce the construction of the ‘Other’ which has restricted the confines of the crimes to outside the established thresholds of authenticity.

*This thesis would not have been possible without the generous support of the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS)
In a speech given at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet in November 1997 which outlined Britain’s approach to foreign policy, Tony Blair proudly referred to Britain’s imperial past. While many had distanced themselves from the negative repercussions of Britain’s colonial past, Blair was amongst those who saw its benefits:

“...I want us to make sense of our history. There is a lot of rubbish talked about the Empire. In my view, we should not either be apologizing for it, or wringing our hands about it. It is a fact of our history. It was, in many ways a most extraordinary achievement and it has left us with some very valuable connections...”

While it can be argued that the “achievement” of empire did provide many “valuable connections”, it can also be said that empire provided an equally influential achievement which has been less understood and recognised. Though Blair argues that Britain cannot and should not forget its past, Britain and the Western world is unable to fully distance itself from norms and discourses which were dominant in the late nineteenth century, the height of Britain’s imperial hegemony. At the centre of these norms and discourses is the ‘Other’, a social construct which appeared in reaction to nineteenth century Britain’s struggle to maintain control during a period of social and political change. The ‘Other’ can be defined as a general expression which identifies that which is “fundamentally different from “us”, thus constituting the basis of the identity of “us”, or the ‘Self’. This struggle was characterised by an obsession with social cleanliness and the health of the body politic through the construction and maintenance of strict gender, racial, and class boundaries, and permeated all social structures and institutions and, as will be argued throughout this thesis, continues to do so in one area in particular.

The British Houses of Parliament is one institution which has remained influenced by the norms and discourses dominant during the late nineteenth century. This is evident in the finding that they are present in certain parliamentary discourses implying that they have changed little over the course of the twentieth century, experiencing continuity despite the exposure of these discourses to external influences and their subsequent and demonstrative change in other social and political fora. In other words, while historical contexts have changed, certain parliamentary discourses have not or, at the very least, have undergone a slower rate of change. This renders these discourses, based on nineteenth century norms, impractical and inadequate in the face of the current social and political environment and contemporary understandings of the social issues these particular discourses are concerned with. In identifying this trend, this thesis seeks to develop a new argument regarding the formation and recognition of the ‘Other’, that is, the antithesis to the norm. What is of interest at present is identifying the particular parliamentary discourses that are at the centre of this finding, as is identifying the reasons why they have been repeated within this particular institution.

This example of discursive continuity will be demonstrated through a comparative analysis of British parliamentary debates on war, specifically the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the Bosnian War (1992-1995). Using a gender frame of analysis, the research will focus on the concentration camp systems used in each war and in particular the crimes of genocide and rape. It is believed that both of these crimes share many discursive commonalities, the primary one being that both are clear examples of deviant acts that are deemed serious crimes, yet which invoke controversy in terms of definitions and recognition of cases, directly contradicting their apparent severity. Another commonality between both crimes is the central role the construction of the ‘Other’ plays in the definition and recognition of genocide and rape. For the purposes of this thesis, the meaning of the ‘Other’ will follow on from Harle’s aforementioned general, that which is “fundamentally different from “us””\(^3\), which at present is a normality based on

\(^3\) Ibid.
nineteenth century norms on gender, race, and class and therefore discourses pertaining to genocide and rape. Moreover, this concept of the ‘Other’ will reflect the dichotomy between the normal and abnormal or more specifically, the acceptable and the unrecognisable, mainly because this was the predominant dichotomy espoused by these Victorian-era norms. The meaning of the concept of the ‘Other’ for the purposes of this thesis will be discussed in more detail in chapter two.

This will be demonstrated by comparatively analysing the two conflicts which, given the time between each, will clearly show the continuity parliamentary discourses concerning these crimes have experienced. The decision to centre the research on British parliamentary debates was taken because of the role Britain played as warring party and global leader in diplomacy and warfare during the respective conflicts. Britain’s influence in areas such as policy-making, broadcasting, and political and social activism across the globe since the 19th century made it a primary choice in terms of providing a contextual basis suitable for analysing concentration camp systems in both wars. More specifically, the British Houses of Parliament were chosen because they are an example of a political arena for open deliberation and dissent, and for discussing opposite points of view⁴, the data from which facilitates a poststructuralist framework. Furthermore, a look at both wars in the context of parliamentary discourse is merited by the fact that comparative analysis of British parliamentary discourse is rare as will be discussed in more detail when the thesis’ methodology is outlined below. It is important to note that the aim of the thesis is not to establish whether these wars constituted cases of genocide and rape but rather how the wars demonstrate that discourses on rape and genocide, the foundations of which were popularised in the late nineteenth century, have been replicated over the course of the twentieth century.

In their influential “The History and Sociology of Genocide” (1990), Frank Chalk & Kurt Jonassohn commented that

“A significant, albeit often ignored, difference exists between everyday discourse and scientific discourse. Everyday language does not require and does not benefit from precise definitions; this is so because we want to communicate not only information, but also feelings, attitudes, and opinions.”

This observation recognises the difference between everyday conversational discourse and scientific discourse which relies on precise definitions and categories. What Chalk & Jonassohn expose is the ‘physics envy’ of everyday discourse to these traits which are fundamental to scientific discourse. Attempts have been made to clearly define and categorise social phenomena in the same way scientific discursive categories operate. However, this has been a valiant yet ultimately unsuccessful endeavour because social phenomena are abstract and complex in comparison. Therefore, it will be argued that in attempting to categorise social phenomena and give them precise definitions, definitive standards or thresholds against which to compare the authenticity of social phenomena have emerged. This becomes problematic as many examples of these phenomena, such as acts of genocide and rape, do not meet standards and thresholds which have been established by paradigmatic cases. In turn, such cases become less well associated with the phenomenon in question. However such failed cases are essential in defining authentic cases because one cannot exist without the other. In other words, categories also define what are not authentic cases, in this case, authentic cases of genocide and rape. This is more pronounced in times of war when stereotypes emerge which “formulate the enemy as ‘the other’ and the sufferers on the home side as ‘victims’.”

It will also be argued that the continuity of certain parliamentary discourses have perpetuated and even strengthened the need for authentic examples of these social phenomena.

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Chalk and Jonassohn’s observation is important as it also informs our understanding of late-nineteenth century Britain’s preoccupation with the health of the body politic and maintenance of strict social boundaries. In his history of sexual regulation Sex, Politics & Society, Jeffrey Weeks argues that discussions on the regulation of sex and sexuality identify the importance of “the central organizing role of sexual categorization and the various social practices that sustain the categories.”7 Weeks cites the use of terms such as ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’ to illustrate the role of social boundaries as mechanisms of social control.8 As will be shown further below, this normal/abnormal dichotomy is central to the crimes of genocide and rape which sustain these categories and therefore act themselves as mechanisms of social control against the ‘Other’. The norm thus became the main tool of social regulation which in the late nineteenth century affected the population across gender, race and class. As will be seen in detail in chapter three, the regulation of gender, race and class for the purposes of maintaining the health of the body politic, and therefore the empire, prompted new discourses on social degeneration incorporating discussion on cleanliness, eugenics, ethnic purity, and virility for example. These discussions employed scientific labels of categorisation and distinction such as ‘species’ and ‘genus’, highlighting the importance of categorisation and its organising role. The importance of categorisation thereafter is evident in the development and establishment of ‘thresholds of authenticity’ which represent the definitive standards or thresholds against which to compare the authenticity of social phenomena, in this case the authenticity of crimes, and which are evident in social and political discourse.

‘Thresholds of authenticity’ are instruments of classification which are established when an extreme example of a certain social phenomenon is substantiated as the paradigmatic example of that phenomenon therefore becoming that by which all other similar cases are measured, scrutinised and occasionally authenticated. Thresholds of authenticity are an exclusionary mechanism concerned with

8 Ibid.
establishing a dichotomy based on what is acceptable and not acceptable. Furthermore, they appear to be durable and difficult to change. This thesis argues that thresholds of authenticity regarding genocide and rape exist, but also that they were established on the basis of late nineteenth century social norms represented in parliamentary discourse. It will be demonstrated that these thresholds have endured over the course of the twentieth century. In more detail, it will be argued that British parliamentary discourses have engaged with specifically nineteenth century norms and values which have come to constitute thresholds of authenticity on genocide and rape, therefore informing us of these crimes while also perpetuating these same thresholds. This is problematic because over this timeframe the wider social and political climate has changed significantly, resulting in a definite tension between the discursive demands of what these crimes should entail and the characteristics of the majority of cases. While new discourses on these crimes have emerged over the twentieth century, this thesis argues that these discursive innovations have not been adopted generally amongst members of parliament at least, and members of government in particular. This anomaly positions many cases of these crimes as the ‘Other’, ensuring they are not recognised as genocide or rape or ensuring they are recognised as inauthentic cases. This in turn means these cases cannot be grievances or redressed because they do not exist as crimes, having not conformed to norms of recognition, thus failing to reach the established threshold of authenticity.

Adapting Judith Butler’s use of the term, the positioning of these crimes as the ‘Other’ in this instance renders them precarious crimes. For Butler precariousness means “that life requires various social and economic conditions to be met in order to be sustained as a life.” In the context of genocide and rape, precariousness means that in order to be recognised as crimes, acts of genocide and rape require various conditions in order to be recognised as such. Categories of organisation which uphold norms and act as mechanisms of control are represented not only in paradigmatic examples of crimes and thresholds of authenticity but also in the

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discourses (parliamentary as one example) that regulate what is deemed a legitimate act of genocide or rape. Phenomena like genocide and rape are thought of through “metaphor, metonymy, and prototypes.”\textsuperscript{10} Therefore, the recognition that paradigmatic examples, or discursive categories, of genocide and rape exist is important as it acknowledges that many cases of these crimes are less recognisable and therefore less authentic than paradigmatic cases. These un-sensationalist crimes are therefore ordinary in comparison, often seen as wrong but outside the limits of what many believe should be criminalised. However, the fact that many cases do not match the scale of the Holocaust or genocidal rape, for example, should not detract from the fact that such cases constitute genocide and rape.

The main argument of this thesis is that parliamentary discourses on genocide and rape have experienced continuity throughout the twentieth century according to discourse analysis, the practice of analysing empirical raw materials and information as discursive forms\textsuperscript{11}, conducted in the context of the two case studies. This is evident from the repetition of discursive categories which affect the norms of recognition for the crimes over the two wars, despite the fact that both conflicts occurred in extremely different political and social contexts. The concept of thresholds of authenticity contributes to understanding this anomaly. According to the definition provided, thresholds of authenticity are notoriously hard to destabilise and change and because of this they act as the pillar of discursive continuity. They operate by being the reference point associated with social phenomena such as genocide and rape and, with regard to this thesis, are reflected in the discourses common to both case studies. Five discourses common to both wars have been identified which isolate the ‘Other’ and interpret genocide and rape in a manner which is loyal to late nineteenth century norms and discourses on social purity and social boundaries. These will be explored in detail in chapter five.


As stated previously, gender will be the main category of analysis throughout. This approach can be explained by a number of reasons. Firstly, gender analysis, though a valuable framework, has traditionally been absent from academic enquiry. Its importance lies in the fact that, as criminologists Lorraine Gelsthorpe and Allison Morris suggest, theories which do not address gender are not just incomplete, they are misleading. \(^{12}\) Joan W. Scott has suggested that the absence of gender from analysis was because of the view that gender seemed not to apply, and was therefore irrelevant, “to the thinking of historians concerned with issues of politics and power.” \(^{13}\) However, the necessity of using gender analysis was apparent to many. South African historian Helen Bradford has argued that “breaking with the gender-biased imperialist discourse structuring many war stories does not merely enrich accounts: it alters interpretations” \(^{14}\) a statement which has been echoed by fellow historian Karen Offen who has stated that “when women ask the questions, the past assumes new shapes.” \(^{15}\) Secondly, it is warranted because the majority of concentration camp inmates in question were women and since the focus of data collection and analysis will be on concentration camps systems it stands to reason that a gender framework of analysis be employed to adequately analyse discourses regarding the systems and therefore the crimes in question. Finally, it is felt that a gender analysis can offer new perspectives on the issues presented in this thesis. A gender analysis will reveal the origins and significance of gender roles in terms of how perceptions of genocide and rape are constructed. The setting of this research during war is also significant as war is “a gendering experience”. \(^{16}\)

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Gender is “the culturally constructed beliefs that regulate relations between and among men and women, manifest at various levels of social organization.”\textsuperscript{17} However, gender has often been reduced to a synonym for “women”\textsuperscript{18} thereby excluding the male experience. Gender, and more specifically gender history, incorporates the study of men as gendered beings, as well as concerning itself with “the recovery of women’s pasts and inclusion of female experiences into history.”\textsuperscript{19} As Cherryl Walker has noted, there is a tendency to confine gender analysis to women’s studies “or, once the formal acknowledgement of gender has been made, to proceed without further reference to it.”\textsuperscript{20} However, this thesis acknowledges the importance of a full gender analysis and the fact that gender concerns both men and women and will therefore look at the roles both played during both case studies. The context of war is important because gender norms and roles become more obvious during conflict; as Benderly has observed, gender roles become more polarised by nationalism and war.\textsuperscript{21} These roles include the “innocent civilian” and the “especially vulnerable”, roles not confined to war time but which become exacerbated during conflict and which, overall, “exert constitutive effects on the discourse and regulative effects on the behaviour of actors within the network.”\textsuperscript{22}

Judith Butler has described gender as “the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being”\textsuperscript{23} implying that gender is a process. This notion of performativity will be explained in more depth in relation to the current research in chapter two. Similarly, Scott identifies that the process of gender is used to outline social relations between the sexes, therefore

\textsuperscript{18} Scott, op. cit. n. 13, p. 1056.
\textsuperscript{22} Carpenter, op. cit. n. 17, p. 663.
becoming integral to denoting and allocating “appropriate” roles for men and women.\textsuperscript{24} From these viewpoints, gender, as well as race and class, is recognized as “a social category imposed on a sexed body.”\textsuperscript{25} Butler has stated her wariness about the tendency of some theories to “compartmentalize gender over here and race over here” as she is with those which aim to “synthesize them absolutely or set up analogies between them as if they are isomorphic in relation to one another.”\textsuperscript{26} Anne McClintock explains that gender, race, and class are not “distinct realms of experience” which exist in “splendid isolation from each other” nor can they be “simply yoked together”; ultimately they exist “in and through relation to each other.”\textsuperscript{27} In other words, the three are processes “so interconnected that they cannot be disentangled.”\textsuperscript{28} These assertions mean that while gender is the main category of analysis, both race and class cannot and will not be ignored. This will be evident throughout as both of these categories will contribute significantly to the discussion presented.

Just as gender cannot be studied in isolation from class and race, women and men therefore cannot be studied in isolation from each other. To do so would be to perpetuate “the fiction that one sphere, the experience of one sex, has little or nothing to do with the other.”\textsuperscript{29} In doing so it also recognises that men and women do not conform to assigned gender roles: men can be victims of violence as well as being perpetrators, and women can be perpetrators of violence as well as being victims. Although research has been, and continues to be, conducted highlighting these anti-normative gender roles\textsuperscript{30} a closer look at this aspect of gender war

\textsuperscript{24} Scott, op. cit. n. 13, p. 1056.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} A. McClintock (1995) Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest, London: Routledge, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{28} Scott, op. cit. n. 13, p. 1067.
analysis will not be possible given the strict confines of the thesis although certain elements will be referred to. While the obvious application of this frame of analysis is on gender-based violence it can also applied to the study of genocide. Until recently, the relationship between genocide and gender was neglected and work on the subject is only just emerging. Despite work led by Adam Jones on the targeting of specific genders for specific punishment, and the development of gender-specific theories of evil which comment on the overwhelming numbers of men who commit the crime, research also shows that women are just as capable as men of being perpetrators of genocide.\(^\text{31}\) Copelon is correct to assume that persecution based on gender is a legitimate category of crimes against humanity. She notes that in the wake of the Holocaust the concept of crimes against humanity was closely associated with violations against religious and ethnic groups, despite the fact that it is a broad concept, with open-ended categories of persecution which are “capable of expanding to embrace new understandings of persecution.”\(^\text{32}\) Shaw has observed that genocides are profoundly gendered.\(^\text{33}\) Sex discrimination in genocide,
in terms of the separation of men from women and distinct punishment meted to each sex, is “primarily a function of power relations” with the gendering of the crime indicative of “the gender assumptions of the perpetrators in general, and their perceptions of gender relations in the target groups.”\textsuperscript{34} In relation to target groups, Shaw maintains that the gendering of genocide not only accounts for male victimisation of women, which has been acknowledged by scholars, but by the overwhelming male victimisation of men, who have accounted for the vast majority of those killed before and after the civilianisation of targets.\textsuperscript{35} This aspect of genocide, Shaw claims, needs to be highlighted because of its surprising neglect in comparison to the plight of women.\textsuperscript{36}

Furthermore, this thesis acknowledges the danger of suggesting that information about women automatically provides information about men which perpetuates the myth that the experience of one sex has little to do with the other.\textsuperscript{37} As Walker notes,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 179.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Scott, op. cit. n. 13, p. 1056.
\end{itemize}
“One of the advantages of using gender as an organising principle is precisely that it moves the analysis beyond the preoccupation with particular categories of women, and abstracts the notion of womanhood/woman-ness (as well as manhood/man-ness) as it operates in society – in particular societies.”

However, the scope of this thesis prevents it from examining more closely issues which emanate from the main discussion. A gender analysis of war generally entails the discussion of the relationship between gender and nationalism. While this topic will be referred to during this thesis, it will be only to illustrate a point. In mentioning it from the outset, this thesis acknowledges the importance and scale of the topic, recognises the contribution it makes to the discussion, but also concedes that a fuller discussion of the issue is not possible within the confines of the present research.

This thesis will analyse the use of gender as an organising principle and the particular categories of gender which operate in tandem with other categories of organisation such as class and race. This is important as the theme of contextualising the ‘Other’ and what the ‘Other’ signifies in different historical contexts is central to the current investigation. The importance of gender as a category of analysis, and the recognition of its interconnectedness with other frames of analysis such as race and class, signal the value of using the Boer War as a case study. This is because, as stated previously, it will be argued over the course of the thesis that current discourses on genocide and rape which are still prominent in parliamentary debates were formulated and popularised during the late nineteenth century. In turn, these discourses were prominent during and represented by the Boer War as will be detailed in chapter three. In this sense, a gender analysis provides “a refusal of the fixed and permanent quality of the binary opposition” as signified by the polarised gender roles deemed appropriate for men and women since the late nineteenth century. A gender analysis also offers an important insight into the issues prevalent during the Boer War – a patriarchal and misogynistic historical moment which was also experiencing destabilisation due to undergoing change in gender norms. It will also highlight the irrationality of the continuity of

38 Walker, op. cit. n. 20, pp. 6-7
39 Scott, op. cit. n. 13, p. 1065.
discourses. While thresholds of authenticity can account for the inferred continuity of discourses and crimes in general, its combination with a gender analysis demonstrates and explains the context of discourses, specifically those regarding genocide and rape. Finally, keeping in mind the interconnectedness of social process and categories, a gender analysis can also broaden our understanding of race and class and its relationship with genocide and rape.

Overall, this thesis examines the social and political factors that reinforce and redefine our understanding of these crimes today, that is, how the parliamentary discourses of these two wars have helped establish and reinforce the construction of the ‘Other’ which has restricted the confines of the crimes to outside the established thresholds of authenticity. It will do so over the course of six chapters which will engage theoretical considerations, methodological strategies, and empirical data.

Chapter One will identify the definitions of genocide and rape that will be used for the purposes of the discussion. Using these definitions as its foundation, it will also identify popular discourses of these crimes. These discourses have traditionally endorsed the formation of the ‘Other’ although, as will be discussed, new and alternative norms and discourses which move away from this view have gradually emerged. This shift away from the traditional represents a destabilisation of traditional discourses and has emphasised the necessity for new discourses which better reflect contemporary issues concerning, and cases of, these crimes. The change in discourses will be emphasised in later chapters when the lack of similar change in parliamentary discourses on the same crimes is revealed. Finally, the chapter will discuss the relationship between these definitions and the concept of thresholds of authenticity. It has already been made clear that this concept facilitates the continuity of discourses on the crimes in question. The discussion that will be presented focuses on the problem of recognisability with respect to the crimes in question as epitomised by their paradigmatic, and unique, examples, and the importance of categorisation in the identification of the ‘Other’.
Chapter Two deals with two important areas of the thesis: its theoretical framework and its methodology. The theoretical framework that will be employed is poststructuralist and draws heavily on the work of Judith Butler. Specifically, the chapter will explain her concepts of performativity and of framing. Iterability and performativity are important insofar as these discourses are repeated, but also insofar as how members of parliament’s identification of thresholds of authenticity are performed. Framing is conceptually very important as is the idea of precariousness. Both help account for why certain discourses and crimes are not acceptable according to established norms. Analysis of Butler’s work and its significance in the overall argument of the thesis will be prefaced with a brief discussion on the main tenets of poststructuralist theory, and will make special reference to the work of Michel Foucault in doing so. Overall, the sections concerned with the theoretical framework will outline the main tenets of poststructuralist theory that will be applied to the investigation and focus on the concepts of discourse and discursive fields, which are of importance given the analysis of parliamentary debates. The issue of subjectivity will also be discussed. This discussion will acknowledge Butler’s view of precarious lives, living beings that exist outside of set frames. However, as the focus of this thesis is on precarious crimes and cases as opposed to precarious lives, or lives that are ungrievable, the stipulation of subjectivity of the crime rather than the person will be made clear. Finally, Chapter Two will also outline the research methodology employed, explaining why the chosen methods were selected, identifying potential problems with the research, and explaining how they can be consolidated and solved.

The third and fourth chapters discuss the role Britain played in, and its reaction to, the Boer War and Bosnian War respectively while outlining the historic specificity of both eras. Both chapters introduce the ideas presented in the first chapter within the context of specific conflicts, with emphasis placed on the concentration camp system used in each case. Chapter Three will discuss how discourses on genocide and rape have experienced continuity over the course of the twentieth century by introducing both the first case study, the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), and the corresponding social and political context which will account for how the
discourses on genocide and rape were established. This will be done by analysing discourses on gender, race, and class which were dominant at the end of the nineteenth century. The discussion will look specifically at how these discourses were reflected in Prime Minister Lord Salisbury’s parliament. The chapter will begin with a background to the conflict’s origins, followed by a brief account of the conflict itself. Following this, focus turns to the war’s concentration camp system and the discussion will demonstrate how dominant social and political contexts were replicated by and within this particular institution.

Chapter Four will continue the discussion of how discourses on genocide and rape have undergone minimal change over the course of the twentieth century by analysing the Bosnian War (1992-1995). It will also analyse the corresponding social and political context which will account for the discourses on genocide and rape which were prevalent in parliamentary discourses at the time and specifically how these discourses were reflected in parliament under the auspices of Prime Minister John Major. Like the previous account of the Boer War, Chapter Four will begin with a background to the conflict’s origins, followed by a brief account of the conflict itself. It will also present an account of the concentration camp systems used, drawing discursive comparisons with the account of the Boer War presented in Chapter Three, ensuring links are identified between both conflicts. Both chapters will gradually isolate discursive patterns and trends that debates during both wars shared in common.

Following on from these detailed discussions, Chapter Five will isolate a number of discourses of war present in parliamentary debates and questions during both the Boer War and the Bosnian War. These discourses have been isolated not only because of their evident continuity but also because of their recognition of the ‘Other’, their impact and influence on thresholds of authenticity and, therefore, the recognition of cases of genocide and rape. A total of five discourses have been isolated; three of which concern the origins of the conflicts, the latter two dealing Britain’s reactions to both conflicts. Each identified discourse will be subject to application of the poststructuralist theoretical framework. What will become
apparent from the poststructuralist analysis of these discursive categories, as well as observations made in regard to the concept of thresholds of authenticity, is that the reliance of outdated views on crime, conflict, and gender remains a problem within the British Houses of Parliament. Another issue which will become evident during the analysis is the division of opinion, and consequently of discursive traits, between members of government and the opposition. The fact that the majority of statements within each discursive category were made by government members suggests that the use, or even the reliance, on outdated discourses of genocide and rape is policy-related and of benefit to governments. This is one of many observations that will be detailed in this chapter.

Finally, in Chapter Six, conclusions will be drawn to summarise the study of the threshold of authenticity, the continuity of discourses in the British parliament, and the precariousness of certain crimes. As well as this, a number of suggestions regarding future research on the area of discursive durability and precariousness will be put forward.
Chapter One

Defining Genocide and Rape

1.1. Introduction

While the last chapter outlined the research hypothesis and the general outline of the thesis, this chapter will outline the definitions of genocide and rape which will be used over the course of the current investigation. This chapter will also trace the development and motives behind each definition which will add to a greater understanding as to how they were established. It will also give special consideration to the influence of discourses and varying contextualizations of the ‘Other’ and why parliamentary discourses on these crimes have not developed at pace with contemporary understandings of them. In her comparative analysis of western governments’ rhetorical framing of the Gulf War and the Bosnian War, Riikka Kuusisto observed that “research on recent and earlier instances of Western war rhetoric has revealed a tendency for simplifications, black-and-white depictions and a relentless determination to see matters through to absolute victory...”40 The data and subsequent analysis presented in this chapter will support Kuusisto’s observation of a simplistic take on events which has ultimately impacted on discourses of genocide and rape, on what norms are recognisable, and in particular the thresholds of authenticity of those crimes. The discussion of definitions and discourses of the crimes will focus on the fact that such concepts and definitions emerge at a given historical moment and in a particular context. However, the Bosnian War was not in the same historical moment as the Boer War and yet, as will be shown, the same discursive categories were evident during both time periods.

1.2. Definitions and Discursive Trends

Many different definitions and interpretations of genocide and rape have been developed over time. Moreover, the development of different definitions suggests that discourses have in fact changed, or have been and are still undergoing continuous development. The existence of definitions which focus on different priorities and characteristics supports the hypothesis that parliamentary discourses on these crimes have experienced continuity over the twentieth century and, therefore, that these discourses do not correspond with changing views of these crimes. Though many recent definitions attempt to reflect new information and awareness regarding genocide and rape, they appear not to have impacted on parliamentary discourses on these crimes. In any case, though different definitions exist for both crimes, it is parliament’s discussion of the crimes that is currently of importance.

Joan W. Scott reports that words, “like the ideas and things they are meant to signify, have a history.” Words which focus on crime and “ideas and things” concerning genocide and rape also have a history. The continuity, or replication, of parliamentary debates on these crimes over the course of the twentieth century calls into question what the history of these terms is and indicates that their history warrants investigation. For example, Clive Emsley describes crime as something that people rarely experience as victims, explaining that “perceptions of crime therefore depend largely on what they are told about it.” Problems therefore ensue if parliamentary discourse at least tells the same story about crime that it had done a century before.

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41 Scott, op. cit. n. 13, p. 1053.
When arguing that parliamentary discourses on both crimes have remained consistent over the course of the twentieth century, it must therefore be simultaneously argued that other discourses on these crimes have evolved over the same time, highlighting the continuity of the parliamentary discourses that are the focus of this thesis. This observation adheres to the principle established by the exception to the norm, which dictates that existence is based on the dependency of the ‘Other’. In recognising its ‘Other’, this causal relationship becomes necessary in the formation and acknowledgment of thresholds of authenticity. While this section will provide a general overview of definitions of these crimes, it will also outline the popular discourses on these crimes which simultaneously create the normative cases of genocide and rape, and precarious cases of these crimes. Moreover, it will also suggest how these definitions correspond to, and support, thresholds of authenticity.

1.2.1. Genocide

Genocide has been called “the worst of all crimes.” Samantha Power has deemed it “the ultimate crime.” According to Eric Markusen and Carol Rittner, it is “the ultimate human rights violation, encompassing all other violations, including murder, torture, genocidal rape and other atrocities.” Berel Lang has described it as “the equivalent of a curse other than which nothing is more damning.” As it stands, genocide is legally the most serious crime that can be committed, as it is considered an “aggravated” crime against humanity. It would therefore be expected that a crime this widely condemned could be clearly defined,
acknowledged and punished. However, in his 1997 investigation of the genocide of Amerindians, Ward Churchill described genocide as “the least properly understood word in the world today”, one which has been subjected to “a bewildering array of misrepresentations and distortions, both unintentional and deliberate” since the term was conceived.49 This lack of understanding, as identified by Churchill, indicates that genocide is an ambiguous term which fails to be neatly categorised and identifiable.

While the term genocide is relatively new, coined only in 1944, the crime itself has existed for much longer. Genocide scholars Robert Gellately & Ben Kiernan have noted that the twentieth century introduced new technologies and methods of genocide, but it was not when the crime originated.50 Moreover, as Martin Shaw notes, these new technologies and methods led to new characteristics “that made people think differently” about the crime and how it could be conducted.51 These developments necessitated a new term for the crime, one which was better able to reflect “new circumstances or old circumstances newly pushed to an extreme or, perhaps, an expanding moral consciousness or imagination.”52

Many have identified the age of empire as when contemporary understanding of genocide originated. The First World War is credited with introducing the concept of total war, “a conflict fought by citizen soldiers with no clear distinction between home front and combat zone...”53 However, the Boer War and colonialism in general prefaced this scale of destruction which was characteristic of the twentieth century. Mike Davis has written that nineteenth-century colonialism was marked by regular famine-related genocides, within “the context of cyclical weather patterns that tended towards food crises”, which, when combined with “more or less conscious neglect and indifference on the part of colonial authorities contributed

50 Gellately & Kiernan, op. cit. n. 30, p. 21.
51 Shaw, op. cit. n. 33, p. 1.
52 Lang, op. cit. n. 47, p. 6.
decisively to extensive, preventable famines.” Davis also argues that it is difficult not to decipher a “quasi-genocidal element” in these events, an element often associated with the Boer War. Barnes notes that genocides “often occur at a time when a new regime is emerging and seeking to establish a new order in their domain”, indicating that genocides can be “particularly useful for regime consolidation.” In this sense, certain genocides can be and have been seen as catalysts for positive or necessary change. This was certainly the case regarding colonial expansion, and may have been a contributing factor as to why this particular area was avoided as a part of larger genocide research until recently. However, this was also true of the break-up of the Former Yugoslavia which occurred during the post-Cold War emergence of new nation-states, a process seen as a positive move away from the legacy of Communism and a divided Europe. Until recently the issue of colonial genocide had proved contentious within the field of Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Notably, according to A. Dirk Moses this was because these cases did not resemble the Holocaust or its attributes. The Holocaust has over the latter half of the twentieth century been established as

“the paradigmatic instance of genocide, the analysis of which have significantly shaped our notions of what should be construed as genocide.”

In doing so it has also unknowingly been accepted as the authentic standard against which other cases of genocide are measured and either accepted or rejected. This is supported by Gregory Kent whose work on the framing of the Bosnian War has indicated the existence of a threshold of authenticity, the instrument of measurement and classification defined in the previous chapter. His observation that “the features of the genocidal wars against Croatia and Bosnia ‘seem to fall

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54 Shaw, op. cit. n. 33, p. 39.
55 Ibid.
within the limits of the tolerable, even the normal” ⁵⁹ demonstrates how the Holocaust has affected reactions to genocide. At present, this consensus has changed within the field and colonial genocide is now an integral part of Holocaust and Genocide Studies. ⁶⁰ However, as stated previously, this thesis is not concerned with whether the Boer War was in fact a genocide, but how discourses on the war itself have exposed the lack of progression of parliamentary discourses on genocide and rape over the course of the twentieth century.

The term genocide was devised by Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin who later developed its legal definition during the Second World War and the Holocaust, a definition enshrined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereafter Genocide Convention). This defined genocide as

“any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” ⁶¹

This definition has been criticised because of the influence of the Holocaust on its development which has restricted its application to contemporary cases of genocide. As Martin Shaw notes, Lemkin’s definition was “plausible as an overall account of Nazi occupations” taking into account “variation in the experiences of occupied peoples.” ⁶² That Lemkin’s early work treated genocide as an inter-state problem has caused much confusion and uncertainty as to what constitutes genocide, especially considering that genocide increasingly became a case of states killing groups of their own citizens during the twentieth century. ⁶³ Alexander Laban Hinton explains this by suggesting that the Holocaust “very much puts its imprint”

⁶⁰ Moses, op. cit. n. 57, p. 291
⁶² Shaw, op. cit. n. 33, p. 32.
⁶³ Chalk & Jonassohn, op. cit. n. 5, pp. 8-9.
on the Convention and “subsequent definitions that emphasize intent, particularly with regard to the role of the state.”\(^{64}\) Another criticism of the 1948 definition is that “the Convention is silent on the issue of what amounts to partial destruction” of groups despite the fact that the “number killed is the criterion on which the label ‘genocide’ turns.”\(^{65}\) Churchill has observed that governments and international legal bodies as well as the public have made these misjudgements regarding the term\(^{66}\), further strengthening the need to examine parliamentary discourse on the crime in general. For example, the popularity of the oversimplified assertion that “genocide equals mass murder” had, by the mid-1980s, rendered the idea almost universal.\(^{67}\) Churchill notes that for the most part, the notion, and definition, of genocide has conflicted with “real world” phenomena, rendering it inapplicable to many cases, while its common utterance has rendered it a rhetorical tool, its frequent deployment trivialising the term, or voiding it of any real meaning.\(^{68}\)

Despite these shortcomings, this definition will be used for the purposes of this thesis because as well as being the legal definition, it also acts as a basis from which the alternative definitions emerged. Moreover, it will be used because “the definition of genocide that politicians rely on is an authoritative interpretation” of the Genocide Convention while “less authoritative and widespread definitions cannot be expected to impact significantly on decision makers”, an important point given the widespread acknowledgment that genocide prevention is dependent on political will.\(^{69}\) However, it was Lemkin’s intention to develop a broad concept of

\(^{64}\) Hinton, op. cit. n. 10, pp. 10-11.

\(^{65}\) Kent, op. cit. n. 59, p. 7.

\(^{66}\) Churchill, op. cit. n. 49, p. 399.

\(^{67}\) Ibid., pp. 423 - 424

\(^{68}\) Ibid., p. 399

the crime. According to Jacques Semelin, many academics believe that the Genocide Convention offers the most useable definition because a common definition of genocide cannot be agreed on. Concerns over the definition of the crime have recently been met with admissions that “it is impossible to find a workable definitional core that completely satisfies every scholar,” and that perhaps the best alternative is to revert back to that presented in the Genocide Convention, at the very least because it is “a workable alternative to the present anarchy in definitions” or what Shaw has called the “vexed meaning of genocide.”

Other definitions of genocide have attempted to narrow Lemkin’s broad concept of genocide to counter what Hinton has called “the dilution metaphor” which risks “diluting” or reducing the meaning and power of the term through its use in a “broad array of cases.” As is being currently argued, such definitions reiterate these unique characteristics, deemed important or vital to acknowledging the occurrence of genocide, which have residual effects on parliamentary discourse. Though many of these new definitions of the crime were created to avoid the legal rigidity of the Genocide Convention’s definition, to deal with the omissions the legal definition presented, and to allow for more inclusivity of cases for the purposes of research and analysis, understandably, many have felt it necessary to develop their

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71 Bjornlund, Markusen & Mennecke, op. cit. n. 69, p. 28.
73 Hinton, op. cit. n. 10, p. 10.
theories and definitions in line with that provided for in the Genocide Convention. Helen Fein is one such scholar whose work is a sociological approach to genocide as defined by the Convention. Fein developed her definition of genocide over the course of the 1980s, a time when assumptions of Holocaust-uniqueness were returning to prominence, concluding in 1988 that

“Genocide is a series of purposeful actions by a perpetrator(s) to destroy a collectivity through mass or selective murders of group members and suppressing the biological and social reproduction of the collectivity. This can be accomplished through the imposed proscription or restriction of preproduction of group members, increasing infant mortality, and breaking the linkage between reproduction and socialisation of children in the family or group of origin. The perpetrator may represent the state of the victim, another state, or another collectivity.”

However, Fein’s definition did acknowledge that murder was not the only modus operandi of genocide, suggesting she is “perhaps the closest follower of the Convention.” More recently, Dovid Katz suggested that genocide is

“the mass murder of as many people as possible on the basis of born national, ethnic, racial or religious identity as such; with intent to eliminate the targeted group entirely and internationally; without allowing the victims any option to change views, beliefs or allegiances to save themselves; and with large-scale accomplished fulfilment of the goal. Genocide leaves in its wake an extinct or nearly extinct group within the territory under the control of the perpetrators.”

Katz’s definition is another which shares similarities with that presented in the Genocide Convention; the Holocaust is evidently what characterises genocide. However, Katz’s definition negates any development Fein’s may have made, reverting to the Holocaust as its basis, concentrating on the scale of the case, rather than acknowledging that genocide can be conducted using other means, and result in a smaller scale of killings in comparison to that of the Holocaust.

74 Sémelin, op. cit. n. 70, p. 284.
75 Moses, op. cit. n. 57, p. 292.
77 Shaw, op. cit. n. 33, p. 44.
Katz’s definition has contributed to the aforementioned “anarchy in definitions” which risks enforcing, and arguably has enforced in some cases, inadequate, discourses of genocide. For example, Chalk & Jonassohn define genocide as a “form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.”

Eric Markusen & Damir Mirković have suggested that this definition which emphasises the “one-sidedness of the killing” must exclude casualties of war because “neither side is defenceless” during conflict, thereby ruling it out from use in this thesis. However, both Chalk & Jonassohn’s and Katz’s definitions are important because they represent widely held views of what genocide should embody. These definitions run contrary to Lemkin’s vision which saw extermination as the “destruction of ways of life as well as of lives.” They are flawed because they risk ignoring the existence of other cases which do not meet the threshold of killings the Holocaust produced. Nonetheless, this common perception of what genocide should entail becomes problematic when translated into mainstream and political discourse and in particular when converted into subsequent policies. In other words, “the debilitating effect of the Holocaust paradigm remains.”

The Convention’s ambiguity regarding the measurement of killing “in whole or in part” has also contributed to the confusion surrounding the term. One repercussion of this uncertainty is that many have adopted the term “genocidal massacre” to refer to cases “that fell short of the wholesale destruction of a population.”

Former UN Secretary General’s Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide Francis Deng acknowledged this trend of mislabelling acts, stating that “allegations of genocide are too often loosely made to describe various forms and degrees of..."
mass violence.”Michael Ignatieff made a similar observation, while Director of
the Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University, stating that

“Those who should use the word genocide never let it slip their mouths. Those who
unfortunately do use it, banalise it into a validation of every kind of victimhood.”

Similarly, Blum et al have criticised the acceptance of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’
which appeared during the 1990s and was for many a euphemistic term for
genocide. In their opinion, the term “bleaches the atrocities of genocide” and
undermines its prevention. This supports the fact that many continue to regard
only cases that approximate the maximum case of total extermination such as the
Holocaust as genocide. Moreover, Barbara Harff has observed that the Holocaust
has been “employed as the yardstick, the ultimate criterion for assessing the scope,
methods, targets, and victims of [other] genocides.” This in turn has been
politically convenient as it severely limits the actions governments need take should
a case for genocide recognition be made, as will be discussed in relation to Britain
and the Bosnian War further below, but has also provided impetus for social
scientists such as Michael Mann to construct their own groups of classifications for
mass killings. Freedom from the term ‘genocide’ has allowed Mann and others to
distance their work from the strict legal definition, which itself fails to recognise
many ‘obvious’ cases such as that committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia
during the 1970s.

According to Stuart Stein, the organisation of all group-targeted and other mass
killings under the concept of genocide “partly accounts for some of the basic

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and Mass Atrocities: End of Assignment Note, New York: Office on Genocide Prevention and the
Responsibility to Protect.
Washington: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
86 R. Blum, G. Staunton, S. Sagi, & E. D. Richter (2007) “Ethnic cleansing’ bleaches the atrocities of
87 Shaw, op. cit. n. 33, p. 35.
Mass Murder since 1955’ in American Political Science Review, 97 (1).
89 M. Mann (2004), The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press.
misunderstandings that prevail concerning the content of the convention and its role in the international regulatory framework."\(^{90}\) Shaw notes that “to make people believe that killing people can be right, against the backdrop of fundamental prohibitions on killing in human society, has always been a core problem in war.”\(^{91}\)

This is the case with regard to genocide, but what remains a neglected issue is perhaps not making people believe that such killings are right or justified, but that they are wrong. Instead, the international community is inclined to focus on those cases which are inherently wrong, or which have reached a certain threshold; anything that fails to reach this standard can be categorised as something less critical, or at least something which is more difficult to condemn and cannot, therefore, be called genocide.

Essentially, the international community resists the use of the term to avoid the obligation to act that comes with its utterance, just as Rhonda Copelon has noted that the term “civil war” translates, in all languages, as “not my problem”; such an admission demonstrates that the international community has defined a situation “in terms of what it has been willing to do about it.”\(^{92}\) As Smith argues, in the European discourse surrounding particular purported genocides, “genocide” is used much more often to describe situations by those who are not in government than by those who are in government.\(^ {93}\) Dan Bar-on has argued that “the architects of genocide are those who carefully plan the process of socialization.”\(^ {94}\) What needs to be investigated further is how bystanders, such as Britain during the Bosnian War for example, influence this socialisation through the medium of political discourse. This thesis is consequently concerned with the acceptance of this idea within parliamentary discourses, the effects this has on the recognition of the ‘Other’, the evolution of discourse, and the effect it has on the subjects concerned.

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\(^{90}\) Stein, op. cit. n. 58, pp. 48-9.
\(^{91}\) Shaw, op. cit. n. 33, p. 123.
\(^{92}\) Copelon, op. cit. n. 32, p. 189.
1.2.2. Rape

Like genocide, rape is consistently deemed a serious crime. Ruth Seifert describes it as “a violent invasion into the interior of one’s body” and that it “represents the most severe attack imaginable upon the intimate self and the dignity of a human being.”\(^{95}\) Moreover, it is often regarded as one of civilisation’s oldest crimes and an inevitable aspect of war. However, the crime is inextricably linked with dramatic incidents involving violent serial rapists, child abusers, and strangers for example, which in fact account for a minority of rape cases. Incidents which do not share these characteristics lack the sensationalist nature of the former examples, resulting in their exclusion from the recognised category of rape. This also impacts on thresholds of authenticity and common perceptions of the crime which more often than not necessitate some element of physical violence. The term rape, not unlike the term genocide, is wrought with confusion and misunderstanding. Kate Roiphe has controversially argued that the term has become

“a catch-all expression, a word used to define everything that is unpleasant and disturbing about relations between the sexes...regret can signify rape. A night that was a blur, a night you wish hadn’t happened, can be rape.”\(^{96}\)

From this viewpoint, the term rape, in peacetime\(^ {97}\) at least, also experiences “anarchy in definitions”\(^ {98}\) and a threshold of authenticity similar to that associated with genocide. Eric Reitan has called rape an “essentially contested category”,\(^ {99}\) one that Joanna Bourke sees as “infused through and through with political


\(^{97}\) Lene Hansen differentiates between “peacetime” and “wartime” rape in (2001) ‘Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security’ in International Feminist Journal of Politics, 3 (1), pp. 55-75. These terms will also be used throughout this thesis to differentiate the different settings in which rape and other forms of sexual violence take place. In doing so it does not intend to differentiate between different cases of rape thereby endorsing a ‘hierarchy’ of acts of sexual violence.

\(^{98}\) Bjornlund, Markusen & Mennecke, op. cit. n. 69, p. 28.

meaning.”\textsuperscript{100} Though violence is integral in all acts of rape and sexual abuse, the difference in recognition appears to be the level of extremity of the act: the more extreme the violence, the more legitimate the case of rape. In her study on the relationship between language and sexual consent, linguist Susan Ehrlich warns that

“all these factors have made it credible to assume a real/unreal rape dichotomy and to further believe that “real rapes” are more likely to be reported than ‘those who fall short of the standard.”\textsuperscript{101}

This standard is also applicable to rape committed during war. A distinction is often drawn between genocidal rape and “normal” rape in war indicating a rape “hierarchy.” This distinction “obscures the atrocity of common rape”\textsuperscript{102} drawing parallels with how the Holocaust similarly obscures lesser known incidents of genocide.

Acknowledging that rape also experiences “anarchy of definitions”, the definition of rape which will be used for the purposes of this thesis is that formulated by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda during its judgment in the case against Jean-Paul Akayesu in September 1998. This case marked the first time that a person was convicted of genocide and the first time that rape was recognized as a component of the crime. The Chamber’s definition of rape is “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”\textsuperscript{103} It recognises that “rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts.”\textsuperscript{104} In stating this, this definition of the crime transcends many of the issues other definitions present, such as ascertaining the technical criteria of the crime. It is also more representative of the violent rather than sexual aspect of the crime, and also offers a more suitable platform from which to launch

\textsuperscript{100} Bourke, op. cit. n. 53, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{102} Copelon, op. cit. n. 32, p. 205.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
the theoretical framework and support the current hypothesis. The anarchy in definitions is also acknowledged by the Chamber, which stated that there is no commonly accepted definition of the crime in international law.\textsuperscript{105} Finally, it must be noted that the Chamber saw sexual violence, including rape, as an act which must, for its jurisdiction, be committed “(a) as part of a wide spread or systematic attack; (b) on a civilian population; (c) on certained catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, political, racial, or religious grounds.”\textsuperscript{106} This thesis will therefore use the Chamber’s initial definition as it encapsulates the factors which are intrinsic to the crime and to an examination of associated parliamentary discourses.

According to Seifert, rape occurs in situations where

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“(a) male power has become unstable, (b) women have a subordinate status and low esteem, and (c) rigid definitions of “masculine” and “feminine” prevail and are connected to strong hegemonies or hierarchies of value.”\textsuperscript{107}
\end{quote}

This is most likely because war’s legitimate violence blurs “the distinction between taking a human life and other forms of impermissible violence” with rape and other atrocities becoming “an inevitable by-product.”\textsuperscript{108} None of these situations definitively excludes the possibility of male rape yet, at a glance, they all point towards rape perpetrated by a male on a female victim, relinquishing focus on female subjectivity to the behaviour of, and effect on, male groups. Moreover, this set of criteria applies to societies in times of conflict, which is the focus of this thesis. Rape is associated with social taboos in all cultures, regardless of context.\textsuperscript{109} It has traditionally been seen as “a ‘normal’ accompaniment to war,”\textsuperscript{110} and

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\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Seifert, op. cit. n. 95, pp. 56-7.
\textsuperscript{109} Gellately & Kiernan, op. cit. n. 31, p. 14.
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presented as “a natural aspect of wartime sexuality.” As Hansen notes, wartime rape’s (previous) invisibility “relied upon a construction of rape as ‘normal behaviour’ in warfare.” However, the idea that rape is inevitable in times of war contradicts the fact that incidents of rape “vary so greatly over geographical space and historical time.” Elisabeth Jean Wood has studied the variations in incidences of sexual violence during conflict, concluding that while rape is not inevitable in war the literature on sexual violence during war has yet to provide an adequate explanation for its variation across different wars and warring parties. She explains that the type of warfare has no influence on rates of sexual violence which “varies in prevalence and form among civil wars as well as inter-state wars, among ethnic wars as well as non-ethnic, among genocides and ethnic-cleansing cases, and among secessionist conflicts.” More importantly, Woods argues that oftentimes this form of violence is perpetrated with the intention to ruin the most vulnerable civilians for life, echoing Lemkin’s belief that the object of genocide is to do the same. This can be explained by Hansen’s argument that rape during conflict, in comparison to peacetime rape, is seen “in much less sexual terms” because “the woman in question is understood as being raped primarily because of her national, religious or ethnic identity and only secondarily because of her sexual features.”

Nationalism as seen in the early nineteenth century established female symbols of the nation such as Germania, Britannia, and Marianne, using “the example of the chaste and modest woman to demonstrate its own virtuous aims.” This process “fortified bourgeois ideals of respectability that penetrated all classes of society during the nineteenth century” ensuring that those who threatened social degeneration by not living up to the idealised female and contradicting feminine

111 Bourke, op. cit. n. 53, p. 381.
112 Hansen, op. cit. n. 97, pp. 59-60.
113 Bourke, op. cit. n. 53, p. 436.
115 Ibid., p. 330
117 Ibid., p. 335.
118 Hansen, op. cit. n. 97, p. 59.
values of “respectability and rootedness.” Therefore, the relationship between gender and the establishment of the ‘Other’ in this context is significant and will be explained further below.

The ‘inevitable’ infliction of rape during war was traditionally seen as a form of communication between men. In other words, “a simple rule of thumb in war is that the winning side is the side that does the raping” insofar as rape is the act of the “conqueror” which is carried out “on the bodies of the defeated enemy’s women.” The denial of women’s subjectivity in terms of traditional rape discourse is evident from analysis of reactions to the crime during the First World War, which directly followed a period in history synonymous with the promotion of sexual purity and temperance. Rape was a vital theme in the British propaganda machine, with German rapes and sexual abuse dominating “contemporaries’ imaginings and representations of the war,” for example. “The Rape of the Hun” thereafter came to “symbolise the criminal violation of innocent Belgium” and dramatize “the plight of La Belle France.” However, rapes by Bulgarian and Greek soldiers in the Balkan war and the rape of Hungarian women by Russian soldiers also earned attention.

Leila J. Rupp argues that the first wave of the international women’s movement corresponded with the “early murmurings of women against the rape of women in wartime.” However rape was never mentioned or explicitly stated but only referred to. During the First World War, for example, women from twelve countries lobbied the U.S. president Woodrow Wilson to mediate in order to save lives and to avoid making women “victims of the unspeakable horrors which inevitably accompany the bloody game of war!”

120 Ibid.
121 Seifert, op. cit. n. 95, p. 59.
122 Brownmiller, op. cit. n. 108, p. 27.
123 Goldstein, op. cit. n. 110, p. 369.
124 Brownmiller, op. cit. n. 108, p. 38.
126 Ibid., p. 1.
127 Ibid., p. 3.
the area, rape during war was consistently defined by what men did to other men albeit through an act carried out on the bodies of women. Many men regarded their masculinity as compromised by the abuse of “their” women whom they were supposed to protect.\(^{128}\) In other words, throughout history wartime rape served to “humiliate enemy males by despoiling their valued property.”\(^{129}\) Goldstein also writes that rape in wartime is “an extension of everyday misogyny by other means”\(^{130}\) supporting the thoughts of writers such as Susan Brownmiller, who herself stated that “sexual trespass on the enemy’s women is one of the satisfactions of conquest...[reflecting] submerged rage against all women who belong to other men.”\(^{131}\)

According to criminologist Ngaire Naffine, rape “is a crime which makes manifest criminological and legal orthodoxies about the respective natures of men and women, and the appropriate relation between the two.”\(^{132}\) This “appropriate relation between the two”, based on strict Victorian gender boundaries, ensures that any deviation from these roles is met with the ‘Othering’ of the subject in question. Crucially, given that parliamentary discourse is being analysed, that parliament predominantly comprises of male members, in addition to the traditional absence of female subjectivity regarding rape, has revealed that

> “Prevailing accounts of this crime have been built upon a male understanding of heterosexuality, not women’s experience, and yet that male point of view has often been presented as universal, as natural and as inevitable.”\(^{133}\)

Naffine’s argument explains why outdated parliamentary discourses relating to war rape are still prevalent and still influence thresholds of authenticity of the crime. Sociologists John H. Gagnon and William Simon developed the concept of sexual scripts as a way of understanding the social construction of sexuality, with each

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\(^{128}\) Seifert, op. cit. n. 95, p. 59.
\(^{129}\) Goldstein, op. cit n. 110, p. 362.
\(^{130}\) Ibid., p. 366
\(^{131}\) Ibid.
\(^{133}\) Naffine, op. cit. n. 132, p. 99.
script differing ostensibly for men and women\textsuperscript{134}, based on Victorian-era gender norms. These scripts dictate that men should be aggressors and women the “gatekeepers”\textsuperscript{135}, a notion obviously influenced by respective reproductive capabilities. Gagnon and Simon’s concept has been criticised for being “ahistorical”, as it fails

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“to consider where sexual scripts and sexual meanings come from, and for failing to consider how the sexual behaviour of women and men reflects not only the learning of cultural scripts but also the effects of differential social power.”\textsuperscript{136}
\end{quote}

However it is also applicable to wartime insofar as the expectation is that the female population of the ‘conquered’ are defenceless, and submissive, as has been discussed. Targeting the female population is necessary given that the target nation is often gendered as female as was the case regarding the aforementioned La Belle France and “innocent” Belgium. Women are also perceived as “the mothers of the nation”, whose

\begin{quote}
“most important contribution to the nation-state has apparently been their reproductive capacity that facilitates the growth of the nation’s population and the creation of new soldiers to defend it...”\textsuperscript{137}
\end{quote}

However, sexual scripts have also been applied to those who commit rape, limiting both men and women’s “gender mobility” and “reinforcing traditional sexism.”\textsuperscript{138} Sexual scripts have also reinforced stereotypes surrounding the crime itself, which has contributed to a distorted understanding of rape. Male physiology and subsequent outbursts of “passion”\textsuperscript{139} and “aggression” towards subordinates\textsuperscript{140} are

\textsuperscript{138} Goldstein, \textit{op. cit.} n. 110, p. 371.
\textsuperscript{139} Roginsky, \textit{op. cit.} n. 138, p. 247.
often cited as motive for war rape. Another popular assumption is that rape “has to do with an uncontrollable male drive that, insofar as it is not restrained by culture, has to run its course in a manner that is unfortunate, to be sure, but also unavoidable...” However, this understanding of rape “is built upon a biological drive in men which borders on essentialism.” Rape, rather, is a sexual manifestation of aggression as opposed to an aggressive manifestation of sexuality. However, this was not evident in early accounts of war rape. The primary focus on the impact of rape on men rather than the female victims “reflects the fundamental objectification of women” which in turn perpetuates sexual persecution by failing to acknowledging its gender dimension.

A more significant form of contemporary rape invisibility is that involving men as victims. As Ruth Seifert notes, “the myth of man as protector that is mobilised in most wars is really nothing more than a myth.” However, the dominance of traditional sexual scripts means that the rape of women is often seen as a reflection of their male peers’ inability to protect them. At its most extreme, the rape and sexual abuse of men distorts their gender roles beyond recognition, destroying them often, and revealing these victims as the ‘Other’ in contrast to their predominantly male abusers. If the abuse is recognized, it may not always be seen as sexual violence, for the issue is often concealed by the rhetoric of ‘abuse’ or ‘torture’. Often times, castration is seen as ‘mutilation’ and rape as ‘torture’, a view that becomes apparent when reading reports of non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations. This view reinforces the idea that men cannot be subjected to sexual assault. Because wartime sexual violence has typically been defined as an issue affecting women male victims, and indeed female perpetrators, are absent from any established discourse and fall outside the scope of predominant understandings of the crime. This is despite Sivakumaran’s

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141 Seifert, op. cit. n. 95, p. 55.
143 Seifert, op. cit. n. 95, p. 55.
144 Copelon, op. cit. n. 32, p. 208.
145 Seifert, op. cit. n. 95, p. 59.
observation, similar to Woods regarding wartime sexual violence in general, that the numbers of men who suffer wartime sexual violence vary between conflicts from the seemingly sporadic to the more evidently systematic.\textsuperscript{147} Moreover, like Seifert and Bourke’s earlier remarks regarding why wartime rape occurs, it is argued that wartime sexual violence against men occurs because there is “an attempt to suppress challenges to the social status of the dominant group.”\textsuperscript{148} This attempt is consolidated by transforming the enemy male population into the masculine ‘Other’.

In contrast to the ideas presented by Brownmiller, events in the Former Yugoslavia and reactions to them, have changed this outlook to some degree. The use of rape during the Balkans conflicts became especially notorious because of the fact that, by this time, “civilising influences in Europe had become so widespread” and improvements in “women’s social status” seemed to guarantee protection that many considered such barbarities impossible.\textsuperscript{149} Some observers saw it as a “new style of warfare ... aimed specifically at women,” using “organised sexual assault as a tactic in terrorising and humiliating a civilian population.”\textsuperscript{150} Others, including Catharine MacKinnon, went so far as to assert that mass rape of this kind was “a form of genocide directed specifically at women.”\textsuperscript{151} While the new visibility of war rape has been welcomed and applauded, Hansen has noted that the attention given to the mass rapes in the Former Yugoslavia was “perhaps slightly surprising” because rape had been used as a strategy of warfare for centuries.\textsuperscript{152}

The targeting and subsequent impact on the female population, rather than the consequences for the male population, caught global attention and arguably promoted a new degree of attention the crime had never before been associated with. This is because the use of rape during this conflict had a different goal than in

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., p. 260
\textsuperscript{149} Seifert, \textit{op. cit.} n. 95, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{150} Goldstein, \textit{op. cit.} n. 110, p. 363.
\textsuperscript{152} Hansen, \textit{op. cit.} n. 97, p. 56.
previous wars, or at least called older hypotheses on rape during war into question. In the case of the Former Yugoslavia, rape had been used not just as a means to exact revenge, “reward” for soldiers, or as random acts of sexual violence, but also as a systematised weapon of domination. The feminisation of the enemy also targeted male members of the population. Again, the events in the Former Yugoslavia highlighted this traditionally overlooked aspect of the rape in war category, bringing it to the forefront of discussions of wartime sexual violence. For this new generation “being a victim of sexual violence did not mean being incapacitated and powerless.” Reactions moved away from the traditional feminist discourse of the 1970s and 1980s which paid attention to “female emotional and psychic fragility in the face of injurious social structures.”

The Bosnian War simultaneously sensationalised the nature of the war rapes, forging a new threshold of authenticity compared to other conflicts. That the Bosnian case has attracted and commanded so much worldwide attention is important as even though it educated about rape warfare it also highlighted a new systematic means of war rape, which risked institutionalising it as paradigmatic. Catherine MacKinnon has written that the use of rape as a weapon of war during the break-up of the Former Yugoslavia was “to everyday rape what the Holocaust was to everyday anti-Semitism.” This notion brings rape warfare in Bosnia on a par with the Holocaust insofar as it establishes a new and almost unique standard of rape warfare based on established norms of war and sexual abuse. In this sense, the case of war rape in Bosnia runs a risk of establishing itself as an exceptional case, rendering others as less than deserving of this prestigious category. However, this itself questions why this case should be seen as exceptional, the answer of which lies in the fact that this apparent uniqueness “is a product of the invisibility of the rape of women through history as well as in the present.”

This commentary on war rape in Bosnia demonstrates that

154 Bourke, op. cit. n. 53, p. 429.
155 Ibid.
156 Copelon, op. cit. n. 32, pp. 197-8.
“the politics of rape always occur in a historical context. The victims, the reporters, the readers – they, we, all exist in very particular historical settings that will determine whether we are assaulted and by whom, whether we ever hear about the assaults on others and from whom.”\textsuperscript{157}

Cynthia Enloe makes an important point in recognising that whether rape is taken as a “conscious attempt to control and humiliate women” or as “part of wartime’s politically dulling litany of “murder-pillage-rape”” is determined by these historical contexts.\textsuperscript{158} The historical context evident during the twentieth century has resulted in the view that rape is “an inescapable element of modern warfare.”\textsuperscript{159} However, as shown earlier, events in Bosnia and reactions to them have prompted the emergence of a new discourse because of the increased subjectivity of women as victims of rape warfare. On the other hand, events in Bosnia have also placed genocidal rape at the top of the rape hierarchy and established it as a threshold of authenticity, upholding popular paradigms of what rape warfare and wartime gender violence should entail while simultaneously pointing towards a solution to the problem.

1.3. Definition, Categorisation, and Thresholds of Authenticity

So far this chapter has outlined definitions of genocide and rape, that is, what the crimes entail at their most basic level. In doing so it has also outlined the background to how each definition developed and, more importantly, has outlined corresponding discourses on what each crime \textit{should} entail. In turn, these popular discourses represent and have enshrined the threshold of authenticity for each respective crime. While the thesis’ introduction defined the concept of thresholds of authenticity and demonstrated what they are, this section will elaborate on the


\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{159} Bourke, \textit{op. cit.} n. 53, p. 385.
concept further having outlined the examples and criteria of what acts of genocide and rape should entail in the previous section.

As has been shown throughout this chapter, definitions of, and popular discourses on, genocide and rape rely on the construction of the ‘Other’ using norms which, as will be seen over the course of the thesis, were popularised during the late nineteenth century. The fact that varying levels of attention are given to different cases of each crime demonstrates the validity of the concept of thresholds of authenticity and the argument of categorisation as a central social organising concept. Admittedly, this often depends and varies according to the historical context of the crime which is committed. As Enloe has argued, the politics of rape, and therefore of genocide, “always occur in a historical context.”

However, analysis of parliamentary discourses on the crimes suggests that the variables which different historical contexts present, and which develop perceptions and understandings of the crimes outside of parliament, are not reflected in members’ dialogue.

For Canadian philosopher Wendy Hamblet, humans, by nature, are “namers”, making sense of the world through a process of identification and categorisation which attempts to give meaning to the “absurdity of experience.” Ailbhe Smyth has similarly identified a “mania of classification” within society. These accounts correspond with Chalk & Jonassohn’s earlier observation regarding precise definitions and groupings which elude sensitive and emotive issues such as genocide and rape. Genocide and rape are susceptible to such standards. For example, the reality of genocide and particularly concentration camp systems is misrepresented by the dominant Holocaust paradigm: a unique example and therefore a difficult standard to reach.

\[160\] Enloe, op. cit. n. 158, p. 221.
\[162\] Unpublished discussant comments made at Galway Rape Crisis Centre’s 25th anniversary conference “The Next 25 Years: Societal Responses to Rape and Sexual Abuse” held on 27th November, 2009.
As such, crimes that meet this threshold must also have met the criteria established by norms of recognition. The terms ‘genocide’ and ‘rape’ are thereafter employed as a means of “conferring status” while lesser standards provide the ‘Other’, that which is opposite and unaccepted. This status unveils respective cases as officially sanctioned acts of genocide or rape, cases that have reached the threshold of authenticity and are therefore deemed legitimate. Having earned this status, cases can be ‘grieved’ and addressed: they do not exist alongside precarious cases.

However, the fact that the use of the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘rape’ serves to confer status on a particular act demonstrates the value of the terms. This value is preserved through the maintenance of thresholds of authenticity which act as an instrument of exclusion, protecting the concepts of genocide and rape, and preventing their devaluation. As Kent notes in relation to genocide, the historic resonance of the term diminishes with each dubious deployment of it. If terms diminish they must be replaced with both new terms and new discourses. Because these terms and discourses have not diminished in the British Houses of Parliament, new discourses are not needed. The importance placed on the value of the terms also leads to a stigmatisation of acts, and perpetrators of such acts, should these acts be recognised as having reached the threshold of authenticity. This stigmatization occurs because these crimes are seen as extremely serious and because of their characteristically rare occurrences. Such a perspective makes it easier to exploit emotion in order to highlight the seriousness of the crime, which happens occasionally. This is usually when a case breaches and surpasses all norms and boundaries protecting the perceived standard of the crime.

The strength and influence of thresholds of authenticity becomes important in the context of Hamblet’s argument that processes of identification and categorisation such as social codes, prescriptions and prohibitions, rules of etiquette, and political and economic patterns of exchange are long lasting, “always already in place long before arrival on the scene.” While she acknowledges that these practices are

163 Kent, op. cit. n. 59, p. 99.
164 Ibid.
165 Hamblet, op. cit. n. 162, p. 240.
always under construction, Hamblet also admits that “there persists an underlying, unrelenting logic that orients thought and predisposes people toward certain kinds of behaviours.”\textsuperscript{166} That Hamblet sees these practices as constantly under construction suggests that changes outside of parliament have occurred, and will continue to do so. This is reflected in the data which will be examined, as will be shown throughout the following chapters, which still persists with traditional ideals of the crimes despite the fact that it acknowledges that the nature of conflicts has also changed over the century. In essence, this represents the perpetuation of norms outside their historical setting as evidenced by the continued use of popular Victorian-era discourses during the Bosnian War which will be explained in detail further below.

Despite this, Hamblet’s latter point regarding the persisting underlying logic which influences thought and behaviour is equally valid especially when the concept of thresholds of authenticity is considered. In essence, both genocide and rape are affected in this way insofar as the process of categorisation is popular; as stated previously, certain types of crimes are easier to recognise and punish. This thesis argues that though there has been a move to dispel stereotypes and myths associated with genocide and rape, an underlying pervasive attitude which runs counter to contemporary thinking and agitation and which influences many social and political institutions still exists. What is of paramount importance is discovering how these discourses originated, especially with regard to the late nineteenth century when policy was deemed to represent, apart from self-interest, noble motives,\textsuperscript{167} and why they have endured.

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.

1.4. Conclusion

This chapter has completed the introduction to this thesis by outlining important definitional characteristics of and problems associated with the crimes of genocide and rape, and by further developing the concept of thresholds of authenticity. In identifying the definition of each crime deemed most suitable for the thesis it has also been able to provide an explanation as to what the most popular discourses of each crime are, reasons behind their prominence, and the problems that these particular discourses and the ‘anarchy of definitions’ present. The fact that this chapter looked at discourses popular today and prior demonstrates that discourses outside of the jurisdiction of parliament have evolved over time. The contrast with parliamentary discourses on the crimes which, as is being argued, have endured over the twentieth century, will be demonstrated over the following three chapters. Bjornlund et al’s concept of the ‘anarchy of definitions’ offers some explanation as to why cases of these crimes can be deemed precarious as opposed to others. However, the main explanation is offered by an examination of the relationship between the construction of the ‘Other’ using Victorian-era discourses and the concept of thresholds of authenticity. The following chapter outlines the theoretical framework which will be used throughout the thesis and will highlight this relationship in terms of the framework being used.
Chapter Two

Theoretical Framework & Methodology

2.1. Introduction

Teun Van Dijk states that discourse plays an important role in the production and reproduction of prejudice and racism. People acquire the “mental models, the social knowledge, the attitudes, and the ideologies that control their action, interaction, and dialogues” with issues through the daily proliferation of news media, political commentary, personal opinion, and so on. With parliamentary discourse and current affairs now reaching a larger audience than ever, and with rhetoricians and spin doctors holding important positions in political administrations, the impact that discourse has is far reaching, yet clandestine. Hall’s assertion that discourse involves “any means by which human meanings, beliefs, and values are communicated and replicated” be it through language, images, gestures or clothing, helps to reveal the reach it has on everyday life; the fact that this is an invisible influence may explain why stereotypes and universal assumptions we take as valid are not questioned regularly or vigorously enough. If the hidden agendas and ideological or tactical bias of rhetoricians, specifically members of parliament are to be revealed, discourse analysis must take place.

However, this is not the overall objective of this thesis. While the opening chapters outlined the research problem, this chapter will explain how the argument of the continuity of discourses will be made, providing a detailed theoretical framework and methodology while identifying potential problems with the research, and

169 Ibid.
171 Ilie, op. cit. n. 4, p. 1.
explaining how they can be navigated and solved. As explained, the anarchy of definitions genocide and rape experience directly contradicts their apparent severity. The research hypothesis being used in this particular study is that parliamentary discourse, specifically British parliamentary dialogue, demonstrates how discourses regarding these crimes have endured over the course of the twentieth century, offering an explanation as to why these crimes invoke weak responses. It will therefore be argued that what has occurred reflects a continuity of discourses. This chapter will also outline how the theoretical and methodological approaches will apply to the analysis of British parliamentary debates to support its research hypothesis.

2.2. Why poststructuralism?

Emile Durkheim preceded poststructuralist theorists by arguing that “social life is made up entirely of representations.” Durkheim argued that representations must be analysed like social facts, explaining the responsibility of the individual “is not to place them in this or that category of reality; it is to observe towards them a certain attitude of mind.” These observations support the notion that “what we see when we look at each other is profoundly mediated by social context.” The theoretical framework used in this thesis is poststructuralist and elaborates on these arguments. Poststructuralism is a critical philosophical position which is anti-essentialist, suspicious of grand narratives, and opposed to the idea of history as linear and progressive. It was chosen because it stresses that facts need to be explained, named and given meaning before they can be comprehended. In other words, poststructuralism asserts that all meaning and knowledge is

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173 Ibid., p. 36
176 Kuusisto, op. cit. n. 40, p. 25.
discursively constituted through language and other signifying practices. This implies that what many regard to be factual and true about victims, perpetrators and crimes themselves may or misrepresentative with such a realisation potentially changing how crimes, and genocide and rape in particular, are viewed. This includes what members of parliament think and the possibility that parliamentary discourse on these crimes experienced continuity over the twentieth century requires investigation as to why this is so given the differences between the two timeframes in question. Moreover, the general premise of extremely similar discourses present in different historical moments is neatly exposed using the poststructuralist idea of history as non-linear and non-progressive.

Kuusisto has observed that our reality is forever being created in and through discourses. Much has already been stated and claimed about the nature of discourses, however a detailed outline of the current research hypothesis, and the data presented, necessitates further discussion on the concept of discourse. An elementary understanding of the term in the present context is offered by Joan W. Scott who defines discourse not as “a language or a text but a historically, socially, and institutionally specific structure of statements, terms, categories, and beliefs.” In their discussion on discourse theory and political analysis Howarth & Stavrakakis define discourse as “a social and political construction that establishes a system of relations between different objects and practices, while providing (subject) positions with which social agents can identify.” Moreover, they recognise that “practices articulate and contest the discourses that constitute social reality.” Wendy Hollway has described discourse as a “system of statements which cohere around common meanings and values [that] are a product of social factors, of power and practices, rather than an individual’s set of ideas.”

Furthermore, Mitchell Dean writes that discourses are “...rule-governed systems for

178 Kuusisto, op. cit. n. 40, p. 25.
180 Howarth & Stavrakakis, op. cit. n. 11, p. 3.
181 Ibid.
the production of thought...”\textsuperscript{182} Michel Foucault notes that ‘discourse’, or indeed the discursive,

“always implicates the institutions, technique and practices that generate subjects, amongst other things...Discourse neither uniformly serves the interests of power nor uniformly resists them; it is more complex and volatile than this, working at once both to consolidate hegemonic power and to oppose it. In addition to consolidating power, discourse thus also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.”\textsuperscript{183}

Foucault’s point is developed by Chris Weedon’s description of discourses as “a structuring principle of society” which “represent political interests and in consequence are constantly vying for status and power.”\textsuperscript{184} She also notes that “the site of this battle for power is the subjectivity of the individual” and that this “battle” is one “in which the individual is an active but not sovereign protagonist.”\textsuperscript{185} However, Alcoff and Gray’s work more explicitly identifies the contradiction that speech, and therefore discourse, “is an important object of conflict” but simultaneously “that disclosures increase domination.”\textsuperscript{186} This dichotomous role lends itself to a false conceptualisation of the nature of discourses. Foucault highlights the inaccurate temptation to “imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse”, or between the dominant and the dominated. Discourses, instead, should be viewed as “a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies.”\textsuperscript{187}

Politicians have a particular responsibility in terms of the language they use and discourses they employ to address issues, given that their words receive a large audience, if not by session observers, then through media coverage and subsequent policy development. As Kuusisto notes, their choice of words is an extremely

\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{187} Foucault, \textit{op. cit.} n. 183, p. 100.
relevant problem not just for linguists with rhetorical concerns, but also for students of public and social policy. Moreover, Van Dijk notes that members of parliament, as “elites”

“initiate, monitor, and control the majority and most influential forms of institutional and public text and talk. They have preferential access to the mass media, may set or change the agenda of public discourse and opinion making, prepare and issue reports, carry out and publish research thereby controlling academic discourse and so on. In other words, the power of specific elite groups may be a direct function of the measure of access to, and control over, the means of symbolic reproduction in society, that is, over public discourse.”

This thesis shows how the normative language, and therefore the discourses, used in parliamentary debates on these crimes has been replicated across the twentieth century. What is vital to the explanation of this process is not only the recognition and identification of the different meanings of each but also the production of knowledge concerning these issues. From a poststructuralist perspective, knowledge is considered to be socially constructed, transient and inherently unstable with few, if any, universal truths in existence. Even more applicable is the idea that knowledge is closely associated with power, far from the point of being neutral with those who have the power to regulate what counts as truth able to maintain their access to material advantages and power. This thesis will therefore identify who within parliament had the power to regulate the truths surrounding these crimes during the conflicts in question.

Poststructuralism developed from the work of linguist and founding father of Structuralism, Ferdinand de Saussure, who advocated that language, far from reflecting an already given social reality, constitutes social reality for us. Different languages and different discourses within the same language give the world different meanings to different subjects. For example, meanings of femininity and masculinity vary from culture to culture, language to language, and even between

190 Gavey, op. cit. n. 177, p. 462.
191 Ibid.
192 Weedon, op. cit. n. 184, p. 22.
discourses within a particular language (for example, feminist discourses), and are subject to historical change (from the emergence of domesticity to the suffragette movement and to latter day women’s rights).\textsuperscript{193} In terms of the present research, the most significant difference between both structuralism and poststructuralism is that poststructuralists, “stress inability and indeterminacy” of subject structures, in contrast to structuralist theorists who identify theirs as stable and invariant.\textsuperscript{194} Though poststructuralism has most notably been used within the field of literary criticism, with the author seen more as a reproducer of discourse than a creator of new thought,\textsuperscript{195} its view that there is no essential truth behind a discourse is applicable to other types of text. It must be noted that though the term ‘text’ is clearly associated with discourse, talk, speech, utterances and, as Hall stated previously, “images, gestures, or clothing”\textsuperscript{196} can also be included in this category. The principle that different meanings are constructed on every reading of a text, or in this case debate on a topic, is essential in understanding why the contentious subjects of genocide and rape can, and have produced, many varying vernaculars and perspectives.

Poststructuralism states that the effect of representation, in which meaning is apparently fixed, is only a temporary retrospective fixing.\textsuperscript{197} Signifiers such as sound or written images are always located in a discursive context and the temporary fixing of meaning in a specific reading of a signifier depends on this discursive context, which in this case is British parliamentary discourse during two contrasting timeframes. For example, the meaning of the signifier ‘woman’ can vary from a stereotypically weak subject, to an active political agent, according to its context. Likewise, the meaning of the signifier ‘concentration camp’ can differ from a place of refuge, to one of incarceration, to one of extermination. As a result, meanings are always open to challenge and redefinition with shifts in their discursive

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} Lloyd, \textit{op. cit.} n. 175, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{195} Gavey, \textit{op. cit.} n. 177, p. 465.
\textsuperscript{196} Hall, \textit{op. cit.} n. 170, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{197} Weedon, \textit{op. cit.} n. 184, p. 25.
\end{footnotes}
context. At the very least, as Arslanian-Engoren has noted, the recognition of different meanings serves to disrupt and displace oppressive knowledge and meanings. In this respect, it can be argued that although discourses and therefore signifiers and meanings around the crimes have been reproduced, thereby helping to exclude many other possible cases which have ‘emerged’ over the course of the twentieth century, they should and can become more representative of the crimes as presented in the previous chapter.

Weedon’s view on discourse also includes the understanding that it is a “structuring principle of society that constitutes and is reproduced in social institutions, modes of thought, and individual subjectivity.” In essence, subjectivity “denotes our social constructs and consciousness of identity.” In contrast to identity, subjectivity is concerned with the social and personal being that exists in negotiation with broad cultural definitions of our own ideals, comprising all facets of identity including gender, race, and class, for example. In this sense, language, or discourse in general, becomes a site of struggle in terms of meaning and interpretation and is particularly dependent on its speaker, and its historical context. Weedon’s term ‘regimes of power’, specific social and political institutions which define norms and deviant behaviour at a given historical time, construct subjectivity by shaping one’s perception of self, but also through shaping and influencing meanings and values for behaviours. Although these regimes of power comprise of a mixture of social organizations, social meanings, as well as power and individual consciousness, according to poststructuralist theory they are linked together by language. Language is where “forms of social organization and their likely social and political consequences are defined and contested,” yet it is also the place where subjectivity is constructed meaning that language is not the expression of unique individuality; it instead constructs the individual’s subjectivity

198 Ibid.
200 Gavey, op. cit. n. 177, pp. 463-464.
201 Hall, op. cit. n. 170, p. 134.
202 Ibid.
203 Arslanian-Engoren, op. cit. n. 199, p. 513.
204 Weedon, op. cit. n. 184, p. 21.
in ways which are socially specific. In turn, dominant discourses of gender are found in social institutions such as policy formation, medicine, education, media, and politics. Essentially, these dichotomise gender into distinct categories, that is, femininity which is naturally passive and dependent, and its antithesis masculinity. Though these discourses change somewhat throughout history, in turn providing different opportunities of resistance, they have arguably managed to continuously restrict notions of femininity and masculinity within influential institutions such as the law and parliament and therefore discursive contexts such as conflict and crime. Gavey, for example, has stated that because poststructuralist theory rejects the possibility of absolute truth and objectivity, feminists have observed that dominant conceptions of reality and truth in patriarchal Western society have tended to be male constructions which reflect and perpetuate male power interests, impacting not just on women, but also on non-conforming men. Overall, it is this thesis’ contention that genocide and rape, during both peace and war time, is best understood via poststructuralist analysis, as it is the best theory to provide sufficient theoretical leverage to understand the socio-cultural complexities in which these crimes are embedded.

In essence, poststructuralism argues that words have no fixed meanings, only specific historical and contextual meanings, which is why it is currently being used to help support this thesis’ argument that discourses of war, based on norms from a different political and social era, have been replicated over time within parliament. Poststructuralism’s view on a linear history permits reference to the work of Michel Foucault, which will be discussed as a foundation of poststructuralist thought in more detail below. Although criticised for her controversial writing style, Judith Butler’s contributions to the field of

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205 Ibid.
206 Gavey, op. cit. n. 177, p. 462.
208 Arslanian-Engoren, op. cit. n. 199, p. 513.
209 Birkenstein also noted that in 1998, Butler was awarded first prize in the annual Bad Writing contest established by the journal Philosophy and Literature, and early in 1999, was criticised in an editorial in the Wall Street Journal by Denis Dutton, one of the chief architects of the contest. C.
poststructuralism, in particular her work on iterability, performativity and framing, and their relationship with contested meanings, is of significant value to this thesis and will be examined further over the course of this chapter.

2.2.1. Michel Foucault

Moya Lloyd has written that “poststructuralism in its Foucauldian form looks to the variable and historically specific ways in which subjects – or rather subject positions – are produced by discourse and power...”\textsuperscript{210} Foucault’s work on the poststructuralist concept of genealogy or histories of the present is of upmost importance to this thesis, which itself will be a history of the present of discourses on genocide and rape, mirroring the critical strategy exemplified in Foucault’s writings involving the attempt to trace the history of forms of rationality regarding the crimes which comprise our present.\textsuperscript{211} The concept of genealogy is a process of reading backwards

\textit{“from what seems natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal in order to show that these things have their history, their reasons for being the way they are, their effects on what follows from them and that the starting point is not a (natural) given but a (cultural) construct, usually blind to itself.”}\textsuperscript{212}

In this context, the method of genealogy takes parliamentary discourses on genocide and rape which, given the statements made and analysed in the chapters below, appear “natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal” and identifies their historical origin to emphasise their outdated nature. Foucault understands statements as repeatable events that are connected by their historical contexts\textsuperscript{213}, and his work seeks out the continuities between statements that together make up

\textsuperscript{210} Lloyd, op. cit. n. 175, p. 12.
discursive formations such as ‘medicine’, ‘criminality’, ‘madness’ and in this case genocide and rape. Such concepts are discursive constructs which should be analyzed in the context of the specific historical context or shift in which they occurred.\textsuperscript{214} Moreover, these concepts are not embodied by one discourse. In \textit{The History of Sexuality}, Foucault demonstrated that the issue was not one single discourse (on sex) but rather “a multiplicity of discourses produced by a whole series of mechanisms operating in different institutions.”\textsuperscript{215} However, though different parliamentary discourses will be presented, each have sustained outdated discourses on genocide and rape as the following chapters will demonstrate. Rose writes that Foucault’s work demonstrates the possibility to question present “certainties” by confronting them with their history and destabilising their present\textsuperscript{216} which is what this thesis aims to achieve with regard to rape and genocide. This destabilisation, or “de-fatalisation of our present”\textsuperscript{217} will therefore open the possibility that the present “could have been different,” potentially revealing that the future of our present is more open to change should the history of our present appear, in conclusion, more accidental than had been initially thought.\textsuperscript{218} This potential destabilisation acts as an incentive to probe texts and other instances of discourse for possible points of resistance and therefore change.

Foucault understands that power subjects bodies not to render them passive, but to render them active\textsuperscript{219} acknowledging the possibility that power in itself can provide opportunities to reverse its constraints. He has observed that power exists where there is resistance.\textsuperscript{220} However, this is not to suggest that there exists “a discourse of power, and opposite it, another discourse that runs counter to it.”\textsuperscript{221} In terms of the current research, this characteristic of power indicates that the problems in defining and acknowledging what constitutes an act of genocide or rape may indicate how they can be addressed. This aspect of Foucault’s theory has

\textsuperscript{214} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{215} Foucault, \textit{op. cit.} n. 183, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{216} Rose, \textit{op. cit.} n. 211, p. x.
\textsuperscript{217} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{218} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{220} Foucault, \textit{op. cit.} n. 183, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{221} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 101-102.
found support within feminist poststructuralist circles. Foucault’s insistence that power creates as well as destroys, and that in the case of concentration camp systems, potentially incubates “resistance, disobedience, and oppositional groupings”\textsuperscript{222}, supports the use of gender-specific research given the different experiences shared by male and female camp inmates.

Though lacking any gender-specific references, Foucault’s work in general has been embraced by many contemporary feminists because it “challenges the notion of a fixed meaning, a unified subjectivity, and central theories of power”, while his ideas, including that of power as productive, provide them with a “different and creative way of thinking about the politics of contextual construction of social meanings.”\textsuperscript{223} While he fails to deal explicitly with gender, Foucault’s work can be interpreted to imply that the meaning of gender is both socially produced and variable between different forms of discourse.\textsuperscript{224} For example, his theory of discourse and discursive fields, which impacts on, for example, how gender is seen and performed, “insists” on historical specificity. This means that researchers are obliged to look at the specific details of the respective discursive field/discourse to identify what exactly constituted norms and deviant behaviour according to the historically specific social and political institutions or, as Weedon labels them, the particular regimes of power.\textsuperscript{225} This implies that fixed or universal meanings do not exist and cannot therefore be offered by historical analysis because meanings “always take the forms for them by historically specific discourses.”\textsuperscript{226} \textit{History of Sexuality} argues that sexuality is not a constant but a historical construct. Adapting this argument, this thesis argues that genocide and rape should not be seen as historical constants either. However, the continuity of parliamentary discourses relating to genocide and rape suggests that they are.

\textsuperscript{223} Arslanian-Engoren, \textit{op. cit.} n. 199, p. 513.
\textsuperscript{224} Weedon, \textit{op. cit.} n. 184, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{225} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 107.
\textsuperscript{226} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 108.
Although poststructuralism and Foucault in particular provide the theoretical tools with which to make such an investigation, these tools have previously been used to demonstrate how discourses have changed over time. One example of Foucault’s study of the change in discourse was evident in the late 1970s when

“the courses at the Collège de France start to focus on the passage from the “territorial state” to the “state of population” and on the resulting increase in importance of the nation’s health and biological life as a problem of sovereign power, which is then gradually transformed into a “government of men”.”

In his investigations of discursive changes, Foucault asked

“How is it that at certain moments and in certain orders of knowledge, there are these sudden take-offs, these hastening of evolution, these transformations which fail to correspond to the calm, continuist image that is normally accredited?”

In contrast, this thesis will employ the theoretical tools provided by poststructuralist thought to expose patterns of discursive continuity with regard to norms of gender, race, and class and their relationship to thresholds of authenticity of genocide and rape. It will investigate how there has been a lack of “sudden take-offs” and a “hastening of evolution” with regard to parliamentary discourses on genocide and rape, despite transformations of everyday discourses on these crimes. While contexts and regimes of power have changed, parliamentary discourse, according to the current investigation, has not. Consequently, it will not be argued that no comprehensive changes between discourses of these wars occurred, only that they are too similar given the contextual changes that took place in the hundred years in between. Moreover, this will also demonstrate the durability of thresholds of authenticity.

This investigation is important because it highlights how the contexts of the crimes in question have changed insofar as the development of discourses on human rights and bodily integrity for example, amidst changing political scenes, have provided a new and different understanding of these crimes from that offered by

228 Rabinow, *op. cit* n. 222, p. 55.
parliament. It will be argued that, although some discourses have emerged from the changing contexts over the twentieth century, those predominant in parliament have not. While this will be addressed specifically in chapter five, the following two chapters will focus on each case study conflict respectively and will

“reconstruct the epistemological field that allows certain things to be considered true at particular historical moments, in the kinds of entities, concepts, explanations, presuppositions, assumptions and types of evidence and argument that are required if statements are to count as true.”

This will establish what the predominant norms affecting perceptions of genocide and rape were in the late 1890s and 1990s, and why these and other related discourses have been replicated. Finally, Foucault admits that it is true that society defines what must be regarded as a crime in terms of its own interests. Therefore, it must be asked exactly what the motivations for defining certain acts as crimes and for punishing these acts are and whether these motivations are reflective of the perceived seriousness of the crimes. How these acts are recognised as crimes by society at large must also be assessed. For example, though the crimes of genocide and rape exist and are well known, many perpetrators appear to have committed these acts having failed to recognise their actions as criminal in comparison to what they perceive true genocide and rape to be. This issue will also be discussed in the following chapters.

2.2.2. Judith Butler

Although Judith Butler’s work has informed feminism, psychoanalysis and Marxism, it is her contribution to the area of poststructuralism which is of specific interest to this thesis. Her work has provided valuable concepts such as ‘historicity’ and ‘norms of recognition’, all of which are of importance to the current research and will be given attention over the course of this particular section. However, the most significant aspects of Judith Butler’s work in relation to the current theoretical

Rose, op. cit n. 211, p. xiv.
framework concern (i) iterability and (ii) framing. It is important to note that these elements will not form the basis of the theoretical framework of this thesis, but will contribute to it significantly by offering a conceptual vocabulary to use, mirroring Cadwallader’s appraisal of Butler’s work as “enabling new directions of thought...”

(i) Iterability

Butler’s celebrated concept of performativity explains how the reiteration of idealised or normative cases of genocide and rape, including what their associated subjects should be, contributes to the enforcement of thresholds of authenticity and therefore the continuity of parliamentary discourses of these crimes. However, the concept of performativity relies on the concept of iterability for meaning. Iterability is the “constrained” repetition of norms, or the capability of norms to be repeated, and is a process which helps these norms endure. In other words, “continuity is sustained primarily through the repetition of a given interpretation” of a particular social “script”. The centrality of the theme of normative and discursive continuity to this thesis demonstrates the importance of the concept of iterability.

Conceived of by Jacques Derrida, Butler’s use of the term iterability in Bodies That Matter (1993) is significant because it plays a pivotal role in developing her theory of performativity. Butler states that performativity cannot be understood without iterability, whose repetition of norms in turn implies that performance, for example in terms of gender, is a ritual brought about through constraint and “the force of prohibition and taboo, with the threat of ostracism and even death”, that is, the transformation into the ‘Other’, “controlling and compelling the shape of the

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production...”234 rather than any single act. Norms, which for Butler produce gender and other subjectivities, require iterability or repetition in order to “have an effect...Without their repetition, gendered subjects would not exist.”235 It follows that norms, far from being static entities, are “incorporated and interpreted features of existence that are sustained by the idealisations furnished by fantasy.”236 This indicates that the “reality” of genocide and rape within parliament “is not so much performatively constituted through an imitation that sets itself up as the origin and the ground of all imitations”237 but that dominant nineteenth century norms on gender, race and class undergo constrained repetition in parliament, establishing them, in this case, as vital in understanding genocide and rape.

The iterable nature of norms reinforces the poststructuralist challenge of the fixity of meaning, especially since the repetition of a norm occurs in different contexts and circumstances affecting the meaning to be derived from every utterance.238 In this sense, iterability can help in understanding the continuity of discourses concerning genocide and rape in parliament, that is, the repetition of norms of recognition or normative acts of genocide and rape. However, this challenge of the fixity of meaning is dependent on the notion that meaning itself is temporal in so far as the meaning of a word depends on a temporal history of usages.239 This is of importance to this thesis given that it argues that the history of use of these two terms has endured over this time period, in this instance on contradicting discursive changes outside parliament. Even more significant is Butler’s assertion that the temporal nature of norms, and therefore poststructuralism, implies “a preoccupation with notions such as living on, carrying on, carrying over, continuing, that form the temporal tasks of the body”240 which strengthen her arguments on

234 Butler, op. cit. n. 232, p. 95.
235 Lloyd, op. cit. n. 175, p. 65.
239 Ibid.
240 Butler, op. cit. n. 9, p. 169. Emphasis in original.
framing, which will be discussed further below, and how lives become viewed as valuable or insignificant. The fact that both crimes still occur mitigates the severity with which they are held. In other words, reactions to genocide and rape do not reflect the fact that both are consistently deemed serious crimes, as detailed in chapter one. As Butler has noted, stories and statistics about deaths, or victims of crime more generally, are widespread, but their “endless, irremediable” repetition assuages any imperative to force through bureaucratic red-tape, rhetorical rebuttals, or discursive counterarguments.

Given the use of gender analysis throughout this thesis, the related concept of performativity also merits attention. It implies that our identities are formed from our own performances and those of others towards us. While this highlights performativity’s concern with habitual ‘performance’, it lends itself to the conceptual vocabulary of the theoretical framework in use, and in Calwallader’s words, enables new directions of thought. The case of gender identities and gender performativity is a clear example of this; Alsop et al argue that the traditional male/female dichotomy is an effect of our gender performances, rather than a natural state. Similarly, Butler argues that the gendered performances in which we engage are performances in accordance with a script. However, like Foucault, Butler is concerned with the formation of subjectivity, stating that subjects are formed from their performances and the performance of others towards them. In addition, she recognises that all-pervasive forms of power influence such performances, representing behavioural norms which subjects aspire to though often fail to achieve. The dominant ideals which influence gender performativity arguably reinforce the power of certain groups, for example men, heterosexuals. For Butler, this repetition of idealised performance is “a reenactment and reexperiencing of a set of meanings already socially established.”

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241 Ibid., p. 13.
242 Alsop, Fitzsimons & Lennon, op. cit. n. 238, p. 98.
243 Ibid., p. 99
244 Ibid.
245 Ibid.
246 Ibid.
247 Butler, op. cit. n. 23, p. 140.
idealised performances are of obvious concern to this thesis as is how exactly, or to what extent, they were already socially established, and by what institutions.

In terms of subjectivity, Butler insists that there is no doer behind the deed, instantly differentiating between performance which presupposes the existence of a subject, and performativity which does not. As Salih notes, in poststructuralism the author is not taken to be the source of meaning for a text. The author, or subject, is therefore not “doing” a performance, as there is no doer behind the deed; instead, it is the performance which “pre-exists the performer”, by virtue of the reiteration of the performance. In essence, performativity translates as gender which “is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being.” Friedman’s assertion that choice is often an illusion echoes Butler’s sentiments regarding her concept of performativity, implying that gender is something that we ‘do’ rather than ‘are’.

Butler’s concept of performativity therefore echoes Simone de Beauvoir’s belief that one is not born, but rather one becomes, a woman, or any particular subject by submitting to power.

Therefore, the idea of performativity can allow one to substitute gender for other forms of identity such as race, and poise the question as Salih does of whether “one is not born but rather one becomes black/white”?

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248 Salih, op. cit. n. 213, p. 45.
249 Ibid., p. 21.
250 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
251 Butler, op. cit. n. 23, p. 33.
253 Salih, op. cit. n. 213, p. 46.
254 Ibid., op. cit. n. 23, pp. viii-ix. Emphasis in original.
256 Salih, op. cit. n. 213, p. 92.
However, Butler also warns that this substitution of one identity for another can only be carried out with extreme caution. Echoing the earlier discussion on the interconnected nature of gender, race, and class for example, Butler suggests

“that the question to ask is not whether the theory of performativity is transposable onto race, but what happens to the theory when it tries to come to grips with race...Thus, the sexualisation of racial gender norms calls to be read through multiple lenses at once, and the analysis surely illuminates the limits of gender as an exclusive category of analysis.”

*Excitable Speech* (1997), while concerned with hate speech, also sought “to outline a more general theory of the performativity of political discourse.” Butler’s focus on the area of hate speech illustrates the role of iterability and performativity in the creation and identification of subject recognition:

“One is not simply fixed by the name that one is called. In being called an injurious name, one is derogated and demeaned. But the name holds out another possibility as well: by being called a name, one is also, paradoxically, given a certain possibility for social existence, initiated into a temporal life of language that exceeds the prior purposes that animate that call.”

Recognition, or “social existence”, is what precarious subjects lack. In recognising one, another is automatically chastised for not being the same. This precludes the principle that existence is based on the dependency of the ‘Other’. Moreover, this principle denotes that existence is claimed not only by being “recognised” but also “in a prior sense, by being recognizable.” Thresholds of authenticity ensure that some cases of genocide and rape, for example, cannot become recognisable, that is precarious, if they fail to meet certain criteria and standards established by paradigmatic cases. *Excitable Speech* is also where Butler develops her concept of historicity. The meaning of the term historicity is related to Scott’s earlier observation that words, “like the ideas and things they are meant to signify, have a history.” Again, using hate speech as an example, Butler recognises that hate speech terms and other associated “injurious names” have a history that “is

257 Butler, op. cit. n. 23, p. xvi.
258 Butler, op. cit. n. 43, p. 40.
259 Ibid., p. 2.
260 Ibid., p. 5.
261 Ibid.
262 Scott, op. cit. n. 12, p. 1053.
invoked and reconsolidated at the moment of utterance...”263 The historicity of these terms and names is the way “histories are installed and arrested in and by the name”, an understanding that the given history “has become internal to a name, has come to constitute the contemporary meaning of a name...”264 In turn, the effect of a term’s historicity “works in part through an encoded memory or a trauma, one that lives in language and is carried in language.”265 This effect depends on the iteration of the term or name but also an iteration that is linked to this memory or trauma.266 In a similar way, genocide and rape both have a “historicity”, in this case an associated memory or ideal associated with each. However, in the case of both crimes, the utterance of the terms, that is, for an incident to be labelled as either “genocide” or “rape” is, instead of the negative and damaging connotations of hate speech, a term of recognition signifying the breaching and surpassing the criteria and standards set by the threshold of authenticity and the transformation into a recognisable crime.

Like Foucault, Butler recognises the ability of power to create as well as to constrain. In acknowledging the temporal disposition of iterability, and therefore performativity, Butler supports the notion that such repetition can take on different meanings in various contexts and time frames, and though this can strengthen dominant norms, in other scenarios it is possible it could work to undermine them. She notes that because performativity “has its own social temporality in which it remains enabled precisely by the contexts from which it breaks”, this means that “the very terms of resistance and insurgency are spawned in part by the powers they oppose.”267 In another conversation with Davies, Butler agrees that through this process gender norms can differ over space and time268, lending credence to the poststructuralist, and Butler’s own, understanding that there are no universal truths, only “conceptual schemes that can be taken up and revised in various

263 Ibid., p. 36.
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
267 Ibid., p. 40
locations and times.”

In contrast, the establishment of specific gender identities and rigid social boundaries acts as a form of containment which, according to Butler, are not unlike the disciplinary approaches discussed by Foucault, operating to “regulate and police the acceptable and the illicit.” This will be illustrated in later chapters’ descriptions of how subjects of crime (victims and perpetrators) are seen, and how these views contribute to the iterability, historicity, and in turn the definition of crimes.

It can be argued that reactions to genocide and how it is dealt with incorporates some of the characteristics of iterability. For example, acts of physical violence carry out what is “already happening in discourse, such that a discourse on dehumanization produces treatment, including torture and murder, structured by the discourse.” These acts are thereby recognised and reacted to as outlined by the discourse, which not only justifies but directs that course of action. The denial of acts or the victimised subjects derealises the experiences of such groups, assuages the guilt of the perpetrators, and appeases the international community.

Butler’s illustration of US derealisation tactics towards inmates at Guantanamo Bay detention camp inmates gives a clear indication of the importance and significance of derealisation within political and social discourse and, thus, in a wider sense, also influences how outside parties view proceedings. The next section deals with Butler’s concepts of framing and precariousness which featured in her later work. However, these concepts are a continuation on, rather than a departure from, iterability, performativity and Gender Trouble in general which was “motivated by a specific political aim: to contest the way in which particular idealisations of the sex/gender relation determine...who counts and who does not.”

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269 Ibid.
270 Butler, op. cit. n. 23, p. 141.
275 Lloyd, op. cit. n. 175, p. 27.
(ii) Framing

Butler’s concept of framing deals with how events are viewed and, in so doing, how subjects within these events are defined, if at all. She deals with the issue in detail in *Frames of War* (2010), the main focus of which is why and how war becomes easier, or in some circumstances more difficult, to wage by looking at the “ways of selectively carving up experience as essential to the conduct of war,” better known as the frames of war, and how this framing shapes the way we apprehend and engage with the victims of conflict. By portraying certain versions of reality, such frames cannot avoid omitting or derealising other versions, which both ostracize and alienate, but also provide potential resources and locations for resistance, akin to the idea of power as productive. According to Butler, derealisation can occur in two ways. Firstly, derealisation occurs when specific populations or groups are named as inhuman or less than human within a given discourse, “such that a discourse on dehumanization produces treatment, including torture and murder, structured by the discourse.” Secondly, derealisation occurs when subjects are failed to be named at all, even in contrast to the recognised. Moreover, the principle of derealisation means that “if violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already negated.”

For Butler, precariousness stipulates “that life requires various social and economic conditions to be met in order to be sustained as a life” and “is coextensive with birth itself...” and not a characteristic which subjects later acquire. With regard to genocide and rape, this concept indicates that some cases are precarious in origin, that is, they have not reached the threshold of authenticity thus failing to

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276 Butler, op. cit. n. 9, p. 2.
279 Butler, op. cit. n. 9, p. xiii.
280 Butler, op. cit. n. 273, p. 36.
281 Ibid., p. 33
284 Butler, op. cit. n. 9, p. 14.
meet the normative view of what an act of genocide and rape entails. Butler notes that while frames are certainly powerful, they can never be trusted to remain in place\textsuperscript{286}, hence the potential for the destabilisation of norms.

*Frames of War* continues where *Precarious Life* (2004) left off in suggesting that lives cannot be apprehended as injured or lost if they are not first apprehended as living\textsuperscript{287} or worth keeping alive. This method of producing an enemy also lends credence to Jagger’s idea that within poststructuralist thought violence not only involves the act but “the production of meaning and intelligibility, which allows some meanings to prevail and forecloses others.”\textsuperscript{288} That precariousness, as defined by Butler, means that “one’s life is always in some sense in the hands of the other”\textsuperscript{289} underlines the importance of frames and framing with respect to discipline and punishment. Such frames become important in this regard as they not only structure how lives are identified but also how lives can be sustained\textsuperscript{290}, implying that, by what they omit, they outline how non-identified lives are dealt with insofar as an indication of the ‘Other’s’ vulnerability “incites the desire to destroy them.”\textsuperscript{291}

To provide resistance, or to at least call a frame in to question, not only scrutinises the authenticity and endurance of the frame’s contents, but also acknowledges the presence of something else outside the frame, that is, what has been defined as the ‘Other’ within that discursive context. In this case, the frames of war are dictated by parliament, both by the government and opposition members. Butler’s use of the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks to demonstrate how war is framed mirrors the case studies used presently. For example, the precariousness of the lives of Afghan civilians who died meant that those who grieved their deaths alongside the deaths

\begin{footnotesize}
286 Kenny, *op. cit.* n. 277, p. 4.
\end{footnotesize}
of American soldiers in the War on Terror were called traitors, like members of parliament who did likewise with Boer and African victims of the Boer War. Within the framing phenomenon, Butler sees the body as a mere “social phenomenon”, depending on social conditions and institutions as well as the ‘Other’, or entities “outside itself”, to exist. Her main argument is not that one exists by virtue of being recognized, but by already being recognizable, via categories including gender, race, and class in accordance with the frame of the event constructed.

Her main point regarding the precariousness of lives is that frames, in reflecting social norms, have the ability to build and destroy populations as objects of knowledge and targets of war respectively. Essentially, those that inhabit the area outside a given frame become what Butler terms ‘ungrievable’. They represent lives that can be neither lost nor destroyed because they occupy a non-existent zone and so already start off as lost and destroyed implying that “when they are destroyed in war, nothing is destroyed.” However, as stated previously, norms of recognition rely on the precarious, or the ‘Other’ for its own recognition. In this sense, the precarious subjects of precarious crimes are engaged in what Jock Young has called society’s “bulimic” process of inclusion and exclusion, “engulfing them culturally while simultaneously excluding them socially.” Referring again to detainees at Guantanamo Bay detention camp, Lloyd argues that, “To talk of them as ‘detainees’, but to talk of them nevertheless, is thus to construct them within discourse as less than human...” In much the same way, to speak of “acts of genocide”, for example, is to similarly construct these acts within discourse as less than genocide.

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293 Butler, op. cit. n. 9, p. 33.
294 Butler, op. cit. n. 43, p. 5.
295 Butler, op. cit. n. 9, p. xix.
296 Ibid.
298 Ibid., p. 134.
299 Lloyd, op. cit. n. 175, p. 145.
The concept of framing provides this thesis with another perspective on how we come to formulate views on, within *Frames of War*, conflicts and their victims. Butler felt that *Frames of War’s* main contribution was to expose “precariousness as something both presupposed and managed by such discourse, while never being fully resolved by any discourse.” In the same way framing can do the same in regard to crimes, specifically genocide and rape. For instance, thresholds imply a standard of state of inclusion set by certain cases, as well as the victims and perpetrators involved. This state of inclusion also creates a state of exclusion. Butler’s concept of valid life is also appropriate here. According to Kenny, Butler recognises that “death can only happen to those we consider to have been human in the first place, those whose loss prompts shows of grief.” In a similar way, the same can be said of victims of genocide and rape, and in particular victims of cases which do not meet the threshold set out by the state of inclusion. As Kenny states, “if we want to think about how to see lives as worth preserving, we need to consider the norms that govern our very concept of valid life,” or in this case of valid crimes and cases, further emphasising the need for a genealogy or history of the present. However, the importance of this genealogy in terms of parliamentary discourse cannot be overstated. For Butler, the state is central to framing and in particular, the war-time process of crafting images. It has been noted that parliament is an important disseminator of discourse and rhetoric, but its role in manufacturing these images within political contexts and according to political necessity and inclinations cannot be overlooked.

That lives and their positive framing depend on social and political conditions means in turn that such conditions impact and influence the strength and potency of commitments to equality and universal rights, or in this case acknowledgment of and redress for crimes. The importance of this thesis lies in its awareness of how such conditions have impacted on what lies outside the frames of established examples of crimes. The difference in grievability for populations is why “politically

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300 Butler, op. cit. n. 9, p. 18.
301 Kenny, op. cit. n. 277, p. 2.
302 Ibid., p. 3
303 Ibid.
consequential affective dispositions” such as horror, guilt, and indifference\textsuperscript{304} are experienced during certain incidents and not others. The same applies to crime in terms of how society and its institutions sympathise and act on behalf of those aggrieved by criminalised acts. What Butler ultimately argues in \textit{Frames of War} is that our inability to treat the ‘Other’ with care, or to see people as “living” and others as not, despite our mutual precariousness, is because of the respective frames created.\textsuperscript{305} As stated previously, she in turn sees the contribution of her work on frames and its relationship with precarious lives not as a genealogy of concepts surrounding life and death, but as developing thought on precariousness “as something both presupposed and managed by such discourse....”\textsuperscript{306}

While their applicability to the current research is evident, Butler’s theses are not universally accepted. Digeser problematises her use of the term performativity, due to “the intelligibility of understanding gender, sex and self as pure performatives and the difficulties of using the idea of performativity as a way to explicate and respond to the harms of essentialism.”\textsuperscript{307} Heckman finds fault with Butler’s rejection of the “widely held feminist assumption that gender is the cultural inscription of meaning on a pregiven biological sex.” Instead, Butler controversially claims that gender is produced by the discursive and cultural means by which “natural sex” is produced.\textsuperscript{308} Finally, her notion of subjectivity has also found criticism. Hall identifies a tension between subjectivity and questions of responsibility, questioning Butler’s proclamation that “the subject as a self-identical entity is no more”\textsuperscript{309} when that subject “is gay-bashing, raping, or carving a swastika into someone.”\textsuperscript{310} In such cases, Hall believes that “even the most postmodern of theorists” would want the offending subject held accountable for

\textsuperscript{304} Butler, \textit{op. cit.} n. 9, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{305} C. Nichols (2010) ‘Frames of War: When is life grievable?’ (review essay) in \textit{The Unacknowledged Source}, Victoria: University of Victoria Graduate Students’ Society, 1, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{306} Butler, \textit{op. cit.} n. 9, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{307} Digeser, \textit{op. cit.} n. 233, p. 661.
\textsuperscript{309} Butler, \textit{op. cit.} n. 232, p. 230.
\textsuperscript{310} Hall, \textit{op. cit.} n. 170, p. 125.
their actions\textsuperscript{311}, a concern to which she does not find redress in Butler’s work. While each of these critiques has merit, they do not affect the use of Butler’s theories in the current research. As stated from the outset of the discussion of her work, Butler has enabled new directions of thought and for the purposes of this thesis her work has simply been adapted to help answer the anomaly presented by the continuity of parliamentary discourses on genocide and rape. Given the critiques above, Butler has indeed enabled new directions of thought in terms of subjectivity and hate crime, for example. Her contribution has been to question the evolution and validity of discourses. Her work rarely delves in specific issues, preferring instead to use different examples such as Guantanamo Bay to illustrate her points. Moreover, Butler’s work has questioned the liberal-humanist view of the subject as a fully autonomous agent\textsuperscript{312}, allowing Digeser, Heckman and Hall the opportunity to discuss these issues.

While this thesis will identify why parliamentary discourses on genocide and rape have experienced continuity over the course of the twentieth century, it will do so with the issue of precariousness, and therefore of framing, in mind. In terms of the current research, the objective is not how to include more people, and therefore more cases, within existing norms, “but to consider how existing norms allocate recognition differently.”\textsuperscript{313}

2.3. Theoretical Overview

Previous discussions on thresholds of authenticity introduced the concept in the context of the current research but were unable to fully elaborate and develop its usefulness without the theoretical underpinnings that have thus far been presented in this chapter. Prior to this, discussion focused on the centrality of the concept to the main research question, that is, why and how have parliamentary discourses on

\textsuperscript{311} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{312} Weedon, \textit{op. cit.} n. 184, pp. 41-2.
\textsuperscript{313} Butler, \textit{op. cit.} n. 170, p. 6.
genocide and rape experienced continuity over the course of the twentieth century? 
If discourses disseminate norms, why have norms on these crimes in parliament endured over this time? Norms differ over time and space, but is parliamentary discourse immune to time and space? Early discussions introduced the argument that certain standards or thresholds of authenticity were established which permitted certain incidents to be called “genocide” or “rape”. Because genocide was not a term in the late nineteenth century, and because there was a low incidence of rape and sexual offences during the Boer War, it would be counterproductive to conduct a comparative study centring on the rate of crimes committed. Instead what this thesis demonstrates is that assumptions and perceptions on race, class and gender in particular have informed discourses and attitudes and therefore shaped thresholds of authenticity of genocide and rape as evidenced in parliamentary debates.

Certain criteria must be met for the naming of incidents of genocide and rape to occur, criteria which were established and embodied by paradigmatic cases. As regards genocide, this paradigmatic case was the Holocaust. Its reputation as the legitimate standard of genocide was evidenced by the emergence of a “uniqueness interpretation” which cast the Holocaust as the only “true” genocide. The reliance on a paradigmatic case has also been observed within parliamentary discourse. Speaking on the Bosnian War, one member of the House of Commons declared, in his opinion, that genocide was occurring in Bosnia, but it was not “on the scale practiced by Nazi Germany.” What is currently at issue is not whether genocide occurred in Bosnia, but that it and other cases like it were constantly measured against the threshold of authenticity which, according to this speaker, was the Holocaust.

314 This uniqueness interpretation has since been critiqued and refuted by a number of leading scholars including David Stannard, (American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), and Ward Churchill, (A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas, 1492 to the Present, San Francisco: City Lights, 1997).
315 Former Yugoslavia HC Deb 9 May 1995 vol 259 c635 – Malcolm Wicks
The theoretical framework presented here is not “Butlerian” but is inspired by and borrows from her work. In this case, Butler’s work is, similar to Cadwallader’s description, used to enable “new directions of thought...” Butler’s main contribution is her concept of grievable lives, which depends not only on the concepts of framing and precariousness, but iterability and historicity too. For Butler, grief, and moreover public grieving, “tends toward iconicity.” Essentially, these ideas have been analysed and adapted to argue that the more recognised or grievable cases of genocide and rape are therefore the more worthy and ultimately legitimate cases. Paradigmatic examples of the crimes of genocide and rape which contribute to the establishment and maintenance of thresholds of authenticity are instantly grievable and, therefore, memorable. What often ensues is the adoption of the discourse of hierarchy and memory, an attempt to surpass the threshold of authenticity. As Moses as observed, since the commencement of the “war on terror” post September 11th, the debate about empire, colony, and genocide has been marked by a “phallic logic”:

“Commentators shout, “my trauma is bigger than yours” in order to defend or attack the theodicy that the brutal extermination and disappearance of peoples over the centuries is redeemed by human progress in the form of the Western-dominated global system of nation-states.”

Using the work of Butler, this theoretical framework, and this thesis in general, is specifically concerned with the political and social recognition and existence of crimes and subjects with regard to genocide and rape. The issue of subjectivity is integral to any poststructuralist framework. According to Weedon, subjectivity refers to “the conscious and unconscious thoughts and emotions of the individual, her sense of herself and her ways of understanding her relation to the world.”

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316 Cadwallader, op. cit. n. 231, p. 289.
321 Weedon, op. cit. n. 184, p. 32.
Subjectivity focuses on the individual and yet it has been stated in earlier chapters that the focus of this thesis is cases of genocide and rape which fail to meet the established thresholds of authenticity. However, this problem will be resolved by using the concept of subjectivity on individuals associated with the crimes of genocide and rape. This will take into account popular views on how subjects, that is, victims, perpetrators, observers, should act and behave, that is, their performativity. However, because these subjects are associated with the crimes in questions, an analysis of their actions and reactions pertaining to them will allow an investigation into the crimes as being precarious as a result of the precariousness of their associated subjects. This will be another adaptation of Butler’s work. While Butler is concerned with the precariousness of lives, this thesis is concerned with the precariousness of crimes, that is, how certain crimes are excluded and derealised from the category of the authentic.

Butler has consistently identified the subject as “dependent upon the recognition of the other”, meaning that, as Butler puts it, “we are, from the start, ethically implicated in the lives of others.”\(^3^{22}\) This reliance on the ‘Other’ adheres to the principle of recognisability, and therefore to the principle of precariousness. The concept of difference is an integral part of poststructuralist analyses of language. This means that a positive, or recognisable, definition depends on “the negation or repression of something represented as antithetical to it.”\(^3^{24}\) For example, sexual difference portrayed by the simplistic contrast between masculine and feminine serves this purpose. Similarly, Giorgio Agamben, in Homo Sacer, challenges the work of Carl Schmitt in reporting that “the fundamental categorical power of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence...”\(^3^{25}\) Such “clear” and “standard” oppositions conceal the fact that these entities are interdependent, deriving their meaning from an established contrast. \(^3^{26}\)

\(^{322}\) Salih, op. cit. n. 213, p. 2.
\(^{324}\) Scott, op. cit. n. 179, p. 760.
\(^{326}\) Scott, op. cit. n. 179, p. 761.
enemies to ensure the “constitution of ‘oneness’ within the friend camp.”\(^{327}\)

Therefore Agamben’s bare life/political existence dichotomy necessitates an “incessant” production of inauthentic cases of genocide and rape, for example, to ensure the “constitution of ‘oneness’” or recognisability/grievability of authentic cases. This observation supports the causal relationship established by the exception to the norm, which dictates that existence is based on the dependency of the ‘Other’,\(^{328}\) and which produces the relevant threshold of authenticity.

Overall, the discussion so far has shown that thresholds of authenticity represent the norms of gender, race, class, and therefore of genocide and rape that are being repeated. Their repetition in parliamentary dialogue at least has meant that such thresholds and discourses are hard to destabilise primarily because the paradigmatic examples which established thresholds of authenticity also inherited and bestowed a historicity upon cases of genocide and rape which scrutinise the authenticity of each case. However, resistance to this iteration has been noted with issues such as the growing visibility of the rape of men and the perpetration of genocide by women, for example. In light of this, the poststructuralist observation that “meaning itself is temporal in so far as the meaning of a word depends on a temporal history of usages”\(^{329}\) conflicts with discursive continuity. The continuity of parliamentary discourses means that the norms associated with, and therefore the meaning, of genocide and rape do not appear to be temporal at all in parliament, or at least their thresholds of authenticity, based on late-nineteenth century social discourses, have remained.

2.4. Methodology

The previous sections have introduced the main tenets of poststructuralist theory, focusing on the work of Judith Butler, and established the thesis’ theoretical


\(^{328}\) Butler, op. cit. n. 43, p. 5.

\(^{329}\) Alsop, Fitzsimons & Lennon, op. cit. n. 238, p. 103.
This section will outline the methods which will be used over the course of the thesis. The conflicts that are of focus are the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the Bosnian War (1992-1995). Both were chosen for a number of reasons, namely that they were both of a similar duration; involved multiple parties; represent one of the first and the last significant use of concentration camp systems; and that they fall away from the paradigmatic example of concentration camp systems that is the Holocaust. As well as this, both conflicts represented watersheds in terms of warfare and military conduct, running counter to ideas postulated about the conduct of war at those particular times. The former represents one juncture of the age of imperialism, the proliferation of mainstream hierarchies of gender and race, and the sciences and supremacist rhetoric which emphasised the idea of purity and health of the body politic, which led to the establishment of social boundaries and classification which conflicted with the civilising process espoused at this time. The latter conflict represented the abuse and ignorance of human rights by both perpetrators of violence and the international community respectively in a post-cold war world which was supposed to epitomise humanitarianism and respect of the individual. Finally, in as much the same way as the Boer War was chosen for its bridging two different and significant eras in history within the context of racial and gender hierarchies, the Bosnian War was also chosen as a case study as it closes the century the Boer War continued into, that coincidentally having been termed the century of genocide.\(^{330}\)

There are striking differences between both conflicts, particularly the timeframes within which they occurred, the respective global political climates of these timeframes, as well as the scale of each conflict, the various parties involved, and the availability of information on each. At a glance, the difference in the British approach to both wars makes them appear even more incomparable; one policy was based on active participation, the other was distinctly non-interventionist. However, similarities between both have been found and are explained over the following chapters. These similarities contradict the evidential change in historical

contexts between both periods which would presuppose that associated parliamentary discourses would change in tandem. Though the discursive categories which will be isolated and identified over the course of the thesis differ slightly in terms of focus, they are too similar given the contextual changes that took place in the century in between to be ignored. Overall, these focus on the presence of concentration camp systems within both territories, the committal of criminal acts within these systems, and how these acts were understood and recognised in British parliamentary circles. The importance of the social and historical contexts specific to a text is relative to this thesis, especially considering that one of its aims is to demonstrate that parliamentary discourse on these crimes have experienced continuity over the course of the twentieth century.

Parliamentary discourse analysis has been chosen as the main methodological approach for a number of reasons. Firstly, it represents political opinion during both wars. As Rose states, it is possible to identify certain rationalities of politics at any one time and, more importantly, these rationalities “form the web of assumptions and presuppositions of mundane and minor texts for the training of professionals, the education of parents or of managers, self-help books and advice columns in the media” operating “not so much to describe the world as to make it thinkable and practicable under a particular description.” Here, Rose alludes to the idea that different contexts influence different government behaviour or “rationalities of politics”, that is, specific ways of rationalising how government is to be exercised at particular times and places. Though Rose in this case refers to examples such as the science of police, liberalism, new liberalism, and welfare, it can be inferred that discourses on crime fall under this description. He also demonstrates how particular discourses may become a form of knowledge, or norm, through political endorsement. As the focus of this thesis, it will be examined whether Britain has demonstrated this practice, and the context Britain found itself in during the timeframes in question will be outlined in the following chapters.

331 Rose, op. cit. n. 211, p. xxii. Emphasis added.
332 Ibid.
The institution of parliament, and the British Houses of Parliament in particular, was chosen because it provides a political arena for open deliberation and dissent, and for discussing opposite points of view, as well as for jointly reaching solutions through interaction between political adversaries. As Ilie further explains, members of parliament discursively (re)shape and (re)frame current conceptualisations of values, identities and relationships that lie at the basis of collective decision-making through debating and negotiating ideas, opinions, and proposals. However, it is also important to acknowledge that “politicians are not the only participants in the domain of politics” and therefore in political communication. Despite this important social and political function, the study of parliamentary mechanisms, argumentation patterns and rhetorical strategies of parliamentary discourse has long been under-researched; the British Parliament appears to be the exception, even drawing attention from language and discourse scholars. However, the area of comparative discourse analysis remains somewhat neglected and will be supplemented by this thesis.

Though it has been pointed out that the British Parliament has only a limited policy-making function, in essence its most important role, and that of other parliaments, is scrutiny, recruitment, and dismissal. Political theorist John Stuart Mill concluded that the main role of a given representative assembly was “to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publishing on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of them which any one considers questionable...,” emphasising its importance as a critical and reactive institution, vital for the smooth functioning of the democratic system. Therefore, given that policy can be influenced through these faculties of critique, scrutiny, and dismissal for example, though this is not the major role of parliament, the analysis of discourse and language used retains importance. This becomes even more pertinent when

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333 Ilie, op. cit. n. 4, p. 1.
334 Ibid.
336 Ilie, op. cit. n. 4, p. 3.
acknowledging Patterson and Copeland’s assertion that we are living in the “age of parliaments”, the number and importance of parliaments having increased since the end of the Cold War with the restoration of parliaments in Europe, as well as in Asia and Latin America.\textsuperscript{339} The scope for research on the area of parliamentary discourse, among other areas of study of parliamentary assemblies, appears to have widened.

This thesis uses qualitative research methods, specifically discourse analysis of British parliamentary debates. It was felt that a qualitative approach would best suit the objective of the research because of what Kuusisto notes as “the great diversity in style and length of the statements” as well as the fact that statistical analysis and numerical answers would fail to answer the research questions at hand.\textsuperscript{340} As regards British parliamentary debates, which will constitute the main data source, archival data collection is done through \textit{Hansard}, the Official Report of Debates in Parliament database\textsuperscript{341}, which holds transcripts of debates from 1803 to 2005 and is available on-line. The decision to use \textit{Hansard} in the context of the project was twofold. Parliamentary debates are invaluable sources of information, incorporating opinions and decisions based on human rights agendas, social and political issues, as well as policy making. Moreover, as debates are conducted on a daily basis, this detailed source should provide an alternative justification for the nature of the crimes as they are recognised today. It was felt that the overall benefit of using \textit{Hansard} in a poststructuralist-based theoretical study was because it “unquestionably gives a fuller account of proceedings then any one newspaper and there is no suspicion of bias or unfairness in it.”\textsuperscript{342}

Following a variety of inceptions since the idea to record parliamentary proceedings was first acted on in the late 18\textsuperscript{th} century, \textit{Hansard} was taken into direct ownership

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340 Kuusisto, op. cit. n. 40, pp. 15-16.
341 The proper title of \textit{Hansard}, the daily record of the Chamber, is \textit{Parliamentary Debates – Official report}.
\end{flushleft}
by the House in 1909. The Hansard Digitisation Project, a joint venture of the House of Commons and House of Lords Libraries, started in 2005. The Internet has dramatically increased the accessibility of government publications, official archives, and other primary sources. \(^{343}\) Kupfer and O’Donovan define digitisation as “the reformatting of analog materials, be they print documents, manuscript materials, three-dimensional objects, film, and so on, to create digital objects which are then made accessible electronically.” \(^{344}\) Overall, “Digital archives aim to make the full text of archival materials available online, rather than simply allowing people to search a catalogue of the materials held.” \(^{345}\) There are many advantages to digitisation projects such as this, all of which were found by this author. They do not have to be handled, an action which aides preservation; images can be enhanced; online archives can be accessed from a distance rather than in person. Ultimately, such digital collections “allow patrons to search by keyword, subject, and other search criteria...” \(^{346}\) a characteristic of vital importance when dealing with as much information as currently is.

This thesis is primarily socio-historical centring on parliamentary debates, and supplemented by in-depth research of existing literature on the subjects, including parliamentary papers, reports, and newspaper and journal articles. Although discourse analysis will be the main methodological tool in this study, gender will act as the primary category of analysis throughout. It is worth noting that although latter day debates have been recorded and videoed, all dialogue analysed will be done so using the written form. However, it must be noted that the advent of audio and visual recordings of parliamentary proceedings meant that politicians and speakers were scrutinised more so than ever. This applies only to one of the case study conflicts being used, and it will be assessed whether this lack of further scrutiny had any impact on the dialogue used during the Boer War. In the case of


\(^{345}\) Ó’Dochartaigh & Sleeman, *op. cit.* n. 342, p. 135.

this study, the advancement of communication technology regarding parliamentary dialogue will be a factor but not with regard to audio-visual recordings as this does not apply methodologically as all dialogue will be read. It will however apply to communication technologies relevant to the respective eras studied in terms of differences in time and precision of information and research and facts on the conflicts being shared.

Despite the fact that parliaments are ubiquitous, Patterson and Copeland stress the fact that the majority of studies on parliamentary institutions have been confined to that of the British Houses of Parliament. Such is the amount of information available on this particular institution that the Westminster model can be implied to be given in nature, leaving no hint of other parliamentary institutions. This thesis focuses on the British Houses of Parliament and though initial appearance indicates that there is a risk of contributing to this essentialist, and inherently Western, commentary on parliamentary institutions, as identified by Patterson and Copeland, this is appeased by virtue of Britain’s pivotal role in both of the study’s case studies. As well as this, the British Parliament has been hailed as what Patterson & Copeland have called the “Mother of Parliaments”, establishing a template for those used throughout the (English-speaking) world during its days of Empire. Finally, the fact that comparative analysis of British parliamentary discourse is rare has allowed for its inclusion in this thesis. In fact, Patterson and Copeland argue that studies on parliamentary institutions which are confined to one time and place have little value, despite the fact that comparative studies are rare. Though referring to the need for comparative studies across countries or subnational units, this thesis heeds Patterson and Copeland’s calls for comparative studies on parliamentary institutions across time and place, and adds to its recent interdisciplinary scope incorporating linguistic sub-disciplines, such as pragmatics, critical discourse analysis, rhetoric and cognitive linguistics, as identified by Ilie.

348 Ibid., p. 9
349 Ibid., p. 2
350 Ilie, op. cit. n. 4, p. 5.
The current research will look predominantly at two forms of dialogue conducted at the British Houses of Parliaments. The predominant type found in the research corpus is parliamentary speeches, or parliamentary debates. Addressed to the Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the House, these speeches crucially provide information about the opinions and experiences of both the speaker, and their party.\textsuperscript{351} They also provide similar information about other political parties and members of parliament, as well as facts and information in reference to a subject matter.\textsuperscript{352} These speeches will be the main focus of the theoretical framework as opinions will be important in understanding why discourses on genocide and rape have changed little over the course of the twentieth century, despite the fact that these opinions are somewhat curtailed by the formalities of parliamentary operations. These speeches form what is better known as the parliamentary debates, a formal discussion on a particular topic and which is strictly controlled by an institutional set of rules and a moderator, who in the British Parliament is the Speaker.\textsuperscript{353} The preparation of speeches means that members take it in turn to speak on the given subject\textsuperscript{354}, with intervention quite minimal. The purpose and value of these debates lies not in the fact that policies will change after an effectual speech, but that opinions of ministers, civil servants, interest groups and the public will be influenced. Debates can also give publicity to causes or points of view\textsuperscript{355}, a notion well demonstrated by Irish members of parliament during the Boer War. The debates form the bulk of parliamentary dialogue which will be analysed throughout the thesis. The primary goals of such dialogue are to negotiate political solutions, to reach agreements and to make decisions\textsuperscript{356}, the results of which impact on the population at large through actual policy or influential discourse as this thesis argues. In other words, “parliamentary debates do not only reflect political, social

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{351} Ibid., p. 9
\item \textsuperscript{352} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{353} Ibid., p. 10
\item \textsuperscript{354} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{356} Ille, \textit{op. cit.} n. 4, p. 14.
\end{itemize}
and cultural configurations in an ever changing world, but they also contribute to shaping these configurations discursively and rhetorically.”

The second type of dialogue found within the research corpus is parliamentary questions. These questions are another way of scrutinising the government, though members are obliged to ask only questions on issues which are the responsibility of the Minister being asked. This adheres to the formality of parliamentary dialogue, yet contributes to the efficiency of the parliamentary system in so far as questions are addressed to whoever is best placed to answer them, although ministers can give whatever reply they deem appropriate, which may not, given the context, be revealing at all. However, the language used at question time can be more conversational than during the debates; if a member is not satisfied with an answer supplied, an additional ad-hoc question may be asked. This conversational dialogue is important in this thesis to trace and identify any discernible personal or party opinion which may account for why discourses on genocide and rape have not altered much over the twentieth century. However, the potential for this conversational dialogue is hampered by the fact that the majority of questions are replied to in writing. This form of response, however, has only occurred since 1918 when the concept of supplementary questions was introduced, leaving little time restriction on oral answers. Presently, limitations on how many questions can be asked exist to curb delays and to present a manageable number of questions to be answered; for example members can only ask two or oral questions each to be addressed to two different departments, and time set aside for questions is reserved for approximately one hour each Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday.

359 Silk & Walters, op. cit. n. 354, p. 177.
360 Íñigo-Mora, op. cit. n. 357, p. 330.
361 Silk & Walters, op. cit. n. 354, p. 178.
362 Ibid., p. 182
363 Ibid., p. 179
A number of potential hazards for the thesis have been identified. Bayley notes that, in studies of debates, the most dramatic aspects of parliamentary life, such as war or in this case genocide and rape, tend to be analysed more than others. This is a weakness in the study of parliamentary discourse given that the majority of parliamentary work involves routine and non-contentious questions, while the focus on exciting issues may misrepresent parliamentary discourse as a whole.湾利 also notes the risk of inaccuracy in transcribing daily debates as another weakness in parliamentary discourse analysis insofar as accuracy of what was said may be compromised through the transcripts, but also because the “spokenness” of parliamentary discourse, that is the jeers, heckling, calls for support for example, is lost in this medium。Furthermore, debates lack a spontaneity that is available in other forms of conversation. Most contributions to the daily record are read out and prepared in advance and are spontaneous only when proceedings are interrupted by jeers, catcalls, praise or other reactions from fellow parliamentarians。Thus, given the sensitive issues of war, for example, the preparation of statements is essential given the moral and political implications of one that is ill-prepared。

Another potential hazard of the thesis is the view of political scientist Jack Brand that the British Parliament is “powerless”, which would render the research pointless. This complaint has been made despite the fact that the British parliament receives a lot of media coverage and public attention in comparison to other national parliaments. Although it can influence, modify, and reject policy

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365 Ibid.
367 Ibid.
368 Brand, op. cit. n. 336, p. 1.
formulated by its executive, it lacks the ability to formulate policy of its own.\textsuperscript{369}

Fittingly, parliament’s gradual loss of power began in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century industrial boom\textsuperscript{370}, coinciding with the Boer War. Bayley has cited two reasons for this change: the rise of party politics helped shift the site of political decision making from parliament to government; and the arena for political debate has shifted from parliament to the burgeoning area of mass media, now arguably the “principal organ for the communication of political ideas.”\textsuperscript{371}

Another controversy of investigating parliamentary discourse is its cliché-ridden nature in comparison to other forms of political discourse. The formalities and rules governing speakers in exchange for efficiency results in the use of “‘ready-made’ assumptions and commonly shared opinions” to, ironically, make efficient their limited time to maximise their impact on their parliamentary and disparate public audience.\textsuperscript{372} Needless to say, controversial or sensationalist items of discussion comprise a minimal part of parliamentary debates and discourse. However, the justification for analysing controversial topics such as genocide and rape in this context is that this particular subject matter, and discussions thereof, are better exposed and therefore warrant an investigation as to why discourses around them have undergone minimal change. However, it is these controversial issues which raise many questions, debates, and arguments that, although infrequent in comparison to its more mundane activities, represent the “quintessence” of parliament\textsuperscript{373} and is therefore important to look at in terms of how the fundamentals of parliament facilitates the (non) advancement of discourses, in this case, on crime. Finally, though the British Houses of Parliament are very well exposed and covered, few voters access the daily debate transcripts, or watch the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{371} Bayley, op. cit. n. 363, pp. 10-11.
\textsuperscript{373} Bayley, op. cit. n. 363, p. 7.
\end{flushleft}
live debates. Many come into contact with parliamentary dialogue through news media, and these are usually to report excitable or dramatic exchanges.  

2.4.1. Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is the practice of analysing empirical raw materials and information as discursive forms. In the context of this particular methodology, empirical data is seen as a set of “signifying practices that constitute a “discourse” and its “reality”, thus providing the conditions which enable subjects to experience the world of objects, words and practices.” The aim of this particular discourse analysis is to test and analyse everything which is suggested as being universally valid, and to examine these suggestions as historical constructs. This is important because of the suggestion that the continuity of parliamentary discourses implies that they have now become almost universally valid as these same discourses represent the purest form of these particular crimes. This comes despite the fact that these crimes as are known today are historical constructs from another context. Even then, restitution is rarely assured despite frequent citation of genocide and rape as the most serious of all crimes. Butler hinted at this anomaly when referring to Talal Asad’s work on suicide bombing when she stated that “our moral responses – responses that first take form as affect – are tacitly regulated by certain kinds of interpretive frameworks.” It will be argued that these frameworks which regulate our moral responses are dependent upon language and its everyday use, its analysis revealing “occlusions or concealments” when ordinary language is taken as “a true indicator of reality as it is and as it must be.” Reflective of this is the research methodology which, through discourse analysis, will uncover the patterns of thought which structures texts or, in this case, parliamentary debates.

375 Howarth & Stavrakakis, op. cit. n. 10, p. 4.
376 Ibid.
378 Butler, op. cit. n. 9, p. 41.
379 Salih, op. cit. n. 213, p. 327.
Gavey has described discourse analysis as the careful reading of texts “with a view to discerning discursive patterns of meaning, contradictions, and inconsistencies.”\textsuperscript{380} The discursive patterns of meanings, contradictions and inconsistencies in this instance are those associated with nineteenth century norms on gender, race, and class, with a specific analysis of the respective concentration camp systems. The contrasting timeframes used for the purposes of the thesis, the beginning and end of the twentieth century, should easily highlight these patterns given their vast differences. However, commonalities are expected to arise considering the present argument regarding the continuity of discourses. Overall, discourse analysis “is an approach that identifies and names language processes people use to constitute their own and others’ understanding of personal and social phenomena.”\textsuperscript{381} The particular form of discourse analysis that the thesis will present involves identifying the social discourses available to women and men in a given culture and society at a given time. Specifically, the thesis will identify those discourses made available in Britain during the early and late twentieth century by looking at the parliamentary debates of these eras. Though the case studies, the Boer War and the Bosnian War, take place outside Britain and are not necessarily tied to gendered social discourses popular in Britain at these times, it is the reaction to, and interpretation of, the conflicts’ camp systems within Britain, and specifically the Houses of Parliament, that is currently of interest.

Foucault’s concept of discourse, as outlined in \textit{The History of Sexuality}, states that the discursive always includes the institutions, techniques and practices that generate subjects, but also that it simultaneously consolidates and opposes power structures.\textsuperscript{382} Both of these points emphasise why this method of analysis should be used in determining the relationship between parliamentary debates and the definitional problems of the crimes in question; the former permits analysis of the institutional discourse and actions, the latter implies that this type of analysis will

\begin{small}
\textsuperscript{380} Gavey, \textit{op. cit.} n. 177, pp. 466-467.
\textsuperscript{381} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{382} Foucault, \textit{op. cit.} n. 183, p. 100-101.
\end{small}
expose the full extent of how such institutions impact on these particular crimes. Butler agrees with Foucault’s assertion that discourses are productive of the identities which they appear to be representing in so far as they (re)produce subjects. Fairclough describes parliamentary discourse as discourse “shaped by relations of power, and invested with ideologies.” By analysing parliamentary debates, this thesis will be able to look at the structures of their contexts as well as their individual discursive structure, prompting what Van Dijk calls a theory of context. These structures of context include setting, participants, their knowledge and motives, as well as the wider political situation of the given time. Van Dijk suggests that in a given debate, or “communicative event”, participants have what he calls “K-device” which regulates how their knowledge affects their discourse. The idea around this device, that knowledge regulates discourse, is of importance in this thesis given that many forms of knowledge are firm belief or plausible inference, rather than actual knowledge per se. What exactly these beliefs and inferences are, and how they impact on discourses on genocide and rape, will be explained in due course.

Discourse’s (re)production of subjects reinforces its relationship with power. As Butler notes, “if one always risks meaning something other than what one thinks one utters, then one is, as it were, vulnerable in a specifically linguistic sense to a social life of language that exceeds the purview of the subject who speaks.” Although Butler deems this risk to be “proper to democratic process” in so far as the meaning of an “utterance” is assigned by another, it also implies that a conflict of interpretation may arise, as evidenced in the previous chapter’s discussion on issues arising from attempts to define the crimes. It is the presence of this conflict that the thesis is interested in examining for, as will be argued, the characteristics

383 Alsop, Fitzsimons & Lennon, op. cit. n. 238, p. 98.
386 Ibid.
387 Ibid., p. 104.
388 Butler, op. cit. n. 43, p. 87.
389 Ibid.
of the crimes being studied facilitate this conflict of interpretation much easier than other crimes given their thresholds of authenticity and paradigmatic examples which are rarely matched. In addition, the current contradictory state strengthens Butler’s belief that its only remedy, a “struggle of translation” is never guaranteed to be successful.\footnote{Ibid., p. 88.}

What makes these particular crimes generate a conflict of interpretation is arguably their susceptibility to sensationalism both from victims, invoking the moral repugnance of the crimes in order to seek assistance, and perpetrators, who take advantage of their weak and conflicting definitions to maintain innocence either because the act in question was not a crime, or by projecting blame on to another party, usually the victim. For example, Butler suggests that graphic depictions can aid the sensationalising of events, which is usually followed by periodic outrage without sustained political resistance\footnote{Butler, \textit{op. cit.} n. 9, p. xiv.}, a negative attribute associated with both crimes. Parliament is no exception, and examples of where members have sensationalised events to both compel and deter government action are given in the following chapters. Moreover, it will also be suggested that genocide and rape, as extreme examples of events that are routinely sensationalised, demonstrate Butler’s notion of linguistic vulnerability very well. Though the phrase carries two meanings, this thesis is only interested in one, that which refers to the vulnerability of language in terms of its re-appropriation and re-signification, permissible as “there is no sovereign subject to fix the meaning of terms and ensure the efficacy of speech acts”\footnote{C. Mills (2000) ‘Efficacy and Vulnerability: Judith Butler on Reiteration and Resistance’ in \textit{Australian Feminist Studies}, 15 (32), p. 268. The other meaning involves “the linguistic vulnerability of the subject, insofar as the subject is produced through language and hence is susceptible to its power to injure and wound.”}, yet dangerous because, with contentiously defined entities, problems of interpretation become more common and damaging. Butler has also warned that many focus on the productive elements of language when undertaking a discourse analysis of “government speech”, that is “what it’s doing, how it
contains, how it constructs, how it maintains and strategizes...”\textsuperscript{393} Moreover, Butler advises that when attempting to “try to discern the intentions of policy makers, we have to consider that the language they use is not always the language they have made.”\textsuperscript{394} The history of a discourse therefore becomes a factor, “even as one uses a certain discourse to effect certain ends intentionally.”\textsuperscript{395} This has to be taken into consideration when analysing statements made by members of parliament during the Bosnian War if the hypothesis of discursive continuity is to be argued.

The essential point is that poststructuralism and politics appreciate the existence of several possibilities of representing “reality”.\textsuperscript{396} What is of importance is the fact that language not only produces discourse but also denies it in some cases, through government agendas or public-relations strategies for example. However, Butler is eager to point out that various realities also result from second-hand language insofar as the language used by, for instance policy makers, is not always created by them.\textsuperscript{397} Butler continues, confirming that

\begin{quote}
“we have to ask in what crucible of language such intentions are formed, and, are the workings of the crucible, strictly speaking, without intention? It seems to me that even as one uses a certain discourse to effect certain ends intentionally, one is also used by the history of that discourse, its formative practices, its ways of foreclosing the field of what can be intended or said.\textsuperscript{398}”
\end{quote}

Certainly, as Owens Goulart has identified, the members of the Houses of Parliament and its public audience meet the key requirement that the listeners within the rhetorical situation be in a position not only to be influenced by the

\begin{footnotes}
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item Kuusisto, op. cit. n. 40, p. 45. Kuusisto’s research refers specifically to rhetoric rather than poststructuralism but is a useful body of work.
\item Butler & Davies, op. cit. n. 392, p. 190.
\item Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
speakers, but capable of turning that response into action or inaction as the case may be.

When a discourse defines, as Foucault termed, what can and what cannot be said, then those who are subject to this discourse are subject to its power effects. In the context of this thesis, this will include members of the Houses of Parliament, and those who are victims and perpetrators of the crimes in question. Before these areas are discussed in terms of how they will interact with the current theoretical framework, the basic discursive contexts of the thesis must first be identified. Finally, what is important to note in analysing political discourse is that language, textual and spoken, is “bound up in practice with culture, and that culture is in turn closely bound up with the practice of politics in a particular society.” This gives credence to the inclusion of individual chapters on both case studies, which outline the political and social contexts of the war, identifying the “culture” of the time which in turn influenced political discourse, and discourses on genocide and rape.

2.4.2. Isolating Discourses / Discursive Categories

Discursive fields “consist of competing ways of giving meaning to the world and of organising social institutions and processes.” These categories, such as law, psychology, the family, medicine for example, offer a range of modes of subjectivity. Parliamentary speech also offers a similar range of modes indicating that it, too, is a discursive field. For the purposes of the current research it is necessary to divide the language used and uttered in this particular discursive field

399 N. Owens Goulart (1982) Backbencher Against War: A Rhetorical Analysis of the Parliamentary Speaking of David Lloyd George During the Boer War, unpublished PhD theses, University of Nebraska, p. 46.
402 Weedon, op. cit. n. 184, p. 35.
403 Ibid.
into categories of different discourses on war, or discursive categories. The division of parliamentary speech in this way facilitates the comparison of discourses on war over the course of the twentieth century.

Issues arise when faced with the problem of how to correctly identify and collate categories of discourses of war using a high volume of data. When analysing parliamentary debates on racism, Van Dijk noted that a common question was “How to isolate among hundreds or thousands of possible discourse structures those that express or confirm racism?" He attempts to answer this question in his paper *Realities of Racism* which “provides a sample analysis of a debate on asylum seekers ... in the British House of Commons.” In comparison to Van Dijk’s analysis of one debate, this thesis analyses a variety of debates and parliamentary questions over the course of two conflicts of three years duration each but which also took into account the build-up to and aftermath of both wars. Needless to say, it was impossible to read and analyse every debate and question session which took place during those time periods. Instead, the *Hansard* data search tool was used to isolate debates and questions which focused on, and referred to, both wars. Certain search terms were used to isolate these relevant passages. These terms can be divided into two categories. Firstly, search terms with geographical and political associations with the wars were used at the initial stage of data collection as it was felt they would account for the majority of relevant passages. These terms described the areas and populations in question: “South Africa”; “Southern Africa”; “Cape Colony”; “Transvaal”; “Orange Free State”; “Boer(s)”; “Uitlander(s)”; “Yugoslavia”; “Balkans”; “Bosnia”; “Serbia”; “Croatia”; “Slovenia”; “Bosnia”; “Bosnian(s)”; “Serb(s)”; “Croat(s)”; “Slovene(s)”. The second category consisted of terms historically associated with the wars. These terms were used to ensure that no relevant data had been missed from the first round of searches: “concentration”; “camp”; “civil”; “civilised”; “civilisation”; “convention”; “murder”; “genocide”; “ethnic cleansing”; “ravage”; “rape”; “humanitarian”.

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Once relevant parliamentary debates and questions had been gathered it was necessary to examine each, identify various discourses of war, and collate statements within each identified category. This involved reading the text “clause by clause, and sometimes sentence by sentence or paragraph by paragraph,” to ensure that any statements that were ultimately used were always taken within the context of their utterance. Regarding his research on parliamentary debates and racism, Van Dijk concluded that the easiest structures to identify were those concerned with “derogation...the use of specific metaphors, lexicalization, hyperbolas...” Similarly, the most obvious discursive categories which emerged from the current research consisted of statements which, during the Boer War, used descriptive and emotive language and which were more subtly reiterated during the Bosnian War. This observation refers primarily to the first two discursive categories – ethnic and “racial” animosity and “uncivilised” populations - which will be examined in chapter five. Van Dijk’s categories of discourse analysis refer to rhetorical and argumentative structures such as “reasonableness”, “polarization”, and “norm expression”. Such structures are neither ignored nor explicitly referred to at present. This is because the focus of this thesis is on the endurance of broader discourses, and therefore by extension the inexplicitly stated structures, used which have been duplicated across the twentieth century.

While reading relevant debates “clause by clause, and sometimes sentence by sentence or paragraph by paragraph,” was time-consuming, it enabled an extremely thorough review of the primary source data. Similarly, though much time was devoted using this method, the detailed reading and extrapolation of data meant that various themes within the dialogue concerned with hierarchies of gender, race, and class, in turn presenting as discursive categories, emerged simultaneously. This corresponds with Gavey’s earlier comment that discourse analysis is the careful reading of texts “with a view to discerning discursive patterns

406 Ibid., p. 213
407 Ibid.
408 Ibid., pp. 221 - 223
409 Ibid., p. 213
of meaning, contradictions, and inconsistencies.”

Although no specific methodological approach was employed in this instance, the method used corresponds closely with the Topos Method, employed by social scientists such as Harald Bauder and Martin Wengeler. This method of discourse analysis identifies topoi or “aspects” within texts “which express a distinct rhetorical perspective.”

In this regard, both methods are very similar. Researchers who employ topoi analysis to their data work emerge with quantitative results, detailing, for instance, which topos or “aspect” appeared more frequently within their data set. However, this approach arguably risks undermining the context of certain topoi because of its concern with rates of occurrence. In this regard it was felt that though the approach employed in this thesis was more time consuming, it was more reliable in terms of providing an in-depth background to norms and discourses of gender, race, and class and therefore more reliable in terms of isolating relevant discourses. This process was helped by the fact that, as Watt reports, a study is shaped and reshaped as a study proceeds, and data is gradually transformed into findings because analysis occurs throughout the entire research process.

From the outset it was feared that the methodology used and the subsequent identification of discursive categories would be affected by a lack of reflexivity on the part of the researcher. Reflexivity is frequently viewed as “the analytic attention to the researcher’s role in qualitative research”, and is central to qualitative research, where it is viewed as a means of adding credibility to a piece of work. It argues that researchers “should engage in continuous self-critique and self-appraisal and explain how his or her own experience has or has not influenced the stages of the research process.” Its importance in terms of research lies in the fact that the researcher is the primary “instrument” of data collection and

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410 Gavey, op. cit. n. 177, pp. 466-467.
analysis. In this context, it was assumed that discourses influenced by nineteenth century norms on gender, race, and class would comprise the majority of those found in parliamentary debates during the wars. This was ultimately true, though it is worth noting that dialogue was found which indicated towards different discourses regarding the wars. However, these were not used as they either (a) could not be found in respect to both wars and (b) comprised of an insufficient amount of dialogue to warrant inclusion within this thesis. These reasons indicated that reflexivity was not absent, but also that the main premise of the thesis could be well supported by this particular data. However, reflexivity in the context of this thesis is also concerned with understanding the motives and reasons why such dialogue which formed these categories was uttered by relevant members of the houses of parliament while also negotiating any associated biases and assumptions of the author. While this will be hinted at within the conclusion chapter, it is not possible to devote attention within the confines of this thesis to such a broad and multifarious issue. Additionally, the absence of such an analysis will not hinder the current research as, presently, the sole focus is demonstrating discursive continuity. Fortunately, there is scope to expand on this and further examine why the motive behind these statements in the future.

While Kuusisto’s research looked specifically at statements made by the Presidents, Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of the French, American, and British governments during the Gulf War and Bosnian War, this thesis did not distinguish speakers according to their roles. Kuusisto explains that her speakers were chosen

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415 Watt, op. cit. n.412, p. 82.
416 Some notable alternative discourses to those presented in chapter five which are unique to each ware include a discussion on the relationship between tea consumption and the outbreak of war in South Africa (Hansard HC Deb 05 March 1900 vol 80 cc78-147; HC Deb 26 March 1900 vol 81 cc337-415 especially c391 where women, as the majority of tea drinkers, are blamed for the war; the 1899 Hague Convention and debates around the conduct of the war (HC Deb 20 May 1901 vol 94 cc579-80; HC Deb 23 May 1901 vol 94 cc989-1051; HC Deb 13 June 1901 vol 95 cc262-3); German influence on European policy towards the war in Bosnia (HC Deb 18 December 1991 vol 201 cc260-3; HL Deb 07 May 1992 vol 537 cc32-133; HL Deb 02 June 1992 vol 537 cc840-8); issues on the influx of refugees of the Bosnian War to the continent (HL Deb 01 July 1992 vol 538 cc851-68; HL Deb 05 November 1992 vol 539 cc1561-72; HL Deb 19 January 1993 vol 541 cc807-9).
However, despite the best intentions of this author, it will be revealed in the comparative discussion where most data from the *Hansard* database is presented, that certain members emerge as dominant speakers. By coincidence, a presentation similar to Kuusisto’s appears insofar as the speakers of statements of interest to this thesis in debates during both wars were predominantly those who held important of visible roles. During the Boer War these were Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain; First Lord of the Treasury and Leader of the House of Commons Arthur James Balfour; and Secretary of State for War William St John Brodrick. During the Bosnian War the main speakers were Prime Minister John Major; Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and Secretary of State for Defence, and for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (from June 1995), Malcolm Rifkind. On reflection this observation is not surprising. The argument that power structures such as governments use discourses to support their own agenda has been introduced, and will be developed in due course. That the majority of statements which support the discursive categories identified in chapter five were made by members of respective governments and ruling parties indicates that this assumption is true. In adopting this methodology, this thesis argues that multiple discourses “reflect political tensions capable of producing significant inconsistencies and direct contradictions between policies.”

### 2.5. Terminology

#### 2.5.1. Concentration camp systems

For the purposes of conducting coherent and effective research, the current investigation of parliamentary discourses of war will be situated within the area of

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concentration camp systems which were a feature of both conflicts although each system differed in appearance and function. This section explains the use of the term ‘concentration camp systems’ throughout the thesis. This is necessary in order to highlight the accuracy of the term for the specific needs of the present investigation, especially as thresholds of authenticity, paradigmatic examples, and the perceived uniqueness of the concentration camps used during the Holocaust for example, is a particular concern.

Concentration camp systems descended from, and therefore have some commonalities with other penal institutions. However they differ in terms of function. The aim and function of prisons, for example, is to transform the behaviour of inmates which has been deemed deviant on account of the act in question which necessitated incarceration. On the other hand, concentration camp systems have, over the course of their history, been used to imprison people not for what they have done, but for who they are based on their identification with a particular ethnic or political group, and usually without indictment or fair trial. They emerged during the period of colonial rule in the non-Western world and helped reinforce “the assumption of white superiority, justified the use of violence against colonized populations, and proliferated ideas of ethnic and/or political cleansing.”

Concentration camp systems coincided with and best illustrated the transition of warfare from being confined to a battlefield to encompassing civilian populations. The Spanish-American War (1898) is a useful example of this transition. When Spain’s General Valeriano Weyler initiated his policy of reconcentration, he claimed that it was for the protection of Cuba’s noncombatant peasantry, as Lord Horatio Kitchener subsequently did in Southern Africa two years later. However, the Spanish reconcentrado policy gained infamy by claiming the lives of hundreds of Cubans through starvation and insanitary conditions. Historians have highlighted other labels which were used to describe the concentration camp system during the

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420 Ibid., p. 555
Boer War. For example, Liz Stanley describes them simply as “war camps.”\[^{421}\] Elizabeth van Heyningen notes that the labels such as “refugee camps”, “burgher camps”, and “concentration camps” were all used though with varying frequency.\[^{422}\]

Given the proximity in time between the concentration camps systems established in Cuba and Southern Africa, it is clear that this particular system of incarceration was easily exported, its simplicity transcending culture and traditions. However, many camp systems differed in terms of strictness and organisation, aims and outcomes, depending on particular historical contexts which influenced social, cultural and political motives.\[^{423}\] The most referred-to example of concentration camp systems is that used by the Nazis during the Second World War. It has dominated research of camp systems since, with the Holocaust doing likewise in the area of Genocide Studies, to the point where it has become the paradigm, or threshold of authenticity, of such systems. Though ultimately the most brutal of the camp systems, the Nazi concentration camp system remains unique in terms of its effectiveness, scale, and methods, and so does not serve well as a comparison for other systems. For example, Sofsky believes that to compare Auschwitz with the concentration camp system of the Boer War serves as revisionism which “not only wishes to exculpate, but presumably also violates elementary rules of historical comparison.”\[^{424}\] However, in terms of reaction to camp systems, it illustrates the stereotypical nature of crime and the moral repugnance well-constructed stereotypes can create particularly well, meaning that “the very act of comparison is regarded as necessary for one’s moral and political integrity.”\[^{425}\]

\[^{423}\] Mühlhahn, op. cit. n. 419, p. 555.
\[^{425}\] Ibid.
Despite this the term concentration camp system will be used for the purposes of this thesis. It aptly describes the policy of ‘concentrating’ groups which occurred in varying degrees during the Boer War and the Bosnian War and is not intended to reflect the Nazi system which emphasised the murder of its inmates. Both cases of concentration camp systems differed; that used during the Boer War was officially sanctioned and was concerned with the concentration and protection of the civilian population. The system used in Bosnia was haphazard in comparison, and while containment appeared to be an aim, punishment, often sexual and severely physical, was certainly an objective. Both also shared the common feature of not reaching the extremes of those which were a feature of the Second World War. In that instance, extermination of the target groups was not the key factor and though the Boer War especially saw camps set up on a relatively large scale, the industrious nature of the Holocaust camps means that it has not yet found a peer. Given these comparisons, it is felt that the term best used to describe both is ‘concentration camp system’. It is understood that the term carries emotional power\textsuperscript{426}, but it is felt that with the justification given in this section that any emotional attachment associated with the term will be appeased.

\ \ \ 2.5.2. Group labels

The term ‘race’ also needs to be consolidated as it appears in numerous debates and literature sources throughout the thesis and is also referred to as a category of analysis. The term cannot be avoided in certain circumstances, such as direct quotes and analysis thereafter. The term “came into existence at a discernible historical moment for rationally understandable historical reasons...”\textsuperscript{427} This

\textsuperscript{426} See Deborah Schiffrin (2001) ‘Language and Public Memorial: ‘America’s concentration camps’’ in Discourse and Society, 12 (4), pp. 505-534. This article examines the relationship between language and genocide memory and the controversy surrounding the use of the term ‘concentration camps’ to describe a museum exhibit on the Japanese-American interment during the Second World War. For Schiffrin, the “emotional power” of the term ‘concentration camps’ in this instance “was a verbal attention-getter that would certainly intensify the Japanese-American experience, but by so doing, would also diminish the European Jews’ experience.” (p. 506).

Chapter Two

historical context necessitated a distinction between what was perceived as normal and abnormal “according to the rules society laid down.”\footnote{Mosse, op. cit. n. 119, p. 133.} The term ‘race’ thus became “the ultimate empty signifier”\footnote{Magubane, op. cit. n. 174, p. 821.} and has been understandably critiqued yet it is essential for much academic work. Many researchers have solved this problem in their work by placing the word in inverted commas indicating that it is a “problematic, unstable and by no means self-evident term.”\footnote{Salih, op. cit. n. 213, p. 76.} A similar use of quotation marks will feature presently and in so doing it declares this thesis’ recognition of ‘race’ “as a discursively and socially constructed phenomenon.”\footnote{Magubane, op. cit. n. 174, p. 821.}

Discussion of the term ‘race’, and by extension ‘racism’, necessitates a similar discussion of the labels used by members of parliament of the various parties involved in and affected by the Boer War specifically. The white South African population of Dutch descent are commonly called ‘Boers’ throughout parliamentary debates, with some referring to the group as ‘Afrikaners’. As this thesis is concerned with analysing parliamentary speech it will also refer to this group as Boers. However, the issue of naming the black South African population is more complex. Analysis of parliamentary debates shows that two terms were predominantly used to label this group: ‘natives’ and ‘Kaffirs’ and its variant ‘Kafirs’. Both of these different spellings are used throughout to reflect the different ways they are spelt in different documents which were consulted. Two other notable contributions identified during the data analysis were ‘aboriginals’ and ‘blacks’. The term ‘Africans’ will be used to identify this group throughout the course of the thesis as it is felt that it is the most appropriate and possessed the least negative connotations than the others that were used.

Various group labels were also used during the Bosnian War to identify those involved in and affected by the war. ‘Serbian’ and ‘Croat’ civilians and forces were also referred to as ‘Chetniks’ (Čhetniks) and ‘Ustashe’ (Ustaše) respectively in reference to the role each played in previous world wars. The most common labels

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Mosse} Mosse, op. cit. n. 119, p. 133.
\bibitem{Magubane} Magubane, op. cit. n. 174, p. 821.
\bibitem{Salih} Salih, op. cit. n. 213, p. 76.
\bibitem{Magubane_2} Magubane, op. cit. n. 174, p. 821.
\end{thebibliography}
for the population of Bosnia were ‘Muslims’, ‘Bosnians’, and ‘Bosniacs’. As well as this, integration within the Former Yugoslavia provided multi-ethnic groups such as ‘Bosnian-Serbs’, ‘Serbo-Croats’, and ‘Bosnian-Croat’ for example although these groups do not feature much in parliamentary data. The predominant group labels found during data analysis were those established on national lines, that is, ‘Serbs’ and ‘Croats’. The population of Bosnia was interchangeably known as ‘Bosnians’ or ‘Muslims’ despite the fact that the term ‘Bosniac’ is “the more official name” for those of Muslim descent.\(^{432}\) While the term ‘Bosnian’ should not be confused with the term ‘Bosniac’ and its variant ‘Bosniak’ as the former “denotes anyone from Bosnia-Hercegovina regardless of ethnonational affiliation,”\(^{433}\) it will be used throughout as it is the most common term used in parliamentary dialogue. It is also used because it “is a national category that does not rely on exclusionary ethnic identities such as Bosniak ... it constitutes a post-conflict attempt to institute a cohesive and multi-cultural society in Bosnia.”\(^ {434}\)

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework and methodology this thesis will use to explore the relationship between the ‘Other’, thresholds of authenticity, and discursive continuity. It started by explaining the omnipresence and importance of political discourse on daily lives, illustrating how parliamentary discourse in particular impacts on and influences opinions, stereotypes, interactions and social attitudes, despite questions around how politics in general fits into the lives of the general public.\(^{435}\) In outlining the nature of discourse, as well as the methodology

\(^{432}\) E. Helms, (2008) ‘East and West Kiss: Gender, Orientalism, and Balkanism in Muslim-Majority Bosnia-Hercegovina’ in *Slavic Review*, 67 (1), p. 89 (footnote). Teodora Todorova describes the term ‘Bosniak’ as a “post-conflict category of identification that has re-enforced the wartime emergence of the notion that Bosnians of Muslim heritage are a distinct “ethnic” group, similarly to Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats” (p. 3).

\(^{433}\) Ibid.


the thesis will follow, this chapter also detailed more of the thesis’s aims, one being
to assess how “leaders and followers come to believe their actions flow from noble
of motives,” and how these actions impact on those subjected to them.436
Ultimately, this chapter explained that the emphasis of this inquiry is on
understanding and explaining the emergence as well as the “logic” of discourses, in
this instance of genocide and rape, and the socially constructed identities such
discourses place on social agents.437 To a lesser extent, this thesis will also
contribute to “a better knowledge of the interplay between parliamentary
procedures, rhetorical traditions and political discourse styles” which will in turn
contribute to a better understanding of the interactions of parliamentary figures.438
As well as this, this chapter outlined the theoretical framework which this thesis will
use to demonstrate that discourse on genocide and rape has experienced
continuity over the course of the twentieth century. It discussed the merits of using
a poststructuralist framework based on the work of Judith Butler. Her concepts of
iterability and framing, and by extension performativity, historicity, and
precariousness, help demonstrate how crimes are viewed and parliamentary
discourses on war have endured.

The social and political contexts of the wars in question, and therefore the political
discourses of those times, are of obvious importance and will be the next point of
focus of this thesis. Alternatively, in the words of Foucault, it must be asked

“...what were the most immediate, the most local power relations at work? How did they
make possible these kinds of discourses, and conversely, how were these discourses used to
support power relations?”439

Alexander notes that the Holocaust was, in Durkheimian terms, a sacred evil that
“recalled a trauma of such enormity and horror that it had to be radically set apart
from the world and call of its other traumatising events.”440 However, not

436 Michalowski, op. cit. n. 167, p. 316.
437 Howarth & Stavrakakis, op. cit. n. 11, p. 7.
438 Ilie, op. cit. n. 356, p. 59.
439 Foucault, op. cit. n. 183, p. 97.
Crime to Trauma Drama’ in European Journal of Social Theory, 5 (1), p. 27.
everything can be deemed likewise and the following two chapters which deal with both case studies discuss what were identified as sacred evils during both periods. They will also further argue how discourse produces certain language and categories which label and regulate deviant activity and, as a result, why other forms of deviant activity are not recognised.
Chapter Three

The Anglo-Boer War, 1899 – 1902

3.1. Introduction

From the late eighteenth century onwards, Britain emerged as Europe’s preeminent imperial power.\textsuperscript{441} By the start of the Anglo-Boer War in October 1899 the British Empire was not only

\begin{quote}
"the greatest imperial entity that the world had ever seen, but Britain also represented the very cutting edge of progress in almost every field of human activity. Britain had led the world into the industrial revolution and was now reaping the benefits of this vast leap forward in human achievement."\textsuperscript{442}
\end{quote}

Moreover, as Martin Weiner reports, Queen Victoria’s reign was for some marked by the “treatment of women in Britain and in the burgeoning empire” which “became a touchstone of civilization and national pride.”\textsuperscript{443} At the same time, developments in technology and commerce brought about significant changes in late nineteenth century British society. For example, migration to cities, labour movements, and subsequent agitation for social and political rights created new discourses and moral concerns. As will be argued throughout this chapter, these changes affected Britain’s colonies too. These developments were also represented by the Boer War which was, despite being an imperial war, also very new in terms


of the technologies such as railways and weaponry it used, the media coverage it received and, of course, its concentration camp system.

This chapter will contribute to the discussion of how discourses on genocide and rape have experienced continuity over the course of the twentieth century by examining the first case study, the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). In doing so it will outline Britain’s social and political contexts and concerns which will offer a background as to how notions of the ‘Other’ and discourses of genocide and rape were subsequently formed. Analysis of the domestic context is important because, as Angela Woollacott argues in Gender and Empire, “British’ history in the modern period cannot be apprehended” unless it is itself identified and studied as one of the sites of the British Empire. In doing so this thesis acknowledges the significance of the exportation of cultural and political mores. Specifically, the chapter will develop the burgeoning argument that the late nineteenth century emphasis on the heath of the body politic, embodied by gender, race and class restrictions, has contributed to the production of thresholds of authenticity of the crimes of genocide and rape and, therefore, their discursive continuity in parliamentary debates. In so doing, this chapter will also show that thresholds of authenticity have their origins and were popularised during the late nineteenth century, and were made manifest during the Boer War.

A background to the conflict’s origins, and subsequent analysis of how the conflict was framed in light of the social and political context of Britain will also be provided to present the fundamental arguments and matters of social and political importance in Britain at the time. These arguments and matters, subsequently exported across the colonies, impacted on, in this context, the framing and conduct of the Anglo-Boer War. This analysis will explain why and how the thresholds of authenticity of genocide and rape were mainstreamed and popularised at this time and why they continued to endure. How these discourses were reflected in the dialogue of parliament and Lord Salisbury’s Conservative government (1895-1902)
will also be examined. In so doing, a variety of recurrent and interconnected themes will be explored. These themes include the health of the nation; social cleanliness and progress; moral panics; and modernity all of which contributed to the construction of the deviant ‘Other’ which, in identifying anti-normative behaviour according to gender, racial, and class roles, contributed to the production of thresholds of authenticity.

The latter half of the chapter will focus on the war’s concentration camp system which was initially established to house Boer civilians alleged to be spies but which later expanded to house victims of Britain’s farm-burning policy. This will entail an analysis of the gender and ethnicity of its inhabitants and its administrators which will further illustrate the influence of domestic discourses on colonial matters and how these discourses have contributed to our knowledge of discourses of genocide and rape today. The examination will draw heavily on the writings of Emily Hobhouse, Millicent Fawcett and Olive Schreiner whose individual experiences of, and impact on, the war is of interest. Sara Mills has identified that few serious studies have been undertaken to examine woman as agents within the colonial context, as opposed to “women as the objects of male gaze or male protection.”

The contributions of these particular women alleviate this disparity and provide interesting new insights into the current investigation, supporting Woollacott’s hypothesis that feminist perspectives have helped to recast and reinvigorate the “moribund field of British Empire history”. This analysis will also confront the traditional confinement of the history of the camp system to that of British apologists, women’s testimonies and histories of individual camps, as identified by Boer War camp historian Elizabeth Van Heyningen. It will also avoid what Helen Dampier has identified as a nationalist history of the camps which had emerged by the 1930s to encourage “patriotic support for the emergent Boer/Afrikaner nation”

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446 Woollacott, op. cit. n. 441, p. 2.
447 Van Heyningen, op. cit. n. 422, p. 23.
by virtue of the “deliberate genocidal cruelty” the system represented for some.\textsuperscript{448}

Overall, this chapter will show how discourses on the Anglo-Boer war were framed. This will be of particular use when looking at the next chapter, which will demonstrate that parliamentary discourses and norms as outlined in this chapter have endured through the late twentieth century through a similar analysis of the Bosnian War.

\textbf{3.2. Britain at the turn of the twentieth century}

The late nineteenth century saw European society embrace an increasingly belligerent form of progress which was epitomised by the Anglo-Boer War. The principles of this social progress included the notion that war was “both desirable and beneficial, a supreme competitive test of national virility and racial fitness”\textsuperscript{449}. A significant, if not one of the most central aspects, of this “test of national virility and racial fitness” concerned the sexual and racial health of the nation. This section outlines the reasons why such importance was placed on this issue and explains what elements of these concerns endured to influence discourses on genocide and rape. Among these is the “cultural hygiene” of colonialism which saw fears of racial, and therefore moral, degeneracy grounded in class-specific sexual norms.\textsuperscript{450} This notion gained momentum in the mid nineteenth century with the publication of Charles Darwin’s \textit{Origins of the Species}. The social and political changes which marked Victoria’s reign were often framed within Darwin’s notion of evolution which inspired an idea of “a social world in motion, \textit{progressing} to a better

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\textsuperscript{450} The term “cultural hygiene” was taken from A. L. Stoler (1989) ‘Making Empire Respectable: The Politics of Race and Sexual Morality in 20th-Century Colonial Cultures’ in \textit{American Ethnologist}, 16 (4), p. 636. See also McClintock’s \textit{Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest}, especially chapter five. Other authors have also focused on the interconnections between racial and moral health and gender terms notably Angela Woollacott who writes in \textit{Gender and Empire} that “Ideas of gender, always linked to ‘race’ and class, were forged in the colonies as well as in the metropole and circulated constantly throughout the empire” (p.3).
\end{flushright}
future.”\textsuperscript{451} However, the book’s themes of “struggle and excess, waste and extinction” simultaneously “stirred unquiet dreams of degeneration and moral decay.”\textsuperscript{452} Stoler notes that degeneracy “characterized those who were seen to veer off bourgeois course in their choice of language, domestic arrangement, and cultural affiliation” but, more importantly, that degeneracy was a “mobile” discourse of empire that “designated eligibility for citizenship, class membership, and gendered assignments to race.”\textsuperscript{453} With this in mind, this section argues that these factors establish society according to categories of organisation which identify the anti-normative ‘Other’. This in turn helped influence the development of discourses on gender, race, and class which would in turn influence the shaping of discourses on genocide and rape prominent during the twentieth century.

3.2.1. “The test of national virility”

The ‘Victorian Age’ “has long been a synonym for a harsh and repressive sexual puritanism.”\textsuperscript{454} The opening statement of Michel Foucault’s \textit{The History of Sexuality} reads that society continues to be dominated by a Victorian regime, with “the image of the imperial prude … emblazoned on our restrained, mute, and hypocritical sexuality.”\textsuperscript{455} Though this volume of work was published in 1978, Foucault’s observation has resonated in the decades since, with “the imperial prude” continuing to influence social and political discourses. Yet it was also during this period that the debate about sexuality “exploded.”\textsuperscript{456} Foucault explains that sex became a concern of the state at the end of the eighteenth century; moreover, sex became “a matter that required the social body as a whole, and virtually all of its individuals, to place themselves under surveillance.”\textsuperscript{457} The curtailment and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{452} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{454} Weeks, \textit{op. cit.} n. 7, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{455} Foucault, \textit{op. cit.} n. 183, p. 3
\textsuperscript{456} Weeks, \textit{op. cit.} n. 7, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{457} Foucault, \textit{op. cit.} n. 183, p. 117.
\end{flushright}
institutionalisation of sex continued into the late nineteenth century when “the technology of sex was ordered in relation to the medical institution, the exigency of normality, and ... the problem of life and illness.”  

By extension, the silencing and confinement of sex and discussions on sex also constrained any official discursive development in the area within Britain and, by extension, its colonies. As George Mosse has noted in *Empire and Sexuality*, unconventional sex was deemed a national threat and the management of sexuality thus became necessary for the health of the state.  

This section outlines the domestic discourses of gender, race and class which, as is being argued, influenced the development of discourses on genocide and rape and their thresholds of authenticity. As Joan W. Scott wrote, this discussion is not simply “about the things that have happened to women and men and how they have related to them; instead it is about the subjective and collective meanings of women and men as categories of identity have been constructed.”  

In other words, this section looks at the emergence of gender, race, and class as distinct social boundaries and the impact this had on the formulation of discourses on genocide and rape.

By the nineteenth century, British society had effectively been divided into public and private domains which “defined the place and roles of the sexes as separate

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458 Ibid., p. 116  
459 Ibid., p. 3  
460 See Mosse, *op. cit.* n. 119, pp. 10-22.  
461 Scott, *op. cit.* n. 29, p. 6.  
462 McClintock, *op. cit.* n. 27, p. 16.
and ‘complementary’.” According to Paula Krebs, the period correspondingly represented a shift in, and therefore created anxieties and uncertainties regarding, men’s roles in relation to women. McClintock has argued that the industrial market and the imperial enterprise depended on the cult of domesticity which was a symptom of male and female identities that emerged throughout the nineteenth century. More importantly, the norms of domesticity, and the emergence of the public/private dichotomy, “drew a clear ideological boundary between rational members of society and the feckless.”

This is reflected in parliamentary dialogue with many members referring to the change in gender roles in debates, as well as to what they felt were appropriate roles for women. In 1899, for example, one member opposed to a proposed amendment to the London Government Bill which would see women excluded from running for election to the city’s councils, argued that the amendment would demonstrate men’s “fear” of women. The continuous campaign and debates for women’s enfranchisement, which culminated in the Representation of the People Act (1918), was one of many sites where the contestation of and debates around gender roles took place. The expansion of the empire created new opportunities for both men and women, ensuring that matters of imperial interest and importance also became sites of similar gender struggles. Women and men did not experience imperialism in the same way and so these new sites of struggle predominantly reflected domestic social mores. McClintock has argued that European imperialism was “a violent encounter with pre-existing hierarchies of power” and therefore with pre-existing hierarchies of discourses. Parliament represented one such hierarchy of power; at the outbreak of war its composition excluded women.

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465 McClintock, op. cit. n. 27, p. 5.
466 Weeks, op. cit. n. 7, p. 28.
467 Hansard HC Deb 06 July 1899 vol 74 c60 (Augustine Birrell MP). The amendment was carried forward by 243 to 174, with many agreeing that anyone who had proposed that women share the same political rights as men “would have been looked upon as a lunatic” (Henry Labouchere, c62).
468 McClintock, op. cit. n. 27, p. 6.
meaning that parliamentary dialogue was inherently biased. The fact that the question of women’s political agency, for example, was a contested issue in Britain in the lead-up to the war indicates how heavily gendered the colonial and war experiences of women, and men, during the period were.

By 1899, imperialism and Britain’s predominance on the global stage was embedded in everyday British discourse.\footnote{Krebs, \textit{op. cit.} n. 464, p. 7.} John MacKenzie’s work on propaganda and empire demonstrates how pervasive empire and imperialism was in everyday life by the start of the twentieth century.\footnote{See John MacKenzie (1984) \textit{Propaganda and Empire}; and (1986) \textit{Imperialism and Popular Culture}. \textit{The Colonial Alphabet for the Nursery} (1880) was a case in point. K in this instance “is the Kaffir of wild Kaffirland, his home is a kraal, his bed is the sand.”} Advertising became a key, if not the dominant, medium through which colonial discourse was disseminated. Ann McClintock’s \textit{Imperial Leather} (1995) details what has been termed “commodity racism”, a form of advertising which sold products based on colonial stereotypes.\footnote{For example, the following text is from an advert for Pear’s Soap which appeared in October 1899, coinciding with the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War: \textit{The first step towards lightening The White Man’s Burden is through teaching the Virtues of cleanliness. Pears’ Soap is a potent factor in brightening the dark corners of the earth as civilisation advances while amongst the cultures of all nations it holds the highest place – it is the ideal toilet soap.}} Despite Krebs’ critique that the book failed to devote “attention to the text that surrounded much of the visual material”\footnote{Krebs, \textit{op. cit.} n. 464, pp. 8-9.}, McClintock has provided a valuable commentary on the issue of civility and social morals. While MacKenzie’s work looks at a myriad of commodities and examples, McClintock focuses on soap and its importance in consolidating Britain’s civilising enterprise at home and abroad. She argues, in line with Foucault’s theory of Victorian sexual regulation as a new “technology of power”\footnote{J. Walkowitz (1980) \textit{Prostitution and Victorian Society: women, class, and the State}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 4.} to control this new public issue, that as the nineteenth century progressed, the
“iconography of dirt became a poetics of surveillance, deployed increasingly to police the boundaries between “normal” sexuality and “dirty” sexuality, “normal” work and “dirty” work and “normal” money and “dirty” money.”

Likewise, the iconography of “pollution”, “disorder”, “plagues”, “moral contagion” and racial “degeneration” was represented by those who eschewed “normal” sexuality, “normal” work, and “normal” money. Emerging during impending social crises to preserve the contested boundaries of class, gender and racial identity, soap, as McClintock describes, offered “regeneration through commodity consumption” and a hygiene regime “that could restore the threatened potency of the imperial body politic and the race.”

The intersection of gender roles, the iconography of dirt, and the fear of degeneracy is well illustrated by the controversy surrounding the Contagious Diseases Acts (CDAs) of the mid-nineteenth century. Social Darwinism, which prompted theories of eugenics and racism, had become more pervasive in social and political discourse. Britain’s social purity campaign ran through the latter half of the nineteenth century in an attempt to ‘clean’ and purify the body politic, focusing on ‘sexed’ areas such as the age of consent, homosexuality, soliciting, and incest for example. Moreover, the CDAs were based on, and reinforced, the double standard of sexual morality which had become “an important adjunct of respectability.” These acts attempted to control and limit venereal disease within the British armed forces by subjecting prostitutes in ports garrison towns to health checks, thus eschewing any responsibility of the male soldier. The prostitute was the antithesis of the ideal of womanhood at this time though prostitution served the valuable purpose of “drawing away the distasteful but inevitable waste products of male lustfulness, leaving the middle-class household and middle-class ladies pure and

474 McClintock, op. cit. n. 27, p. 154.
475 Ibid.
476 McClintock, op. cit. n. 26, p. 211.
477 Weeks, op. cit. n. 7, p. 30.
478 Emsley, op. cit. n. 42, p. 96
Despite this function, the Victorian-era prostitute was an object of class guilt, fear, and a “powerful symbol of sexual and economic exploitation under industrial capitalism.” Walkowitz’s observation of the prostitute as representative of “deep-seated social fears and insecurities, most vividly expressed in the images of filth and contagion associated with the “Great Unwashed” echoes the earlier remarks made by McClintock regarding the “iconography of dirt” and moral panics rife at this historic juncture. Moral panics emerge when a “condition, episode, person or group of persons emerge to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests...Sometimes the panic is passed over and forgotten, but at other times it has more serious and long term repercussions and it might produce changes in legal and social policy or even in the way in which societies conceive themselves.”

Like Weeks, Walkowitz suggests that the Contagious Diseases Acts reinforced a double standard of sexual morality, simultaneously justifying male sexual access to prostitutes yet penalising women for engaging in the same vice. The CDAs, like soap, aimed to preserve social boundaries, prevent the degeneration of gender, race, and class and the consequences this permeation would have for “white male control of progeny, property and power.” While the CDAs also transcended accepted boundaries between the public and private spheres, they reinforced, through the control of women’s sexuality, existing hierarchies of class and gender, illustrating what Michel Foucault had identified as the obsessive preoccupation with sex which distinguished sexuality in the Victorian age from previous historic codes. The CDAs and other aspects of the Purity Laws in general were representative of “a puritanical code politically attuned to the supposed needs of

480 Walkowitz, op. cit. n. 473, p. 4.
481 Ibid.
482 S. Cohen (2002) Folk Devils and Moral Panics (3rd edition), London: Routledge, p. 9. The term ‘moral panics’ was used by Cohen, a criminologist, to explain the negative response to youth in 1950s and 1960s Britain.
483 Walkowitz, op. cit. n. 473, p. 3.
484 McClintock, op. cit. n. 27, p. 47.
486 Foucault, op. cit. n. 183; see also Walkowitz, op. cit. n. 473, p. 4.
ruling a world-wide empire...”\textsuperscript{487} However, while the controversy surrounding the acts was itself an effect of contentious debate, it also inspired more debate and discussion around the issue of sexuality. The CDAs encouraged public discussion on a wide range of social and political issues, most notably on the double standard of sexual morality, the burden of which was placed disproportionately on women. Moreover, other issues such as the participation of women in political activity, the control of women by male doctors, and the role of the state in enforcing sexual and social discipline among the poor also entered the debate.\textsuperscript{488} As well as this, the repeal of the CDAs in 1886 allowed another avenue for women to enter the political arena, further disturbing the public/private division of space along gender lines previously “essential to the male spectator’s mental mapping of the civic order.”\textsuperscript{489}

While new opportunities to contest gender norms were offered by such incidents, the growth of empire simultaneously provided new discourses around the issue of gender and gender ideals. Moreover, sex became a special area of interest for many


\textsuperscript{488} Walkowitz, op. cit. n. 473, p. 3.

colonial observers and participants, and the topic was often invoked “to foster the racist stereotypes of European society.” This was evident with the public fascination with the perceived dangers of the colonies which was represented in narratives on captivity, popular from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, and narratives on sexual assault, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For example, the work of Jenny Sharpe and Nancy Paxton on literary narratives of the rape scares of the Indian Mutiny supports this argument. Pamela Scully has recognised that traditionally colonial sexual violence was analysed “as a metaphor for or index of tension within colonial societies” instead of been investigated as an act of violence by men against women which transcended racial and class boundaries. By the late nineteenth century, the particular interest was the perceived threat of violent interracial sexual abuse. Such discourses helped spread the fear of the white woman’s vulnerability to “lustful” indigenous men, as such “outrages” were deemed to be committed only by those of lower standing in society. This belief was popular within Britain: one member of parliament stated that within Britain such crimes, which involved taking “what is more valuable” to a victim than life itself,” were “usually committed by tramps”, the abnormal ‘Other’ in contrast to the model citizen. For the British in 1899, women had no place in war except for their role as a propaganda tool which took the shape of “victims of a callous enemy in a war for justice and equity.” In the colonies as at home, this meant that women were in need of the protection of men, from men. As Judith Walkowitz has observed, this illustrated the central contradiction of the discourse of social purity. While men were to control their own sexuality they also

493 Woollacott, op. cit. n. 441, p. 38.
494 Hansard HL Deb 28 March 1900 vol 81 c554 (John Wharton MP).
495 Van Heyningen, op. cit. n. 6, p. 91.
gained more control over women’s as their role was now to “protect their women and to repress brothels and streetwalkers.” 496

The gendering of the nation offered another dimension to the gendering of empire. As Mosse has noted, the female was a symbol of the nation, as ‘Marianne’ or ‘Britannia’. In this respect, her role was as “guardian of the continuity and immutability of the nation, the embodiment of its respectability.” 497 The threat of sexual violence on the embodiment of a nation’s respectability heightened panic and stress relating to women in the colonies. Not only would it result in an interracial attack, but would negate Britain’s colonial power. The perpetual risk of rape pervaded all aspects of the colonial mission, and exacerbated the widely accepted image of the African as savage. Paxton’s work on references to rape in novels on the Indian Mutiny suggests that although most professional British historians of the incident agreed that English women were not raped during the Mutiny, most novels on the subject reiterated these images. 498 Needless to say, these images were most influential “when the victim remained passive and silent” 499 not only reinforcing the stereotype of the savage African, but also the ‘sanctity’ of the passive and virtuous victim which remains influential today. The popularity of Mutiny rape myths in Britain entrenched “definitions of femininity that cast women as being in need of male protection and as under the threat of sexual assault” thereby effecting their social autonomy. 500 Interestingly, Sander Gilman’s well known hypothesis that the antithesis of European sexual mores and beauty was embodied in the “Black” 501 contradicts the lack of reference to “Blacks” in parliamentary debates during the Boer War as will be evident in the comparative discussion presented in chapter five. Indeed the reliance on imagery, provided for by journalism, literature, art, advertising, and photography, was necessary to

496 Walkwotiz, op. cit. n. 489, p. 214.
497 Mosse, op. cit. n. 111, p. 18.
499 Ibid., p. 20.
500 Woollacott, op. cit. n. 441, p. 45.
“sustain British public support for the economic project of empire.”\textsuperscript{502} Moreover, the use of imagery was also used to counteract the appetite for war and, as will be seen in the next chapter, played a major role in attempts to elicit support during the Bosnian War. While the nineteenth century had given rise to many issues and opportunities for the contestation of gender roles, the growth of imperialism arguably provided even more. While imperial expansion appeared to be “a distinctly masculine affair”\textsuperscript{503}, women also played significant roles. Colonial crises such as the Anglo-Boer War afforded women with prospects to become more and more prominent on the political stage, while creating new tensions between the sexes, as well as between ethnicities and classes.

### 3.2.2. “The test of racial fitness”

This period of British history, heavily influenced by the “iconography of dirt”\textsuperscript{504}, was also marked by British “race patriotism.”\textsuperscript{505} The distinction of Africans from white populations was part of the nineteenth century pseudo-science phenomenon which distorted the work of Charles Darwin, dividing humanity into races, and ranking these races “according to inherited differences not just in physique but also in character” with white Anglo-Saxons at the top, and Africans at the bottom.\textsuperscript{506} This hierarchical system adhered to, and relied on, the formation of categories and thereafter thresholds. As McClintock explains, from the mid-nineteenth century evolutionary theory, thanks to the publication of \textit{Origin of the Species}, “entered an “unholy alliance” with the allure of numbers, the amassing of measurements and the science of statistics.”\textsuperscript{507} This development led to what she has termed “scientific” racism, which endorsed discrimination on an authoritative level.\textsuperscript{508} Mosse reports that during the second half of the nineteenth century, when the

\textsuperscript{502} Krebs, \textit{op. cit.} n. 464, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{503} Hyam, \textit{op. cit.} n. 487, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{504} McClintock, \textit{op. cit.} n. 27, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{507} McClintock, \textit{op. cit.} n. 27, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{508} \textit{Ibid.}
influence of Social Darwinism was at its peak, the ideals espoused by the pseudosciences became applicable to the management of a booming and increasingly changed society: it appeared that natural selection “would reward a healthy national organism free of hereditary disease and moral weakness.” This method of population management was aided with the entry into political and social discourse of terms of scientific categorisation such as “type”, “species”, “genus” and “race” which not only expressed anxieties about gender, class and race but also reinforced the preservation of now established gender, racial, and class boundaries. As Ann Laura Stoler has suggested in *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*, colonialism rested on the contradictory desire to make the colonised subject adopt the habits and practices of the colonizer while maintaining the boundaries between the two. In essence, racial discourse emerged in tandem with Foucauldian “technologies of sex” during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to regulate the population for “hygienic necessity.” Nadine Ehlers further argues that scientific discourse contributed to the formulation of the norm during the nineteenth century, given that its development relied on the idea of the average, which in turn was indebted to the rise of the discipline of statistics. She notes that at this time attempts to normalize subjects against the template of the statistical average became institutionalised, with the result that norms were associated with scientific discourse which deemed deviance or abnormality as a developmental failure. In this sense, the construction of the ‘Other’ was scientifically and factually endorsed and therefore legitimised, ensuring the longevity of this representation of the abnormal and the unrecognisable.

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509 Mosse, op. cit. n. 119, p. 33.
510 McClintock, op. cit. n. 27, p. 48.
511 Stoler, op. cit. n. 490.
512 Ibid., p. 149.
514 Ibid., pp. 322-323. However, Ehlers also notes that “mores of notions of standard and acceptable forms of behaviour and identity were circulating prior to and outside of scientific discursivity and institutionalization in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and such workings were beginning to form the ideas of the norm and sexual normativity” (p. 323).
While both the African female and male had now become “icon[s] for deviant sexuality”\textsuperscript{515}, racial boundaries were not limited to those which distinguished between coloniser and colonised. They also served to separate those who represented Victorian ideals within Britain from those who did not. The influence of terms of scientific categorisation such as those mentioned above was evident in the construction of perceptions of crime at the time, and the subsequent rise in authority of scholars such as Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso. Lombroso made his mark by insisting that crime could be explained by examining the criminal and not the “moral significance of different criminal acts.”\textsuperscript{516} His 1878 magnum opus, L’Huomo Deliquente (Criminal Man), was based on two simple premises which reflected Darwinian rhetoric of the time and became highly influential: that up to 70% of criminals were “programmed from birth” to commit crime; and that such criminals were identifiable by certain physical traits.\textsuperscript{517} The Positivist approach espoused by Lombroso contributed to the overall discourse and identification of the abnormal, essential for the management of the population. Natural selection of the ideal members of society would, according to Darwinian rhetoric, “reward a healthy national organism free of hereditary disease and moral weakness.”\textsuperscript{518}

Lombroso’s theory proposed that criminality, and therefore degeneracy, could be located within a specific social group. A brief examination of crime and criminality regarding gender in late-nineteenth century Britain illustrates this point. Though Weiner’s earlier comments revealed that the “treatment of women in Britain and in the burgeoning empire” at this time had become “a touchstone of civilization and national pride”\textsuperscript{519}, the reality was that gender violence was permitted within the discourse of the public/private divide. Adopting the same approach as Lombroso, the influential sexologist Henry Havelock Ellis reported that physiognomy could be

\textsuperscript{517} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 3. See also Cesare Lombroso (1896) \textit{L’Huomo Deliquente}.
\textsuperscript{518} Mosse, \textit{op. cit.} n. 119, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{519} Weiner, \textit{op. cit.} n. 443, p. 3.
used to identify men likely to use violence in sexual encounters. This theory was formulated to overcome the public/private divide which accounted for the invisibility of sexual abuse. For example, marriage for many at this time meant that a wife was presumed to have granted lifelong consent to sexual intercourse with her husband. What was known as the “marital rape exemption” stipulated that under the marriage vows, husband and wife became “one person under the law.” In other words, “wilfully declining matrimonial intimacy and companionship” was nothing short of a “breach of duty, tending to subvert the true ends of marriage.” Joanna Bourke’s work amalgamates these observations with the previous section’s commentary on constrained sex in stating that

“...the rise of the male domestic ideal affected every aspect of middle-class domestic interaction. It was particularly significant in reducing the tolerance of cruelty within marriage...Marital rape continued to take place, but it was less readily tolerated and significantly more private – a guilty secret. If the household was to retain its respectable position within society, rape could only take place out of sight...Husbands had to respect the sexual integrity of their wives not because of a shared humanity but because women were different from men, more emotional and more pure.”

As is reflected in thresholds of authenticity today, rape trials in the late-nineteenth century were as “much an examination of the character and purity of the accused as they were of the events of the alleged offence.” Furthermore, such cases

521 Ibid., p. 421.
523 Bourke, op. cit. n. 520, p. 427.
involved the intersection of gender and class discourses; abusers were labelled as ‘monsters’ as their offences were a negation of the ideal of the Victorian gentleman.\(^{525}\)

The model of rape which emerged at this time was one which transcended the public/private divide; a female victim, violently raped and injured, while struggling, raped by a stranger or a group of strangers. Only with evidence of violence, injuries, and a traumatic reaction on the part of the victim could rape escape the constraints of the private setting and become a visible crime and problem that demanded attention. This prompted the development of a rape standard and the subsequent threshold of authenticity. One excerpt from a 1900 debate on the Corporal Punishment Bill illustrates this:

“I do not believe in single-handed rape, unless drugs are used or the woman is in a state of hysteria. I remember hearing a man get fourteen years penal servitude in a case of rape, and I believe it was no more a case of rape than of pocket-picking...I say that for the punishment of whipping to be inflicted in cases of rape there must be actual violence shown, or there must be two or more people engaged in it. That will show the House that so far as I am concerned I am wishful to approach this subject in a fair way to the criminal”.\(^{526}\)

From this excerpt it can be seen that one ‘type’ of rape, what is called “single-handed rape”, has been demoted as such to not be regarded as a crime. It has therefore transcended the boundaries of criminal act and social anomaly to become a non-criminal act. Overall, sexual deviancy and aggression was a mark of the “the unrespectable poor.”\(^{527}\) Even “the wife beater” was perceived as a working-class problem.\(^{528}\) As Joanna Bourke explains, racial anxieties framed debates about sexual deviancy and violence; perpetrators were seen to have failed to develop and were “stuck at the lower level of evolution.” Moreover, these failures were believed to be common among non-white races as well as the British working classes.\(^{529}\) This

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\(^{525}\) Emsley, op. cit. n. 4, p. 107.

\(^{526}\) Hansard HL Deb 28 March 1900 vol 81 cc552-5530 (John Wharton MP). Emphasis added.

\(^{527}\) Bourke, op. cit. n. 520, p. 425.

\(^{528}\) Emsley, op. cit. n. 42, p. 104.

\(^{529}\) Bourke, op. cit. n. 520, p. 425.
notion of a separate class of criminals “allowed crime to be defined as ‘other’... as divergent from, and not really a product of, respectable society.” Moreover, the formulation of the Other in terms of social purity meant that sexual aggression acted as a mechanism of social control and as a category of organization, distinguishing “the respectable from the unrespectable poor, the so-called civilised from the savage...” Not only had criminality in late-nineteenth century Britain been confined to those deemed racially and socially deviant, but the aforementioned national pride in Britain’s treatment of its women appears unfounded. Any developments in that regard were arguably “largely cosmetic, or installed as defensive measures in order to preserve the fundamentals of patriarchy in a changing world...” Moreover, court/criminal justice reform “only really reflected changing conceptions of what men thought was acceptable” limiting the use of such systems.

The work of Lombroso and the Positivist School of criminology, which offered scientific justification for the categorisation of the population, augmented the Victorian preoccupation with the health of the body politic and simultaneously contributed to and developed from the emergence of eugenics. According to Francis Galton, a pioneer in the field, eugenics was “the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race.” The field of eugenics became a fundamental aspect of social movements based on late nineteenth century discourses and ideologies of gender, race, and class thereby becoming “meshed with population control, social hygiene, state hospitals, and the welfare state.” These discourses and ideologies, highlighted during the Boer War “panic about possible physical deterioration” provided the resources from which

531 Bourke, op. cit. n. 520, p. 425.
532 Weiner, op. cit. n. 443, p. 76.
533 Godfrey and Lawrence, op. cit. n. 530, p. 64.
eugenics drew upon to promote its scientifically-based social theory of racial regeneration. This theory argued that social position was “largely the result of individual qualities such as mental ability, predisposition to sickness or health, or moral tendency” 537, the inheritance of which, it was argued, could be curtailed mainly through the influence of differential birth rates. In essence, eugenics was a method of talking about social problems in scientific terms. 538

With the domestic discourses having been addressed, the following section will examine how the popularization and acceptance of these discourses affected how the Boer War was framed in terms of gender, but also race and class. It will conclude with a look at how the establishment of the camp system was facilitated by these discourses.

3.3. Framing the Second Anglo-Boer War

British imperial dominance had been uncontested before the Anglo-Boer War. From the outset, Salisbury’s government used the case of the Uitlanders, the Transvaal’s British population, and their infringed franchise rights, as the reason for Britain’s military campaign in South Africa. The Earl of Camperdown, Robert Haldane-Duncan (HL) noted that the Transvaal’s independence was conditional on Britain remaining the “paramount power in South Africa”, but also that “there should be equality of persons in the sight of the law...”\(^{539}\) which, according to supporters of the Uitlanders, was not the case. Referring to the Transvaal’s military activity, General Francis Russell MP, stated that the likelihood “that those great military preparations in the Transvaal and the enormous amount of money spent on them can be made for purely defensive purposes” was unimaginable, and that British preparations were necessary “to protect our own Colonies against the armed forces.”\(^{540}\) Boer attacks on Britain’s dominance and regional hegemony was therefore an attack on British way of life, prompting Chamberlain to declare in September 1899 that “the existence of a pure Dutch Republic flouting, and flouting successfully, British control and interference” had to be terminated.\(^{541}\)

Many opposition members argued that the primary motive for the Uitlanders’ presence, and Britain’s antagonism, was purely economic. As early as August 1899, Sir Wilfred Lawson MP dismissed the plight of the Uitlanders as the contentious issue, describing franchise rights as an insufficient reason to go to war. Demonstrating his opposition, he stated that

“...because of these grievances, the same as we endure in this country, the war-drum is beat...For this the colonies send offers of assistance—what for? To crush 30,000 Boers...”\(^{542}\)

\(^{539}\) Hansard HL Deb 28 July 1899 vol 75 c622.
\(^{540}\) Hansard HC Deb 21 April 1899 vol 70 c258.
\(^{542}\) Hansard HC Deb 07 August 1899 vol 76 c113.
This is supported by J. A. Hobson, an economist and critic of imperialism whose work drew links with empire and international conflict; he argued at the outset of war that gold-mining capitalists were the real reasons for the conflict, and not the oppressive reign of President Paul Kruger as was being argued in parliament.\footnote{See The War in South Africa: Its Causes and effects, New York: Macmillan, 1900 and Imperialism: A Study, London: James Nisbet, 1902.} Krebs has since also identified economic incentives as being reasons for Britain’s belligerence. Moreover, she argues that the gold-seeking Uitlanders had travelled to the region without a community of English women “to keep domestic and social order for them.”\footnote{Krebs, \textit{op. cit.} n. 464, p. 57.} Lord Charles Beresford MP counter-argued, remarking that he did not believe “it would be possible that we should ever be able to go to war over the franchise,” acknowledging that “there have been gross exaggerations on both sides” though recognising that “the whole issue at stake in this country is a question of our being paramount at the Cape...”\footnote{Hansard HC Deb 07 August 1899 vol 76 c63} that is, an exertion of Britain’s dominance and racial fitness.

Mobilisation was further justified through the use of the discourse of superiority which presented the Boers to the British public as

\begin{quote}
“primitive and backwards, isolated rural people”, often described in terms associated with the animals which provided their livelihood, such as ‘herds’ or ‘flocks.’\footnote{K. O. Morgan (2002) ‘The Boer War and the Media (1899-1902)’ in Twentieth Century British History, in 13 (1), p. 5.}
\end{quote}

This implied that Britain was not just going to war but was also embarking on a civilising mission which had become a “necessity” imposed upon the empire. This was supplemented by the feeling that the Boers faced inevitable defeat against a superior civilisation exemplified by Britain.\footnote{Ibid.} Many opposed to the campaign felt that targeting the Christian and Caucasian Boer population had the feel of a civil war. Leader of the opposition Henry Campbell-Bannerman MP explained that because the war was, on the surface, mainly between white men the conflict had
“the character of a civil war...” and the idea of ‘civilising’ a population similar in appearance to their own did not endear itself to many people as due to their similar appearance and religious beliefs the Boers too were seen as civilised, thus making the case for war both “weak and absurd.” However, according to Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett MP, the necessity of war was “for great national or imperial interests, or because,” as was the case here, it was “demanded by vital claims of justice.”

Given the necessity to justify Britain’s civilizing mission, the African population was also included in pre-war debates by presenting it as uncivilised and in need of saving. Colonel Edward Saunderson MP presented an enduring image of African as unrestrained by a lesser intellectual capacity and as

“a man with the intelligence of a child and the passions of a man. In dealing with a child you restrain him until his intellect has grown sufficiently to guide him. If he were to try that on the Upper Congo, what would he find? The first thing the natives would do would be to fatten him and then eat him...”

Though referring to the population of the Upper Congo, Saunderson used this example as evidence that the African and Boer populations of Southern Africa could not and should not be treated in the same way, despite the apparent inferiority of both when compared to the British. The ‘savage’ African was representative of degeneration and this idea, combined with the popularity of Social Darwinist discourses further prompted the provision of law and order to these degenerative societies which itself was espoused by the emerging colonial discourse of pacification. Similarly, subjects who transgressed the established boundaries between public and private or who transcended gender, racial and class boundaries in the domestic sphere were “increasingly stigmatized as specimens of racial regression.” Illustrating again that racial degeneration was not solely applicable to colonised populations, domestic subjects such as deviant women were, like

548 Hansard HC Deb 17 October 1899 vol 77 c74.
549 Hansard HC Deb 31 January 1900 vol 78 c207.
550 Hansard HC Deb 07 August 1899 vol 76 c74.
551 SUPPLY. (Questions – Privilege) - HC Deb 05 June 1899 vol 72 cc396
553 McClintock, op. cit. n. 27, p. 42.
Saunderson’s African, “the prototypes of anachronistic humans: childlike, irrational, regressive and atavistic, existing in a permanently anterior time within modernity.”

Just as European colonisers were cast in gendered terms as wiser, more responsible and self-disciplined, and therefore more masculine, colonised populations, in representing the ‘Other’, were identified as sensual, childlike and irresponsible, and ultimately feminised.

The Earl of Shaftesbury (H.L.) foresaw that the war was

“destined to revolutionise in no small degree all tactics of modern warfare...It is bound to make every nation pause and consider how the lessons to be learnt from it are to be best applied to the perfecting of their national systems for attack and defence, and in like manner it is destined to mark an important epoch in the military history of our Empire. Under these circumstances, therefore, the war must be the all absorbing topic of the hour...”

The war dominated the ensuing debates, but Shaftesbury’s comments regarding the revolutionising of warfare tactics remained striking given that the most “modern” tactic of warfare, the concentration camp system, had not yet been established. It was of the utmost importance that Britain emerge from the war victorious. The First Anglo-Boer War ended in a negotiated peace against an enemy who supposedly maintained “feudal barriers” which blocked the progressive development of civilisation associated with a great imperial power such as Britain. Moreover, the regeneration and growth of the Boer population was another incentive to quash the threat the colonies presented. Dr. Gavin Clark MP highlighted the virility of the Boers in contrast to the image of the supposed “dying race” it was meant to be:

“When in 1814 we got possession of South Africa by purchase, we found 30,000 unwilling Dutch subjects, who objected to our buying them without their consent. These 30,000 have grown until they are 500,000.”

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554 Ibid.
555 Woollacott, op. cit. n. 441, p. 4.
556 Hansard HL Deb 30 January 1900 vol 78 cc9-10.
557 Nasson, op. cit. n. 449, p. 19.
558 Hansard HC Deb 07 February 1900 vol 78 c852.
Clark detailed why the Boers were currently “the most virile race in the world”, explaining its population increase with the observation that they attained “legal and physical” maturity at sixteen, and married early\(^{559}\), and therefore posed a threat to Britain’s security and reputation. Clark also pointed out that though the global trend had seen “aboriginal blacks” disappear in the face of white growth, the same could not be said of the region’s African population which had “increased in almost as great a ratio as the Boers...”\(^{560}\) Britain was now fighting on two fronts, despite the fact that part of its initial mandate was to protect the African population from Boer oppression. Since the Boer community did not understand that they, too, had rights, it became

> “the solemn duty of the British Government to intervene on behalf of those three-quarters of a million natives whom they – under assurance that their rights would be secured – handed out to the Transvaal Government...and it is for the British Government now to define those rights and to make the necessary provision that they be observed.”\(^{561}\)

Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain MP himself referred to the 1881 Pretoria Convention and the 1884 London Convention with the republics which declared Britain’s suzerainty in the region and its subsequent duty to protect the African population as per the Conventions’ terms as reason enough to embark on the military campaign. Their treatment since, according to Chamberlain, “has been disgraceful; it has been brutal; it has been unworthy of a civilized Power...”\(^{562}\)

3.3.1. The necessity of war

With the expansion of empire came the rationale that war was

> “a necessary evil, and in some cases it was regarded not as an act of evil, but as the supreme act of virtue, especially in the case of bringing the benefits of civilization to “poor misguided ‘savages’”.”\(^{563}\)

\(^{559}\) Ibid.
\(^{560}\) Ibid.
\(^{561}\) Sibbald, op. cit. n. 442, pp. 15-16.
\(^{562}\) Hansard HC Deb 19 October 1899 vol 77 c271-2.
\(^{563}\) Sibbald, op. cit. n. 442, p. 10.
Many remained faithful to the increasingly popular Social Darwinist school of thought and saw the origins of the war as “the sheer inevitability of an evolutionary human struggle through which progressive civilisations shoulder aside conservative, stagnant, and outmoded societies”, and given the rationale that war was essential in the progression of society, it became both natural and necessary. The influence of Social-Darwinism, indicated by the focus on “the test of national virility and racial fitness”, was key in championing Chamberlain’s belief that bringing the Transvaal under British cultural influence would be “good for the Boers” who were still inferior although being white and Christian were antithetical to traditional colonial subordinates. Just as Social Darwinist rhetoric ranked races, the Boer population found itself classified beneath the Anglo-Saxons in terms of civility.

Britain entered the war with the belief that the strength and power of its military which had facilitated the growth of the empire would deliver a swift and decisive victory. However, it was immediately stifled. After a century of successful colonial campaigns, confidence in what MacKenzie has termed the “over by Xmas” mentality soon diminished. By December 1899, two months into the war, “the cream of the British regular army” had been stalled by a “collection of Afrikaner farmers, who seemed to have stepped straight out of the Old Testament.” The early period of the conflict was marked by a series of crushing British defeats, which not only called the status of imperial power into question but also Britain’s fighting efficiency and the nation’s ‘racial’ vitality, initiative, and competence in general. At this time, the frames of war crucially transformed from demonstrating and protecting Britain’s health to securing its initial security. The course of the war soon changed and, though it carried on for a considerable length of time, momentum was with Britain from 1900 onwards. Where the Boers were commanding in terms

564 Nasson, op. cit. n. 449, p. 18.
565 Ibid., p. 235.
566 Pretorious, op. cit. n. 505, p. 10.
569 Nasson, op. cit. n. 449, p. 6.
of territorial familiarity, they soon found themselves at a severe logistical
disadvantage. Supply problems manifested once the war encompassed the civilian
population which until then had been the main logistical support for the Boer
guerrillas. Britain’s now superior military solidarity and management, as well as its
improved logistics, were culminating in a gradual, rather than decisive, victory. 570

The instigation of the scorched-earth policy was the turning-point in the war.
Supporters of the policy viewed it as a necessity to defend against the mobile Boers
who were often supplied food and information by civilians though, as Liz Stanley
notes, it may also have been a punitive act against the population, “many of whom
inhabited a grey area between being civilians and being combatants.” 571 The
damage afforded to homesteads as a result of the scorched-earth policy was
“comparatively slight” according to Ashmead-Bartlett MP. He noted that “a Boer
farm does not very much resemble a farm in other parts of the world...It will be
found that the amount of damage done in money value is very slight and easy to
repair...” 572 thus negating any cause for argument and strengthening the frame of
war which identified the Boer population as savage, uncivil, and therefore inferior.

Britain’s farm-burning policy was instigated under the auspices of Lord Frederick
Roberts, commander of British forces in South Africa, and was accelerated under
Horatio Kitchener, who succeeded Roberts in November 1900. Though the region’s
land and cultivation ultimately suffered, the original intention of the programme, to
undermine the morale of the active burghers, failed or at least had only a gradual
impact. The dominant calls in Parliament were in protest of the policy which,
according to Keir Hardie MP was “one of the stupid blunders of our generals in the
conduct of this war.” 573 Arguing that the method used was solely a way to compel
the men “to surrender out of pity for their wives and children,” Hardie felt that it
“was not work fit for soldiers or men.” 574 Samuel Smith MP saw the scorched-earth

570 Ibid., p. 208.
571 Stanley, op. cit. n. 421, p. 5.
572 Hansard HC Deb 06 December 1900 vol 88 c163.
573 Hansard HC Deb 11 December 1900 vol 88 c542.
574 Ibid.
policy as leading to “a heritage of hatred which would last for generations,”\textsuperscript{575} while John Dillon MP questioned the would-be legitimacy of the policy were it carried out by a different party, and also were it carried out closer to home and European scrutiny:

“... What would Europe have said if the German troops, when they advanced and took possession of Orleans, burned it down and laid the country waste between Orleans and Paris? All Europe would have cried shame on them. But because these countries are distant and you have your hand on the telegraph wires you dare to do in South Africa what you would not dare to do nearer home.”\textsuperscript{576}

Such critics of government policy signify through their denunciation a potential destabilisation of dominant parliamentary discourse. The scorched-earth policy also brought about a “deep and lasting resentment” amongst the Boer population.\textsuperscript{577} Ill-feeling soon spread globally as the policy’s effects on “a white race defending their homes with a bravery and resource” became common knowledge\textsuperscript{578}, though such feelings were to become more widespread and pronounced after the revelations of the ensuing camp system.

Taking into account the examination of the formation of discourses on gender and race as outlined in the previous sections, the following sections demonstrate how these discourses helped frame the Anglo-Boer War. In terms of gender, for example, the majority of accounts of the war which focused on women were initially on the plight of the Boer women, and children. This group was seen predominantly as victims of an unjust war, with emphasis placed on their passive suffering. While this account coincides with the work of Emily Hobhouse, it does not fit into the observations of Millicent Fawcett who saw the Boer women as active agents in their suffering. However, Van Heyningen argues that the discourse of female passive suffering in war is “a historiographical trend which has continued into the

\textsuperscript{575} Hansard HC Deb 11 December 1900 vol 88 c572.
\textsuperscript{576} Hansard HC Deb 25 February 1901 vol 89 c1161.
\textsuperscript{578} Ibid.
present.\textsuperscript{579} The continuation of this discursive trend is a central tenet of this thesis’s main argument, that is, that discourses on genocide and rape have themselves continued into the present and is demonstrable through parliamentary dialogue.

3.4. Gender roles, sexual deviancy, and the Anglo-Boer Concentration Camp System

The Boer War’s concentration camp system consisted of what were originally entitled ‘refugee’ camps, a term resented by inmates who felt they were not there on their own accord; the term ‘burgher’ camps was also sporadically used in their early days.\textsuperscript{580} The term ‘concentration’ camps became widely used soon after. It aptly described the containment incentive behind the camp policy. Many members of Parliament had reservations about the policy, with some supporters describing it as “a most disagreeable necessity of war,” enacted due to the lack of other suggested methods.\textsuperscript{581} The policy of concentrating Boer women and children, who were now destitute as a result of the scorched earth policy to end the flow of food and information to the mobile commandos, was considered the best option to both protect them and to end the war. Through this system, Kitchener aimed to efficiently manage the huge number of civilians now wandering the land post-eviction, as well as making the camps serve as hostage sites by enticing armed burghers to surrender in order to be reunited with their families.\textsuperscript{582} In any case, one reason to explain why this method was deemed appropriate by parliament is offered by Miller, who identifies that societal attitudes regarding proper conduct during war are confined to a cultural moment insofar as “what is viewed as an acceptable action by one people at one time may differ considerably from how

\textsuperscript{579} Van Heyningen, op. cit. n. 6, p. 92. She also notes that “the traumas of the twentieth century have largely erased popular memory of the camps amongst blacks. Their experience can often only be extrapolated from that of Boer women” (p. 94).


\textsuperscript{581} Hansard HC Deb 17 June 1901 vol 95 c606 (Richard Haldane MP).

\textsuperscript{582} Nasson, op. cit. n. 449, p. 221.
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others view the same action.\(^{583}\) Overall, in this context the role of crime and
punishment was “not simply to produce obedience but also to satisfy the moral
conventions of Victorian society wherever it transmitted.”\(^{584}\) As will be shown
below, the concentration camp system used during the Boer War reflected the
beliefs and discourses of its British administrators which influenced perceptions of
the camp inmates and more importantly of gender and race.

The system’s notoriety lay in the fact that the scorched earth and concentration
policy was endorsed by politicians and civil servants

> “who failed to comprehend the difficulties of dealing with a ‘concentrated’ population of
many thousands of women and small children in wartime circumstances in a country of the
size and with the climate of South Africa.”\(^{585}\)

While the safety and well-being of the inmates, predominantly women and children,
was supposedly the policy’s priority, its instigators were evidently unprepared for
the influx of inmates and the problems thereafter. Described as one of Kitchener’s
famous short-cuts, the camp system operated solely as an administratively and
financially convenient plan, with roughly one superintendent, one doctor, and a few
nurses for each of the initial camps.\(^{586}\)

The camps were, for the purposes of justification and propaganda, both a “military
and moral necessity”; as Secretary of State for War, St. John Brodrick MP, explained,
the country had to be cleared of food, and the women and children could not be
left to starve.\(^{587}\) While the burning of farmland was seen as a military strategy, the
camps became a humanitarian issue.\(^{588}\) Britain’s main humanitarian mandate was
to protect women and children against the deviant African male. Viewing the
African as a threat was pertinent to guaranteeing support for the war campaign.


\(^{584}\) Ibid., p. 313.

\(^{585}\) Stanley, *op. cit.* n. 421, p. 7.


\(^{587}\) Ibid., p. 536

Even opposition members identified this threat; Lloyd George bemoaned the fact that the scorched earth policy had cleared the country leaving “all the women and children there without any provisions at all, and at the mercy of the Kaffirs...”

This intersection of gender and racial hierarchies demonstrate ‘charity’ in the face of anxiety over potential African ill-behaviour which brought together, as Paula Krebs has noted, two central aspects of Victorian Britain: “that of the weakness of women and that of the sexual savagery of the black man towards the white woman.”

The imprisonment of the Boer women and children within the camps necessitated a discursive context which adhered to Britain’s ideology on gender relations. This was provided for by the threat of the African, the sexual and racial ‘Other’. Britain could not allow the exposure of Boer women and children to this threat and therefore their presence within the camp system was explained using the discourse of protection. The British camp system offered protection not only from the deviant African, but also from starvation and exposure to the elements, thus strengthening the discourse of femininity as weak and dependent. Moreover, the British men who were overseeing the camp system were reinforcing the Victorian ideal of masculinity in taking on “the duties shirked by the unmanly Boers on commando who had ‘deserted’ their families.”

For some members of parliament, the camp system was simply reinforcing the idea that the House simply feared women. In asking “what civilised Government ever deported women and children”, John Dillon MP questioned whether the Empire was in fact afraid of women and children. Moreover, the internal structure of the camp system “was linked to stereotypes found in the surrounding social milieu” meaning that it “was unable to stand free of the turbulence of the historical events beyond its precincts.” This ensured that the social and political discourses of the day survived within this system, as did the norms of gender, race, and class upon which thresholds of authenticity on genocide and rape were established.

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589 Hansard HC Deb 15 December 1900 vol 88 c899.
590 Nasson, op. cit. n. 449, p. 220.
591 Krebs, op. cit. n. 588, p. 44.
592 Ibid.
593 Hansard HC Deb 25 February 1901 vol 89 cc1164-5.
The perceived humanity of this particular aspect of the civilising mission to South Africa was cited many times in parliamentary debates. Though many felt that no previous war had impacted as negatively on civilians, Chamberlain attempted to assuage this by declaring that “never in the history of war has war been carried out with so much humanity on the part of the officers and of the soldiers concerned as in the present war,” in terms of protecting the lone female population from “marauding bands...and also from the vast native population.”\(^{595}\) This was reiterated by others, including Sir Andrew Agnew MP who applauded the humanity of Britain’s conduct of the war, but was also proud of “the admission of those who fought against us that our soldiers in South Africa have shown that war instead of brutalising men may ennable them...”\(^{596}\) The conduct of British soldiers throughout the war does not appear to have been the same contentious issue for members as it was for journalists Arthur Conan Doyle and William Stead, as will be detailed below; for example, William Redmond MP another fervent opponent of the war, stated that he did not blame the soldiers for what he saw as the “brutality” of the campaign, as they were simply carrying out orders.\(^{597}\) In any case, it was felt that the camp system would serve the needs of the Boer women and children who had been “deserted by callous male breadwinners, selfishly putting war above the crying need of love and family”\(^{598}\), positioning them outside the frame of true masculinity. However, as Francis Channing MP stated, reports from certain camps revealed that female inmates

> “had been expressing in the strongest and most passionate terms their hope and belief that their husbands and sons would never allow the sufferings of the women to be a motive for surrendering their struggle for their liberties...”\(^{599}\)

With the onslaught of disease and neglect within the camps, Kitchener had civilian administrators take over running the camps from February 1901 onwards, with one administrative system for the Orange Free State based in Bloemfontein and one for

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\(^{595}\) Hansard HC Deb 07 December 1900 vol 88 c253.
\(^{596}\) Hansard HC Deb 14 February 1901 vol 89 cc79.
\(^{597}\) Hansard HC Deb 14 February 1901 vol 89 cc126.
\(^{598}\) Nasson, op. cit. n. 449, p. 220.
\(^{599}\) Hansard HC Deb 26 February 1901 vol 89 c1265.
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the Transvaal based in Pretoria. This failure saw the administratively and financially advantageous camp system succumb to its own supposed efficiency or, for want of a better term, lack of fundamental resources. Westminster’s lack of planning became evident soon after the establishment of the first camps, which lacked tents and other basic necessities. A more contentious issue was that of the ration scales which, though similar to institutional ration scales of the day, were inadequate for women and children. Stanley notes that with regard to African inmates, lower rations were given as it was “assumed they would produce some of the food they needed,” further demonstrating the bad planning and foresight of the policy.

The British system of ‘refuge’ was gradually being undermined by criticism at home and abroad. Campbell-Bannerman’s description of British operations in the region as using “methods of barbarism” is one of the best known of the time. Britain’s methods were quickly losing credibility. Lloyd George MP accused the government of pursuing a “policy of extermination” against Boer women and children. The negation of the tradition of civilized war which had entailed treating women and children as non-combatants was, in Lloyd George’s view, all the more “disgraceful” as it would essentially prolong, not shorten, the war:

“We want to make loyal British subjects of these people. Is this the way to do it? ... It will always be remembered that this is the way British rule started there, and this is the method by which it was brought about.”

The threat of future Boer retribution became an issue during the war. One British soldier who, after spending up to six months being one of a column employed in destroying homesteads and farms in the Potchefistoon District of the Transvaal, and who thereafter brought in the affected women and children into camp, condemned

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600 Stanley, op. cit. n. 421, p. 6.
602 Stanley, op. cit. n. 421, p. 6.
603 Pakenham, op. cit. n. 586, p. 539.
604 Ibid.
605 Ibid., pp. 539-540
the practice, saying “that retribution was sure to follow the English.” Kitchener unwittingly sampled a similar reaction when he recounted how some Boer women in the camps, referring to their pregnant bellies, threatened that “when all our men are gone these little Kharkis will fight you,” though he referenced the incident within the wider belief that this behaviour was typical of the “type of savage produced by generations of wild, lonely life.”

The fall of the camp system was instigated by British campaigner Emily Hobhouse, whose life story has been extensively recorded by Thomas Pakenham in his account of the war. Hobhouse played a major role within the context of the war after her initial contact with camp personnel in December 1900, when she travelled to the colony to distribute an array of clothes, and comfort items, paid for by her relief fund. Instead, she found that essential commodities were lacking within the camps, which then numbered over thirty. Her early correspondence home placed the blame of the camp conditions firmly on “crass male ignorance, stupidity, helplessness and muddling” to which she ‘rubbed’

“as much salt into the sore places of their minds as I possibly can, because it is good for them; but I can’t help melting a little when they are very humble and confess that the whole thing is a grievous mistake and gigantic blunder and presents an almost insoluble problem and they don’t know how to face it.”

This account of mismanagement, and the inability to solve the problems at hand, indicated a naivety on the part of the military regarding the task at hand. Parliament did not seem so ill at ease as the camps gave the impression of order and control of the situation. The improvements Hobhouse campaigned for after her first visit, though carried out, were unavoidably undone by the constant weight

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607 Nasson, op. cit. n. 449, p. 256.
608 Ibid.
609 Pakenham, op. cit. n. 586, p. 536.
611 Ibid.
612 Pakenham, op. cit. n. 586, p. 537.
of new arrivals, as she later observed.  

Thereafter the camps represented “war in all its destructiveness, cruelty, stupidity and nakedness.”

From start to finish, the focus and intent of Hobhouse’s campaign emphasised her gender. She saw the camp system as a gendered issue, demonstrating her allegiance to gender roles and social boundaries in her acceptance of the discourse of protection, “by white men and from black men” despite the fact that she critiqued the government within the confines of this very discourse. Her empathy with the female Boer population provided new insights into colonised populations. She attempted to equate the camp inmates with the population at home in an attempt to elicit empathy and establish equivalence, stating that they were “a civilised, industrious set of people, as truthful as the rest of the world, and capable of bringing up large families with love and care...and other fine qualities which belong to high breeding.”

Hobhouse’s and the government’s interest in “woman” centred on the white female. Since, as has been stated previously, the British Uitlanders neglected to travel to South Africa with a small female population, the predominant white female group within the colonies were of Boer descent. This was problematic as Boer women transcended Victorian class, racial, and therefore gender, boundaries the British embodiment of white womanhood. However, the justification of the camp system necessitated a respectable female group to protect. Therefore, the protection of white womanhood was only invoked by Britain when it was advantageous; moreover, African womanhood was neglected to the point where it “could hardly be said to exist at all.” The value of rape narratives and imagery during the colonial era was compromised by this lack of a clear and agreeable white womanhood in Southern Africa. As Krebs notes, “the absence of British potential

613 Ibid.
614 Ibid.
615 Krebs, op. cit. n. 588, p. 40.
616 Ibid.
617 Ibid., p. 45.
618 Hobhouse, op. cit. n. 606, p. 313.
619 Krebs, op. cit. n. 564, p. 65.
rape victims meant that the deployment of the black rapist stereotype was less straightforward.”\textsuperscript{620} However, as Hobhouse was aware, African male sexuality was a powerful threat to both the white British and white Boer man.\textsuperscript{621} The threat posed by the African propelled Boer women to the status of white womanhood which had to be protected. In doing so, in constructing the Boer female as the embodiment of white womanhood, Hobhouse presented witnesses who provided testimonies of camp life as well as possible. Most of these witnesses were educated women presented as ladies, “delicate and refined like their English middle-class counterparts.”\textsuperscript{622}

Her second visit to South Africa made Hobhouse realise the full extent of the camp system’s effects on its inmates; the lack of resources and concern thereafter catalysed a high death-rate “such as had never been known except in the times of the Great Plagues.”\textsuperscript{623} Her subsequent \textit{Report of a Visit to the Camps of Women and Children in the Cape and Orange River Colonies}, published in June 1901, not only detailed the conditions individual Boer women lived in, but also gave Hobhouse space for her own political viewpoint. She equated the use of the camp system with keeping a whole nation captive.\textsuperscript{624} She also acknowledged her close identification with the Boer women, and criticised the humiliation and degradation of the South African white woman in front of the African population whose growing disrespect, coupled with what they were witnessing on a daily basis, were reason enough for Hobhouse to recommend that they should not be given roles of authority.\textsuperscript{625} The worsening camp conditions were exacerbated by the official tiered food-rationing system which meant that women and children whose husbands and fathers were still in fighting commandos received less than others.\textsuperscript{626} Recounting her initial arrival, one camp inmate who spoke with Hobhouse confided that many, if not all, of the “sick lying about in the iron sheds” she found were, to her shock, “of the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item \textsuperscript{620} Ibid., p. 64.
\item \textsuperscript{621} Ibid., pp. 64-65.
\item \textsuperscript{622} Van Heyningen, \textit{op. cit.} n. 422, p. 506.
\item \textsuperscript{623} Pakenham, \textit{op. cit.} n. 586, p. 538.
\item \textsuperscript{624} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{625} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{626} Ibid., p. 535.
\end{thebibliography}
superior class of Boers.627 It was now clear that all inmates, regardless of their background, were increasingly susceptible to disease, malnutrition and death as they had been during the farm-burning campaign. As Hobhouse noted, class did not decide who would survive exhaustion from roaming the veld before entering the camp, who would survive South African winters living in a tent, nor did it dictate who would be able to survive on the meagre and inadequate food supplied.628 This and the poor nutritional value of camp rations were the main cause of disease and death within the camps.

By 1901 over 93,000 Boers resided in the ‘camps of refuge’, with over 24,000 Africans occupying similar compounds, though their story was acutely neglected until quite recently.629 In terms of statistics, however, less is known about mortality in the African camps, but since their accommodation and nutrition were far worse than in the Boer camps, it is conceivable that mortality was at least as high amongst African children as Boer children.630 Small improvements were consistently cancelled out by further influxes of inmates, thus helping to account for a rapidly increasing death-rate over the course of the year; from May to July, for example, deaths trebled from 550 to 1,675.631 The camp system had symbolically brought Victorian social boundaries and aspiration for progress to the Boer population. The British government did not attempt to hide the scale of the deaths but they did seek to place the blame on the Boer inmates, and more specifically their unhygienic nature, their superstitious practice of medicine and the failings of the mothers in caring for their children.632

For Hobhouse, one of the most unfair aspects of the treatment of the inmates was their placement “in conditions where all the things that go to help cleanliness were scarce or altogether lacking.”633 Hobhouse’s affirmation of the normality of the

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627 Mrs. P. Moritz Botha (April 1901) quoted in Hobhouse, op. cit. n. 606, p. 169.
628 Ibid., pp. 170-1.
629 Pakenham, op. cit. n. 586, p. 540.
630 Van Heyningen, op. cit. n. 601, p. 2.
631 Pakenham, op. cit. n. 586, p. 540.
632 Van Heyningen, op. cit. n. 580, p. 23.
633 Hobhouse, op. cit. n. 606, p. 313.
Boer women were amplified by her belief that, under the same circumstances, any average Australian or English woman would be as clean\(^\text{634}\), and that the presence, as in any society, of a “few thriftless and dirty families” should not mean that their particular habits should be quoted as universal within the given context.\(^\text{635}\) As Nasson notes,

“In a neat reversal of the conventional Victorian social perception, in the Transvaal and Orange Free State it was country, not urban life, which was unhealthy or diseased, and it was rural, not urban fertility which was producing socially irresponsible racial stock.”\(^\text{636}\)

Hobhouse’s report noted that soap was not included in the rations for the Bloemfontein camps\(^\text{637}\) highlights the importance placed on cleanliness at the time. McClintock’s earlier reference to the value of soap in the era’s “commodity racism” is reflected here in the administration’s failure to provide the product, and in Hobhouse’s concern/observation that none was available in certain camps.

Van Heyningen acknowledges the importance of the repetition, or indeed the iterability, of the universality of suffering of the Boer inmates. Through this process the “veracity and the value of testimonies” would be made evident.\(^\text{638}\) “Veracity” was vital to the construction of the victimised Boers indicating the construction of a threshold of authenticity of suffering. Visual symbols of the camps were instrumental in this regard. Images of starving children reinforced mythologies of the camps as sites of extermination though, as van Heyningen notes, there is an inherent contradiction between such accounts and various other imagery and photography “of respectable families surrounded by their material possessions.”\(^\text{639}\)

The iterability of Boer camp suffering also reinforced the woman-as-nation paradigm which was reinforced by Hobhouse’s reports. Brink has argued that the Afrikaner notion of the volksmoeder or ‘mother of the nation’ was a “central

\(^{634}\) Ibid., p. 314 \\
^{635}\) Ibid. \\
^{636}\) Nasson, op. cit. n. 449, p. 244. \\
^{637}\) E. Hobhouse 1901) Report of a visit to the camps of women and children in the Cape and Orange River colonies. London: Friars Printing Association, Ltd, pp. 4-5. \\
^{638}\) Van Heyningen, op. cit. n. 422, p. 506. \\
^{639}\) Ibid., p. 507.
unifying force within Afrikanerdom and, as such, was expected to fulfil a political role as well. This is well illustrated by the case of Rachel Steyn, wife of M.T. Steyn, President of the Orange Free State. Her internment within the camp system saw her “universally hailed as a true volksmoeder...” That parliamentary dialogue on her situation was sporadic, succinct, and of little interest demonstrates the silence with which gender during conflict was treated with.

Amid the growing criticism of the camps, and the consistently complacent rebuttals from Kitchener, the British government opted to deploy its own commission to the colony in order to conduct a report in the style of Hobhouse’s earlier publication. The all-female group, appointed in July 1901, was headed by Liberal Unionist Millicent Fawcett, and comprised of Katherine B. Brereton; Lucy A. E. Deane (Honorary Secretary); Alice Knox, wife of one of Kitchener’s brigade commanders, Major-General Sir William Knox; Ella Campbell Scarlett (M.D., L.S.A, L.M.); and Jane E. Waterston (M.D.). On hearing of the commission’s impending visit, a confident Kitchener wrote:

“I see a number of ladies are coming out, I hope it will calm the agitators in England. I doubt there being much for them to do here as the camps are very well looked after.”

According to its subsequent report, the Committee was sent to ascertain how funds collected in England could be used to improve camp conditions; whether changes in the general organisation of the camps should be recommended; and camps should be relocated. Its chief point of inquiry focused on basic facilities previously neglected such as camp water supplies; sanitation and the disposal of refuse;

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641 Ibid., p. 279.
642 Carver, op. cit. n. 568, p. 220.
643 Ibid., p. 221.
housing; rations; positions of slaughter places; and the collection of statistic and records.\textsuperscript{645}

Millicent Fawcett’s biographer, Ray Strachey, described Hobhouse as “a violent pro-Boer” who was “easily deceived by agitators and imposters” and culpable to “many false or exaggerated stories...”\textsuperscript{646} The necessity of the camps lay in the fact that, as Fawcett believed, if the facility did not exist matters would have been much worse. This, as Strachey points out, was the fundamental difference between Fawcett and Hobhouse who did not identify the camp system as necessary.\textsuperscript{647} Strachey reports that though Fawcett recognised the camp system was a military necessity, she shared with Hobhouse a deep concern over its mismanagement and that of the war in general. Like Hobhouse, she identified the war as a gendered issue and held its male administrators responsible, commenting that

"What a splendid thing it would be for men now if they were able to say that the military blunders made in the conduct of the South African War were due to women."\textsuperscript{648}

Strachey’s book attempts to refute many of the negative views of Fawcett espoused by Hobhouse and her supporters. Referring to Fawcett’s pro-war stance, Strachey wrote that Fawcett “was no lover of war...but she was not prepared to see her country abandon its rights rather than fight for them.”\textsuperscript{649} It was this patriotism that led Fawcett to reject the discourse of protection espoused by Brodrick and maintained by Hobhouse to describe the camp system imperatives.\textsuperscript{650} A known advocate of women’s rights as evidenced by her involvement in campaigns for suffrage and for the repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts, she instead took the opinion that the Boer women were active agents in their incarceration declaring that “no one can take part in war without sharing in its risks, and the formation of the concentration camps is part of the fortune of war."\textsuperscript{651} She maintained that

\textsuperscript{645} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{646} R. Strachey (1931) \textit{Millicent Garrett Fawcett}, London: John Murray, p. 192.

\textsuperscript{647} Ibid., p. 196.

\textsuperscript{648} Ibid., pp. 189; 190.

\textsuperscript{649} Ibid., p. 184.

\textsuperscript{650} Krebs, \textit{op. cit.} n. 588, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{651} Committee of Ladies Appointed by the Secretary of State for War, \textit{op. cit.} n. 635, p. 2.
women who played an active role in the war must face consequences as the male Boer population had; she did not blame them for their activity but she did hold them responsible for the deaths of their children within the camp system. While Hobhouse had worked to portray female camp inmates as “delicate and refined like their English middle-class counterparts,” Fawcett could not as for her they were not identifiable in that way. Mirroring pre-war parliamentary dialogue, the commission’s report criticised the Boer inmates for their backwardness and “filthy habits” and interestingly, shared commonalities with the reports of sanitary inspectors recording visits to working-class and poor areas in Britain, and therefore commonalities with a domestic ‘Other’. Hobhouse criticised the commission for its lack of empathy with camp inmates, stating that

“[G]reat and shining lights in the feminine world, they make one rather despair of the “new womanhood” – so utterly wanting are they in common sense, sympathy and equilibrium.”

However, as Stanley points out, the female inmate was both “the suffering mourning Boer mother” and “the vengeful Afrikaner nationalist.” Both images, though representative of different opinions, were seen in Britain as a symbol of the Boer nation. Though it recognised female agency during war, the Fawcett Commission identified the Boer female camp system inmates as having transcended the strict gender, race, class boundaries established at home, instantly transforming them into the ‘Other’, the precarious subject onto which no harm could be inflicted. As Krebs notes, the positions of Boer and African women could not be compared to those of British women. In this sense, it can be suggested that a reason why this particular group was chosen was that their report reflected dominant discourses on gender, class and race, even though it generally critiqued the camp system.

652 Krebs, op. cit. n. 588, p. 46.
653 Van Heyningen, op. cit. n. 422, p. 506.
654 Krebs, op. cit. n. 588, pp. 48-49.
655 van Reenen, op. cit. n. 610, p. 462.
657 Krebs, op. cit. n. 464, p. 70.
658 Krebs, op. cit. n. 588, p. 49.
From the outset of its report, the commission noted that the “differences existing between different camps are so striking that it would be misleading to attempt any but a very few generalisations concerning them.” The report appeared to be more impartial than any of Hobhouse’s war-time publications, with both favourable and unfavourable testimonies presented on different assessment criteria. The education system set up within the camps, which became the effective means of education in the colonies up until then, received much credit from the Committee, as did the “the organisation of the hospitals and the provision of ‘medical comforts’” despite the Boer community’s suspicion of them.

However, education and medical provisions were not universally well administered and the Committee was quick to identify and critique problematic camps and sources. It attributed the high-death rates of 1901 to three connected causes namely the insanitary condition of the country caused by the war; causes within the control of the inmates of his camps (including sanitation, ventilation, treatment of disease); and causes within the control of the administrations, and provided specific recommendations for the improvement of the rate, making special mention of the inadequate nutritional provision, and exposure, of young children who accounted for the bulk of the deaths, as well as the “insanitary habits of the people”... whose “inability to see that what may be comparatively harmless on their farms becomes criminally dangerous in camp is part of the inadaptability to circumstances which constitutes so marked a characteristic of the people as a race.” This was also reflective in the Committee’s criticism of the community’s unwillingness to take advantage of medical provisions, noting that the Boers, “not unlike the more ignorant of the English poor, strongly object to hospital treatment for their children; consequently there are many cases of concealed illness nursed in

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659 Committee of Ladies Appointed by the Secretary of State for War, op. cit. n. 644, p. 1.
660 Ibid., p. 6.
662 Committee of Ladies Appointed by the Secretary of State for War, op. cit. n. 644, p. 14.
663 Ibid., p. 15.
664 Ibid., p. 16.
Finally, the report did acknowledge the need to keep the approximately 100,000 inmates within the camps to avoid starvation, and confirmed that “even if peace were declared tomorrow,” Britain had a duty to continue camp provisions “for some months to come.” This recommendation ran counter to the opposition’s claim that it was “the very worst policy in the world to keep these women and children there in these camps against their will, and under such conditions”. Overall, the Fawcett Commission’s report confirmed Emily Hobhouse’s earlier testimonies, differing perhaps only in the connection it made with the rates of death and disease and the alleged unhygienic habits of Boer women.

While both Hobhouse and Fawcett contributed significantly to the exposure of women as wartime subjects, as well the camp system, they failed to recognise the connections between gender, race, and class and, therefore, pose “a powerful challenge to the hegemony of the imperial idea in Britain at the turn of the century.” Another female personality who was vocal at the time succeeded in this regard. Olive Schreiner, a South African writer of German and English parentage, was “amongst the most significant figures in the “Woman Debate” taking place during the final decades of the nineteenth century.” Her analytical work of the war and its aftermath transformed her into the ‘Other’ in contrast to institutional social science and “governmental and related knowledge–producing agencies.” She was an anti-establishment figure who “analysed and theorised on the basis of grounded local knowledges.” Writing from the standpoint of “both colonized and colonizer”, Schreiner exposed many of imperialism’s contradictions, permitting a new examination of the relationship between gender, race and class

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665 Ibid.
666 Ibid., p. 20.
667 Hansard HC Deb 17 June 1901 vol 95 cc573-629 (David Lloyd George MP).
668 The report described the inmates as having “a horror of ventilation...It is not easy to describe the pestilential atmosphere of the tents...the Saxon word “stinking” is the only one which is appropriate.” Committee of Ladies Appointed by the Secretary of State for War, op. cit. n. 635, p. 16.
669 Krebs, op. cit. n. 588, p. 39.
671 Stanley, op. cit. n. 421, p. 540.
672 Ibid.
and more generally, power and resistance. Krebs reports that Schreiner opted for a view based on political economy to negotiate the issues she found herself presented with as colonizer and colonized. The tensions in the region between Britain, the Boer community and the African population led Schreiner to suggest a future where “black and white groups are linked by economics, while white and white groups become linked by evolution.” Evolution, or ethnicity, was a more palatable link between two white races than with a black group. Furthermore, linking Britain and Boer by race negated the threat posed by linking them politically. In this instance, the category of race was non-threatening. On the other hand, to link Africans with whites using a racial discourse would prove inflammatory. Instead, Schreiner uses the discourse of political economy, which in this instance is the non-threatening category; she identified Africans “as the working class of the new South Africa.”

Her literary works demonstrate her treatment of gender. *The Story of an African Farm* (1883) was Schreiner’s best-known work and earned her instant success and notoriety. Its description of the “entrapment in womanhood is a powerful articulation of what we now call the cultural construction of gender...” From *Man to Man* was posthumously published in 1926 and since credited for providing prostitution with a social history. The book exposes the Victorian sexual double-standard as told through the lives of two sisters and their roles as wife and prostitute respectively. The book eschews the powerful Victorian dichotomy of Madonna housewife and whore, describing the heralded institution of marriage as “the crassest prostitution.” More importantly, it also rejects the pathology and abnormality that prostitution was deemed to be instead shifting responsibility and focus onto “the man with the long purse”, and therefore highlighting the economic

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675 Ibid., p. 429.
676 Ibid.
678 McClintock, *op. cit*. n. 27, p. 287.
679 Ibid., p. 185.
duress many women were experiencing just as the CDAs had. In doing so, Schreiner provided a new perspective on women’s subjectivity as active and rational, critiquing the popular notion of women’s universal and natural subjection like Fawcett had espoused during the war. Schreiner’s commentary and the contradictions it revealed was an important contribution to gender analysis of colonialism because it demonstrated the multifaceted system of restriction which women, for example, experienced. As Stoler notes in her analysis on French IndoChina and Dutch East Indies in the early 20th century,

“...European women in these colonies experienced the cleavages of racial dominance and internal social distinctions very differently than men precisely because of their ambiguous positions, as both subordinates in colonial hierarchies and as active agents of imperial culture in their own right.”

Moreover, such women found the domestic, economic, and political restrictions on their colonial experience were not only more limiting than those they had left behind but also were more polarised in contrast to the ample opportunities afforded to their male peers. However, Schreiner’s astute observations led her to believe that the “peril which has long overshadowed this country, is one which exists for all dark skinned women at the hands of white men.” Her sympathy for what she called the “black cause” was interconnected with her involvement in public debates on controversial issues such as sexuality and prostitution, demonstrating her awareness of the interconnectedness of gender, race, and class. For example, she resigned from the Women’s Enfranchisement League when she discovered that its aim was to gain the vote for white women in South Africa.

Schreiner was in no doubt of the cost war placed on women. In Women and War (1911) Schreiner noted that women “...have always borne part of the weight of war,
and the major part” and their role as giving birth and raising children meant that women “pay the first cost on all human life.”

Before the war she had publicly called for better cooperation between Britain and the Boer community. After the outbreak of war she adopted an anti-imperialist stance, worked tirelessly organise women’s anti-war congresses, and developed a reputation as a “fiery speaker” against the concentration camp system. This and her “sensitivity to all forms of oppression” made her controversial but also viewed as “[s]o far ahead of her times.”

3.4.1. Gender, race, and sexual deviancy

Victorian Britain’s preoccupation with social degeneration and its subsequent construction of criminality and deviancy supports French historian Michelle Perrot affirmation that “...there is a discourse of crime that reveals the observations of a society.” In this sense, the discourse of crime which emerged from the Victorian preoccupation with the physical and moral health of the body politic, demonstrable during the Boer War, relied on the aforementioned discourses of gender, race and class. As has already been discussed, the development over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of technologies of sex and racial discourse was essential in the management of populations, and for the assurance of a physically and morally healthy body politic. It has also already been argued that the

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687 Theron, op. cit. n. 684, p. 18.
development of such technologies is the main locus of the history of Western sexuality. In this sense, technologies of sex and racial discourses produced historical “Others”\(^691\), be they sexually-deviant women, colonised populations, or sexual and class deviants, but ultimately a generally accepted representation of the criminal “Other”. The discourses defining the sexual and racial ‘Other’ were exported to the colonies. This is illustrated by Jeremy C. Martens’ account of colonial rape scares towards the end of the nineteenth century. Martens describes the threat presented by African male domestic workers whose performance of “women’s work” not only rejected settler notions of masculinity but also rejected established gender and racial boundaries and the delineated public and private spheres.\(^692\) The image of the “houseboy rapist”, the issue central to Martens’ article, further risked the restoration of domestic security and social boundaries. This image, part of the wider colonial discourse that case Africans as sexual deviants as outlined in the previous section, was inherently associated with “primativeness and social deprivation.”\(^693\) Moreover, such images underlined that the colonies, with or without conflict, were no place for white women, but also arguably reflected colonial male confidence of defending themselves against similar perceived threats of sexual abuse.\(^694\)

If social and moral values and priorities were exported to the colonies, it is important to examine what these values were and how sexual deviancy was framed and treated in the domestic sense. There was a strong reluctance among female victims of sexual offences to report crimes during the nineteenth century.\(^695\) Emsley cites the reasons for this reluctance as the embarrassment involved in discussing intimate body parts; the discouragement by male officials of working-class women to report such incidents especially if male members of the upper classes was involved; and the fact that, at trial, a woman’s virtue and “fantasies” were as much

\(^{691}\) Stoler, op. cit. n. 453, p. 195.


\(^{693}\) Ibid., pp. 394-395.

\(^{694}\) Woollacott, op. cit. n. 441, pp. 42-43.

\(^{695}\) Emsley, op. cit. n. 42, p. 28.
at issue as the man’s actions.\textsuperscript{696} Weiner reinforces Emlsey’s hypothesis, that the categories of gender, class and racial categories intersect, writing that prosecution was especially difficult for a woman of a low social standing, if she “lacked a protector ready to act on her behalf” such as a parent, relative or employer, if she needed to keep her job, “or if she simply feared the public ordeal a woman prosecuting such a charge faced.”\textsuperscript{697} Such observations meant that typically only women who resided within the accepted boundaries of gender, class and race and whose perpetrator violated these same boundaries, proving his degeneracy and deviancy, could hope to successfully prosecute a case of sexual abuse. This represents an early indicator of a threshold of authenticity of rape and what an authentic and therefore definite case should involve. These discourses of gender formed the barriers to successfully prosecuting sexual offences. Furthermore, these attributes of the criminal justice system and, therefore, ideas pertaining to thresholds of authenticity were exported to the colonies. As Pamela Scully has observed, the rape of certain categories of women in the colonies was punishable by death\textsuperscript{698} demonstrating that hierarchies of sexual offences existed which further strengthened the thresholds of authenticity and discourses of rape as they are known. That certain sexual offences, and therefore certain perpetrators, were punishable by death also confirmed a hierarchy of punishment according to the crime and its perceived severity.

The general view of the Boer War was that it had a low incidence of rape\textsuperscript{699}, despite the fact that Van Heyningen reported that three doctors in Bethulie camp were dismissed at one time for misdemeanours including crimes of a sexual nature\textsuperscript{700}, for example. Nevertheless, the popularity of rape narratives and the proliferation of racial discourses mean that rumours and legends emerged centring around the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{696}{Ibid.}
\footnote{697}{Weiner, op. cit. n. 443, p. 79.}
\footnote{698}{Scully, op. cit. n. 492, p. 344.}
\footnote{700}{Van Heyningen, op. cit. n. 6, p. 100.}
\end{footnotes}
supposed violent nature of the African. This constant fear of attack from Africans contributed to the construction of the popular view of them “as being not only childlike and impressionable, but also brutal and savage.”  

This included a sexual savagery which captured the imagination of many. One of these involved the belief that the British would afford the aboriginal population, their ‘natural’ ally in a war against a more civilised and developed enemy in comparison, new social freedoms which would include “permission to ‘enslave’ or ‘carry into their kraals’ defenceless Boer women who had lost husbands in the fighting.”

The inclination at this time was to ascribe sexually aggressive acts as the responsibility of those of lower social standing, distinguishing the so-called civilised from the ‘savage’.

Chamberlain stated that every case of rape had involved a “native”, as “in no case has a British soldier been justly accused of such an outrage,” though that hardly represents concrete proof.

Such attitudes condoned the belief that the African, for example, was lustful and passionate. It also highlighted the supposed self-restraint of white, and in this case specifically British, men in comparison to the “ascribed uncontrolled lustful and barbaric behaviour” of non-white men.

Stephen Miller offers the most detailed account of instances of rape during the war. He writes that the good reputation of the British Army espoused in the media by

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702 Nasson, op. cit. n. 449, pp. 254-5.
703 Bourke, op. cit. n. 520, p. 425.
704 Hansard HC Deb 07 December 1900 vol 88 c253.
705 Bourke, op. cit. n. 520, p. 425.
706 Woollacott, op. cit. n. 441, p. 52.
707 While the role of the media in the war’s coverage will not be discussed in great detail in this thesis, some points must be highlighted. The Anglo-Boer War dominated news headlines throughout its duration in Britain and further afield. Newspapers were the central source of information about the War for the British public and more importantly for members of parliament, especially those without access to the War Office’s cables received from South Africa (Krebs, op. cit. n. 455, p. 36). As Krebs explains, many members based parliamentary questions on information taken from the papers (Ibid.). However, Hobson’s work reports the influential ties between British daily newspapers and the South African pro-British press which was inextricably linked in turn with Rand capitalists (The War in South Africa; The Psychology of jingoism; Krebs, op. cit. n. 455, especially p. 24). These associations implied that biased and influenced reports on the conflict were reaching the British public and members of parliament, arguably impacting on parliamentary dialogue, and therefore discourses, on the war. As Judith Butler notes, “Information presupposes the ability to apprehend what is being presented, and if that ability to apprehend is systematically destroyed or limited or
Arthur Conan Doyle for example meant that crimes committed by soldiers were hidden from public to the point that the general post-war consensus “was that crimes against Boer civilians and soldiers were extremely limited in extent.”

This ignorance meant that the attention of members of parliament was focused on “trying to close down brothels and prevent arms from illegally entering the country” than policing British troops. Miller writes that “officially, rape almost never occurred”: only fourteen British and imperial soldiers were charged with rape, attempted rape, or aiding and abetting rape, and of these, nine were acquitted. Miller is doubtful that these numbers are correct; for one thing, “Even if victims were able to overcome traditional cultural attitudes, they would have been sceptical about receiving justice in a British court.”

The conservative Victorian-era views on sex had infiltrated the military and political system. It was in Britain’s interest to keep the number and noise of rapes down to further develop and support the image of the chivalrous and heroic British soldier, a notion well supported in parliamentary debates. The juxtaposition of views on the behaviour of British soldiers was well illustrated by the views of writers Arthur Conan Doyle and William Stead. While Conan Doyle maintained that the ‘sexual honour’ of the British soldier, and consequently his treatment of the women, was an example of the empire’s “moral worth”, Stead saw Boer women as actual or potential rape victims. However, most British soldiers fitted neither the model of “chivalrous heroes” or “vice-ridden monsters”. They were, for the most part, “labourers, regulated by order and strict discipline, under very dangerous and often chaotic conditions...” who maintained the Regular army’s role as a repository for Britain’s unemployed and unskilled male population, thus ensuring that, in this case at least, it was the pressure of bleak prospects, rather than patriotism, which induced skewed, then our capacity to receive information is accordingly undermined” (Butler & Davies, op. cit. n. 316, p. 7).

Miller, op. cit. n. 583, pp. 311-2.

Ibid., pp. 317-8.

Ibid., p. 322.

Ibid.


Miller, op. cit. n. 583, p. 331.
working men to enrol to fight for the empire in South Africa.\footnote{Nasson, op. cit. n. 449, pp. 238-9.} Krebs also acknowledges the significance of the Doyle-Stead debate in the valuable context of gender. She identifies that the debate of the sexual honour of the British soldier was indicative of the contestation of gender roles which marked the late nineteenth century.\footnote{Krebs, op. cit. n. 464, p. 81.} It also reflected concerns about the army which now comprised of mainly under-trained volunteers. As Krebs explains, soldiers had also been seen as a sexual threat; however volunteer soldiers lacked the discipline of standard training and therefore posed a bigger problem.\footnote{Ibid.} Regardless, the pervasive image of the chivalrous soldier meant that convictions were hard to secure, with the end result that “relatively few sexual violations made their way into the printed record.”\footnote{Miller, op. cit. n. 588, p. 323.}

The influence of sexual opportunities on colonial expansion and maintenance has been a subject of much debate. Woollacott argues that unbridled sexual opportunities in the colonies became an incentive for colonial service and “fuelled” imperial expansion.\footnote{Woollacott, op. cit. n. 441, p. 89.} In a similar appraisal, Stoler notes that the myriad of colonial literary works reflected the feminisation and control of the colonies through sexual and gendered metaphors such as penetration, rape, silencing, and (dis)possession. She adds that, in general, colonialism had been constructed as “the sublimated sexual outlet of virile and homoerotic energies in the West.”\footnote{Stoler, op. cit. n. 453, p. 174.} Moreover, John Tosh argues that the colonies provided an escape route for any man who wished to leave behind the “‘Victorian’ conventions of domesticity and sexual continence.”\footnote{J. Tosh (2005) Manliness and Masculinities in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Essays On Gender, Family, And Empire, London: Pearson Education, p. 200.} He writes that since “respectable” white women were absent from many colonies, so too was a high level of “countervailing censure” and the likelihood “of deviant behaviour being reported back home,”\footnote{Ibid.} a demonstration of the sexual double standard espoused in Britain. However, these arguments are rebuked by Hyam who opposes any suggestion that the formation of empire can be explained by sex drives,
declaring the idea “that more than a minority of men initially went overseas in order to find sexual satisfaction” as “nonsense.” However, Hyam concedes that the long-term administration and exploitation of the colonies may well have been impossible without the sexual opportunities empire provided. Therefore, while sex may not provide the motives for empire it can explain the sustenance of the system, contradicting the domestically disseminated message that the survival of the British Empire relied on sexual restraint.

3.5. Conclusion

While the camp system may have prevented a large-scale famine, the mortality rate within of 450 per thousand was higher than that of military personnel, which stood at fifty-two per thousand a figure which testified to the transition of war as a military affair to one that encompassed civilians. Britain’s adoption and development of the Spanish method of incarceration presented warfare to the civilian masses as had never been done before. The aforementioned instruction to forbid camp entry to families applied only to the Boer community, and though they were kept from foraging off a depleted landscape, Africans were still being sent to their own compounds up until the war’s end, with numbers leaping from 65,589 in September 1901 to 107,344 in May 1902. The steady increase in African camp populations ensured that death rates would remain constant until the first few weeks of 1902, at least three months after death rates had decreased in white camps.

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723 Ibid.
724 Ibid.
725 Hansard HC Deb 17 June 1901 vol 95 c577 (David Lloyd George MP).
726 Hobhouse, op. cit. n. 606, p. 317.
728 Ibid.
729 Ibid., p. 264.
The Anglo-Boer War occurred at a critical juncture for Western women and the burgeoning feminist movement.\textsuperscript{730} The late nineteenth century saw an unprecedented level of consciousness regarding questions of gender; as Tosh notes, few men at this time could recall a time when women had been so free or so subversive.\textsuperscript{731} Even more questions of gender emerged in the aftermath of the war and more so its concentration camp system. Publicity surrounding the war ensured that stories about the camps and their inmates were plentiful. These questions not only asked about women’s roles in wars, but also asked about the role of men, whose mandate it was to protect vulnerable women and children though evidence gathered on the camp system that this mandate had not been met. In any case, the war and British imperialism in gendered “depended on particular discursive relationships of British policy-makers to British women, Boers, and Africans in South Africa.”\textsuperscript{732} This accounts for the dissemination of the discourse of protection and, as has been discussed throughout this chapter, the intersecting discourses on gender, race, and class.

This chapter also demonstrated that sexuality, “the set of effects produced in bodies, behaviours, and social relations, and social relations by a certain deployment deriving from a complex political technology”,\textsuperscript{733} did not operate in the same way, nor produce the same effects with respect to gender, race, and class.\textsuperscript{734} Sexuality in this sense was represented by the “woman question” which prompted “scientific outpourings on gender difference” and “an implicit defence of traditional class-status divisions, along gendered lines.”\textsuperscript{735} In essence, this tumultuous period was represented by a clash of “the best and most manly male minds against the minds of all other men, women, racial others, children and animals.”\textsuperscript{736} As Cock explains, women are usually cast in the role of the innocent, the protected, and

\textsuperscript{731} Tosh, \textit{op. cit.} n. 720, p. 204.
\textsuperscript{732} Krebs, \textit{op. cit.} n. 464, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{733} Foucault, \textit{op. cit.} n. 192, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{734} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{736} \textit{Ibid.}
those to be defended.” Both Cock and Woollacott deem this notion of women’s vulnerability essential to maintaining sexism and militarism, as well as to the enduring feminist ideal espoused by imperial Britain for example. The latter “stressed bourgeois women’s confinement to a notional private sphere and their supposed incapacity for productive labour, education, professional work or political citizenship.” This was evident in the dissemination of the discourse of protection which was used to justify the concentration camp system. The camps system became a women’s issue not just because of this protectionist stance, but also by Brodrick’s appointment of the Fawcett Commission, and of Fawcett in particular. As Krebs explains, while men were blamed for the camp conditions, women were credited with reforms within the system. However, these women simultaneously lacked the power to order and carry out the reforms, relying on recommendations to male officials. The camp system, therefore demonstrated how “the new female discourse masked the male bureaucracy that had the decision-making power.” In this sense it is evident that gender, as both an analytic category and a social process, is relational; it has no meaning nor can it exist alone.

The Anglo-Boer War resulted in the distressing fact that “for the first time in a century an English war had been fought in the face of serious and outspoken opposition at home.” It embodied the first real ‘total’ war not only in terms of reporting on the devastation of civilian populations, but because, after an indifferent start in which the war was for London “a limited war” it consumed the British public like never before. Though Britain emerged victorious, the cost of the campaign, the manner in which it was won, and the legacy of the war negated any feeling of success. In South Africa, the legacy of the war and its discourses has been hard to destabilise. As Moffett has concluded, after over a decade of post-apartheid

737 Cock, op. cit. n. 15, p. x.
738 Ibid.
739 Woollacott, op. cit. n. 441, p. 53.
740 Ibid.
741 Krebs, op. cit. n. 588, p. 53.
744 Nasson, op. cit. n. 449, p. ix.
rule, old narratives of sexual violence “that demonise black men as incontinent savages, lusting after forbidden white flesh” remain steadfast. \(^{745}\) This is problematic because, with such archaic assumptions prominent, the majority of rape and abuse cases, that which occurs between members of the same racial community, are not properly addressed, leaving the real problem behind such abuse untouched and perpetuating racial stereotypes. \(^{746}\) What Moffett argues convincingly is that such hierarchical thinking, in this case in terms of racial and gender hierarchies, does not disappear with the onset of a new political regime/perspective. \(^{747}\) These hierarchies, and thresholds of authenticity, are notoriously difficult to destabilise yet are easy to export and institutionalise. The spread of discourses from Britain to colonial South Africa can be explained as an effect of imperial expansion. This is not an isolated case as there are few societies which were not a core or peripheral part of empires, “not the product of a colonization process, whether haphazard or planned.” \(^{748}\)

Wolfe has noted that writers such as W. E. B. Dubois, Hannah Arendt and Aimé Césaire have argued that some of the core features of modernity were in fact pioneered in the colonies. \(^{749}\) Therefore it becomes relevant that the Holocaust, the most infamous of contemporary genocides, was, as described by Zygmunt Bauman, “born and executed in our modern rational society, at the high stage of our civilisation and at the peak of human cultural achievement”, \(^{750}\) elements of which were part inspired by events in South Africa during the Anglo-Boer War. The fact that its concentration camp system lay the ideological and methodological foundations for the system used during the Holocaust, as well as the discursive basis for genocide and rape as known today, is important. Moreover, Nazi policy also embraced the tenets of the Eugenics movement, developed at the height of


\(^{747}\) Moffett, op. cit. n. 745, p. 140.

\(^{748}\) Moses, op. cit. n. 326, p. 3.


imperialism and which espoused the genetic purification of populations. Essentially, the connections between racism, colonialism, and concentration camp systems highlight the fact that modernity is a “colonial modernity”, with “its histories and geographies” having been created “in the shadow of colonialism.” Finally, the concentration camp system seen during the Boer War represented a new dimension for British and Western ideas about women and war. As Krebs notes, the issue had now become one of gender which, under the discourse of protection, alluded to “gallant men protecting helpless women and children or of unmanly men allowing helpless women and children to starve.” This account of gender othering will also be expanded in the next chapter, and will help demonstrate how these norms and discourses have maintained influence over the course of the century. The following chapter on the Bosnian War will demonstrate how parliamentary debates of the time reinforce this ‘genderising’ of camps and war despite the fact that changes in outside discourses on the same issues had undergone contestation and were continuing to change albeit quite slowly.

752 Krebs, op. cit. n. 464, p. 68.
753 Ibid., p. 71.
Chapter Four

Britain and the Bosnian War, 1992 - 1995

4.1. Introduction

According to Bowen, the misleading presumption of “primordial ethnic conflicts” has been prevalent in recent discussions of international affairs.754 Ideas of dormant tensions, age-old hatreds, and powder kegs primed for ignition, restrained only by powerful states755, have dominated the commentary of many post-Cold War conflicts. Former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali estimated that four hundred new countries could be created over the 1990s as a result of conflict756 demonstrating the changed global landscape that the end of the Cold War would produce. This challenged previous expectations that it would instead signal a new era of peace and harmony. The case of the Former Yugoslavia is no exception. The federation’s final disintegration coincided with the end of the Cold War, evidence for many members of parliament that the recently concluded “era of ideological confrontation” now appeared to have been an era of relative global stability, despite its association with “tyranny and repression.”757 For many members, the emergence of different nationalist movements at this time confirmed that long buried tensions were merely rediscovered after the thaw of “the Stalinist ice age” and were now a threat to international security.758 The fixation of western commentators on nationalism after 1989 did not lessen this view, and only added to the prophetic sense that (re)emerging national memories and “old hatreds” were about to overwhelm the continent, and be the basis for its future troubles.759 The

755 Ibid.
756 Hansard HC Deb 23 February 1993 vol 219 c808.
757 Hansard HL Deb 22 November 1990 vol 523 c849 (Lord Thomas Bridges)
758 Ibid.
perpetuation of such views through the rediscovery of “ancient hatreds” in the lead-up to the Bosnian War, and indeed once the war began, necessitated the construction of a European ‘Other’, affecting understandings of the war and the crimes that ensued. It also affected views on those who were involved, arguably sustaining the “ancient hatreds” that were negligible to begin with.

This chapter continues the discussion of how parliamentary discourses on genocide and rape have experienced continuity over the course of the twentieth century by analysing parliamentary discourses on the Bosnian War (1992-1995). It also examines the social and political contexts of 1990s Britain to demonstrate the normative commonalities shared with those from the late nineteenth century accounting for discursive continuity, working backwards from this late twentieth century case study to assess these similarities. While the age of empire had ended by the late twentieth century, the exportation of social mores and discourses still took place, specifically, it will be argued, those which promote hierarchies of gender, race, and class which perpetuated these nineteenth century norms, albeit at a different historical moment. Britain’s international standing, as evidenced by Tony Blair’s speech presented at the outset of this thesis, now represented and exported its domestic discourses abroad through its foreign policy and actions. Maria Todorova’s criticism that the Balkans are usually only reported in times of trouble, cementing the essentialist image that “nothing has changed in the past fifty, one hundred, and even one thousand years”, neglects the region’s “powerful ontology” which she feels “deserves serious and complex study.”

Though her observation contributes to the current investigation, regrettably it is not within the scope of the current research to devote more attention and to prompt a fuller discussion on the issue.

Discussion will continue with an analysis of contemporary discourses on genocide and concentration camp systems, referring to the previous chapter’s discussion on the Boer War and specifically how these discourses were reflected in parliament

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under the auspices of Prime Minister John Major. Like the previous account of the
Boer War, this chapter will begin with a background to the conflict’s origins,
followed by a brief account of the conflict itself. This will include a report on the
conflict’s concentration camp system, which will be presented through a gender
analysis, and which, like in the previous chapter, will refer to the aforementioned
discourses of the time, demonstrating how Victorian-era norms, and therefore
discourses, presented in the previous chapter’s discussion have been replicated
through the twentieth century. In contrast to the concentration camp system
established during the Boer War, the system used during the Bosnian War could
hardly be called a system given the ad hoc nature of its camps. Moreover, the
camps themselves varied in size and type with locations ranging from farms to
factories acting as places of internment. Another difference between the camp
systems of the Boer War and the Bosnian War was their function. While the Boer
War system aimed to concentrate and protect its inmates, camps in Bosnia were
less concerned with provision and have become synonymous with places of torture
and interrogation. Another notable aspect of the Bosnian War concentration camp
system was its high level of rape and sexual violence, as mentioned in chapter one.
This difference raises many issues regarding the relationship between gender and
conflict, as well as the construction of the ‘Other’ and the maintenance of
thresholds of authenticity. These issues will be explored further below and will refer
heavily to the Commission of Experts Report chaired by Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni
(Bassiouni Report) which offers great detail on a notably informal concentration
camp system. Despite these differences, this chapter will demonstrate how
nineteenth century norms of gender, race, and class, presented in the previous
chapter, framed reactions to this twentieth century war within the British Houses of
Parliament. It will highlight the persistence of these norms within parliamentary
discourse of war which, as will be demonstrated, impacted on assumptions around,
and thresholds of authenticity, on genocide and rape.
4.2. Britain at the turn of the twenty-first century: social and political contexts revisited

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the opening statement of Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality*, which states that society continues to be dominated by a Victorian regime, with “the image of the imperial prude ... emblazoned on our restrained, mute, and hypocritical sexuality”\(^{761}\) has resonated in the decades since the book’s publication in 1978. “The imperial prude” has continued to influence social and political discourses, with the state’s preoccupation with sex as a matter which concerned the social body and its surveillance at the end of the eighteenth century continuing through the twentieth century. However, the emergence of alternative discourses on sex began to gradually erode the legitimacy of the silence which surrounded the subject with the Human Rights movements and second wave feminism for example questioning this rule. Despite this, within parliament at least, traditional values surrounding the confinement of sex and sexual actors remained influential. With regard to the criminalisation of sexual acts, parliamentary debates and discussions had become more focused on quantitative evidence of progression such as numbers of prisoners, recidivism rates, and conviction rates for example. This was demonstrated by Secretary of State for the Home Department in 1990, John Patten MP, who confirmed the high priority the government had given

> “to action against rape, including the detection and punishment of offenders; the provision of help and support to victims; and the development of prevention policies...The enhanced police response to rape allegations is reflected in the increases in the recorded crime statistics.”\(^{762}\)

Concern with such topics helped remove the emotiveness from the issue, supplying data with less descriptive language than was used during the 1890s but nevertheless reaffirming the importance of statistics established during the late nineteenth century\(^{763}\) and strengthening arguments of the “physics envy” of the social sciences mentioned at the outset of this thesis. However, elements of

\(^{761}\) Foucault, *op. cit.* n. 183, p. 3.
\(^{762}\) Hansard HC Deb 17 July 1990 vol 176 c470.
\(^{763}\) Ehlers, *op. cit.* n. 513, p. 322.
traditionalism remained. In the same passage, Patten disclosed that the government’s latest crime prevention handbook “encourages women to take common-sense precautions to reduce the risk of attack” prescribing a discourse of rape which highlighted the responsibility of the victim while removing emphasis on, and the guilt of, the perpetrator.\textsuperscript{764} Marital rape was still a contentious issue in the early 1990s. Patten stated in February 1990 that the issue

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"...was last considered by the Criminal Law Revision Committee as part of its 1984 report on sexual offences. The committee recommended, by a narrow majority, that the law should not be changed to cover all subsisting marriages. It pointed out that where a husband commits assault or indecent assault, he can be prosecuted for these offences and that the question raises issues about the nature of marriage and about violence in the domestic context which go beyond the scope of the criminal law."\textsuperscript{765}
\end{quote}

Harry Cohen MP highlighted the fact that the law, and therefore by extension parliament, did not comply with “the present reality of marriage where a wife is not a husband’s chattel” nor “...society’s attitude to rape, which is viewed as a crime to be punished without exception because it is a brutal sexual assault.”\textsuperscript{766} He met with opposition in parliament by Tony Marlow MP, who felt that “remedies” such as “separation, injunctions against molestation and other court procedures” already existed to protect against domestic abuse.\textsuperscript{767} Furthermore he called Cohen’s calls for reform “absurd”, claiming that they were

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"...motivated by a combination of some distressed and unfortunate women, who need our help and support and whose problems probably need to be addressed further, and those whom Private Eye calls "wimmin"—the ghastly feminist lobby who seem to think that all men are evil and that some are more evil than others, that men are made of slugs, snails and puppy dogs’ tails and that women are made of sugar, spice and all things nice."\textsuperscript{768}
\end{quote}

Marlow also stated his belief that such a measure would “lead to a gross abuse of the institution of marriage,” insisting that to prove a case of rape between a cohabiting couple would be “notoriously difficult”.\textsuperscript{769} Later, the case of R v R (1992)
confirmed that a husband could be convicted under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 for the rape of his wife.\textsuperscript{770}

However, Cohen continued to attack the legislation on sexual crimes. In late 1992, he called for the criminalisation of rape and sexual assault, and for the modernisation of rape laws. He identified four necessities for this to be achieved: recognition of the crime of rape in marriage; recognition of the crime of male rape; "greater rights for survivors of rape"; and, finally, "a redefinition of rape, based on coercion and lack of consent."\textsuperscript{771} These recommendations, particularly the first two, defy the discourses of sex and criminalised sexual activity which were embraced during the nineteenth century. However, Cohen’s suggestion that the prerogative to legislate against male rape, because “of the fear, the humiliation and the shock which are felt or because of the fear of being criminalised or branded as a homosexual”\textsuperscript{772} simultaneously indicated an underlying persistence of Victorian-era attitudes regarding the stigmatisation of homosexual relations and the silencing of rape. Overall, Cohen’s agitation can be seen as an attempt to redraw social boundaries and to therefore reconstitute the ‘Other’.

Use of the term ‘race’ had subsided in parliamentary speech by the 1990s. The era of empire, and decolonisation, had passed and with it the acceptance of Social Darwinism and other social doctrines which promoted the division of humanity into hierarchical categories of biological superiority. In 1990, Patten declared that the

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"United Kingdom has long accommodated many diverse cultural traditions. Our guiding aim is that people of all races should participate fully in the mainstream of British society. Modern Britain has plenty of room for cultural and religious diversity, but there cannot be room for separation or segregation."\textsuperscript{773}
\end{quote}

Later, in 1991, the government’s stance on “racial discrimination” was outlined when it declared that it was “resolutely opposed” to it and that it saw “fair treatment between citizens regardless of race as fundamental to a healthy and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[771] Hansard HC Deb 28 October 1992 vol 212 c1021.
\item[772] Hansard HC Deb 28 October 1992 vol 212 c1022.
\item[773] Hansard HC Deb 12 July 1990 vol 176 c323W.
\end{footnotes}
The health of society which had a century earlier relied on the idea of racial fitness and superiority was now measured by fair treatment between groups. However, imperialist rhetoric which promoted British superiority and which was inherently racist proved to be an intrinsic part of its politics. Speaking with regard to the Balkans, Andrew Hammond has noted that the region was a place of savagery, unpredictability, lawlessness, moral turpitude and mystery, a set of motifs and evaluations that closely resembled those of colonial discourse, the interpretative framework that dominated Western notions of abroad during this era of expansionism...The discourse of imperialism was so powerful and influence on the understanding of Eastern Europe that, as many critics have argued, it was not abandoned after 1945, but rather inspired and moulded the manner in which the West constructed its Communist adversary.

This became more prominent after the Cold War. For example, Todorova notes that Yugoslavia escaped the label “Balkan” (with Romania) at this time for its stance towards the Soviet Union. It was only after the Cold War that it was referred to as Balkan, a term which was increasingly derogative, symbolising backwardness and constructing it as the ‘Other’ within Europe. For example, Razsa and Lindstrom define Balkanism as “a dichotomous and essentialist system of representations embodied in stereotypes around which Europe has set itself apart from a Balkan “other” ...

\[^{774}\text{Hansard HC Deb 04 July 1991 vol 194 c200W.}\]
European Third World. Helms develops this argument in observing that such symbolism has been evoked by western powers and local actors to construct a superior west and backward east mirroring the function of orientalism as developed by Edward Said. However, balkanism and this particular form of racism differs from Orientalism in, for example, how it is gendered: in contrast to the erotic depiction of the Orient, the Balkans were less sexualised, and represented by “the dishevelled, violent peasant man engaged in blood feuds and revolts.” Boer men also carried a similar description though the savagery of the Boer War was fixated mainly on Africans. This commonality in denigration continued and was exacerbated in the period after the Cold War, resulting in a “binaristic, hierarchical manner of ordering the continent” which cemented the images of “danger, violence, cruelty, irrationality and internal dimension” as characteristic of the entire Balkans region.

This binaristic division of Europe based on the ‘Other’ has been critiqued due to its inherent simplicity. In her analysis of the use of the Irish paradigm in nineteenth century British discourse on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Neval Berber instead argues for a ‘centre-periphery’ view which substitutes a diametric ‘opposition’ with a ‘graduation’. In contrast to the characteristics of the ‘Other’, this view argues that there is no strict opposition to a civilised ‘Europe’, maintaining that cultural relations within Europe instead follow a gradual scale that descends from the ‘centre’ to the ‘periphery’.

However, both views essentially maintain the existence of a fundamental difference between Western Europe and the Balkan

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Helms, op. cit. n. 431, p. 90.
Helms, op. cit. n. 431, p. 94.
Hammond, op. cit. n. 774, p. xii.
region, including the Former Yugoslavia, a view evident in parliamentary debates during the Bosnian war. Correspondingly, old traditions and sentiments of the idea of race and its negative attributes of some groups still shaped attitudes towards war, genocide, and rape as will be shown below.

4.3. Lead up to war: preliminary frames

Shiraev and Sobel have noted that the fall of communism aroused widespread anticipation of a peaceful period of humanity given the assumption that democracies did not wage war against each other.783 As Chandler has noted,

“Globalization, complex interdependencies and the assertion of an emerging global consciousness were all held to necessitate a shift from ‘narrow’ state-based constructions of security to globalized frameworks in which ‘universal human rights’ and ‘ethical’ or ‘values-based’ foreign policy interventions increasingly took centre stage.”784

The break-up of the Former Yugoslavia, and the Bosnian War in particular, thus at the very least called into question the veracity of ethical and values-based foreign policy. In reality, the end of the Cold War coincided with a spate of violent internal struggles, the majority of which were conveniently observed from a non-interventionist stance.785 Britain’s Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd MP dismissed as “pretentious” the idea of a ‘new world order,’ and instead saw the rise of instability across the globe as a resurgence of “ancient disorders fanned into a new blaze by factions and extreme nationalism.”786 The post-communist era had given Britain the choice of “settling for the status of a middle-rating European power commensurate with its economic performance” or working to “retain its long-enjoyed world power status.”787 How Britain conducted future policy regarding the burgeoning crisis in

786 Hansard HC Deb 29 April 1993 vol 223 c1176.
Yugoslavia can be attributed to its choice of the latter option. In any case, Britain held a unique position on the world stage at this time. It differed from its European counterparts by virtue of its position as a leading military and nuclear power, “with a disproportionate share in NATO military commands...its trade and investment patterns, its continued military and political commitments in the dependent territories and Commonwealth,” and its permanent position in the Security Council.  

As mentioned previously, though the age of Empire had finished, these new roles on the world stage allowed for the exportation of British discourses as colonialism had done before.

Despite its position and strength, the Government maintained that Britain was not in a position to “impose peace on the people and republics of Yugoslavia,” and because Britain could not then no other nation could. This consigned the breakup of Yugoslavia as an unavoidable event. For many members of parliament, the absence of Tito’s tactical dexterity and the power vacuum it presented appears to have been the more immediate cause, and heavily influenced their future discourse on the war despite the fact that other factors were also, if not more, responsible. Lord Fanshawe of Richmond (H.L.) stated that Tito’s “strong and vigilant leadership” held together “an extraordinary conglomeration of nations,” which “tended to split apart” after his death. The former strength of the federation made many aware that more volatile unions could falter if Yugoslavia’s predicament was anything to go by; interestingly, the diverse demographic of South Africa led it to be singled out by Lord Elibank (H.L.) to suffer a similar fate.

The potentially fatal fallout resulting from the vacuum Tito’s death had left was discussed in parliament as early as 1989 when Donald Anderson MP described the events in Yugoslavia during the previous months as “akin to a volcanic eruption...”, warning that Britain should in no way encourage the secession of the Federation’s states, in particular that of Slovenia or Croatia, lest it run the risk of “a break-up or a

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788 Ibid.
789 Hansard HC Deb 1 November 1991 vol 198 c 130 (Douglas Hurd MP).
790 Hansard HL Deb 21 March 1990 vol 517 c350.
791 Hansard HL Deb 14 December 1992 vol 541 c461.
military Government there.” Many had speculated against violence during the lead-up to war simply because of the geopolitically significant position Yugoslavia had traditionally occupied between East and West, but the changed dynamics in global politics after 1989 meant that this position was no longer tenable. Regardless of where Yugoslavia, and the Balkans in general, now stood Britain could not ignore the precarious situation affairs in the region presented. Pretences about the “savagery” and “lawlessness” and derogation of the Balkans mentioned previously by Todorova and Hammond occurred again in the 1990s. This imperialist rhetoric is evident in parliamentary discourse of the time in the endorsement of Britain’s policy of non-intervention during the war. They also demonstrate the perpetuation of norms, and therefore discourses, since the imperial heights of the late nineteenth century.

792 Hansard HC Deb 20 December 1989 vol 164 c502.
794 While not of central importance to the thesis, it is important to address the use of the term ‘intervention’, and more specifically ‘non-intervention’, in describing Britain’s policy towards the region. The term is problematic, especially when the inherent differences between its interventionist stance during the Boer War are considered. The present reliance of this term is qualified by its frequent use by members of parliament, both those who supported the notion that intervention was impossible, those who argued against Britain’s non-intervention, and those who called for an end to Britain’s non-interventionist stance. The most prominent example of the use of and reference to the term to describe Britain’s choice of action cited in the thesis is Douglas Hurd’s view that it was “impossible to enforce by external force a settlement of a civil war” (Hansard HC Deb 23 February 1993 vol 219 c846). Other such references include those made by Tony Banks (Hansard HC Deb 01 November 1991 vol 198 c171); John Major (Hansard HC Deb 12 November 1991 vol 198 c914); Lord Max Beloff (Hansard HL Deb 29 January 1992 vol 534 c1361); Sir Edward Heath (Hansard HC Deb 21 January 1993 vol 217 c536); Cyril D. Townsend (Hansard HC Deb 02 February 1993 vol 218 c301); Michael Connarty (Hansard HC Deb 12 May 1993 vol 224 c790); Baroness Chalker of Wallasey (Hansard HL Deb 14 February 1994 vol 552 c27); Lord Monskwell (Hansard HL Deb 14 February 1994 vol 552 c58); David Howell (Hansard HC Deb 09 May 1995 vol 259 c598). These are supported by a number of experts who have written about Britain’s non-intervention in the region. They include Evans (2006), Simms (2002), M. Finnemore (1996) ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’ in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, pp. 1-25, P. Dixon (2000) ‘Britain’s ‘Vietnam syndrome’? Public opinion and British military intervention from Palestine to Yugoslavia’ in Review of International Studies, 26 (1), pp. 99-121, Cushman (1996) for example. It is worth noting that there were also instances when members referred to Britain’s presence as part of wider coordinated efforts as examples of successful intervention, although these were markedly less frequent. They include Douglas Hogg (Hansard HC Deb 22 May 1991 vol 191 c920); Baroness Chalker of Wallasey (Hansard HL Deb 10 January 1994 vol 551 c8); Robert Key (Hansard HC Deb 09 May 1995 vol 259 c628). Interestingly, in both cases, use of the terms ‘non-intervention’ and ‘intervention’ were used to justify an avoidance of full-scale British military involvement in the region. In any case, the entry of the term into the 1990s British political lexicon regarding the Bosnian War permits its use within the present examination of parliamentary discourse.
Many have since identified Tito’s ‘unifying’ tactics, permitted by “resentments and fears generated by modern state warfare and the absence of a civil society,” and not the ‘ethnic’ differences consistently endorsed by internal and external leaders alike, as the main reasons behind the subsequent rise of nationalists such as Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tudjman. What followed was the creation of a collective blame in order to address forgotten or trivial historical grievances in a bid to mobilise a nation. For “their ‘chosen’ trauma” Milošević’s Serbs reverted to the Ottoman victory at Kosovo Polje in 1389 and sought redress by both blaming and punishing Bosnian Muslims for what had occurred over six hundred years previous. Armed with this potent weapon, perpetrator groups were able to begin their own group’s transformation into aggrieved victims proving that, in Yugoslavia as a whole, and Serbia in particular, popular perceptions of past events were infinitely more important than what may or may not actually have taken place. Milošević’s rise to power in 1987 had been prefaced by an “intense revisionist radicalization of Serbia’s intellectual elite” which ultimately sought a new platform for change “based on true Serbian national interests” having criticised the present federation as a spiritual, economic and political loss for Serbs.

War drew closer when, on 15th January 1992, Yugoslavia formally ceased to exist, following the European Community’s controversial recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states. Slovenia’s escape from the developing mire in 1991 after a token war with the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) demonstrated to observers that the likely break-up of the federation could be peaceful. However, the significant Serb minorities within Croatian and Bosnian territory ensured that this was not possible. Despite arguments such as that put forward by Ken Livingstone MP, that Britain should accept the Slovene and Croat peoples’ right to

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795 Bowen, op. cit. n. 754, p. 336.
797 Bennett, op. cit. n. 793, p.6.
799 Bennett, op. cit. n. 793, pp. 1-2.
800 Mazower, op. cit. n. 759, p. 398.
their own political and cultural identity and freedom, as British people can claim, many saw the secession of the federation’s states as akin to “throwing petrol on a bonfire”, which would “excite the Serbs to fight.” Hurd avoided committing to any stance by stating that the recognition of the Yugoslav republics, especially Croatia and Slovenia, “was a matter of timing and judgment”, a phrase he acknowledged that he had used often before. By October 1991, well before the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, Hurd admitted that Yugoslavia could not “be held together by force” nor could “the old Yugoslavia be recreated.” When Britain did recognise the republics on 16th December 1991, Hurd declared that it was a matter of compromise. Confirming that conflict was inevitable, and providing a succinct illustration of the use of the manipulation of history and myth, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, on the eve of the war in Sarajevo, stated in what would become his mantra, and that of many commentators and journalists, that

“We cannot live with the Muslims and the Croats, for there is too much hatred, centuries old hatred. Serbs fear the Muslims. They cannot live together. Because of genocide committed against them (the Serbs) have to defend themselves.”

The potency of political aspirations and the hijacking of myth and history to form a nationalist agenda are well illustrated by the example of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Moreover, it supported Moeller’s theory that “events dating back centuries became part of the rhetorical justification for all sides in the conflict in Bosnia and part of the rhetorical context of the media’s pieces on the region.”

With war in the region a certainty, Britain was presented with an opportunity to recapture international prestige and authority within the European Community following the diminution of its strategic power to the United States after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The incentive to enhance its position on the world stage would influence much of Britain’s policy towards the Balkans, despite the fact that Hurd believed Britain had “punched above her weight in the world” in recent years. He also confirmed that it would remain the case that Britain would play a central role in global affairs, owed in part to its history and continuously earned “through active diplomacy and a willingness to shoulder our share of international responsibilities.” However, Simms notes the inconsistency of Britain’s tenure during the Bosnian War during which it punched “much below her actual weight...preventing heavier-weights from connecting with a vastly overrated adversary.” As will be shown below, British parliamentary discourse during the Bosnian War failed to progress far past the Victorian era discourses of gender, race, and class espoused during the Boer War, framing the conflict inadequately, affecting debate and policy on the issue, and reinforcing thresholds of authenticity regarding genocide and rape.

4.4. Framing the Bosnian War

Like the Boer War almost a hundred years previous, the Bosnian War, by Western definitions, was not a “normal” war because

“It did not fit the accustomed model where two hostile (state) actors or groups of actors, both looking after their own interests and employing their own tactics, confront each other in an open ‘game’ and where the clearly articulated objectives are mutually incompatible.”

The Bosnian War therefore became an ethnic or tribal conflict correcting historical wrongs. However, as Kuusisto argues, to understand the conflict as a “mysterious predestined battle without any reason or logic or civilised restraints requires editing the material considerably...” There was widespread belief among government

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808 C. Hodge, op. cit. n. 787, p. 2.
812 Ibid., p. 100.
members that this ‘ethnic’ conflict should be dealt with by the warring parties. Hurd announced in July 1992 at the height of the war that the conflict could in no way be “halted from outside” because of the “destructive hatred on a scale which will not be easily or quickly checked.”\footnote{Hansard HC Deb 02 July 1992 vol 210 c976.} This stance towards non-intervention was pursued from the outset, in spite of the obvious advantage in terms of manpower, arms, and indeed motivation held by the Serbs. Though this also implied it risked condoning an overwhelming one-sided affair, Britain adopted a non-interventionist stance, using the discourse of ‘ethnic’ conflicts to justify its decision.

Tony Marlow MP demanded less diplomacy in the Government’s approach to the conflict when he proposed that the Serbs were “swimming in the arms of the Yugoslav army”, assuming the role of the aggressors while the Bosnians, without arms, were the victims.\footnote{Hansard HC Deb 25 November 1992 vol 214 c855.} However, his call to provide them with arms, which would “allow them to defend themselves...”\footnote{Ibid.} rather than prompt a full-scale military intervention, was ignored. Serbia had been perceived as a British ally in both world wars and may yet prove useful to her in the as of yet undefined post-cold war Europe\footnote{Hodge, op. cit. n. 787, p. 22.}, a fact which can account for why pleas such as Marlow’s were ignored and why parliamentary discourse on Serb aggression was suspiciously less than critical. The Serb campaign in Bosnia added to the lexicon the term ‘etničko čišćenje’ which emphatically described its war campaign. The practice of ethnic cleansing essentially involved “targeting civilians and ridding their territory of non-Serbs”\footnote{Raul Hillberg quoted in C. Lanzmann (1985) Shoah: An Oral History of the Holocaust, New York: Pantheon, p. 139.} and was to become, and remains to this day, a euphemism for genocide.

In some cases, the euphemistic nature of the term lent itself to link the Bosnia War with the Holocaust; Lord Pearson of Rannoch (H.L.), in reference to “ethnic cleansing” asked parliament whether “the word "holocaust" begin to lurk in the back of our minds?”\footnote{Hansard HL Deb 15 December 1992 vol 541 c536.} Kate Hoey MP echoed this by admitting that though “civilians will get hurt in all wars”, the Serbian policy in particular was “terrorism on
a scale unprecedented in Europe since the Nazis." However, even such associations could not propel decisive interventionist action.

This stance was tested with the sacking of the United Nations safe-haven of Srebrenica in the summer of 1995, resulting in the execution of approximately 7,000 Bosniac men and boys of military age by General Ratko Mladić’s Bosnian Serb forces. The ultimately futile presence of the UN had arguably motivated the population to remain in the area despite the unhindered advance of the Bosnian Serbs. Designating responsibility to protect the area proved confusing; Bosnians looked naturally towards the UN for safety, while the beleaguered and woefully under resourced Dutch battalion expected the town’s equally under-resourced Bosnian defenders to offer the first line of defence against attack, with NATO airpower supposedly in the position to bolster their lead. Despite beginning as an exercise in ethnic cleansing, Srebrenica had, according to the ICTY, turned into genocide, allowing for the conviction in August 2001 of General Radislav Krstić, the Serbian commander of the Drina Corps operating in the Srebrenica area at the time. The failure of the UN or other interventionist forces to halt the executions was, and still is, condemned because of the priorities accorded to reputation and territory over the vulnerable population.

The incident marked the end of a “ramshackle” UN peacekeeping operation and ushered in the final phase of the war. For many, the collapse of the safe area was the worst tragedy that could have occurred and given the proximity in time of the incident to the Kuwait intervention, many felt that

“If oil was flowing in the streets of Srebrenica rather than just blood, 29 countries would quickly have assembled a vast armada of armies and air forces to come to the rescue of a sovereign state and a member of the United Nations that is being invaded and subjected to brutal aggression…”

819 Hansard HC Deb 16 November 1992 vol 214 c95.
820 Power, op. cit. n. 45, p. 399.
823 Hansard HC Deb 12 July 1995 vol 263 c960 (George Galloway MP).
Baroness Thatcher (H.L.) echoed this sentiment, stating that “we gave the Kurds air power and there is no reason why we should not have given it earlier to some of those people in Yugoslavia”, pointing towards the geographical and cultural proximity of the region to Britain and the loyalty which should dictate given that it was “little more than a two-hour flight from London, and in the heart of Europe...”\textsuperscript{824} It is worth noting that Srebrenica, or ethnic cleansing for that matter, had no parallel in the Boer war. Though the civilian death rate during the Boer War prompted accusations of a British extermination policy, this was certainly contrary, or at least not part of, Britain’s war aim. However, both of these incidents have been discursively constructed in parliament around the identification of the ‘Other’: its presence in South Africa formed Britain’s war campaign and humanitarian mission while its presence in Bosnia ensured a policy of non-intervention as military action would prove futile against “ancient hatreds.”

Though the Bosnian War represented a new type of conflict, Britain remained a world power with the ability to bring the war to a close, and played a significant role in the various UN and NATO peacekeeping and conflict missions that were present in the region from the mid-1990s. In terms of the argument for intervention, Bosnia was the antithesis of the Boer War when Britain’s rush to intervene was more than questionable. Once again the issue of ancient ‘ethnic’ hatred and fears of getting bogged down in a conflict of little national concern to Britain was offered as the reason for Britain’s quiet stance. Lord Renfrew of Kaimsthorn (H.L.) declared his grievances “at the way in which the past is consistently misused at the present time in the name of national aspirations and ethnicity.”\textsuperscript{825} Nevertheless it was easier to believe the dominant discourse, and that the only way to reverse the ethnic cleansing campaign was “for certain people in Belgrade and their cohorts in Bosnia to realise that we mean more than strong words.”\textsuperscript{826}

\textsuperscript{824} Hansard HL Deb 02 July 1992 vol 538 cc902-3.
\textsuperscript{825} Hansard HL Deb 24 March 1993 vol 544 c409.
\textsuperscript{826} Hansard HL Deb 05 November 1992 vol 539 c1572 (Lord Milverton).
Before Srebrenica, Britain’s and indeed the world’s response to the conflict “had been an elaborate effort to dampen the fighting and mitigate its effects without actually intervening.” This policy was no longer tenable with maintaining Britain’s prestige, as was in the case of the Boer war, fast becoming a reason to act with civilised society at stake, and with averting a “European Armageddon” the reward. However, Hurd mitigated this stating that decisions could not be based on anger and horror alone, and that for him the phrase “something must be done” never carried

“any conviction in places such as the House or the Government where people have to take decisions...It is a British interest to make a reasoned contribution towards a more orderly and decent world. But it is not a British interest, and it would only be a pretence, to suppose that we can intervene and sort out every tragedy which captures people’s attention and sympathy.”

This was echoed by Lord Chalfont (H.L.) who voiced caution at

“allowing media images to set the agenda—instant images without instant understanding. The impact upon public emotions is a powerful and volatile mixture. It can lead political leaders into unwise decisions; into believing that activity is a sufficient substitute for deep thought about problems.”

Hurd was willing to note the contribution of the media in influencing policy, though he suggested that it was “difficult for the television or even the press to convey the complexity of conflict, the spread of guilt, or the difficulty of arriving at the truth which characterises, in particular, a civil war...” thus attempting to explain why intervention was difficult. However, with regard to policy at least, it appeared that the West and Britain specifically had to believe the nationalist rhetoric of the conflict as a civil war as it would cost less in terms of lives and money. As Robert Key MP noted, the one thing worse than a religious war was a tribal war, “and in

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827 The Economist, op. cit. n. 822, p. 20.
829 Hansard HC Deb 29 April 1993 vol 223 c1176.
831 Hansard HC Deb 29 April 1993 vol 223 c1176.
this instance we have both further embellishing the complicated state of affairs in the region. The “civil” nature of the war was also brought home by Hurd who stated that the majority of those fighting were Bosnian in the sense that they were either Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims... Identities within the Former Yugoslavia had now fractured, whereas people who once identified themselves as Bosnians were now Muslims, Croats or Serbs according to Western politicians who were inadvertently supporting the Serb programme of ethnic cleansing.

In the meantime, Hurd confirmed Britain’s policy towards the region by claiming that since it was “impossible to enforce by external force a settlement of a civil war” it must be done by agreement. It was also necessary to ensure “that the flames do not spread to neighbouring homes.” Previous military disasters, such as the war in Vietnam, had proffered the ultimate example of what could go wrong with military engagement. Many opposed to intervening in Bosnia summoned the memory of Vietnam to quell any support, knowing not only that there was a similarity between both conflicts but because no other argument would better dampen any public desire for intervention. As Peter Fry MP argued, it was imperative that Britain “avoid Yugoslavia becoming ... the Vietnam of Europe” with troop protection paramount. This cause was undoubtedly helped with the timely arrival of the crisis in Somalia, which involved the deaths of nineteen American soldiers during a botched rescue mission in October 1993, thus, demonstrably shocking the country from any more potential disasters which would risk the loss of American lives. The sanctity of Western lives was evidently a central reason for non-intervention in this and other such coinciding conflicts, a severe paradox given the emphasis on humanitarian action and human rights instilled directly after the end of the Cold War. The health of the army and the state, and indeed Europe as a whole, would only be guaranteed if the scourge of

832 Hansard HC Deb 09 May 1995 vol 259 c628.
833 Hansard HC Deb 29 April 1993 vol 223 c1170.
834 Hansard HC Deb 23 February 1993 vol 219 c846.
835 Hansard HC Deb 02 February 1993 vol 218 c299 (Cyril D. Townsend MP).
836 Power, op. cit. n. 45, p. 284.
837 Hansard HC Deb 02 June 1992 vol 208 c716.
“Balkanisation” was safely contained. Described by Lord Howe of Aberavon (H.L.) as a “classic European disease”, Balkanisation embraced and spread the “disease of conflicting nationalisms, the disease against which the very process of European Union was originally mobilised, the disease against which the European Union has achieved so much and still needs to achieve more” as opposed to a cultural phenomenon. The health and security of the British and European body politic was a constant priority and mirrors parliamentary discourse and rhetoric used during the Boer War.

For some, the idea of the “centuries-old-hatred” that had justified non-intervention in the conflict, and insinuations of the natural primitiveness of the region’s population, ensured that the war could not be stopped in any way. This was also the opinion of Lord David Owen, one of the architects of the 1995 Dayton peace agreement, who suggested that “the warring factions would have to fight it out.” The idea that this ‘civil war’ would only be resolved by letting the parties involved fight it out helped “relativize and minimize” the war as it blurred the distinction between aggressor and victim. Simms argues that British statesmen “needed to knock the Bosnians down from their pedestal of victimhood” thus excusing non-intervention. In any case, Bosnia appears to have marked the emergence of a new reaction relating to genocide and acts thereof, insofar as non-intervention dictated policy. This policy, with non-intervention the goal, focused on depoliticising the conflict and turning it into a humanitarian problem, replacing the terms “ethnic cleansing” and “aggression” for example with “ethnic strife” and “humanitarian relief”. It relied on the notion of equivalency between the parties to justify a non-interventionist stance based on the belief that the fighting could not be stopped and that all parties were responsible.

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838 Hansard HL Deb 17 November 1994 vol 559 c46.
840 Ibid.
841 Simms, op. cit. n. 810, p. 25.
842 Ibid., p. 27
843 Ibid., p. 22
Chapter Four

The “concept of equivalence,” postulated by Ali & Lifschultz, also helped the case for non-intervention. This idea was allowed to develop because of Tom King’s earlier observation that there were no “clear objectives” for action in Bosnia given a lack of precedence in dealing with this particular occurrence. The concept of equivalence supports Conversi’s view that moral relativism was the main characteristic of British discourse on the Bosnian conflict, insofar as many felt the civil conflict could not be solved by outsiders “lest they become embroiled in the quagmire.”

Conversi has described moral relativism “as an underlying current of public opinion that, even at the peak of Serbian atrocities and ethnic cleansing, was determined to view all parties in the conflict as “warring factions” engaged in a “civil war””. This reaction to the Bosnian War negated any hope for an altruistic future which the end of the Cold War was supposed to bring. This was supported by the fact that, unlike the Boer War, there was an evident lack of attack by the opposition in parliament to government policy on the war. In Simm’s view, Labour policy and rhetoric was indistinguishable from that of the Major administration with the notion that all sides to the conflict were more or less equally guilty having found widespread acceptance. While opposition forces acted differently during both the Boer and Bosnian Wars, the frame in question, that of the area as prone to violence, was common to both case studies.

The concept of equivalence was evidenced and supported by a number of attributes of the Bosnian War. Firstly, equivalence in arms and military capabilities appears to have been a strong argument. Hurd stated in November 1992 that “the whole country of Bosnia-Herzegovina is awash with arms” despite the fact that an embargo on the Former Yugoslavia, affecting Bosnia the most, was in operation

846 B. Simms, op. cit. n. 810, p. 297.
847 Ibid., p. 298.
since September 1991. Opposition members such as Kate Hoey MP were quick to point out that, to the contrary, because of the embargo Bosnians were “being killed because they have no opportunity to get the weapons that they need to defend themselves.” Her colleague John Cunningham MP noted that the Labour Party had “consistently protested at the failure to make the economic and military sanctions effective...” in opposition to government policy. Responsibility for the violence was another area where the concept of equivalence was used. Due to the lack of a given enemy within the region, all sides were guilty of atrocities. This was similar to how the British government had convinced parliament of the necessity of a military campaign in Southern Africa by creating a much stronger and potentially deadlier enemy than the Boers actually constituted. Echoing that era was Hurd’s use of the world “imperialism” in describing his desired role for the United Nations. As Lord Kennet observed, in a similar vein to Hammond’s earlier remarks, this was an ill-chosen word to use in the circumstances as

“Empires were built by force of war, and mostly war against those who had done the imperial countries no harm. That is not what the United Nations is about. In fact, the present massacres in the west Balkans are still due to the breakdown of the prolonged communist dictatorship in Yugoslavia which was imposed on a new unit invented by the imperial powers of 1918 after the old imperial powers—Turkey and Austria—were defeated in the First World War. In the Balkans we now see a multiple legacy of empires.”

It did however seem to present an opportunity for future state-sponsored crimes against humanity to occur, and most importantly, to occur without hindrance.

As stated previously, imperialist rhetoric was utilised during the Bosnian War despite the fact that Britain’s age of empire had come to an end some decades previous. This discursive continuity was evident in what historian Niall Ferguson has described as a repetition of “…the Victorian’s project to export their own

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850 Hansard HC Deb 16 November 1992 vol 214 c98.
851 Hansard HC Deb 29 April 1993 vol 223 c1181.
852 Hansard HL Deb 25 September 1992 vol 539 c566 (Lord Kennet).
853 Ibid.
854 Ibid.
'civilisation’ to the world...”, describing Victorian missionaries’ absolute confidence “that it was their role to bring the values of Christianity and commerce” to the same regions to whom Britain now wished to bring “democracy and freedom.”

However, as Todorova and Helms have already alluded to, it was questionable as to whether Bosnia and the Former Yugoslavia required this very treatment. Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegović’s portrayal of Islam as the synthesis of eastern and western values mirrored Todorova’s view that the Balkans “have always evoked the image of a bridge or a crossroads.” This was also acknowledged in parliament. Robin Cook, for one, noted the non-threatening nature of the Islamic religion in the region. However, this was an exceptional observation in an institution which predominantly reduced and cast Bosnia and the rest of the region as the “other of Europe” and which described its inhabitants as not caring “to conform to the standards of behaviour devised as normative by and for the civilized world.”

More controversially, Lord Owen, referring to the idea that ethnicity could be physically observed, thereby echoing eugenicist thought, stated that there were “no outward and visible signs” that Izetbegović “was a Muslim” given that he and his family “dressed and acted as Europeans”. Moreover, Victorian gender roles and norms detailed in the previous chapter were also dominant in discussions on the war. R. Charli Carpenter’s look at gender essentialisms in transnational war-victim advocacy reveals that invoking intervention or humanitarian action on the basis of prescribed gender roles which clearly delineate the “innocent” and

857 Helms, op. cit. n. 432, p. 102
858 Todorova, op. cit. n. 760, p. 3
859 Hansard HC Deb 09 May 1995 vol 259 c596: Cook explained that “…The ethnic differences are slight, and are not based on race or even language. They are based only on religion, but the Muslims in Bosnia are the least fundamentalist of any in the Islamic world. Indeed, I have heard it alleged that they are the Anglicans of the Islamic world. In recent history there has been a high degree of integration of the ethnic communities. One quarter of all post-war marriages in former Yugoslavia were mixed, and the schools were integrated before the war. Children from all ethnic communities went to school together in a way which they do not in Northern Ireland, or even in Scotland.”
860 Todorova, op. cit. n. 760, p. 3.
“vulnerable” is strategically viable and makes sense.\textsuperscript{862} Such moves prove problematic when “the actors in our moral dramas stop playing the roles on which our identification with them depends.”\textsuperscript{863} It can therefore be argued that the framing of the region as hostile and inherently violent, coupled with deviant gender roles characterised by the perpetration of sexual violence against men, for example, helped to problematize gender essentialisms to the point where intervention was delayed and its effect minimalized.

If the Boer War was the last of the gentleman’s wars, it was also one of the last of the soldiers’ wars. The twentieth century had seen a rise in civilian wartime deaths and states were not privy to sacrificing troops as this was not now the norm and because of the new type of warfare Bosnia represented. Any military loss was quickly acknowledged and sympathised.\textsuperscript{864} However, it was in Britain’s national interest to stop or at least contain the fighting. As Prime Minister John Major remarked, “a wider conflagration across the Balkans...most certainly would affect our strategic interests...”\textsuperscript{865} Hurd elaborated this by outlining Britain’s main prerogatives for peace and stability, namely national security by means of stability in Europe; “to end suffering and save lives”; and finally to maintain its transatlantic partnership with the US.\textsuperscript{866} Paddy Ashdown MP, leader of the Liberal Democrats, added to this list by insinuating that to let the fighting and policy of appeasement continue would not only increase the “appetite of aggressors”\textsuperscript{867} but also mitigate the authority of the UN and “the basic standards of human rights and international law.”\textsuperscript{868} That the government did not see fit to comment more on these standards says much of its priorities in terms of the war. It left many, including Lord Pearson of Rannoch (H.L.), to wonder “to what extent are the civilised nations of the world

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{864}Hansard HC Deb 18 April 1994 vol 241 c647 (Jacqui Lait MP).
\footnote{865}Hansard HC Deb 31 May vol 260 c1000.
\footnote{866}Hansard HC Deb 17 November 1994 vol 250 cc133-4.
\footnote{867}Hansard HC Deb 29 April 1993 vol 223 c1192.
\footnote{868}\textit{Ibid.}
\end{footnotes}
prepared to tolerate these evils without committing their own troops to alleviate the suffering in question?" although, as he admitted himself, the answer was not yet clear.  

What was clear was the growing influence of the media in terms of generating public opinion and pressure. What many members took exception to this time around was the manner in which reports on what Lord Monkswell (H.L.) described as “politically sexy areas” such as Yugoslavia worked in detriment to other newsworthy conflicts of the time such as East Timor. Sir Peter Tapsell MP was of a similar view though in terms of policy formation, he described how British foreign policy was “directed by Miss Kate Adie”, a BBC correspondent, and that it was vital that foreign policy not be “dominated by where the television cameras happen to be.” However, as Robin Cook MP noted, though Britain was protecting its strategic interests in the Balkans, it was imperative that the houses remembered that “one of the reasons for being there is that our constituents saw the victims of war on television and responded with a considerable sense of solidarity and sympathy to what they saw.” These feelings heightened when reports of mass rapes against the female population emerged. As Susan Brownmiller has noted this revelation “is given credence only at the emotional moment when the side in danger of annihilation cries out for world attention.” While this may be the case, it can also be argued that this is simply a role women, as non-combatants, have to play. In war, women become useful propaganda tools. The Boer War and the plight of the female camp inmates became such a tool for both Britain and Boer forces; the former criticising the Boer men for leaving their women to the wilds, the latter lamenting Britain’s treatment of the innocent and vulnerable female. However,

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869 Hansard HL Deb 15 December 1992 vol 541 c536.  
870 Hansard HL Deb 25 September 1992 vol 539 c568.  
872 Hansard HC Deb 31 May vol 260 c1053.  
873 Hansard HC Deb 09 May 1995 vol 259 c595.  
women, and men, played various other roles during the Bosnian War although these echoed what were established a century before.

4.5. Gender roles, sexual deviancy, and the Bosnian Concentration Camp System

In many respects, the power of the visual image was enough to persuade the public that another Holocaust on European territory loomed. The camps in Yugoslavia certainly did not reach the destructive heights of their Nazi predecessors, an observation made clear in parliament by the lack of Holocaust rhetoric used during the Bosnian War. The Bassiouni Report reported that since early 1992, all states of the Former Yugoslavia were operating “a variety of detention facilities (camps)” numbering up to 715 throughout the region. These facilities were based at pre-existing structures such as schools, sports arenas and administrative offices, which permitted “quick and easy control and displacement of the targeted population of a controlled or conquered geographic region by one of the warring factions.”

Though the camp system in general was “the scene of the worst inhumane acts... committed by guards, police, special forces, and others who are allowed to come

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876 During the war, and throughout the 1990s, the vast majority of references to the Holocaust in parliamentary debates were made regarding items such as the Holocaust Museum, Holocaust Remembrance Day, Holocaust denial, survivors/victims of the Holocaust, the threat of a nuclear Holocaust, and the Holocaust in education. Notable exceptions were Bosnia - HC Deb 06 May 1993 vol 224 c288; Kosovo - HC Deb 25 March 1999 vol 328 c608; Yugoslavia - HC Deb 26 July 1993 vol 229 c853.


878 Ibid.
from the outside to perform such acts” the report concluded that those by Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina were “the ones where the largest numbers of detainees have been held and where the cruellest and largest number of violations occurred.”\textsuperscript{879} Bassiouni also reported that the main objective of the camps was the elimination of the non-Serbian leadership, encompassing political leaders, academics and intellectuals, court officials, “despite the absence of a real non-Serbian threat”\textsuperscript{880}, which also adheres to the aforementioned premise of the destruction of cultural representations of Bosnia. Roy Gutman, writing for Newsweek during the war, was one journalist who presented his findings in the Holocaust mould; his July 1992 article, entitled “Like Auschwitz”, detailed the deportation of Muslims in freight cars in sweltering summer conditions. His use of terms such as “sealed boxcars” and “deportations” harked back to the Holocaust; his quotation of a Muslim student who said, “We all felt like Jews in the Third Reich”\textsuperscript{881}, was also added to great effect.

The Holocaust analogy had arisen two years previously with ITN’s Penny Marshall and Ian Williams’ news reports for ITV and Channel 4 respectively from the Trnopolje camp. The footage conveyed images of the detainees, and details of the camp structure including the customary barbed wire barrier. However, it was a two second image of these substantial reports that catapulted the conflict further into the public conscience. ‘Framegrabbed’ from the report by the media was the image of Fikret Alić whose emaciated stature pictured behind Trnopolje’s wire fence immediately cast minds back to images of the Holocaust camps.\textsuperscript{882} However, though Marshall and Williams’ respective reports did not focus on Alić and this analogy, some commentators were quick to admonish claims of another Final Solution. Thomas Deichmann’s infamous rebuttal of the reaction to the concentration camps is perhaps the most well-known. Among his many accusation against the reports was his certainty that Trnopolje was neither a concentration camp nor a prison but “a collection centre for refugees, many of whom went there

\textsuperscript{879} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{880} Ibid., IV (A) 5.
\textsuperscript{881} Power, op. cit. n. 45, pp. 271-2.
\textsuperscript{882} Campbell, op. cit. n. 851, p. 4.
seeking safety and could leave again if they wished”\textsuperscript{883}, a view which echoes how Britain initially described the concentration camp system used during the Boer war. The ‘revelation’ of the concentration camp system in Bosnia added credence to Lord Monkswell’s (H.L.) comments about “politically sexy areas.”\textsuperscript{884}

The revelation of the camps meant that Bosnia was on the way to becoming more “politically sexy” than it had already been. Many commentators found it easy to oblige and provide emotive and provocative accounts of the camps. Journalist Ed Vulliamy, who reported extensively from the region during the conflict, gave an exemplary ‘sexy’ account of the camp at Omarska:

\begin{quote}
“They devoured their watery bean stew like famished dogs, clutching their spoons in rangy fists. They were horribly thin, raw-boned, some of them cadaverous – the bones of their pencil-thin elbows and wrists protruded like pieces of jagged stone through parchment skin. Their complexions had been corroded; they were alive, but decomposed, debased, degraded and subservient. They fixed their huge, hollow eyes on us with stares that cut like the blades of knives. There is nothing so haunting as the glare of a prisoner who yearns to tell some terrible truth, but dare not, with the guards swinging their machine guns, strutting to and fro, but listening carefully.”\textsuperscript{885}
\end{quote}

In any case, the ITN reports, amended or not, and the subsequent media frenzy thereafter, unleashed a series of powerful verbal and visual images which was “all the politicians...could talk about that weekend.”\textsuperscript{886} It seemed that until that moment the “Great Powers” had deliberately neglected the Yugoslav war until the evocative symbolism of the Holocaust, represented by Fikret Alić, stirred up sufficient interest.\textsuperscript{887} It also added an incentive to end the violence, or at least the detention system which, according to figures released by the Bosnian government in September 1992, confined almost 15 per cent of the country’s population, or 200,000 individuals.\textsuperscript{888} The existence of such a system should have been enough to

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\textsuperscript{884} Hansard HL Deb 25 September 1992 vol 539 c568.
\textsuperscript{886} Moeller, op. cit. n. 807, p. 258.
\end{flushright}
warrant decisive action. Minister of State Alastair Goodlad MP revealed in December 1992 that the International Red Cross (ICRC) estimated that 4,100 are currently held in detention camps run by Bosnian Serbs.\textsuperscript{889} Seven months later, Hurd confirmed that, in camps located in Bosnia alone, the ICRC was regularly visiting 1,098 prisoners held by Bosnian Serbs, 951 held by Bosnian Muslims and 398 held by Bosnian Croats, with no knowledge as to how many prisoners were civilians.\textsuperscript{890} Bassiouni later confirmed that of the 715 camps identified in the Former Yugoslavia 237 were operated by Bosnian Serbs and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia; 89 by the Government and army of Bosnia and Hercegovina; 77 were operated by Bosnian Croats, the Government of Croatia, the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council; four were operated jointly by the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croats; and a further 308 camps existed though there is uncertainty as to whose effective control they were under.\textsuperscript{891} Much of the discussion of the camps within parliament were concerned with quantitative information, not unlike its concern with rape and sexual violence at home, and indicated little emotion from speakers. The predominant difference between gender commentary on the respective camp systems at the focus of this thesis is the use of, and reporting on thereof, of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the Bosnian War. However, commonalities emerge on analysis of the gender roles during both conflicts, most notably the continuity of the protection discourse.

All parties involved in the conflict were responsible for operating camps; they were not an exclusive Serb weapon, though this is often ignored given the disproportionate levels of power available and suffering felt by the sides respectively. The case of the Čelebići camp is an example of how Bosnian Muslims were responsible for war crimes in the region. However, the level and nature of atrocities committed on its namely Muslim population distinguishes the Bosnian war from the others within the region. This in turn meant that, with the Holocaust analogy firmly in place, it was difficult for many to acknowledge any degree of

\textsuperscript{889} Hansard HC Deb 11 December 1992 vol 215 c816W.
\textsuperscript{890} Hansard HC Deb 26 July 1993 vol 229 c567.
\textsuperscript{891} Final Report of the Commission of Experts, op. cit. n. 877, IV (E).
equivalence in responsibility for the camp system. Sir Russell Johnston’s emotive
description of Bosnia’s Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić’s observations was
exemplary of the abundant accounts which credited Serbia as the resounding
agggressor. Though Silajdžić admitted that the Serbs were not the only ones guilty of
atrocities, he presented justification for this explaining that if one were to:

“Kill a man’s son, then rape his wife and he is no longer a man. You have stolen his
humanity. There is a difference, you know, between active and reactive crime. That is an
interesting statement: the difference between active and reactive crime. The contention in
this conflict has been that, although horrible things have been done by both sides, the main
weight has been the continual aggressive action by the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia, which has
produced the horrible prison camps ... The weight of responsibility clearly rests on the one
side.” 892

The camp system gained a notorious dimension when the scale of sexual violence
carried out on-site emerged. The European Community’s 1993 report on the
treatment of Muslim women in the Former Yugoslavia, chaired by Dame Anne
Warburton and submitted to the UN Commission of Experts, concluded that the
rape of Muslim women had been “perpetrated on a wide scale and in such a way as
to be part of a clearly recognizable pattern, sufficient to form an important element
of war strategy.” 893 This acknowledgment was an important development because,
as Hurd noted on announcing the details of the report, in Britain at least “people
have been sickened by war crimes in the former Yugoslavia - by the rape, torture
and ethnic cleansing.” 894

The report helped to debunk myths surrounding war rape, stating that sexual
abuses occurred across both nationality and gender. 895 It made a “reasoned”
estimate that 20,000 had experienced such abuses, conservative given the wide
ranging estimates of between 10,000 to 60,000 victims. 896 Warburton’s report was

892 Hansard HC Deb 14 December 1992 vol 216 c69.
893 European Community Investigative Mission into the Treatment of Muslim Women in the Former
Informations on Crimes of War against Women in Ex-Yugoslavia (3 December 1992, updated 11
January 1993), paragraph 13. The Report stated that it only investigated rapes inflicted on Muslim
women.
894 Hansard HC Deb 23 February 1993 vol 219 c782.
896 Ibid., paragraph 14.
followed by the more conclusive Bassiouni report. It detailed the prevalence of rape within the camps, stating that while young women between thirteen and thirty five years of age were most targeted, there were cases of girls as young as seven and women as old as sixty five raped while in detention.  

It also stated that abuses were committed in the presence of other prisoners, as were murders of women who resisted being raped. This report was also explicit in the type of rape that was committed, identifying five specific patterns which determined different types. The first two patterns, alluded to previously, involved individuals or small groups committing sexual assault “in conjunction with looting and intimidation of the target ethnic group” and “in conjunction with fighting in an area, often including the rape of women in public” respectively. The latter in particular was usually a prelude to the separation of the population according to sex and age and their subsequent referral to camps.

The following three patterns refer to camp detainees. According to the report, the third pattern “involves individuals or groups sexually assaulting people in detention because they have access to the people.” With the population separated according to age and sex as per the second pattern, the men would either have been detained or executed. The female population were usually sent to separate camps that, owing to their pre-existence, allowed for civilians to easily ‘access’ the detainees, along with soldiers, camp guards, and paramilitaries to rape them, with the option of killing them thereafter or returning them to the site. Both perpetrators and victims were often grouped, and the rapes were usually accompanied with beatings and torture. As noted previously, women were often raped in front of other detainees, but in some cases detainees were also forced to sexually abuse each other. The fourth pattern bears many similarities to those pervious as it involves sexual assaults “for the purpose of terrorizing and

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898 Ibid.
899 Ibid., IV (F) 3
900 Ibid.
901 Ibid.
902 Ibid.
humiliating them often as part of the policy of “ethnic cleansing” with many such rapes taking place in camps. Carried out in the presence of others and similarly accompanied with beatings, fourth pattern rapes also included the forced impregnation of victims. Many perpetrators stated this desire during the act, with one survivor stating that her abusers “repeatedly said their President had ordered them” to do it. One author has cited documentary proof of the Serb targeting of women of all ages, which also goes towards explaining the rationale behind the amount of rapes and abuse cases reported:

“Our analysis of the behaviour of the Muslim communities demonstrates that the morale, will, and bellicose nature of their groups can be undermined only if we aim our action at the point where the religious and social structure is most fragile. We refer to the women, especially adolescents and to the children.”

As in other contexts, rape during the Bosnian War acted as a pollutant. Seifert explains that the idea of contaminating one group’s “blood and genes” is inherently racist, but it also acts as a pollutant, or indeed dissolver, of the group’s “spirit and identity.” In this instance, the ‘ethnic’ hatred towards one group becomes sexualised, a merger of “xenophobia and misogyny,” with the aim of further cleansing the land of the designated enemy. The words “rodit ces cetnika”, translating as “you will give birth to a chetnik soldier” was uttered by many Serbs to the Muslim women they raped. One female rape camp inmate was told upon her arrival that they next time she would meet her attackers, she would “have one of our kids in your belly.” Another was told by her abusers that they wanted to

903 Ibid.
904 Ibid.
909 Stiglmayer, op. cit. n. 141, p. 92.
“plant the seeds of Serbs in Bosnia.” Such motivations were not limited to Serb perpetrators; Serb women who were also raped and impregnated reported that their Muslim or Croat attackers made similar comments about wanting to impregnate them for ethical reasons. Providing conclusive estimates as to how many Bosnian women were raped has proved tough; it has been even more difficult to assess how many became pregnant as a result of rape, though Warburton proposes that, based on previous figure of 20,000 women raped, approximately 1,000 pregnancies may have occurred as a result. Like the debates surrounding the CDAs and the general question of the health of the body politic in nineteenth century Britain, contagion and more particularly the order of social and demographic boundaries, relied on women’s sexuality and more importantly their sexual restraint placing them once again at the centre of the crisis. As McClintock notes, women’s sexuality in particular “was cordoned off as the central transmitter of racial and hence cultural contagion.” The centrality of this issue has since been rejected and Engle has commended the ICTY for not focusing on forced impregnation. However, the identification of the rapes, and the subjects involved, in terms of ethnicity gives the rapes the unique trait of a specifically national context, that is, “it was the rape of a Muslim woman by a Serbian man, or of a Serbian woman by a Muslim man.” In this sense, rape symbolized the subjugation

912 Warburton Report, op. cit. n. 883, paragraph 17. The report agreed with forced pregnancy in some of the cases (p. 15).
913 McClintock, op. cit. n. 27, p. 47.
914 Todorova, op. cit. n. 434. Karen Engle (2005) has noted that “feminist advocates often reinforced and perpetuated such assumptions, turning a blind eye to the history of the region, which demonstrates that such a result is not inevitable. Not only were children of mixed marriages abundant before the war, but during and after the war there is evidence that even religious leaders encouraged women to raise the children as Muslim.” K. Engle (2005) “Feminism and its (Dis) Contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in The American Journal of International Law, 99 (4), p. 807.
915 Ibid., p. 808.
of one nation by another, and also affirmed the subordination of gender issues to nationalist concerns.\textsuperscript{917}

The final pattern of rape involved the “detention of women in hotels or similar facilities for the sole purpose of sexually entertaining soldiers, rather than causing a reaction in the women,” with the women detained in such facilities killed more so than those held in camps.\textsuperscript{918} These facilities took on various guises such as hotels and cafés, with their names and locations reflecting “pre-existing attitudes toward sexuality and courtship, but in a cruel new context.” According to Olujić, names such as “Vilina Vlas” (Fairy’s Tresses) and “Kafana Sonja” (Coffeehouse Sonja) referred to legitimate brothels instead of detention camps, in which women willingly satisfy men’s desires but also blamed women for their own victimisation.\textsuperscript{919} Patrick Cormack MP brought to Parliament’s attention the nature of fifth pattern rapes when relaying Silajdžić’s comments of how in one Bosnian motel “young girls and women are taken and ravished by soldiers and others and then killed” with one man having apparently confessed to killing 200 victims this way.\textsuperscript{920} Though there are crossovers between each pattern, their uniqueness is obvious. Lončar et al’s sample of 68 women who were victims of such abuses concluded that twenty six were raped in the victim’s home, seventeen at a Serbian war camp, and eight in a brothel camp.\textsuperscript{921} These numbers, and other evidence pertaining to the patterns in Bassiouni’s report, led the Commission of Experts to share the same conclusion as Warburton, that is, that “a systematic rape policy existed in certain areas” and though it was not conclusive as to whether such a policy was to apply to all non-Serbs, it was “clear that some level of organization and group activity was required to carry out many of the alleged rapes.”\textsuperscript{922}

\textsuperscript{917} Ibid., p. 262. See also Hansen, op. cit. n. 97, p. 60; Stiglmayer, op. cit. n. 140, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{918} Final Report of the Commission of Experts, op. cit. n. 877, IV (F) 3.
\textsuperscript{919} Olujić, op. cit. n. 878, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{920} Hansard HC Deb 14 December 1992 vol 216 c57.
\textsuperscript{922} Final Report of the Commission of Experts, op. cit. n. 867, IV (F) 3
Where the Commission of Experts and Warburton differed to some extent was the degree to which the former confirmed in detail that male members of the population were also subject to sexual abuse and rape. A hierarchy of rape victimology seems to have emerged from the wars in the Former Yugoslavia and the voyeuristic reporting of the rapes thereafter, with Bosnian Muslim women first, followed by Serb and Croat women, with male victims from all groups propping up the table. Žarkov has correctly written that “perceiving men only and always as offenders and never as victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence is a very specific, gendered narrative of war.”

This is presumably because of the ease in which it is done as men have been and still are the main perpetrators of sexual crimes during both war and peace time. But what is easily forgotten is that men can sexually victimise other men too. This is often overlooked because, as Žarkov points out, “dominant notions of masculinity merge with norms of heterosexuality” and especially in the Yugoslavian context with definitions of ‘ethnicity’ which designates “who can or cannot be named a victim of sexual violence.”

The sexual crimes committed against male detainees pertain to such thoughts especially the discourse of heterosexuality. Castrations, as highlighted in the house by George Robertson MP for instance, were committed because, as Žarkov notes, there could be no retribution for the loss of the phallic power of the penis which denies the virility of the nation, already compromised by the forced impregnation of the enemy female population. The subsequent castration of the ‘ethnic’ male ‘Other’, again usually performed in the presence of other inmates, negated the masculinity of the whole group. However, castrations, as testimonies detail, took different forms: maintaining their distance from the homosexual ‘event’, castration by cutting was conducted by camp guards while castration through biting was usually performed by fellow detainees.

The case of Fikret Harambasić became well known internationally not only because it led to the first case in the ICTY in which male

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924 Ibid.
925 Hansard HC Deb 10 July 1997 vol 297 c1074.
926 Žarkov, op. cit. n. 923, p. 78.
927 Ibid.
sexual assault was prosecuted but also because of the abuse that was conducted; Harambasić had died from a loss of blood after a fellow inmate was forced to orally castrate him.

Other acts of sexual abuse were perpetrated against male inmates. One testimony recounted electric shocks to the scrotum; another of seeing a father and son forced by guards to perform sex acts with each other.\textsuperscript{928} In the latter incident the power of the discourse of heterosexuality becomes apparent. In this case, the act of violence, as sexual abuse is, is framed in the context as a sexual act with both men “symbolically positioned as homosexuals.”\textsuperscript{929} Through this act they and their ‘ethnic’ group become emasculated not only through their lack of power but also through their apparent lack of heterosexuality.\textsuperscript{930} Though acts of rape were carried out by guards on prisoners, the more favoured acts of rape were carried out among prisoners to completely remove the perpetrator from the “ambivalent site of homosexual desire” as represented by the rapist, thus positioning them as the masculine authority.\textsuperscript{931} Medical practitioners Petra Brečič and Mladen Lončar have catalogued four categories of sexual abuse against men carried out during the war: injuries of testicles with blunt objects (44% of their sample); castrations and semi-castrations (24%); rape (20%); perverse sexual acts (12%).\textsuperscript{932} As with male survivors of peacetime abuse, it is argued that rape was the most difficult trauma men had to deal with because of its inherent associations with homosexuality, often leading survivors to question their sexual identity, leading in turn to a “prolonged process of healing.”\textsuperscript{933} The invisibility of male rape and sexual violence is explained using Butler’s concept of performativity which suggests that men are perpetrators and not victim thanks to the iteration of prescribed gender roles. This is alluded to by Sivakumaran who argues that this is because men “see themselves as being able to

\textsuperscript{928} Final Report of the Commission of Experts, op. cit. n. 877, IV (F) 3.
\textsuperscript{929} Žarkov, op. cit. n. 923, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{930} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{933} Olujic, op. cit. n. 888, p. 41.
resist any potential attack and this is how others see them” and that regardless of the gender of the perpetrator and victim, “the characteristic of masculinity is attributed to the perpetrator and femininity to the victim.”

Despite the traumas of male victims, the burden of representation for war rape fell on the female victims with any lobbying for justice and war crimes tribunals referring to their collective ordeal. This was arguably due to the fact that the term “rape camps” and other attributive terms is highly-politicised and usually only used “when and to the extent that females are targeted for sexual assault.” Del Zotto and Jones use the example of Omarska camp to illustrate their point, stating that it was designated a “rape camp” by virtue of the sexual assaults on its female inmates who constituted a tiny minority (thirty three to thirty eight out of approximately 2,000), and not because of the apparently severe sexual violence inflicted upon males detainees. Hurd pointed out that rape “probably already comes within the definition of a war crime” but despite this truism rape gained a distinct notoriety after the Bosnian War which raised it to the forefront of the war crimes tribunal established after, helping to make it a primary concern in future conflicts. As Chesterman noted, there are concerns that the exaggeration of the distinctive features of genocidal rape will obscure the atrocity of “common” rape, replacing the initial fears that the rapes in the Former Yugoslavia would go unnoticed. The risk perhaps was now that the ‘fame’ the crime had earned as a result of Bosnia would distort the recognition of ‘peacetime’ or ‘common’ rape to necessitate the assimilation more than before of the violence and terror which stereotypically is a part of it. According to Engle, the most contentious issue was

934 Sivakumaran, op. cit. n. 148, pp. 270; 271.
935 Hansard HC Deb 24 May 1993 vol 225 c575.
938 Del Zotto & Jones, op. cit. n. 936, p. 7.
939 Hansard HC Deb 24 May 1993 vol 225 c575.
whether the rapes should be seen as "genocidal rape", which would transform "everyday rape", or even everyday wartime rape," into the 'Other'.

However, the systematic use of rape during the Bosnian War represented stereotypes of ‘ethnicities’ and groups for the perpetrators and victims, thereby creating them for observers. The film Calling the Ghosts, which details the lives of two female inmates of Omarska camp, alludes to this problem. Its subjects, Jandranka Cigelj and Nusreta Sivac, are two middle-class women who were childhood friends, an attorney and a civil judge respectively who, as co-director Mandy Jacobson maintains, "defy all those stereotypes about peasants and mad savages" which was synonymous with Western interpretations of the war. Weeks' argument that discussions on the regulation of sex and sexuality identify the importance of “the central organizing role of sexual categorization and the various social practices that sustain the categories” corresponds with Kesić’s work which has isolated several categories of the most common war images of women in the war, these being “Amazon, Slut, Victim, Witch, and Womb.” All adhere to the gender stereotypes of the deviant and normal woman but, most tellingly, “are validated at all levels of society and through all sociocultural institutions from the Church or mosque to the schools” which has prompted Kesić to suggest that these images and stereotypes will "probably linger long after the conflict ends." He also suggests that this official endorsement means that any objection to these roles is met with condemnation, suspicion, and ridicule further strengthening the case that precariousness and the 'Other' are confined to outside and are admonished for breaching the prescribed social boundaries.

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941 Engle, op. cit. n. 914, p. 779.
943 Weeks, op. cit. n. 7, p. 5.
945 Ibid.
946 Ibid., p. 201.
While the issue for Britain in the Boer War was “of gallant men protecting helpless women and children or of unmanly men allowing helpless women and children to starve”\textsuperscript{947}, the plight of women in the Bosnian War elicited a different reaction. It generally received a less emotive response than the Boer War had elicited overall with Baroness Chalker of Wallasey (H.L.) referring to the widespread “rape and evictions” of one city’s residents as harassment in one particular exchange with Lord Hylton.\textsuperscript{948} In fact, parliamentary debates on the war are notable for the conspicuous absence of reference to gender-based crime within the camp system, with the vast majority of these references adhering to the clinical description evident in Chalker’s account.\textsuperscript{949} Rape was confirmed as “a problem which falls within the realm of the private/domestic, not the international.”\textsuperscript{950} In other words, in international politics, the domestic sphere where sexual abuse rests is a national issue unless committed by the ‘Other’ thus breaching the threshold of authenticity. The entire region was deemed to be the ‘Other’ and, with the concept of equivalency, it therefore mattered less what it did to itself. In essence, the representation of the region as “non-western” and therefore different combined with the belief that rape was an inevitable aspect of war, forged a policy of non-intervention.\textsuperscript{951} In other words, the imagery of the mass rapes combined with the discourses of moral degeneration and Balkanisation led to the understanding that these rapes could only be understood within the framework “of the cultural values unique to the region.”\textsuperscript{952} This resulted in the description of the acts as

\begin{footnotes}
\item Krebs, \textit{op. cit.} n. 464, p. 71.
\item Hansard HL Deb 28 March 1994 vol 553 c35WA. Chalker stated that “UNHCR, the International Commission of the Red Cross and the Bosnian Government have reported a high level of harassment of both Croatian and Muslim minorities in the Banja Luka area. We have made clear to the authorities in Belgrade that such behaviour is unacceptable and urged them to intervene with the Bosnian Serbs. We also asked the Russians to use their influence to end these activities.”
\item Hansen, \textit{op. cit.} n. 97, p. 61.
\item \textit{Ibid.}
\item Todorova, \textit{op. cit.} n. 760, p. 138.
\end{footnotes}
unprecedented as well its explanation using “pseudoscientific interpretations.”

Here, Todorova identifies anthropology as one discipline which understood the crime “only in the context of the heroic tradition and the specific code of shame in Yugoslavia and the Balkans” thereby condemning the region’s population to an essentialist construct culturally distinct from another essentialist construct – western women.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter continued the investigation of how parliamentary discourses on war have endured over the course of the twentieth century by providing an account of the thesis’s second case study, the Bosnian War. It started by giving a brief overview of how British discourses on gender and ‘race’ had changed since the late nineteenth century. Thereafter, it indicated how the war was framed in Britain with early indicators demonstrating that the frames of war had changed little since the Boer War despite the inherent differences of both eras and both conflicts. Britain’s policy towards Bosnia, and to the Balkans region in general, was dictated in large part by its perception of its own position in the newly unified Europe, its wider role in the emerging post-Cold War configuration, and by its concern to retain its influence as a leading world power which at times, according to Hurd, had meant it punching above its own weight. On the whole, Britain joined many of its peers by conducting a relatively “play-it-safe”, low-risk, and low cost foreign policy line with regard to the war. That the “collapse of the Soviet Union and of the control and discipline that that exerted over ancient hatreds in the old Yugoslavia” was the main reason for the war in Bosnia was repeated in parliament and justified the laissez-faire stance adopted by Britain. Referring to the controversial Iraq war, Malcolm Wicks MP confessed that supporters of the invasion were tested by Bosnia,

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953 Ibid.
954 Ibid.
955 Hodge, op. cit. n. 787, p. 21.
956 Shiraev & Sobel, op. cit. n. 783, p. 291.
957 Hansard HC Deb 23 June 1993 vol 227 c324 (John Major MP).
an occasion where “western profits were not at stake, and neither were money, cash, oil or other precious resources, but people and their nation.”

The wars in the Former Yugoslavia, and Bosnia especially, were the realisation of a change in how and why wars were fought, and that the international community had to adequately adapt to this new era.

The Bosnian War provided a myriad of enquiries as to the exact nature of such a seemingly random, and incredibly damaging, conflict. It posed more questions than answers on the nature of crimes against humanity and genocide itself, with perhaps the most shocking aspect of the war being that it occurred in a region supposedly “at the heart of Western culture and civilization, or heirs to its traditions.”

The issue of pursuing imperialistic objectives was mentioned during the war, an easy route to take considering the deluge of discourse and rhetoric surrounding the “savage” behaviour which characterised the war and the civilising mission that had to be carried out. For instance, Hurd, after the Bosnia war, stated that it was in the national interest for Britain to make, “time to time...a specific and considered contribution to a more stable and less savage world.” This had been somewhat achieved by the fact that “Europeans” had

“at each stage of the Yugoslav crisis agreed on what we should do – that is, we Europeans have avoided the disastrous rivalries of western powers in the Balkans which caused such harm in the first years of this century.”

All in all, Britain’s attitude to the war “blended a customary British obsession over the maintenance of international borders, with an anti-European, particularly anti-German slant.” In any case, the heroics of the British army’s humanitarian effort, routinely applauded in parliament, was not enough to stem the violence and influence the conclusion of the war. For some it was a modern representation of Edmund Burke’s famous quote, reiterated by Patrick Cormack MP’s statement in parliament that “I am not suggesting that good men have done nothing — far from

958 Hansard HC Deb 09 May 1995 vol 259 c635.
959 Evans, op. cit. n. 785, p. 327.
962 Conversi, op. cit. n. 845, p. 264.
it—but we are certainly seeing the triumph of evil because good men have not
done enough...” In this case the humanitarian or protectionist objective was
deployed because the Bosnian War did not threaten British interests to the extent
where a full military intervention was warranted. However, Britain’s international
position, including its presidency of the EC Council in the latter half of 1992, meant
that it was in “an excellent position to shape international policy on Bosnia.”
However, the widely held British view that “the peoples of Yugoslavia had brought
the tragedy upon themselves” meant that any chance of “military intervention in
order to stop the war and enforce peace was firmly ruled out as an option.”

Todorova has admirably declared her desire not “to exempt the Balkans of their
responsibility because the world outside behaves in a no less distasteful
manner...” However, she criticises the explanation of the breakup of Yugoslavia
“in terms of Balkan ghosts, ancient Balkan enmities, primordial Balkan cultural
patterns and proverbial Balkan turmoil,” and rationally hopes for an approach

“with the same rational criteria that the West reserves for itself: issues of self-determination
versus inviolable status quo, citizenship and minority rights, problems of ethnic and religious
autonomy, the prospects and limits of secession, the balance between big and small nations
and states, the role of international institutions.”

However, the extensive ‘Othering’ of the region had negated any chance of such a
view of the region being held. Interestingly, this approach meant that the British
government’s reaction to the war was criticised for being “unworthy of a civilised
nation in the late 20th century.” Though Conversi has argued that Britain’s
attitude towards Yugoslavia have been “characterised by a certain degree of

963 Hansard HC Deb 25 September 1992 vol 212 c158.
Andrew Hammond (ed.) The Balkans and the West: constructing the European other, 1945-2003,
Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, p. 161.
965 Ibid.
966 Todorova, op. cit. n. 760, p. x.
967 Ibid., p. 186.
Serbophilia”⁹⁶⁹, the reasons why it is felt currently that Britain did not intervene was the dominant presence of nineteenth century discourses on gender, race, and class which meant that intervention “in defence of the Bosnian government and Bosnian women would not live up to the requirements of a sound foreign policy.”⁹⁷⁰

While the discussion on the Bosnian War presented here and the previous discussion on the Boer War outlined the social and political contexts that framed the respective wars, the following chapter takes these accounts and develops the overall investigation of the thesis. It brings together both commentaries under the theoretical framework in order to firstly identify the discursive categories common to both wars but also to conclusively demonstrate that these common categories represent a continuity of discourses on war specific to the historical context of the late nineteenth century.

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⁹⁶⁹ Conversi, op. cit. n. 845, p. 245. Conversi argues that “At least two forces have contributed to a Serbophilic tendency in Britain: one, a small elite of pro-Serbian activists, the other an amorphous mass of minor scholars and key politicians ready to be lured by the propaganda of this minority and hence swept by the tide of revisionism.”

⁹⁷⁰ Hansen, , op. cit. n. 97, p. 61.
Chapter Five

The Continuity of Discourses: Comparing discourses of war in the 1890s and 1990s

5.1. Introduction

Previous chapters have introduced the thesis’ theoretical framework and provided accounts of the case study conflicts. As well as this, the research hypothesis has been outlined and the concept of thresholds of authenticity, necessary to proving the hypothesis, has been explained. This chapter will supplement featured parliamentary statements by presenting additional dialogue from the Hansard database in order to demonstrate that norms, and therefore parliamentary discourses, relating to genocide and rape, from their origins in the late nineteenth century, have endured over the course of the twentieth century, an observation which conflicts with the poststructuralist idea that “the effect of representation, in which meaning is apparently fixed, is only a temporary retrospective fixing.”

Because the temporary fixing of meaning in a specific reading of a signifier depends on this discursive context, which in this case is British parliamentary discourse during two contrasting timeframes, it must therefore be asked: what was the discursive context of each discourse? Why, if Britain played such a different role in both the Boer War and the Bosnian War, were the same discursive categories identified?

The presentation of dialogue in this chapter will involve a detailed analysis of statements from parliamentary dialogue from during both the Boer War and the Bosnian War. These statements have been collated and divided into five discursive categories.

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971 Weedon, op. cit. n. 184, p. 25.
categories, each of which serve to derealise nineteenth century norms of gender, race, and class which formed the basis of thresholds of authenticity of genocide and rape. Each category will include poststructuralist analysis which will follow the theoretical framework established and presented in chapter two, demonstrating the continuity of these discourses over the twentieth century.

This analysis will also demonstrate how these discourses have shaped views on genocide and rape insofar as nineteenth century norms on gender, race, and class, and thresholds of authenticity, represented by the Holocaust and genocidal rape, have been maintained. Each of the five discursive categories illustrate what views were being communicated in parliament during each conflict that correspond with Victorian era norms outlined in chapter three and replicated in chapter four. These norms, and their resultant discourses, are responsible for establishing, reinforcing thresholds of authenticity of these crimes, and consequently constructing the identity of the ‘Other’ as that which is not encapsulated by these norms and ensuing hierarchies of gender, race, and class. The first discursive category which has been identified is that of ethnic and ‘racial’ animosity. This discourse determines that the proximity of groups deemed to be traditionally in a state of conflict represents an inevitability of violence and therefore an explanation for the conflicts. The second discourse deals with the issue of populations within Southern Africa and the Balkans less civil than the West who were held responsible for the outbreak of war in each region. The third discourse presents the issue of both the Boer War and the Bosnian War as unique conflicts. This discourse argues that both conflicts represented a new dimension to conflict and that no precedent for action had been or could have been set, allowing Britain to eschew responsibility to act. The fourth and fifth discursive categories detail Britain’s role as a global leader and a potential victim respectively. These are followed by a commentary on the relationship between these discursive categories and gender which will show the links between the gender analysis, the crimes, the thresholds of authenticity, and the continuity of parliamentary discourses. The chapter will then conclude with a conclusion section which will summarise the main findings presented by these discursive analyses.
The first two discursive categories deal with what were seen as explanations for the outbreak of the wars. Both emphasise the predisposition of violence amongst the regions’ groups therefore asserting that both wars were inevitable. This recognition of the inevitability of violence enforces the belief that all parties were equally responsible for the violence which, according to the definition presented in the Genocide Convention, negates any possibility that genocide can take place. Both of these discourses were prevalent during the early stages of the wars, and comprise the majority of statements collected. The remaining three discursive categories deal with the justifications used for Britain’s reactions to both conflicts. While the first two categories were prevalent in the early stages of the wars, these three were prevalent for the entire duration of the wars. Each discursive category is connected and these connections will be made evident over the course of the chapter. The discourses which will be identified and examined in this chapter are common to both conflicts and therefore demonstrate the durability of discourses pertaining to these crimes.

How the British parliament contextualised and framed these conflicts is vital in understanding their reactions, and ultimately the discourse on genocide and rape within Great Britain at these critical historical junctures. These discourses, based on nineteenth century norms on gender, race, and class, framed the debates on these conflicts and by extension on the crimes of genocide and rape. It has been stated that this thesis is not concerned with establishing whether these cases, the Boer War and the Bosnian War, constituted cases of genocide and genocidal rape. It is concerned with establishing how discourses on these crimes have endured over the course of the twentieth century. What this chapter intends to seek overall is to explain how the parliamentary discourses presented strengthened the thresholds of authenticity of these particular crimes and, therefore, the precariousness of cases while demonstrating that the discursive continuity which is the focus of this
investigation “is sustained primarily through the repetition of a given interpretation” of a particular social “script”. 972

5.2. Ethnic & “Racial” animosity

5.2.1. Background

The perception of Southern Africa and the Former Yugoslavia as volatile regions which were highly susceptible to inevitable inter-group violence was widely promulgated during both the Boer and Bosnian wars. This discourse relied on, and in turn enforced, the idea of ethnic and “racial animosity” 973, strengthening the assumption that all parties were equal in terms of responsibility for the respective wars and the distribution of violence. This concept of equivalency, introduced in chapter four, was important in the denial of genocide and genocidal rape as it assumed that no one party was more at fault than the other. However, the notion of ethnic and “racial” animosity differed slightly in respect of both conflicts.

In terms of the Boer War, this discourse implied that the animosity was natural, a result of the prevalent social hierarchy which existed up to the outbreak of war, and which had placed the British Uitlanders beneath the Boers. As regards the Bosnian War, the discourse implied that the artificial composition of a region which contained culturally disparate and hostile groups was the root cause of the conflict. Britain’s reaction to this animosity differed in terms of intervention or action taken given its role as a warring party in the former case, for example. Despite this, analysis of parliamentary debates shows that the regions’ ethnic and “racial” animosity meant that the prospect of non-intervention in South Africa and intervention in the case of Bosnia rarely found support amongst government members. This will be shown in detail in the data presented below.

972 Digeser, op. cit. n. 233, p. 657.
973 Hansard HC Deb 19 October 1899 vol 77 cc269-270 (Joseph Chamberlain MP).
Another important difference between the recognition of ethnic and “racial” animosity as a cause for the respective conflicts is the length of time this discourse was prominent. During the Boer War, this discourse appeared initially but was quickly dismissed once early battles revealed a Boer force which was stronger than originally foreseen, thus altering the main reason for the conflict to that of quashing an imminent threat to Britain and its empire. Nonetheless, the language used to dichotomise South Africa’s population into superior and inferior groups combined with the prevalence of Social Darwinist rhetoric easily constructed the notion of the Boer threat, hence the role of this discourse as a precursor for others that appeared during the war. The white Boer population of the Transvaal was Britain’s main preoccupation. This correlates with the admission of historians that the experiences of the African populations during the war had been neglected until recently. This is also supported by analysis of parliamentary debates of the time which, as evident below, referenced this group only infrequently and in terms of its potential usefulness and threat in contrast to that presented by the Boers.

In contrast, the notion of ethnic and “racial” animosity remained the predominant cause of the Bosnian War for many members of parliament, as will be shown below. This is supported by Daniele Conversi who has written that

“The main characteristic of British official – and elite – discourse on Bosnia will be identified as moral relativism...an underlying current of public opinion that...was determined to view all parties in the conflict as “warring factions” engaged in a “civil war”...this became a war without victims and aggressors, as if the ... Bosnians who were massacred as a consequence of the Serbian invasion were themselves to blame.”

According to Gregory Kent, ethnicity was the primary explanatory factor in many academic and journalistic accounts of the Bosnian War. He acknowledges that this has been problematic as it denied the primacy of Serbia’s war aim which was the control of territory. Kent argues that ethnic hatred did develop, but only after

974 Conversi, op. cit. n. 845, p. 245.
975 Kent, op. cit. n. 59, p. 68.
the war began and “as a result of the particular character of the war.”\textsuperscript{976} The camp system used throughout the Bosnian War, like those in the Boer War, did not comprise of death camps as characterised by the Holocaust. However, the camp system did play a role in “the fracturing of the Bosnian and Croat peoples.”\textsuperscript{977} Though it was acknowledged in parliament that extreme violence was being used, the fact that it had the look of being quite uncoordinated and random implied that the violence was in fact just a natural and inevitable component of war.

The concept of equivalency was strengthened by the aforementioned racism towards the region which transformed the Former Yugoslavia into the European ‘Other’ and which is comparable with discursive prejudices against the Boers. This combination portrayed the war as “a natural disaster at best, or as biologically determined at worst.”\textsuperscript{978} Terminology such as “ethnic”, “racial” or “tribal,” used to describe the violence in parliament endorsed the primal sentiments many commentators held with regard to the region. It can also be argued that the use of these terms served Serbia’s purposes in constructing a region of inter-group tensions, and supported the view of “moral equalisation between Bosnian and Serbian forces.”\textsuperscript{979} As Michael Sells argues,

\begin{quote}
“the dehumanisation of Bosnians as “Balkan” tribal haters, outside the realm of reason and civilisation, was promoted by a wide variety of Western diplomats as the major reason for the refusal to stop the genocide when it became known in the early summer of 1992.”\textsuperscript{980}
\end{quote}

Many commentators did identify Serbia’s expansionist agenda and argued against any idea of ethnic animosity and a civil war. Sharpe was one such observer who recognised that the “principal aggressor is Serbia directing its proxies in B-H, which the US and the EC and most of the international community recognise as a sovereign independent state.”\textsuperscript{981} The “laziness” of the language used in association

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{976} Ibid.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{977} Power, \textit{op. cit.} n. 45, p. 269.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{978} Bringa, \textit{op. cit.} n. 806, p. 202.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{979} Kent, \textit{op. cit.} n. 59, p. 255.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{981} Sharpe, \textit{op. cit.} n. 968, p. 7.}
\end{footnotes}
with the Bosnian War was even highlighted by Editors of the *New Republic*, who described the situation in August 1992, not as a mere ethnic conflict but as

“...a campaign in which a discrete faction of Serbian nationalists has manipulated ethnic sentiment in order to seize power and territory... There have been too many platitudes about the responsibility of ‘all factions’ for the war. This lazy language is an escape hatch through which outside powers flee their responsibilities.”

Despite evidence to the contrary, it can be said that western rhetoric was successful in promoting Bosnia as the cradle of ancient tribal hatreds throughout the course of the war. Even at its most diplomatic, the caution with which the region should be approached with ensured an ‘Othering’ of sorts. For example, Lord David Owen acknowledged that most sovereign states claimed a “complex history,” but also that the world had to recognise “the dangers of drawing state borders along ethnic lines,” and of “ignoring ethnic and national voices.”

5.2.2. Data

The presence of “racial” animosity before the outbreak of the Boer War indicated that the conflict was assured, a notion which was supported in parliament by many members. Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain MP dismissed the opposition’s claim that “racial” animosity was created by the catastrophic Jameson Raid of 1895, insisting instead that “it existed before...” For Chamberlain and the government, one of the main principles of war with the Transvaal was Britain’s willingness and ability “to protect British subjects everywhere when they are made to suffer from oppression and injustice.” Such action would maintain Britain’s “position in regard to other nations” and maintain its “existence as a great Power in South Africa,” an aim that was given high priority as will be discussed further.

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983 Kuusisto, op. cit. n. 40, p. 176.
984 Owen, op. cit. n. 861, p. 343.
985 Ibid.
986 Hansard HC Deb 19 October 1899 vol 77 c268.
987 Hansard HC Deb 19 October 1899 vol 77 c266.
988 Ibid.
below. The Earl of Dunraven (H.L.) supported any action taken because it was “impossible for the people of this country to forever endure the sight of their white fellow-countrymen being treated with every kind of indignity as a subject and inferior race.” He went on to suggest that the British people would “never for one moment allow any interference with the Imperial position” of Britain “as the paramount Power in South Africa” thus supporting the case that war against the Transvaal was a bid to reassert British dominance in the region and not one concerned with the plight of the Uitlanders.

However this excuse was only employed until the war had commenced. As early as April 1899, Chamberlain described the ensuing campaign as “a necessity imposed upon us” and one which was mandatory as long as the British government had “the responsibility for the peace of South Africa.” Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett MP had earlier declared that the turn of the year had seen “the condition of the non-Boer population ... made worse” while the government of the Transvaal had become “more tyrannical and corrupt.” He stated that Britain was now face to face with a spectacle of a great European population who pay five-sixths of the taxation of the Transvaal, who have, beyond doubt, made its prosperity, and who are deprived of all political rights and most civil rights, and whose privileges are being steadily diminished.

John Douglas Scott-Montagu MP dismissed the argument that the war would “accentuate racial feeling” by affirming his belief that it would instead allay any tensions. He stated in agreement with previous comments made by Chamberlain that the “racial” animosity present was based on “the contempt in which the Boers held our fellow-countrymen in the Transvaal.” Speaking in July 1899 Chamberlain dismissed any idea that a war would create “race antagonism” because “race

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989 Hansard HL Deb 28 July 1899 vol 75 c637.
990 Hansard HC Deb 24 April 1899 vol 70 c491.
991 Hansard HC Deb 20 March 1899 vol 68 c1348.
992 Hansard HC Deb 20 March 1899 vol 68 c1349.
993 Hansard HC Deb 19 October 1899 vol 77 c339.
994 Hansard HC Deb 19 October 1899 vol 77 c340.
antagonism exists at the present time in the strongest possible form." He described the position of the Uitlanders as one of

"...humiliating inferiority, where they are subject to injury, and even to outrage, and where the friendly remonstrances of the suzerain Power are treated with contempt..."

Referring to journalist Spens er Wilkinson’s “recent book on the Transvaal” Colonel Clement Royds MP stated that the government of the colony was currently retained

"...in the hands of the original Boers and for their families, to the perpetual exclusion of newcomers, who are to be left, either as resident aliens, the subjects of a distant Government, or as a subordinate class of unenfranchised subjects, occupying a position midway between that of the Boer burgher and the Kaffir."

Therefore, according to Royds the “Kaffir” occupied the lowest rung of the Transvaal social hierarchy, and though Uitlanders were not yet there, their position was too precarious to tolerate.

Much has already been said about the exclusion of the African population from the discussion and history of the conflict. This ignorance was also evident in parliament; AJ Balfour MP, First Lord of the Treasury, confirmed in February 1900 that “by common consent it was decided it should be confined to the two European races chiefly concerned...” While the initial call to arms did chiefly concern the “two European races” as evident from the data presented, the issue of ethnic and “racial” animosity was not confined to these two groups. Ashmead-Bartlett argued that the Boers had “oppressed the real aborigines in the most barbarous and cruel way.” Chamberlain also noted this issue, stating that “the treatment of the natives of the Transvaal has been disgraceful; it has been brutal; it has been

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995 Hansard HC Deb 28 July 1899 vol 75 c701.
996 Hansard HC Deb 28 July 1899 vol 75 c702.
998 Hansard HC Deb 17 October 1899 vol 77 c67.
999 Hansard HC Deb 15 February 1900 vol 79 c57. Emphasis added.
1000 Hansard HC Deb 07 August 1899 vol 76 c72.
unworthy of a civilized Power.” 1001 He claimed responsibility for protection of this group under the Hague Conventions of 1881 and 1884 to which Britain was a signatory, stating that

“the House will bear in mind when we granted the Convention of 1881 and substituted the articles of the Convention of 1884 we undertook the protection of the natives of the Transvaal. Those natives had been our subjects. They were the majority of the inhabitants, and we retroceded them to the Transvaal, the natives whom we had promised to protect.” 1002

Later, those opposed to the war would later call into question Britain’s treatment of the Boers while referring to the same statutes.

References to the group in terms of “racial” animosity were also made by those opposed to the war. John Dillon MP criticized the Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary for their suggestion that

“one of the main reasons for this war was that England had been somewhat neglectful in her duty towards the native population of South Africa, and that now she felt it to be her duty to insist upon the better treatment of the natives.” 1003

Dillon instead suggested that this particular reason “was thought of at the last moment, in order to bring within the war party large sections of philanthropic but ignorant people in this country who knew nothing at all about it.” 1004 Michael Davitt MP had earlier hinted at this, claiming that “no one single title of evidence has been brought before this House to prove the truth of this charge.” 1005 Sir Henry Meysey-Thompson MP had already charged the Colonial Secretary with hypocrisy at legitimating the war based on the rights and treatment of the African population, given that Chamberlain had “practically connived at selling prisoners of war into slavery in the case of Bechuanaland prisoners...” 1006

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1001 Hansard HC Deb 19 October 1899 vol 77 c271.
1002 Ibid.
1003 Hansard HC Deb 25 October 1899 vol 77 c678.
1004 Ibid.
1005 Hansard HC Deb 25 October 1899 vol 77 c617.
1006 Hansard HC Deb 28 July 1899 vol 75 c751-752.
As expected with the main clashes being between the British and the Boers, and with the history of the experiences of the “natives” and Indian Uitlanders comprising a fraction yet a recently increasing part of the history of the war, “race” antagonism existed between the British Uitlanders and the Boers. According to Ashmead Bartlett, the latter had no claim to the region or to complain as they were “not even the original proprietors of the country. They are only interlopers of some forty-seven years’ standing... They are not the majority of the white population, nor the best part of it, nor the most industrious. They number less than two-fifths of the white population, they pay less than one-sixth of the taxation, and they have not one-tenth part of the education of their Uitlander neighbours.”

Chamberlain’s view on “racial” animosity was that it was “based upon contempt” and that the

“animosities are bitter, are increasing, and will increase as long as one white race in South Africa has contempt for the other... there will never be an end to racial animosity until both the white races have, I will not say learnt to love each other, but, at all events, to respect each other...”

By the time war broke out between Britain and the government of the Transvaal in October 1899, the idea of “racial” animosity had been usurped by a bigger threat to Britain’s dominance, and existence, as the main reason to go to war. This will be dealt with separately in more detail below.

Simms notes that parliamentary thinking on the break-up of Yugoslavia “derived from half-remembered history and strongly held but erroneous generalizations.” Many members of parliament blamed the fall of communism for precipitating the war in Yugoslavia. For them, the communist system had helped to hide and constrain ethnic tensions within the region. As has been noted in chapter four, Lord Fanshawe of Richmond (H. L.) identified the absence of Tito’s “strong and vigilant leadership” as an explanation for the outbreak of violence. Prime Minister John Major MP identified “the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the discipline that that

1007 Hansard HC Deb 07 August 1899 vol 76 c72.
1008 Hansard HC Deb 19 October 1899 vol 77 cc269-270.
1009 Simms, op. cit. n. 810, p. 283.
1010 Hansard HL Deb 21 March 1990 vol 517 c350.
exerted over ancient hatreds in the old Yugoslavia” as “the biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia.”

Lord Elibank (H.L) saw the region as a “combination of races held together latterly by a strong tyrant and a tyrannical party, both of which have disappeared.”

Jacques Arnold MP saw Europe as “a tinder-box of national enmities that are now thawing after the 50 years deep frost of communism.”

Michael Gapes MP insisted that “history is not dead; it is back with a vengeance” and that the conflict was “due to historic animosities and feuds...” Others saw these historic animosities as a result of the artificial construct of the federation, concealed only by Tito’s strong leadership. For Arnold, Yugoslavia was “a creation of Versailles.”

For Ken Livingstone MP, it was “an artificial nation” created “by great power politics at the end of the first world war...” becoming “the border between Christianity and Islam.” Lord Ivor Richard (H.L) described the state’s creation after the First World War as “a marriage of convenience rather than a love affair” and that “From the start there was serious tension between the different ethnic groups.”

According to David Martin MP this background explained why

“Every now and again during the past century and a half, the eastern question, which is centred on what to do about power struggles and atrocities in the Balkans and the potboiling interventions of interested nations, stirs demands for some definite action.”

Sir Nicholas Bonsor MP stated more explicitly that the

“Ethnic rivalry between the groups is hundreds of years old and no attempt at creating a unified country has yet succeeded or could succeed—except under Marshal Tito, who imposed it by force for about 40 years...”

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1011 Hansard HC Deb 23 June 1993 vol 227 c324.
1012 Hansard HL Deb 14 December 1992 vol 541 c461.
1013 Hansard HC Deb 25 September 1992 vol 212 c175.
1014 Hansard HC Deb 25 September 1992 vol 212 c177.
1015 Hansard HC Deb 25 September 1992 vol 212 c175.
1017 Ibid.
1018 Hansard HL Deb 25 September 1992 vol 539 c538.
1019 Hansard HC Deb 19 July 1995 vol 263 c1596.
The fact that “where Bosnia now stands has been a major international dividing line for almost 2,000 years,” \textsuperscript{1021} was further proof that the region was prone to violence, and that racial animosity was ever present and ready to develop into conflict. Other members saw the emergence of violence as a direct result of both the collapse of communism and the artificial state. Major stated that

“once that discipline had disappeared, those ancient hatreds reappeared, and we began to see their consequences when the fighting occurred. There were subsidiary elements, but that collapse was by far the greatest.” \textsuperscript{1022}

While the reliance on the artificially constructed Yugoslavia and the post-Communist fallout in explaining the conflict receded, they was swiftly replaced with similar arguments around the fighting within the federation, which for many members indicated a civil war. Lord Merlyn-Rees (H.L.) shared his personal opinion of the region was “of a hateful, in the true sense of the term, collection of ethnic and linguistic groups who indulge in civil war perhaps even worse than most civil wars.”\textsuperscript{1023} Lord Hylton (H.L.) quoted Pope John Paul II who described the conflict as an “iniquitous fratricidal war.”\textsuperscript{1024} In early 1993, Douglas Hogg MP declared in parliament that there was almost complete agreement that “the conflict in Bosnia bears all the hallmarks of a civil war. It is primarily a civil war, although it is aided and abetted by participants from outside, mainly Serbia.”\textsuperscript{1025} Soon after, Malcolm Rifkind MP revealed the reasoning behind the use of the term “civil war”:

“...the fighting within Bosnia is, sadly, being carried out by Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. It is in that sense that I refer to the conflict as having many of the characteristics of a civil war.”\textsuperscript{1026}

This was supported by Douglas Hurd MP who stated that the conflict was

“...a civil war in the sense that the huge majority—more than 90 per cent—of those fighting are Bosnian. They are Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. What the right
Sir Edward Heath MP stated that the conflict was “a civil war stemming from Yugoslav history going back centuries...seeking to wipe out all the changes and hatreds of all those years.”\textsuperscript{1028} Malcolm Rifkind acknowledged that though Bosnia experienced peace and harmony for a number of years, it had also experienced “more bloody civil war, butchery and slaughter from all sides than almost any other part of Europe.”\textsuperscript{1029} Lord Finsberg’s (H.L.) contention that though Serbia stood at eight “on a scale of one to ten” in terms of blame, Bosnians and Croats were not immune either,\textsuperscript{1030} was shared by many and served to substantiate the cathartic notion of equivalency amongst the parties at war.

As was the case during the Boer War, the ethnic and “racial” animosity within the region implied that the war was inevitable, and therefore unstoppable. Mike O’Brien’s MP comments in July 1992 supported this view. He stated that “It was inevitable that the break-up of the Communist regimes in Yugoslavia and eastern Europe would lead to conflict” because “Too many people were going to find themselves inside borders that they rejected...”\textsuperscript{1031} Lord Ivor Richard (H.L.) described the region as a “cauldron” with deep divisions “of very long standing.”\textsuperscript{1032} According to the Archbishop of York (H.L.) it had been devised that some areas of the region could be handled better or were “slightly easier” because in these particular parts “the deep divisions with which one was dealing were only about 500 years old whereas in other parts of the Balkans they were 1,000 years old.”\textsuperscript{1033} Denis Healey HC added further credence to the notion of perpetual ethnic animosity in the region when he stated that it was “impossible to draw boundaries

\textsuperscript{1027} Hansard HC Deb 29 April 1993 vol 223 c1170.
\textsuperscript{1028} Hansard HC Deb 29 April 1993 vol 223 c1187.
\textsuperscript{1029} Hansard HC Deb 09 May 1995 vol 259 c646.
\textsuperscript{1030} Hansard HL Deb 25 September 1992 vol 539 c562.
\textsuperscript{1031} Hansard HC Deb 02 July 1992 vol 210 c1020.
\textsuperscript{1032} Hansard HL Deb 25 September 1992 vol 539 c538.
\textsuperscript{1033} Hansard HL Deb 25 September 1992 vol 539 c548.
for nation states in eastern Europe without including powerful minorities in each
state which, if persecuted, will rebel against it.”\textsuperscript{1034}

Lord Thomas Bridges (H.L.) also identified with the growth of nationalism in
explaining the break-up of the federation, explaining that the “aspirations of new
nationalism which are now emerging throughout Europe will produce different
kinds of tension.”\textsuperscript{1035} Baroness Chalker of Wallasey (H.L.) claimed that “the speed
with which the animosity and the sheer vengeance of one group of people towards
another have developed is much more recent...” as opposed to the underlying
causes which were longer in fruition.\textsuperscript{1036} Tony Benn MP stated that the “civil war”
had “a history going back hundreds of years to the Turkish, Austro-Hungarian and
Nazi occupations, and the murder of the Serbs by the Ustashi during the war...”\textsuperscript{1037}
including every group and contributing to the concept of equivalence. The
involvement of all groups was highlighted by Baroness Chalker of Wallasey (H.L.)
who claimed that the conflict was “a three-sided civil war” insofar as “Serbs fight
Moslems in and around Sarajevo; in central Bosnia Moslems fight Croats; in the
Croatian Krajina Croats confront Serbs in an uneasy truce; and in Bihac, Moslems
fight Moslems.”\textsuperscript{1038} Though the notion of a civil war in the region is important, this
will be discussed in more detail further below. Cyril D. Townsend (HC) declared that
the war resulted “from centuries-old ethnic feuds which are bound to continue.”\textsuperscript{1039}

Another commonality parliamentary dialogue from the Bosnian War shared with
that of the Boer War was that opposition to these views was vociferous from early
on. Though the Earl of Lauderdale (H.L.) agreed that “until the break-up of the
communist regime people were getting on very well at street level” citing
intermarriage rates as proof, he did acknowledge that the problems leading to the
war were “not as bad as it has been commonly made out to be, except by the

\textsuperscript{1034} Hansard HC Deb 22 February 1990 vol 167 c1109.
\textsuperscript{1035} Hansard HL Deb 22 November 1990 vol 523 c849.
\textsuperscript{1036} Hansard HL Deb 02 June 1992 vol 537 c846.
\textsuperscript{1037} Hansard HC Deb 14 January 1993 vol 216 c1062.
\textsuperscript{1038} Hansard HL Deb 14 February 1994 vol 552 c27.
\textsuperscript{1039} Hansard HC Deb 02 February 1993 vol 218 c299.
leaders who are now at war.” Sir Russell Johnston MP supported the Earl’s claims, identifying that the conflict in Bosnia was “about the activities of one group against both the others. In the context of Yugoslavia as a whole, this has not been civil war.” Patrick Cormack MP cited Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić who stated that the conflict was not a civil war, indicating that the region was not in fact rife with ethnic and “racial” animosity:

“This is a war in an ancient country with ancient borders; a country that has in the past been a shining example of what a multi-ethnic, multicultural country should be. Christians of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic persuasions and Muslims have lived happily side by side, intermarrying and weaving a rich tapestry of civilisation in that part of Europe.”

Lord Mackie of Benshie (H.L.) also identified the conflict as

“a war of brutal aggression for territory that the Serbs want. There is not a shadow of doubt that the enemy of peace and of the people of Bosnia is not that particular satellite Karadzic; it is Milosevic and his dream of a greater Serbia. That is what the war is about.”

Once the Bosnian War began, David Trimble MP regretted that “the international community did not respond quickly enough, because the tragedies might have been averted” given that Serbia’s “intention to create a greater Serbia” had been signalled the year before. Cormack criticised the “regrettable tendency” to speak of the conflict as a civil war, to talk about “warring factions”, and “to ignore the fact that it started very much as aggression from another country against a sovereign state which we have recognised.” Opposition leader Tony Blair MP supported this view, stating that there was “no doubt that the basic cause of the conflict was the aggressive and violent attempt to bring about a greater Serbia from the ruins of the former Yugoslavia”, further admonishing the idea of ethnic and “racial” animosity and the inevitability of war they implied. Blair was notably applauded by Conservative Party member David Howell MP who congratulated him

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1040 Hansard HL Deb 25 September 1992 vol 539 c558.
1041 Hansard HC Deb 14 December 1992 vol 216 c69.
1042 Hansard HC Deb 14 December 1992 vol 216 c57.
1043 Hansard HL Deb 14 February 1994 vol 552 c49.
1044 Hansard HC Deb 02 June 1992 vol 208 c719.
1045 Hansard HC Deb 25 May 1994 vol 244 c350.
1046 Hansard HC Deb 31 May 1995 vol 260 c 1008.
on recognising “the true origins of the horrific saga whose consequences we are discussing today”\textsuperscript{1047} and which counted as an embarrassing comment for the government.

Referring to the region’s historical burden, Sir Edward Heath MP stated that the conflict was “a civil war stemming from Yugoslav history going back centuries. It is seeking to wipe out all the changes and hatreds of all those years.” He also remarked that “unless we recognise that as the basis of the conflict, we shall not reach any peaceful solution.”\textsuperscript{1048} Analysis indicates that British policy towards Bosnia was based upon this premise, despite the counter arguments to the supposed reality as displayed above. Douglas Hogg MP echoed Heath’s sentiments in stating in February 1993 when the Vance-Owen Plan was in motion that because the situation was a civil war, it would be “impossible to enforce by external force a settlement of a civil war; that must be done by agreement”\textsuperscript{1049} a philosophy which influenced Britain’s humanitarian as opposed to interventionist role during the conflict. This view was supported by Peter Viggers MP who, in reference to the roles of the United Nations and NATO, was resigned to the fact that no forces could “stop people fighting if that is what they are determined to do.”\textsuperscript{1050} David Trimble MP criticised the plan for its recognition “the ethnic divisions and ethnic units in former Yugoslavia” ensuring Britain would help “create a series of Serb states, Croat states and Bosnian Muslim states.”\textsuperscript{1051} However, as seen above, the Serb war objective appears to have been ignored by some members of parliament. As stated in chapter four, Douglas Hurd MP declared as early as July 1992 that

\begin{quote}
“The peoples of Yugoslavia could not be held together by force, and the attempt to keep something together by consent was wrecked. The result is the unleashing of destructive hatred on a scale which will not be easily or quickly checked. It certainly cannot be halted from outside...”\textsuperscript{1052}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1047} Hansard HC Deb 31 May 1995 vol 260 c 1022.
\item \textsuperscript{1048} Hansard HC Deb 29 April 1993 vol 223 c1187.
\item \textsuperscript{1049} Hansard HC Deb 23 February 1993 vol 219 c856.
\item \textsuperscript{1050} Hansard HC Deb 09 May 1995 vol 259 c622.
\item \textsuperscript{1051} Hansard HC Deb 23 February 1993 vol 219 c840.
\item \textsuperscript{1052} Hansard HC Deb 02 July 1992 vol 210 c976.
\end{itemize}
Moreover, at this early juncture Hurd stated that “the ethnic picture is too complicated to allow a neat division of the territory” using integration as evidence\textsuperscript{1053}, albeit in a different way to others who referenced it, thus leaving the way open for a Vance-Owen type plan in the future. Essentially, the British government-backed perspective on the conflict rested on an ideal explained by Tony Lloyd MP, Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office:

\begin{quote}
"...searching for and designating one ethnic group or another as "the victim", and increasing support for that group, is a tragic mistake. The truth is that there were victims on every side of the conflict and it was a tragedy for every side."\textsuperscript{1054}
\end{quote}

Lloyd’s comments were made in June 1997, two years after the war in Bosnia had ended, and demonstrate the reluctance of members of the British government to acknowledge the extent of Serbia’s responsibility and, therefore, further justifying the stance it took during the war.

5.2.3. Analysis

This discourse fails to acknowledge the occurrence of cases of genocide and rape outside of the thresholds of authenticity by identifying ethnic and “racial” animosity within both South Africa and the Balkans as the cause for both conflicts. According to this discourse, based on remarks made by various members of parliament, the long-standing, ever-present nature of these intra-region tensions meant that conflict was inevitable and could not be stopped by any means. In the case of the Boer War, it was employed to justify intervention while in the case of the Bosnian War, it was employed to justify a non-interventionist stance. The first reason for this animosity presented in the data is that the regions in question were artificial constructs developed through previous conflicts and administrations, containing disparate groups. The second reason presented was that, because these disparate and seemingly antagonistic groups were concentrated within contentious or

\begin{footnotes}\footnotetext{1053}{Hansard HC Deb 02 July 1992 vol 210 c976.}\footnotetext{1054}{Hansard HC Deb 18 June 1997 vol 296 c263.}\end{footnotes}
artificial boundaries, “racial animosity” was rife. These regions were therefore destined in the eyes of many commentators to succumb to inevitable war, despite the fact that these same areas saw long periods of peace and, in the case of Bosnia especially, experienced a level of integration to the point that ethnic categories were of little importance in many localities. These reasons, and this discourse in general, characterised the conflicts for many members of the Houses of Parliament who were able to justify their respective, though differing, reactions to the wars by virtue of the fact that they saw each conflict as unavoidable due to dormant tensions characteristic of the regions’ multi-demographic composition. This point coincides with the third discursive category presented in this chapter, that of conflicts without precedent, and will be developed further below.

Moreover, ethnic and ‘racial’ animosity implied that the groups in question experienced, and acted upon, tensions towards each other. Many members identified all parties as complicit in the fighting, strengthening the concept of equivalency and leaving no clear victim identifiable, justifying claims of a civil war and a humanitarian effort targeted at all parties. This corresponds with the work of genocide scholar Gregory Stanton who developed a twelve-step process with which genocides are denied. As stated previously, it is not the objective of this thesis to decide whether the cases being used are genocide, however Stanton’s guide offers indicators of how the factors which can dismiss its occurrence. His fifth step is that genocide is denied by rationalising the deaths as the result of tribal conflict, the inevitable result of ancient hatreds. This discourse adheres to this particular step of Stanton’s process and can be used to show that this discourse and its associated language can negatively impact on perceptions and thresholds of authenticity of genocide. This animosity, characteristic of the regions and their history, facilitated the transformation of the regions, and the Former Yugoslavia in particular, into both the geographical and social ‘Other’. In other words, the construction of the region “as a place where this happens” implied “that the western ‘we’ is different.

because ‘we’ do not subscribe to this practice.” Essentially, this discourse allowed for the othering of the populations of these regions into the inherently violent and therefore “abnormal” in direct contrast to the peaceful and “normal” Britain and the West more generally.

With regard to Bosnia, Kuusisto notes that “official Western discourse on Bosnia never designated any single adversary, despite the potent denigrations of each ethnic group that were circulating during the period...” a claim supported by Tony Lloyd’s MP aforementioned remarks. Both aspects of this discourse, that of the inevitability of fighting given perpetual regional tensions and the concept of equivalency in terms of the violence conducted, runs counter to popular ideas of what genocide entails. The Holocaust was not an inevitable result of perpetual tensions, and was not conducted equally given that an aggressor and a victim group were clearly recognisable; this is also applicable to cases of genocidal rape. These characteristics therefore placed both the Boer War and the Bosnian War outside of the definition and characteristics of the optimum example of these crimes, and outside the threshold of authenticity, contrasting against the norms of these crimes.

This discursive category corresponds with the theoretical framework presented in chapter two which made clear that this thesis is not looking at these lives as ungrievable; rather, it is looking at these particular cases and the subjects involved as ungrievable; outside the realm of those who can be sympathised with, that is, the ‘Other’. Though Butler speaks of the precariousness of lives in Frames of War, here it can be said that the simplification of the conflicts into skirmishes representative of ethnic animosity transforms the conflicts and the crimes of genocide and rape into precarious acts, or the ‘Other’ of crimes. When Butler speaks of “the epistemological capacity to apprehend a life” which is “partially dependent on that life being produced according to norms that qualify it as a life or, indeed, as part of life” she is referring to norms of recognition. The question

1056 Hansen, op. cit. n. 97, p. 61.
1057 Kuusisto, op. cit. n. 40, p. 174.
1058 Butler, op. cit. n. 9, p. 3.
of what qualifies these crimes as crimes, or conflicts as conflicts therefore follows. The answer, in this instance, are the thresholds of authenticity defined, popularised, endorsed, and maintained by parliamentary discourse, placing cases outside the frame of normal, or proper, genocide thereby making it precariousness.

Butler’s concept of iterability is also of relevance. The iterability of terms associated with ethnic and “racial” animosity over the years, and during the conflicts, firstly legitimates the terms, even when as was the case with both the Boer and Bosnian Wars they were not applicable. Secondly, this iteration not only normalises these concepts of ethnic and “racial” animosity, but also nullifies the emotional impact of the crises, possibly an aim of government members during the conflicts. This perspective is illustrated by Butler when she describes how “we read about lives lost and are often given the numbers, but these stories are repeated every day, and the repetition appears endless, irremediable.”1060 In the sense that this discourse has been repeated since the 1890s, normalising such labels within contexts, this action mirrors the force hate speech acquires through the repetition of injurious names. Butler notes that “injurious names have a history” or rather a “historicity.” This is “the history which has become internal to a name, has come to constitute the contemporary meaning of a name.” 1061 As Moya Lloyd writes, “when that name is deployed, this historicity – or conventionality – is invoked.”1062 Substituting hate speech for ethnic and racial terms and slurs, it is evident from the data above that the dialogue and discourse above has an influential “historicity.” This historicity is therefore denied to cases such as the Boer War and the Bosnian War by virtue of the fact that they are explained by this particular discourse. It then follows that this historicity is also denied to the wars’ subjects. Without historicity and constrained by the limitations of this discourse, the opportunity to destabilise the discourse and the thresholds of authenticity passes. Overall, this discursive category guarantees the precariousness of, and denies the authenticity of cases of, genocide and rape by constructing the respective regions as the endemically violent and irrational ‘Other’.

1059 Ibid., p. 5.
1060 Ibid., p. 13.
1061 Butler, op. cit. n. 43, p. 36.
1062 Lloyd, op. cit. n. 175, p. 112.
5.3. “Uncivilised” Populations

5.3.1. Background

Another popular discourse used to interpret both wars was that of the responsibility of “uncivilised” populations deemed inferior in comparison to western counterparts. This discourse was closely associated with, and strengthened, the first discourse examined here, that of ethnic and “racial” animosity. A number of British observers identified the involvement of inferior and therefore “uncivilised” groups as responsible for the war, supporting the notion that acts of genocide and genocidal rape became closely associated with terms such as “tribal” and “racial animosity” which stressed the inevitability of the violence. The use of such language and labels imply a predisposition to such behaviour which, because it is natural, cannot be halted. As John Sinclair, Professor of Modern English at Birmingham, was reported to have said “If you say someone has ethnic tendencies you are taken to mean that he is a murderer.”

According to analysis of the Hansard debates the use of imperialist discourse, comprising of supremacist rhetoric, has continued through the century. British public opinion maintained that the Boers were “stubborn, cruel to their African servants, and trapped in the seventeenth century.” Much was also made of the Boer’s lack of hygiene and cleanliness, an issue raised in the thesis’ earlier analysis of the war’s concentration camp systems, and during which women were strongly criticised. The power omitted by the identification and threat of the ‘Other’ not only infiltrated life in racial terms, but also in terms of the other significant divider, gender, too. As Stoler notes, crimes concerning sexuality and race were no exception to being affected by the disseminated British views and standards. British

1063 Quoted in Kent, op. cit. n. 59, p. 352.
1064 Krebs, op. cit. n. 673, p. 431.
public opinion maintained that the Boers were stubborn, cruel to their African servants, and trapped in the seventeenth century. By the end of the century, British and anti-Boer sentiment had taken on increasingly anthropological tones. “A Situation in South Africa: A Voice from the Cape Colony,” by the Reverend C. Usher Wilson, which appeared in *Nineteenth Century* just after the war was declared in 1899, rebutted the defences of the Afrikaner that came from Schreiner and other “pro-Boers”:

“The Boers are supposed to be a simple, pastoral and puritanical people, who plough their fields and tend their cattle during the day, and read their Bibles at night...Truly, distance lends enchantment. Instead of this the Boers are nothing more nor less than a low type of the genus homo...In self-sought isolation they have tried to escape the tide of civilisation.”

Imperialist discourse was not limited to the Boer War, and was also evident during the break-up of Yugoslavia and the ensuing Bosnian War. Terminology such as “ethnic” or “tribal,” used to describe the conflict, endorsed the primal sentiments many commentators held with regard to the region within which violence could not be stopped. The historicity which “tribal” and “ethnic” groups are associated also provided commentators with the justification of non-action through the fact that the groups’ less than civilised existence made their suffering easier to tolerate.1066

As Michael Sells explains,

“the dehumanisation of Bosnians as “Balkan” tribal haters, outside the realm of reason and civilisation, was promoted by a wide variety of Western diplomats as the major reason for the refusal to stop the genocide when it became known in the early summer of 1992.”1067

Kent explains that this understanding of the term ‘ethnic’, as with the Victorian conception of race, can also indicate something ‘exotic’ or ‘culturally different’1068 or abnormal. However, in comparison, Bosnia’s proximity to Britain and therefore “civilisation” made it more difficult to uphold such feelings; the “coincidence of European geography and imagery” which the conflict provided ensured that it

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1068 Kent, *op. cit.* n. 59, p. 69.
would resonate more so than the genocides in Cambodia or Iraq had. Just as the *New Republic* reported the use of lazy language to describe the Bosnian War as an ethnic conflict allowing “outside powers flee their responsibilities”¹⁰⁷⁰, the

“Mental laziness on the part of Western commentators converted communities into “tribes”, and some residual prejudice may have inclined them to think that a partly Muslim country must be, ipso facto, more “primitive.””¹⁰⁷¹

For Kent, the discourse of ethnicity which featured prominently during the Bosnian War “built upon the Victorian ‘race’ discourse” interpreting antagonism between different groups” as inevitable and inalterable.”¹⁰⁷²

The data presented below demonstrates that this discourse was prevalent during the early stages of each war. This discourse also refers to the concept of equivalency in terms of violence and responsibility examined in the previous section. An examination of parliamentary debates hints at a tension in the use of this discourse with reference to the religions of the regions’ populations. Some debate excerpts suggest that civilisation was closely associated with Christianity which, if true, would help explain accounts of British soldiers who were conflicted with fighting Boers, and claims of Islamic fundamentalism in Bosnia. However, there is not enough evidence within the *Hansard* database to prove this point. Moreover, the question of civility, and the focus of “uncivilised” populations, was put to Britain once both wars were in full swing. These questions of Britain’s civility were prompted by its scorched earth and concentration policy and by its non-interventionist stance during each respective war.

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5.3.2. Data

Many members of parliament refuted the possibility of a just war against the Boers precisely because they were seen as an “uncivilised” population. Sir William Gurdon MP reflected that many Boers were “uneducated, ignorant, and obstinate,” citing these characteristics as reason enough for not going to war against them.\footnote{Hansard HC Deb 28 July 1899 vol 75 c716.} Jasper Tully MP taunted government members when stating that the group they had described as “ignorant and lazy” now had “superior guns” to the Empire.\footnote{Hansard HC Deb 19 February 1900 vol 79 c453.} Michael Davitt MP described it as “…the meanest war this country has ever waged against” what he described as “a civilised race.”\footnote{Hansard HC Deb 25 October 1899 vol 77 c618.} The view that the Boers were in fact civilised was a common theme throughout opposition members’ speeches.

Britain’s civility and morality had been questioned from the outset of the war. Patrick O’Brien MP illustrated this point when describing the “hypocrisy of the British people, who claim to be such excellent Christians” who were fighting “one of the most innocent people in the world; against a people who never did you any wrong.”\footnote{Hansard HC Deb 23 October 1899 vol 77 c555.} John Dillon MP highlighted how the distance from Britain and Europe mean that events in South Africa would be scrutinised less and Britain could do in South Africa what it “would not dare to do nearer home.”\footnote{Hansard HC Deb 25 February 1901 vol 89 cc1145-66.} Dillon’s argument was that the Boers “who after all are a Christian nation and a white race, shall have the same rights which the civilised nations of Europe have been accustomed to accord one another in their wars…”\footnote{Hansard HC Deb 25 February 1901 vol 89 cc1145-66.} Sir Robert T. Reid MP believed that Britain would be condemned for

\begin{quote}
“taking the initiative, because so weak and absurd is the case for war between two civilised nations that if Parliament had had an opportunity of considering these grievances I do not believe that Parliament would have sanctioned the commencement of hostilities...”\footnote{Hansard HC Deb 31 January 1900 vol 78 c207.}
\end{quote}
Swift MacNeill’s MP description of the conflict as “a robber’s war”\textsuperscript{1080} reflected many members’ grievance towards the unequal battle. John Redmond MP, in response to comment made by Mr. Wyndham MP in the same debate, stated that, within the “civilised world”, “every nation in Europe except Turkey is against England in this war...”\textsuperscript{1081} As the war progressed and the camp system was established, commentary as to Britain’s “uncivilised” manner became more consistent. Referring to the scorched earth and concentration policy, John Dillon MP admitted that he had “never heard that any civilised nation has ever reverted to so barbarous a practice as capturing women and children by the thousand and detaining them as prisoners of war.”\textsuperscript{1082} Leader of the Opposition Henry Campbell-Bannerman MP had earlier asserted that “such a barbarous and inhuman practice was altogether outside the usages of civilised warfare” and “doubted very much if ever before such a thing had been done by a civilised people.”\textsuperscript{1083} Timothy Sullivan MP believed the “the civilised world would condemn the action of Great Britain, while the Boers had won for themselves immortal honour...” given that

\begin{quote}
“here was a nation with 40,000,000 of people embarking on a war with one of 200,000, and using all the might and resources of its empire to crush and subdue a noble, patriotic, and brave peasantry.”\textsuperscript{1084}
\end{quote}

Many references to the African population evoked the image of the colonial savage. Sir William Harcourt MP protested against any idea of Britain joining forces with African soldiers. He quoted Lord Chatham who has earlier protested against any “civilised alliance” with “the wild and inhuman savage of the woods, to delegate to the merciless Indian the defence of disputed rights, and to wage the horrors of his barbarous war against our brethren...”\textsuperscript{1085}

Despite reports of their support for Britain, many saw the arming of Africans as negative. One reason for opposing the war, Jasper Tully MP equated with “letting

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1080} Hansard HC Deb 19 February 1900 vol 79 c478.
\item \textsuperscript{1081} Hansard HC Deb 19 February 1900 vol 79 c480.
\item \textsuperscript{1082} Hansard HC Deb 26 February 1901 vol 89 c1240.
\item \textsuperscript{1083} Hansard HC Deb 27 July 1900 vol 86 c1628.
\item \textsuperscript{1084} Hansard HC Deb 16 February 1900 vol 79 c276.
\item \textsuperscript{1085} Hansard HC Deb 15 August 1901 vol 99 c980.
\end{itemize}
all hell loose” as the “natives” would then be “let loose on Christians, to carry the spirit of outrage of the worst and vilest kinds into the homes and families of these poor farmers who are defending their liberty.” Sir Wilfred Lawson MP assessed that “two Christian nations cutting each other’s throats while the heathen looks on” was “a grand spectacle to the world.” William Redmond MP exaggerated Lawson’s claims, questioning what effect the war would have on the “Native races”:

“Do you not think that they will not, sooner or later, break from the bonds which now hold them, and probably overrun not only your own possessions but the Transvaal as well?—and then you will have a Christian race fighting for their lives against the savages whose cause you now pretend to be fighting for.”

Though referring to the Africans as “savage tribes” Llewellyn Atherley-Jones MP acknowledged that British public policy was “to maintain the standard of civilisation and humanity which ought to belong to this country.” Atherley-Jones felt that this reputation would not be reflected given Britain’s penchant for “body-snatching and the desecration of tombs,” in reference to its previous campaign in Sudan. This is an example of movement from the African as savage and as civilised instead. John Gordon MP used the example of slavery to question the morality of the war. He stated that Britain was

“now fighting; the last great slave war—that is to say, we white men are trying to save the blacks, so that not only the Boers and British shall have equal liberty when our arms are thrown down, but that the civilised black shall also have that liberty for which he could not hope under the rule of the Dutch...”

Gordon here refers to the “black” population as civilised, indicating that at this point the civility of Britain was beginning to be questioned.

Though the discourse of “uncivilised” populations was prevalent during both wars, the proximity of the conflict in Bosnia to London and ‘civilised’ Europe distinguished

1086 Hansard HC Deb 19 February 1900 vol 79 c457.
1087 Hansard HC Deb 28 May 1900 vol 83 c1583.
1088 Hansard HC Deb 19 February 1900 vol 79 c405.
1089 Hansard HC Deb 05 June 1899 vol 72 c374.
1090 Ibid.
1091 Hansard HC Deb 06 December 1900 vol 88 c100.
its use in the 1990s from its use during the Boer War. In fact, Bosnia’s proximity to Europe only served to exacerbate the anomaly of an “uncivilised” population within European territory, given that “civilising influences in Europe had become so widespread” since the Second World War\(^\text{1092}\) thus making the conflict even more distinct. Referring to hopes of an early military intervention, Tony Banks MP declared that should it not occur, “we shall have to witness these people slaughtering each other, and that is disgraceful in a European country.”\(^\text{1093}\) Lord Craig of Radley (H.L.) remarked that “mankind only a few hundred miles from here can still pick a fight with neighbours.”\(^\text{1094}\) Each of these statements emphasises the strangeness of what was seen as fratricidal violence in Europe within proximity to Britain. Europe’s civilising process exacerbated the horror and backwardness of the parties involved, while simultaneously highlighting Britain’s civility given its repugnance at the situation. For this reason, the idea of “people slaughtering each other” was, for Tony Banks, “disgraceful in a European country.”\(^\text{1096}\)

John Major emphasised the “uncivilised” nature of the conflict by describing it as one which “does not seem to be susceptible to reason.”\(^\text{1097}\) This view was supported by Lord Meghnad Desai (H.L.) who described the war as the “grimmest picture of irrationality that has occurred, certainly in post-war Europe”, a feat more dramatic given the fact that “Yugoslavia was considered to be an ideal place and a prosperous and friendly country where multiculturalism was recognised.”\(^\text{1098}\) Douglas Hurd MP highlighted the emotive, and therefore politically unviable, aspects of the war stating that “the passions of politics prevail over consideration of their standard of living.”\(^\text{1099}\) This was quickly followed by Gerald Kaufman’s MP description of the siege of Dubrovnik, which took place from October 1991 to May 1992, as exemplary of the “savage and futile nature of the fighting in

\(^{1092}\) Seifert, op. cit. n. 95, p. 54.
\(^{1093}\) Hansard HC Deb 12 November 1991 vol 198 c914.
\(^{1094}\) Hansard HL Deb 07 May 1992 vol 537c91.
\(^{1096}\) Hansard HC Deb 12 November 1991 vol 198 c914.
\(^{1097}\) Hansard HC Deb 12 November 1991 vol 198 c905.
\(^{1098}\) Hansard HL Deb 09 March 1994 vol 552 c1448.
\(^{1099}\) Hansard HC Deb 01 November 1991 vol 198 c121.
David Clark found it difficult to “appreciate how neighbours who have lived amicably side by side for 45 years can now behave like animals towards one another.” This was another indication of how the situation was perceived, although Clark did acknowledge that relations between communities had been peaceful, unlike other members who espoused the notion of perpetual intra-group animosity. Cyril D. Townsend MP explicitly separated the Yugoslav population from Britain and the West when he advised his fellow members.

“As was the case with the previous discourse on ethnic and “racial” animosity, data supporting the discourse on “uncivilised” populations strengthens the concept of equivalency between parties involved in the conflict. The horror of the war meant that, according to Douglas Hurd MP, many people attempted to “over-simplify the truth.” He believed that

“It is much easier to make choices if one believes that there is nothing but virtue on one side and nothing but vice on the other. But making the choice easier by creating heroes and villains, when in fact the responsibility is shared, does not produce the right answer.”

This statement indicates how the government perceived the conflict, implying that all parties were equally responsible for the violence. This discourse, that the parties involved were “uncivilised”, again mitigated any one side’s responsibility and indicated that intervention would be futile. However, many shared opinions such as Robert Key’s MP who, as late as May 1995, stated that the war represented a religious and tribal war. Other members had throughout the war tried to counteract such opinions; Robin Cook quickly replied to Key, stating that the region’s ethnic differences were

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1100 Hansard HC Deb 01 November 1991 vol 198 c131.
1101 Hansard HC Deb 14 January 1993 vol 216 c1058.
1102 Hansard HC Deb 02 February 1993 vol 218 c301.
1103 Hansard HC Deb 9 May 1995 vol 259 c589.
1104 Hansard HC Deb 9 May 1995 vol 259 c629.
“slight and are not based on race or even language. They are based only on religion, but the Muslims in Bosnia are the least fundamentalist of any in the Islamic world.”

As was the case during the Boer War, consistent rebuttals of the ‘uncivilised populations’ discourse coincided with questions around Britain’s own civility. As early as July 1992, Lord Finsberg (H.L.) declared that Britain

“could have saved 90 per cent. of those who have died in Yugoslavia had any one of our civilised Western nations been prepared to take action at once when Yugoslavia, and more particularly, Serbia, decided to do what she did...”

According to Jane Sharpe, “the British government’s response to the suffering in Bosnia in 1992 was unworthy of a civilised nation in the late 20th century” and she questioned whether “any nation that has taken no action to stop the Serbian practice of ethnic cleansing could continue to call itself civilised...” mirroring the refocus of this discourse during the Boer War from the regional populations to the British government.

5.3.3. Analysis

While the previous discursive category placed responsibility of both the Boer and Bosnian Wars on the issue of ethnic and ‘racial’ animosity, this discourse fails to acknowledge the occurrence of cases of genocide and rape which fall outside of the thresholds of authenticity, thereby constituting the ‘Other’, by identifying the “uncivilised” local populations of the conflict regions as the source of violence. The identification within parliament of an ‘uncivilised party’ in each respective case primarily ensured a separation and distancing of the “uncivilised” from the civilised society Britain represented. This explains the use of imperialist rhetoric during both conflicts, including the Bosnian War, almost a century after the Boer War had taken place. The “uncivilised” nature of the populations in question also meant that the

1105 Hansard HC Deb 9 May 1995 vol 259 c596.
1107 Sharpe, op. cit. n. 968, pp. 1-5.
conflicts were inevitable, establishing a link between the present discourse and that
discussed previously.

The lack of civilised manner among the Boers has been colourfully illustrated in the
parliamentary data analysed and was a characteristic of the Social Darwinist
influenced public discourse of the time. The lack of civilisation in the Balkans
compared to the West, and in particular Britain, instantly transformed the region
and Yugoslavia into the European ‘Other’. The violence brought about by the
breakup of Yugoslavia defied the “civilising influences in Europe” which had
become “so widespread” at this time\textsuperscript{108} and therefore ran counter to civilised
Europe. Again, like the analysis presented for the previous discursive category, the
construction of the region “as a place where this happens” implied “that the
western ‘we’ is different because ‘we’ do not subscribe to this practice.”\textsuperscript{109} The
concept of equivalency was also used to indiscriminately explain the violence in this
regard, and though some members of parliament attempted to extrapolate
overwhelming Serb responsibility and eschew the derogation of the entire region’s
population, the plausibility of the discourse won over.

The emphasis on the populations’ “uncivilised” nature therefore ensures they are
framed as the ‘Other’, against the norm of what was civilised as defined by Britain.
Alternatively, using Berber’s aforementioned ‘centre-periphery’ argument, Bosnia
lay in contrast to the English “core” characterised “by the values of civilization.”\textsuperscript{110}
For example, as an “uncivilised” party in civilised Europe Bosnia’s population was,
according to the theoretical framework in use, precarious; their anti-normative
characteristics meant that they represented the exception. In another
interpretation of the theoretical framework, this means that crimes committed
become precarious too. This occurs in two ways. The first involves crimes which do
not adhere to the threshold of authenticity, or cases which do not conform to the
norms of what certain crimes should involved, as defined in this case by members

\textsuperscript{108} Seifert, \textit{op. cit.} n. 95, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{109} Hansen, \textit{op. cit.} n. 97, p. 61.
\textsuperscript{110} Berber, \textit{op. cit.} n. 783, p. 320.
of parliament. The second involves crimes which are carried out on precarious subjects. In this sense, these crimes which would be seen as crimes if committed against in this case civilised populations are non-entities through association with non-civilised populations.

Much of Butler’s work and concepts utilised in the framework and developed in the previous discourse’s analysis section are applicable here. The similarities between dialogue on ethnic and “racial” animosity and “uncivilised” populations means that the adapted concepts of iterability, which transforms this discourse into a normative discourse, for example, and historicity of terms can be utilised to describe this discourse in much the same way as the last was explained. The iterability of terms associated with “uncivilised” populations over the years, and during the conflicts, firstly legitimates the terms, even if they are not applicable. Like the previous discursive category, this iteration normalises this concept in relation to the respective regional groups. In the sense that this discourse has been repeated since the 1890s, normalising such labels within contexts ensures the category “uncivilised” populations are removed from the historicity, that is, “the history which has become internal to a name, has come to constitute the contemporary meaning of a name”\textsuperscript{1111}, that authentic cases of genocide and rape have. Michel Foucault describes the barbarian as ‘someone who can be understood, characterized, and defined only in relation to a civilization, and by the fact that he exists outside it’\textsuperscript{1112} Lal notes that the phrase ‘primordial conflicts’ and terms such as those mentioned above are easily available to people, including members of Parliament, who “are predisposed to viewing certain conflicts, whether in the Balkans or in Africa, as not merely intractable but as opaque to the enlightened West.”\textsuperscript{1113} These views help to explain the use of imperialist language and labels in debates during these particular conflicts.

\textsuperscript{1111} Butler, op. cit. n. 43, p. 36.
The iterability, or constrained repetition, of terms associated with incivility and social backwardness during the conflicts legitimates the terms, even when as was the case with both the Boer and Bosnian Wars they were not applicable. In other words, the presence of this discursive category in parliamentary dialogue during both wars indicates that the “reality” of genocide and rape within parliament “is performatively constituted through an imitation that sets itself up as the origin and the ground of all imitations.”1114 This supports Gearóid Ó’Tuathail’s argument in respect to the Bosnian War, but which can be applied to the Boer War also, that the “discursive designators” of the region were drawn from a “western imaginary geography” centring on concepts such as “mindless slaughter.”1115 In conclusion, this discursive category guarantees the precariousness of, and denies the authenticity of cases of, genocide and rape by portraying the populations of the respective regions as the inherently barbaric and violent ‘Other’.

5.4. Conflicts without precedent

5.4.1. Background

The third prominent discourse amongst member of parliament which featured during both wars, and offered an explanation for Britain’s actions during them, was that both wars were without precedent. In this sense many members during the timeframes in question argued that both conflicts represented watersheds in terms of military strategy and action. As stated from the outset of this thesis, both the Boer War and the Bosnian War were unique conflicts in the context of their respective eras. Both represented a new type of warfare atypical to what had been experienced prior. The Boer War represented one juncture of the age of imperialism, the proliferation of mainstream hierarchies of gender and race, and the sciences and supremacist rhetoric which emphasised the idea of purity and

1114 Butler, op. cit. n. 237, p. 128.
1115 Ó’Tuathail, op. cit. n. 779, p. 172.
health of the body politic, which conflicted with the civilising process espoused during the Victorian era. The Bosnian War represented the abuse and ignorance of human rights by both perpetrators of violence and the international community respectively in a post-cold war world which seemingly epitomised humanitarianism and respect of the individual. The importance of this discursive category is that it allowed Britain to react as it did because no precedent for action in the face of such conflicts had previously been set. This impacted on discourses of genocide and genocidal rape because, as unique conflicts, the Boer War and the Bosnian War did not fit the paradigms already established, requiring and prompting new reactionary frameworks thereafter.

According to a widely held view among European leaders and legal scholars humanitarian rights, espoused on the continent to shield prisoners of war and civilian populations from the effects of war, did not extend to non-European populations in dependent territories. The colonies were spaces of exception from European law. This made it possible to test and develop strategies of warfare that were outlawed in Europe in the colonies.\textsuperscript{1116} Despite this, the Boer War was crucially framed within an altruistic framework once Britain gained military advantage. The main focus of this positive spin on the war was put on the concentration camp system, which in this discursive context attempted to highlight Britain’s heroism in its efforts to provide shelter and safety for the region’s civilians. Spierenburg notes that since “prisons appeared on the scene as an alternative to corporal and capital punishments, according to these authors' story, they were useful institutions that deserved to be applauded by everyone.”\textsuperscript{1117} A similar logic was used during the Boer War, during the initial stages of the concentration camp development, which was established to contain, rather than punish. As noted in earlier chapters, the camp system was, for government members, not only a form of protection for the Boers, but also a facility through which it could be ‘civilised.’

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1116} Mühlhahn, \textit{op. cit.} n. 419. p. 547.
\end{flushright}
The suggestion that Bosnia, at least, was a watershed conflict was supported by Riikka Kuusisto’s work which describes Bosnia as anything but a normal war. This abnormality was evident in the complexity of the fighting, but mostly because the war represented the first post-Cold war conflict on the continent. When war broke out in 1992, “no clear precedent had been set for post-Cold War humanitarian interventions…” It has been argued that European organisations “lacked the mandate, experience, and structures to cope with it since they were designed to handle interstate conflicts” and, more explicitly, that no convenient precedent had been established for international organisations to follow. In essence, neither war was ‘normal’ in terms of what had preceded it, although they were compared to, whether rightly or not, previous anomalies of warfare, for example, the American-Spanish War, and the Holocaust. For many members of parliament who saw the breakup of Yugoslavia as containing elements of both a war of secession and a civil war “only added to the difficulty of forming objective judgments.” This discursive category would not have helped the progression of discourses on genocide and rape because of the conflicts’ and therefore the crimes’ anomalous nature in these cases.

5.4.2. Data

According to William Redmond MP, the nineteenth century had “seen such mighty advances in regard to humanity and inventions in every direction…” However, the “un-Christian” war Britain was waging against the Boers nullified these developments. At the outset of the Boer War ST Evans MP alluded to the fact that however justified the war may be, it would “inevitably be an inglorious and an ignoble one” and one which “even a great and mighty Empire like ours cannot win

1121 Owen, op. cit. n. 861, p. 3.
1122 Hansard HC Deb 19 February 1900 vol 79 c405.
with impunity."\(^{1123}\) A more dominant attitude in parliament amongst government members was that the war, especially with the advent of the camp system, was carried out by Britain “in a very gentlemanly fashion”\(^{1124}\) with the end result that Britain had not only won the war, but also gained a favourable reputation, according to itself of course, by protecting the Boer dependable. The ‘success’ of the camp policy was reiterated by many in the debates. First Lord of the Treasury AJ Balfour MP also emphasised Britain’s generosity in this regard, in that it supported the whole civil population of the colonies which, it was hoped, would help alleviate the perceived difficulties of Kitchener’s tenure in the colonies.\(^{1125}\)

The idea that the government was facing an unprecedented ‘crisis’ in the midst of a unique war, seemed to them at least to galvanise the fact that they could do no wrong and only set a precedent as none had been previously set with which to follow. This point was made in parliament by Arthur Lee MP who stated that the term ‘unprecedented’

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\text{“had a very comforting and conclusive sound to those who had not studied history, or to those who, like the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down, knew the history, but preferred to regard it either in the light of an inconvenient witness or as a partisan ally.”}^{1126}
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However, this innovative policy brought a price. Amongst the ideas promulgated was that of charging the Boers a fee for their protection. Chamberlain was one supporter of this scheme, stating in parliament that “the cost of keeping the women and children in the camps should be made a charge on the burghers.”\(^{1127}\) This was rationalised by virtue of the fact that Britain had done “a very important thing” and that the Boer population, especially the fighting burghers could not expect to take advantage of this generosity “without some pecuniary loss.”\(^{1128}\) The potential policy naturally met with some opposition, especially among the pro-Boer...
Irish nationalists. John Dillon MP felt that it was wrong to impose a charge for the sole purpose of “undoing the ravages—the barbarous and purposeless ravages, of the British Generals in South Africa” of the scorched earth policy.\textsuperscript{1129} All in all, the camp system met with opposition too. Charles Brown MP argued against any idea that the “camps represented a gentlemanly method of warfare” though his claims and those of others about the conditions of the camps were lies according to Austin Hopkinson MP.\textsuperscript{1130}

The Bosnian War was a similarly unique conflict for which no precedent had been established. Lord Pym (H.L.) described post-communist Europe as “a very sick man and in need of intensive treatment.”\textsuperscript{1131} Secretary of State for Defence Malcolm Rifkind MP regretted that the end of the Cold War had brought not “international harmony but an extraordinary outburst of some of the most cruel and vicious conflicts—including the first on our own European continent—since the end of the second world war.”\textsuperscript{1132} Douglas Hurd MP however had a different view. Proclaiming his dislike of the “pretentious” phrase “a new world order” he recognised the new conflicts across the globe as “ancient disorders fanned into a new blaze by factions and extreme nationalism” adding that the only thing new was “our awareness of it.”\textsuperscript{1133} He did however admit to a change in “the nature of foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{1134} This change meant that

\begin{quote}
“Few choices are now absolute between good and evil. There is no longer that which President Reagan called an evil empire. There is no longer the likelihood of a world war. In my judgement, although this is more controversial, we are not likely often to see one sovereign state invading another, as Iraq invaded Kuwait.”\textsuperscript{1135}
\end{quote}

Hurd had echoed ST Evans’ aforementioned comments at the outset of the war when he declared his pessimism about

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1129}Hansard HC Deb 15 April 1902 vol 106 c299.
\item \textsuperscript{1130}Hansard HC Deb 15 March 1937 vol 321 cc1742-1743.
\item \textsuperscript{1131}Hansard HL Deb 14 July 1992 vol 539 c153.
\item \textsuperscript{1132}Hansard HC Deb 25 September 1992 vol 212 c183.
\item \textsuperscript{1133}Hansard HC Deb 29 April 1993 vol 223 cc1175-76.
\item \textsuperscript{1134}Hansard HC Deb 9 May 1995 vol 259 c589.
\item \textsuperscript{1135}Hansard HC Deb 9 May 1995 vol 259 c589.
\end{itemize}
“the next six months in Yugoslavia. The way in which the country has disintegrated is clearly a disaster for its people. The peoples of Yugoslavia could not be held together by force, and the attempt to keep something together by consent was wrecked. The result is the unleashing of destructive hatred on a scale which will not be easily or quickly checked. It certainly cannot be halted from outside...”

Because the post-Cold War world ushered in dramatic political changes, resulting in many instances in the rise of nationalism, the majority of conflicts became inter and not intra state. This was another new aspect the Bosnian War brought and one which was used to good effect by the British government to avoid military intervention. The reasoning behind this decision was that there were limits in such instances to what outsiders could do.\(^{1137}\) Douglas Hogg reiterated this stance claiming that the government “did not think it right...to deploy ground troops in a combat rule because this was and is a civil war” and as was the unanimous view, civil wars could not “be resolved by the application of external force.”\(^{1138}\)

The view that the war could not be halted from outside reveals the impact of the first two discourses and their neat connections with the “unprecedented” nature of the conflict. Much has been written of the West’s affinity for the traditional image of the Former Yugoslavia, “defined by the “brotherhood and unity”” and which influenced many debates, opinions and policies which emphasised the preservation of the federation, rather than support the birth of new nations.\(^{1139}\) Confusion regarding the origins and responsibility for the war acquitted Britain, and indeed other states, from proaction. As David Clark MP from South Shields suggested,

> “the situation is Bosnia is very complicated. If it had been easy, we all know that the problem would have been solved. But the problem is there, and is not going to go away. The role of the UN has not always been understood, so the role of UNPROFOR and our troops has not always been understood.”\(^{1140}\)

In this sense, Britain was at an apparent disadvantage in terms of decided which steps to take to end the war. The fact that no certainties could be drawn from the
war, meant that no clear mandate could be drawn, and that meant in turn that Britain could not possibly be at fault for what ensued and for not intervening.

This was welcomed by those who were reluctant to intervene. As was outlined in earlier chapters, many members felt that to enter into the Bosnian War would result in a quagmire. Entry

“would have tied the mighty Western powers down in an endless and brutal war where superiority in weapons technology or volume meant nothing and where the originally clear objectives easily got tangled up in the web of insanity.”

As well as this, an intervention which was not quick, clear and simple would inevitably result in huge costs in terms of finance, resources, and lives. This was condoned by Rifkind. He countered the popular opinion that responsibility should be “shared by the west as a whole or by the United Nations or by NATO” with the fact that responsibility for the war rested “with those within former Yugoslavia who have initiated the conflict...” This reiterated the notion that this was a watershed conflict in terms of the post-cold war world, and that Britain, and it must be mentioned other states, had no clear mandate to intervene. This was a neat and useful way to avoid what the government saw as a potential quagmire but it therefore also emphasised the concept of equivalence in the war, mitigating any possibility that genocide and genocidal rape was taking place.

5.4.3. Analysis

While the previous two discursive categories dealt predominantly with the labelling of groups and crimes, this category is concerned exclusively with the nature of the conflicts in question. It emphasises the point that both conflicts were new and distinct from others which had occurred prior. Essentially, this discourse fails to acknowledge the occurrence of cases of genocide and rape outside of the

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1142 Hansard HC Deb 09 May 1995 vol 259 c645.
thresholds of authenticity by placing both conflicts outside normative frames making them precarious in their own right. This is another observation which corresponds with the idea that this thesis is not looking at these lives as ungrievable; rather, it is looking at these particular cases as ungrievable because they emanate from abnormal contexts. While the precariousness Butler speaks of refers to the precariousness of lives, here it refers to entities which are the antithesis of the norms of recognition, of expectation and quintessentially become an unrecognisable ‘Other’. The view that both the Boer and Bosnian Wars were watershed conflicts which had no precedent allowed Britain to plead ignorance at the respective situations, and formulate new and innovative policies to cope, as was the case in the Boer War, or to-and-fro regarding intervention as occurred during the Bosnian War.

Essentially, because these wars were not normative wars meant that they were instantly transformed into the ‘Other’. As was evident in the discussion of the two previous discourses, this affected discourses towards those involved, and also how policy was framed in terms of logistics and British responsibility for intervening and taking action. Because both wars, and their subjects, were already positioned outside normative frames, thresholds of authenticity could not be applied because they did not relate to crimes committed during these anomalous conflicts. With this particular discourse, established discussions on genocide and rape could not be altered because they were not applicable. Discourses disseminate norms but because there were no authorised discourses for these new wars, old and established discourses had to be used demonstrating that these were non-normative wars. Since recognition, or “social existence”, is what precarious subjects lack, these wars therefore became precarious. As has been noted previously, precariousness details “that life requires various social and economic conditions to be met in order to be sustained as a life.” Since these wars were unique, represented new eras in warfare, and were simply without precedent, they could not and did not meet the “social and economic conditions” which would have

\[\text{Butler, op. cit. n. 9, p. 14.}\]
merited a different perspective. This in effect derealised what occurred because both the Boer War and the Bosnian War lacked a discursive category by which they could be properly explained.

In essence, neither war was ‘normal’ in terms of what had preceded it, although they were compared to, whether rightly or not, previous anomalies of warfare, for example, the American-Spanish War, and the Holocaust. In another sense, because these conflicts did not represent normative conflicts, they also failed to meet the threshold of authenticity of a war, or genocide, that could be intervened in accordingly. Prior to the Boer War, the American-Hispanic War set the standard, while the Holocaust was the established standard bearer by the time the Bosnian War commenced. In essence these case conflicts resided outside of what was framed as a normal war. In comparison, the Boer War and the Bosnian War were the ‘Other’.

Moreover, because they were unique, both wars lacked historicity, although they arguably developed a historicity of their own. The performativity and therefore the normalcy of war is lacking in this particular discourse because, since both wars lack precedent, they are different and new. Both destabilised established discourses on war outside of parliament. However, within parliament the application of normative discourses of conflict to understand both wars and justify British actions was evident. Therefore, when it became evident that established discourses and their associated norms did not fit, the conflicts were reduced to something else, that is, something not normal. The reasons parliament resorted to using the same discourses to comment on the Boer War and Bosnian War and justify British responses to both will be outlined in the discussion on the following two discursive categories. This particular discursive category guarantees the precariousness of, and denies the authenticity of cases of, genocide and rape by simply placing both conflicts outside the established norms of conflict, instantly transforming them into the inherently different ‘Other’.
5.5. Britain as a world leader

5.5.1. Background

Britain’s dominance on the global stage during the nineteenth century has been discussed in detail in chapter three. It was “the power in paramount position in the concert of nations from the late eighteenth century.”\textsuperscript{1144} However, the main points of this dominance which explain Britain’s role as a world leader and the formation of the discourse of superiority must be reiterated here in order to establish why it reacted as it did during both conflicts. The success of Britain’s modus operandi during the nineteenth century led to “the Victorian’s project to export its own ‘civilisation’ to the world.”\textsuperscript{1145} As seen earlier, this was the case, in part, during the Boer War. Yet this exportation could not take place without the view of Britain’s civilisation as being explicitly superior. The promulgation of Social Darwinist ideas regarding the fitness of society and cleansing the body politic, thus promoting certain perceptions of gender, race, and class hierarchies in a bid to assert moral righteousness and to work towards the supposed greater good of the dominant society in question, was therefore important.

As stated previously, historian Niall Ferguson maintains that

“Victorian missionaries had an absolute confidence that it was their role to bring the values of Christianity and commerce to the same ‘people around the world’ to whom Mr. Blair wishes to bring ‘democracy and freedom.’”\textsuperscript{1146}

By the time the Bosnian War had started, Britain was no longer the global force it once was. Decolonisation, the end of the cold war and economic recession had eroded its real power. However, as Hodge as already argued, the post-communist era offered Britain the choice of “settling for the status of a middle-rating European

\textsuperscript{1145} Ferguson, \textit{op. cit.} n. 856, p. 365.
\textsuperscript{1146} Ibid.
power commensurate with its economic performance” or working to “retain its long-enjoyed world power status.”\textsuperscript{1147} Britain’s colonial legacy had endowed her with a reputation to uphold, as well as military experience and capability which made her a potent player. However, Britain identified with this only when it made sense to. With regard to Bosnia,

“The specific responsibility of Britain as the leading military and diplomatic power (alongside France) within the EC was generally bypassed in favour of assertions about a wider collective responsibility of Europe, the UN Security Council, or the ‘international Community’, or even specific American responsibility.”\textsuperscript{1148}

However, others criticised Britain’s silent stance towards Bosnia. While it may have been as an attempt to forge a new era of consensus politics, it has also been seen as lazy and lacking will. Sharpe iterated this when claiming that though

“Britannia may no longer rule the waves, or even sustain a healthy economy, but few countries have better trained or more efficient military forces, or are as well placed to exercise leadership on issues of security in Europe.”\textsuperscript{1149}

Though Sharpe admits that “Britain could have done little on her own to end the war” the experience and capabilities she boasted meant she was not incapable of taking “the initiative to set up a UN trusteeship for Bosnia until that country was ready for self-government.”\textsuperscript{1150}

\subsection*{5.5.2. Data}

British dominance in Southern Africa could not exist without peace in Southern Africa, and vice versa. Britain’s war campaign in the region was based on a number of premises, many of which were abandoned or forgotten soon after war broke out, and which were subsequently redeployed only when politically convenient. The plight of the British Uitlanders, as explained above, was one such premise, and was

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1147} Hodge \textit{op. cit.} n. 787, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{1148} Kent, \textit{op. cit.} n. 59, p. 302.
\item \textsuperscript{1149} Sharpe, \textit{op. cit.} n. 968, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{1150} Ibid., p. 2.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
particularly potent in the early stages of the call to arms because of its disregard for British superiority in the region. Chamberlain made a belligerent declaration of intent, noteworthy for its certainty that such an injustice would not be repeated:

“Never again, with our consent, while we have the power, shall the Boers be able to erect in the heart of South Africa a citadel from whence proceed disaffection and race animosities. Never again shall they be able to endanger the paramountcy of Great Britain. Never again shall they be able to treat an Englishman as if he belonged to an inferior race...”

James Paulton MP regarded the war as one not of aggression but of defence “against invasion of territory” and “in defence of our supremacy in South Africa.” Henry Labouchere MP was one member who disagreed with Prime Minister Lord Salisbury’s objective “to show the supremacy of England over the white races” because “to claim supremacy over a race that are in a majority in South Africa...simply because they are born of Dutch instead of Anglo-Saxon parents” proved problematic for some. In any case, Chamberlain’s statement that the “subordination and subjection of British subjects in the Transvaal to the ruling race endangers our position as the paramount Power in South Africa” implied that the suffering of the Uitlanders also involved the subordination of Britain and its reputation.

As has been discussed in earlier chapters, for many Britons the Boer population represented the antithesis of a civilised nation as embodied by Britain. One dimension of the war lobby focused on this and the civilising mission which the war would represent. For Sir Andrew Agnew MP, the conflict’s early skirmishes embodied Britain’s civilised ideals. In February 1901 he declared that the humanity with which the war had been conducted would be one feature of the conflict which would satisfy most observers:

“There has been nothing done on our side to make it more difficult for Briton and Boer to settle down side by side in peace and tranquility. No doubt there have been stories told of atrocities committed by our officers and men, but whenever these stories have been

1151 Hansard HC Deb 05 February 1900 vol 78 c622.
1152 Hansard HC Deb 25 October 1899 vol 77 c624.
1153 Hansard HC Deb 25 October 1899 vol 77 c633.
1154 Hansard HC Deb 28 July 1899 vol 75 cc686-791.
investigated they have turned out to be calumnies. We have not only the testimony of Lord Roberts that the bravery of our troops in the field was only equalled by their humanity and generosity to the people of the occupied States, but we have the admission of those who fought against us that our soldiers in South Africa have shown that war instead of brutalising men may ennable them...

Britain’s military strength was under no question in Parliament, with many opposition members and those opposed to the war quick to denounce the use of Britain’s superior forces against lesser defences. Swift MacNeill MP recognised that Britain’s force “will number close upon 75,000 men, and when it is remembered that its purpose is to crush a population...” Fred Maddison MP shared MacNeill’s views, stating that “these wretched Boers are entirely at your mercy; you can and you will crush them...” Earlier, John Dillon MP illustrated the inequality of the sides in terms of power when he outlined the conflict as “The British Empire against 30,000 farmers” while Michael Davitt MP described it as a “a war of a giant against a dwarf.” For others, such opposition to the war from both inside and outside Britain only served to highlight the superior strength Britain boasted. This was exemplified by Sir William Harcourt MP who, late in the war, declared that

“We are told that the proof of our greatness is the extent to which we are hated...If for individuals or states to be hated is the real proof of greatness, then no doubt, we are the greatest people in the world...”

Others were humoured at the difference in strength between the warring parties. The Marquess of Lansdowne, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice (H.L.), found “ironical” the fact that Britain,

“the greatest maritime Power in the world, find ourselves at war with two little States which do not own a boat’s crew between them, and which are consequently invulnerable by our powerful Navy. We are in the position of a strong man fighting with his right arm tied behind his back...”

1155 Hansard HC Deb 14 February 1901 vol 89 c79.
1156 Hansard HC Deb 20 October 1899 vol 77 c399.
1157 Hansard HC Deb 20 October 1899 vol 77 c400.
1158 Hansard HC Deb 28 July 1899 vol 75 cc686-791.
1159 Hansard HC Deb 17 October 1899 vol 77 c122.
1160 Hansard HC Deb 21 January 1902 vol 101 c485.
1161 Hansard HL Deb 12 February 1900 vol 78 c1173.
James Bryce MP endorsed the campaign by claiming that Britain should make its strength manifest to the world\textsuperscript{1162}, and by repeating the Roman maxim that “Empire is preserved by the same arts by which it has been acquired.”\textsuperscript{1163} Such was Britain’s military dominance that Ashmead-Bartlett MP illustrated the confidence with which many held the British campaign in, when he affirmed on the outbreak of war that “When the House re-assembles in February next the war will probably be over and the terms of peace arranged.”\textsuperscript{1164} But, by the end of 1899 when the war broke out, the outlook had changed. Colonel Arthur Brookfield MP proposed that the Empire could not face a more formidable foe than the Boer given that the military had “to strain every nerve and go to the very last of our military resources to face a struggle with a second or third rate Power...”\textsuperscript{1165}

The war was also seen as a necessity. Cecil Norton MP believed that if Britain was to remain

\begin{quote}
“the greatest commercial nation of the world, and maintain command of the seas, we cannot do so without great risk of expansion of our Empire, in order to neutralise the expansion which other nations seek”,
\end{quote}

despite what he saw as the Government’s failure to adequately prepare the military for such a campaign.\textsuperscript{1166} Moreover, a military campaign in the Southern African colonies would also afford Britain the opportunity to further strengthen her military recourses. Colonel Thomas Sandys MP saw the war as a chance “for preparing the means of saving the country from future disaster” in a monologue befitting the Social Darwinist discourse of the time.\textsuperscript{1167} However, his opinion that this opportunity would allow the country to “get our house in order” while it had been given “breathing time” embodied Britain’s confidence as well as its naivety in how the war would progress. Once Britain found itself on the military back foot, others raised concerns as to why the army were allowed to mobilise despite its now

\textsuperscript{1162} Hansard HC Deb 02 February 1900 vol 78 c472.
\textsuperscript{1163} Hansard HC Deb 02 February 1900 vol 78 c471.
\textsuperscript{1164} Hansard HC Deb 25 October 1899 vol 77 c601.
\textsuperscript{1165} Hansard HC Deb 31 January 1900 vol 78 c201.
\textsuperscript{1166} Hansard HC Deb 16 February 1900 vol 79 c255.
\textsuperscript{1167} Hansard HC Deb 12 February 1900 vol 78 c1322.
obvious inadequacies. J. F. Hope MP opined that despite the strengths embodied by British soldiers’ bravery, transport system, and colonies’ loyalty, the war “revealed our weakness in our military organisation, in our military education, and, perhaps, in our constitutional machinery itself...”\footnote{Hansard HC Deb 06 December 1900 vol 88 c103.}

Any degree of compromise Britain showed in the face of inferior enemies was deemed to represent weakness and failure. Likewise, any calls for peace made by opposition members as well as Irish nationalists were ignored initially for fear not only of Boer threats to Uitlanders and the wellbeing of the African population, but also because, according to the Marquess of Granby MP, the desire for peace, if “it is pressed beyond a certain point the word peace becomes a synonym for weakness.”\footnote{Hansard HL Deb 17 October 1899 vol 77 c6.} Such attempts to influence parliamentary opinion on the war, failed to convince some members. CP Scott MP was one who expressed his opposition to this idea, claiming that the supreme weakness of a statesman was “the fear to seem weak.” He stated that it “requires courage to look the facts fairly and fully in the face and deal with them, not according to the exigencies of party,”\footnote{Hansard HC Deb 19 February 1901 vol 89 c524.} adding to the burgeoning criticism against the government and its campaign. Soon after, Francis Mildmay MP admitted that Britain’s camp initiative must, ironically “be regarded abroad as a sign of weakness.” What is important about this observation is that Mildmay admitted that he was “one of the strongest supporters” of the government’s war policy but was gradually become “sincerely desirous of understanding the position which the Government takes up in the matter.”\footnote{Hansard HC Deb 20 March 1902 vol 105 c606.}

Though the global political scene and Britain’s own status had changed immensely by the time the Bosnian War commenced, Britain’s role as a global power was still frequently acknowledged. By the war’s end, Sir Patrick Cormack MP had reaffirmed Britain’s leading role in parliament, stating that its reputation was “priceless”:

\footnotetext[1168]{Hansard HC Deb 06 December 1900 vol 88 c103.}
\footnotetext[1169]{Hansard HL Deb 17 October 1899 vol 77 c6.}
\footnotetext[1170]{Hansard HC Deb 19 February 1901 vol 89 c524.}
\footnotetext[1171]{Hansard HC Deb 20 March 1902 vol 105 c606.}
“One of the things that has made Britain a great country—I believe that it is a great country—is the fact that it has been through the centuries a safe haven for those who have fled from desperate regimes and terrible conditions...one is talking of people who have suffered desperately, for whom Britain is a beacon. Why is it a beacon? It is because of the standards and values that they believe that we encapsulate and personify.”

During the conflict, Britain, who had since the Boer War seen its Empire and perhaps its global authority crumble, relied on this discursive category to increase its stature. This was encapsulated by an article written by Hurd which appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* on New Year’s Day, 1992. In it, Hurd described Britain’s status on the world stage:

“In recent years, Britain has punched above her weight in world affairs. We intend to keep it that way...Britain plays a central role in world affairs. We owe this in part to our history, but we continue to earn it through active diplomacy and a willingness to shoulder our share of international responsibilities.”

This passage reflects Hurd’s pride at Britain’s work and standing among the international community. However, other accounts portray a power lacking in will to solve the problem. An account provided by journalist Ed Vulliamy demonstrates this point. He cites one US State Department official remarking that he “learned to treat Britain as a hostile power...it was like having the Russians around. Britain was prepared to block anything...” despite the fact that US support for intervention was negligible at the best of times. Debate transcripts support the notion that the present discourse was of value to the Major government. Robert Key MP saluted the overall reaction to the war, stating that tens of thousands of lives were saved thanks to UN operations, with British participation, going so far as to say that “British Army doctrine is leading the world” in the area of peacekeeping/buffering. In contrast to the forces of the Boer War, the military in the late 1990s were, according to Tony Marlow MP, “unequalled and envied

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1172 Hansard HC Deb 15 July 1996 vol 281 cc857-858.
1173 Hurd, *op. cit.* n. 809.
1174 Vulliamy, *op. cit.* n. 885, p. 82.
1175 Hansard HC Deb 09 May 1995 vol 259 c628: “Whether one calls what the British forces have been doing a “peacekeeping” or “buffer” role is academic: the fact remains that British Army doctrine is leading the world in that area.”
throughout the world.” Nicholas Soames MP emphasised this point when stating that

“President Chirac should make it plain to a wider public in France that he intends the French forces to be restructured along the lines of our existing British forces. No greater compliment could be paid to the British armed forces.”

These same forces were the vehicle with which Britain was administering humanitarian relief which Hurd described in November 1991 as “increasingly necessary.”

However, the escalation of the war prompted Malcolm Wicks to state that “just two hours flying time from London,” could be found “experiences that mock our pretensions about the strengths of collective security in Europe.” The worsening situation called for what Sir Michael Neubert MP termed “a strong Anglo-American alliance”, a successful formula proven during the twentieth century “for defending freedom from ruthless aggressors.” He compared this strategy to the “mirage” of attempting “to secure agreement and joint action among 12 European nations.” On the contrary, John Home Robertson MP saw the problem Bosnia presented as a European one, albeit one that was stopped by “an American-led solution.” Lord Beloff (H.L.) stated that “it might have been better if Britain and France had been a little firmer in insisting on a uniformity of approach to the problems of Yugoslavia.” However, such an alliance had been countered by Douglas Hogg MP who earlier had claimed that the European Community did not have a role to play.

1176 Hansard HC Deb 05 March 1996 vol 273 c140.
1177 Ibid.
1178 Hansard HC Deb 01 November 1991 vol 198 c121.
1179 Hansard HC Deb 9 May 1995 vol 259 c634.
1180 Hansard HC Deb 12 May 1993 vol 224 c792.
1181 Ibid.
1182 Hansard HC Deb 18 January 1996 vol 269 c956.
1183 Hansard HL Deb 07 May 1992 vol 537 c85.
1184 Hansard HC Deb 22 May 1991 vol 191 c920.
5.5.3. Analysis

This category and that which follows, which discuss Britain’s role as a world leader and potential victim respectively, established the contexts in which the wars were framed. This particular discourse is closely associated with the first two discourses, that of ethnic and ‘racial animosity and “uncivilised” populations, because it espouses the racial inferiority of the Boer population and the social inferiority of the population of the Balkans based on late nineteenth-century norms on race and class. Ultimately, this declaration of British superiority implied an instant ‘Othering’ of the Boer and Bosnian communities, and thus fails to acknowledge the occurrence of cases of genocide and rape outside of the thresholds of authenticity. While the previous discursive categories looked at how Britain framed foreign populations and conflicts, this and the following category look at how Britain framed itself during both conflicts. This takes into account the performativity of members of parliament and most importantly how the wars were framed from Britain’s point of view. This particular discourse emphasises the special regard that Britain was held in by many members, that of the consummate world leader. While it is more apparent why this view was held during the Boer War, the data above indicates that this view was held by many members during the Bosnian War as well. This view, so late in the twentieth century when Britain’s role and the world political stage had changed so much, impacted severely on how the Bosnian War was viewed, as well as reactions to it and the crimes which took place there. British interests were paramount as was, for many members, sustaining its role and reputation as a world leader.

Governments and states want to be perceived in the positive image they present themselves. As van Dijk has noted,

“parliaments are the typical sites of national rhetoric. Self-glorification in comparison to other nations, is routine, especially in large countries such as ...Great Britain...”

1185 Van Dijk, op. cit. n. 168, p. 36.
The data above demonstrates that self-glorification was an important part of Britain’s rhetorical reactions to and political strategy towards both the Boer War and Bosnian War. In essence, the reason this particular discourse is important is because of image and prestige. To proclaim genocide was taking place would have negated any support or approval for the stance the government took in both conflicts. It is at this point that this particular discourse connects with the previous categories. It is argued that Britain’s view of the wars originating as a result of ethnic animosity between “uncivilised” populations gave it freedom to not only institute itself as a civilised power in comparison, but to therefore influence policy regarding these conflicts.

While the age of empire had gone, Tony Blair’s speech quoted at the outset of this thesis espouses superiority and more importantly the performativity of superiority in the contemporary era. The reiteration of British superiority within parliamentary circles was important from the point of view of the public, as well as members of the houses. For example, polls indicated a significant increase in the people’s willingness to perceive their country as a world power. Overall, this discursive category guarantees the precariousness of, and denies the authenticity of cases of, genocide and rape by establishing Britain (and the West) as the established Self, thereby denigrating and ‘Othering’ the respective regions and their populations, thereby acting in a similar way as the first two discursive categories.

5.6. Britain as a potential victim

5.6.1. Background

While the last section explored the discourse of Britain as a world leader over the course of the twentieth century, this discourse examines its role as a potential

1188 Shiraev & Sobel, op. cit. n. 783, p. 295.
victim during both conflicts. The present discursive category often featured simultaneously with the latter, providing Britain with a justification for avoiding any commitment its military strength and recognition of genocide might entail. This was evident upon reflection of Britain’s entry into war in Southern Africa. The campaign was launched as a result of lobbying based on both Britain’s might and right to rule the colonies, and the threat facing the British Uitlanders and therefore Britain from the Boer community. It later became more pertinent when Boer forces won the war’s opening skirmishes, forcing Britain to rethink its perceived military strength and the new threat it faced. Hostilities in Bosnia had the potential to spread and threaten the stability of Europe as a whole. Britain and the EC faced a significant threat should the violence not be contained. For some, this threat was unrealistic in a post-Cold War world. Sharpe uses the examples of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to illustrate that previously, intervention could have risked nuclear conflict. She argued that intervention in Yugoslavia did not carry this same risk, as opposed to non-intervention to stop the spread of the violence.\footnote{Sharpe, op. cit. n. 968, p. 5.} However it has been argued that intervention would only take place if security interests were under threat.\footnote{Hansen, op. cit. n. 97, p. 61.} This statement runs counter to the presence of this particular discursive category, which ultimately espoused the fact that Britain was under threat by virtue of the activities in the respective regions. This can be explained by the fact that this discursive category, in acknowledging the threat presented by the breakup of Yugoslavia, was used to justify non-intervention. For many, it was felt that the situation would worsen given the difference from the late-nineteenth century in terms of empire, geopolitical structures and so forth. In the case of Bosnia, as Hansen has already pointed out, intervention “in defence of the Bosnian government and Bosnian women would not live up to the requirements of a sound foreign policy.”\footnote{Ibid.}
5.6.2. Data

As stated previously, the Boer War was originally conducted under the premise that the British Uitlander, and therefore Britain, was under threat from the increasingly belligerent Boer community. It has already been detailed how this premise declined in importance as the war escalated and as other reasons, including the surprise strength of the Boer forces came to the fore. However, parliamentary debates reveal that a threat to Britain’s global hegemony remained ever present. Ashmead-Bartlett MP believed the war had been “forced on the country by a great Boer conspiracy” which had “for its object the destruction of British supremacy in South Africa and the establishment of a Dutch supremacy.”1192 Notwithstanding the ill-treatment of British subjects in the colonies, the other main risk the government initially claimed Britain was facing was the spread of discontent which would upset the stability and its hegemony in the region. This was confirmed by Chamberlain MP who in July 1899 identified that the Transvaal was “the course of poison” which could not “be prevented from spreading across the border into adjoining colonies...”1193

Some members opposed to the war shared this opinion though it was later ascertained that Britain faced a different risk and danger should it go to war. In the same debate, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman MP stated his belief that

“war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars that could possibly be waged. It would be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly war, and, as I have pointed out already, it would leave behind it impressions of strife which, I believe, generations would hardly be able to blot out...”1194

However, Campbell-Bannerman also alluded to Chamberlain’s earlier notion that the tense relations between the Uitlanders and the Transvaal government represented “a constant source of danger to the peace and prosperity of all the

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1192 Hansard HC Deb 20 October 1899 vol 77 cc469-470.
1193 Hansard HC Deb 28 July 1899 vol 75 c702.
1194 Hansard HC Deb 28 July 1899 vol 75 c691.
States and colonies in South Africa.” Sir Edward Grey MP also described the conflict as “a war which has been forced upon this country” and not one which, contrary to the views of the Opposition, the Government “provoked.” Gibson Bowles MP stated that it was the Boers who had invaded British territory, and in fact it was the British who “have been repelling invasion.”

There was a strong consensus in the lead-up to the war that Britain’s military superiority would encounter little problem against this threat the “modern Boer” represented. However, early defeats changed this outlook. Colonel Henry Blundell MP believed that the Boer army

“is much more formidable than it is supposed to be, and it has been trained to the use of arms; hitherto it has been the only force which, as a whole, used arms of precision precisely…”

This was echoed by Lord Alwyne Compton MP who saw the Boer army as

“the most formidable enemy that has ever crossed the path of Great Britain. We have altogether misunderstood the character of the Boer for three-quarters of a century, just as they have misunderstood us, and it is not likely that we should understand them now.”

As detailed in the analysis of the previous discursive category, other members noted that the war had actually exposed the empire’s hitherto unknown military weaknesses, which were being exploited by Boer forces. However, many members identified this not with the optimism others did but with a sense of trepidation. James Hope MP identified the weaknesses in Britain’s “military organisation, ... military education, and, ... constitutional machinery itself...” Jasper Tully MP presented his more humorous view of Britain’s military disorganisation when its claim “to be the greatest manufacturing nation of the world” is “tested by these

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1195 Hansard HC Deb 28 July 1899 vol 75 cc687-688.  
1196 Hansard HC Deb 01 February 1900 vol 78 c378.  
1197 Hansard HC Deb 13 March 1900 vol 80 cc745-75.  
1198 Hansard HC Deb 19 February 1901 vol 89 c538.  
1199 Hansard HC Deb 20 October 1899 vol 77 c431.  
1200 Hansard HC Deb 19 February 1901 vol 89 c538.  
1201 Hansard HC Deb 06 December 1900 vol 88 c103.
pastoral people, these peasants and farmers” who have “superior guns...”¹²⁰²

William Redmond MP identified a different threat to the empire. Though against the war, he warned parliament that the “spectacle of two great Christian countries attacking each other” could have a negative effect on “the Native races.”¹²⁰³ He proceeded to question what

“the Native races will think of these proceedings? Do you not think that they will not, sooner or later, break from the bonds which now hold them, and probably overrun not only your own possessions but the Transvaal as well?”¹²⁰⁴

The question of the African population was frequently ignored yet remained an ever-present problem, with many members concerned with the threat they posed, as explained above.

The perception of the Boers as ‘farmers’ or ‘less than the British’ was an image utilised by both supporters and opponents of military action. Analysis of parliamentary debates of the time demonstrate that pro-war members used the image to denote the Boers as weak, subversive, and ultimately unable to impact on Britain’s superior forces. However, in many cases, those opposed to the war used the image to launch a claim of inferiority to elicit sympathy for the South Africans and, thereafter, to highlight Britain’s ineffectual impact on them, thereby attacking the rationale behind the war. This is clearly demonstrated by John Dillon MP who summed up the confrontation as the “British Empire against 30,000 farmers.”¹²⁰⁵ Sir William Gurdon MP acknowledged that many of the Boers were “uneducated, ignorant, and obstinate”, but it was for this exact reason that they were also

“the very worst people to be treated with injustice. Under a rough exterior they are sensitive and proud; and while they never forget a kindness, they do not easily forget a wrong. And we have wronged them in times past...”.¹²⁰⁶

¹²⁰² Hansard HC Deb 19 February 1900 vol 79 c453.
¹²⁰³ Hansard HC Deb 19 February 1900 vol 79 c405.
¹²⁰⁴ Ibid.
¹²⁰⁵ Hansard HC Deb 28 July 1899 vol 75 c703.
¹²⁰⁶ Hansard HC Deb 28 July 1899 vol 75 c716.
referring to Britain’s earlier acquisition of the colony and the Jameson Raid. To Gurdon, it seemed only logical that

“those who had won their country from savage tribes and wild beasts, and had undergone great hardships before they rendered it habitable, should have been unwilling to remain under foreign rule...”

Yet despite such assertions from both sides, the government justified the campaign by portraying the Boers as able to organise an army “much more formidable than it is supposed to be...” though simultaneously exposing its enemy as a weak and backward motley crew, ensuring a swift victory. Ashmead-Bartlett was also on hand to support mobilisation, stating that Britain had been forced into war by “a great Boer conspiracy, which has for its object the destruction of British supremacy in South Africa and the establishment of a Dutch supremacy...” a remarkable feat for a country whose population was “uneducated, ignorant and obstinate.”

The discourse of Britain as a potential victim was also prevalent during the Bosnian War. The transformation of the region into the European ‘Other’ instantly identified the Balkans as a threat to the stability of Europe. The main issue of victimisation that was brought up in Houses of Parliament debates was that of the threat of the war escalating outside the borders of the Former Yugoslavia. The potential destabilisation of the region, also a minor concern before the outbreak of the Boer War, was highlighted by many members. Robin Cook MP portrayed a detailed threat that ignoring or not-stopping the conflict would bring:

“The history of the Balkans shows that troubles there have a capacity to boil over into the rest of Europe. If the conflict escalates, it will have wider repercussions in which we may well have a strategic interest. It will complicate our relationship with Russia if it feels obliged to intervene on the Serbian side. It could potentially reopen the conflict between Turkey and Greece with profound consequences for our negotiations with Cyprus.”

1207 Ibid.
1208 Hansard HC Deb 20 October 1899 vol 77 cc431 (Colonel Henry Blundell MP).
1209 Hansard HC Deb 20 October 1899 vol 77 cc469-70.
1211 Hansard HC Deb 09 May 1995 vol 259 c593.
Lord Mackie of Benshie (H.L.) compared the situation to the Spanish Civil War and questioned “if we in Europe cannot stand the barbarity in our midst, what can we do? What hope is there for our world order to succeed?”. Peter Fry MP intimated similar sentiments when he stated that the effects of war in Yugoslavia would be “incalculable.” Lord Howe of Abervon (H.L.) referred to the “disease” of “Balkanisation”, one which could be regarded “as safely and forever confined to the Balkans.” He added that

“Balkanisation is historically a classic European disease: the disease of conflicting nationalisms, the disease against which the very process of European Union was originally mobilised, the disease against which the European Union has achieved so much and still needs to achieve more.”

Jacques Arnold MP followed suit, stating that if Britain allowed “the situation to fester, the violence will spread like a cancer through the Balkans and northwards into central and eastern Europe.” The use of the word ‘cancer’ to describe the potential spread of violence compares with similar dialogue during the Boer War, a time when health and the containment of disease was of paramount importance.

Containment had been an official part of British policy for some time, with Douglas Hogg MP confirming this in parliament, in answer to Harold Elletson’s question regarding British policy in the Balkans. One of the policies Hogg referred to was “to prevent the conflict spilling over into Kosovo or Macedonia”, the others being to provide humanitarian relief to the area, and to help the international community “to find a peaceful solution to the area’s problems.” According to Douglas Hurd MP, stability in the Balkans, and in Europe in general, was “essential for our security, so we want to do what we can to bring the war to an end and to prevent it from spreading.” David Martin MP noted that “on occasions” matters around the Balkans’ complicated picture “become deadly serious for our country”, with the

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1212 Hansard HL Deb 14 February 1994 vol 552 c49.
1213 Hansard HC Deb 18 October 1990 vol 177 c1383.
1214 Hansard HL Deb 17 November 1994 vol 559 cc46-47.
1215 Ibid.
1216 Hansard HC Deb 25 September 1992 vol 212 c175.
1217 Hansard HC Deb 10 February 1993 vol 218 c676W.
1218 Hansard HC Deb 17 November 1994 vol 250 c134.
current time one of those occasions.\textsuperscript{1219} This was more explicitly stated by Major when he opined that the war in Bosnia “might not directly affect our interests” but was certain that “a wider conflagration across the Balkans...would affect our strategic interests.”\textsuperscript{1220}

The shadow of both world wars loomed large over many members. John Gilbert MP invited parliament to “remember that both European wars of this century started in central or eastern Europe.”\textsuperscript{1221} Robin Cook MP shared this sentiment, explaining that “The history of the Balkans shows that troubles there have a capacity to boil over into the rest of Europe.”\textsuperscript{1222} By September 1992, Tom King MP had claimed that “there is the greatest risk of a spread of the conflict.”\textsuperscript{1223} A few weeks later, Patrick Cormack MP reiterated Arnold’s calls, stating that unless firm action was quickly taken, “we could be moving towards a European Armageddon.”\textsuperscript{1224} Sir Edward Heath MP reverted to the dialogue of disease when debating what Britain could do to help the situation. He put forward that it could “where necessary, put a fence between Yugoslavia and other countries that might be affected.”\textsuperscript{1225} Again, the issue of containment was critical. Gerald Kaufman MP feared that the conflict “could not only engulf Yugoslavia, but threaten the stability of the Balkans and areas well beyond that.”\textsuperscript{1226} Cyril Townsend MP also implored that parliament ensure “that the flames do not spread to neighbouring homes - one thinks particularly of Macedonia.”\textsuperscript{1227} Townsend, however, did not condone military intervention as it could “suck other countries into the conflict” citing Russia on behalf of the Serbs as an example.\textsuperscript{1228} Baroness Chalker of Wallasey (H.L.), again reiterated the importance of confining the conflict, “from spreading into

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{1219} Hansard HC Deb 19 July 1995 vol 263 c1596.
\item\textsuperscript{1220} Hansard HC Deb 31 May 1995 vol 260 c1000.
\item\textsuperscript{1221} Hansard HC Deb 18 June 1990 vol 174 c735.
\item\textsuperscript{1222} Hansard HC Deb 9 May 1995 vol 259 c593.
\item\textsuperscript{1223} Hansard HC Deb 25 September 1992 vol 212 c143.
\item\textsuperscript{1224} Hansard HC Deb 14 December 1992 vol 216 c56.
\item\textsuperscript{1225} Hansard HC Deb 21 January 1993 vol 217 c536.
\item\textsuperscript{1226} Hansard HC Deb 3 July 1991 vol 194 c329.
\item\textsuperscript{1227} Hansard HC Deb 02 February 1993 vol 218 c299.
\item\textsuperscript{1228} Hansard HC Deb 02 February 1993 vol 218 c301.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
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neighbouring states. Much has already been done. Perhaps the most volatile
neighbouring state is Macedonia.”

Paddy Ashdown MP detailed what he thought may occur should the conflict
incorporate the region, with “members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
will become involved—Greece, Macedonia and Turkey.” Given that many
members were arguing that these potential risks were reasons not to intervene,
Ashdown argued that Britain “should have learnt from the experience of NATO that
Europe’s security problem is Britain’s security problem—the two are
indistinguishable and inseparable.” However, calls to intervene were met with
opposition. Jacques Arnold MP felt that Britain’s humanitarian work would be
risked if it were to intervene, and that the country would “run the risk of becoming
bogged down in the Balkans—something which successive British Governments
have avoided for a century.” Edwina Currie MP highlighted the change in war
over the century and the low numbers of military casualties now associated with
conflicts when she objected to intervention. She was against military intervention
because “The last thing I would want to have to sell to my constituents is the idea
that they should go into that bloody mess and be shot at by the bandits on both
sides.”

This point was further highlighted by Robert Key MP who, almost four
years after Currie’s remarks, noted that the “tragedy is that 13 British soldiers have
already lost their lives and 162 United Nations soldiers are dead.” The transition
of war from a phenomenon that involved only soldiers to one that overwhelmingly
involved civilians now meant that the loss of a soldier’s life was a substantial loss
and a poor reflection on the government. Human economics like this was illustrated
during the 1994 Rwandan genocide; owing to the number of Rwandans killed, who
had become refugees, and had become internally displaced, it was estimated that
“It would take the deaths of 85,000 Rwandans to justify the risking if the life on one

1229 Hansard HL Deb 14 February 1994 vol 552 c27.
1230 Hansard HC Deb 29 April 1993 vol 223 c1192.
1231 Ibid.
1232 Hansard HC Deb 08 February 1994 vol 237 c127.
1233 Hansard HC Deb 18 December 1991 vol 201 c263.
1234 Hansard HC Deb 9 May 1995 vol 259 c628.
American soldier.” Currie’s remarks draw similar conclusions and the threat the war posed for the safety of the British military was of great concern.

5.6.3. Analysis

This discourse, like that previous which detailed the position of Britain as a world leader, influenced how the wars were framed. In both cases, the populations of South Africa and the Former Yugoslavia were cast as the ‘Other’ in opposition to civilised Britain. However, in this instance, the risk each group posed was more pronounced. Each war differed in terms of Britain’s actions, however its actions were characterised by its fear of the identified threat posed by the ‘Other’ as represented by the Boer population and the population of the Former Yugoslavia respectively. Britain intervened in South Africa but not in the Balkans. In both cases, this discursive category was used to justify these varying actions. At first glance the discourse of Britain as a potential victim is problematic because it contradicts the preceding category of Britain as a world leader. It must therefore be asked how this discursive category in particular contributes to the argument that discourses on genocide and rape have endured over the twentieth century? Simply put, the value of this category lies in the fact that a form of defensive derogation was practiced by members of parliament who identified behaviour which was threatening to Britain presented during both the Boer War and the Bosnian War. Analysis of the previous discursive category demonstrated the ease with which government members were able to distinguish its war aims by virtue of its role as a world leader in contrast to other parties, in this instance it was able to distinguish itself once again this time as a potential victim in the face of “uncivilised”, irrational, and therefore universally threatening violence.

The fact that Britain’s distinctions were reiterated not only at either end of the twentieth century but within juxtaposing discourses highlights the importance of

Butler’s concepts of iterability and performativity. Statements within these two discursive categories differed in that one espoused Britain’s strength, the other its weakness. However, they essentially shared a common task of successfully separating Britain from the parties of the conflicts in question. This discursive separation supports Butler’s statement that “existence is based on the dependency of the Other.” The “body metaphor” was inspired by nineteenth century developments in evolutionary biology and its subsequent discourses which infiltrated and influenced the discourse of politics and its associated institutions. The popularity of this metaphor was evident during debates on the Boer War. Remarkably, the discursive analogy between organism and society remained present in political commentary after the nineteenth century despite the fact that the body metaphor had continuously lost validity over time. It is also evident in debates on the Bosnian War which saw threats to British and European security as cancerous and a “disease.” Furthermore, the use of defensive derogation during both wars contributed to the crimes’ thresholds of authenticity in its connection to both the discourse of ethnic and ‘racial’ animosity and “uncivilised” populations. The historicity of terms such as ‘racial’, ‘savage’ and ‘uncivilised’ in relation to the conflicts supported the idea that genocide in these contexts was not possible thus making both wars precarious. However, the issue of rape provides some interesting points. The threat of rape was used by Britain during the Boer War to justify the concentration camp system and was deployed in a discourse of protection, protection of Boer women against African men. Similar did not occur during the Bosnian War. In this instance rape, as seen as a natural accompaniment to war, was in the context of security, not seen as a threat. This anomaly and difference between the two wars may signify the destabilisation of these discourses where this crime is concerned. In short, this discursive category guarantees the precariousness of, and denies the authenticity of cases of, genocide and rape by portraying the respective conflicts, and therefore the regions and populations

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1236 Butler, op. cit. n. 43, p. 5.
1237 Luoma-Aho, op. cit. n. 327, p. 123.
1238 Ibid.
1239 Hansard HC Deb 25 September 1992 vol 212 c175.
1240 Hansard HL Deb 17 November 1994 vol 559 cc46-47.
1241 Carpenter, op. cit. n. 147, p. 85.
involved, as the violent and powerful ‘Other’ which has the ability to threaten Britain’s security and position.

5.7. Parliamentary discourse and gender analysis

The predominant interest with regard to gender in this thesis is how these five discursive categories, which have been replicated over both wars, have been influenced by gender, or how they have been identified by using gender analysis. The relationship between gender and the discursive categories rests with its interconnectedness with race and class. In this sense the connection is clear; these discursive categories reflect late nineteenth century discourses on the health of the body politic and corresponding social boundaries because all five, when in the context of the Boer War, reflect Victorian values on gender, race, and class. Moreover, because of their connection with these social values, these categories reinforce the thresholds of authenticity assigned to genocide and rape which have lasted through the twentieth century. Both conflicts were gendered and subsequently ‘Othered’ affecting the discursive response to them while ensuring that the central role of the ‘Other’ in the understanding of genocide and rape was maintained. As Todorova has argued, “balkanist” discourses were unsexualised and distinctly male with women practically invisible.\textsuperscript{1242} For Helms, the aforementioned dominant figure of “balkanist” discourses “was that of the dishevelled, violent peasant man engaged in blood feuds and revolts.”\textsuperscript{1243} Similar descriptions were made regarding men also carry a similar description though the savagery of the Boer War was fixated mainly on Africans. This ‘genderising’ of discourses associated with these conflicts, and the gender roles which emanate from them, has contributed to what Carpenter identifies as the “very logic of gendered violence.”\textsuperscript{1244} She argues that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Todorova, \textit{op. cit.} n. 760, p. 14.
\item Helms, \textit{op. cit.} n. 431, p. 94.
\item Carpenter, \textit{op. cit.} n. 147, p. 85.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
“much of the ‘human security’ discourse in international institutions is based upon a highly
gendered understanding of who is to be secured, characterized by the exclusion of civilian
males as subjects of ‘protection’ or as victims of ‘gender-based violence’.”

However, parliament’s interaction with gender issues during both conflicts is also of
interest. The thesis’ use of a gender perspective to demonstrate that gender shapes
war and war shapes gender\textsuperscript{1246}, insofar as how gender roles and stereotypes are
targeted, has revealed much about the nature of conflict. Analysis of parliamentary
dialogue during the Boer War and the Bosnian War has revealed that parliamentary
discourses were gendered, reflecting the overwhelming male composition of the
Houses. The lack of a balanced gender perspective in parliamentary dialogue and
discourse can be attributed to the absence of female members of parliament during
the Boer War and the lack thereof during the Bosnian War. In fact only one woman,
Lynda Chalker (Baroness Chalker of Wallasey) who was Minister of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, held a noteworthy government portfolio during the
latter conflict. The finding that masculine discourse styles are treated as the
interactional norm in debates supports the fact that traditionally women have not
been represented in parliament, and continue to be under-represented. The
discourse styles were generated by men, and the culture of parliament continues to
create an environment in which female members “do not have access to the same
interactional repertoire” as their male peers.\textsuperscript{1247} The majority of references to
gender in parliamentary debates during the two conflicts are of male subjects,
primarily soldiers, statesmen and local politicians. References to women during the
Bosnian War increased from those made during the Boer War. Though there were
some exceptions, the majority of these replicated statements made during the
1890s of the wartime female victim. Crucially, the exception to this rule was the
concentration camp system. As identified earlier in this thesis, within this
jurisdiction Boer women were seen as unfeminine and as peasants, which was in
complete contrast to what was espoused by British femininity. The reinforcement
of gender roles was most evident during the Bosnian War as a result of the
widespread use of rape as a weapon of war. This is unsurprising given that state-

\textsuperscript{1245} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1246} Goldstein, \textit{op. cit.} n. 110.
\textsuperscript{1247} Shaw, \textit{op. cit.} n. 33, p. 416.
sanctioned representations of non-combatant women predominantly posits them in supportive wartime roles such as family members, nurses, factory workers, prostitutes and, more recently, though at times reluctantly, as active soldiers.\(^\text{1248}\) Moreover, such representations strengthen traditional gender roles and neglect the war experiences of women which are not part of these state-sanctioned representations.\(^\text{1249}\) This neglect accounts for the silence surrounding non-state-sanctioned experiences including, as Lee Koo argues, war rape.\(^\text{1250}\)

War dictates that traditional definitions of masculinity and femininity are maintained during conflict. As Cock explains, women are usually cast in the role of the innocent, the protected, and those to be defended."\(^\text{1251}\) Both Cock and Woollacott deem this notion of women’s vulnerability essential to maintaining sexism and militarism\(^\text{1252}\), as well as to the enduring feminist ideal espoused by imperial Britain for example.\(^\text{1253}\) Empire

"stressed bourgeois women’s confinement to a notional private sphere and their supposed incapacity for productive labour, education, professional work or political citizenship."\(^\text{1254}\)

Although a shift in this regard occurred during the twentieth century\(^\text{1255}\), it is the contention of this thesis that though changes have occurred in terms of what women can do, the discourse on gender has changed very little. Imperial Britain saw war as an opportunity to use women for propaganda purposes, with few alternative roles available to them during conflict.\(^\text{1256}\) At first glance, the appointment of the all-female Fawcett Commission, sent to South Africa to follow up on Emily Hobhouse’s initial reports on the camp system, by the Salisbury government appeared ground-breaking. However, all members of this all-female

\(^{1249}\) *Ibid.*
\(^{1251}\) Cock, *op. cit.* n. 16, p. x.
\(^{1252}\) *Ibid.*
\(^{1253}\) Woollacott, *op. cit.* n. 441, p. 53.
\(^{1254}\) *Ibid.*
\(^{1255}\) *Ibid.*
\(^{1256}\) Van Heyningen, *op. cit.* n. 6, p. 91.
commission were government supporters which, it may have been presumed, would impact on their conclusions. Van Heyningen also suggests that these members were appointed simply because the British authorities had come to see the camps as a “women’s issue”\textsuperscript{1257} in general.

It is important to state here that it was not only traditional female gender roles that were reiterated over both wars. The initial observation that gender references were overwhelmingly male should not obscure the fact that these same references adhered to traditional male gender roles. Bill Nasson’s account of Boer men on commando dressed in discarded women’s clothes as a last resort because their own, and other substitutes such as grain sacks were unavailable, indicates the relinquishing of their masculine identity, as well as their feminisation by the British. The reliance on masculine gender roles created a tension during the Bosnian War when sexual abuse subverted this traditional role. The emasculation of men during the Bosnian War is found in accounts of sexual violence in the form of molestation, mutilation, and other forms of assault and torture. Significantly, the fact that “heterosexual virile power marks a culturally dominant form of masculinity,” means that men who are sexually abused “will remain invisible.”\textsuperscript{1258} There are few references to male rape and sexual abuse within parliament during the Bosnian War. The most significant is that made by Sir Patrick Cormack MP in which, referring to a video detailing Serb atrocities, describes a scene where “one sees someone carrying a tray of young men’s genitals that were hacked off by Serbian soldiers.”\textsuperscript{1259} Interestingly, this descriptive reference lies in stark contrast to those made about rape and sexual violence against women, the majority of which concern numbers and locations and the fact that the rape of women is a normal accompaniment of war.\textsuperscript{1260}

\textsuperscript{1257} Ibid., p. 101.  
\textsuperscript{1258} Žarkov, \textit{op. cit.} n. 923, p. 81.  
\textsuperscript{1259} Hansard HC Deb 25 September 1992 vol 212 c158. Cormack then urges his fellow members “in all parts of the House to watch that video and to ponder it.”  
\textsuperscript{1260} See for example Hansard HL Deb 18 January 1993 vol 541 c57WA (Baroness Chalker of Wallasey); Hansard HC Deb 27 April 1993 vol 223 c368W (Douglas Hogg MP); Hansard HC Deb 27 July 1993 vol 229 cc1004-5W (Douglas Hogg MP); Hansard HL Deb 20 June 1996 vol 573 c500 (Lord Renton).
As stated previously, criminologist Ngaire Naffine identifies rape as “a crime which makes manifest criminological and legal orthodoxies about the respective natures of men and women, and the appropriate relation between the two.”\textsuperscript{1261} This “appropriate relation between the two”, that is, the responses to the crime(s) from male and female parliamentarians and to responses which rely on the maintenance of gender roles as opposed to the gender roles perceived as adequate, comes under heavy scrutiny in this thesis. Gender-based violence is “so common historically as to be seen as ‘natural’”, but is also “rooted in assumptions about male wartime roles, assumptions that both reflect and reproduce gendered hierarchies prevalent in both peacetime and war.”\textsuperscript{1262} As stated from the outset of this thesis, men are affected by these discourses and gender assumptions too. Speaking in terms of gendercide, R. Charli Carpenter’s reference of a Programme Officer with the US Office of Disaster Assistance in July 2002 notes the gender discrimination caused by war:

“Men are more vulnerable to getting killed. That’s a pretty big deal. Getting sick, getting raped, getting attacked are all pretty bad things but dead is dead and they are much more vulnerable to getting killed than women.”\textsuperscript{1263}

In this sense, rape is usurped by death on the threshold of authenticity with regard to war crimes generally. Therefore, social, cultural, and religious constructs arguably negate the experiences of survivors of rape when compared to those of soldiers which are predominately male, and other women who experience other forms of loss and suffering.\textsuperscript{1264} This point is reaffirmed by Catherine McKinnon who argues that women’s human rights violations are made invisible by the citation of violations as those which happen to both men and women, “like being beaten and disappearing and being tortured to death.”\textsuperscript{1265} This perspective relies on the maintenance of traditional gender roles and the ignorance of female perpetration.

\textsuperscript{1261} Naffine, op. cit. n. 132, p. 99.
\textsuperscript{1262} Carpenter, op. cit. n. 147, pp. 88-89.
\textsuperscript{1263} Ibid., p. 88.
\textsuperscript{1264} Lee-Koo, op. cit. n. 1248, pp. 531-532.
and male victimisation, however the prevalence of those roles within parliamentary discourse demonstrates the importance of her statement.

5.8. Conclusion

If, as Kuusisto notes, our reality is forever being created in and through discourses, then our reality must be questioned. This chapter has demonstrated that certain wartime discourses, based on nineteenth century norms on gender, race, and class, found in parliamentary debates and questions have been replicated over the course of the twentieth century, despite the fact political and social contexts have changed significantly during the same timeframe. Moreover, they also featured despite the fact that Britain played a different role during each conflict; that of a warring party in the Boer War, and of a bystander in the Bosnian War. Their repetition ensures that these discourses have, over the course of the twentieth century at least, framed the debates on these conflicts, the construction of the ‘Other’ and of course on the crimes of genocide and rape. The first two discourses, those on ethnic and ‘racial’ animosity and “uncivilised” populations, featured imperialist rhetoric, an interesting characteristic given, of course, that this discourse was prominent during the Bosnian War of the 1990s. Both discourses outlined that the populations of the respective regions, with the exception of the British Uitlanders, were at fault for the outbreak of the wars, specifically their savage and primordial manners. However, the question of who exactly represented these qualities came to the fore with Britain’s own character called in question once both wars developed over its concentration policy in South Africa and non-interventionist stance towards Bosnia. The remaining three discourses also significantly contributed to the thresholds of authenticity of genocide and rape. As outlined in chapter two, these discursive categories were identified as a result of extensive research and thorough reading of debates and parliamentary questions during the given conflicts. The categories which emerged were given credence by the prevalence with which these topics were spoken about amongst members of the houses of parliament. While other discursive patterns did emerge, particularly amongst members of the Opposition
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within the House of Commons, the majority of dialogue was uttered within the frames outlined. This observation is supported by Simms, for example, who has noted that Labour policy and rhetoric during the Bosnian War was indistinguishable from that of the Major administration with the notion that all sides to the conflict were more or less equally guilty having found widespread acceptance. In essence, each discursive category analysed throughout this chapter is merited by its reliance by individual members.

Writing in relation to the Bosnian War, Cushman and Meštrović have argued that

“Ibid., p. 298.


Conversi, op. cit. n. 845, p. 246.

Butler, op. cit. n. 9, p. 2.”

In this sense, the role played by members of the opposition within parliament is important. Needless to say, these members issued the majority of complaints against government policy and views during both wars, and were for the most part responsible in identifying and explaining contradictions and paradoxes in government rhetoric and discourse. This observation further supports the notion that the discourses identified were relied on by respective governments to justify their policy choices and objectives. Conversi’s point regarding moral relativism is a case in point. He sees the concept not as “a constant in western politics and thought, but rather an ad hoc attitude that is conveniently espoused when it best suits the interests of a particular elite.” Britain’s will to engage in these wars, or lack thereof, corresponds with the focus of Butler’s Frames of War which was to investigate why and how war becomes easier, as in the case of the Boer War, or more difficult, as was the case in the Bosnian War, to wage. A number of reasons why this discursive continuity occurred can be deduced from this analysis. The first is that these discourses were employed intentionally to justify intervention.
in South Africa and to avoid intervention in Bosnia. Secondly, they were employed because it was efficient to use these already established discourses. Based on late nineteenth century norms and discourses supporting strict gender, race, and class boundaries, these discourses were dominant at the outbreak of the Boer War and politically established by the time conflict broke out in Bosnia. Finally, they were employed during both conflicts because, as was the case regarding the third discursive category, there simply were no alternative discourses available which would adequately examine the wars. Political pragmatism was a notable influence in the shaping of these discourses. This is supported by Lene Hansen who notes that one explanation of rape warfare in Bosnia which sees rape as a normal accompaniment to war and characteristic of the primordial nature of Balkan warfare “is a classical realist one.”

Overall, the fact that these five discourses have been consistently employed by members of parliament over the course of the twentieth century supports the thesis’s argument that parliamentary discourses on war have not only enforced thresholds of authenticity regarding the crimes of genocide and rape, but that replication and therefore continuity of these discourses over this length of time has resulted in the widespread acceptance of the Victorian-era norms of gender, race, and class espoused by these discourses, and as a consequence the acceptance of thresholds of authenticity of genocide and rape. This argument therefore adheres to Butler’s principle of performativity which “is always a reiteration of a norm or set of norms...” The repetition of these norms (and therefore of genocide and rape) through the specific framing of events detailed throughout this thesis has subsequently ensured that cases of genocide and rape which rest outside of the frames constructed by these discourses are not easily recognisable. However, the existence of these precarious cases cannot easily be ignored. As Lloyd, speaking about detainees at Guantanamo Bay, suggested earlier, “to talk of them as ‘detainees’, but to talk of them nevertheless, is thus to construct them within...”

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1270 Hansen, op. cit. n. 97, p. 57.
1271 Butler, op. cit. n. 232, p. 12.
discourse as less than human..." In much the same way, to speak of “acts of genocide” for example is to similarly construct these acts within discourse as less than genocide.

The findings presented in this chapter, and the general conclusion that parliamentary discourses have experienced continuity over the course of the twentieth century, question the validity of poststructuralist understandings of discourses as tied to context and historical moments, essentially ever-changing. Alternatively, since discursive continuity on the subject is limited in this respect to parliamentary dialogue, parliamentary discourse on conflict could instead be the site of this anomaly. This argument is supported by the aforementioned fact that discourses on conflict which pertain to genocide and rape have experienced changes over the same time frame, making those presented in parliament obsolete. Since the area of discursive continuity is not the focus of poststructuralist scholarship it is difficult to ascertain how theorists such as Butler would adjudicate the findings. It is however a conclusion which, much like her own work, can enable new thought on the subject.

1272 Lloyd, op. cit. n. 175, p. 145.
Speaking in regard “to human nature or the categories that may be applied to the subject”, Michel Foucault stated that “everything in our knowledge which is suggested to us as being universally valid must be tested and analysed...”\textsuperscript{1273} This thesis has tested and analysed dominant parliamentary discourses regarding genocide and rape in an attempt to challenge their longevity and widespread acceptance within the British Houses of Parliament. It initially endeavoured to demonstrate why genocide and rape are more susceptible than other crimes to certain thresholds which authenticate cases against paradigmatic examples, and ultimately demonstrated the endurance of the ‘Other’ as regards norms and therefore discourses relating to genocide and rape, over the course of the twentieth century within a specific sample. This was achieved by examining nineteenth century norms and values which established hierarchies of gender, race, and class, and which in turn constructed thresholds of authenticity which continue to inform on the crimes of genocide and rape in this instance. Overall, it suggested that there has been, in this context at least, a lack of “sudden take-offs” and a “hastening of evolution” with regard to parliamentary discourses on genocide and rape. The ‘immunity’ of parliamentary discourses in contrast to changing discourses and contexts outside of this institution can be explained by political pragmatism and the changing contexts of warfare. Overall, while historical contexts have changed, adhering to the main tenets of poststructuralism, parliamentary discourses have not thereby producing an anomaly. While this thesis did not aim to establish whether the Boer War and the Bosnian War were cases of genocide and rape, it has sought to contribute to the identification of this anomaly or at least to an understanding of it.

The unique subject matter of the research is indicative of the general contribution of this thesis to academic scholarship. Examined separately, genocide and rape

\textsuperscript{1273} Foucault, \textit{op. cit.} n. 375, pp. 461-462.
have inspired a multitude of works within the disciplines of law, humanities and the social sciences. As detailed from the outset, a significant contribution of this thesis, therefore, is that it brings the study of these two crimes together in an original way, demonstrating that both genocide and rape are linked discursively and normatively within the scope of this thesis. As well as this, the thesis offers a number of original comparative insights, that is, on the institution of parliament, concentration camp systems, and more generally, a comparative analysis of two distinct conflicts. Additionally, there is an evident need for this type of research to take place as knowledge gaps exist not only in terms of gender perspectives on crime during conflict, but also in terms of histories and analyses of concentration camps. Analysis of gender and conflict are confined mostly to historical accounts of women’s roles in times of war, or, more recently, women’s roles in conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peace-building in post-conflict societies.

Perhaps the discipline this thesis contributes to the most is in the area of Discourse and Rhetoric Studies. The work of academics within this area, notably Teun van Dijk and Cornelia Ilie, whose work relates specifically to comparative parliamentary discourse, contributed immensely to the thesis. However, though this area provided the tools with which to complete the current research, it was lacking in terms of established texts which offered a comparative discourse analysis of this type. Riikka Kuusisto’s work on comparative rhetorical frameworks during war has been quoted extensively throughout this thesis as it is a rare example of this type of scholarship. However, the subject matter at hand indicates that this thesis can contribute significantly to this ever-growing field of study.

Consequently, while this thesis has made specific contributions to various disciplines, it has also presented some limitations. The most significant of these is that the current subject matter deals with a very specific and narrow research topic. This is problematic owing to the fact that much qualitative research can be hard to replicate and apply generally regardless of the breadth of its scope. However, this issue regarding its potential for reproduction is exacerbated when the framework of the thesis is examined: the current research comparatively examines two distinct
wars using a specific data set, while simultaneously narrowing its focus to specific dates (late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries), frame of analysis (gender), aspect of war (concentration camp systems), revolving around the circumstances of two distinct crimes (genocide and rape).

Moreover, another limitation presented regarding the narrow scope of the research is the fact that the thesis analyses norms which inform discussion and perceptions on genocide and rape from the nineteenth century onwards. However, it is stated in chapter one’s discussion of definitions of the crimes that both are older than their definitions, implying that to focus on thresholds of authenticity based on a fragment of the lifetime of these crimes is disingenuous. This can be justified by virtue of the fact that the phenomenon of social categorisation which resulted in hierarchies of gender, race and class, and which, as has been argued throughout, rose to prominence in the late Victorian era, yet this may not be satisfactory to some observers.

Likewise, it is not yet clear how this theoretical framework can be identically applied to different issues but perhaps it can enable new directions of thought, as Cadwallader has described the work of Butler. This is apparent in the related areas which this thesis was not able to devote more attention to. These include examining non-conformance of gender roles in war; a more in-depth discussion of gender and nationalism; labelling Britain’s stance towards Bosnia; and the Balkans’ “powerful ontology” as described by Maria Todorova. However, the fact that this thesis borrows concepts from Butler’s work, rather than it being in itself an exclusively ‘Butlerian’ thesis risks the authenticity and legitimacy of entitling it a piece of work in the poststructuralist tradition. Moreover, the thesis’ limitations extend to the fact that it does not explore why the “sudden take-offs, these hastening of evolution, these transformations” of norms and discourses around genocide and rape have occurred outside parliament, and, indeed, within the Houses. This is also a criticism of Butler’s work. For instance, Jennifer Beste has asked

“What, in Butler’s view, precisely motivates subversion, the variations in repetitive performances, the “resignifying of the signifying”? What causes persons to engage in
parodic performances that subvert dominant discourses rather than reify them? Are such variations accidental or intentional on the part of subjects?" \textsuperscript{1274}

Short of reverting to the poststructuralist ideal that power is productive and is the site of destabilisation, this thesis cannot, and does not, claim to be able to answer these important questions. The research currently presented is intended to be merely a starting point from which to further explore the various additional topics emerging from the research questions posed and it is hoped that such matters can be explored specifically in the near future.

Reflexivity is important to consider with regard to a qualitative piece of research and is an issue which has already been covered in chapter two. However, it must be revisited here again. The thesis commenced with intentions to learn from, and contribute to, the discipline of criminology. The research design leaned heavily towards moral issues which is of special interest to criminologists and criminological theorists, for example, those around victimhood, perpetrators, and restitution. While the influence of criminology subsided significantly as the thesis progressed, and while acknowledgement has been paid to more politically-driven factors driving the continuity of discourses, this author’s judgement and interpretation of the issues at hand evidently shaped the research in ways that would not have been the case for a researcher from, for example, a political science standpoint. This comes into play during the identification of discursive categories, which was detailed in chapter two. Reflexivity is most important in this regard because discourse analysis traditionally presents problems when attempting to collect naturally occurring data. How, for instance, can distinct and definite discursive categories be extrapolated from a specific form of text? In this case, identification of discourses was justified by the rhetorical inclinations of members of parliament. Needless to say, however, the role of the scope of the research and the viewpoint of the author in this process cannot be downplayed.

Using a gender analysis and focusing on concentration camp systems during the Boer War and the Bosnian War this thesis has repeatedly argued that parliamentary discourses on genocide and rape are constructed using established norms on gender, race, and class. These norms were dominant in the late nineteenth century prioritisation of the health of the body politic and the subsequent drive to ‘cure’ social and political degeneration and decline. They relied on the construction of the ‘Other’, the dichotomy of normal and abnormal, innocent and criminal, acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, and the phenomenon of scientific categorisation to differentiate between ideal citizens and, as it followed, to differentiate between ideal and inauthentic examples of these crimes. Certain discourses of war which affect understandings of the construction of the ‘Other,’ and therefore understandings of genocide and rape, are common to the case studies. The continuity of these discourses within parliament can be explained because the thresholds of authenticity of these crimes, and their role as instruments of classification, are notoriously difficult to destabilise. Moreover, they are exclusionary in nature because they are based on the extreme example of a given social phenomenon. While extreme examples of crimes such as genocide and rape are easily identified, it stands to reason that because they are not representative of the majority of cases the construction of thresholds based on such examples is problematic.

The contradictions and paradoxes of these discourses and crimes were characteristic of “the contemporary British social fabric” rather than the sole preserve of nineteenth century British attitudes towards crimes and punishment. Essentially, the five discourses isolated in the previous chapter were dominant in parliament’s explanation of why the Boer War and the Bosnian War occurred. Contextually, their use to understand the Boer War is justifiable given that they were dominant at the turn of the twentieth century. However, their use to understand the Bosnian War a hundred years later is problematic. To make the discourses fit that particular situation, and in doing so to interpret the conflict

1275 Mukherjee, op. cit. n. 1144, pp. 11-12.
as “a mysterious predestined battle without any reason or logic or civilized restraints”, required “editing the material considerably and giving the “physical evidence” a specific interpretation.” This is in contrast to Todorova’s earlier calls for rationale to be applied to the region in the same way as it is applied to Britain and the West in general. It has been argued that discourses popular during the late Victorian era have been carried through, utilised, and been influential in the construction of discourses of genocide and rape to the present day. There is a tendency “to associate particular discourses with particular ‘eras’”, just as Foucault’s “imperial prude”, introduced at the outset of chapter three’s discussion on the Boer War, portrays the sexually stifling Victorian era. However, like poststructuralism, Fergusson warns against seeing discourses as unitary or static at any historical moment, with his observation that “different elements of the policy or legislation derive from different discourses.” While “critical-political discourse analysis deals especially with the reproduction of political power, power abuse or domination through political discourse”, it has been argued that this reproduction of political power has been achieved in this instance through the reproduction of discourses.

Gareth Evans has cited four problems which account for “global indifference” towards genocide. These are

“the problem of perception (getting the story out and its gravity understood); the problem of responsibility (confronting traditional taboos against international involvement in sovereign countries’ internal affairs); the problem of capacity (having available the appropriate institutional machinery and resources); and, as always, the problem of political will (effectively mobilizing that capacity, in the face of competing priorities and preoccupations).”

From the analysis presented in the previous chapter, these same problems, and the last one in particular, can be attributed to the crime of rape as well as genocide within the current research hypothesis, that is, that parliamentary discourses on

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1276 Kuusisto, op. cit. n. 40, p. 100.
1277 Fergusson, op. cit. n. 418, p. 5.
1278 Ibid.
1279 Van Dijk, op. cit. n. 334, p. 11. Emphasis in original
1280 Evans, op. cit. n. 786, pp. 327-328.
both crimes have been replicated over the course of the twentieth century. The problems of perception, responsibility, capacity, and political will which Evans has identified are ever present in each of the five discourses presented in the previous chapter’s discussion. They also correspond with the findings of the previous chapter which presented these discursive categories. As stated in the methodology section in chapter two, parliamentary dialogue deals for the most part with mundane day-to-day issues. Topics such as war are infrequent events and highly emotive. It must therefore be conceded that the “degree of uncertainty about the verification of information” which can be tolerated in a conflict situation can vary, especially “where decisions often need to be made more quickly that in ‘normal’ politics.”

In times of conflict, when hastened answers are sought, pragmatism becomes dominant in influencing policy. Realpolitik or political realism has been used to explain reactions to the Bosnian War, and therefore to explain the replication of these discursive categories in the British houses of parliament, contributing to the maintenance of the threshold of authenticity for genocide and rape. Despite this political perspective, Simms comments that British politicians

“were not brazen Machiavellians who delighted in what was to become an increasingly casuistic and untenable position. On the contrary, they were vexed and tortured by the problem.”

What is certain, and what has been argued from the outset, is that answers to the questions raised by the continuity of discourses during times of conflict are provided by sovereign states, many of which manipulate legal uncertainty for political ends. This in turn indicates that it is not discourses which are stagnant and have experienced continuity, but political objectives.

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1281 Hansen, op. cit. n. 97, p. 69.
1284 Kent, op. cit. n. 59, p. 148.
The influence of Realpolitik or political realism on the replication and continuation of these discourses has affected acknowledgement and reception of the events in question. Psychologist Paul Slovic who has written much in the field of risk perception, argues that though “every episode of mass murder is unique and raises unique social, economic, military, and political obstacles to intervention”...

“the repetitiveness of such atrocities, ignored by powerful people and nations, and by the general public, calls for explanations that may reflect some fundamental deficiency in our humanity - a deficiency that, once identified, might possibly be overcome... The numbers fail to spark emotion or feeling and thus fail to motivate action.”

The repetitiveness that Slovic writes of echoes the main tenets of performativity which propose that our subjectivity is a process rather than a set of inherited characteristics. Butler revealed in a 1999 interview with sociologist Vikki Bell that a main issue of subjectivity is the ability to survive without the possibility of grief:

“If there’s a public foreclosure of the possibility of grief and the recognition of loss, then it’s not that an individual fails to grieve, it’s that there’s a public foreclosure of the possibility of grief, instituting melancholia throughout that culture, and that is part of this depression that the newspapers are trying to psychologize.”

However, the performativity of these crimes in the context of this thesis refers instead to the referral and reliance on sustained, established reactions and perceptions towards these acts. An immediate reaction is necessary because, as Alexander notes, “history does not wait; it demands that representations be made, and they will be...Even the vastly unfamiliar must somehow be made familiar.”

With the familiar established as the Holocaust and genocidal rape, reactions to cases which do not meet these examples of the familiar, the aforementioned thresholds of authenticity, reinforce the familiarity and authenticity of these

1286 Bell, op. cit. n. 26, p. 172.
1287 Alexander, op. cit. n. 440, pp. 11-12.
examples. The “vastly unfamiliar” only becomes familiar by virtue of failing a comparison against the paradigmatic examples established throughout history. Alexander also notes that historical background is therefore critical in terms of coding, weighting, and narrating for both “the first ‘view’ of the traumatic event and, as history changes, for later views as well.”1288 These are demonstrably affected by “the agents in charge, by the competition for symbolic control, and the structures of power and distribution of resources that condition it.”1289 This is why suffering does not inevitably leave its mark on history as has been noted in reference to the, until recently, ignored history of the Boer War’s African concentration camps system.1290

Poststructuralism contends that change is offered in the resistance which comes inevitably with power. As Butler has noted,

“...if repetition is the way in which power works to construct the illusion of a seamless heterosexual identity...then this is an identity permanently (p. 131) at risk, for what if it fails to repeat, or if the very exercise of repetition is redeployed for a very different performative purpose?”1291

The argument that “neo-colonialism – the continuity of structures, relationships and attitudes formed in that period – is simply an unavoidable legacy of history”1292 is not valid. This is because other discourses have changed. Continuity is a reflection of the nature of the crimes rather than a reflection of the nature of parliament though it has a role to play in this continuity. Though generally these discourses have changed somewhat throughout history, in turn providing different opportunities of resistance, the influence of realpolitik has meant that they have changed little within parliament, therefore providing few opportunities of

1288 Ibid.
1289 Ibid.
1291 Butler, op. cit. n. 237, pp. 130-1.
resistance within this particular institution. However, the finding that realpolitik explains the continuity of these discourses and therefore of thresholds of authenticity of genocide and rape contradicts the main tenets of poststructuralism and discourse theory in general. Howarth & Stavrakakis explain that discourse theorists reject approaches to political analysis which “focus on the rational (or irrational) functioning of social systems” instead stressing “the historical contingency and ‘structural impossibility’ of social systems” while refusing to “posit essentialist conceptions of social agency.” Alternatively, discourse theorists postulate that social constructs undergo constant historical and social change, and are responsible for charting and explaining such historical and social changes “by recourse to political factors and logics.” This observation indicates that a poststructuralist framework may be unsuitable for the purposes of the current research.

Presently, this thesis has been responsible for explaining the lack of discursive change which has problematized genocide and rape “by recourse to political factors and logics” within different historical and social contexts. In terms of the gender analysis of the data presented throughout this thesis, political realism explains the invisibility of gendered, or non-state-sanctioned, war experiences. Realism’s appeal to issues of state and power reach what Smith calls a point of “common sense”, deriving power and influence from its ability to “delineate not simply what can be known but also what it is sensible to talk about or suggest.” For Lee Koo, this leads to the entrapment of women within traditional and ultimately subordinate gender roles upon which the smooth functioning of international relations depends. Ultimately, the relationship between political realism and the continuity of discourses rests on this observation: according to realism, to stray from the established order and standard of knowledge, for example established

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1293 Howarth & Stavrakakis, op. cit. n. 11, p.6.  
1294 Ibid., p.6.  
1296 Lee Koo, op. cit. n. 1248, p. 526.
gender roles, is not to be rebellious but to be irrational.\textsuperscript{1297} In essence, any attempt to destabilise this established (discursive) order is met with indignation meaning that discursive change in the political arena at least is wrought with difficulty. This is not least because of the view that political realism brings “order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.”\textsuperscript{1298} Accordingly, this “arrogant perception” that is characteristic of realist theory\textsuperscript{1299} echoes similar attempts to streamline and simplify conceptions of genocide and rape facilitated by the anarchy of definitions and resulting in thresholds of authenticity. In turn, political realism “chooses to deny the power-based relationships and the repercussions of both its claim to knowledge and ways of knowing” which results in rendering lives and experiences as invisible and therefore precarious.\textsuperscript{1300}

Another issue that has arisen from this research is the fact that the thesis has neglected to negotiate the tension that exists between the notion of unique genocide and rape and that which seeks to recognise all acts pertaining to these crimes as crimes. This supports William Powell’s stance that “crimes are crimes however they are committed...”\textsuperscript{1301} This is however a point that arises from this enquiry which should be examined more fully at another opportunity. The current discussion prompts but cannot facilitate this as it focuses on discursive continuity which is important in its own right and one that asks different questions and raises different issues though both these issues are connected. Overall, its focus is on the understanding that things are understood in its particular social and cultural context. Separately, it highlighted the fact that discourse on gender-based violence during conflict should remove itself from gender stereotypes which portray women

\textsuperscript{1300} Lee Koo, \textit{op. cit.} n. 1248, p. 526.
\textsuperscript{1301} Hansard HC Deb 14 December 1992 vol 216 c70.
as victims and men as perpetrators, instead recognising the inflexion of these roles. This thesis has shown instead that gender representations are made when it is politically suitable and beneficial to do so.

The attempt to show the opportunity for the destabilisation, or “de-fatalisation of our present”\(^\text{1302}\) has opened the possibility that the present “could have been different,” revealing that the future of our present is more open to change should the history of our present appear, on conclusion, more accidental than had been initially thought.\(^\text{1303}\) However, the continuity of discourses has posed the question whether parliament at least is still in the same temporal history of usage (of a word) as it was in the late nineteenth century during the Boer War. The findings presented here in relation to the two case studies suggest this is the case. It may be productive and more conclusive to compare these findings against a separate, more contemporary war in order to test the hypothesis.

In line with the main tenets of poststructuralist theory, this thesis has therefore provided an interrogative inquiry which challenged and contested “received ideas and norms rather than attempting to resolve problems and prescribe solutions.”\(^\text{1304}\) While the limitations of the current thesis stipulate that solutions and recommendations cannot be put forward, the findings outlined in the previous chapter especially demonstrate that the theoretical framework has enabled “new directions of thought...”\(^\text{1305}\) with regard to these particular crimes.

\(^{1302}\) Rose, op. cit. n. 211, p. x

\(^{1303}\) Ibid.

\(^{1304}\) Lloyd, op. cit. n. 175, p. 11.

\(^{1305}\) Cadwallader, op. cit. n. 231, p. 289.
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