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<td><strong>Author(s)</strong></td>
<td>Murphy, Ray</td>
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<td><strong>Publication Date</strong></td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Publication Information</strong></td>
<td>Murphy, R. (2010, 20 December), 'Irish and UN forces faced with dilemma in Lebanon', 'The Irish Times'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Item record</strong></td>
<td><a href="http://hdl.handle.net/10379/1856">http://hdl.handle.net/10379/1856</a></td>
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Irish and UN forces faced with dilemma in Lebanon

PREPARATIONS ARE now under way for the Defence Forces to return to south Lebanon as part of Unifil (United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon) in 2011. Irish troops will act in a ground-holding capacity similar to that undertaken previously for over 30 years.

However, the Irish contingent will be a mechanised battalion with significant patrolling duties like those performed in Chad and Liberia. This will suit the Irish in terms of equipment, recent experience and training.

The situation in Lebanon presents a dilemma for the United Nations and any Irish forces deployed there. There was talk of an aggressive or robust mandate in 2006 after the Israeli/Hizbullah conflict. The delay in adopting UN Security Council resolution 1701 did not augur well for the new force. Agreement of the parties to a conflict is essential if the UN force is to have any prospect of success. Even agreement by leaders or governments does not always translate into co-operation on the ground.

When the proposal to establish the original Unifil mission was made in 1978, UN officials expressed reservations about assuming such a role. There was no clear policy then either on how the peacekeeping force would deal with armed elements or what action it would take if the Israeli forces did not withdraw completely. Lebanon did not attack Israel in 2006. This fragile democracy had demonstrated that it did not have the capacity to restrain or disarm the Hizbullah militia. The urgent necessity to do something to alleviate the immediate crisis while there was some broad consensus in the Security Council meant such misgivings were put aside.

Resolution 1701 contains a number of provisions which have proved difficult to implement. It calls for a permanent ceasefire, the creation of a weapons-free zone and disarmament of all armed groups. It also calls for no foreign forces or arms in Lebanon without the consent of the government. Israel was required to provide the UN with all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon. Such information has important operational significance taking into account the threat posed by unexploded ordnance and mines.

The mandate authorises Unifil to take all necessary action in areas of deployment as it deems within its capabilities to ensure that its area of operations is not utilised for hostile activities and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate. It also authorises the use of force to protect UN personnel and equipment, ensure freedom of movement and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. While the mandate is more comprehensive than other resolutions in relation to Unifil, four years later it is far from evident how it will be implemented. Especially difficult are the security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities and the creation of a demilitarised zone. Ensuring freedom of movement is also a matter of concern. What is meant by protection of civilians under imminent threat and how will Unifil respond should Israel and Hizbullah resume hostilities?

Resolution 1701 does not say who should disarm Hizbullah, but the implication is that it should be Lebanese forces, with assistance from Unifil. The modalities, to use UN terminology for such action, are not explained. The Israelis had high expectations of Unifil in terms of disarmament of Hizbullah, but these were never realistic. The Lebanese armed forces and government are too weak and divided to take any kind of offensive military action against Hizbullah fighters. Can Unifil use force to disarm Hizbullah? The answer must be no, otherwise the UN will end up trying to do what the Israeli forces could not achieve by force. Hizbullah’s tenacity has given it significant stature in the region and there is evidence that it is preparing for another confrontation with Israel. French and American forces sustained serious casualties as part of the multinational force deployed in the 1980s; a similar fate awaits any international force that takes on Hizbullah in south Lebanon.

While deployment in Lebanon does not present the logistical or security challenges of Chad, no peacekeeping mission is without risk. The uncertainty over Iran and the broader issue of Palestinian/Israeli relations provide a potentially volatile regional backdrop to Unifil. The mission will be good for the Defence Forces in terms of training, experience and mo-
rale. It is consistent with Irish foreign policy objectives and support for the UN. UN reimbursement of expenses in-
curred is crucial. Having pre-empted a UN decision to withdraw from Chad, Ireland is fortunate to be given the oppor-
tunity to participate in another UN mission at this time.

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Murphy, R. (2010, 20 December), ‘Irish and UN forces faced with dilemma in Lebanon’, ‘The Irish Times’.