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The Cultural and Environmental Impact of Large Dams in Southeast Turkey

Maggie Ronayne
The Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) is an independent, non-political, non-governmental human rights organisation founded and based in London, England. KHRP is a registered charity and is committed to the promotion and protection of the human rights of all persons living with the Kurdish regions, irrespective of race, religion, sex, political persuasion or other belief or opinion. Its supporters include both Kurdish and non-Kurdish people.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was written by Maggie Ronayne and edited by KHRP Executive Director Kerim Yıldız and Public Relations Officer Rochelle Harris. Maggie Ronayne is Lecturer in Archaeology at the National University of Ireland, Galway and the author of a number of academic and other publications on the archaeological case against cultural destruction in war and by large development projects (maggie.ronayne@nuigalway.ie)

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Cover photo: The rocks of Halbori, photographed during the fact-finding mission (2004)

A note on archaeological dating conventions - the letters BCE and CE are interchangeable with BC/AD with reference to dating and the former is preferred in this report. BCE stands for Before Common Era and CE is used to mean Common Era

The findings in this report are those of the fact-finding delegation.
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FOREWORD

This study of the cultural and environmental impacts of large dams in Southeast Turkey brings together evidence from and interviews with people affected by hydroelectric dam projects planned for the Munzur, Tigris and Greater Zap rivers. It illustrates information and work by a multitude of human rights, women’s, displaced, cultural and environmental organisations in collaboration with communities in each area and internationally as well as building on previous fact-finding missions undertaken by the KHRP, its partner organisations including those in the Ilisu Dam Campaign and the Department of Archaeology, National University of Ireland, Galway. The report also sheds light on the aims and attitudes of State officials with regard to the GAP dams.

One of the major findings of the report is that there is a new consortium of companies coming together to build the discredited Ilisu dam. From 2000 to 2002, human rights and environmental organisations and others successfully exposed fundamental flaws in project documents and plans for Ilisu, which contributed to the ultimate failure of the last consortium. But all the available evidence suggests that the Turkish State has not learned the lessons of Ilisu: the fact-finding mission has found that the basis for the project this time remains essentially the same and affected communities, those still resident in the reservoir area and those already displaced by conflict, do not appear to have been consulted about the dam.

Consultation with women, a particular requirement according to international guidelines because of their work to care for their families and make the natural resource base productive, appears close to non-existent in all of the reservoir areas so planning for the dams invariably excludes them. The delegation found that the overwhelming response from women and relevant organisations is that the dams have a particularly negative affect on women and all of those in their care and as a result, women are more inclined to oppose the dams.

The ancient town of Hasankeyf, culturally important to many Kurdish people, became internationally renowned as a result of plans to submerge it beneath Ilisu’s reservoir. Despite the promises of the Turkish prime minister and the dam builders, the report finds that it will not be saved by new plans to build the dam. In any case, the cultural impacts of Ilisu are much greater than one town; there are hundreds of ancient sites within the reservoir area and much more that is culturally significant. It is a key premise of the report that cultural heritage is more than the sum of artefactual and architectural
parts and is a basis for the survival of communities now living in or recently displaced from reservoir areas. This is shown to be a pre-requisite for any assessment of the full impact of Ilisu and other dam projects. Turkey’s progress on cultural rights for the Kurds and others has been an object of scrutiny in recent years and the cultural impact of the GAP dams must be considered in that context.

In the case of Ilisu but also of the Munzur and Hakkari dams, the report finds that a range of international laws and standards are not being fully adhered to. EU standards in particular are met by none of the projects. This must be placed within the context of Turkey’s process of accession to the EU, with regard to environmental and cultural heritage guidelines and directives but also in terms of respect for the rights of affected communities. The report places the GAP dams in the context of a culture of repression maintained by the State security forces in Southeast Turkey and the renewal of conflict in the region. It finds that while there have been some improvements and legal reforms, torture remains an administrative practice of the State. In this climate, free and fair consultation about the dams is very unlikely.

Kerim Yıldız, Executive Director, Kurdish Human Rights Project, London
Figure 1. Southeast Turkey showing the locations of places, rivers, reservoirs, current and planned dams mentioned in the text.
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

‘All of those involved will be convicted before humanity’ – Mr A. Vehap Kusen, Mayor of Hasankeyf

The Projects and Their Context

The three areas considered in this report are a representative sample of the impacts of large dams in the Kurdish region of Turkey, adding to the destructive effects of conflict in the region. Eight dams and hydroelectric power plants are planned for the valley of the River Munzur in Tunceli (Dersim). The dams would provide negligible energy in national terms but will radically alter the valley (a protected national park), displace communities and submerge natural, cultural and religious heritage. The Ilısu dam on the River Tigris achieved international notoriety from 2000 to 2002 because of the severe economic, social, environmental and cultural impacts it would have, potentially displacing up to 78,000 mostly Kurdish people and destroying significant cultural heritage, including the historic town of Hasankeyf. It has been on hold due to the collapse of the consortium of companies planning to build it after effective public and international campaigns. Now a new consortium is coming together to work on it again. Three dams are planned for the Greater Zap River in the province of Hakkari, close to the border of Turkey with Iraq. Only the most general information is available on Hakkari dam itself, plans for the others remain unknown. All of the projects are part of the giant Southeast Anatolia Regional Development Project (Turkish acronym GAP), one of the biggest regional development projects in the world.

The long-standing and continuing repression of the Kurdish majority in the region is central to the controversy caused by the dams and the contention of many that a just outcome to the projects is not possible. There has been a return to armed conflict in the region. From 1984 as a result of the armed conflict between the Turkish State and Kurdish guerrillas an estimated 4,000 villages were destroyed and approximately three million people were forced to flee their homes. Over 30,000 people have died; some
families have lost several members. This has been the background for widespread abuses on the part of the security forces, including deliberate village destruction, torture, extra-judicial killings and ‘disappearances’. Despite a ceasefire by the PKK since 1999 and the lifting of emergency rule (known as OHAL), there has been a return to conflict in the region since June 2004. This history must be considered when assessing the impacts of the dams.

Below we frequently report people’s case for defending culture and heritage that the dams would submerge. Archaeological considerations support their case. Many millions of us have been geographically transported away from our roots. Those of us who are displaced or cut off from nature and our past in cities, are not often aware of the power and security that other people derive from having direct access to their past. Others of us may long to know where we come from. Archaeology is a way that we who are so removed, who are not in a position even to appreciate how our past can enrich us, can be re-introduced to where we came from, what it can contribute, how it can shape our standards and values, and to appreciate the individual and collective human endeavour and accomplishment of those who went before. Once we begin to realise what we have lost, we will better understand what many people today are struggling to retain, why they feel that to be deprived of their heritage, their roots, is to be stripped of basic, life enhancing resources. The Indigenous peoples in the Americas, despite over five hundred years of threatened extinction, have tenaciously tried to preserve and renew the culture of those who went before. This has been central to their individual and collective survival. Reinforcing this effort is the job archaeology is eminently suited to do for the present day, not only ensuring the survival of our past but re-invigorating it in the active communities of its descendants, thus helping to ensure the survival of all of us.

The Fact-Finding Mission

The aims of the mission were to:

a) Gather information regarding stages of dam-building projects in Tunceli (Dersim), Batman/Hasankeyf and Hakkari
b) Gather information on new plans for the Ilısu dam in Hasankeyf and the wider reservoir area
c) Gather more information regarding the GAP dams
d) Gather more information on the impacts of dam building in the region, on women, children and men directly affected, impacts on their surroundings, including their cultural and historical environment and whether people have
been consulted in full or at all about those impacts

e) Observe the human rights situation.

The delegation was in Turkey from 21st August to 1st September. Most of that time was spent in the Kurdish region in Tunceli (Dersim), Diyarbakır, Batman, Hasankeyf and Hakkari. We met with representatives from the Human Rights Association (İHD), cultural, women’s and environmental organisations, lawyers, journalists, villagers and shepherds affected by the dams, village guard villagers, villagers displaced during the conflict and their organisations, people from Hasankeyf, the Mayors of Tunceli, Hakkari, Diyarbakır and Hasankeyf and the Deputy Mayor of Batman, representatives from DEHAP, AKP and EMEP parties, the regional directors of the State water agency (DSİ) in Tunceli and Diyarbakır, and State officials from the General Headquarters of the DSİ in Ankara. Meetings were requested with the governors of the regions visited but no response was received. The delegation met briefly with the Assistant Governor of Tunceli but was refused an interview.2

It was pointed out to the delegation more than once that officials and representatives from institutions such as the EU rarely venture into the neighbourhoods and homes of displaced families and even more rarely consult with women in these families.3 Relying on second-hand information, especially from State officials, is common. This delegation heard evidence that the military and State officials escort officials from foreign governments, including the EU, on their visits to Turkey. For example, the Assistant Governor of Tunceli told the delegation that when EU officials had visited, they were brought by military helicopter from the airport for ‘security reasons’ and did not travel the roads.4 This, and other facts outlined in this report, must be considered when weighing the contrast between evidence presented here and much of the EU’s most recent progress report on Turkey.5

Summary of Findings

The Dam Projects

There was no evidence of free and fair consultation with women, children or men from the areas of the planned dams in the Munzur valley, Ilısu or Hakkari, regarding their impact. Nor was there consultation with communities already displaced from the region.
Consultation with women about the impacts of the dams on all of those in their care as well as themselves appears close to non-existent across the whole region.

Affected communities have no access to information on the proposed dams in the Munzur valley or in Hakkari, apart from what they have been able to find out through their own campaigning. Communities affected by Ilısu have had some access to information through a survey for the resettlement plan but this was inadequate and incomplete.

The extent of environmental impact assessment for the Munzur dams remains unknown but most of these projects seem to have had no impact assessment at all.

An assessment has been completed for one dam at Hakkari but it does not appear to have assessed a number of major impacts.

In the cases of the Munzur valley and Hakkari dams, environmental impact assessments and resettlement plans, where these exist, are not available to communities directly affected by these projects or other interested groups. An environmental impact assessment for the Ilısu dam, drawn up under the previous consortium of companies planning to build it, was placed in the public domain in 2001. The Resettlement Action Plan for Ilısu has never been made available.

A new consortium is coming together to build the discredited Ilısu dam but officials from the DSİ say the Turkish State intends to rely on assessments and plans drawn up under the previous consortium, despite numerous basic flaws in these plans, which are well documented. By contrast, sources in the companies now planning to build Ilısu talk of an ‘update’ in the environmental assessment though there does not appear to have been any consultation with affected communities in the region towards this.

Contrary to promises made by the Turkish prime minister and others, officials from the State’s water agency say that the historic town and legally protected archaeological site of Hasankeyf will not be saved, so there is no new design for the Ilısu dam.

There is no evidence of consultation on any of the projects with Kurdish women’s, cultural, human rights and environmental organisations, nor with organisations representing those displaced during the conflict.

There is no consultation so far with regional and/or local officials regarding the planned
dams in all three areas and the same officials report inadequate or no consultation on previous projects already built.

There is no substantial knowledge of the cultural needs and wishes of affected communities in the Ilısu reservoir area, or of the full extent of the cultural impacts of the Ilısu dam.

The proposals to deal with cultural heritage impacts of the Ilısu dam are completely inadequate. There has been a lack of consultation with and involvement of affected communities, those still resident in the reservoir area and those already displaced.

The technical plans for mitigating the cultural impacts of the Ilısu dam are continuing and their rationale and timetable remains unclear. Indications are that they are inadequate and local people are unhappy that the archaeological salvage projects are occurring.

In the case of the Munzur valley and Hakkari dams, the situation is much worse as it appears that no assessment of cultural impacts has occurred. It is unclear if technical plans to undertake archaeological salvage projects exist in the case of Hakkari; they do not exist for the Munzur valley. This contravenes the most basic archaeological standards.

The inadequate and in two cases lack of assessment of cultural impacts of the dams questions the State’s valuing of the people who produced this culture and those, sometimes the descendants, who are making culture today, making it all the easier to implement projects the communities reject and which will displace them.

The State and its representatives have failed to assess the local, regional and international significance of the culture heritage, which would be impacted by any of the dams – to whom it is important and why. There are a number of claims to ancient heritage in the reservoir areas. Whatever the truth of any of those claims, it is clear that the dam builders have valued ancient artefacts and sites over the people who live in the reservoir areas now.

The Ilısu dam reservoir would destroy hundreds of ancient sites in the valley of the Upper Tigris and these could not possibly all be excavated and recorded in the time it would take to build the dam. This area may have international importance for the understanding of our earliest human origins and Neanderthal life, was one of the first areas in the world where communities domesticated plants and animals and has been a frontier zone for empires, including the Roman and Assyrian Empires.
The existence of such ancient sites in the Munzur and Hakkari areas is still unclear though indications are that there may be similar evidence there, in particular concerning a key question in archaeological science regarding the relationship between the first modern humans and Neanderthals.

All of the dam reservoirs examined would submerge significant religious heritage and end the spiritual practices of communities from a variety of religious traditions. This includes sites, practices and beliefs within a number of Muslim, Alevi and Christian traditions and the communities affected are much wider than those still living in the reservoir areas today.

The more recent heritage in the reservoir areas is predominantly Kurdish and in the case of Ilısu and Hakkari, also includes, for example, Assyrian Christian and Armenian heritage. Some of this heritage is evidence of the history of conflict in the region. Thus, the diversity of history of all of us would be cleansed by building the dams. This will make it all the more difficult, if not impossible, to establish the historical truth of cultural difference in those areas, which has been distorted and repressed for so long.

The reservoir areas contain a number of evacuated villages, which constitute material evidence for village destructions during the conflict in the 1990s.

During the fact-finding mission, a number of people interviewed raised concerns that the reservoir areas may contain graves of those ‘disappeared’ during the conflict in the 1990s between the State and the PKK. According to human rights lawyers in the region, it is reasonable to raise this possibility.

Submergence of any possible evidence of such graves without independent investigation may well render the dam builders complicit in concealing any crimes committed. It is highly unlikely that archaeologists and other forensic scientists could undertake an independent investigation to confirm or deny the existence of such evidence, given the prevailing security conditions in the region.

There is evidence of corruption by dam building companies in the region, including reports of payouts to at least one company for operating under emergency rule even though this has ended in the Kurdish region.

There appear to be serious compromises of safety in dam construction and in particular evidence in all three areas visited of a risk of earthquakes, which could damage any dams built and result in an environmental and human disaster of unpredictable
magnitude, affecting untold numbers of people in those areas and downstream.

In the affected communities, both individuals and the many organisations the delegation met were almost all opposed to the dams. But there is surveillance of dam protests, harassment of activists and difficulties for individuals expressing an opinion or protesting in public about what they believe are the drawbacks of dams.

Given wider security conditions in the region, witnessed at first hand by the delegation, effective, accurate and independent monitoring of the projects would be very difficult.

There is evidence of severe and widespread economic deprivation with resulting malnutrition and other serious health problems in the Kurdish region, particularly among families displaced by the armed conflict from their villages. Many such villages are now threatened with submergence by the dams. Assessments and plans for the Ilısu dam have hidden the extent of the poverty and particularly, the widespread lack of food security.

There is no evidence that the economic situation of families displaced by the dams would be protected, or would improve after any of the dams were built. This is most urgent with regard to the Ilısu dam because of the numbers involved, up to 78,000 people.

There is no evidence that the livelihoods of communities who live in the cities expected to receive an influx of people displaced by the dams, would be protected or would improve after any of the dams were built.

Expropriation as a result of dams is likely to result in conflict in all three areas arising from a number of factors. In Hakkari in particular, village guards are occupying the lands of villagers displaced by conflict and believe that they, not the original villagers, have the right to claim compensation if the dam is built.

The Ilısu dam and to a lesser extent, the Hakkari projects, have major implications for future tensions, and possibly conflict over control of water resources in the Middle East.

Projects if they went ahead would violate or are already violating a large number of domestic and international laws and standards – Council of Europe and EU standards in particular are met by none of the projects.

State repression and human rights violations including the threat of sexual torture and
humiliation directed at women especially are the context in which people would be consulted about the dams. Therefore, as previous delegations have had to conclude, there can be no fair outcome for the public with regard to the projects at the present time.

**The Regional Context**

Instances of very violent forms of torture, previously perpetrated systematically across the whole region, have been reduced. This includes the rape and other sexual torture of women, children and men, against which women survivors and their lawyers organised effective public and legal opposition.

Despite the reforms taking place as part of Turkey’s EU accession process, the evidence suggests that torture, both physical and psychological, remains an administrative practice of the State. The physical torture includes heavy and repeated beatings but a significant proportion is comprised of methods which leave no mark, including sensory deprivation and disorientation.

According to information given to the delegation, there is evidence that unofficial detentions, which are not recorded by police and where the detainee is not afforded any legal rights, have been increasing in some areas in recent months.

The fact-finding mission was informed of instances where women continue to be targeted by the security forces for specific forms of harassment, humiliation and assault including forcibly removing veils from their heads, strip searches on the street and sexual insults.

One result of State violence is the re-enforcement of a climate where women also face a high level of domestic violence, including the threat of murder in what are sometimes referred to as ‘honour killings’. They receive little, and in the Kurdish region, no practical support or protection from the State.

Though there have been improvements, there is still no effective freedom of expression and association. Demonstrations and press conferences continue to be restricted, monitored and occasions of harassment including sexual harassment. Journalists and publication distributors continue to be harassed and taken to court. Expression in the Kurdish language remains restricted.

There are still no effective plans acceptable to internally displaced people and their organisations for the return of refugees to their villages. Village guards still occupy many
villages of those displaced and landmines remain.

There is a widespread lack of food, clean, accessible water, sanitation and housing and no adequate welfare system, health care or education in place for poor families, indicating in particular the failure of the authorities to assess and solve the problems of the large internally displaced population. All of this puts an enormous burden of work on women and girls in particular.

There is little industrial development in the Kurdish region and the majority of men are unemployed in each of the cities visited. Many children from displaced families must work to support their families.

Information given to the delegation suggests that the situation of poor families, especially those displaced by the armed conflict, is worsened by corruption and the delegation heard reports of the State's refusal to help families it views as suspect.

The close surveillance of the Kurdish population, military control of the region and attempts at cultural assimilation remain very visibly the case and were witnessed at first hand by the delegation.

The renewal of the conflict between the State and KONGRA-GEL\(^6\) has resulted in increasing militarisation of the Kurdish region and an increase once more in serious human rights violations, which were characteristic of the last conflict. The situation in Hakkari, close to the Iraq border, is particularly tense. The delegation heard very frequently from people in the region that they do not want any further conflict.

There continue to be problems with the implementation of changes to legislation and the structure of government, made to meet the Copenhagen Criteria.\(^7\) A number of breaches of new laws are occurring, not least because of the continued impunity of the State security forces and the independence of those sectors of the State from the executive power.

It is concluded that although some reforms have taken place and repression has been reduced, the effect of emergency rule and enforced poverty continues and a culture of repression remains substantially in place. As long as it remains so, the ground is fertile for large dam projects to be imposed.
CHAPTER 2:

THE RATIONALE FOR THE GAP PROJECT

‘Aren’t they terrorists of history who would destroy a place like this? We never, ever want Hasankeyf to be submerged...’ - Landless resident of Hasankeyf

Introduction

The impacts of the large dams examined in this report must be placed within the framework of the Southeast Anatolia Regional Development Project (GAP). A number of key concerns regarding the GAP project have been outlined in previous reports and are summarised here with additional evidence: the economic, social, cultural and political implications of the project; past failures; the impossibility that GAP can fulfil promises with regard to Ilısu and other dams in the region; the failure to release project information and documents; the potential impacts of the dams on women, children and men, on their environment and cultural heritage; the implications of the failure to consult adequately, or in many cases at all with affected communities; the failure to consult with those people already displaced from the area and its implications.

Flaws in the Economic Rationale for the Dams

GAP is worth 32 billion dollars and was launched in 1977 when the State water agency, the DSİ, brought together various programmes on the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, creating a regional project that covers nine provinces and 74,000 km². The two rivers are considered to have key potential in the region with approximately 51-52 billion m³ of water between them. The completed project aims to have built a total of 90 dams and 60 hydroelectric power plants, generating 27 billion kilowatt hours of electricity. At the moment, the completed projects generate 15 per cent of Turkey’s total energy production.

GAP aims to irrigate 1.7 million hectares of surface area in order to grow cash crops and promote agri-industries such as food processing for export. The dams will increase the irrigated land in Turkey by more than 40%. GAP says that eventually this will generate
3.8 million jobs, mostly in agriculture and raise per capita income in the region by 209 per cent. The completion date for GAP, according to DSİ in Diyarbakır, is 2015, five years later than the previously quoted completion date.

GAP has been expanded since its original design to meet sustainable development goals and now includes other infrastructure projects such as the building of schools, roads, health care centres, housing, cultural projects, women's projects and the development of tourism.

There is no doubt that all of those who currently live without access to the essentials of life in what has been historically, and still is, one of the poorest regions in Turkey want an end to that poverty. They are entitled to all of the benefits which GAP proposes to bring to them. But all potential supporters of the dam projects are obliged to consider the question of who will ultimately benefit from the GAP development plan, whether 'poverty alleviation' is at all uppermost in the objectives of GAP as a whole, and the role of GAP in relation to the history of the State's security interventions in the Southeast.

On economic grounds alone, it is not credible that the GAP project will deliver on its promises. An examination of the current socio-economic structure of the region where the dams would be built, and its relationship to Turkey as a whole, makes this clear. Despite extensive investment in the region, the East and Southeast continue to be the most neglected parts of Turkey. Unemployment is at 50% or above in all the major cities in the region. Men and boys travel as migrant labourers to the cities in Western Turkey and to Europe because of the need for extra household income, leaving women and children behind. Almost 80% of people either have holdings that allow them to barely subsist or have no land at all. The areas affected by GAP projects are owned largely by Agas (landlords), many of them also tribal chiefs. As a result, the lion's share of the expropriation money from dams goes to these Kurdish landlords who, by means of agri-business, are also the main beneficiaries from irrigated land. This landowning system, and the failure to prioritise land redistribution, is at the core of the flaws in GAP as a project proposing to benefit those most in need. This is historian David McDowall's analysis for Ilısu but it applies more generally. Where landless villagers and subsistence farmers do try to make a living from the land, the dams often result in the destruction of these livelihoods. In particular, families rely on the rivers for fishing but the reservoirs put an end to this, either by removing the people, killing the fish life or restricting fishing rights.
GAP, Displacement and Conflict

The regional context for GAP must include the fact that this area has been and is once more a conflict zone, under emergency rule until recently. Development of the area would have to plan for the effects of that conflict on everyone, the continuing economic and social effects of militarisation and the threat of torture and raids that people live under. In fact, any development with the genuine aim of reducing poverty could not proceed without addressing the situation of Kurdish people. But the conflict in the area has never been seriously considered by GAP planners and there is no project, for example, to assist the return of the millions of people who were forced to flee their villages in the 1990s and have a right to go back. This is a serious issue for all the dam projects discussed here. In particular, a quarter of those affected by the Ilısu dam have already been displaced from their villages as a result of forced evacuations by the military. Most villagers remain unable to return because of the security situation, landmines, village guards occupying their homes and/or lands and the sheer level of destruction such that there is no housing or functioning village to go back to nor effective assistance provided to re-build. There is evidence from the Hakkari dam reservoir area in this report that the State’s militia or village guards occupy the lands of those forced to flee but there is no sign of the demobilisation and resettlement of this militia. Conflicts may well arise if the dam goes ahead, because of this unresolved situation.

There were very high levels of poverty to be witnessed in all the cities and rural areas the delegation visited. The degree of desperation varied from area to area but in all cases, the worst poverty is always among displaced families, where malnutrition and serious health problems are common. The full extent of poverty in the Kurdish region is unknown, particularly among these communities.

The latest response from the authorities does not tackle these core problems in any clear way. Human rights lawyers informed the delegation of a new law titled ‘Compensation to the People Who Were Harmed By Terror or By the Anti-Terror Fight.’ Various branches of İHD in the region were receiving many applications under the new law from displaced villagers. There has been no implementation as yet but the Ministry of the Interior will appoint a commission to decide all cases. However, villagers and lawyers alike were skeptical that claimants would receive all they are due in compensation for what they have lost. It is unclear for example if people without title deeds to land or those with use rights will be able to claim. The president of the self-help organisation set up by displaced people themselves, Göç-Der, has commented to the media that ‘the law is definite but nobody knows how the returns will take place because there is no regulation on the issue.’ Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, the Chairperson of İHD in Diyarbakır
said it is ‘a very hastily prepared, cosmetic law and very insufficient.’ He pointed out that the compensation amounts are negligible and insulting. It may also be a convenient way that the authorities can avoid losing cases at the European Court where the amounts payable and the political damage are much greater.

GAP itself has directly displaced or is in the process of displacing hundreds of thousands of people. Even though some of those displaced by dams may receive compensation for their losses in expropriation processes, it was the view of a wide range of people with whom the delegation met that this is rarely enough to meet the needs of those displaced, particularly because most of those who receive compensation get only a small amount. A previous fact-finding mission in 2001 has documented how many more villagers already displaced by GAP dams received no compensation at all. Women’s organisations commented to this delegation that their experience is that any compensation money nearly always goes to the men. There has been little or no consultation with affected communities and full local participation in decisions about development of resources and communities has been missing. Many have ended up in the shantytowns of major cities, unable to find full-time or indeed, any, employment and living in poverty.

A woman representing Göç-Der in Diyarbakır spoke of how the building of the dams ‘means the evacuation of villages by another means. Families are affected very badly when they arrive in the cities. Their problems increase. Even the air and water are much worse than what they are used to from their lives in the villages.’ She has relatives in reservoir areas ‘who feel that they are caught between two impossible decisions: refuse to move and risk serious repression and physical force or take any expropriation money offered and move to a whole new set of problems in the cities.’ Several families interviewed by the delegation who are living in the conditions described in this report, without enough food, no access to clean water, little or no health care, no adequate schooling are displaced from villages and lands which will be flooded by either Munzur valley, Ilısu or Hakkari dams. The opinion of the vast majority is that they do not want the dams and want to return to their villages. None of the displaced families or individuals interviewed had been consulted about the dams affecting their home villages.

GAP and ‘Women’s Development’

GAP makes particular claims regarding the benefits of the project for what its publicity terms ‘disadvantaged groups’ and for women in particular. A basic aim of the GAP Social Action Plan is to give priority to women and children. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) web site for Turkey has even described GAP as
the National Program for the Enhancement of Women’s Integration in Development. But women’s opposition to the dams and why they oppose them has been hidden. The developers have failed to consult with women about the projects, despite the fact that the women know what the real cost of the displacement and the loss of the land will be.

Women made the point repeatedly that it is they and their organisations who have to deal with the effects of conflict and poverty on their families and somehow try to keep everyone alive. Selma Polat from the Women’s Platform in Tunceli said, ‘many women have no food and no money to feed, clothe or educate their children. Men are easier about that, men don’t think about those things. What children are eating and wearing, women have to deal with.’ The delegation met with a number of women’s organisations as well as displaced and village women. What women have to say about their work as well as the day-to-day activities of their organisations are the best way to gauge the situation of the poorest families and what the dams would do to communities, their environment and culture. Displaced women and their organisations felt that the detail of what they have to face is not only a key consideration for Turkey’s EU accession process but also reflects the situation that families displaced by dams would face or have already had to cope with.

The burden of poverty and the work that has to be done for the survival of families falls most heavily on women, who themselves suffer health and other problems, particularly after the forced move to the cities. Women carry out most of the basic unpaid subsistence work in bearing and caring for large numbers of children, but also, a substantial part of their work in the villages to take care of their families – and this is true for most women in the global South especially – involves growing their own and relatives’ food to feed everyone, livestock management and other work to make the land, and resources on it, productive. Women and children are also responsible for fetching water. This work is hardly ever officially recognised and there is no evidence that it has ever been considered in the planning or compensation processes for large dams.

Women in the Kurdish region are mostly housewives; when they can do waged work it is almost always for very low wages, for example, as cleaners and a number of women, mainly from displaced families, work as prostitutes in order to feed their children. The delegation found that there is no real social welfare system for women and their children in Turkey (nor an adequate unemployment benefit for men). What does exist tends to be complicated by the tensions and conflict in the region. For example, the Chairperson of Göç-Der in Hakkari explained that poor families from evacuated villages who applied for Green Cards (free medical care) found themselves refused the cards or put to the end of the list below village guard families.
The literacy rate is lowest in the Kurdish region of Turkey and much lower for women than for men (women are also more likely to speak only Kurdish). Within the family and community social structures prevalent in the region and supported by the practical actions of the State, religious institutions and the landlords, the relative social power of the male head of the household is such that he is generally the owner of any land and the women who use it do not own any. They do not generally inherit land or property either and their value and existence is undermined or denied by a variety of other means. The invisibility of women’s contribution to the care of everyone and their resulting lack of economic and social power mean that they are also at risk of violence from the State and within their families and communities.

To illustrate the situation they face, women in displaced neighbourhoods in Tunceli elaborated on the effects of the migrations. They explained that ‘everyone in the village helped each other. Here we try and help each other but this is not the same as before. People have nothing to give each other here, we try to support but many families end up focusing only on themselves and are cut off from others around them.’ Women outlined how families were broken up after the move to the cities and many family members, particularly men, had had to migrate to western Turkey and beyond to look for work. This meant that older people especially were eventually left alone with no one to care for them. The result of all of this is an increased burden of work on women in particular. According to the women themselves, ‘it’s us women who were doing nearly all the work in the villages, in the house but also agriculture on the land, we did all that work. But it got much worse when we came here. In our villages we grew our own food and cooked it, but here we can’t even find bread to feed our children. When we first came, we couldn’t eat the food we eventually did find in the city, we couldn’t digest it, as we were not used to it. Many women and children became sick.’ One woman added: ‘And when we came we women only spoke Kurdish, we did not know Turkish and it took us a while to learn. It was so hard, we could not even ask [the authorities] where to get food.’

Lack of food security has been and still is widespread in the Kurdish region and was reported to the delegation throughout the trip. Municipal authorities in all four cities visited stated that a majority of the population lives under the UN hunger threshold, with a smaller proportion in each case suffering severe malnutrition and starvation. Three generations of women displaced to Diyarbakır explained how it was the women who had to go begging door to door in their neighbourhood when they first fled from their villages in the 1990s. ‘What else could we do?’ they asked, ‘our children had to eat.’ They and many others said that this still happens today. This situation directly contradicts the claim, in a review of the Resettlement Action Plan for Ilısu, that food security in the region will not be a problem in relation to the Ilısu dam.
In Diyarbakır, KEDV (Foundation for the Evaluation of Women’s Labour), a local branch of a women’s NGO, has been working with low income and migrant women since 2001. 41 Naşide Buluttekin from KEDV confirmed what the displaced women had said, adding that ‘women are the most serious victims of migration for these reasons. Their workload increases enormously and they have to cope with huge psychological problems also. Not being able to grow food and feed their families is one of the most important reasons for the women’s suicides.’ 42 Women’s suicides are particularly high in certain areas such as Batman and especially among displaced families.

According to Handan Coşkun, of the women’s organisation DIKASUM (Diyarbakır Women’s Problems Research and Applications Centre), 43 women’s demands are for basic needs: change to their economic conditions, literacy, information on their rights and action on domestic violence. The delegation found that displaced and village women prioritised demands such as food, land to grow food, accessible, clean water, health care, housing, jobs for the men but also had demands for an end to conflict and return to the villages they have been evacuated from. 44 DIKASUM has carried out a survey of prostitute women in Diyarbakır and has found that there was an explosion in the number of prostitute women after millions were forced out of their villages in the 1990s. Ms Coşkun said that the results show that there will be more prostitution after Ilısu and other dams are built as women try to feed their children after displacement: ‘The dams don’t offer alternative livelihoods to women. The expropriation money goes to the men. Women don’t own property, they don’t have rights and they won’t benefit from the dams. That’s why women villagers especially want to stay in their villages.’ 45 Prostitute women face some of the most violent situations in the region. ‘They are subjected to violence by their clients’ said Ms Coşkun, ‘but there is nowhere to go for help. The police send domestic violence survivors back home to their husbands so there’s no hope for prostitute women.’ 46 All of the women’s organisations the delegation met in Diyarbakır agreed with a previous analysis by the Dicle Women’s Centre in 2001 that there are always arguments within families because of the dams since the women in particular don’t want to move, knowing the conditions they will face, but the men are always asked to sign the forms and they are also the ones who receive the compensation. 47

OECD guidelines state:

‘Since women are to a great extent responsible for making the natural resource base productive (with their knowledge, skills and labour) and thereby contribute significantly to the well-being of their families, communities and national economies, planning for
relocation should consider their preferences and should address their specific needs and constraints.\textsuperscript{48}

This recognition of the unpaid work that women do and of the fact that they are significant users of and providers from natural resources is not found in the laws relevant to resettlement and expropriation in Turkey.\textsuperscript{49} The OECD guidelines above and other international standards require or pre-suppose consultation with women\textsuperscript{50} but women from the Munzur valley, Ilisu and Hakkari reservoir areas with whom the delegation met had not been consulted about the dams.\textsuperscript{51} Women’s organisations had not been consulted either.\textsuperscript{52} Furthermore, according to current legislation, there are difficulties with compensating traditional land users if they are resettled or lose access to land or other resources. Previous fact-finding missions have noted this.\textsuperscript{53} It is worth adding that the law’s silence on the gendered nature of resettlement and expropriation denies women any entitlement on the basis of their work to use the land and care for their families.

In the report of the World Commission on Dams (WCD), this situation is found to be very common.\textsuperscript{54} These are not just problems for the women as individuals but imply enormous difficulties in finding food and water for their children. The possibility of consultation about this being in any sense fair does not exist at present in Southeast Turkey so that impacts like those described above are more than likely to occur if the dams go ahead. In any case, any outcome that would benefit the majority of women is not possible when the threat posed to them by the security situation is considered (see chapter six).

The DSİ’s director in Diyarbakır, Mr Nihat Üstundağ, agreed that women have to keep families going after displacement and have not usually had a say in the decisions on moving.\textsuperscript{55} He claimed that the ÇATOM centres for women, which GAP has set up, are a great success and will combat the problems mentioned above including any difficulties as a result of displacement by dams. According to GAP publicity, ÇATOM centres are ‘multi-purpose community centres’ where women can come together, organise activities and gain skills such as literacy, health care, sewing, making crafts, nutrition, cooking, childcare. \textsuperscript{56} They are supposed to generate income for women but Kurdish women’s organisations in Diyarbakır say that ‘these centres are just a source of cheap labour for GAP.’\textsuperscript{57}

The three women’s organisations with whom the delegation met in Diyarbakır commented: ‘We already work with migrant women and we don’t have the resources to cope even with that. The dams will mean more problems and more work.’\textsuperscript{58}
Past Failures

Particularly, for those most affected by previous dam projects, restoration and improvement of their means of survival is vital. But the GAP project has a dismal record on past resettlements including those that have taken place very recently. Salinisation of irrigated land and other soil erosion have been effects of GAP projects also and have led to further threats to livelihoods.

The effects of previous dams have been well documented elsewhere. A previous fact finding mission in 2001 found, for example, that the Birecik dam has resulted in a number of failures. Eighteen villages close to the construction sites were forcibly evacuated by soldiers in 1996 and 1997 and received no compensation at all. Over one thousand villagers in another location woke to find their homes partially submerged by the rising reservoir and were forced to abandon them. Many villagers never received any compensation or houses because, a very common occurrence with GAP dams, they did not have land rights. People lost their livelihoods and had little or no employment prospects in the places to which they were moved. Those who did get new houses found them half finished and overcrowded while people lost their ancestral graveyards under the reservoir with no assistance given to move the graves. The Atatürk dam, completed in 1993, had previously created similar problems; the town of Samsat and nearly three hundred villages were flooded and no comprehensive resettlement plan whatsoever was prepared. The health impacts of the Atatürk dam were severe: the dam and associated irrigation channels brought malaria and other tropical diseases.

When it came to Ilısu, the Turkish authorities and the then members of the Ilısu consortium claimed at the time that Turkey’s resettlement procedures now met international standards, were sustainable and would restore livelihoods. But the Ilısu Dam Campaign demonstrated that this was not the case on the publicly available evidence and the collapse of the Ilısu consortium of companies confirmed it.

As well as inadequate resettlement plans, the economic situation in urban areas of the region means that there is little possibility of a higher level of income or even the maintenance of income for people who might be relocated or for communities who would have to host them. A reliance on a general economic improvement to sustain those resettled and their host communities is in contravention of OECD guidelines on resettlement.

The delegation found that senior State officials remain unwilling or unable to acknowledge past mistakes and problems, let alone correct them. The Assistant Governor of Tunceli
province, İlker Arıkan, spoke in a personal capacity about his time in Adiyaman as governor of Samsat county. He commented: ‘People got a good life out of the dam. In our country, there is no Kurdish discrimination as such whatever people see from the outside. The dams definitely do not destroy Kurdish culture. The dam actually added value to people’s lands.’ On the negative impacts of the dams, including those officially documented by GAP surveys, he told the delegation that ‘our State does not do small calculations.’

DSİ officials were equally if not more reluctant to acknowledge previous errors or current problems arising from the impacts of the dams. An engineer in the Investigation and Planning Department of the DSİ headquarters said that their attitude is that ‘you can’t wait a long time to do all these archaeological surveys and to comply with standards.’ Nihat Üstundağ, Regional Director of DSİ Diyarbakır, claimed that in the case of the GAP dams, ‘people who lose lands are resettled and given lands that are irrigated. Land is re-distributed, cadastral surveys are done and the benefits from farmland are increased.’ The same director failed entirely to answer a question about the fact that most people own little or no land so cannot benefit from expropriation processes for the dams.

**Bureaucracy and Corruption in the Water Sector**

The high level of bureaucracy and centralisation of decision-making in the DSİ was experienced by the delegation at first hand with constant replies of ‘I don’t know’ and ‘I can’t tell you that’ to requests for basic information from the regional branches. The Regional Director of the DSİ in Diyarbakır explained that his office’s responsibility was implementation of the building of the dams, control of the projects and collection of data for impact assessments including cultural heritage in the area. But he commented to the delegation that ‘we don’t have the authority to speak to you about the new projects [in the area].’

Despite the fact that the regional branches of the DSİ consistently referred the delegation to their Ankara headquarters regarding most questions about the dams, the atmosphere at senior management level is one of suspicion of anyone wanting to find out about the projects and secrecy regarding project documents. When the delegation asked for copies of a ÇED report (the Turkish domestic environmental impact assessment) for Hakkari dam, the Deputy Department Head of Investigation and Planning at DSİ headquarters, Ms Cansen Akkaya, refused: ‘You cannot have this report. It’s not just you, we don’t give this information to anyone.’ In fact, the same official tried to claim to the delegation at first that this report did not exist even though staff in her department had already
informed us that it did. Given these obstacles to getting hold of basic information, it is very difficult for those directly affected to find out anything about projects that impact their lives so seriously. It is also obvious that whatever changes are being made to the law on paper, for example, regarding freedom of information, in practice State institutions like the DSİ expect to carry on operating without accountability.

The latest EU progress report on Turkey points to corruption as a continuing and serious problem. This is no less true of the energy market and within that, the water sector; dam building companies have had to be investigated more than once and compensation processes have been hijacked by wealthy landowners indulging in land speculation and attempting to inflate the amount of compensation due to them. An example in the Munzur valley is outlined in chapter three of this report and instances have been noted in previous reports for Ilısu and other dams. One issue is that before 2002, companies working in the Kurdish region benefited financially from the imposition of emergency rule, with all of the gross violations of human rights that that enabled. They received extra insurance payouts to compensate for the ‘risk factor’ involved in working there. However, at least one company working in Tunceli is reported to have continued receiving payments after the end of OHAL, which points to the need for wider investigation of such practices.

Parliamentarians, businessmen, senior officials and top level ministers were all embroiled in one of the biggest corruption scandals in Turkey in recent times in the energy sector. Daubed the White Energy affair, an investigation by the army discovered in 2001 that fifteen top officials awarded multi-billion dollar electricity contracts to favoured companies in return for large bribes. Many officials convicted were from the state electricity board (TEAS) and one ex-minister, Mr Birsel Sonmez, received almost ten years in prison. Many of those involved implicated the Turkish Energy Minister at that time, Mr Cumhur Ersumer, but he was not indicted. This same Minister was a co-signatory to the bilateral agreement between the US and Turkey, in 1998, to contract nine dams to US companies, including Konaktepe in the Munzur valley and the Hakkari dam. The investigation into the affair is continuing but in the interim, any agreements and energy generation projects associated with Mr Ersumer should be halted until the awarding of those contracts can be examined.

The Cultural Rationale of GAP

The delegation found that the DSİ alternates between two approaches to cultural heritage in the region: certain kinds of heritage, which it considers significant are to be
appropriated. Everything else is dismissed as insignificant or not recognised as existing. The comments of Mr Nihat Üstundağ, the Director of DSİ Diyarbakır are an example of the first approach. He claimed to the delegation that the GAP project is the natural successor to the prehistoric and medieval use of the River Tigris:

‘People used to use very primitive ships on this water and took steps on the Silk Road. The works done increased the level of technology in those times. Today, we need more energy and we need to expand agriculture and the GAP project has been prepared in this sense, within this tradition.’

As part of its brief then, the DSİ in Diyarbakır aims to assess the cultural impacts of the dams. ‘DSİ values revolve around cultural work and protecting cultural values,’ according to its director. But given both the history of the region in recent times and the continuing repression there, it’s no wonder that the dams and the GAP project appear to many to be part of a continuing strategy of controlling or even eradicating Kurdish people by displacing them, dislocating their communities and submerging cultural heritage.

Who heritage is important to and why, including disputes over it, must be assessed in any consideration of the value of these dam projects. This is a fundamental requirement in various standards for impact assessment, including those of potential creditors for the dam projects discussed here such as the US credit agency, Ex-Im Bank. Key standards prioritise it as a first step, before any other form of assessment or salvage goes ahead. The World Bank, whose guidelines are often used by governments and developers as an international measure in these situations, states that:

‘Significance assessment is the basis for determining any action to protect cultural sites and is part of a site management plan…Social value: This concept embraces the qualities by which a place becomes a focus of spiritual, political, national, or other cultural significance to a majority or minority group…[t]he qualities causing this preference are very important and in many cases are the strongest argument for conserving the place…’

Far from significance assessment, the DSİ denies that dams have any destructive affect on culture and heritage in the Kurdish region or more widely. ‘How can dams destroy culture?’ asked officials in its Ankara headquarters. ‘Turkey gets a great deal of money from tourism and we try to keep our heritage. Why would we prepare a project to destroy these things? It’s nonsense. Turkish and Kurdish, we are all the same.’
Drawing a contrast with their own claim to protect cultural heritage, DSİ officials accused Kurdish people of destroying it. Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Head of the Investigation and Planning Department of the DSİ, commented:

‘People are destroying the cultural heritage. In Hasankeyf they make toilets in the monuments but we will document these monuments. If we don’t do this work with the dams, then the heritage will all be gone. Also, the PKK bombed archaeological sites and has placed landmines all over the area. People leave the area because of terrorism and as a result, there is no one left to look after the structures. Many of them are built of mud brick and they fall apart. In fifteen years, most of the archaeological structures will be destroyed anyway. For example, walls at Hasankeyf will be destroyed because of time anyway, so our people, TAÇDAM, have tried to support the walls.’

By contrast, when speaking of the Munzur valley where there is no spectacular single site like Hasankeyf, she dismissed the question of cultural impacts, saying ‘there is nothing there.’ The implication is that the people in that valley, whose communities and considerable natural, cultural and historical wealth will be destroyed by the dams, do not count.

These allegations are not borne out by facts. It is well established that large dams submerge cultural heritage the world over and cannot be construed as a protection of that heritage. It is true that some monuments, for example, in Hasankeyf are in a dilapidated state and some members of communities do damage sites. That is the case all over the world and there are a variety of reasons why that occurs. However, to say only this is to ignore the efforts residents and campaigners in Tunceli, the Ilısu area and elsewhere have made to defend culture and heritage from submergence. It can also be noted that until the potential destruction of Hasankeyf itself by the Ilısu dam was highlighted by campaigners, the State had not acted to maintain or repair the fabric of the monuments there, as is its legal duty.

The Significance of Heritage in the Reservoir Areas

Some of the heritage in the reservoir areas has attained significance through the work of archaeological science and in that way, has come to be important to many of us removed from our roots. In the context of the Southeast of Turkey, the land along and between the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates is internationally regarded as one of the origin points for our modern Western Asian and European societies, for example, it is one of the earliest places where agriculture was first invented. When this is put together with other
evidence, such as the ancient Silk Road that runs through it, then this area represents the common ancestry and brilliance of the East and the West. The dams have destroyed and would destroy evidence for our common humanity in this way. For example, although some highly important Neolithic (New Stone Age) sites have been or are being excavated in the region, providing new evidence of the very earliest domestication of plants and animals in this area, there is not enough time or resources to know the extent of such evidence being lost from this time.  

Perhaps less well known is the potential of the dams to submerge important evidence for our African and Middle Eastern origins as a species. One of the major debates in the archaeological science of human origins concerns the relationship between Neanderthals and ourselves, modern humans. The debate revolves around whether Neanderthal DNA is part of our make up or whether modern humans evolved separately and migrated out of Africa. This would make the Neanderthals an evolutionary cul-de-sac, dying out and being replaced by us. Skeletal, stone tool, DNA and other evidence including plant and animal bone evidence for the ancient environment recovered from caves and their landscape surroundings are vital in this debate. The Middle East is seen as a key area for resolving these questions and other sites in the region, in Palestine and Israel for example, have produced evidence for the first modern human beings as well as Neanderthals.  

Evidence of stone tools from this time has been recovered from, or close to, all of the reservoir areas discussed in this report. The number of Neanderthal skeletons worldwide and the range of evidence associated with them are still small in comparison with what we know of many other societies. Any new evidence is all the more valuable as a result. Furthermore, the nature of this evidence (and that of the Neolithic and much else) is that it is not limited to neatly definable locations but scattered across the landscape and often located inside and around natural features such as caves, of which there are many in the region.

The significance of the destruction by the dams is not only concerned with individual places or, indeed, ancient heritage. Archaeological science is keenly aware of the fact that a site is not necessarily a place built by human hand but can be a natural feature in the terrain, which has become an important cultural, historical or sacred place to a particular social group. This natural feature may have been added to and altered by humans over time or it may simply be left untouched and only those who know that landscape and have knowledge of the important places could pick it out as significant. In addition, archaeologists have recognised over the last few decades that the entire landscape, including the communities that have lived and continue to live in it, is our inheritance and deserves to be studied and cared for as a whole. In recognising this, archaeologists are taking their cue from people's care for natural heritage, in particular,
from indigenous conceptions of place and history around the world. Indigenous movements have sought to protect sacred, natural places and keep community together in the face of various development projects. Many such natural places are now protected in law, listed on national records of culture and heritage in several countries or the subject of conservation charters. Many more have been destroyed, including by dams.

In the case of river valleys, which have been preferred locations for human settlement for millennia, it is clear that the river itself usually embodies a long history and prehistory of travel, trade, ritual, life, death and conflict. The livelihood people get from rivers, their function as source of life and food, cannot but leave traces in and beside them, everything from riverside settlement sites to fish traps, fording points, bridges, animal watering holes, lost objects and sunken boats. It is the work of archaeologists to recover these traces. Many societies have considered rivers sacred and this belief has given birth to myths and legends. This has often involved the deposition of objects into rivers as a ceremonial act or the construction of monuments along their banks and on hills and cliffs high above. Communities have seen rivers as routeways, channels of communication, trade and exchange but also as barriers, lines not to be crossed and markers of territory. Armies have crossed and re-crossed them or have fought at them. Weapons and skeletons are not uncommon finds in and beside rivers as a result. And rivers have also been part of human death rituals, where ashes can be scattered or human bodies sent off to float down a path to the other world. The more recent significance of all three rivers discussed here was raised by a number of interviewees and is discussed below. The authorities in Turkey (and this is not only true of the Kurdish region) have failed to assess the significance of the rivers in a way that acknowledges the continuities between past and present day communities.

Archaeology can also show us that evidence of empires and resistance to them, battles and more recent heritage of conflict, has much to say to us today. There is very extensive evidence for all of this in the river valleys of Southeast Turkey. For the first time here, human rights defenders in the region have confirmed, for example, that graves of those disappeared during the 1990s may well exist in these reservoir areas, a matter raised by a number of people interviewed by the delegation. It is already known that many burnt and evacuated villages would be submerged by the reservoirs of the dams mentioned here, the majority by the Ilısu dam. Physical evidence for the destruction still remains in those empty, ruined villages, recoverable by forensic archaeologists and others. But when archaeological investigation is carried out within ‘rescue’ operations in advance of dams and under security restrictions like those still existing in Southeast Turkey, it
cannot meet this challenge.

In the case of other countries, such evidence has been used in a number of national and international courts and it is always possible that it could be required in a future case, for compensation purposes within Turkey and in any future attempts to end the conflict in the Southeast. Human rights defenders in the region attempt to collect such evidence where they can, under repressive circumstances. Where wars and dictatorships resulted in disappearances elsewhere in the world, part of the process of ending the violence has usually been demanding that those missing people be accounted for. Argentina and Ireland are two examples. But in Turkey it is highly unlikely in the current climate that forensic archaeologists and other scientists could search for or examine such graves freely and independently.

While it may well be seen as a distinct advantage to sectors of the State, it is not the case that the State of Turkey is building all of the dams solely to destroy Kurdish society or Kurdish culture. The Hasankeyf Volunteers say that the dams would destroy "the culture of Mesopotamian peoples." It is not only Kurdish culture here; it is a joint value and inheritance of all. The threads of civilisation are here, going back thousands of years. There is also other recent heritage at risk in the reservoir areas, for example, the potential submergence of Armenian heritage as a result of the Munzur valley, Ilısu and Hakkari dams.

This is a region where many social and religious groups, the armies of several empires and many travelers have crossed and re-crossed, moved, traded, settled down together and fought. Recent heritage in all the reservoir areas discussed here includes the sacred sites, places and landscapes of a number of traditions within Islam, Alevism, Christianity and more besides. It includes linguistic heritage, present in living speakers of at least two Kurdish dialects for example and physical remains, which could tell us much about the archaeology of language. Since the authorities show little or no concern for most medieval or recent heritage and for the most part it is not even recognised in reservoir areas, the recent history and evidence for the complex ethnic origins of several different groups will go largely unrecorded under the waters of the reservoirs, including Kurdish, Armenian, Turkish, Arab, Assyrian.

Thus, the populations affected by the dams are much wider than the communities resident in the valleys where they would be built. Many of those who may well find this cultural heritage important no longer live in the area; some communities are scattered across the world. It’s hardly likely that all these people have been consulted but it is the case that some at least may well have a legal case against these projects, for example, on
religious grounds.96

The destruction of Kurdish communities today and the submergence of a diversity of histories, recent and ancient, impacts on all of us. **Without an assessment of this, the reservoir would submerge any traces and deny us historical truth, all the more serious where the relations between religious communities are disputed and the histories of ethnic groups have been repressed and distorted, for so long.** A major factor in this lack of attention is the fact that the recent history of a number of communities in Turkey, and most especially that of Kurdish people, has been taboo since the foundation of the State and distortion of that history a common occurrence.97 Along side this has gone the most severe repression of cultural practices, beliefs and language. The Kurdish language was banned for various periods up to 1991 and its usage in public life is still restricted.

The issue of return to villages from which people are displaced is key in all three areas discussed here and is fundamental to this question of the survival of culture, all the more so where there has been so much repression. People want to return or do not want to leave their villages in reservoir areas because of dams. Their life is in those places, their means of survival, their inherited connections with the past, their links to each other. Thus, heritage is embodied in these people’s villages and can only be saved by those displaced being able to return once more and those still resident being able to remain. This was the cultural destruction that most concerned people affected by the dams. Ms Handan Coşkun, a spokeswoman for the DIKASUM organisation commented:

‘The State could stop the dams and give respect to people’s history and culture. Our graves are important to us here. There are graves in those reservoir areas, which people will not be able to visit. Our old people want to be buried where they belong in their villages; this is a serious violation to take people’s soil from them. We perceive the dams as a political intervention.’98

This is born out by official surveys; in 1999 a survey of people’s attitudes to the dam, by the export credit guarantee department of the UK government found them extremely worried about the reservoir covering over family graves and the fact that no assistance seemed to be on offer to either move the graves or avoid flooding them.99 The question of people’s right to have access to their culture and heritage is one that is recognised in various standards and in the draft UN Declaration on indigenous peoples.100

If the villages do not continue, what will be destroyed is community itself – the cultural and historical networks within and between people in the villages and between those in the villages and those who have fled from war and poverty to the cities. History would
be destroyed, not only because empty buildings, cemeteries and fields would be under water but because the life of the community in those places will be wiped out, villagers separated from one another and families broken down. Roads would be flooded or cut off, health care and schools unavailable, drinking water polluted, animal, plant and fish life killed off. The possibility of history and culture being made by those communities in the future would end and also, the inherited connections to past generations. Even the looming threat of the dams begins this process of erasing culture because those areas have been re-designated as valueless, about to be submerged, and people leave.

Though often invisible and unvalued, the work of building and maintaining community is done primarily by women, in the work of giving birth to and caring for their children and everyone in the household or village. This is a key means by which culture is shaped, transmitted, defended and changed. In fact, not only individuals and communities but also the acts and relationships of which they are comprised and their culture can only live by and through this biological, manual and mental work. The opposition of women to the dams – the break up of everyone and everything they have created, should be understood in this context.

In opposing the dams, people defend the language, customs, habits, traditions, spirituality and other relations between them, not as ‘folklore’ to be collected and studied by others but on which they depend for their survival and well-being. People’s defence of these things, their struggle to hold onto memory and place is not superstition but a respect for the strategies of survival, sometimes miraculous in the circumstances that their ancestors and they themselves have worked out. It is their own value and their connection with their past that they are defending. The point is not to propose a static ‘traditional life’ in the villages and prevent change for the better but to understand culture and heritage as living relationships between people, past and present. Therefore, the sole project instigated by the authorities to save recent heritage, the study of traditional architecture in selected villages before they are submerged, cannot save this history because it is recording inert objects and soon to be dead culture.101

Dams and Cultural Assimilation

The GAP project has always been underpinned by the long-standing assimilation policies of the Turkish State with regard to Kurdish people - their forced inclusion into mainstream Turkish society and culture. This is clear from the official publicity for the project and statements of the most senior officials who implement parts of the plan. The GAP web site refers to the purpose as being to ‘reinstate civilisation to the Upper
Mesopotamia\textsuperscript{102} implying the demeaning of the whole of society in the region, suggesting that it has somehow degenerated since ancient times and is in need of superior cultural forms, imposed from the outside and the top down. It has been suggested in a paper for UK Defence Forum, a think-tank that advises the UK government, that the Turkish authorities have promoted GAP as a tool for altering the demography of the region by means of the displacement of many Kurdish people into large towns in order to exercise more effective control over them, over the terrain and over water resources.\textsuperscript{103} The projects in each of the three areas discussed here will flood or cut off roads and in all cases, this will result in at least part of the population outside the immediate reservoir area (and potentially the whole population in the Munzur valley) being denied access to basic services and/or being forced to leave.

The cultural aims of GAP have an ominous ring to them for many Kurdish people. A representative from Göç-Der in Diyarbakır said that ‘war doesn’t just mean to kill a person with a weapon. If you cut down the trees or kill a culture, that’s war.’ \textsuperscript{104} İsmail Acar, the Deputy Mayor of Batman, from the pro-Kurdish DEHAP party, said that ‘this dam [Ilısu] aims at submerging Kurdish culture.’\textsuperscript{105} The women's organisation DIKASUM said that ‘a geography will be destroyed by these dams, especially in Tunceli, which is a national park. History will also be destroyed. It’s a massacre.’\textsuperscript{106} People spoke about the submergence of Hasankeyf as an act of monumental cultural vandalism, with many seeing it as an attack on Kurdish culture.

Some however are cautious about making claims to the cultural heritage the dams would destroy and the Hasankeyf Volunteers and others, for example, listed the many histories present in Hasankeyf, not just Kurdish. There are dam projects all over Turkey where cultural heritage is at risk and there are projects outside of the Kurdish region where the expression of another cultural identity and a complex ancestral heritage is also a key difficulty, for example the case of communities of probable Georgian descent on the Çoruh river.\textsuperscript{107}

But whatever the truth of the claims in the Kurdish region, some Kurdish people's identification of themselves as the inheritors of the great wealth of history and prehistory in the reservoir areas has to be understood as one response to the attempt to displace them and deny their existence. \textbf{If it is said that people have no culture or heritage or} artefacts and sites are claimed as ‘Turkish heritage’ only, then the claim to existence of a community can be denied.

The reservoirs covering the largest surface area, per square kilometre, have been or are being built in the Kurdish region.\textsuperscript{108} The presence of such large dams in the Southeast
is certainly an indicator of external political and economic factors. But the fact that it has been possible to appropriate such large areas of major river valleys must also be seen to be related to the level of repression of the Kurdish population resident in them. In the case of the Munzur valley that rationale is the only one that satisfies any attempt to explain the reasoning behind the projects there.

The comment of the World Archaeological Congress, the largest global organisation of archaeologists, following the withdraw of UK company Balfour Beatty from the Ilısu dam remains true today and can be applied to the Munzur and Hakkari dams as well:

‘In its displacement of up to 78,000 mostly Kurdish people and its destruction of their culture heritage, the Ilısu dam would have amounted to a form of ethnic cleansing in which governments and companies would have been complicit.’

This cleansing of culture can also be applied to the other histories present in the reservoir areas.

**Problems with Assessment and Salvage of Cultural Heritage**

The archaeological salvage projects in advance of dams involve joint work between the DSİ and various archaeological institutions, managed by TAÇDAM, the State salvage organisation. There is a more extensive discussion that can be had concerning these projects but the most important issue for the archaeological case concerning the dams is whether the affected communities, with archaeological assistance, can succeed in first of all assessing the full extent of impacts and then, saving all that has been laid out above. At the moment, there appear to be surveys and salvage projects for the Ilısu dam but not the other projects discussed in this report.

In this region, the problems with archaeological surveys of ancient or more recent heritage, mandatory for assessment of impacts, are many. Surveys have taken place for Ilısu and completed projects such as the Keşan dam. The security situation prevented parts of those areas from being examined and people from being consulted for many years, particularly when the region was under emergency rule. Surveys have been carried out with many physical areas inaccessible due to the presence of the military, village guards or landmines. While the situation has improved, it is unlikely that a complete survey of historic, cultural or sacred places could occur in any of the reservoir areas discussed here, due to security factors in the region. GAP continues to be supported by a structure of military control, which has grave implications for the way in which all
of its activities – cultural and social projects as well as irrigation and power generation – are carried out. **The military has responsibility for cultural property in all of the areas** and is responsible for the maintenance of heritage as well as permission for surveys and excavations. It is not credible to suppose that permission would be granted for surveys to assess possible crimes by the security forces in reservoir areas. This means that archaeological or other cultural work cannot meet basic professional standards at present since there is limited freedom to consult with local people or, for example, to investigate graves of the disappeared.

Since the wider region had hardly ever seen any form of survey before, rapid surveys for dams are lacking in the wider information needed to make comparisons, to work out, for example, what to look for on the ground. Since it is all so unfamiliar, different types of sites and artefacts can easily be missed and normally archaeologists would spend many decades building up a picture of the sorts of settlement characteristic of a region. Professional archaeological standards require that a number of such surveys, using different technologies and forms of assessment should be carried out over a number of years. An archaeological survey project called TAY is attempting to undertake a preliminary survey of the entire country in order to compile a national record of sites and monuments but this will take years to complete and even longer to analyse the findings from it. Turkey is in breach of European cultural heritage law by not having such a national record.\footnote{111}

These points demonstrate that not only are the surveys inadequate to truly know what would be lost, but whether projects are to be assessed as category A projects are not, there is no professional rationale for any cultural work of the DSİ in reservoir areas at this time.\footnote{112} It is a basic archaeological standard that there must be a complete survey before decisions are made on what to excavate and why. Since the foundation of the modern profession of archaeology, the concept of ‘preservation in situ’ i.e. leaving the material in place, has been the basis of professional ethics with regard to physical remains of the past. Yet the DSİ is already planning to remove parts of the architecture of Hasankeyf. It is another basic premise that the people whose heritage it is or who live in that area now should be consulted, all the more so when they are indigenous to that area.\footnote{113}

The apparent refusal of the DSİ to complete impact assessments in Turkey for projects begun before 1993 means that older projects, inevitably less environmentally friendly at the best of times, are not subject to any kind of assessment procedure within Turkey. The Environmental Impact Assessment Report for the Ilısu dam, commissioned in order to satisfy the requirements of international creditors, was not considered an adequate or complete assessment.\footnote{114} It is shocking that there appears to be no assessment at all of any
impacts of the Munzur valley dams and that the Hakkari assessment seems to have been a desktop exercise for the most part.

Concerning the specific issue under discussion here of cultural heritage assessment, the wholesale refusal to meet international standards and legislation on this in major development projects contravenes a large number of international guidelines and directives. Perhaps the most useful to illustrate here are the contraventions of examples of EU directives as a standard against which the Turkish authorities continue to be measured. The 1985 EU Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment\textsuperscript{115} requires the effects on the environment to be taken into account ‘at the earliest possible stage in all the technical planning and decision-making processes...’ It requires ‘prior assessment of the likely significant environmental effects on the environment...’ Dam projects among others come under the category of those projects which must ‘as a rule’ be subject to systematic assessment. Even for projects which, for exceptional reasons, it is decided to exempt from assessment, the member State, according to Article 2, has to ‘make available to the public concerned the information relating to the exemption and the reasons for granting it...’ Most significantly, Article 3 states that:

‘The environmental impact assessment will identify, describe and assess in an appropriate manner, in the light of each individual case and in accordance with Articles 4 to 11, the direct and indirect effects of a project on the following factors: human beings, flora and fauna, soil, water, air, climate and the landscape, the interaction between the factors mentioned in the first and second indents, material assets and the cultural heritage.’

According to the Directive, the lead partner is responsible for the evaluation and information must be shared with the public ‘within a reasonable period of time’. Konaktepe dam in the Munzur valley falls within all of these requirements of the EU Directive yet there appears to be no assessment of impacts and no information available. Equally, a case could be made for the other projects in the valley and for the Hakkari dams, as the Council Directive does not specify the size of the project in that instance. The cumulative impacts of the projects could also be considered, in particular under the more recent 2001 Directive on strategic environmental assessment of plans and programmes, which also mentions cultural, architectural and archaeological heritage.\textsuperscript{116} The term cultural heritage is undefined in the legal systems of many European countries but its usage internationally has generally been in the context of more than physical remains of the past and also includes, for example, beliefs, language, custom, tradition, song and community memory.\textsuperscript{117} This is a major part of the heritage which would be submerged in the Munzur valley in particular. An understanding of this point clarifies the importance of significance assessment in the case of Munzur and the other reservoir
areas discussed in this report; the requirement for such an assessment has already been outlined.

The argument made by the dam builders, when they do consider heritage to be worthy of investigation, that whatever the difficulties, we would never have all of this information but for the dam projects (and that it is a great opportunity to train young archaeologists and test out new technologies), can be weighed against what is being valued here.\textsuperscript{118} The Director of DSİ in Diyarbakır commented that the salvage costs of the archaeological projects for the Ilısu dam are very high, running into millions of dollars, but are worth it to ‘protect cultural values.’\textsuperscript{119} Whatever the truth of any of the claims it is clear that the dam builders have either valued ancient artefacts and sites over the people who live in the reservoir areas now, or are ready to ignore those who are making culture today and their more recent heritage, sometimes the descendents of those the archaeologists are studying. Either approach makes it all the easier to implement projects the communities reject and which will displace them. It represents the cleansing of the diversity of history of all of us.

Regional Disputes and Potential for Water Wars

People from all walks of life made clear the political and military advantage of the dam reservoirs in the Kurdish region and the widely held view that any benefits from the dams would go to western Turkey. The drive to Tunceli from Elaziğ entails crossing the enormous reservoir of the Keban dam by ferryboat. On the delegation’s journey, all vehicles were being stopped at a checkpoint on the Tunceli side and each passenger asked for ID. Men on the bus remarked to the soldier that KONGRA-GEL would not come this way. The soldier replied, ‘well how else would they get across except by the reservoir, that’s the whole point.’ In 2001, soldiers commented to Channel 4 news in the UK in a similar fashion that the Ilısu dam would cut off routes the PKK took and this motive is acknowledged in a UK defence briefing.\textsuperscript{120} In Hakkari, the Ilısu dam area and Tunceli, the same comment was made repeatedly. Another factor that arises from the renewal of the armed conflict in the Kurdish region and from the Iraq war is the possibility of threats to destroy the dams. In October 2004, the Turkish media reported an attack on the oil pipeline of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation in Batman province, close to the Ilısu reservoir area, believed to be carried out by KONGRA-GEL.\textsuperscript{121} An act of war on any of the GAP dams but particularly on the larger reservoirs would have catastrophic effects for communities in each area and downstream, affecting untold numbers of people.
The downstream effects of GAP also have international implications for stability and security in the region because it is not only oil but water – who controls it, who sells it and who needs it – that is key to future conflict issues there. The Euphrates, Tigris and Zap are shared rivers, rising in Turkey but flowing into Syria and Iraq where they have met the needs of communities there for drinking water, agriculture, transport by river and more for millennia. The construction of dams and the control of water have already led to the mobilisation of armies in the region. The start of the Keban dam construction triggered protests from Syria to Turkey and the completion of the Tabqua dam in Syria led Iraq to threaten military action in 1974 and 1975, although this dispute has since been resolved. Tensions have continued and both the Syrian and former Iraqi government have protested to Turkey about the GAP project. The UK Defence Forum, a think-tank that advises the UK government, has described it as:

‘One of the region’s most dangerous time-bombs. The dispute has not erupted yet because the project has not reached its full potential. By the time of its planned completion in 2010 [now 2015], the vital interests involved give it the potential to become one of the region’s most dangerous flashpoints.’

The Turkish State has made very belligerent statements over the years about ownership of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. Three of the major dams in Turkey on the Euphrates, Keban, Karakaya and Atatürk, have a huge surplus storage capacity so that Turkey has the means to cut off the flow of the river downstream for some time. The actions to match the words included an incident in 1990 where Turkey blocked the flow of the Euphrates for nine days while filling the reservoir of the Atatürk dam. Syria and Iraq both stated that Turkey had not informed them of the plan to cut the supply downstream and Iraq threatened to bomb all the Euphrates dams.

Problems with downstream flow rates have continued and both Iraq and Syria protested that they were not consulted on the plans for the Ilısu dam, in contravention of international law. These problems have not arisen with the Greater Zap since the dams on that river have not yet been built. However, one human rights lawyer explained that for years people in the Hakkari area have viewed the prospect of these dams as ‘a kind of gun against the Iraqi Kurds.’ The potential of the GAP project to increase already very volatile tensions where there are also now the repercussions of the Iraq war to consider is enormous. It was not within the remit of this report to undertake an in depth analysis of the risks of water wars which may arise as a result of the Iraq conflict. Nevertheless, included in the findings below are some immediate implications that people in the region are raising.
Despite the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East, the attitude of officials in the DSİ is still one of belligerence towards downstream neighbours. Officials in the Investigation and Planning Department in Ankara claimed that ‘Arab NGOs’ acting in the interests of Iraq and Syria had scuppered previous plans for the Ilısu dam.\textsuperscript{128} Asked for evidence of this allegation, they suggested that the two governments, by means of these NGOs, had bought shares in Balfour Beatty and voted down the project. In fact, independent campaigners in the UK have engaged in shareholder protests on Ilısu. On the other hand, there is also a denial of the problem. Discussing downstream flows, a civil engineer in the Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants in the Ankara headquarters said that there were not now and had never been any problems with downstream flows of the Euphrates and Tigris.\textsuperscript{129} He commented: ‘Even on the Euphrates, there is no problem and we have no problem with Syria about that. In fact, the Atatürk dam protected Syria from flood damage so we were doing them a favour. Recently, a dam in Syria was ruined because of the flooding problem.’\textsuperscript{130} This is an extra-ordinary claim in view of past incidents, the frequent observable reduction in the flow of the Euphrates and statements of the Syrian government that there has been no consultation by Turkey with them about the shared water.\textsuperscript{131} The delegation was able to see the problem with downstream flows at a local level in the case of the Batman dam, which has moved the course of the Batman river and reduced the flow of water down into the Tigris.

Foreign Investment Opportunities and BOT Projects

In its bid to join the EU and remain a strategic US ally in the region, Turkey offers opportunities to companies and governments for investment. The extent to which the State will go to accommodate these companies may be seen in the Host Government Agreement and Inter-Government Agreement for the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline which will bring oil from the Caspian Sea to the Turkish port of Ceyhan.\textsuperscript{132} ‘The infringement of communities’ and workers’ rights on this project may well set a precedent for other multinational consortiums. It is already the case that companies and governments take economic advantage out of the displacement of Kurdish people and looking the other way when major human rights violations accompany the resettlement processes for the dams.

The Turkish government may not refuse the companies but affected communities and campaigners made their feelings clear. Members of the Hasankeyf Volunteers asked a question often repeated in the region throughout our visit:
‘Why are Europe and the US and their companies exporting old technology and old energy means – large dams – to Third World countries like Turkey? Dams are discredited everywhere and it’s certainly not regional development that is going on here. These dams expire after a short time, many in thirty years, so they’re no use to us. The Build-Operate-Transfer model won’t benefit Turkey, it’ll benefit the companies who will make their profit then hand the dam over to the State when it is almost ending its use life.’

All of the projects discussed in this report are BOT projects i.e. Build-Operate-Transfer. This means that the developer, in this case the DSİ, contracts the construction out to private companies who operate the dam once built for an agreed period of time before handing it over to the State. The efficiency of the dam in making electricity is often much reduced by the time the State takes back control. The State has invested a large amount in the GAP project relative to the private companies and foreign governments: $14 billion from domestic resources have been invested in GAP, while international institutions and the private sector have invested $3.5 billion. The electricity board is currently being privatised and many believe that the process of accession to the EU will result in the full privatisation of many services in Turkey, including water supply and water power. Families in the displaced neighbourhoods of cities and in the villages will be unable to afford piped water or electricity, resulting in life threatening poverty.

Others drew analogies between the dams and other ‘old fashioned’ technologies introduced to the region. İsmail Acar, the Deputy Mayor of Batman, pointed out that eight coal burning plants built by the State in the Kurdish region were impacting badly on the air quality. Asked about the use of older, polluting technologies, DSİ officials were dismissive. One official comment that ‘the developing countries must build dams because the economy of these countries is dependent on generating energy. Because they have finished investment in water resources in their own countries, it is easy for European countries to criticise us.’ When the delegation pointed out that the report of the World Commission on Dams shows that most of the opposition to large dams is by communities directly affected in the Third World, not in Europe, he dismissed this and questioned the sources of the WCD’s funding.

The strategic interests of governments in granting credit for water projects in the region clearly underpin the GAP project. This is outlined in the statement of the then US Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham in 2002, when the contract for Konaktepe in the Munzur valley was signed:

‘Turkey is a valued ally, especially in today’s world environment. The United States is especially grateful for Turkey’s role in fighting international terrorism. These agreements
are very significant in the energy realm, and are examples of the strong relationship our two countries share.\textsuperscript{137}

Whether this particular relationship remains the same in the context of the Iraq war is a key question for future water projects in the region. One company now involved with Ilısu told a campaigning source that the new Turkish government means financing will be easier to obtain than before from other governments and lending institutions. The Iraq war is believed by many people in the region to be a major factor now in whether water projects in Turkey go ahead. One Ilısu campaigning group gave these reasons for such a belief, echoed by a number of other people in the region: ‘From now on, the reason why dams will or will not be built in the Southeast of Turkey in particular will be on the basis of whether they suit US interests. The dams here are now related to the US dominance in the Middle East.’\textsuperscript{138} The view of a number of campaigners on both Ilısu and Hakkari is that neither dam is now beneficial to US interests in Iraq because they will hold water upstream from water projects by US companies there.

In the case of Hakkari this situation is more straightforward because the US company building that dam, part of Washington Group International, has won a contract to supply $600 million in services to develop water resources in Iraq.\textsuperscript{139} The delegation did hear that one source, an official working in Hakkari, believes that the Hakkari dam has now been halted. This could not be verified. In the case of Ilısu however, this scenario could indicate potential for future conflict since the companies wanting to invest are European and competing with US companies for control of water resources in the region. This cannot be viewed apart from Turkey’s ambitions to join the EU. In the recent past, the former government of Iraq estimated that once GAP irrigation projects on the Tigris are completed, it would receive 47% less water in that river than at present.\textsuperscript{140} Of course, Ilısu is a dam for generating electricity but it is also being built to regulate water flow on the Tigris from other dams. This potential to hold water upstream using the Ilısu dam, combined with the fact that it is inseparable from irrigation dams like Cizre, means that it would very likely play a part in any future attempts to reduce downstream flows of water. An independent assessment of data on flow rates in the Environmental Impact Assessment Report for the Ilısu Dam found that even normal operation of the dam would create significant reductions in flow, affecting both Iraq and Syria.\textsuperscript{141}

**Conclusion**

The evidence suggests that the GAP project has not delivered the growth and the benefits promised by the State to everyone in the region, because it has not adequately tackled
the effects on women, children and men of an unequal land distribution in a landlord system (doubling as a political/religious system), the effects of armed conflict (including forced displacement), lack of provision of literacy in Kurdish and the export of much of the electricity and other goods generated out of the region. In fact, it has often reinforced and encouraged this situation and particularly, endorsed and extended the devaluing of Kurdish women and the basic work of survival that most do. The destruction of culture and heritage by the dams represents a cleansing of the diversity of the region’s long history, impacting on the whole of humanity. The dangers posed by the GAP project at a regional level are immense, placing it at the heart of current and future tensions and conflicts. The rationale for the dams is complex, and clearly there are different reasons for different dams. It is not reasonable to suggest that the hydroelectric dams are only or even, in some cases, mainly for energy generation in order to supply people's needs. The profit motive is key but in the case of Munzur, for example, there seems to be no rational basis for investment. It will effect destruction of Kurdish communities, their own natural, linguistic, sacred and cultural heritage and the heritage of those who went before them.
CHAPTER 3:

THE MUNZUR VALLEY DAMS

‘We didn’t have enough information at the time on the environmental damage the dam would do. Now we are more aware but it is too late for us’ - Villager whose land will be submerged by the reservoir of the Uzunçayır dam

The Projects and the Companies

Eight dams and hydroelectric power plants have been planned for the river Munzur in the province of Tunceli (Dersim). Five dams will be built on the Munzur itself, one on the tributary Harcik river and two on the Mercan tributary. The opinion of local people is that the electricity from them, negligible in national terms, is to feed the grid already set up at Keban dam. It is widely known that Keban, Karakaya and Atatürk are silting up, with the result that the energy generated from their power stations has fallen. It appears that the electricity from Keban goes to industry in western Turkey. Local people say that there is no need for that sort of energy production in Tunceli. An official from ATA Holdings, one of the companies involved with the projects, has acknowledged this. According to local people, the purpose of the dams is firstly, ‘to get people out of the place where we live’ and secondly, ‘for national and international companies to profit from investments in water and energy here.’ The former but not the latter suggestion is borne out by the figures: the dams will cost $2 billion to build according to local and international NGOs; yet the total energy generation from all eight projects will be only 362 megawatts (MW). This is less than 1% of Turkey’s gross annual energy generation, in an already glutted energy market. The cascade effect the dams will create on the river has been discredited as an efficient means of energy production while their cumulative impacts have a qualitatively and quantitatively more serous effect on communities and their environment.

Two projects are already built, with one now almost ready to go into operation at Uzunçayır, south of the city of Tunceli. Uzunçayır is an earthfill and gravel dam, 69.50 metres high from its foundation and 58 metres from the riverbed. Its reservoir will be 13.43 km² and will generate 74 MW. Mr Ali Sariççek, the Director of the DSİ branch in Tunceli said that the body of the dam is finished and there are some facilities in place,
but for other technology such as the turbines, the DSİ in Ankara has just opened the tendering process. The same director had no information on what companies might be involved, on any impact assessments for this or other dams in the valley. ‘I don’t know anything’ and ‘that is not our responsibility here’ were recurring responses. There is correspondence between the DSİ and the municipality regarding changing the channels the river flows in, in order to begin inundation and at the same time provide continued access to the river for those who need it. The municipality is demanding that the DSİ pays for this work to be done and new access roads made. The Mercan hydroelectric plant is built but not in operation yet. Other dams are still at planning stages and little is known about them.

From information given to the delegation during the fact-finding mission, it appears that no one has yet been consulted about the Konaktepe dam, the other major project on the river. Konaktepe, despite apparent attempts by the DSİ to make it into two, will comprise only one dam, its hydroelectric plant and a release mechanism for the water further down the river. It’s a rockfill dam whose height is 125 metres from its foundation or 118.50 metres from the river bed, capacity is 138 MW (or annual generation of electricity would be 579 Gwh) and the reservoir area would be 20km². The most recent event has been a sondage at the point where it is intended to build the dam on the river, in order to test the geological composition and slope of the area. This was completed by ATA holdings, the Turkish company in the consortium for Konaktepe. The sondage was carried out, according to the date on the concrete cap from 18th to 25th August 2002.

In 1998, the US government made a bi-lateral agreement with Turkey on hydropower projects, under which US companies would win contracts for nine dams including Konaktepe in the Munzur valley. It seems there is also a US-Turkey agreement specifically about the development of water resources in the Munzur valley. The foreign companies involved include the US engineers Stone and Webster, part of the Shaw Group; Strabag AG (Austria); VA Tech (Austria) is indirectly involved through its electrical and mechanical equipment subsidiaries in the US, VA Tech Voest MCE Corp. and VA Tech Elin USA Corp. The Turkish companies are ATA Holdings and Soyak Uluslarasi Insaat ve Yatrim A.S.

VA Tech is also now getting directly involved in the discredited Ilısu dam (see chapter four) and has been part of consortia for a number of very damaging projects including Atatürk and Birecik in Turkey, the San Roque dam in the Philippines and Urra 1 in Colombia. ATA Holdings was also involved in the building of the Atatürk dam and allegations have since been made that the dam’s partial subsidence was due to the company cutting corners in the construction work. The involvement of these companies
means that applications will probably be made to European and US credit agencies. The likely European agencies would be Austria’s Österreichische Kontrollbank (OeKB), the German ECA Hermes, the Swiss ECA ERG and the French agency, COFACE. Another agreement between Turkey and the US in 1998 specifically mentioned Konaktepe and referred to the interest of the US export credit agency, Ex-Im Bank in funding such projects.\footnote{154}

The Uzunçayır dam project exhibited all the hallmarks of corruption as well as poor labour practices which have dogged large dam construction all over the world. Workers on the dam did not have their social insurance paid for some months, so when some were injured or went off sick, they had no income. The wages were the minimum payable in Turkey and the jobs were not secure. When workers tried to organise themselves into a union to fight the poor pay and conditions, they were sacked and the management brought in other workers from western Turkey to finish the job. At a meeting with the EMEP party, which was involved in the organising, the delegation was informed that 90 per cent of the workers had been sacked.\footnote{155} Lawyers have begun legal proceedings to establish construction workers’ right to secure jobs and entitlement to social insurance contributions.

The Munzur dams in general, and more recently the Uzunçayır project, have also been associated with corruption. Media reports have suggested that the company building Uzunçayır had illegally benefited from insurance payouts indemnifying them against the high-risk environment in the Tunceli area.\footnote{156} These payments were supposed to be discontinued after the end of OHAL and the reduced tension in the region but the company continued to claim and be paid the money. According to the report, Mr Cemil Özgür, the company director, benefited to the tune of sixty two trillion TL from this fraud.\footnote{157} The company requested 28.6 trillion TL on the basis of the ‘terror risk.’ The article states that the DSİ conducted an investigation into these corruption allegations and uncovered illegal activities on the part of the company, which DSİ published in a report. The delegation asked the DSİ offices in Tunceli, Diyarbakır and Ankara for various reports including this one but was either refused or told they did not know about it.\footnote{158} The question remains: if one company has been operating in this way, how many others have done so?
Impacts of the Dams

Costs to Families, Communities and their Carers

The key impact according to local people consulted is that the road through the valley along the river will be submerged, mostly by Konaktepe. Not just a matter of practicalities: residents drew attention to the long history of use of the river as a guide to journeys through the valley, probably over millennia. Submerging the roads and damming the river will end this and will cut off the villages and towns from each other and from Tunceli city centre. It will isolate Tunceli in the region and make the journey from the small town of Ovacik, further up the valley, to Elazığ much longer. This is clearly going to have consequences for people needing to travel to hospitals especially in emergencies, for example, where women have problems in childbirth. In an already depopulated province, Munzur Valley campaigners point out that it’s hardly likely that infrastructure, not only roads but schools or medical centres, will be provided to deserted rural areas if the dams are built. Therefore, almost everyone will leave, present communities will be broken up and people already displaced by armed conflict will be unable to return. Local people fear that the province itself will be abolished due to the lack of remaining population since historically, this has been shown to be a longstanding aim in order to put down opposition to repression in the valley. The dams will impact on eighty-four villages in the region, but the size of affected communities is actually much greater when cultural destruction on this scale is taken into account.

The expropriation and construction processes in the case of Uzunçayır were dogged by irregularities and inadequate compensation to villagers who will lose lands, crops and houses. Most of those displaced by Uzunçayır have left for cities in western Turkey and only a few opted to move to Tunceli city centre itself. The dam is said to have resulted in a great deal of environmental damage even in the construction phase, with torn hillsides, polluted water supplies and dead fish after the use of explosives. One man, whose village will not be submerged but whose lands and fruit trees will go under the reservoir, explained how his and other families at first wanted the dam but had to go to court to get the amount of compensation increased. He commented: ‘We didn’t have enough information at the time on the environmental damage the dam would do. Now we are more aware but it is too late for us.’ This reflects a general experience. Some compensation amounts were quite high because of the high value of land in that area, close to the city centre; others, it is said, got little or nothing. In the case of the other dams, the land will not be worth as much, and since most of it is within the national park it is already owned by the State. In addition, another problem one human
rights lawyer stressed was the fact that inflation rises after the compensation awards for Uzunçayır meant that many people’s awards lost much of their value.\textsuperscript{163} It appears that an amendment to the law now rules out cases taken to increase compensation.\textsuperscript{164} This is very worrying since the legal avenue has been the only way people have had, in the past, of obtaining anything close to the real value of their property.

The land situation in Tunceli differs from the landlord system elsewhere in the Kurdish regions. Historically, many of the landlords, some of whom were leaders of the 1930s uprising, were exiled or fled the area. As a result, land was re-divided among those who remained. A larger proportion of people on the land own a small amount compared with other Kurdish areas. Therefore, the enormous problems with title deeds and land ownership, which have arisen with other dams, are not as great an issue in the Munzur valley. On the other hand, the State compulsory purchased the land in the national park several decades ago, so while many people there have use rights, they do not own the land. The delegation visited a temporary camp of families in this situation (many such families were already displaced during the armed conflict in the 1990s) where they were grazing their animals and tending beehives. A young woman in the camp told the delegation that her family and others camped along the riverbank did not want the dam because it would destroy their livelihoods and the environment in the valley.\textsuperscript{165} She explained that in the summer many groups of villagers come down from the hills or if displaced from their villages, out from the town of Ovacık, to graze their flocks of sheep and goats along the river valley. They also practice beekeeping. This livelihood is what keeps many families going through the winter. In particular, the delegation observed that those villagers forcibly evacuated to Ovacık live in draughty, pre-fabricated shacks and are clearly struggling to survive. If the Konaktepe dam is built, the valley will be flooded and this summer practice will have to come to an end. ‘We will have nowhere to go with our sheep and bees so we will have to sell them,’ villagers said.\textsuperscript{166} Asked how the families would then make a living, they did not know. These families have little or no chance of obtaining compensation for lost use rights and livelihoods as a result of the dams.

Even though it is forbidden to fish in the river, a number of people said that they do so because they need an extra food source and they can sell some of their catch to shops and restaurants in Tunceli. That too will come to an end so that people’s diets will suffer and it will be one less source of income for many families. People reckoned that fishing in the reservoir might not be possible due to pollution and fish kills from the dam construction. Or if possible, the authorities would regulate it and subsistence fishing to feed families and generate a small income would no longer be viable.
The consultation and compensation of villagers already displaced by the armed conflict is also an issue for the Munzur valley dams; there are evacuated villages in the Konaktepe and other dam areas and the delegation met with a number of women who had been forced to flee villages which are now threatened with submergence under dam reservoirs. They have not been consulted at all about the dams even though they all want to return to their villages. All but one of the villages in the Konaktepe reservoir area has been evacuated by the military, according to information received by the delegation. The mayor, villagers and campaigning organisations also confirmed that no one has been consulted about Konaktepe or the other planned dams. They are unclear about whether displaced people would receive any compensation in the expropriation processes for these dams.

Some people do believe that the projects will provide desperately needed jobs in construction or are ready to take expropriation money. The delegation also met with villagers originally displaced by the army from the next valley, now housed by the side of the road and the river Munzur. They wanted the dam to be built because they expect to get expropriation money for their fruit trees. ‘Look at these children’, said one man of 70 years. ‘They are thin and hungry because they haven’t got enough to eat. We will get money from the dam and we will go.’ They felt that if they cannot go back to their village they want to leave this new place and the family spoke angrily about what they felt was the failure of the European Union to press Turkey to meet their needs. The grandfather said that he would sell his family’s animals, and take a job somewhere else if he had to, in western Turkey or in Germany. There are a significant number of people affected by the Munzur dams who feel this way, that they have not got enough land to make a living and if the dam comes they will get some money to buy a house in the city or go elsewhere. But the amount is rarely enough to sustain life in the city.

The men here also felt that the dam would provide construction jobs and they might be able to get work there. They had not heard of the problems workers had building the Uzunçayır dam nor the difficulties villagers have had in receiving the compensation they were entitled to. These villagers had not been consulted either about plans for the project. Mr İnan Yılmaz, a lawyer from the Tunceli Bar Association, said that local campaigners have worked to provide as many as possible with any information they can obtain about the dams. But working on a voluntary basis with little or no resources, this is difficult and many people still do not have the knowledge to make an informed decision about the projects. He pointed out that it is the State’s duty to inform.

Health problems resulting from large dams have been documented worldwide, varying from illness resulting from enforced poverty after resettlement to malaria and other
water borne diseases introduced as a result of the large body of stagnant, polluted reservoir water. People in Tunceli also have these fears, particularly because of the lack of sanitation and sewage treatment in the valley, the effects of which the dams will only magnify. Nobody knew of any plans to mitigate the sewage and river pollution problem in advance of the dams. ‘The dams will create huge health problems because of the lack of sewage treatment here’, noted Mr Yilmaz. As a result, it is almost inevitable that children in particular will fall prey to easily curable diseases.

The dams will also damage drinking water sources at natural springs in the valley. The building of the dams is deeply ironic considering the problems with access to clean water in the Tunceli area. Mr Yilmaz commented: ‘There are so many sources of water here but you can't drink from any of them. The water is hard, has a bad taste and it is polluted with sewage, rubbish and animal carcasses. In some places in the city, the water smells because of this.’ Nevertheless, most people are forced to drink the water or else women have to climb the mountains to find clean water coming out of springs in the ground. This can take hours of hard work, the women informed the delegation, and they can't always undertake that work. An older woman noted that it is not generally possible for older people to fetch water so they rely on their neighbours or else they must drink the dirty water. Environmental organisations campaigned for a water purification plant but there is no local government funding for this; the costs are higher than usual because of the topography of the city, built among the mountains and across a series of ravines through which the Munzur flows.

Two neighbourhoods in Tunceli have piped, running water for only one to two hours a day. These are areas where displaced families live. The pipes through which the water flows are lined with asbestos, according to a reliable local expert. He predicted that shortly people would begin to get cancers from this as the pipes were installed ten years ago.

Host Communities

Tunceli itself is likely to be a host city for oustees from Konaktepe and other Munzur dams. A city of 30,000 to 40,000 people, a majority of its people live in desperate conditions. The Mayor of Tunceli, Ms. Songül Erol Abdil, has not been consulted at all about the resettlement process for Konaktepe. Her response to a possible influx of displaced families is: ‘We are under a heavy burden of debt in the municipality and we have very little income. This month, we couldn't even pay the salaries of our workers. So how will we pay for the needs of an influx of people from the dams?’ Even though the
number of affected villages is nothing like the case of the Ilısu dam, she felt that coping with people displaced by these dams was still not possible. She went on to outline the serious deficiencies in services in the city for those already living there. These include lack of clean water, lack of running water in two neighbourhoods, lack of any sewage system. ‘There are so many people who come to us wanting houses, a flow of people from the villages. We have social housing but only two houses are vacant and one hundred families applied for them; there are probably many more families in need of shelter but we don’t even hear from them.’

The city also has a major problem with rubbish collection because it has no collection vehicle despite requests to central government. The health problems that this situation is causing, combined with the lack of clean water, are very serious and, as the delegation heard at first hand, affecting women and children the most.

The centralised system of funding and managing local government exacerbates this situation, not just in Tunceli, but throughout Turkey. The Mayor explained that ‘in the Turkish system, the central government sends money to the municipality and the amount you receive is according to population number. Our population is small and decreasing all the time due to out-migration so the basic recurrent funding we receive is very low. The Bank of Municipalities, which handles the funding, deducts a monthly payment from our allocation at source in order to re-pay our debt. So then we get even less.’ A new law on increasing the control of municipalities over their funds at a local level and other steps towards devolving power to local government had been debated in the parliament but was still not in place at the time of this interview.

Natural Heritage

A large proportion of the Munzur valley (42,000 hectares) is a legally designated national park, the first to be created in Turkey in 1971 and the only protected area in a unique ecological region referred to as the Anatolian Diagonal. The park is protected for good reason. Visually stunning, it is home to a rich concentration of diverse and often rare flora and fauna, including wild pigs, wolves, deer, lynx, falcons, owls, eagles, cranes, storks, parrots, woodpeckers, otters and wild goats. The World Conservation Union (IUCN) classifies the latter two species as vulnerable. The river is home to a wide variety of fish including the red spotted trout which is unknown elsewhere. The diversity of the flora makes the region one of the most important areas in Turkey for plant preservation. The plants and trees include tulips, walnuts, roses, hyacinths, chamomiles and violets. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has warned of the severe threat that dam construction in the wider region poses to plant species. The valley also features a number of natural
springs, some of which people use for bathing and many of which are also holy places. One of these, Halbori springs, will be destroyed by the construction of the hydroelectric plant for Konaktepe. But even springs that will not be submerged such as those at the sacred source of the Munzur will be affected according to campaigners, because of localised climate change due to the dams, resulting in reduced snowfall. Konaktepe’s 16km power tunnel, which is to link the dam with the power plant and speed up the flow of water, would dry up the riverbed for approximately 20km where the water is diverted. This would not only kill off the fish life and cut off people’s access to water; it would damage historical sites (see below).

Thus, ecological balance would be destroyed by the dams with the submergence of land and resources on it and the drying up of parts of the riverbed. Although forests remain in the protected area, the mountains are very denuded of trees. Local people say that the army burnt off the forests on a number of occasions, starting with the Dersim uprising in the 1930s. Some of it is also probably due to overgrazing and the need for fuel, themselves the result of people’s displacement and ensuing poverty. In any case, hill wash and other soil erosion are clearly occurring and the worry has to be that by destroying plant and animal life and creating the conditions for localised climate change, the dam will accelerate this.

The director of the DSİ in Tunceli and other State officials we met were unable to express any opinion on the environmental and cultural impacts any of the dams would have or the fact that the Munzur valley is a protected national park. The DSİ’s General Headquarters appears sanguine about flooding a section of the park; when the question was raised in Ankara, one senior State official retorted that ‘the area to be flooded is less than one per cent of the park.’ Legal cases are continuing.

Structural Stability of the Dams and Suitability of the Area

There are continuing concerns among independent geologists and campaigners about the friability and porous nature of the rock in the reservoir area. The delegation also heard and saw evidence that safety considerations are not a priority with regard to the Munzur valley dams. Women from families displaced by conflict invited the delegation into their houses in the city of Tunceli to take video footage and record the conditions they are forced to live in. The women pointed out large cracks across the floors and walls of their homes, which they said had been caused by an earthquake. These houses on the hills above the city centre had been abandoned by other families at the time of an earthquake some years ago, the epicentre of which was a village several kilometers away.
Many people in Tunceli confirmed this to be the case and referred to other recent ‘quakes. For example in January 2003 an earthquake in excess of 6.0 on the Richter scale occurred nearby in Pulumur. When questioned on the possibility of another earthquake and the stability of the Munzur dams, the local DSİ director said he was searching for studies himself on earthquake risks in the valley, as he did not have any information.\textsuperscript{188} At first he dismissed the possibility of an earthquake in the region, saying ‘that only happens once in a hundred years’ and when the evidence from houses in Tunceli was pointed out to him, he claimed not to know about it.\textsuperscript{189} It is unacceptable that this potential risk of a major catastrophe does not appear to have been investigated.

He also explained that his branch was responsible for implementing the construction works for dams as well as other projects such as flood control. ‘When we implement a project, we include details in our project outline which are designed to make the structure sound. But the authorities say ‘remove these measures because they are too expensive.” This was followed by the statement that ‘we can’t say if they also say this with regard to dams. We can’t tell you that.’\textsuperscript{190} The comment is re-produced here so that others may draw their own conclusions but it does raise questions about potential compromises to the safety of large numbers of people.

The flooding of the rivers in the area was another question on which the DSİ in Tunceli would not be drawn. The Director explained that his branch was responsible for meeting the demands of citizens who had a problem with flooding on the Munzur or any of its tributaries.\textsuperscript{191} The river was low and slow flowing while the delegation was in the area but the run off from melting snows on the mountains in the spring causes the rivers and streams to swell in size and speed up in flow. Both conditions must surely present problems for the dam builders, since the summer flow rate does not look like it could generate much energy at all and the winter/spring increase in flow and volume, with resulting floods, will be difficult to regulate.\textsuperscript{192} The example of the Three Gorges Dam in China is instructive where a dam built to regulate flooding downstream is now struggling to cope with flooding upstream, which some say is a direct result of the dam itself.\textsuperscript{193} The DSİ in Tunceli builds small walls to prevent floods as the water level rises, but its director ‘could not say if this happens regularly on the River Munzur.’\textsuperscript{194}

**Cultural Heritage Impacts**

The cultural impacts of the Munzur dams are many. According to the investigation of the fact-finding mission, they have never been officially assessed and no modern archaeological surveys appear to exist for the area in question. Thus, only preliminary
pointers can be given here. When the delegation asked people in the valley to say what they thought the biggest cultural impact of the dams would be, they all referred to the destruction of the routeway through the valley. Linking it to the many past communities who must have lived and traveled through this place, they made it clear that the submergence of roads and paths will make life very difficult for many families and they may well have to leave. Thus, culture as well as the connection to it of people from that area will be destroyed in the valley.

The valley is often a narrow gorge and this, coupled with the lack of a renowned site, of the stature of Hasankeyf for example, has led some to the incorrect conclusion that there is no cultural heritage of note that will be flooded by the reservoir.

But any assessment worth its name should note that there has been no modern archaeological survey in the area so it is not possible to make a definitive statement as to the existence or not of any sites. It is also inaccurate to assume that because there are not many remains visible above ground in the reservoir areas, this means that there is no worthwhile archaeology. Sub-surface archaeology may well exist, whether it is from ancient times or reflective of more recent use of the valley. River valleys are key locations of human settlement throughout the millennia. There are a number of locations in the valley suitable as settlement sites and which would be investigated by any survey. Most fundamentally, the delegation found that no consultation has taken place with women, children or men now living here or already displaced, about the cultural impacts of these dams. It is unlikely that any meaningful consultation could take place in the context of the current security situation in the area and the wider Kurdish region. So it is not possible to assess the potential for the destruction of community or the full significance of this valley.

In fact, the valley is full of holy places and important cultural sites and, together with its communities, their river and their history, must be taken as a whole cultural and sacred landscape, rather than fragmented bits and pieces to be taken away or recorded and submerged. Many natural places in the valley have great significance for its inhabitants and others. The Munzur, like so many other rivers, is clearly a source of food and water – of life – to the valley’s inhabitants today as it must have been for many generations before. The significance of the river and places along its banks in more recent times of conflict must also be acknowledged.

A few examples will illustrate these points. Just outside Tunceli, heading to Ovacik, the State wants to build Bozkaya dam. This would flood the valley right up to Tunceli, in an area outside the national park. One of the holy sites to be flooded is known locally
as Ana Fatma, meaning Mother Fatma. The site, which is a shrine, is located half a kilometre from Tunceli city centre on both sides of the road and immediately adjacent to the river. It is only one of many, many similar sites, which would be destroyed by all of the dams including Konaktepe and to which people would no longer be able to gain access. The focus of the site is a natural spring, which emerges from the rock on the side of the ravine at two points on the right hand side of the road. Around the main spring and its pool there are many small offerings on the rocks, mainly stones, bits of paper and the remains of many candles which have been set alight (the use of candles in this way is widespread in Turkey). On the tree growing over the spring, many bits of cloth, paper and plastic are tied to the branches. On the other side of the road, immediately above the river, is a metal frame with a hook, which functions as a place of animal sacrifice. Mr İnan Yılmaz, a human rights lawyer in Tunceli, explained that the entire outcrop of rock as well as this spring is known as Ana Fatma who is considered one of a pantheon of spiritual beings, which inhabit the land and manifest themselves in its natural features. Fatma is a water goddess. While the delegation was present in the early evening, we observed a large number of people breaking their journeys in order to stop and pray at the site. Generally, people went to the spring and touched the water, some washing hands and face in it. Some lit candles or tied a piece of cloth to the tree and prayed for the goddess to grant them whatever they asked for. We did not observe any sacrifice while we were there but local people informed us that generally people sacrificed sheep or goats. Apart from ad hoc visits as people passed, many people also plan visits to the site and the vast majority of those who visit are women and children. No one could say how old this practice is although generally people recalled Ana Fatma being a holy place all of their lifetimes and one historian has suggested that the religious use of such springs in the region may have origins as early as the second millennium BCE. It is of course impossible to date any site or practice simply by observing it. An analogy can be made, for example, with similar practices today in Ireland at natural springs called holy wells. The precise date at which any began to have this significance is not usually clear but at least some may have arisen from later prehistoric sacred water rituals subsequently Christianised by the new religion. Several appear on colonial maps from the 19th century. In exactly the same way as the holy springs in Munzur, the wells are visited by members of the public, again often women and children with particular devotion from the traveling community, an indigenous ethnic group. There are similar set activities, which take place during the visit reflecting Catholic religious practice but often seeming to incorporate older traditions. The use of the wells today is tied into changing culture and society in Ireland, the dying away of many of the days of worship at such sites reflecting the enormous shift in Ireland from a predominantly rural society to a place where the majority of younger people live in cities or migrate there. It is not
necessary to look for far-flung and ancient migrations between Ireland and the Kurds to understand this similarity. The point in drawing the comparison is to show that the evidence from other societies, Irish holy wells being one example, suggests that holy places like Ana Fatma are probably marking much older sites involving water rituals and that the sites today are bound up with changing community and society in the region.

More broadly, the sacred nature of the whole landscape and the way in which places became sacred sites in recent times are appropriate considerations here. Once the delegation enquired about this, people were eager to explain how practically every tree, rock and turn of the road has some meaning for them or is understood in a particular way.

The predominant religious orientation in Dersim as a whole is Alevi and these holy places and shrines represent a number of Alevi practices. Alevism is a set of religious practices related to Shi’ism. Significant in itself that the dams will flood religious sites, there is also a wider religious and linguistic damage to be done by destroying the Munzur valley. Kurdish Alevis elsewhere generally trace their origins to Dersim, many having left after uprisings and military operations. People in the valley also speak a particular dialect called Zaza. The core area where this dialect is spoken is Dersim and according to historian David McDowall, ‘there is a large overlap between Zaza speakers and Alevis, and one must therefore suspect a connection’. If this is the case, there is a clear threat to the language and the culture that goes with it from the breaking up of communities as a result of the Munzur dams. Furthermore, the history of Alevism is one of persecution and massacres under the Ottoman Empire and later within the Turkish Republic. So Kurdish Alevis have often seen themselves as persecuted on two counts. As well as women and children, local guides said that the holy places (and sites of resistance; see below) are important to the older people and to the huge numbers of Dersim people scattered all over the world. Many returning on visits go to see the sites, to worship and remember.

Important Christian heritage dating from medieval times to the twentieth century may also be impacted by the Munzur valley dams either by means of direct submergence of sites or of their landscape context. According to architectural historian T.A. Sinclair, a number of settlements just south of the Munzur valley seem to have been Christian monasteries in the Middle Ages. It is reasonable to note the possibility that evidence connected with these settlements, medieval pilgrim routes and other life in the Middle Ages may also lie in reservoir areas in the Munzur valley. In fact, Sinclair notes the existence of a medieval town and monastery in the Munzur valley national park, close to the river. Observable remains consist, he says, of a probable 16th century Armenian
church of the monastery of Surb Karapet Vank or Halvuri Vank and the place is known as Halvuri. In the nineteenth century other ruined churches, tombstones, graveyards and traces of a town were to be seen. Also near the monastery is a disused goldmine, the entrance of which was reportedly filled up with debris according to an account of a visit dating from before World War One, which also noted that the monastery was still inhabited at that time. The delegation was unable to search for these sites or verify that they are within a reservoir area due to time constraints and the security situation; the precise location is not clear from the information given in published accounts. However, their location and significance, not least to Armenian communities today, deserves further investigation. Even if they would not be submerged, their position so close to a reservoir would render future investigation and access very difficult if not impossible.

Therefore, there are many sectors of people who must be considered affected by the cultural impacts of the dam projects, not only the communities living in the reservoir areas today. Thus, the population affected by the flooding of the valley is very large. In particular, those Alevis who trace their origins here and for whom the valley remains a sacred landscape may well have a claim under European human rights law regarding the impossibility of manifesting their beliefs due to submergence of the sacred places.

Battlefield archaeology and the archaeology of conflict are recognised sub-disciplines of the profession today. Historical sites of resistance and massacre in the Munzur valley also demand assessment before any development could go ahead. The history of Dersim includes a history of resistance to repression. As a result, the province has been the focus of many attempts to bring its people under control by force. The most remembered uprising is that of the 1930s. The Tunceli law first militarised the region in 1935, the intention was large-scale removal of the population and forced assimilation. A fact which now has added significance is that the army even suggested plans to flood the valley with water ‘in order to liquidate and wipe out Dersim.’ At the time, the security forces resorted to military might, culminating in a massacre of Kurdish people in the province in 1938-39. Numbers vary but it is estimated that 40,000 women, children and men were murdered and tens of thousands more deported. Those remaining were reduced to desperate conditions. The fallout continues to this day, with one resident explaining to the delegation how his entire family has been repeatedly singled out for torture and public humiliation because a family relative was involved in organising the 1930s uprising. This history has to be put together with the recent village destructions of the 1990s. The figures are not precise but estimates vary that between 270 and 320 out of the region’s 460 villages were forcibly evacuated in the last 15 years. These figures are among the highest for any part of the Kurdish region. The 60-70,000 people evicted joined the long running exodus from the area. According to the 1990 census, over a
quarter of a million people already out of the area gave their birthplace as Tunceli.

The delegation was told that many of the sites which relate to these historical events, including old settlement camps where women took their children to escape the army, are high in the mountains and would not be submerged but the reservoirs would cut through this historical geography and prevent people visiting the old places. Other sites will not fare so well. The Laç Deresi, a very narrow river valley, which appears as a cleft in the ravine of the Munzur valley, will dry up as a result of the tunnel linking the Konaktepe dam and hydroelectric plant. This site is known as a place where Kurdish people held out against a much larger military force during the 1930s uprising, until eventually all were killed. Many people in the valley made the comment to the delegation that ‘the river flowed red with blood for months’ at the time of the uprisings, and that many bodies floated down. The Rocks of Halbori, a stunning series of cliffs, are reported to be the site of an Armenian massacre and later, the place where Kurdish people, cornered by the army in the 1930s uprising, threw themselves or were thrown off the cliffs. They will be submerged under the reservoirs. A place referred to by locals as the castle of Sayyit Riza, one of the leaders of the rebellion, is also said to lie in the valley. And the location of caves where people hiding out were reportedly burnt alive during the uprising would have to be pinpointed. Oral history is a valuable source of information concerning such events and archaeology can add physical evidence and investigate the veracity of such accounts. No archaeologist could credibly claim to be able to assess or investigate this heritage freely, given the security situation in the region today. Yet not to do so would contravene fundamental professional ethics (besides being in breach of various assessment standards).

There is also the possibility of more ancient heritage in the valley, which has never been properly surveyed. The national TAY archaeological survey project has never visited Tunceli but records that there are six archaeological sites known so far in the province, some of which were submerged beneath the Keban reservoir. Undoubtedly a modern survey would increase this number greatly. Associated artefact finds or excavations date the sites to the Old and New Stone Ages, Bronze Age and Middle Ages. Of particular note, is a record of Palaeolithic (Old Stone Age) tools made from obsidian near caves and rock shelters, south of Tunceli city. There are no drawings from this old survey so it is unclear if modern humans, Neanderthals or even earlier hominids made the tools. In any case, it is a strong indication that the Munzur valley itself and its caves may also have been a settlement location for one of these groups. This would have international archaeological significance and a similar situation appears to exist for Ilısu and Hakkari.
The intent to proceed with this level of destruction, without assessment, cannot be acceptable to governments considering credit or the archaeological profession internationally.

Tourism As An Alternative to Dams

A number of people stressed to the delegation that they knew of someone or they themselves would be ready to try their hand at tourism for which they felt the valley is a great resource. The Munzur festival, held just before we arrived, had featured paragliding in the valley. Rafting is another possibility. But the State authorities appear uninterested, which is a very telling comment on the official attitude to Dersim people, their Munzur valley, its culture and history since elsewhere in the region, GAP has developed major tourism projects. The Mayor of Tunceli noted that a number of people wanting to develop tourist accommodation and other infrastructure have found it impossible due to the lack of infrastructure in the area and in the villages in particular. She asked: ‘Why doesn’t the State provide infrastructure for tourism, instead of dams?’ The delegation did not uncover any local knowledge about the problems with this sort of State development of tourism in other areas, however.

Impact Assessments and Resettlement Processes

Because the basic standards for consultation and impact assessment have not been followed for Konaktepe, it follows that there cannot be any sort of plan to resettle families or compensate for lost livelihoods in existence. Mr İnan Yılmaz of the Tunceli Bar Association explained that with regard to the expropriation process, the previous experience has been that there is no consultation with those affected. Instead, a price per unit of land is determined in a desk-based assessment along with additional fixed compensation for houses and other buildings and this is the amount paid out to those who own land and houses. These valuations are usually under the price the land would fetch on the open market and those who can afford it have ended up taking court cases to recover something like the market value of their property.

Local people did not believe that there had been any adequate evaluation of the ecological effects of the dams and certainly no cultural heritage assessment that they know of. Human rights lawyers told the delegation that no one had looked at the number of sacred sites or other cultural places in the valley, which would be flooded by the dam reservoirs. Neither has there been any consideration of cheaper and
As far as people in the valley are aware, there are no EIAs commissioned by the companies for the Munzur projects. VA Tech suggested that they would commission an impact assessment of Konaktepe in order to obtain credits but this does not appear to be happening. The terms of reference, scope or duration have not been made public, nor have other feasibility studies undertaken for the dams been released. Some of the other projects on the river may not be considered large enough to warrant a full impact assessment under some guidelines but this does not take the cumulative affect of the projects into account. According to campaigners there are ÇED reports in existence for Konaktepe and Uzunçayır, prepared by the Ministry of the Environment, though an official in the DSİ General Headquarters in Ankara told the delegation that Konaktepe is exempt from this.

The lack of an EIA for Konaktepe contravenes numerous international guidelines including World Bank standards and Ex-Im Bank guidelines. Despite the fact that Turkey is required to bring its environmental law and practice into line with the EU, the absence of this impact assessment also contravenes EU Directives. It almost goes without saying that all seven of the World Commission on Dams strategic policies are violated by the Konaktepe project.

The comments of various government officials bear out this casual, and frequently dismissive, attitude to communities, their natural and cultural heritage. Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Head of the Investigation and Planning Department in the DSİ Headquarters said ‘the reservoir areas cover only one per cent of the national park and we’ve prepared a special project so that the dam structures are hidden from view in the valley.’ On the cultural destruction the dams would result in, she first said, ‘there is nothing there, there are no cultural remains in the valley.’ When the delegation listed some of what was there including present day families and communities, she responded that these are small things, they are nothing. The cultural heritage there consists of small things. We can carry them to somewhere else or save them [with archaeological salvage projects]. It’s nothing.

Campaigners informed the delegation that recently in Turkey the Ministries of Forestry and Environment had been amalgamated and before that, those of Culture and Tourism. This has created a contradictory situation where the power of the State as developer is vested in the same Department as the power of the State as conserver and protector. Inevitably it is leading to decisions favouring development over preservation as it has done in other countries. Other reports prepared by experts and those commissioned by the Munzur Associations advise against the construction of the dams. One human rights lawyer, for example, explained that the General Director of National Parks gave a
negative assessment of the Munzur dams but this was ignored by the State. His report is not available publicly but word had been passed on to campaigners.

Opposition to the Dams

Well organised protest actions against the dams have included public and press meetings, conferences, cultural festivals, marches, human chains, pamphlets, leaflets, research documents and signature campaigns. These initiatives are organised by a wide platform of political, cultural, environmental, women's and human rights organisations, some already existing to respond to the effects of conflict and some created to oppose the dams and save the heritage of the valley.

Last winter, there were two protests at Ana Fatma, for example. Protests generally have a high police presence and they are filmed. One petition in 2000 resulted in 50,000 signatures against the dams from people in the valley and those who had migrated to Istanbul. This was sent to the Minister for Energy to which they received the response that all the necessary surveys had been done and there is no legal obstacle to the dams. Campaigners have also taken their case to other ministers, to the parliament and to the President of the Republic. Their organising has also resulted in contacts with the Bergama mines protest and the leader of the latter campaign participated in the Munzur festival this year. Campaigners say they expect protest numbers to get bigger as long as the restrictions of OHAL are eased though people are still wary as they feel that it has only been ended on paper.

‘We cannot really say OHAL has been lifted’, said one human rights lawyer.

Every year, the Munzur associations which people from the valley have formed everywhere they have emigrated, co-ordinate a festival back in Tunceli in co-operation with the municipality. People travel from all over Turkey and from other parts of the world to this event, often taking the opportunity to see the old sites of resistance and the holy places. The festival is a mixture of panels on cultural and social topics of concern to the people of the area as well as cultural events with music, film screenings, singing and dance. In the past, under OHAL, the festival was banned but since the formal lifting of emergency rule, it has been possible to hold the event. There have been tensions with a heavy police and army presence but in the last couple of years, the event has passed off peacefully.

This year, approximately 15-20,000 people attended the event, which ended just before the delegation arrived. Attendees told the delegation that many of the events and
panels, and certainly all the major workshops, were about the dams and environmental destruction. The platforms consisted of activists from local cultural, environmental and human rights organisations as well as experts on biodiversity, geology and dam construction. Many of those affected by the projects attended the workshops in order to get information about the dams and some workshops are brought to affected areas along the valley; people get no information from the State so this is the means by which they inform themselves about the impacts the dams will have.

A serious incident occurred at the end of this year’s festival, involving the police trapping people on a bridge. The people, mostly students, were from the Basic Rights and Freedoms Association and had explained to the organisers of the festival that they wanted to stage a peaceful march ending on the bridge by throwing flowers into the River Munzur. The Mayor and other organisers agreed to this. However, the police closed off the bridge at each end and trapped the marchers on it. The marchers feared violence at the hands of the police and some jumped off the bridge into the waters of the Munzur far below. The police moved in on those who remained and fifteen to twenty people were badly beaten by them.

The incident has resulted in an escalation of tensions in the city between people and the security forces, something the Mayor told the delegation she believed to be the intention of the authorities. She explained that similar events had happened when the conflict was at its height in the past and that people saw such a new occurrence as an indication of a return, by the State, to past tactics. One example of the way in which the authorities have used the incident to increase tensions was in the treatment of the newly elected DEHAP Mayor by the local army commander. After the bridge incident, the Mayor demanded a meeting with the chief military commander to ask why this operation had been mounted, particularly since she had personally informed the security forces that this march had been agreed with the festival organisers and assurances had been received from the marchers that it would be a peaceful action. The commander had told her, ‘you are used to being mentioned together with terrorism’ during the meeting and refused to answer any questions. The Mayor made the point to the delegation that she had been legally elected by the people of Tunceli and had a legal mandate to run the municipality. Therefore, ‘we perceived this as an attitude to local people as a whole because I’m elected by them.’

Legal Cases

An Istanbul lawyer, Mr Murat Cano, together with a heritage group he is part of, opened
a case regarding the Munzur valley dams but got nowhere with it. The Munzur Valley Protection Association has taken cases, one of which was to the State Council in Ankara to challenge the Ministerial decision to go ahead with the dams but the case was refused with no reason given.  Six cases for each of the incomplete projects have been filed in Malatya Administrative Court. Lawyers in Tunceli intend to open what is known as an identification case. This allows the court to invite independent experts to carry out feasibility studies and surveys in order to determine whether it is possible to build the dam and what sort of impacts it will have, for example if it is possible to cut down trees in the national park. The findings from this case can then be used to open another case challenging the dams in the administrative court. The Munzur Association has also applied to the Erzurum regional board for the protection of natural sites. There are boards all over the country with the power to make a decision about whether a natural place is worthy of legal protection, with different levels of protection which either ban all constructions that would alter the site or allow limited works to go on with safeguards in place. The campaigners applied for a decision on the natural springs, which will be affected by the dams. Initially they received a positive reply but the board then withdrew its response and they have heard nothing further. Many of the campaigners feel that even though the valley should be protected under various laws and UN Conventions such as the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, these laws are never implemented in Turkey and there is no effective legal redress for this. They cite Bergama mine as an example of the fact that even when several court rulings in favour of affected people and their environment are won, the project continues regardless and the authorities ignore the rulings.

The national parks legislation up to recently protected parks from any development without rigorous assessment so the development of the dams was contravening this law. However, representatives from the Munzur Association of Tunceli informed the delegation that the law on national parks was amended in 2004 such that private companies can now lease protected areas for a period of forty nine years and develop extractive or construction projects in those areas. After forty nine years, a clause in the amended law allows them to extend the period of the lease again. The government has also changed laws on forestry and mining. Where this has occurred in the UK, for example, it has not happened without objections being raised and a number of commissions have been set up to investigate the impacts of quarrying and other works in such areas. It is also significant that the Turkish authorities have chosen to bring this aspect of legislation into line with EU practice but not standards on environmental impact assessment.
CHAPTER 4:

THE ILISU DAM

‘I wouldn’t accept, even if they gave all of Batman to me as compensation. I want to return to my village. I can never accept the destruction of history’ – Villager displaced by conflict from Çaltepe village in the Ilisu reservoir area

The Project and the Companies

The Ilisu dam is a hydroelectric project on the River Tigris. If built, it would displace up to 78,000 mostly Kurdish people from 183 villages and hamlets and the historic town of Hasankeyf. Previous fact-finding missions have documented that it is very likely to cause serious environmental pollution, health problems and curtail the downstream flow of water to Iraq and Syria. Its cultural heritage impacts have been the focus of much controversy. It would have a reservoir of over 300 km² with a catchment area falling within five provinces: Diyarbakır, Batman, Siirt, Şırnak and Mardin. The height of the dam would be 138 metres from foundation or 130 metres from the riverbed. The Ilisu dam itself is directly connected to the construction of a smaller irrigation dam downstream at Cizre, which will have a reservoir area of 21 km². Ilisu is the lynchpin in a whole series of dams on the river Tigris, balancing the control of water flow.

As a result of public and international campaigns, the project was discredited and the previous consortium for the dam, which included Sulzer Hydro (Switzerland/Germany/Austria, now owned by VA Tech in Austria), ABB/Alstom (Switzerland and France), Balfour Beatty (UK), Impreglio (Italy), Nurol, Kiska and Tekfen (Turkey) collapsed as companies withdrew. The UK-based Ilisu Dam Campaign worked with human rights defenders, affected communities and campaigning groups in the region as well as many people, Kurdish and others, in the UK itself in order to stop UK involvement with the dam and to expose problems and deficiencies in the planning and implementation of the project. These have cohered around a number of key issues which make a just outcome to the project unrealisable: the longstanding and continuing history of repression of the Kurdish majority in the region by the Turkish State; the failure of the project to meet the most basic international standards on resettlement and with regard to assessing
impacts on the environment and cultural heritage; the potential submergence of most of the town of Hasankeyf, as a place of particular economic, cultural and historical significance to residents and to Kurdish people more widely, and as an archaeological site of international significance; the fact that the dam could exacerbate regional conflict over water between Turkey and its downstream neighbours; the secrecy with regard to key project documents; the failure to seriously consider alternatives to the dam; doubts over independent monitoring of any possible project implementation. A number of fact-finding reports, newspaper articles and academic papers have covered these issues.  

Despite this, State officials from the DSİ confirmed to the delegation that there is a new consortium getting together to build the Ilısu dam. The lead company is VA Tech in Austria, previously indirectly involved through its ownership of Sulzer Hydro. Since May 2004, VA Tech and the DSİ have been in negotiations on the Ilısu project. In November 2004, it was reported that agreement had been reached whereby VA Tech would lead a consortium to build the dam and supply the turbines for one billion euros, with a further thirty million euros being spent on ‘salvaging’ Hasankeyf. Officials at the DSİ would not be drawn on other companies intending to participate although it is now known that Alstom (Switzerland) is also indirectly involved as a subcontractor to VA Tech in order to supply the generators as well as the German office of construction specialists Züblin. ‘The Turkish firms involved are Nurol, Cengiz and Celikler and they would construct the site and tunnels.

A civil engineer in the DSİ’s Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants in Ankara told the delegation that ‘at the moment there are consultations between companies and the DSİ on Ilısu but there is no final agreement yet regarding the construction.’ This still appears to be the case. Sources inside one of the companies said that there was nothing definite on financing as yet and no credits have been applied for though it is known that two Export Credit Agencies have been approached informally for support – ERG in Switzerland and OeKB in Austria. Sources say that both are hostile to supporting the project. It was reported that contracts would be signed in December 2004, though this does not appear to have occurred due, it seems, to a takeover bid for VA Tech by Siemens. It appears to be only an initial agreement needed in order to make applications for funding rather than a final and binding arrangement. The record of VA Tech has already been mentioned. Alstom’s roll call is no better. The company worked on the Three Gorges Dam in China, involving the forcible relocation of 1.4 million people. It was also in the consortium for the Tucurui dam in Brazil, which flooded a large area of rainforest, displaced 24,000 people and virtually eliminated several indigenous groups.
Reports of a new plan to build the Ilısu dam have focused on whether it would avoid flooding the historic town of Hasankeyf. This can be traced to a number of speeches which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the prime minister of Turkey, has made in the region and while abroad. In two separate speeches in the city of Batman in 2003, the prime minister said that Hasankeyf would be saved. In Austria, he and his foreign minister made reference to Austrian companies wanting the Ilısu dam to be built and again, the saving of Hasankeyf. However, journalists in Batman who reported this story were extremely skeptical and local campaigners, the Hasankeyf Volunteers, believed the promises to be ‘a tactic to stop the struggle about this project.’

263 The Deputy Mayor of Batman explained that the prime minister had made this promise and these speeches during an election campaign. A number of people the delegation spoke with in Batman and Hasankeyf felt that this promise on Hasankeyf could also be looked upon as ‘election talk.’

Officials in the General Headquarters of the DSİ in Ankara told the delegation to ‘forget it’ when the issue was raised. ‘The prime minister did not consult with experts or with the DSİ before saying Hasankeyf would be saved,’ they noted. DSİ engineers also explained that the process of planning the dam’s location, height, volume and axis along the river takes years to complete and could not be altered so swiftly. One engineer stated quite categorically that ‘the dam would have no economic value if its height is reduced in order to save Hasankeyf.’ They had looked at alternatives in the preliminary planning reports for Ilısu years ago but in their opinion, the present plan proved to be the best choice. They knew of no alteration to the design. Since the fact-finding mission, the reports of funding for salvage in Hasankeyf have shed further light on the issue. It seems that Hasankeyf will be submerged if the Ilısu dam goes ahead; selected locations in the town will simply be excavated and architectural components removed in advance of inundation. Evidence from the fact-finding mission outlined below suggests that references to this work as ‘saving Hasankeyf’ are, at best, a misunderstanding of the archaeological process involved and of the elements that constitute cultural heritage in the town, beginning with the wishes of its residents.

Furthermore, DSİ officials told the delegation that the DSİ would use what will be essentially the same impact assessment and resettlement plan compiled under the previous consortium for Ilısu, documents which were fundamentally flawed in numerous ways. An assessment of the Ilısu Dam in 2001 found it contravened guidelines and standards on multiple counts. Another assessment of the dam in 2002, examining project plans, documents and other information from a fact-finding mission listed multiple contraventions of international guidelines in 34 separate categories. But the DSİ seems set to ignore these and other documented problems, which must surely discredit the agency as a competent developer. According to the same DSİ officials, if a
new environmental impact assessment is required in order to obtain export credit then further work might have to be done but the resettlement plan is the same plan, using the information collected in the original survey.\textsuperscript{273} By contrast, companies joining the new consortium for the Ilısu dam have suggested that a ‘new’ environmental impact assessment is now being prepared to satisfy creditor requirements though it is said to be only an update of the old assessment, done by the same company that worked on the original.\textsuperscript{274} According to the DSİ, this was to have been finished by December 2004 though a VA Tech spokesperson estimated its completion by April/June 2005.\textsuperscript{275} Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Director of the Investigation and Planning Department of the DSİ summed up the attitude: ‘We will build this dam. It’s our land and our dam and we will build it. Nothing will stop us.’\textsuperscript{276} She went on to speak about how funding was withdrawn for the Atatürk dam and the Turkish State funded the venture itself through shares.\textsuperscript{277} ‘We could do the same for Ilısu’ was the comment.\textsuperscript{278}

**Impacts of the Dam**

**Costs to Families, Communities and their Carers**

The same official in the DSİ claimed to the delegation that women in the Ilısu reservoir area say ‘they want the dam. They say things like “I want a dish washer” and so on. They want a more comfortable life and they want to earn money.’\textsuperscript{279} The delegation met with women and their organisations in the reservoir area, in the city of Batman and in Diyarbakır.\textsuperscript{280} ‘We did not find the claim that women want the dam to be true or dishwashers to be their main demand. Certainly, women in the villages and in Hasankeyf are entitled to all the modern conveniences that can ease their burden of work. It is not unreasonable that they want dishwashers but it is unreasonable, given the track record of GAP on resettlement and the poverty in the region, to assume that building the dam will result in women getting them. It is misleading and offensive to women in the area, given the conditions they have to face, to suggest that dishwashers are their priority, and the comment discredits the DSİ. Women’s opposition to the dam and the reasons for it have been hidden by such comments, which tend to hide the fact that the State and the companies have systematically failed in their duty to consult with women about the impacts on them and all of those in their care of this and other such projects.\textsuperscript{281} Women’s organisations and women living in the reservoir area said they had not been consulted about the Ilısu dam and had not heard of any women affected by the project or their organisations being consulted about it.\textsuperscript{282}
The delegation had a lengthy meeting with women in the village of Meymuniye which would be flooded, who all said that they did not want the dam. One woman added: ‘No one in any of the villages that we know or in Hasankeyf wants the dam’ and this was confirmed by all present. They were adamant they did not want to leave even as they testified at length to a high level of repression against them, their children and men in the village, including sexual insults and assaults against the women by the military during village raids. The women grow the food and rear stock, assisted by children and men. The men and boys fish in the river. They went on to say that ‘we are all poor in this village, no one has very much and most villagers don’t own any land.’ So if they are forced to move to the city, the means to feed their families will be gone, and without any title deeds to property, the men will get little or no expropriation money because they are not officially landowners. This is a recurrent problem in the Ilısu reservoir area and although those with use rights should be entitled to some compensation under international guidelines (OECD standards, for example), the record of previous GAP projects suggests that there is no guarantee that this would happen. Families would also lose their livelihood from fishing. One villager explained: ‘We sell some of the fish we catch, we take them to market along with anything else extra that we can grow to sell so if we are forced to move to the city we will lose our livelihoods from that.’

The pollution that the dam will bring worried the women for two reasons, health and the killing of fish life. One woman explained that ‘the river is dirty even now and it never used to be like that before. If they build the Ilısu dam it will be even worse.’ The women are aware that the raw sewage flowing into the Tigris from cities in the region will create a major problem once the reservoir inundates. They believe the growing pollution of the river water is because of the overcrowding in the cities along its route, added to by the dams already built. The exponential increase in population in the slums of cities and towns along the river happened as a result of the village evacuations in the 1990s. The Mayor of Diyarbakır and Deputy Mayor of Batman told the delegation that plans are underway for sewage treatment plants in those two cities but these will not be ready for some years and will not resolve the whole of the problem. The women stressed that serious illnesses would result among the families who remain in the area after the dam is built. They are worried also that this pollution and the disruption caused by the construction works for the dam will kill off the fish life in the river. They know this has happened on other projects. If so, it is likely that people’s livelihoods from fishing all along the river would be affected.

The women were also fearful that they and their families would be left homeless by the dam. ‘We have no money to build new homes so we will have to go wherever they send us after the dam is built. We women did not hear of any plans to resettle us. Because we
have no money, they will have to build homes for us and if there is no plan, then we will have no place to go.’ Their preference, they say, ‘if there is definitely no other way out of this and the dam goes ahead’ is that ‘we want houses near our village, we want to stay in our own place.’ But they are worried that even if this happens the impacts mentioned above will have devastating effects on them and all of those in their care. Women’s organisations in the area expressed similar worries and spoke at length concerning the fact that the impacts of dams and displacement hits women the hardest, first of all in their role as carers for families and communities.  

The women in this village, as is the pattern from other projects, have not been consulted at all about the dam. The survey team contracted to compile information for the resettlement plan did visit the village: ‘SEMOR came here and they only talked to the men in the house of the muhtar (village headman). They did not talk to us women. The men told them that no one in the village wants the dam but we don’t know if SEMOR recorded that.’ They had not heard of the new plan to go ahead with Ilısu once more. ‘As women we did not hear, maybe the men have heard something about this.’ The women were upset to hear this but determined to carry on opposing the project: ‘We still don’t want it, no one does and we will carry on telling the authorities that.’ Many other problems have been recorded concerning the SEMOR survey for the resettlement plan, of such a serious nature that they invalidate the draft Resettlement Action Plan for Ilısu. In any case, it is impossible that a safe resettlement could happen without women’s input and consent since it is women who would do the work of organising their families to move. Yet the DSİ is now on record refusing to address this impending disaster because it intends to use a discredited resettlement plan.

A quarter of those potentially affected by Ilısu are already displaced by conflict from the region. Their deep poverty is detailed elsewhere in this report. Previously, it has appeared that this sector of people affected by the project were not being consulted at all and therefore, would not receive any compensation if their villages were submerged. Male villagers displaced to Batman from the villages of Yazlıca and Çaltepe in Siirt province spoke of their absolute opposition to the project, to large dams all over the world and their need to return to their villages. They reported that they had still not been consulted about the Ilısu dam even though their villages are in the reservoir area but would not accept compensation if it is ever offered. One villager from Çaltepe said:

‘I wouldn’t accept, even if they gave all of Batman to me as compensation. I want to return to my village. I can never accept the destruction of history. If they are saying that they consulted us then they are lying. The [Turkish] State lies everywhere, they are lying
to the EU and the EU listens to those with money and power, not to us.  

Another man went further stating that he had waited a long time to return to his village, Yazlıca, and he wanted the dam builder companies and funding governments to know that ‘if they submerge my village beneath the reservoir of the Ilısu dam, I will go and burn myself. Nothing will be important for me after that any more.’ Göç-Der confirmed in Diyarbakır that it had not heard of any people displaced from the Ilısu reservoir area being consulted about the dam. People’s need to return to their villages and restore their lives is not only sentimental. It is a practical demand for survival of community and culture and they have a right to return, which submergence beneath dam reservoirs contravenes.

**Hasankeyf**

The situation in Hasankeyf remains much the same as previous reports of incomplete consultation and a population denied any information on a project set to submerge their town and their heritage. People in Hasankeyf explained that they had heard reports of a plan to save the town but they simply did not believe it. Hasankeyf had not been visited by anyone connected to the dam builders since SEMOR carried out their survey for the resettlement plan and residents said people in the town still had no information on the dam. While a few, such as the Mayor, hold the opinion that Hasankeyf should be saved but the dam should still go ahead, the group of residents the delegation met said that even if their town is saved, they would still be against this dam because of all the other villages and history that it would destroy. They pointed out that they and many others like them were from landless families and many did not even own houses, so they would not receive any compensation for the flooding of the area. They felt on the contrary that any one opposing the project as well as Kurdish people generally are still seen as ‘separatist’, potentially criminal or ‘terrorist.’ One man said:

‘Some people have no property or even a house or land, there is an aga [landlord] system here so they own the land. I am hungry, my sons are hungry, my daughters are hungry, my wife is hungry. How are we terrorists?’

Residents interviewed by the delegation didn’t know where they would go if Ilısu were built and their town flooded. None had been consulted about the dam or by the SEMOR survey team and, extending the evidence of previous missions, interviewees said that SEMOR only consulted people with land and mostly people with substantial lands.
This evidence contrasts with claims of DSİ officials that they talked to local people in Hasankeyf during a number of technical visits to the reservoir area over the past four years who all reportedly said that they wanted the dam.\textsuperscript{298} One engineer remarked that ‘it was very easy for them to say that they want the dam to me. Turkey is a democratic country and they can say freely if they want the dam or not. I meet people on the street when we go to do technical work. Everyone in the DSİ does this. No one we meet feels they are not free to express opinions.’\textsuperscript{299} In fact, residents spoke of their fear in coming to meet with the delegation at the office of the pro Kurdish DEHAP party.\textsuperscript{300} They said that whoever came and went from this office was watched and visited later by the security forces.\textsuperscript{301} Some people had been detained and tortured for being associated with the office and the former president of the now banned pro Kurdish HADEP party in Hasankeyf is in prison, sentenced to twelve years for conspiracy under Article 168 of the Turkish Penal Code.\textsuperscript{302}

The Mayor of Hasankeyf, Mr A. Vehap Kusen, informed us that he too had heard of the plan to save the town from submergence and he was more hopeful that it might be true; ‘this was something we had wanted to hear for years.’\textsuperscript{303} However, he added:

‘We have no tangible information since that day when the previous consortium for the project collapsed. We feel bad that we can’t answer questions about the dam but we have no information. They could say that they are starting the construction tomorrow and that’s when we’d be informed.’\textsuperscript{304}

The Mayor, on behalf of the municipality, wrote to the DSİ in Ankara on a number of occasions over the past year about the possibility of a new design and asked DSİ Diyarbakır’s director in person but has still received no answer. ‘This silence of the DSİ is very worrying for us’, he commented, ‘we suspect that the project will go ahead as originally planned and there will be no change.’\textsuperscript{305} Responding to DSİ Diyarbakır’s claims to be protecting cultural values and consulting with affected communities, the Mayor said ‘I don’t believe at all in DSİ Diyarbakır. We can’t tolerate them. They don’t tell the truth. You can go to the people here, they are the ones who will tell the most truth.’\textsuperscript{306} If the municipality does not receive an answer shortly the Mayor will apply to the court under the new freedom of information law and try to get the information that way.

The Mayor stressed the negative impact that the prospect of the dam continues to have. ‘This threat hanging over the people here is like the sword of Damocles, you never know when it will come and hit you.’\textsuperscript{307} Not knowing what is going to happen and unable to determine their future, means that ‘yes, people are leaving and no one makes any investment here because of the threat of submergence. As a result, there is high
unemployment and poverty. Ninety per cent unemployment sounds odd but it is that bad.\textsuperscript{308} The boom in tourism due to the international renown of Hasankeyf has not benefited most local people (see below). The Mayor explained that many people had left Hasankeyf because of the threat of the dam. Recent censuses do show people are leaving the town. In 1997, the population was 5,670 according to the census and in 2000 it had dropped to 3,700 people.

### Host Communities

Both the Mayor of Diyarbakir and the Deputy Mayor of Batman confirmed to the delegation that the municipalities of both cities have still not been consulted at all about the impacts of the Ilısu dam and the potential influx of up to 78,000 displaced people.\textsuperscript{309} Both were very definite that their cities could not cope with those people as the funding and the services are not enough for the population already living there. They saw little possibility of an adequate increase in funding or services in the foreseeable future or a radical improvement in the general economic situation in the Kurdish region. According to Mr İsmail Acar, Deputy Mayor of Batman, ‘I don’t know how we will tackle all the problems of the Ilısu dam, especially if people from the reservoir area come here. The people who build the dams should consult with us but they do not.’\textsuperscript{310}

The Mayor of Diyarbakır listed all of the serious social and economic problems in a city that has seen a fourfold increase in population in the last ten years due to refugees forcibly evacuated from their villages. He also emphasised:

‘The money paid for property in the reservoir areas is paid to landowners but most people are traditional users, they don’t own the land and they won’t get anything. So they’ll be impoverished if displaced. Even if some do get expropriation money, they won’t be able to save it because of the cost of living in the city.’\textsuperscript{311}

There is still no sewage treatment system for ten neighbourhoods in Diyarbakır, neighbourhoods where those displaced by the armed conflict live. The municipality continues to look for funding from abroad for a treatment project.\textsuperscript{312} Clearly, if Ilısu goes ahead and there is a sewage treatment problem in such a large city, the pollution of the reservoir will be very great. However, even if complete sewage treatment is in place in this and other cities discharging waste into the Tigris, it is the opinion of an independent assessment that the planned treatment plants will not significantly reduce eutrophication and anoxic conditions in the reservoir.\textsuperscript{313} (This combined with higher greenhouse gas emissions from the reservoir and other factors make the proposed dam...
a major pollutant and a serious health risk to the population of the area).

The Deputy Mayor of Batman outlined in detail the extent of the economic and social problems of those migrants already in that city in order to make clear that there is no possibility of most oustees from Ilısu maintaining or improving their livelihoods if they arrive there. Over twenty years, he said that about 100,000 people fled to Batman from the villages as a result of the armed conflict and they make up about one third of the population presently. There is still a lack of food, clean water, infrastructure, housing and jobs for them. ‘People bring their production relations with them to the city’, he added, ‘so here in Batman families live in the city centre and in the ghettos with their animals, trying to farm as they did in the village and it causes problems.‘ Sanitation is one of these problems; at the moment there is no sewage treatment system in Batman. However, there is a protocol between the municipality and the German Development Bank. Construction will begin on a project in one year’s time. It will take between two to three years to build and become operational. An eco-friendly sewage treatment system is planned.

The municipality organises people’s days every Wednesday where people can come and tell their problems and get emergency food parcels, made up from donations by wealthier individuals in the city. It is overwhelmingly women who come to get the food for their families and also older men and women who have no one to care for them. The women’s demands are for food, especially milk for babies and bread. They also want jobs for their male relatives. The Deputy Mayor said that ‘on these days, the scenes are not so different from what you see on TV from Africa in places where there is famine.’ The delegation was unable to be present on the following People’s Day to see this but spoke to eyewitnesses, both local and European, who confirmed the description of Mr Acar, the Deputy Mayor. He stressed that the municipality did not receive the resources from central government to cope with this situation.

Mr Acar commented that he did not agree with sociologist Ayse Kudat’s official review of the draft Resettlement Action Plan for Ilısu, where she notes that there will be no real food security problem or risk of death if Ilısu is built. ‘We see it differently every Wednesday’, he explained, ‘if you don’t have enough money then the first problem you have is a food problem and that is the problem displaced families have.’

In sum, the cities of the region cannot cope with the impacts of the Ilısu dam and especially the arrival of yet more displaced people. In particular, what can be construed as an attempt to hide the levels of hunger and malnutrition already in those cities is indicative not only of the State’s failures with regard to its internally displaced population.
but of the lack of care among the dam builders for the life threatening human impacts of this project.

**Cultural Impacts of the Ilısu Dam**

Much of the public outcry over the Ilısu dam previously has focused on the potential flooding of the historic town of Hasankeyf. This has partly and justifiably resulted from the fact that it has great cultural significance for many Kurdish people. This focus also arose because the British government, followed by others, chose to make it a condition of giving credit for the dam that the developer should ‘preserve as much of the archaeological heritage of Hasankeyf as possible.’ Archaeological advice on this was shown to be wholly inadequate, including from the perspective of the residents of Hasankeyf and the wider reservoir area. All of these factors have given the impression to some that there are no other significant impacts of Ilısu on culture and heritage. The danger of this is seen in the rumours that with the saving of Hasankeyf, a plan to build Ilısu would not destroy culture and the misinformation from the DSİ that the GAP project ‘protects cultural values’ in the words of one official. This is not the case. In fact, a consideration of the wider cultural impacts of the project shows that even in the unlikely event that Hasankeyf is saved, the dam will still cleanse the diversity of culture from the reservoir area.

The DSİ in Diyarbakır has claimed to the delegation that people have been consulted throughout the planning process about their cultural heritage and the cultural impacts the dams would have. ‘We always consult with them. There are people’s stories and then also the sites found on people’s lands and settlements.’ Statements of local people denying this and instances of intimidation of cultural organisations seeking information were put to the director but he repeated that everyone is consulted.

**Cultural Heritage in the Reservoir Area**

A detailed analysis of the potential cultural impacts of Ilısu can be found in a previous report published by the KHRP and the National University of Ireland, Galway. It is useful to summarise here some of those points in so far as they compare to the other two areas and to add new evidence and updates where appropriate.

As in the Munzur valley, most people the delegation met here have a great concern for the environment and ancient heritage of the area, while at the same time what matters
most to them is recent heritage and the culture that is found in people’s relationships with one another in the community and on the land, on which physical as well as social survival depend. According to one villager displaced from Yazlic in Siirt province, which would be submerged by Ilısu:

‘Hasankeyf is a historical city but all the lands along the Tigris apart from that town are full of historical settlement areas. So we are opposed to the dam even if Hasankeyf is saved. What we understand is that they want to submerge our history. We don’t want our villages to be submerged. There are some things whose value cannot be measured by money. In Kurdistan or elsewhere in the world, we are against history being lost under water. We are against large dams everywhere, Munzur, Ilısu or anywhere in the world.’

He added that what he and other villagers in the reservoir area want people in Europe and all over the world to demand with them is ‘to go back to our home places. We live with a longing for our villages, in bad conditions with no jobs but we haven’t been able to go back for years.’ Such opinions and the sharp knowledge of what would be lost make a mockery of the claims of TAÇDAM, the institution that manages the archaeological salvage project for the Ilısu dam. Examined from the perspective these villagers present, the idea that the work of the salvage project is beneficial because it has led to an ‘increase in local awareness for the importance of preserving the archaeological cultural heritage’ is simply offensive to local people and dismissive of the efforts of villagers and campaigners to save heritage.

TAÇDAM is either unaware or unconcerned that heritage is embodied in these people’s villages and can only be saved by those displaced being able to return once more and those still resident being able to remain. This is why the women from the village of Meymuniye want their community to be resettled together close to their own village. First they will oppose the dam but ‘if there is no other way’, they are looking for some way to keep their community alive, which means that they will try to save the key part of history – the people and the bonds between them that comprise a way of life. GAP’s record tells us that resettling villagers together like this rarely happens.

Whatever claims there are to ownership of more ancient heritage, the existence of Kurdish communities in the reservoir area means that much of the recent history that would be destroyed is Kurdish heritage. In a change to the previous complete denials of the existence of Kurdish people and therefore of their history and culture, the DSİ in Diyarbakırm acknowledged to the delegation that there is Kurdish history and culture in the Ilısu reservoir area. However, this was immediately qualified and reduced to
an inconsequential fact and a source of humour: ‘Yes, Kurdish history and culture is a fact but there is also Seljuk heritage and Artukid heritage in that area. There are many cultures, there is soil, water, there’s a lot there in that place.’\textsuperscript{329} When pressed that the existence of Kurdish people in the reservoir area meant that Kurdish culture would also be destroyed by the dam, the Director of DSİ Diyarbakır replied, ‘I’m trying to be useful to all peoples so it’s not possible to say that. It’s not as you see it from far away.’\textsuperscript{330}

It is true to say there is a long and complex history in this area and a number of ethnic groups lay claim to different parts of it, the most obvious contradiction is between the State’s insistence that everything of any value is Turkish heritage, and Kurdish people’s demands for recognition of their culture and heritage. There is also Armenian and ethnic Assyrian heritage for example, as well as Christian, Shi’a, Sunni and more besides. These claims and sometimes conflicts over whose history this is must be recognised in assessment of cultural impacts, according to international standards.\textsuperscript{331} But the State and its representatives have failed to assess the local, regional and international significance of the cultural heritage, which would be impacted by Ilısu – to whom it is important and why.

As in the Munzur valley, the more recent history of the area is one of conflict. This raises a number of concerns about what the reservoir would submerge including evidence of recent village destructions. People have large repertoires of stories about most aspects of the landscape, cultural and natural. Some of these concern the former presence of Armenian people in the area. Historical texts can tell us much about the history of Armenian people in Turkey but the physical evidence of archaeology could be used to pin down the historical reality with precision. Since this history, most especially the genocide of Armenian people from 1915-16, continues to be disputed by the Turkish State, it is unlikely that archaeologists could fully and independently investigate it. Without an assessment of this, the reservoir would submerge any traces and deny us historical truth.

This is equally true for more recent evidence such as graves of the Kurdish people disappeared in the 1990s, an issue raised by a number of people as a concern regarding the İlisu reservoir area. Thousands of people have been disappeared during the course of the conflict between the State and the PKK. İHD Batman confirmed that it is quite possible that some graves of these people lie in the reservoir area.\textsuperscript{332} If so, then the dam would cover over evidence for this and relatives searching for graves will never find them.

İHD Batman explained that, in the days immediately before the delegation’s visit, they
had had seventy applications regarding unknown perpetrator killings and disappearances for compensation under a new law (the law does not refer to disappearances specifically but people apply for damages and losses as a result of the conflict). İHD say the result of their requests for information from the authorities is always the same: ‘According to our records these people were not taken into detention’ or ‘our security forces are looking for them.’

A number of mass graves were found accidentally about two years ago. Two such graves in Bitlis contained the bodies of nineteen and thirteen people respectively. The other grave was near Sason and contained seven people. İHD Batman went to investigate, made records and subsequently sent photographs of the skeletons to the prosecutor’s office. Their president was sued as a result and no investigation of how the bodies got there has taken place to date. These discoveries are not that far away from the Ilısu reservoir area and underline the potential problem. The rapidity of archaeological surveys and rescue excavations in advance of the Ilısu dam, a focus on ancient heritage rather than anything more recent and the security problems prevent the issues raised above from being addressed. If there is no independent investigation, submergence of any evidence for such graves as well as the known evidence of a number of village destructions in the reservoir area may well render the dam builders complicit in concealing evidence for any crimes committed.

It is also worth noting just some of the ancient remains to be lost and the difficulties in finding out this information in order to grasp the level of destruction of the diversity of history of all of us which would result from building the Ilısu dam. Despite the lack of acknowledgement from many official sources, it is already known that the Ilısu dam reservoir would destroy hundreds of cultural and historical sites in the valley of the Upper Tigris. These could not possibly all be excavated and recorded in the time it would take to build the dam. Different figures have been quoted for the potential number of sites that might be destroyed and archaeologists surmise that the dam could affect thousands of sites, as yet unknown with many not even visible above the ground surface. There has been no adequate survey of the whole area to be flooded by Ilısu’s reservoir and there is no evidence of adequate consultation with affected communities, even about the partial surveys already done. Up to recently, a small US team had surveyed only one fifth of the area to be inundated (there has now been further work by TAÇDAM but there is still no complete coverage).

There is both local and international concern regarding the impacts of the dam on more ancient sites and areas across the planned reservoir. This is not just a question of what is and isn’t the more long term history of Kurdish and other groups in the region but also encompasses instances where ancient sites have been re-used and become central to more recent village histories or religious worship, as well as what is recognised by local
people as history and prehistory common to the whole of humanity – including the town of Hasankeyf itself. Archaeologists and local campaigners are worried that Ilısu would be built in an area which has importance for the understanding of Neanderthal life, was one of the first areas in the world where communities domesticated plants and animals and has been a frontier zone for empires, including the Roman and Assyrian Empires.

Initial survey work between 1988 and 1990 along the Upper Tigris and its tributaries found, for example, that ‘…developments fundamental to the history of the ancient Near East [sic] as a whole took place in these areas and…important cultural information will be lost forever if it is not recovered now.’\(^{341}\) An article in the international archaeological journal *Antiquity* summarised the potential extent of the damage thus: ‘Sites at risk include several mounds…some of which date from at least the pre-pottery Neolithic and may extend through into the post-medieval period (one such example is as much as 40 m high); large fortified sites dating to the Ubaid, Assyrian, Roman and Byzantine periods respectively, in one example enclosing an area of up to 30 hectares, and in certain cases preserving cultural deposits several metres deep; additionally there are an unquantifiable number of smaller settlements and structures dating from every period of human history. Particularly notable in this last category, but clearly underrepresented in survey and salvage work, are the sites and materials of the last 500 years that must be of most immediate relevance to any understanding of the more recent histories of those communities now threatened with inundation. The region is located at the heart of the ‘Fertile Crescent’; it functioned as a frontier zone between competing polities at the time of the very earliest formation of city states and the expansion of empires out of Mesopotamia, Assyria, Greece and Rome, and in the case of the town of Hasankeyf may have been home to one of the longest-lived Kurdish dynastic families in medieval Western Asia…’\(^{342}\)

**The Cultural Heritage of Hasankeyf**

It is undoubtedly the case that there is a significant cultural heritage in the town of Hasankeyf, from a cultural, archaeological and religious point of view. There’s no doubt that it is a spectacular setting. Some argue that it is Kurdish heritage, others that there are many histories here. The Mayor of Diyarbakır, Mr Osman Baydemir, described it as ‘a joint value of the whole of humankind.’\(^{343}\) Its significance to Kurdish people the world over and religious importance to Muslim pilgrims, just as in the case of the Munzur valley, means that the size of the community affected is much greater than the residents of the town or even the population of the region. The delegation learned of recent discoveries
on the excavations in the town during the last year, including the fact that the layers on one site have shown that two earthquakes destroyed most of the remains in the lower town. This appears to contradict claims that the town was sacked in historic times and the team is awaiting dating evidence to pinpoint the time of the earthquakes. This has implications for the safety of constructing the Ilısu dam in an earthquake region.

Set among steep cliffs and ravines along the banks of the river Tigris on a striking natural limestone formation, the town of Hasankeyf has significance for a number of different groups of people, in a variety of ways. What Hasankeyf’s full significance might be – and the vital issue of to whom it is important and why – has never been addressed by the dam’s planners and potential backers despite the fact that this is required before any other action is taken for impact assessment and especially before excavation. The extent of this importance can only be briefly sketched at present given the long-standing repression of people and culture in the region.

The key significance of Hasankeyf is to the residents of the town and the network of local villages, which depend on it economically, culturally and socially, whether they are Kurdish or part of the Arabic community residing in the area since medieval times. The town and its wider network is a living community with social and cultural bonds – which women maintain particularly and on which they depend for help with bearing and taking care of their families - bonds which would be broken by the displacement of residents and the cutting off of the central node and marketplace connecting smaller villages. Therefore, it cannot simply be treated as an abandoned archaeological site from the past, which can be ‘saved’ by excavation and removal of architectural elements. A fact-finding mission in 2000 was told that ‘Hasankeyf is not just artefacts, caves and bones, it is our inheritance and we should have access to it.’

To many Kurdish people in the local area, in the region and the world over, the cultural and historical significance of Hasankeyf to them cannot be overstated though many Kurds also feel that the loss of the town would be a loss for the whole of humanity. The medieval town was home to one of the longest-lived Kurdish dynastic families in Western Asia. The Mem-u-Zin, one of the most famous Kurdish epic poems/love songs still sung today by the dengbej or Kurdish singing storytellers, written by Ahmede Xane in the 17th century, is set in the town and the graves of the two lovers in the poem are said to be there. One of the most striking features of the town are the many caves in the cliffs surrounding it and along the river, many carved into the limestone bedrock by human hand at various times in the past, some of which are still inhabited and about which there are many local stories.
Since the medieval period, the town has also been a pilgrimage centre and particularly because of the tomb of Imam Abdullah, a place of religious significance to many Muslims. A previous Mission reported that ‘the tomb is visited by some 30,000 pilgrims a year, in particular women wishing to have children’. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights has already been mentioned in connection with the right to freedom of religious practice, which the submergence of the town would end. The town’s religious heritage also comprises Christian history. A substantial Syrian orthodox group lived at Hasankeyf in the time of the Byzantine empire. It is said to have been the seat of a Bishopric of that church in the fifth century CE and to have been a centre of the eastern Christian churches in the sixth and seventh centuries. It has been noted that it was one of the oldest Christian congregations in the eastern world.

The upstanding monuments and visible heritage – including a number of inscribed and carved mosques – as well as ancestral cemeteries, testify to much of this history. Hasankeyf consists of both an upper and lower town on the South bank of the river. The upper town, with its citadel or kale, sits on and around the highest cliff and the citadel is reached via a stone stairway, which passes through three ornamental gateways dating from the medieval period (possibly 15th century). There is also a zig-zag stairway directly from the river cut into the cliff-side. A number of monuments are found on this cliff top, including a palace, tower, mosque, cemetery and possible remains of Roman fortifications. The lower town sits between the cliffs on this side of the river and features much of the settlement from the last few hundred years up to the present time, including a market place still in use. In the cliffs around the lower town are the many caves, some of them still inhabited as well as cave churches. Others are said to relate to Armenian history. The suburbs of the medieval city were here, among them a number of monuments including ornate mosques and minarets, mausolea, a medrese or Islamic religious school and a han, a resting place for travelers on their route east along the Silk Road, all apparently dating between the 12th and 15th centuries. This famous road originally crossed the river Tigris precisely at this point and the remains of a 12th century bridge can still be seen at Hasankeyf. On the opposite bank of the river is further recent settlement as well as the tomb of Imam Abdullah, another graveyard and the probable 15th century Zeynel Bey mausoleum with its dark blue and turquoise glazed brick decoration. More caves are carved into the cliffs on this side of the river and many more exist back along the river, dating from various times.

Archaeologists have also pointed to the importance of the town at its present location at this historic crossing point of the river Tigris, noting that it has been the seat of several pre-Ottoman medieval dynasties such as the Artukids and Ayyubids and that it alternated with Diyarbakır as capital of the Artukid sultanate. In fact, the previous director of
excavations in the town, Dr M. Oluş Arik, has described it as ‘one of the most important commercial and cultural centres of the Medieval world.’ \(^{353}\) And its strategic location has also seen it function as a frontier post of the Roman and Ottoman empires. Sherds from pottery vessels in use during the time of the Assyrian empire were reportedly found in the town, and Dr Arik has elsewhere suggested that settlement there could be dated to as far back as the 7th century BCE. \(^{354}\) The town was taken under Ottoman sovereignty in the 16th century although much of its history after this has not been written down\(^{355}\) and is contained and passed on in local song and story.

And all of this is just what is visible on the surface or what is known from fragments of the rich body of people’s stories about the place as well as travelers’ tales – the full extent of that knowledge as well as what are thought to be the deep layers of cultural material under the upstanding buildings would certainly reveal many times more. The fact that the extent of that knowledge is not clear and cannot be at the present time, that no consent can be freely given for assessments means that the real importance of Hasankeyf cannot be known. This invalidates all suggestions and actions for ‘rescuing’ this heritage.

Campaigners and residents are very opposed to the flooding of the town but also to the removal of parts of the cultural heritage by the salvage projects. As the Hasankeyf Volunteers commented: ‘Hasankeyf is supposed to be protected in law. To where will they take Hasankeyf? It’s a whole with the Tigris and the caves and it’s not possible to move it to another place.’ The fate of Hasankeyf if the citadel alone is to be isolated above the water and other parts, such as the bridge, removed elsewhere can be compared to the current situation of the famous Malabadi bridge on the Batman River. The Malabadi bridge is famed in song and story, an Artukid bridge very similar in architecture and date to the ruined bridge at Hasankeyf itself, though smaller in size. The delegation visited this bridge and saw that it now spans a dry riverbed as the waters of the river have been diverted through the Batman dam, which is only a few hundred yards away. The setting of the bridge is completely dominated by the dam and the works and facilities around it. So while it has been saved from inundation as the Hasankeyf citadel would be, the landscape context of the site has been destroyed. The DSİ is reported to have plans to develop the citadel of Hasankeyf into an archaeological park but no such park could bring back this wider context nor the community which makes the town what it is, once it has been submerged.

A number of legal decisions made Hasankeyf a protected site under Turkish cultural heritage law.\(^{356}\) The literature of the DSİ and the salvage projects studiously avoids mentioning this fact. Because the site is protected, any development has to be assessed
regarding its impact on the archaeology within the protected area; all impacts must avoid damaging the physical fabric of the monuments. Residents have complained to past delegations that they are unable to build onto their houses or build new homes because of the restrictive legislation; they draw an ironic contrast between this situation and the fact that the State is in breach of its own law by planning to submerge the town.\(^{357}\) One resident asked:

‘The mentality that submerges an ancient city like this, what do we call this mentality? The world should wake up with history and go to sleep with history in whatever country. Aren’t they terrorists of history who would destroy a place like this? We never, ever want Hasankeyf to be submerged but the authorities don’t listen to us.’\(^{358}\)

Regarding assistance from international cultural organisations, the Mayor of Hasankeyf said that very little support had been received. ‘UNESCO does not do its duty in these situations. Hasankeyf meets the criteria in full to be listed as a World Heritage Site but they don’t want to know.’\(^ {359}\) In fact, it is the host government that proposes a list of sites and the Turkish government is not likely to propose Hasankeyf because of its plan to submerge it. However, UNESCO officials have offered little support for residents’ and campaigners’ bid to save the site even though it has been pointed out before that the general, introductory provisions of the World Heritage Convention are a very apt description of the significance of Hasankeyf and much else in these reservoir areas.\(^ {360}\) The Mayor said that in 2000 he was a founding member of a union between municipalities of historical cities and through this group, Hasankeyf has become a member of the European historical cities network. But there has been little support from the latter network.\(^ {361}\)

As a result of a new tendering process, this year the director of excavations who has worked at Hasankeyf since 1986 (with a gap in the 1990s due to the war) is no longer excavating. Instead a team from Van University has won the contract and is working there. While local campaigners and officials say that this director is more open about his findings than the previous incumbent, at the same time they expressed serious worry about what is going on. The Mayor pointed out that whereas the previous director said it would take him fifty years, the new team from Van is saying they can salvage Hasankeyf in twenty-five years.\(^ {362}\) If the dam goes ahead anytime soon, it would be operational long before this in any case. ‘Of course we are concerned that the archaeological work is facilitating the flooding of the town. The name for what they are doing is ‘salvage works’ so from that we understand that the project is still going ahead as before,’ said the Mayor.\(^ {363}\)
The previous director was only working there for one month each year according to the Mayor of Hasankeyf and others. The new director, Abdul Selam Uluçam, is excavating for two months and at two locations, the Zeynal Bey tomb and in the lower town. Last year, they examined the palace on the citadel. The excavations appear to local residents to still be in higher levels and medieval pottery is still turning up in the layers. Apart from the issue of consultation with residents, the technical scope of the dam and the salvage projects means that archaeologists cannot hope to excavate the entire town given constraints of time, even if funding is increased substantially.

The most fundamental breach of archaeological standards by the developer is the failure to consult with affected communities to whom the heritage is important. The Mayor provides assistance and information for the archaeologists if asked but he and other residents confirmed that it is still the case that they are not consulted about the cultural heritage of the town or their wishes in that regard. About one hundred and twenty local men are employed on the minimum wage of 320 million TL per month but as the Mayor pointed out, two months of this work is not enough to feed a family for a year.

Impacts on Tourism

The Mayor of Hasankeyf informed the delegation that tourism had increased enormously as a result of the public outcry over the possible flooding of the town. However, he pointed out that because there has been no investment in Hasankeyf, the financial benefits of the tourism did not come to residents of the town but went to Batman and other large towns nearby. The town is on the official GAP tour of Mesopotamia. People primarily come as day-trippers to Hasankeyf, there is nowhere to stay overnight and little in the way of facilities for tourists. The lack of investment he said was a direct result of the ever-loomming threat of the dam. ‘Who will build a hotel here when it may be flooded in a few years? The State or the private sector will not invest in a place to be submerged.’

There has been significant development of tourist information and plans for attracting tourists in the region generally in the last two years. The municipalities of Batman and Hasankeyf have produced a colour brochure of the latter and tourist information on Batman also includes discussion of Hasankeyf. In Batman, the municipality reports that tourism is more active than ever before. However, the Deputy Mayor said that ‘there is a lot more potential here but there is a lack of facilities and investment. The only facilities are downtown in Batman and away from the tourist attractions themselves. The potential for an escalation of the conflict again is causing a drop in tourist numbers.’ In Diyarbakir, the Mayor is currently seeking international funding to develop the
potential of the cultural heritage in the city, including the ancient and renowned walls of Diyarbakır, said to date from Byzantine times. The project would aim to restore and rehabilitate historical, archaeological and other cultural sites in Diyarbakır and provide livelihoods. However, this is proving difficult due to the conflict.\footnote{370}

GAP has made claims that the dams increase ‘lake tourism’ and that Ilısu, with the citadel of Hasankeyf as an archaeological park, will be an attraction. But in fact it is the case that the dam will destroy much of this potential. Large scale tourist development also has the potential to do that of course.

**Impact Assessments and Resettlement Plans**

DSİ officials in Ankara told the delegation that Ilısu is exempt from environmental impact assessment in Turkey, usually done in the form of a ÇED report\footnote{371}. This is the case because any project, like Ilısu, that was planned before 1993, when the law was amended to make ÇED reports compulsory, is exempt. It is unclear if one has been done anyway. An Environmental Impact Assessment Report was commissioned internationally to satisfy the requirements of governments considering credit for the dam and was found to contain a large number of basic flaws; it was not considered a complete or accurate assessment of impacts.\footnote{372} A Resettlement Action Plan is still in preparation and is not publicly available. A number of reviews of project impacts, including a government commissioned review of the plan, found the draft plan lacking in a large number of respects.\footnote{373} Most fundamentally, many residents of the area to be submerged have simply never been consulted, informed or consented to the dam. This is particularly true of those displaced during the conflict from their villages in the reservoir area.

When the delegation enquired about plans for new impact assessments and resettlement plans, DSİ officials claimed they did not understand what was meant.\footnote{374} In fact, DSİ has proceeded with other work on Ilısu since the collapse of the last consortium and despite pending legal cases e.g. the archaeological salvage projects have carried on each year. Journalists in the area noted, ‘they are called salvage or rescue projects so from that we have understood that Ilısu was still going ahead.’\footnote{375} DSİ also has no plans to work on a new resettlement plan or social survey for it. One senior official from the DSİ told the delegation that ‘the Resettlement Action Plan is still in preparation. It’s the same plan and has been prepared using the data collected by SEMOR.’\footnote{376}

Officials also stated that the DSİ ‘will not do any new Environmental Impact Assessment’ unless the companies or the governments giving credits require this as a condition.\footnote{377}
Since then, it seems that an updated version of the original Environmental Impact Assessment Report is in preparation. Whether an update is underway or not, the comments of DSİ officials to the delegation show no willingness on the part of that institution to comply with international standards on impact assessment and involuntary resettlement for category A projects.

It cannot be acceptable to any institution that may consider offering credits for the Ilısu dam, that the discredited plan to resettle up to 78,000 people remains in place and no account appears to have been taken of serious problems with the social surveys carried out for the plan or of the reviews, critical assessments and most seriously, alleged alteration of the survey results. This is equally true of the assessment of impacts. The fact that the DSİ is prepared to go ahead with plans as they stand indicates not only failures within that institution but the degree to which the State is unconcerned about the impacts of these projects.

**Opposition to the Ilısu Dam**

While vehemently opposed the project, residents in Hasankeyf say that they still feel unable to demonstrate openly. ‘Everyone here is against the dam, our grandfathers lived here and we want to live here’ said one resident. The pro Kurdish party, DEHAP, also said that they could not organise public protests in the town for fear of repression. They told the delegation of a number of instances where the State bussed people into the town to make protests ‘against peace and democracy’. One such ‘protest’ involving village guards took place only two months before our visit in Hasankeyf. In the villages, there is also widespread opposition to the dam, according to village women.

None of the people’s organisations and NGOs have been consulted. The Tigris-Euphrates Culture and Art Centre in Diyarbakır and the Bahar Cultural Centre in Batman haven’t been consulted about the impacts of Ilısu or other dams at all. Opened within the last few years, they provide a forum for artistic work, organise cultural events and festivals. One organiser at the Diyarbakır centre said that ‘they don’t consult us. We’re trying to reveal the culture of the community and the pains we’ve suffered for centuries. So because we are an institution which is independent and does not follow the State’s line, then there is no tolerance of us.’ The Hasankeyf Volunteers were formed to oppose the submerging of that town and the wider implications of the project. Their members include journalists and other professionals and their network extends to residents of Hasankeyf, Batman and the surrounding villages. They have organised various petitions, publications and campaigns over the years and their work has succeeded in creating...
international awareness about the town and the dam. The Batman and Hasankeyf culture and arts festival has provided a platform for further work. Over two hundred delegations have come to Hasankeyf. Now the group is preparing a project to publicise Hasankeyf with a book and a CD in several languages, applying to the EU for the development of cultural heritage.³⁸⁸ They are struggling financially with the project, which is currently helped out by the festival and ironically the State has applied for the same funds and is looking to develop ‘temporary tourism projects’ in relation to Hasankeyf.³⁸⁹

The Hasankeyf Volunteers confirm that they are not consulted about the dam and have little or no new information. They say:

‘We are against this project even if Hasankeyf is saved. Who could tolerate the devastation the dams will bring? Many modern villages will be submerged, 70 to 80,000 people displaced and at least thirty ancient mounds will be submerged. Even an alternative design and location for the dam would still cause cultural destruction, including of ancient mounds.’³⁹⁰

They note that they are more free to oppose the project now than in the past, particularly with the change of government and the harmonisation laws.³⁹¹

**Legal Cases**

The Mayor of Hasankeyf is continuing with the legal case that the municipality has taken in order to save the town. This case was opened under Law 2863, the law on cultural heritage in Turkey. Hasankeyf is a grade one protected archaeological site. There were three decisions taken about the town, firstly in 1978 when it was first listed, then in 1981 and again in 1982. But to residents the law appears to apply only to them and not to the State itself. The Mayor explained: ‘If, as a citizen, I go to pick out one small stone from this archaeological site, I go to prison for three years under the law. But to destroy the whole thing is not a crime, apparently.’³⁹² ‘We still don’t know how the law will be able to help but definitely, all of those involved will be convicted before humanity’, he added.³⁹³
CHAPTER 5:

THE HAKKARI DAM

‘How can you claim, as the DSİ does, to be protecting culture by submerging it?’ – Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari

The Projects and the Companies

According to a DSİ engineer in Ankara who is working on the project, there are three dams to be built in Hakkari province on the Greater Zap river, Cukurca, Doğanlı and Hakkari dam itself, the latter being ‘the first step to dam the Zap.’ This information is unknown to many people in Hakkari, some believed that up to seven dams were planned and some that there was only one or two at most. There are no publicly available measurements for two of the dams but a DSİ engineer involved with the projects said that alternative design options were still being considered for them. The Hakkari dam is a rock fill dam and will reach a height of 210 metres from its foundation or 170 metres from the riverbed. It will cover a reservoir area of 14.2 km². In other words, it will not cover a large area along the valley like the giant dams on the Euphrates but will be very deep. It is a hydroelectric dam and its capacity is 208 MW, with its annual generation expected to be 625 GWh. DSİ engineers in Ankara stated categorically that the ‘final design for the Hakkari dam has been completed’ this year and the necessary environmental reports have been finished. One engineer said that it is intended to proceed with the project and construction work can be commenced as soon as the financing is arranged. Officials could not say or did not know which institutions or governments had been asked for credit. However, a local State official in Hakkari said that the project had been halted.

The delegation was taken to see a long tunnel, bored into the mountainside at the site of the proposed Hakkari dam. The rock face had been spray painted with the words ‘52 m’ which seemed to mean that the tunnel is fifty-two metres long. Local people said they walked about ten metres inside but were hesitant to go further. They say this tunnel has been there for some time. A DSİ engineer with responsibility for this project, Mr Serhat Batmaz, at first denied that such a tunnel existed then said that it must be an investigation tunnel to examine the geology. The proportions of the tunnel seem
excessive for this. He added that the first act of the DSİ before construction would be to create diversion tunnels for the river so that the dam wall could be built on the dry riverbed, but these would be of different specifications.

Washington Group International, a US conglomerate, leads the consortium to build the Hakkari dam, which is a Build-Operate-Transfer project. This multi-national bought out the original company contracted to build the dam, Raytheon Infrastructure Inc. The latter was a sub company of the giant US arms manufacturer, Raytheon. Raytheon was awarded the engineering and construction contracts for the dam as part of the 1998 Turkey-US bilateral agreement, mentioned earlier with regard to the Munzur dams. ABB, another US company, was also originally in this consortium but it has since sold its hydropower interests to Alstom and it is unclear whether it sold on its interest in Hakkari. Two Turkish companies are also involved, Kiska and Dolsar. The total project cost is approximately US$600 million.

Washington Group International is involved in many sectors of industry but has a large division dealing with development in the water sector, both with regard to large dams and supply of water. Its acquisition, Raytheon, designed and constructed the giant Keban dam on the Euphrates. Other divisions in the Washington Group have previously been involved in the construction of dams including the Hoover dam on the Colorado River in the United States. In the 1930s, the International Workers of the World tried to organise the men working in dangerous and poisonous conditions on this dam but was forced out and union workers were sacked. The final death toll on the Hoover dam is reported to have been 107 men. With Raytheon on board, Washington Group is now constructing the controversial San Rocque dam in the Philippines. The conglomerate is currently one of the contractors in Iraq, receiving over a billion dollars in water and electricity contracts from the US government. Many people in the region believe that its interests in Iraq will determine whether the Washington Group decides to proceed with the Hakkari dam or not; in other words, since the Greater Zap is a shared river, whether it will be profitable to control the flow of water upstream or downstream. If it did seek credits for Hakkari dam, it would most likely apply first to Ex-Im Bank, the US government credit agency.

Local people do not think the electricity produced will be used locally. In fact, no one really knows. The vice president of the AKP party (now in government in Turkey) in Hakkari, Mr Eyüp Zibek, who is in favour of the dam, said, ‘we don’t know if the electricity produced will be for local consumption.’ There is also a suspicion locally that whatever project is brought to the area, it is not instigated for the benefit of the majority. The AKP representative added that it was very obvious that the previous government built dams
and power plants ‘only in the interests of a few people but this will be a more rational project. There are three units, phase one will involve a dam upstream of the Depik dam and the other two will be built later, downstream.‘ \(^{405}\) He said that his party and the MP for Cukurca had taken initiatives for the last two years to begin the construction of the dam. \(^{406}\) He claimed to the delegation that 10 trillion TL are already available to fund the first dam but this is not enough to begin and investors are awaiting insurance from the Treasury of the Turkish State. \(^{407}\)

**Impacts of the Dam**

**Costs to Families, Communities and their Carers**

Some of the lands in the reservoir area belong to big landowners but most people from that valley own only a little land, if any. The numbers are uncertain but there are about 5 -10,000 people who would be displaced.

The number of villages in the reservoir area has varied in different accounts between six and twenty but all of them, except one, are new villages built by the State’s militia or village guards. \(^{408}\) The one original village is comprised of villagers who decided to become village guards in order to stay in their homes. (The State has forcibly evacuated many villages in the Kurdish region, which have refused to take up arms on its behalf). However, some of the outlying hamlets of this head village refused to become village guards and were forced out. All of the villages around Hakkari city centre are village guard posts. \(^{409}\) So, many original villagers from the reservoir area were forcibly evacuated and their occupants now live in the slums of Hakkari city. A future source of potential conflict here is the fact that village guards are occupying the lands of the villagers displaced. \(^{410}\)

The delegation went to a village in the reservoir area where village guard families have built new houses. No men were present at the time but women in the village told the delegation that they want the dam to be built. They could not say why it would be good but repeated that ‘we just want the dam to come; we think it is a good project. Then we can leave. We want to go.’ \(^{411}\) They had no information about the project and had never been consulted about it. \(^{412}\) They were growing fruit trees in and around the village but regarding compensation for these and for the land, they said: ‘We don’t own the title deeds to this land at the moment. Our men are investigating how we can get the title deeds.’ \(^{413}\) Afterwards, İHD Hakkari told the delegation that displaced villagers now
living in poverty in Hakkari city centre own this land. These original villagers have the title deeds and the chairperson of İHD predicted that there would be considerable disputes and legal cases between these two groups if the expropriation process for the dam begins.

People’s livelihoods will also be affected by the environmental damage the dam would do. The DSİ engineers building the dam claimed to the delegation that ‘there is no environmental problem with Hakkari dam, no farming land and no forestry.’ In fact, the delegation observed a number of small, irrigated plots of land and gardens with fruit trees along the Greater Zap and its tributaries. Added to this is the considerable potential for stock grazing on the valley floor and sides. Settled villagers clearly do raise animals in the valley. There is a strong history of nomadic stock rearing in the region and tribal movement annually between pastures, including across the border with Iraq and Iran, for example, by the Herki tribe. Border security, armed conflict and landmines have halted most of this movement. The delegation could not establish whether the dam would impact upon the livelihoods of groups with use rights to grazing in the valley and on its slopes. It seems that what remained of such livelihoods was destroyed by the armed conflict in the 1990s but it deserves further investigation. None of the livelihoods in the valley described here appear to have been considered by DSİ officials.

Local people were worried about the fish life in the Zap and the possibility that the construction works for the dam and pollution in the resulting reservoir may kill it off, not just destroying the ecology but people’s livelihoods from fishing. Like those living by the Tigris and the Munzur, people from Hakkari and the surrounding villages fish in the river, for food and to sell on some of their catch. Mr Serhat Batmaz, a DSİ civil engineer involved with the dam, said that a 10 km energy tunnel would be created and in order to mitigate the impact of this on the wildlife in the river, some water would be maintained in the intermediary region. The bottom outlet to the riverbed would discharge a flow of water at a certain speed, a base flow rate, so that fish life could be maintained. However, the promised maintenance of water flows did not seem to be happening in the case of the Batman or Zernek dams, for example, both of which the delegation observed at first hand.

Human rights defenders, Göç-Der, the DEHAP party and the Mayor all said that there had been no consultation with them or with any of the villagers directly affected by the project. One human rights lawyer had tried to speak with the dam engineers but could not. ‘They have no relationship with people in the area,’ she said. A key impact to which all the groups and individuals with whom the delegation met drew attention is that the Hakkari dam would cut off the only route by road into the city from the rest
of Turkey. At the moment, the roads are in appalling condition and people in Hakkari view it as a sort of embargo on them by the State. A new road would have to be built as a result of the dam but this would add hours to the already lengthy journey time to the nearest cities. This will isolate Hakkari people socially and is a clear advantage in terms of military control of the area.

Many families here have relatives in Iraq and must negotiate border crossings and military checkpoints in order to maintain contact with them. The disruption of the route through Hakkari by the dam reservoir and potentially by further dams downstream would act as another barrier between people here and communities downstream in Iraq.

But most importantly, the flooding of the road will have a serious impact on people’s health. At the moment, the hospital in Hakkari has no adequate medical services. This means that anyone who has a serious illness and can afford it has to go to Van, Diyarbakır or Ankara in order to get to a functioning hospital. The Mayor noted that there had been public protests after five people with kidney problems died in Hakkari hospital within one month recently due to lack of treatment. As a result, the government sent fifteen to twenty doctors to Hakkari but the situation is still very bad because there is no specialised equipment in the hospital. Women also raised the problem that the obstruction created by the dam reservoir and the new route would put mothers’ and children’s lives at risk. The secretary of İHD Hakkari, Leyla Çiftçi, said, ‘it will result in the deaths of more babies.’ At the moment, if there are complications with a woman’s pregnancy or in childbirth, she has to be taken the many miles over the mountains to Van because there are no facilities in Hakkari hospital. This has resulted in a high infant mortality rate in such cases because of the length of the journey. A longer route would only worsen this situation. The alternative, that the State would fully equip Hakkari hospital, is extremely unlikely according to local people and would not resolve the situation completely because villages would still be cut off from Hakkari by the reservoir.

**Cultural and Environmental Impacts**

No precise estimate of the extent of the impacts of the Hakkari dam can be made currently due to the continuing repression of the Hakkari population, the security situation and the long standing lack of knowledge of society, culture and the environment in the area. Hakkari, close to the border with Iraq, was off limits to outsiders for many years and has really only opened up since the end of OHAL. People from the province itself were forbidden to move freely for a long time. Therefore, there have never been any serious archaeological surveys of the area or recent investigations of the wider culture and
society. Equally, environmental studies are lacking. Older 'expeditions', themselves often lacking in detailed information and personnel, cannot substitute for an investigation of the situation in the region today.\textsuperscript{423} It is very difficult for people in Hakkari to be freely consulted about the impact of the dam, given the security situation and the threat of repression.\textsuperscript{424}

People in the area are aware that the dam will have serious environmental and cultural impacts. As well as the threat to lands, gardens and fishing livelihoods, there are natural heritage impacts: ‘the natural beauty of the valley and its wildlife will be destroyed,’ said the Mayor.\textsuperscript{425} The lack of sewage treatment in Hakkari makes it all too likely that serious pollution will occur in the river and in local drinking water as a result of building the dam. The local chairman of DEHAP, Mr Sebahattin Suvadci, also spoke about the fact that in a few decades the dam would cease to function so this destruction is for a project without a long term strategy.\textsuperscript{426} This, combined with the submerging of cultural heritage outlined below also has implications for the tourism potential of the valley, people believed. They noted the potential of the river for rafting, for example.

People are opposed to the potential cultural impacts of the dam. ‘How can you claim, as the DSİ does, to be protecting culture by submerging it?’ asked the Mayor.\textsuperscript{427} He referred to Hasankeyf and in his own area, the Christian heritage in the Zap valley, which will be submerged. There are a number of Christian sites in the reservoir area. They were built by the Nestorians i.e. followers of St Nestorius. These communities broke with the Western Church on theological grounds in 431 CE. Some of their descendants identify as ethnic Assyrians, descended from the people who lived in the ancient Assyrian empire. The term Assyrian Christian is sometimes used interchangeably with Nestorian to describe them and this is how Hakkari residents referred to these communities. However, Izady among others has also suggested that some of these Christians were Kurdish.\textsuperscript{428} Originally, these Christian communities were located widely on the continent of Asia, as far away as China, but over time and especially after attacks by the Mongols in the 14\textsuperscript{th} century, their numbers shrank and they became concentrated in the Hakkari area and around Urumiya in Iran.\textsuperscript{429} The churches in the Zap valley must date from the 5\textsuperscript{th} century CE onwards and are more likely, on architectural grounds, to date to the later medieval and early modern periods, though only further work, including excavation, could date them precisely.\textsuperscript{430} They are evidence of the existence of ancient Christian communities in this region for hundreds of years.

The Nestorians were an integral part of society in the region. Sometimes the patriarchs were as or more powerful than Kurdish leaders, at times in power with them and at other points fighting them. In the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, there were a series of schisms in the
communities as a result of foreign missionary activity, which also provoked attacks on them by Kurdish leaders, sanctioned by the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{431} The remaining Christian communities seem to have fled during World War One when their patriarch at that time made a decision to support the allies in the war, but no help arrived in return to support the Nestorians and their choice was either to flee or be killed. There are still Assyrian Christians and those who claim descent from the Nestorians living in Turkey, Iran and Iraq. It is unclear if any still live in the Zap valley or Hakkari province. In 1908, five hundred Christian families are recorded as living here and claiming descent from these ancient communities but this was before the flight during the war.\textsuperscript{432} It is also unlikely that these communities elsewhere in the region have been consulted about the potential submergence of what they may well see as significant heritage.

The village of Dez-Kırıkdağ was mentioned as a particularly historic place with Assyrian churches and chapels. The downstream valley towards Cukurca also contains such sites. Many Kurdish residents of Hakkari spoke of the sites as significant to them and to the wider world also. The Chairman of the Hakkari branch of DEHAP commented: ‘We know that different peoples lived here, Assyrians and Armenians also, so the dam is going to destroy that history too’.\textsuperscript{433} The delegation could find out very little about Armenian heritage in the area. It is known that the Armenians were established in the Van area by the 6\textsuperscript{th} century BCE.\textsuperscript{434} On the other hand, the Vice President of the local branch of the AKP party claimed that ‘there are no farming fields in the reservoir area and no historical sites’.\textsuperscript{435} When asked about the churches and other heritage, he added that ‘none of the sites are like Hasankeyf and anyway, the villages with churches won’t be submerged’.\textsuperscript{436} But he had to admit that he didn’t think ‘there has been a comprehensive survey of the cultural heritage impacts of the dam’ and that there ‘have been no recent surveys’.\textsuperscript{437}

The delegation was able to visit one church site in the reservoir area, consisting of a sub-rectangular stone building with a single nave, an internal wall dividing off what presumably was once the sacristy, several narrow slit windows and a doorway on the South side.\textsuperscript{438} The doorway had been widened in more recent times to allow animals to enter. Internal features were few, consisting of only two niches, on a gable and side wall respectively, both a few feet from the floor. Most of the plaster had fallen from the walls, which were constructed of undressed stone and there were no other distinguishing internal features. Pieces of dressed stone masonry lay on the floor. The building is being used as an animal shelter and had a modern extension built on to the side. It lies beside a stream flowing into the Zap, on a small hill amid irrigated fields and a dispersed modern hamlet. There were no detectable graves around the church but the hill the building rested on looked as though it may have been at least partly a prepared
platform or foundation. The delegation did not have the opportunity to explore further up the valley due to time constraints. However, sources mention that the Nestorians developed farmland in the valleys here, with terraced orchards and stone built houses.\(^{439}\) Traces of these remains must still exist beneath undergrowth and beneath the ground surface. Hillwash and other soil erosion may have damaged some remains but there has been no invasive plough agriculture, which can erase archaeological traces in the subsoil. Another church site nearby, perched on the mountain above a village guard village, looked more substantial.\(^{440}\) It is above the height of the reservoir but it will be cut off and its immediate surroundings on the hill below flooded.

The delegation noted that in the mountainside immediately above the first church site described above, are a series of caves. It is unclear whether the reservoir water would reach them, though it looked possible particularly given the dam measurements the DSİ has published. Even if it did not, they would be cut off from their surroundings and any future investigation of them would be severely hampered if not impossible. There were further caves along the Zap valley. In the whole region, it is already clear that caves have been occupied up to very recently in a number of communities and in some cases such as Hasankeyf still continue to be lived in. Therefore, the possibility that some of these caves contain evidence for human habitation in historic and modern times (perhaps related also to the Nestorian settlement in the valley) would have to be investigated by any impact assessment.

Another possibility these caves afford, when combined with the all too scarce archaeological evidence for the area, is that they may contain evidence of much more ancient human settlement. This area is known to contain sources of obsidian or ‘volcanic glass’, the black glass-like stone favoured by many prehistoric communities for the production of sharp, multi-purpose stone tools. A key source was located at Nemrut Dağ, on the west side of Lake Van and trade was maintained with other communities, including those from what became Southern Mesopotamia, for many thousands of years. Hunters, fishers, gatherers, the first farmers and nomads all made use of it. Some of this trade through the millennia would have to have passed through the Zap valley and communities in the valley must have used the stone also. Burney and Marshall Lang say that ‘obsidian artefacts of Middle Palaeolithic type have been found in the Hakkari, Van and Kars provinces of eastern Turkey.’\(^{441}\) The TAY archaeological survey project records that a 1961 archaeological survey of the region by one man noted obsidian tools dating to the Middle Palaeolithic (Middle of the Old Stone Age) in Yüksekova, northeast of Hakkari city.\(^{442}\)

The Middle Palaeolithic is the time when both Neanderthals and fully modern human
beings were living in the Middle East. The physical terrain the Zap valley caves are set in looks very much like the classic settlement location for Neanderthal communities. Neanderthal communities were certainly present in the wider area. One of the most renowned Neanderthal sites worldwide is just across the border in Iraq at Shanidar cave. Here the US archaeologists, Ralph and Rose Solecki, and their team of Iraqi Kurdish labourers discovered a series of nine Neanderthal skeletons. Ralph Solecki proposed that Neanderthals, rather than the brutish creatures of the caveman stereotypes, were social and cultural beings who buried their dead with care, from evidence gathered at this site.\textsuperscript{443} The tools they used were made of obsidian and were dated to 30,000 years ago.\textsuperscript{444} They may well have gotten the stone from the Hakkari and Van areas.

The co-existence of Neanderthals and the first fully modern humans i.e. ourselves in the Middle East, the potential interaction between the two species and whether we are related to these Neanderthals is a debate of international significance in archaeology and beyond. Archaeological evidence for this is scarce and all the more valuable as a result. Such evidence may well lie in the reservoir area; without a full survey this cannot begin to be assessed. What is certain is that the flooding of the wider landscape will irreversibly destroy any possibility of finding out about these ancient communities, their environment and our common human origins.

Further prehistoric evidence from the Neolithic (New Stone Age) and later is attested to in nearby valleys in the form of rock art - carvings on boulders depicting images of what are described as ‘human hunters’, a human in a boat, wolves, hares, mountain sheep, wild goat and more.\textsuperscript{445} The possibility of such rock art in the reservoir areas would have to be investigated.

Situated as the Zap is on the Northern Mesopotamian frontier, many armies, empires, ethnic and religious groupings have crossed and re-crossed through these valleys. Trade and other networks with the North was one of the features of the early city-states of South Mesopotamia in modern Iraq. The Assyrians and others maintained frontiers beyond the Zap (as seen from archaeological evidence in the Ilısu reservoir area). The communities in the valleys have been made subject to many masters and no doubt refused that subjugation in various ways. In other times, Hakkari and the surrounding areas have been more isolated local fiefdoms. This heritage has much to say to us in the context of war in the region today. There is evidence in the chronicles the empires kept of travels through this region. The Mesopotamian specialist Nicholas Postgate notes that the Assyrian kings passed through these mountains on a number of conquering campaigns. The son of Sargon of Assyria campaigned in what is now the Cudi Dağ (around Hakkari) and he wrote of how he ‘leapt from rock to rock like an ibex, and then
sat on a rock and had a cold drink.’ Hakkari itself is mentioned in the *Sherefname*, a Kurdish history compiled in 1596. The ‘prince with the golden hand’, Xane Lepzerin is said to have been appointed ruler of Hakkari by Christian tribes.

But there must also be material evidence of all of this in the area the dam will submerge. Of particular note in the Hakkari area are a series of stelae, which may be grave markers and other types of memorial or they may function as important journey markers. Stelae are single, usually carved stones placed upright in the ground. Those with inscriptions are also a very valuable source of information about ancient individuals and societies in the area. It is quite possible that there are such stelae in the reservoir area. A local lawyer is taking a case on behalf of some people in the area who found one of these stelae while building a house. They informed the State, according to heritage law, and should have received money for the find but they have gotten nothing. According to their lawyer, there is a dispute over the interpretation of these stelae, all the more reason for assessing whether they are present in the reservoir area. ‘The nationalists say that the stelae are evidence only of Turkish civilisation,’ she said. She has been unable to get documents for the legal case from the State.

Residents of Hakkari felt that the dam had to be linked to the submergence of evidence for the recent and widespread uprooting of people from the villages, which happened in the Zap valley and many other places in this area. ‘In Hakkari, people have been subjected to a cultural massacre, it’s a fact. And with the dam, a history is also being destroyed. They want to assimilate people and erase us from history as a whole so they also aim to erase the traces of our history,’ said one DEHAP activist. A human rights lawyer confirmed the possibility of graves of the disappeared existing in the reservoir area here. As elsewhere in the Kurdish region, the military has responsibility for cultural property in the reservoir area. It is not likely that permission will be granted for surveys of evidence of crimes by the same military. Full archaeological surveys of potential ancient sites may not fare much better due to the presence of village guard posts in the valley. A human rights lawyer reported that an international Christian organisation recently tried to undertake a project to conserve the Christian heritage of the area, particularly to repair the churches. The local jandarma, as the institution responsible for cultural property in the area, refused permission for this work. Local people were disappointed as they saw the tourism potential of such a project.

Furthermore, residents of Hakkari say that there are landmines throughout the region and people are afraid to go looking for possible cultural sites. Another indicator of the State’s attitude to cultural heritage in the area is summed up by an account told by a wide range of people. A key army post in Hakkari sits atop a hill at the centre of the
city. Residents of the city say that the army blew up an ancient castle on top of this hill in order to site their station there. T.A. Sinclair confirms the fate of this castle in his authoritative account, *Eastern Turkey: An Architectural and Archaeological Survey*, and dates the destruction to 1962 though the cause is not given.

**Safety of the Hakkari Dam**

Engineers for the project say that the reservoir slopes are stable, very steep and sound. There is a major geological fault about 1.5 metres downstream, the Southeast Anatolia fault, which marks the juncture between two rock types, on one side the Midyat limestone and on the other, shale and metamorphic rocks. The engineers claimed to the delegation that this area is not a critical earthquake zone. Nevertheless, there is a major earthquake zone only 70-80km away in Iran. There have been recent earthquakes in the area. At the very least, such a potential for disaster deserves a full investigation.

**Impact Assessments, Resettlement and Expropriation Plans**

The dams at Cucurka and Doğanlı, DSİ officials surmised, would be exempt from ÇED reports. It is unclear why this is the case since both are only at a very early design stage. Such a report has been completed for the Hakkari dam itself. According to officials in the Investigation and Planning section of the DSİ, ‘on the basis of the report, the Minister of the Environment granted permission to the DSİ to build the dam.’ If this report were completed to international standards, it would have to contain proposals for the resettlement of those villagers in the reservoir area and a solution to the potential conflict between two groups of villagers over land in the reservoir area. It would certainly have to have assessed in full the natural and cultural heritage within the reservoir area. But since it appears that affected communities have not been consulted about this project, it’s hard to see how such impacts are being measured. DSİ officials refused to give the delegation a copy of this report, which they are legally obliged to do under a new access to information law. One official, Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Head of the Investigation and Planning Department in the General Headquarters of the DSİ, denied it existed then retracted this once it became clear that others in her own department had informed us it did exist.

The Director of the DSİ in Diyarbakır stated that his officials, in collaboration with various experts from Van University, are also collecting cultural data for the Hakkari reservoir area. İHD, Hakkari residents, lawyers and villagers testified to the fact that
no one had ever come to properly survey the archaeological sites of the area or assess the wider cultural impacts. They had never heard of a team from Van University coming to work there. It would be hard to miss an archaeological survey team since entry to the area is so restricted and everyone in town knows when people connected with the dam come and stay. The TAY archaeological survey project, though nationwide in scope, has not visited Hakkari province. Therefore, it’s difficult to know what the ÇED report could possibly be assessing; on the contrary, it seems that there is much that it has omitted. An archaeological survey would have to consider sites and cultural places from all periods on the valley floor but also up the sides of the valley to considerable height, given the predicted height of the water in the reservoir. All periods includes recent heritage and present day places of cultural and religious significance. Apart from the security factors discussed later on which render a complete survey unlikely, it is not possible to know the full extent of impacts by means of one rapid survey, particularly given the time limits imposed by dam construction. The comprehensive surveys of the wider region needed to meet basic archaeological standards of assessment do not exist. No survey could proceed without consultation with affected communities in any case. Residents in Hakkari spoke of ‘feasibility studies continuing for twenty to twenty five years but we don’t know what’s in them and still, they don’t begin the construction.’

The potential for unexploded landmines in the area also reduces the likelihood of a comprehensive survey. There continue to be deaths and injuries as a result of the landmine problem in the region and there is no evidence that the State is dealing with it.

The lack of adequate surveys and of consultation with affected communities does not necessarily mean that this project has been halted. Evidence from the other projects described in this report and from many previous reports suggests that the failure to consult or to assess impacts is the norm for dams which have been built or which are going ahead as planned.

**Host Communities**

Hakkari city centre would be the main host location for villagers displaced by the Hakkari dam, unless, because they are village guards, the State provides settlement for them elsewhere. The latter scenario is quite possible and the delegation heard from displaced people and their organisation of numerous instances where they said village guards were offered various incentives and benefits for taking up arms on behalf of the State. If the oustees from Hakkari or the other dams do end up in the city, the Mayor made it
very clear that ‘we can’t deal with more displaced people and with the environmental problems due to the dams. How can we? People displaced by the conflict here don’t have enough to eat, we have no clean water and we don’t have the funds or the services to help them…. ‘

The Mayor also spoke about how municipal money had been wasted by corruption in the past on the part of the ANAP party.

The water situation is particularly serious: ‘We are waterless in the middle of huge water resources. In the houses of people in the city centre, 30% don’t have water or sewage treatment. Of those remaining, only 30% get water regularly and the remaining 40% have water once every two or three days.’ He explained that the city’s population had risen from about 30,000 since the mid 1990s to 120-130,000 due to the village evacuations.

Göç-Der in Hakkari detailed the conditions that displaced villagers have to live in and women from one neighbourhood together with representatives from İHD showed the delegation these conditions. The health of displaced families is always poor. In Hakkari, women in a displaced neighbourhood brought us to the nearest source of piped water, a tap surrounded by a stagnant pool of water with raw sewage from people’s houses flowing nearby. The women said their children are often ill and many die from diseases brought on due to the poor sanitation and the lack of food. Because of the lack of hospital facilities and the fact that they are prevented from getting Green Cards (free medical care) due to the preference of the authorities for village guards, most displaced families have no health care to speak of.

The average annual income in Hakkari the Mayor quoted as $500 whereas in Istanbul it is seven or eight thousand dollars. About 60% of people in the city have an annual income of approximately $200 per year. The only regular employment is with public bodies and institutions, in other words, for professionals. This places the vast majority of people under the UN hunger threshold. According to the Mayor, ‘It is a fact that people don’t have enough to eat, they live on plants from the mountains and we have no funds to give them food.’

Local people also spoke of the chronic lack of education facilities and teachers in the city and the province. The chairperson of the local Göç-Der branch said that most displaced families would like to send their children to school, girls as well as boys, but could not afford to do so for very long, a common problem throughout the region. Even though school itself is free the cost of books and various extras make it unaffordable for many displaced families where the priority has to be money for food. This impacts on girl children especially many of whom never go to school. Boys are sent for a year or two to learn to read and write and then go out on the streets to sell napkins or do any other
sort of work that becomes available.\textsuperscript{477} The Mayor said that Hakkari needs 800 teachers but when organisations recently petitioned the governor on this, he informed them that Hakkari would shortly be receiving 300 military teachers to make up the shortfall.\textsuperscript{478}

In sum, it is unrealistic to expect that the city could provide the facilities to feed, clothe and educate yet more refugees from the dams.

\textbf{Opposition to the Dam}

The risk of violent repression has meant that public protests about anything, including dams, have not been possible in Hakkari until recently. The delegation met a number of people and organisations opposed to the projects and what people called ‘government by the US’. One lawyer spoke of Turkey’s internal political aims: ‘it’s a kind of gun against the Iraqi Kurds,’ in other words, the dam may be used to hold the water of the Zap upstream.\textsuperscript{479} Regarding downstream flow to Iraq, a DSİ engineer with responsibility for the project asserted that ‘the Hakkari dam is on a small river and reduction in downstream flow will not happen’ – hardly an encouraging or detailed plan.\textsuperscript{480} The Mayor of Hakkari, from the DEHAP party, told the governor of the province that the dam should not go ahead.\textsuperscript{481} He says that people do not have any information on the projects or their implications and the municipality intends to organise information sessions so that people can be informed of the impacts and about alternatives that would meet people’s energy and water needs without harming the environment.\textsuperscript{482} He believed the model of opposition through the public provision of information in Munzur is a good one.

DSİ engineers in Ankara claimed to the delegation that the Hakkari dam enjoys widespread popular support. A civil engineer involved with the Hakkari project, Mr Serhat Batmaz, said that ‘the people living in the Hakkari area press the DSİ; they want to build the dam. There’s no industry or factories there and they are waiting for the dam.’\textsuperscript{483} He estimated that approximately one thousand people could be employed on the construction, which would take seven or eight years (though the potential number of employees seems exaggerated).\textsuperscript{484} It is true there is support for the dam going ahead; what the DSİ fails to acknowledge is the desperation for work that lies behind this support.

Pointing out the very high rate of unemployment in Hakkari, the Mayor and a number of representatives of organisations said that a significant number of people do want the dam to be built because of the severe poverty they live in and the chance of jobs, however temporary, unsafe and un-unionised.\textsuperscript{485} The Chairperson of Göç-Der in Hakkari said that although he and others in their organisation are opposed to the dams, he ‘does not
blame other displaced people for wanting them to come. When you see the desperate situation people are in, you understand why they are ready to take any work. For many families the jobs would be the difference between life and death. Nevertheless, the delegation met others who were not ready to accept the dam at any cost. For example, a mother explained that her father, a construction worker, was the sole wage earner in the family. But she said that ‘we need a water project that will provide us with clean, running water. We have none here. Only if the project will do that, then we want it.’

The Hakkari dam is not such a project of course.

Another point made by the Mayor with regard to the employment provided by dams is that in his view, it is unacceptable to present such a temporary, unreliable and environmentally destructive project as the solution to people’s poverty. The Mayor commented that ‘in a city like this with so much unemployment, the dam might provide some jobs if they don’t bring in workers from outside as they did with some other projects. But I don’t accept such a temporary solution to the unemployment problems of Hakkari.’ People felt they have a right to demand jobs which are not destroying their environment or culture and that the desperation of people in the area was being used by the State and the companies to impose the project. There are also alternatives in the energy sector which could be looked at but which, local people say, have never been considered.

There are currently no legal cases concerning the Hakkari dam. A human rights lawyer explained that a change in the law on expropriation means that people will no longer be able to take court cases to increase the amount of compensation they might receive. The State appears to have moved to a scheme whereby, if people don’t accept that the State is taking their land, a court procedure values the land automatically and the State pays the money into the account of the title deed holder.
CHAPTER 6:

THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

‘Sometimes people are too afraid to come and make applications to us because the security forces wait outside our door and psychologically disturb anyone coming in’ – Mr İsmail Akbulut, Chairperson, İHD Hakkari 491

Introduction

The region in which the dams are being built has been and continues to be one where repression and human rights violations characterise everyday life.

After 1987, most of the Kurdish region was under emergency rule but by the end of 2002 and three years after a PKK ceasefire, it was lifted in all areas. At the same time, a series of harmonisation packages began to be put through parliament in order to bring Turkish governance and its legal system into compliance with the European Union. These have included the abolition of the State Security Courts (military courts), the shortening of detention times, the right to legal advice in detention, increase in punishments for those convicted of torture, changes allowing more freedom of expression and association in the media and at events, changes to make the founding and running of organisations easier. A set of criteria laid down by the EU for countries acceding to the union, called the Copenhagen Criteria, was to be the measure of Turkey’s progress. Several of these criteria have been related to the serious human rights violations known to occur in Turkey such as systematic torture and the considerable power of the military in public life. Many Kurdish people and their organisations have focused on the part of these criteria, pertinent to their demands for cultural rights. The election of the pro-EU and pro-reform AKP party, an Islamic party, to government has accelerated these changes.

As these alterations to legislation and the structure of government have been taking place, people in the region as well as national and international human rights organisations have pointed out that real change has to be seen on the ground. A number of testimonies, reports and statistics document the fact that implementation of legislative change has been slow, haphazard and in many areas, non-existent.492
One factor deserving priority attention is that the general impunity of the security forces in Turkey remains in place. The delegation did not hear any evidence that the torture, beatings, harassment on the street and other violations by the military and the police are being properly investigated or punished. Supported by their organisations, people lodge complaints and take court cases but obtaining domestic legal redress in Turkey is still very difficult and in many cases impossible. Evidence from previous chapters (for example concerning disappeared persons) and below shows that when families and human rights defenders request that the authorities investigate violations by the security forces, they continue to be met with evasion and threats. State institutions and officials often deny that there is any problem or discrimination in Turkey at all.

This is the context in which the dams in Munzur, Ilısu and Hakkari would be built. Not only does this make valid consultation very difficult, people's opposition to the submergence of their homes, lands and history is seriously undermined by the threat of a violent response.

Continuation of Detention and Torture

The torture described here, still occurring in the region, is from information given by human rights lawyers, based on examples of applications and cases they are involved with and, in some cases, on direct testimonies that the delegation heard from survivors. It is presented here in order to convey the considerable physical and psychological risk facing those who oppose the dams and defend their roots.

The delegation found that many forms of torture by State agents characteristic of the Turkish security and penal system for many decades and used with particularly ferocity against the Kurdish population have been reduced considerably. This torture includes electric shock treatment, ‘Palestinian hanging’ (by the arms tied behind the back), falaka (beating the soles of the feet), burning with cigarettes, hosing with pressurised water, stripping naked of detainees and the sexual torture and humiliation of women, children and men. It has not ended but the sectors of society on whom it is practiced and the occasions on which it is used have changed. Reports from İHD branches and other organisations the delegation interviewed say that the forms of torture prevalent now in the Southeast are less violent physically with more emphasis on the psychological, though physical torture continues as well.

With regard to forms of torture previously used in a systematic way against large numbers of Kurdish people, the Human Rights Association (İHD) branches and other lawyers in the various cities the delegation visited all reported that there has been a visible reduction in the past year to year and a half. Activists, villagers and professionals
alike agreed. Batman İHD Chairperson Saadet Becerikli reported that her branch had not had an application involving violent torture for one year.\textsuperscript{497} İHD Diyarbakır Chairperson Selahattin Demirtas noted that such an application had not been made to them in several months.\textsuperscript{498} He informed the delegation that the last application had been made to his office twelve days before and concerned a young woman who had been passing a demonstration on the street in the city.\textsuperscript{499} He told of how she was seized upon by a section of the security forces present and badly beaten. She collapsed on the street and was helped to her feet by passers by after which she made her own way home. This is the sort of assault described by other human rights activists as the most common physical threat, on the street and in detention. People feel that this is an improvement on the more violent forms of torture.

Instances of more violent torture are still occurring however, mainly used against activists and people suspected of ‘assisting terrorists’. İHD Diyarbakır reported that in Şırnak two months ago, captured Kurdish guerrillas were prevented from seeing lawyers for two days and subjected to electric shocks and high pressure hosing.\textsuperscript{500} This is not confined to the Kurdish region: according to the same İHD branch, in Adana four months ago, two detainees were held incommunicado for thirty days, accused of being members of the PKK and subjected to electric shock treatment.\textsuperscript{501}

Along with heavy and repeated beatings, other physical forms of torture that human rights defenders\textsuperscript{502} report include sleep deprivation, forced to stand for long periods, forced to stand up and sit down repeatedly for long periods, preventing detainees from going to the toilet, refusing water or food, putting detainees and prisoners into small, cramped isolation cells, disorientation techniques such as the light being left on in cells during sleeping time, blindfolds, refusing treatment for injuries and chronic illnesses detainees were already suffering from, any or several of the above being inflicted during interrogation of the detainee. It can be noted that most of these methods and the psychological methods described below, inflicted on a wider section of the population, do not leave physical marks on the person and are therefore more difficult to document in any court cases.

One application, which İHD Hakkari gave as an example of common practice, concerned the detention of an older man one month before the delegation’s visit.\textsuperscript{503} He is blind and has other health problems. According to the application, he was detained for three days and badly beaten including around the head as a result of which he sustained several injuries, one of which was to his inner ear. He was blindfolded, stripped naked, forced to stand up for a long time and a gun was placed in his mouth. He is on remand in prison at present. İHD do not expect that the family will get justice because even though the
State Security Courts have been abolished under the harmonisation laws, many of those who served in them still make up the judiciary so ‘this means impunity will continue.’

These and other detentions occurred when the army mounted an operation on civilians in the city one month before the delegation’s visit as a punishment for a recent attack, by KONGRA-GEL, on a military building. According to the applications made to İHD, houses were searched and women subjected to verbal sexual insults. Entire families were dragged out onto the street and away to security points. Such incidents are increasing with the renewal of the conflict in the region.

Alongside these physical forms, psychological methods of torture are used systematically, according to human rights lawyers and organisations. These include accusations of political crimes which carry heavy prison sentences, particularly ‘assisting and sheltering terrorists’; threats of death or threats to inflict violent physical torture such as electric shocks or sexual torture (the latter used particularly to threaten women); continuous interrogation for many hours (ten hours in some cases the delegation heard); dogs held close by and threats to set them on detainees; threats to kill and/or sexually torture close relatives of the detainee especially wives, mothers and children (this is used to threaten men particularly). Interrogators often demand that detainees become informers or some or all of the above will happen to them.

İHD branches reported that detentions are once again increasing with the renewal of conflict in the region. A news conference towards the end of 2004 in Diyarbakır by İHD lawyers confirmed a sharp rise in human rights violations, including torture in detention, with more than a third of detainees complaining of torture by the police. The increases in detentions are varying between areas, as one might expect depending on where the main zone of conflict moves, but Hakkari seems to be most affected. According to İHD in Hakkari, ‘especially with the renewal of [military] operations, we have many applications to İHD on this; in the last three months we have had thirty five applications and the families of those detained are often the ones who report it. Initially, many are applying to find out where the detainees are.’

For official detentions throughout the region, the detention times are generally within the legal limits allowed.

One of the problems İHD in Hakkari report is that some detainees are still being refused access to a lawyer; in some instances they have recorded detainees being left incommunicado in cells for up to three days. Whether access to a lawyer is granted or not appears to them to be completely arbitrary, indicating that the perpetrators consider that they are protected from any credible investigation or punishment. In other cities, lawyers report more compliance with the new law on access to their clients. However, this is still made difficult in practice with detainees forced to wait several hours to
see their lawyers and in cases where the detainee is an activist or suspected of being a guerrilla, access may still be refused. There is a distinct tendency on the part of the authorities to get around the limit to detention times and rights to lawyers by means of unofficial detentions. This practice means that the detainee is taken to a place other than an official venue or is taken to a police or army station but their presence is not recorded in the stations’ logbooks. These detainees are afforded no rights and at risk of serious torture. Unofficial detentions have been increasing again in the last few months in a number of places in the region. İHD Batman in particular, noted that they had a number of applications.

The detentions and torture, combined with other forms of repression the delegation heard of, are twofold: either they are arbitrary, which is not to say unsystematic or they are part of a targeted campaign against individuals, groups or the population of a particular area. The arbitrary acts are those done to intimidate the community or torture to get convictions for unresolved cases. The targeted campaigns are an escalation of this and examples documented here include the deliberate use of violence at the end of the Munzur festival to heighten tension and the threats and media attacks on public representatives from DEHAP in particular. More frequently now the whole population in an area may be punished for the actions of others in the conflict and in order to repress any alleged support for the guerrillas. The evidence from the fact-finding mission suggests that people in all of the reservoir areas are at risk in this way and for the expression of opinions on the dams.

Sexual Torture, Humiliation and Harassment

Women’s opposition to the dam projects and why they are so opposed has been very hidden. Equally, the risks they take when they organise events, speak out or merely express an opinion critical of the dams are downplayed and the considerable threat they face rendered invisible. Therefore, the following evidence is presented in order to clarify the context in which women oppose the projects and in which consultation about dams is to take place. Dam builders cannot claim that this situation constitutes freedom for women to express their opinion.

Kurdish women survivors and their lawyers (some Turkish) have had great success in speaking out against and publicising internationally the sexual torture, including rape,
perpetrated systematically against them.\textsuperscript{517} As a result this torture, which all women in Turkey are threatened by but which has been used with particular force against Kurdish women, has been reduced. Women explained that by gaining the courage to speak publicly about this they have brought male colleagues and relatives to accept that they must support the women.\textsuperscript{518} A spokeswoman from the Labourer Women’s Union and the Women’s Platform in Tunceli said ‘the bravery of the women, so sure in what they are saying, is dragging the men along.’\textsuperscript{519} She noted that this had been the most positive thing that women were able to speak to the press and public meetings about what happened to them, and therefore, many more women came forward and the crimes were highlighted nationally and internationally. Determined not to allow the same sort of silence to hide other, similar situations, women’s organisations spoke about their demonstrations against the Iraq war.\textsuperscript{520} With banners and speeches at the demonstrations and in their publications and press statements, they focused as a priority on the rape and harassment of women in Iraq by coalition forces saying, ‘we know what the women in Iraq are going through.’\textsuperscript{521} In this way they also continue to highlight their own case.

Women have sought to get communities to accept that the rapes and degradations are not a stain on the men’s or family honour but rather on the State, no small feat in the context of the high levels of domestic violence and frequent murders of women by male relatives for suspected sexual indiscretions or for being raped i.e. what are sometimes referred to as ‘honour killings.’\textsuperscript{522} \textbf{Women reported substantively to the delegation} on the high levels of violence they face within families and the lack of support from the authorities.\textsuperscript{523} A number of women felt that the domestic violence must be seen in the context of the State’s violence against them and outlined examples where men had changed after torture and took out their pain on those with even less power – women and children.\textsuperscript{524}

Human rights activists spoke of violent sexual torture now being used against certain individuals considered to be prominent activists or suspected or convicted of being Kurdish guerrillas.\textsuperscript{525} Women frequently cited the case of DEHAP activist Ms Gulbahar Gündüz as one of a number of examples intended to threaten them all.\textsuperscript{526} The delegation could find no information on such a case from the recent period but equally, there is no evidence that those who perpetrated such crimes in the past are no longer employed in the security forces. Women told the delegation that they fear such sexual torture could occur again.\textsuperscript{527}

İHD Hakkari said that the police follow human rights defenders around the streets of the city, right up to their front doors. The police try to intimidate and insult them, in particular shouting sexual insults at the women and threatening ‘we don’t want to
detain you because if we do, you’ll be excluded by the people of Hakkari.’ One woman explained that ‘this means that they are threatening us with rape, for which we might be ostracised by our community but also they are showing us that they know that even if they do not sexually torture us in detention, many people will believe that it has happened anyway so we’ll still suffer the same consequences.’ A representative of the Labourer Women’s Union in Tunceli said that women are harassed when they put up posters for an event or when they go to the neighbourhoods to meet grassroots women. Neither she nor other women in the group had been sexually assaulted in detention but the threat of it was always there. Dogs have been held outside the room where she was detained and she thought they would be set on her. The women they visit are often threatened as well; the police threatened one woman’s family, illegally, with eviction because she asked the Labourer Women’s Union for help with domestic violence. It is all too likely that she suffered more violence from her husband, a State official, as a result.

İHD Hakkari reported to the delegation that the threat of raping and assaulting close female relatives is still used to humiliate and terrorise men in detention. Human rights lawyers and women from cities and villages across the region confirm that women and men are verbally abused, including with sexual insults, on the street and in detention. This has lessened to a certain extent since the ceasefire of the PKK and the ending of OHAL but still goes on. It is now normally verbal threats and insults whereas previously it also included sexual assault. Village women told the delegation that they have, in the past, been sexually assaulted during village raids ‘of course, yes, every time.’ Because of the decrease in the number of raids as a result of the ceasefire and the ending of emergency rule, instances of this kind of assault had reduced considerably. But women told the delegation that with the renewal of the conflict, village raids are occurring again and the women’s treatment at the hands of the army is the same as on previous occasions.

One practice which women, human rights defenders and organisations in Hakkari, Batman, and from the villages reported was the ripping off of women’s veils. This can happen in the street, at checkpoints, on village raids and during demonstrations. It often accompanies strip searches also.

According to the Batman Women’s Platform and human rights defenders in Batman and Diyarbakır, the strip-searching of women in small booths on the streets at the start of demonstrations continues to occur. Female police or sometimes the army carry out the searches, which are down to underwear. The Women’s Platform in Batman reported on a demonstration and a march for the eighth of March 2004 (International Women’s Day) where this occurred. Having been refused permission to march to Hasankeyf, the
demonstration was halted at the entry to a street where a rally was to be held. The army told the women that if they wished to enter the street and attend the rally they would have to agree to be strip-searched. Some women refused and some decided to carry on. The hundreds of women who went through were all strip-searched in the street in small, temporary booths by women soldiers who made comments such as ‘I’ll have to wash my hands after touching these dirty Kurdish women’ and ‘You’re dirty, our hands get dirty when we touch you.’ The strip was down to the women’s underwear and those women wearing veils had to take them off. Many of the women were older women from the villages and this practice particularly shamed them. İHD Batman has approximately one hundred applications from women, lodging formal complaints regarding this action. İHD made a complaint to the local chief of police who apologised and said it would not happen again. But women from the Women’s Platform said, ‘whether it’s the 8th of March or the day against violence against women, these things always happen to us on those days.’

In sum, sexual torture has decreased as a result of women’s courage and organising ability. However, the threat of such torture remains. With other practices, such as verbal insults, strip searches and the forced removal of veils, sexual torture and the threat to use it are designed to target women in particular ways. The ripping off of women’s veils can also be seen as targeting the religious and cultural values of the community. These practices are well known in zones of conflict worldwide. Designed to intimidate, humiliate and set sectors of the community against each other, first of all men and women, they must also be recognised, according to women themselves, as an attempt to silence women and prevent them keeping families together, coming together with each other and with men to make their demands known.

**Freedom of Expression and Association**

There has been a long history of the repression of free speech, banning and restrictions of organisations, events and demonstrations in Turkey, again most severely implemented under emergency rule in the Kurdish Southeast. Although the situation has now improved a number of difficulties remain. This is one of the ways in which people’s opposition to the dam projects is being restricted. According to the evidence presented in earlier chapters, people’s efforts to defend their villages from submergence and save heritage is easier in some areas than others. The previous chapters and this present discussion have also shown that it is easier for some sectors of the population to speak out, mainly professionals and members of organisations in the cities, harder for those villagers who will be most severely and directly affected and hardest of all for women to
express their opinion.

Human rights, cultural, women’s, environmental and political organisations reported a number of violations of their rights to freedom of expression and association. Organisations and those trying to use their services continue to be harassed, though this does not involve the same level of raids on offices as previously occurred. İHD and DEHAP in Hakkari said that their offices and personnel are continually monitored, personnel are verbally abused in the street and İHD spoke of how ‘sometimes people are too afraid to come and make applications to us because the security forces wait outside our door and psychologically disturb anyone coming in.’ Across the region, representatives of the pro-Kurdish DEHAP party reported harassment and surveillance of their activities. Göç-Der in Hakkari informed the delegation that they are regularly refused permission to carry out activities such as distributing food or clothes to poor families. Cultural centres in Batman and Diyarbakır reported that the police watch outside the entrance and harass the families of the people who frequent the centres. In the case of the Diyarbakır centre, the last raid was 27th February 2004. Everyone was forced into the garden and filmed. The doors were closed and the building searched. A court case is continuing about this raid. When organisations and individuals petition the governors of the regions concerning their needs they may also be threatened, according to İHD Hakkari. The Chairperson of the branch listed eight people he knew who are currently in prison for petitioning.

The delegation received information from a number of organisations and individuals concerning harassment by the security forces at events and demonstrations. This involved violence by the security forces in one instance the delegation heard about, at the Munzur festival which had highlighted the impacts of the dams there. The Batman Women’s Platform and İHD Batman reported that although organisations are now able to hold press conferences without permission and without being physically attacked by the security forces, when they do so they are normally surrounded by armed police and army and often threatened verbally. The police also film gatherings right across the region, which is illegal under amendments to the law. Women in Batman made the point that displaced women and others with little power to fend off threats from the security forces often stay away from the events because of the risk of being identified and visited later in their homes. The widespread nature of these practices indicates that it is a policy decision at a higher level of command to resort to these tactics. In Hakkari, İHD reported that the authorities are breaching the legal amendments on another count because permission is still required there even for press conferences and organisations must propose a committee of people who are made accountable for any event that is given permission to go ahead.
The degree to which people’s right to protest or celebrate is repressed varies from area to area. Once again, the worst situation appears to be in Hakkari. In the past, there was no possibility of public protest there but since the ceasefire some organisations have tried to hold events. According to İHD Hakkari, ‘these developed how the State wanted them to, not how we wanted. The governor and the chief of police would try to tell us the slogans we were to shout. At Newroz (Kurdish New Year) this year, a number of organisations came together. The authorities would not let us go into the square with a banner saying ‘Happy Newroz’ because the letter ‘w’ was used [which is in the Kurdish but not in the Turkish alphabet]. They refused to let women go into the square at all and they took the veils from some women’s heads, especially the ones that had the Kurdish colours on them.’

A number of organisations also reported that the authorities deliberately give people a false impression of what they can and can’t do under the new laws, particularly to people who cannot read or write and do not know the details of the legal changes. For example, an activist from the Labourer Women’s Union in Tunceli, an organisation that assists unwaged women, explained that the police threatened a domestic violence survivor the organisation had visited, claiming falsely that under the law they could evict her and her family from their house because her husband was a State official and she was assisting a banned organisation. The Labourer Women’s Union is not banned.

Cases continue to be opened against individuals and organisations for expressing an opinion, though the frequency with which this happens has been reduced. İHD Diyarbakır reported to the delegation that new amendments to the law on freedom of expression have made a difference in the courts. According to Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, chairman of İHD Diyarbakır, the most important amendment is to the constitution, which has written international law into domestic use. ‘Now the court acquits us based on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.’

In Tunceli, Diyarbakır, Batman and Hakkari, the delegation observed that pro-Kurdish newspapers were fairly freely available. The banning of newspapers, other publications and private TV and radio stations has been greatly reduced and journalists face less direct (physical) violence than in the past. However, repression of the media is still occurring. Reporters Without Borders note that prison sentences and exorbitant fines continue to be handed down to broadcasters and print journalists; TV and radio stations are still censored and put off the air for weeks at a time. Representatives of the Journalists Association spoke to the delegation of how they are far more comfortable now under the new laws than in the past, when they had large numbers of cases running against them in the courts, some carrying the death penalty (now abolished). However, they
noted that the new legal amendments would mean heavy fines that would force many journalists to give up the profession if convicted.\textsuperscript{563} The journalists felt that these new laws are an attempt to replace the old apparatus.\textsuperscript{564} One problem that lawyers and journalists reported as occurring in all the cities visited is that distributors of newspapers are now targeted more often.\textsuperscript{565} Organisers from the Bahar cultural centre in Batman said that it is still not possible for community organisations, centres and NGOs to publish freely and when there is some article published which causes offence, the offending material or newspaper is seized. The president of their own organisation was taken to court in 2004 as a result of invitations to a meal at the centre, which had the name of a local Kurdish dish printed on them.\textsuperscript{566} There is no Turkish name for that dish.

In terms of the use of the Kurdish language, newspapers carrying small items in Kurdish are now available and there has been an easing of other restrictions. People generally welcome the changes including the limited television broadcasting in Kurdish but describe them as insufficient and cosmetic.

The practice of exiling officials such as teachers from the region does not appear to be as common as it used to be. The delegation heard of one example where a person employed as a State official had been exiled from Batman just prior to the fact-finding mission, because he was seen attending an event at the Bahar cultural centre in that town.\textsuperscript{567} It is still the case that people who have already been exiled are not allowed to return.

**The Renewal of Conflict**

The renewal of conflict and its potential for escalation was a matter occupying everyone’s mind in the region. Many people expressed fear of a ‘return to the past’ i.e. the intense conflict of the 1990s. People’s attitudes to this situation in the region have relevance for any discussion of the GAP dams in that they reveal the pressure and life threatening situations communities are already facing and would face, undermining the possibility of their defence of their villages and heritage against submergence by dams. In an area of conflict, survival from day to day is the priority and there is little space to deal with whatever else is being imposed. In the context of conflict and given previous, documented actions by the Turkish security forces, it is difficult to see how people’s rights on anything, let alone consultation on dams, would be respected. The reports of new atrocities and violations by the army shed light on the low value accorded to a Kurdish life. Given the situation as it stands now and certainly given any further escalation of the conflict, dam builders themselves would be operating in a ‘high risk’ environment because of potential threats to attack the dams, personnel and the project facilities.
The presentation of evidence here is confined to some of the main effects on civilian women, children and men of the return to conflict in the region. The delegation also heard reports of the execution of captured guerrillas, the mutilation of their corpses, and the abandoning of the bodies in the street with families unable to collect them for fear of further repression. These are all tactics reported from the previous conflict, fuelling people's fear of a ‘return to the past’. Such reports deserve urgent investigation, not least by the EU in the context of Turkey’s accession process.

People stressed to the delegation that they did not want conflict. Women, in particular, stated very firmly that their chief demand was for peace, ‘No more war, we don’t want war again.’ Women informed the delegation about a number of demonstrations for peace that they had organised or traveled to participate in, some women-only and some with men. Some of these and other demonstrations they took part in had also been in support of people in Iraq. People in the Hakkari area close to the border with Iraq and Iran said that it was hard for them: according to Mr Sebahattin Suvadci, the chairman of the local branch of DEHAP, ‘our relatives are on the other side of the border, so of course we felt glad that the threat [Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship] was ended, but we did not support the war. How could we support war when we know what that means ourselves? We held mass press conferences against it.’ The Women’s Platform in Batman expressed most succinctly to the delegation the view that the contrast between the media focus on the Iraq war and the silence on what had happened and continues to happen to them had made them feel very bitter. Even as they organised to oppose the torture in Abu Ghraib they could not help but feel angry and frustrated that ‘the world was silent while the same things happened to us.’

In terms of recent incidents, İHD Hakkari reported that a family from Şimdinli, close to the border, has lodged an application with its office because their fourteen-year-old son had been run over by an army tank two weeks prior to the delegation’s visit. The child’s corpse was reportedly left in the street by the army and there had been no investigation, apology or compensation offer to the family. The Los Angeles Times reported more civilian killings in the region after the delegation’s return. Villagers from Meymuniye in the Ilısu reservoir area who told the delegation that their village had undergone frequent raids by the army at the height of the previous conflict, said that these raids had died away with the ceasefire and the end of OHAL but have now started again. Villagers in nearby Şırnak province are also reporting such raids again to İHD in Batman along with renewed threats of forced evacuation.

In the 1990s, many villagers suffered food embargoes where the army surrounded their villages and refused to let them tend their crops or livestock or even get out to buy food.
The delegation went to the shanty area of Hevsel Gardens in the city of Diyarbakır to hear accounts from people there of an embargo during a military operation, which began on 28th July 2004 and lasted for ten days. Women said that many families were trapped in Hevsel Gardens without food for the entire time and could not reach their land. Adults and children went hungry and were unable to sleep due to the fear and the noise of the army firing rounds. “The bullets were whizzing past our balconies here. We thought we were going to be shot. We couldn’t even put our heads outside our doors for the first few days. And the firing went on all night every night for the first three days.”

Families whose gardens were closer and who had livestock in their yards were able to access food and those families without, bought or borrowed food from them. Some families had little money to do that, however. The families who live here are already displaced by conflict from their villages and women said that the army operation had traumatised people greatly, sparking off memories of previous attacks in their villages.

**Checkpoints, Conflict Operations and Other Disruption**

During the delegation’s stay in both Tunceli and Hakkari, army operations were undertaken. This situation is becoming more widespread throughout the Kurdish region as the army extends its operations over a wider area. Hakkari seems to be in the worst situation regarding new incidents and has been the scene of renewed conflict for a longer period of time, no doubt due to its location close to the border with Iraq. The Mayor informed the delegation that every evening for the previous month, army tanks had been driven around the city centre for the whole evening. “There’s no reason for this except psychological pressure on us’ he added ‘so the special war methods are becoming apparent again.”

The checkpoint situation has eased in some places for example the roads of Tunceli province are freer than they have been for many years. In Hakkari, human rights defenders and the Mayor reported that there was a relative improvement in the level of military presence on the streets. Previously, people could not leave their houses after mid afternoon because of the number of checkpoints on the streets of the city and the high risk of harassment, detention and torture to all. Now, they say the streets are generally safe during the day but it is not a good idea to be out on one’s own in the late evening or at night. People are now usually permitted to leave their clothes on at checkpoint searches where previously they would have been subjected to strip-search. The improvements were put down to the PKK ceasefire since 1999 and the subsequent ending of emergency rule.
However, army checkpoints are increasing in number again. In Hakkari, we were informed that earlier on the evening of the delegation’s arrival the army had mounted checkpoints in the main street.\textsuperscript{588} This had just started to occur regularly again in the last few months because of the increasing security problems with the war in Iraq and the renewal of the conflict in Southeast Turkey.\textsuperscript{589} The delegation went through many checkpoints over the course of the mission. We counted seven on our way from Hakkari to Diyarbakır via Lake Van. At one, the delegation complained that the sole purpose appeared to be harassment and delay of people traveling along this road and was told by the officer in charge that he was merely following orders from higher up.

The checkpoint that guards the entry to Hakkari resembles a border crossing into another country. It controls all movement into and out of the one road leading into the city when it is operational, particularly at night. On the night the delegation arrived in Hakkari, we were forced to wait for approximately half an hour at this checkpoint even though we were the sole visitors present, while our identity documents were checked on a computer. The checkpoint was manned by heavily armed members of the ‘private teams,’ special forces teams of the jandarma who deal with operations against KONGRA-GEL. According to the Mayor of Hakkari, people in the city and its hinterland are regularly delayed and harassed at this checkpoint.\textsuperscript{590} He compared this to the queues of Palestinian people at Israeli checkpoints.\textsuperscript{591}

\textbf{Continuing Militarisation, Surveillance and Displays of Control in the Region}

The material display of military control in the region is still very obvious. Both Tunceli and Hakkari people with whom the delegation spoke used the analogy of an open prison to describe their situation. Geographically contained by the mountains around them, in former times this has been a source of strength and protection but now the cities are tightly controlled by checkpoints and the army installations the delegation was able to observe on the hills surrounding both places. People are watched from all directions, surrounded by military bases and posts. The level of surveillance of the entire population remains high. The delegation experienced only a small element of this at first hand and was followed constantly by intelligence or uniformed police throughout the time spent in the Kurdish region. On arrival at the accommodation in Hakkari late at night, the delegation was followed into the hotel by armed special forces jandarma in plain clothes. Others remained outside with automatic weapons held ready.

The sentences expressing Turkish nationalism spelt out in stone and paint on the hillsides above and in the middle of Kurdish towns and cities are still maintained: ‘Happy is he
who calls himself a Turk'; ‘First the motherland’; ‘First the military.’ In a classic ‘Who controls the past controls the future’ gesture, a number of archaeological sites are topped with Turkish flags, pictures or busts of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk or crowned with army stations. The delegation was shown a hilltop at the heart of Hakkari city centre crowned with an army installation; local people remembered that when building the installation, the army blew up a medieval castle, which had occupied the site. Apart from the disregard for the principles of international heritage protection, it is a gesture of cultural destruction to the native population irrespective of whose heritage the castle represented. These actions, past and continuing, do not reflect a State intent on respecting the lives and needs of communities with regard to dams.

The delegation was witness to the continuing use of military displays in the region to disturb and intimidate the population. On 30th August, Republic Day is celebrated in Turkey. The delegation's meeting with women's organisations in Diyarbakır had to be conducted in the midst of a barrage of gun salutes and low and noisy fly-pasts of warplanes. The warplanes flew so low that the five-story building we were in shook and its windows rattled. Women in the meeting said this was highly disturbing for them as survivors of village raids.

**Conclusion**

It is testimony to the level of violence which has been inflicted on the society in Southeast Turkey that people feel what has been outlined above is an ‘improvement’. Nobody the delegation met, however, wished it to be understood from this that the Copenhagen Criteria and their own demands as Kurdish people had been met. People continued to make the point that what was and is happening to them has remained largely unacknowledged, beginning with the European press and EU officials. While any easing of the situation is welcomed, the general feeling among all of those the delegation met is that the changes enacted by the government are superficial gestures to satisfy EU requirements rather than people's demands at home.

In October 2004, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen, issued his final progress report on Turkey which recommended to EU governments that the Turkish State be given a date for the beginning of negotiations on EU entry. In December 2004, EU governments agreed to do this. The purpose of the present report is not an analysis of this progress report but clearly, the findings here shed some light on major discrepancies in it. The **most salient point to note in this context, is that the EU accession process has never recognised the serious problems and numerous breaches of**
EU and other standards and laws that have resulted or would result from the building of the GAP dams. This is significant in view of the investment opportunities they present to European companies.

Also among the relevant points is the finding in the EU report that torture is no longer systematic in Turkey though there are ‘numerous cases’ still occurring, and this is further qualified by a reference to many as merely ‘ill treatment’. Findings here contradict that and suggest an urgent re-assessment is required. The Human Rights Association of Turkey, with branches across the country, has noted 692 cases of torture in the first six months of 2004. Its reports, it says, show that ‘torture is still continuing and is systematic and widespread.’ In 2004, a report by the KHRP documents the ongoing practice of torture in Turkey and details the legal cases where every treatment described here has been judged to be torture in the courts. In particular, it should be noted that ‘torture also includes mental suffering by means other than bodily assault.’

The KHRP has noted that semantics can sometimes be made the scapegoat for attempts to deny that various practices constitute torture. It is understood here that systematic torture means that it is organised and deliberate infliction of severe mental and/or physical suffering, widespread, at the instigation of State agents and officially sanctioned. It is clear that when targeted practices described here are happening in different cities to many individuals, that there is intent to create fear and that it is not simply individuals acting in isolation without State knowledge. This is directly related to the continued independence of certain sectors of the State, particularly the security forces, from the executive power of the government of the day. Therefore, while the governing party may call for ‘zero tolerance’ of torture and at one level has clearly been committed to pushing through some reforms on paper, it would be at best naive to take this as an indication of the levels of torture and repression on the ground. The evidence suggests that torture is still an administrative practice of the State.

The EU report makes a point of praising the new Turkish Penal Code in terms of women’s rights, despite the fact that most women in the region remain opposed to many articles in it. The EU report offers little else to women, least of all on the continuing power of the security forces directed against them despite the threats of sexual torture that Kurdish women in particular must face.

Other practices which changes to the law should mean are no longer occurring are in fact continuing, such as refusing access to lawyers, unofficial detentions, filming of press conferences and other protests. There continue to be serious difficulties with expression of opinions, use of the Kurdish language, the organising of events, demonstrations and
even basic services to meet some of the needs of the poorest families. Some, though not all, of these violations are noted as continuing in the progress report but are downplayed. Most of the changes to the legislation do not remove the substance of articles that have regularly been used to control free speech and repress any critical opinion. In some cases, new versions of these articles (insulting the State and the military, for example) have been re-introduced. Apparent safeguards to allow for ‘critical’ opinion remain to be tested in the context of the renewal of the conflict.

Although EU Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen has made statements about the need to improve the conditions of people in the Southeast, especially those displaced by conflict, the report does not detail the failure that this situation of so many internally displaced people constitutes, nor does it seriously address solutions acceptable to those displaced such as right of return to the villages and the widely acknowledged need for land reform in the Kurdish region.

Most Kurdish people want Turkey’s entry to the EU, but a fact often ignored is that they do not want this without their situation being acknowledged and addressed in a substantive way. The EU progress report and the subsequent discussions around the decision to grant a date to Turkey for the beginning of accession negotiations failed to properly address the situation of the Kurdish people. It is certainly the case that reforms have been made by Turkey as a part of this accession process. But the question regarding these reforms is one of implementation. Those members of the security forces that have, in the past, perpetrated torture and other human rights violations continue in their posts for the most part and the independence of those sectors of the State from the executive power remains. This is not an issue the EU has addressed. Repression in the region has been reduced but the culture of repression is not qualitatively different. As long as it remains so, the ground is fertile for large dam projects to be imposed.
RECOMMENDATIONS

- Any Export Credit Agencies considering involvement with the Munzur valley, Ilısu and Hakkari dams to refuse credit for them. To afford credit could only mean facilitation of the continuing culture of repression in Southeast Turkey, complicity in human rights and other legal violations and involvement in projects which will result in human, environmental and cultural destruction of international significance.

- The Turkish State to release all environmental assessments, resettlement plans, feasibility studies and social surveys relevant to the projects, to affected and interested parties immediately in compliance with Turkish and EU law on access to information.

- Any government or institution asked to consider any new requests for support for GAP projects to refuse to approve credits or other funding unless and until:

  All of those already displaced from their villages by conflict who wish to return, are allowed to do so by their own decision, in safety, with financial and other assistance, without the need to obtain ‘permission’ or any requirements to become village guards or give a ‘correct’ answer as to why they left;

  - There is an independent investigation of the record and current practice of the GAP project and the explicit inclusion in this of an examination of the project’s impacts on women and children as well as on men – especially since GAP claims it prioritises women and children;

  - There is clear and mandatory involvement in informed decision-making of all sectors of affected communities for all of the above.

  - It is clear that women in particular, because of their role as carers for families, communities and their culture, are fully consulted, the impacts of any project on them fully assessed and that they have discussed and given their free and informed consent to the results of
any survey and the implementation of any project.

The Turkish authorities are urged to consider alternatives to large dam projects which would be community-led approaches with regard to people's water, food and energy needs, as recommended by international standards including the WCD and which would not impose increased hardship on people, threaten internal displacement of its Kurdish citizens and other communities.

- The European Union to include an investigation of the compliance of the GAP project with EU environmental and human rights standards in its assessment of Turkey’s progress towards EU accession and, in particular, to link the impacts of the GAP project on Kurdish communities to its assessment of progress on cultural rights in Turkey.
APPENDIX:

ORGANISATIONS, OFFICIALS AND INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

Organisations

AKP party, Hakkari (Mr Eyüp Zibek, Vice President)
Bahar Cultural Centre, Batman
Bar Association, Tunceli (Mr Hüseyin Aygün (President) and Mr İnan Yılmaz, human rights lawyer and member)
DEHAP, Hakkari (Mr Sebahattin Suvadci, Chairperson)
DEHAP, Hasankeyf ((Mr Mehmet Şirin Baytar (Chairman) and members)
DEHAP, Women’s Branch National Executive (Ms Makbule Altıntaş, Executive Member)
Diyarbakır Women’s Problems Research and Applications Centre – DIKASUM (Ms Handan Coşkun)
EMEP party, Tunceli
Foundation for Evaluation of Women’s Labour - KEDV, Diyarbakır (Ms Naşide Buluttekin).
Göç-Der, Diyarbakır (Ms Panayır Celik and other members of Diyarbakır branch)
Göç-Der, Hakkari (Mr Suleyman Ertuş, Chairperson)
Hasankeyf Volunteers, Batman
İHD Batman (Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), Mr Ladi Sari and Mr Nazif Akar (Administrative Board))
İHD Diyarbakır (Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, Chairperson)
İHD Hakkari (Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary))
Journalists Association, Batman
Labourer Women’s Union, Tunceli
Mother Child Education Foundation (AÇEV), Diyarbakır
Munzur Association of Tunceli
Tigris-Euphrates Culture and Art Centre, Diyarbakır
Women’s Platform, Province of Tunceli (Ms Selma Polat and a representative of the Labourer Women’s Union)
Women’s Platform, Batman
Municipalities

Ms Songül Erol Abdil, Mayor of Tunceli
Mr İsmail Acar, Deputy Mayor of Batman
Mr Osman Baydemir, Mayor of Diyarbakır
Mr A. Vehap Kusen, Mayor of Hasankeyf
Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari

State Officials

Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department, DSİ General Headquarters, Ankara
Mr İlíker Arıkan, Assistant Governor, Tunceli province (Mr Arıkan refused to give an interview to the delegation in his official capacity. He did agree to make a number of comments in a personal capacity).
Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters, Ankara
Mr Mert Erdemli, DSİ engineer, Investigation and Planning Department, DSİ General Headquarters, Ankara
Officials of the Investigation and Planning Department and Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters, Ankara who declined to give their names to the delegation.
Mr Ali Sariççek, Director of DSİ Tunceli
Mr Nihat Üstundağ, Director of DSİ Diyarbakır

Individuals

Ms Rojbin Tugan, human rights lawyer, Hakkari

The fact-finding mission interviewed residents and displaced villagers (women and men) in Tunceli, the Munzur valley, Diyarbakır, Hasankeyf, Batman and Hakkari. Interviews also took place with a group of women from Meymuniye village in the Ilısu dam reservoir area, men displaced to Batman from Yazlıca and Çaltepe villages, both located in the Ilısu reservoir area and women displaced from the Hakkari dam reservoir area. A short meeting was held with women resident in a village guard village in the Hakkari dam reservoir area. The names of all of these interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.
REFERENCE

1 Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) interview with Mr A. Vehap Kusen, Mayor of Hasankeyf, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf.

2 The delegation was told that ‘the proper channels’ had not been followed although the office of the governor had received a faxed request for an interview many weeks beforehand and had not replied.

3 FFM interview with representatives of Göç-Der, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır. In an FFM interview (23rd August 2004, Tunceli), the Tunceli branch of the EMEP party described some of these delegations as ‘tourists’ who are not particularly interested in the people they meet. Similar sentiments were expressed by residents of Hasankeyf (FFM interview, 26th August 2004) and Ms Makbule Altintaş, Executive Member of the Women’s Branch National Executive of the DEHAP party (FFM interview, 28th August 2004, Hakkari). The names of some interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

4 FFM meeting with Mr İlker Arıkan, Assistant Governor of Tunceli province, 24th August 2004, Tunceli. It is reasonable to at least suspect that any member of the public those officials did eventually encounter would be reluctant to express their true opinion in front of military and civilian State escorts.


6 KONGRA-GEL (People’s Congress of Kurdistan) has replaced the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party).

7 A set of criteria, which the EU has used to assess Turkey’s progress towards accession to the European Union.

8 FFM interview, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf. The name of the interviewee has been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.


10 Source of information: KHRP, Cornerhouse, Ilısu Dam Campaign 2002, p. 15 and FFM interview with Mr Nihat Üstundağ, Director of DSİ Diyarbakır, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır. The figure for hours of electricity to be generated does not include the taking of water for irrigation from some of the dams. The Munzur valley is not included in the official descriptions of the GAP project but is considered to be part of it in this report. Eight dams and hydroelectric plants will be constructed on the River Munzur, which is part of the wider Euphrates river system so these dams are related to the larger projects downstream. The Munzur dams would have a miniscule energy output but there are claims that they are being built to compensate for the reduced energy production, due to silting, in the Keban reservoir on the Euphrates.


12 FFM interview with Mr Nihat Üstundağ, Director of DSİ Diyarbakır, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

13 McDowall, D. 2000. ‘Ilısu: the economic and political context,’ www.ilısu.org.uk Accessed 31st October 2004. The situation in Tunceli is slightly different since there are fewer landlords there but an added complication is the State ownership of the land in the national park.

14 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Article 28. Refusal of the right of return potentially contravenes the European Convention on Human Rights. Applicants may submit that Turkey has infringed their right to respect for their private and family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention and their right to peacefully enjoy their property guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol 1. Article 8 of the Convention provides: ‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ Article 1 Protocol 1 provides: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.’

15 Law No: 5233 (Date of ratification: 17th July 2004; date of publication in the official gazette: 27th July 2004). Lawyers from İHD Batman and İHD Diyarbakır informed the delegation that the practice of forcing villagers who wish to return to sign forms stating that the PKK destroyed their villages is still going on.
FFM interviews with Mr İnan Yilmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), Mr Ladi Sari and Mr Nazif Akar (Administrative Board), İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman; Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, Chairperson of İHD Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır; Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Mr Suleyman Ertuş, Chairperson of Göç-Der, Hakkari, 29th August 2004, Hakkari; displaced villagers in Tunceli city, in the Munzur valley, Diyarbakır and Hakkari whose names have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety and who were interviewed on 23rd, 24th, 25th and 28th August respectively.


FFM interview with Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, Chairperson of İHD Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

The statistics of GAP give a figure of around 200,000 but the real figure must be much higher since the social surveys in advance of the dams have proved so inaccurate. The GAP figures are quoted in ECGD 1999. Stakeholders' Attitudes to Involuntary Resettlement in the Context of the Ilısu Dam Project, Turkey. London, p. 14. Hereafter: ECGD 1999.

FFM interviews with Mr Osman Baydemir, Mayor of Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır; Mr İnan Yilmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; residents of Hasankeyf, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf; displaced villagers in Tunceli city and in the Munzur valley, interviewed on 23rd and 24th August respectively. The names of some interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

See Ilısu Dam Campaign, KHRP et al 2001. This was also emphasised to the delegation in a FFM interview with Mr Osman Baydemir, Mayor of Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

FFM interview with women's organisations: Foundation for the Evaluation of Women's Labour (KEDV), Mother Child Education Foundation (AÇEV) and Diyarbakır Women's Problems Research and Applications Centre (DIKASUM), 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

See the following reports for evidence from a number of fact-finding missions: KHRP 1999; Ilısu Dam Campaign, KHRP et al 2001; KHRP, NUI, Galway et al 2002; KHRP and Cornerhouse 2003; Cornerhouse et al.

FFM interview with Ms Panayır Celik, Göç-Der, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

Ibid.

FFM interviews with a group of displaced women villagers, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli city; male villagers displaced from Yazlıca and Çaltepe, both located in the Ilısu reservoir area, 26th August 2004, Batman; displaced villagers in Hakkari city centre, 28th August 2004. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

Ibid.


FFM interview with Ms Selma Polat, Women's Platform, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.
FFM interviews with Women’s Platform and Labourer Women’s Union, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; Women’s Platform, 27th August 2004, Batman; Ms Makkule Altintaş, Executive Member of Women’s Branch National Executive of DEHAP, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Foundation for the Evaluation of Women’s Labour (KEDV), Mother Child Education Foundation (ACEV) and Diyarbakır Women’s Problems Research and Applications Centre (DIKASUM), 30th August 2004, Diyarbakir; groups of displaced women villagers in Tunceli city, in the Munzur valley, Diyarbakır and Hakkari who were interviewed on 23rd, 24th, 25th and 28th August respectively; group of women from Meymuniye village in the Ilısu reservoir area, interviewed on 26th August 2004. The names of some interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

See KHRP, NUI, Galway et al 2002 for a more detailed discussion with reference to publications and sources from the region.


FFM interview with Ms Handan Coşkun, DIKASUM, Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004.

FFM interview with Mr Süleyman Ertuş, Chairperson of Göç-Der Hakkari, 29th August 2004, Hakkari.

The literacy rate has been said to be more than 27 per cent lower than the national average - see McDowall, D. 2000. Ilısu: The Economic and Political Context, http://www.ilısu.org.uk Accessed 31st October 2004. Less than half of women in the region are literate - see KHRP, NUI, Galway et al 2002, p. 36 for a discussion of GAP statistics illustrating this.

FFM interview with group of displaced women villagers now living in the city of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety. All information and quotation in the paragraph which follows is from this interview.

Ibid. The higher level of illness among displaced women and children and the other problems documented here are all found in a survey by the migrants’ own association. See Göç-Der 2002. Research and Solution Report on the Socio-Economic and Socio-Cultural Conditions of the Kurdish Citizens Living in the Turkish Republic Who are Forcibly Displaced Due to Armed Conflict and Tension Politics; The Problems They Encountered Due to Migration and Their Tendencies to Return Back to the Villages. Istanbul: Göç-Der, p.242 et passim.

FFM interview with women displaced from İkitepe and Kayabalı villages in the province of Mardin, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakir. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.


KEDV get a small amount of funding from the EU to bring women in poor neighbourhoods together to determine their needs, receive training and find solutions to problems the women
face. They have set up childcare for 3 to 6 year olds while mothers do waged work and together with women from the neighbourhoods and a local branch of AÇEV (Mother Child Education Foundation), a national NGO that works to provide literacy, health, women's rights training and pre-school activities, have founded a women's co-operative. All their services are free of charge.

42 FFM interview with Ms Naşide Buluttekin, KEDV, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır.
43 FFM interview with Ms Handan Coşkun, DIKASUM, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır. DIKASUM was set up to investigate the reasons for the high rate of suicides among women in the region and now carries out research on all aspects of women's lives, providing free information, training and other services and lobbying for solutions to various problems on the basis of what women say they need. The municipality of Diyarbakır funds the organisation.

44 The delegation interviewed women who are residents and displaced village women in Tunceli, Munzur valley, Diyarbakır, Meymuniye village and Hakkari on 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 28th/29th August 2004.
45 FFM interview with Ms Handan Coşkun, DIKASUM, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır.
46 Ibid.
47 KHRP, NUI, Galway et al 2002, p. 118
49 Resettlement Law No: 2510 (Date of ratification: 14th June 1934; date of publication in the official gazette: 21st June 1934). Expropriation Law No: 2942 (Date of ratification: 4th November 1983; date of publication in the official gazette: 8th November 1983). See Kudat 2001 for a statement on this.
50 For example, World Bank OP 4.12 (revised 7th April 2004), para 8: 'Particular attention is paid to the needs of vulnerable groups among those displaced, especially those below the poverty line, the landless, the elderly, women and children, indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, or other displaced persons who may not be protected through national land compensation legislation.' And OECD DAC 3, p. 7: '...community participation in planning and implementing resettlement is essential and should include women.' For a discussion see KHRP, NUI, Galway et al 2002, pp. 48-57.
51 FFM interviews with women who are displaced by conflict from reservoir areas and now resident in Tunceli and Hakkari; women resident in the Munzur valley, Meymuniye village in the Ilısu reservoir area and in the Hakkari reservoir area on 23rd, 28th, 24th, 26th and 29th August 2004 respectively. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.
52 FFM interviews with Women's Platform and Labourer Women's Union, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; Women's Platform, 27th August 2004, Batman; Ms Makhbule Altintaş, National Executive of Women's Branches of DEHAP, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Foundation for Evaluation of Women's Labour (KEDV), Mother Child Education Foundation (AÇEV) and Diyarbakir Women's Problems
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Research and Applications Centre (DIKASUM), 30th August 2004, Diyarbakir.

Guidelines and standards contravened include those of the OECD and World Commission on Dams.


FFM interview with Mr Nihat Üstundağ, Director of DSİ Diyarbakır, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

Handout given to the delegation by Mr Nihat Üstundağ, the Director of the DSİ in Diyarbakır. Also available on the web at: www.gap.gov.tr Accessed 31st October 2004.

FFM interview with DİKASUM, KEDV and AÇEV, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır. These three women's organisations have alternative projects where women from displaced neighbourhoods decide themselves what they need. For literacy classes, free childcare is provided. All the money from income generation projects goes back to the women themselves. As a result of their work, GAP in Diyarbakır has carried out a critique of its ÇATOM initiative, according to the women. In general, women's own organisations feel that the ÇATOM centres are part of the attempt to forcibly assimilate Kurdish women. Organisations like their own and particularly, Göç-Der, carry out most of the basic service work such as health care, food and clothes distribution, legal advice and other information.

Ibid.


Ibid. The information in this paragraph is taken from the report of this fact-finding mission.

Ibid, p. 53.

Ibid, pp. 93-96.


OECD DAC 3 Annex, p. 11.

FFM meeting with Mr İlíker Arıkan, Assistant Governor of Tunceli province, 24th August 2004, Tunceli. Mr Arıkan refused to give an interview to the delegation in his official capacity. He agreed to make a number of comments in a personal capacity.

Ibid.

Ibid.


FFM interview with Mr Nihat Üstundağ, Director of DSİ Diyarbakır, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

Ibid.

Ibid.

FFM interview with Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

Ibid and FFM interview with Mr Mert Erdemlı, engineer and an environmental official who
declined to give his name to the delegation, both staff of the Investigation and Planning Department, 
DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara. Mr Serhat Batmaz, a civil engineer in the 
Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants Department of the DSİ General Headquarters had also 
confirmed the existence of the report in question in an FFM interview on 31st August 2004, 
Ankara.

73 ‘…surveys continue to indicate that corruption remains a very serious problem in Turkey’. EU 

74 See, for example, KHRP, NUI Galway et al 2002, p. 123.

75 See chapter three of this report for a description of the case.

76 KHRP and Cornerhouse 2003.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 FFM interview with Mr Nihat Üstundağ, Director of DSİ Diyarbakır, 25th August 2004, 
Diyarbakır.

80 Ibid.

81 For example, World Bank Environmental Impact Assessment guidelines, OECD DAC Good 
Practices for Environmental Impact Assessment of Development Projects, Guidelines on Aid and 
Environment No. 1 and World Commission on Dams Strategic Impact Assessment. The 1985 EU 
Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment refers to ‘prior assessment of the likely significant 
environmental effects of these projects…’ in its preamble.

82 World Bank, Environmental Assessment Sourcebook. Update. Cultural Heritage in Environmental 

83 FFM interview with Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning 
Department and other officials of her department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, 
Ankara.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid. TAÇDAM is the State institution that manages the archaeological salvage projects in 
advance of the Ilısu dam.

86 Ibid.

87 The Turkish Law on Cultural Heritage is Law No: 2863 (Date of ratification: 21st July 1983; date 
of publication in the official gazette: 23rd July 1983).

88 One of many examples is the limited salvage excavation in advance of the Batman dam reservoir 
in the early 1990s, which produced evidence of prehistoric animal symbolism from a Neolithic 
mound site at Hallan Çemi Tepesi comparable to evidence from the internationally renowned 
Neolithic settlement of Çatal Höyük on the Konya plain in Central Turkey. See Rosenberg, M. and 
Preliminary Observations Concerning Material Culture. Anatolica 18, pp. 1-18 and Rosenberg, 


FFM interview with Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), Mr Ladi Sari and Mr Nazif Akar (Administrative Board), İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman; Ms Rojbin Tugan, human rights lawyer, 28th August 2004, Hakkari. This issue is discussed in chapter four.

The potential submergence of Armenian heritage by the dams is likely to be a matter of concern to Armenians today. It would destroy physical evidence that Armenian people ever lived in those parts of Turkey. While a recent report of the European parliament recognises ‘the remarkable work carried out by Turkish historians on the [Armenian] genocide’, the Turkish State has continuing difficulties regarding the recognition of this historical reality and it is worth noting the possibility that the dams may also submerge physical evidence for it. See EU Committee on Foreign Affairs. 2004. *European Parliament Report on the 2004 Regular Report and the Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession*. A6-0063/2004. Hereafter: EU Parliament Report 2004.

Under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This is discussed further below in Chapter 3.


FFM interview with Ms Handan Coşkun, DIKASUM, 30th August 2004, Ankara.

ECGD 1999, p. 29; p. 39, *et passim*.

The draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples sets out rights to culture, history, to the practice and development of culture and to have access to cultural property. The main
articles referring to these rights are 12, 13 and 14. The World Bank's definition of cultural property clearly includes rights of access and its policy guidance on indigenous peoples also recognises this.


103 Marsh, N. ‘Wars Downstream,’ UK Defence Forum at: www.ukdf.org.uk/ts5.htm Hereafter: UK Defence Forum. This paper is no longer available online but has been available for the past few years on this site and is referred to in a number of reports on the Ilısu dam.

104 FFM interview with displaced villager and member of Göç-Der, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır. The name of the interviewee has been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

105 FFM interview with Mr İsmail Acar, Deputy Mayor of Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.

106 FFM interview with DIKASUM, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır.


108 The source for the statistics used to reach this conclusion is the DSİ’s information on dams in Turkey. DSİ 2002. Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants in Turkey. Ankara: DSİ.


111 The law is the Valetta Convention or European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (Revised) Valetta, 16th January 1992. It came into force in Turkey in May 2000. Article 2 requires each country to maintain ‘an inventory of its archaeological heritage.’

112 While Ilısu and Konaktepe come within this definition and therefore all guidelines, laws and
standards referenced in this report refer to them directly, some of the other projects may not be considered to be in that category. This ignores the cumulative impact of such projects particularly in the Munzur valley. In any case, there is an archaeological case to answer on these other dams on professional standards and with regard to Turkish and EU/Council of Europe law on cultural heritage, the environment and human rights.

On consultation: International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) 1990. Charter for the Protection and Management of Archaeological Heritage. Article 2: ‘…active participation of the general public must form part of policies for the protection of archaeological heritage…’; on full survey: ICOMOS 1990 Charter, Article 4: ‘The protection of the archaeological heritage must be based upon the fullest possible knowledge of its extent and nature…’; on preservation in situ: ICOMOS 1990 Charter, Article 6: ‘The overall objective of archaeological heritage management should be the preservation of monuments and sites in situ…’. For a more extensive documentation of these and other archaeological standards and their contravention by the Ilısu dam, see KHRP, NUI, Galway et al 2002, Appendix 2.

For comprehensive critiques see Cornerhouse et al 2001 and on cultural impacts, Kitchen and Ronayne 2001a.


Professor T.C. Champion, Department of Archaeology, University of Southampton (UK) and member of the English Heritage Advisory Committee to the UK government (personal capacity), pers comm.

This point, on the new information the dams provide to archaeologists, was repeated in various FFM interviews with DSİ officials in Diyarbakır and Ankara on 25th and 31st of August respectively. It is also used in the publicity for the archaeological salvage projects for the Ilısu and Carchemish dams.

FFM interview with Mr Nihat Üstundağ, Director of DSİ Diyarbakır, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

‘An underlying motive of the project is to deny the Kurdish guerrillas the environment in which they operate.’ Marsh, N. ‘Wars Downstream,’ UK Defence Forum.


KHRP, Cornerhouse and Ilısu Dam campaign 2002, p. 21.
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126 Ibid., p. 23. The law referred to is the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. See the report referenced for an analysis of Turkey’s contravention of this law. In answer to a recent parliamentary question (3rd November 2004, Hansard), the UK government has said that to its knowledge Iraq has not been consulted about downstream affects of dams on the Tigris and Euphrates.

127 FFM interview with Ms Rojbin Tugan, human rights lawyer, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

128 FFM interview with Mr Mert Erdemli, engineer and an environmental official who declined to give his name to the delegation, both staff of the Investigation and Planning Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

129 FFM interview with Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

130 Ibid.

131 See the findings of KHRP, Cornerhouse, İlisu Dam Campaign 2002.


133 FFM interview with the Hasankeyf Volunteers, 26th August 2004, Batman.

134 KHRP, Cornerhouse and İlisu Dam Campaign 2002, p. 17.

135 FFM interview with Mr İsmail Acar, Deputy Mayor of Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.

136 FFM interview with Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.


138 FFM interview with the Hasankeyf Volunteers, 26th August 2004, Batman.

139 It has another $1.5 billion contract to support the US army corps of engineers in Iraq and elsewhere and has, for example, built and supplied power to the Baghram airbase in Afghanistan. It has also received a $500 million contract for electricity services in Iraq. Source: website of Washington Group International at www.wgint.com. Accessed 31st October 2004.

140 KHRP, Cornerhouse and İlisu Dam Campaign 2002, pp. 19-20, quoting the former Iraqi government.


142 FFM interview with villager affected by the Uzunçayır project, 24th August 2004, Tunceli. The name of the interviewee has been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

143 When the delegation tried to verify this with the DSİ the reply was that they did not know or could not say. FFM interview with Mr Ali Sariççek, Director of the DSİ in Tunceli, 24th August 2004, Tunceli.
144 Oylum, Ş. Interview with Ata’s Motugan. Energate Magazine, undated. Translated from Turkish by Andrew Penny and quoted in KHRP and Cornerhouse 2003, p. 25.

145 FFM interviews with residents and displaced villagers in Tunceli and in the Munzur valley on 23rd and 24th August 2004. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

146 See for example KHRP and Cornerhouse 2003, p. 23.

147 WCD 2000, pp. 88-89.

148 These figures are from DSÎ 2002. Other sources quote slightly different figures.

149 FFM interview with Mr Ali Sariçicêk, Director of the DSÎ in Tunceli, 24th August 2004, Tunceli. All subsequent references to this interviewee in the paragraph are from this interview.

150 FFM interview with Ms Songül Erol Abdil, Mayor of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

151 FFM interview with Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSÎ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

152 Source: FFM interview with Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSÎ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara. And DSÎ 2002. Different figures have been quoted in previous reports and by VA Tech, one of the companies. The confusion is indicative of the lack of information available to the public. For the specifications of the other projects see KHRP and Cornerhouse 2003.


154 Daley: Open Trade is a Win-Win Game, Turkish Daily News, 3 January 1998.

155 FFM interview with Tunceli branch of EMEP party, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.


157 Ibid.

158 FFM interviews with Mr Ali Sariçicêk, Director of DSÎ in Tunceli, 24th August 2004, Tunceli; Mr Nihat Üstundağ, Director of DSÎ Diyarbakır, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır; Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department and officials in her department, DSÎ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara; Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSÎ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.


160 Ibid.

161 Ibid.

162 FFM interview with villager affected by the Uzunçayır project, 24th August 2004, Tunceli. The name of the interviewee has been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

163 FFM interview with Mr İnan Yilmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

164 Ibid.

165 FFM interview with displaced woman villager, her family and members of other families in
temporary camps by the River Munzur, 24th August 2004, Munzur valley. The names of interviewees in this section have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

Ibid.

FFM interview with a group of displaced women villagers, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

FFM interviews with Mr İnan Yilmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; Ms Songül Erol Abdil, Mayor of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

FFM interviews with Mr İnan Yilmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; Ms Songül Erol Abdil, Mayor of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; Tunceli branch of EMEP party, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; displaced woman villager, her family and members of other families in temporary camps by the River Munzur, 24th August 2004, Munzur valley. The names of some interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

FFM interview with displaced villagers, 24th August 2004, Munzur valley. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety. The information in the following two paragraphs is from this interview.

FFM interview with Mr İnan Yilmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


FFM interview with Mr İnan Yilmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

Ibid.

FFM interview with a group of displaced women villagers, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

Ibid.

The interviewee gave this information to the delegation on condition that his name would be withheld in the report of the fact-finding mission. Asbestos was used because it is cheaper than other materials but the delegation was unable to find out which company installed the pipes or who was responsible.

FFM interview with Ms Songül Erol Abdil, Mayor of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli. The information attributed to Ms Abdil in the following paragraphs is from this interview.

Ibid.

KHRP and Cornerhouse 2003, p. 28.

Ibid, pp. 28-29.

Tunceli Solidarity Council. Munzur Valley and Dam Issues. Undated document, summary translated in KHRP and Cornerhouse 2003. This climate change due to reduced snowfall has already had a visible effect on the Kebar reservoir.

FFM interviews with Mr Ali Sarıcıçek, Director of DSİ in Tunceli, 24th August 2004, Tunceli; Mr Nihat Üstundağ, Director of DSİ Diyarbakır, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır; Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters,
31st August 2004, Ankara. The relevant laws are Article 23 of the Forestry Law No. 6831 and Law Regarding the Protection of National Parks No. 2873. The latter refers specifically to the Munzur Valley National Park. However, the delegation also heard of amendments to these laws, which reduce the level of protection they offer.

186 FFM interview with Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

187 FFM interview with a group of displaced women villagers, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

188 FFM interview with Mr Ali Sariçiçek, Director of the DSİ in Tunceli, 24th August 2004, Tunceli.

189 Ibid.

190 Ibid.

191 Ibid.

192 The Munzur has a mean flow of 87 cubic metres per second, a peak in April of 398 and a low in October of 44. Source: KHRP and Cornerhouse 2003, quoting local sources, p. 23.


194 FFM interview with Mr Ali Sariçiçek, Director of the DSİ in Tunceli, 24th August 2004, Tunceli.

195 FFM interview with Mr İnan Yilmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

196 FFM discussion with visitors to Ana Fatma, 22nd August 2004.

197 McDowall 2000, p. 5 who comments: ‘The importance of these [cold springs] in the religion of prehistoric Anatolia, with the veneration of so many divinities attached to sources of fresh water, suggests that such an appreciation prevailed at least as early as the second millennium BC.’

198 McDowall 2000, p. 10. There are also Zaza speakers of other religious denominations, mainly Sunni Islam.


201 Ibid, p. 87.

202 Ibid. Halvuri may be another version of the place name Halbori in which case it will almost certainly be affected by the dams.

203 Ibid.

204 Ibid. The reason why the mine fell into disuse is not recorded but its existence does raise questions concerning the potential resources of the Munzur valley that would be submerged by the dam reservoirs.

205 Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights states, inter alia, that: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance…”

207 Ibid, p. 207.
208 Ibid.
209 KHRP and Cornerhouse 2003, p. 8, quoting army plans.
211 FFM interview with Munzur valley resident, 24th August 2004, Tunceli. The name of the interviewee has been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.
212 See KHRP and Cornerhouse 2003, p. 27 for different sources of estimates.
213 FFM interviews with residents and displaced villagers in Tunceli and the Munzur valley, 23rd and 24th August 2004, Tunceli. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 FFM interview with Ms Songül Erol Abdil, Mayor of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.
221 FFM interview with Mr İnan Yılmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
224 FFM interviews with Mr Hüseyin Aygün (President) and Mr İnan Yılmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.
225 Ibid.
226 FFM interviews with the Munzur Valley Association of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; environmental official, Investigation and Planning Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara. The official declined to give his name to the delegation.
227 At least six World Bank safeguard policies on environmental assessment, natural habitats, involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, management of cultural property and safety of dams.
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
232 FFM interview with the Save Munzur Valley Campaign, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.
In the Irish context, the State is embroiled in a number of court cases and controversies following the amalgamation of Ministries in a similar way, with decisions to build roads in particular taking precedence over the preservation of community, natural and cultural heritage.

FFM interview with Mr İnan Yılmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

FFM interview with Munzur Association of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; Tunceli branch of EMEP party, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

FFM interview with Mr İnan Yılmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

FFM interview with Ms Songül Erol Abdil, Mayor of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli. The information in this and the next paragraph is from this interview.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

FFM interview with Mr İnan Yılmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

Ibid.

Ibid.

FFM interview with Munzur Association of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

Ibid.

Ibid.

FFM interview with displaced villager from Çaltepe, province of Siirt, 26th August 2004, Batman. The name of the interviewee has been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

The Ilısu Dam Campaign was set up by the Kurdish Human Rights Project, Cornerhouse, Mark Thomas and Friends of the Earth UK.


At the time of writing Siemens is in the process of taking over VA Tech and whether Ilısu will continue to be a project under Siemens remains to be seen.


FFM interview with Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.


FFM interview with Mr İsmail Acar, Deputy Mayor of Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.

FFM interview with Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department and officials in her Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

FFM interview with Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department and officials in her Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

FFM interview with Mr Mert Erdemli, DSİ engineer, 31st August 2004, Ankara.


FFM interview with Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department and officials in her Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.


KHRP, NUI, Galway et al 2002 (particularly Appendix 1).

FFM interview with Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department and officials in her Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.


FFM interview with Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

Ibid.

FFM interviews with Women's Platform, 27th August 2004, Batman; KEDV, AÇEV, DIKASUM
and Göç-Der, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır; group of women from Meymuniye village in the Ilısu reservoir area, 26th August 2004, Meymuniye. The names of some interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

281 See also KHRP, NUI, Galway et al 2002, for example pp. 122-126. As noted in chapter two, the failure to consult with women contravenes several international guidelines and accepted standards for such projects.

282 FFM interviews with Women’s Platform, 27th August 2004, Batman; KEDV, AÇEV, DIKASUM and Göç-Der, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır; group of women from Meymuniye village in the Ilısu reservoir area, 26th August 2004, Meymuniye. The names of some interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

283 FFM interview with women in Meymuniye village in the Ilısu reservoir area, 26th August 2004, Meymuniye. All subsequent references to statements by these villagers are from this interview. The names of the interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

284 FFM interviews with Mr Osman Baydemir, Mayor of Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır; Mr İsmail Acar, Deputy Mayor of Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.

285 FFM interviews with Women’s Platform, 27th August 2004, Batman; KEDV, AÇEV and DIKASUM, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır;

286 FFM interview with women in Meymuniye village in the Ilısu reservoir area, 26th August 2004, Meymuniye. The names of the interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety. It is already known that SEMOR conducted interviews in Turkish and did not have Kurdish translators. See Ilısu Dam Campaign, KHRP et al 2001 and KHRP, NUI, Galway et al 2002. In this village alone, a number of older women speak only Kurdish and this is a general pattern. There was no attempt to make translation available so that these women could be consulted.

287 Ibid.

288 Ibid.


290 FFM interview with displaced villagers from Çaltepe and Yazlıca, province of Siirt, 26th August 2004, Batman. The names of the interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

291 Ibid.

292 FFM interview with displaced villager from Çaltepe, province of Siirt, 26th August 2004, Batman.

293 FFM interview with displaced villager from Yazlıca, province of Siirt, 26th August 2004, Batman.


295 FFM interview with Hasankeyf residents, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf. All subsequent references to information from these residents is from this interview. The names of interviewees
have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

296 FFM interview with Hasankeyf resident, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf. The name of the interviewee has been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

297 FFM interview with Hasankeyf residents, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf. The names of the interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

298 FFM interview with Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department and officials in her Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara; Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

299 FFM interview with Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

300 FFM interview with Hasankeyf residents, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf. The names of the interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

301 Ibid.

302 Ibid.

303 FFM interview with Mr A. Vehap Kusen, Mayor of Hasankeyf, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf. All further references to information the Mayor gave to the delegation are from this interview.

304 Ibid.

305 Ibid.

306 Ibid.

307 Ibid.

308 Ibid.

309 FFM interview with Mr Osman Baydemir, Mayor of Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır; Mr İsmail Acar, Deputy Mayor of Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.

310 FFM interview with Mr İsmail Acar, Deputy Mayor of Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.

311 FFM interview with Mr Osman Baydemir, Mayor of Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

312 Ibid. The GAP website states that there is a protocol with France regarding funds for this treatment plant but the Mayor seemed unaware of this. See www.gap.gov.tr. Accessed 31st October 2004.


314 FFM interview with Mr İsmail Acar, Deputy Mayor of Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman. All further references in this section to information on the situation of displaced people in Batman are from this interview.

315 Ibid.

316 Ibid.

317 Ibid.

318 Problems of ‘food security and morbidity are unlikely to increase after the project both because the construction of the dam will provide large scale employment to many during the project and will also help raise the regional standards of living after its completion.’ Kudat Report, p. 7.
FFM interview with Mr İsmail Acar, Deputy Mayor of Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.


FFM interview with Mr Nihat Üstundağ, Director of DSİ Diyarbakır, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

Ibid.

For details of statements prior to 2004 by local people and cultural organisations with regard to the İlısu dam, see KHRP 1999, KHRP et al 2001, KHRP, NUI, Galway et al 2002. Information in this report suggests that the lack of consultation is continuing.

KHRP, NUI, Galway et al 2002.

FFM interview with displaced villager from Yazlîca, province of Siirt, 26th August 2004, Batman. The name of the interviewee has been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

Ibid.

Turkish Ministry of Culture, Middle East Technical University, DSİ and TAÇDAM. Salvage Project of the Archaeological Heritage of the İlısu and Carchemish Dam Reservoirs. Ankara. Undated brochure.

FFM interview with Mr Nihat Üstundağ, Director of DSİ Diyarbakır, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

See chapter 2 on significance assessment.

FFM interview with Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), Mr Ladi Sari and Mr Nazif Akar (Administrative Board), İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Several reports have chosen to state a figure of 200 such sites. A survey by G. Algaze and his team actually registered above this number of sites in the one fifth of the reservoir area they surveyed, although from the publications it appears likely that, depending on what archaeologists and others might define as a site, many more sites could be listed from this survey. See Algaze et al 1991; Algaze 1989. See also Kitchen 2000 for a discussion of the limitations of this survey and the problems with using what has been published of it to define numbers of sites that could be flooded.


Ibid. See also KHRP, NUI, Galway et al 2002 for an extensive discussion and Algaze 1989, Algaze et al 1991 for accounts of the achievements and problems of the initial survey.

The Tigris-Euphrates Archaeological Reconnaissance Project carried out the initial survey, see
Algaze 1989, Algaze et al 1991. TAÇDAM has since updated and extended this survey but it remains incomplete.

Algaze 1989, p. 255.

Kitchen and Ronayne 2001b, p. 38.

FFM interview with Mr Osman Baydemir, Mayor of Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır.


See guidelines on significance assessment referred to earlier. According to WCD recommendations, such considerations would have to happen as part of a Strategic Impact Assessment before any more extensive project-level assessment. Such key issues ought to have been addressed in the process of screening out unsuitable options or in determining the scope of the option of a dam at this location.


Ilısu Dam Campaign, KHRP et al 2001, p. 31.


Ibid, p. 796.


See Sinclair 1987, p. 118. The author describes ‘an almost complete pause in the progress of building,’ together with ‘a lacuna in information and research on the events of local history,’ that persisted in the region from the sixteenth up to the nineteenth centuries.

Hasankeyf is a class I protected site under decision No. A-1105 on 14th April 1978 and is registered as a priority site by decree No. A-3767 on 13th March 1981 and A-3298 on 8th March 1982.


FFM interview with Hasankeyf resident, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf. The name of the interviewee has been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

FFM interview with Mr A. Vehap Kusen, Mayor of Hasankeyf, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf.

For example KHRP, NUI, Galway et al 2002, p. 66. The law is the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. The impact of any designation of the town as a World Heritage site would also have to be assessed. Such designations elsewhere have led to other forms of restriction on communities. In any case, a recent EU parliament report ‘[i]nvites
Turkey to drastically improve its perception of ethnic and religious minorities, for instance by highlighting their contributions to the cultural heritage of the country; in particular, requests the Turkish authorities to consider some of these specific contributions such as Hasankeyf, Ani, Zeugma or Aghtamar as suitable for registration in the World Heritage List of UNESCO.’ EU Parliament Report 2004.

361 FFM interview with Mr A. Vehap Kusen, Mayor of Hasankeyf, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf.

362 Ibid.

363 Ibid.

364 Ibid and FFM interview with residents of Hasankeyf, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf. The names of interviewees in the latter case have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

365 FFM interview with Mr A. Vehap Kusen, Mayor of Hasankeyf, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf.

366 Ibid.

367 Ibid.

368 FFM interview with Mr İsmail Acar, Deputy Mayor of Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.

369 Ibid.

370 FFM interview with Mr Osman Baydemir, Mayor of Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

371 FFM interview with environmental officials of the Investigation and Planning Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara. The officials declined to give their names to the delegation.

372 For reviews, see Cornerhouse Research et al 2001; Kitchen and Ronayne 2001a;


374 FFM interview with Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department and with officials in her Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

375 FFM interviews with Journalists Association, 26th August 2004, Batman.

376 FFM interview with Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

377 FFM interview with Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department and with officials in her Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.


379 This shows no attempt to bring practice in the DSİ into line with EU Directives on Environmental Impact Assessment, where impact assessment is mandatory for a project like İlısu.


381 FFM interview with Hasankeyf residents, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

382 Ibid.

383 FFM interview with Mr Mehmet Şirin Baytar, Chairman of DEHAP branch in Hasankeyf and
members of DEHAP branch, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf.

384 Ibid.

385 FFM interview with women in Meymuniye village in the Ilisu reservoir area, 26th August 2004, Meymuniye. The names of the interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

386 FFM interviews with members of the Tigris-Euphrates Culture and Art Centre, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakir; members of the Bahar Cultural Centre, 26th August 2004, Batman. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

387 FFM interview with member of the Tigris-Euphrates Culture and Art Centre, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakir.

388 FFM interview with the Hasankeyf Volunteers, 26th August 2004, Batman.

389 Ibid.

390 Ibid.

391 Ibid.

392 FFM interview with Mr A. Vehap Kusen, Mayor of Hasankeyf, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf.

393 Ibid.

394 FFM interview with Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

395 FFM interview with Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara. The plan for three dams was confirmed by other officials in his department and in the Investigation and Planning Department of the DSİ General Headquarters on 31st August 2004.

396 FFM interview with Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.


398 Ibid.

399 FFM interviews with Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara; Mr Mert Erdemli, engineer and an environmental official who declined to give his name to the delegation, both staff of the Investigation and Planning Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

400 FFM interview with Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

401 FFM interview, 28th August 2004, Hakkari. The name of the interviewee has been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

402 FFM interview with Mr Serhat Batmaz, a civil engineer in the Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

403 Seven Wonders of the Industrial World: The Hoover Dam. Documentary written and directed by Mark Everest. A BBC/TLC Co-Production.

404 FFM interview with Mr Eyüp Zibek, Vice President of AKP Hakkari, 28th August 2004,
Hakkari.

405 FFM interview with Mr Eyüp Zibek, Vice President of AKP Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.
406 Ibid.
407 Ibid.
408 FFM interviews with Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Ms Rojbin Tugan, human rights lawyer, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.
409 Ibid.
410 Ibid.
411 FFM discussion with women villagers in the Hakkari reservoir area, 29th August 2004, Hakkari. The women declined to give their names to the delegation.
412 Ibid.
413 Ibid.
414 FFM discussion with Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 29th August 2004, Hakkari;
415 FFM discussion with Mr İsmail Akbulut, Chairperson of İHD Hakkari, 29th August 2004, Hakkari.
416 FFM interview with Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters and discussion with other officials in that Department, 31st August 2004, Ankara.
417 FFM interview with Mr Serhat Batmaz, civil engineer, Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.
418 FFM interviews in Hakkari with Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004; Ms Rojbin Tugan, human rights lawyer, 28th August 2004; Mr Süleyman Ertuş, Chairperson of Göç-Der Hakkari, 29th August 2004; Mr Sebahattin Suvadci, Chairperson of DEHAP Hakkari, 28th August 2004; Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari, 28th August 2004.
419 FFM interview with Ms Rojbin Tugan, human rights lawyer, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.
420 FFM interview with Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.
421 FFM interview with Ms Leyla Çiftçi, Secretary of İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.
422 FFM interviews in Hakkari with Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004; Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari, 28th August 2004; residents of Hakkari, 28th August 2004 whose names have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.
Evidence for this situation is outlined in the next chapter.

FFM interview with Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

FFM interview with Mr Sebahattin Suvadci, Chairperson of DEHAP Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

Izady, pp. 163-165. The tenth century Arab geographer, Al Masudi, refers to ‘Christian Kurds’ though it is not clear if this means Nestorians/Assyrians or Syrian Orthodox/Jacobite, also known to have lived in the Kurdish regions. See McDowall 2000, pp. 12-13 for discussion.

McDowall 2000, p. 12.

Sinclair describes nine churches in the valley of the Greater Zap and its tributaries close to Hakkari though it is likely that further sites also exist. See Sinclair 1987, pp. 252-254.

McDowall 2000, p. 46.

Izady, p. 164

FFM interview with Mr Sebahattin Suvadci, Chairperson of DEHAP Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

This is possibly Sinclair’s Church A identified in Sinclair 1987, p. 253.


Solecki, R.S. 1972. Shanidar. The Humanity of Neanderthal Man. London: Allen Lane, the Penguin Press. Some of his burial evidence is now disputed but the essential point remains.

Burney and Marshall Lang, p. 16.

Sinclair 1987, p. 256.


FFM interview with Ms Rojbin Tugan, human rights lawyer, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

Ibid.

FFM interview with Mr Sebahattin Suvadci, Chairperson of DEHAP Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.
FFM interview with Ms Rojbin Tugan, human rights lawyer, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

Ibid.

Ibid.

FFM interviews with Hakkari residents, 28th and 29th August 2004, Hakkari. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

Sinclair 1987, p. 252.

FFM interview with Mr Serhat Batmaz and other engineers in the Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

FFM interview with Mr Mert Erdemli, engineer and an environmental official who declined to give his name to the delegation, both staff of the Investigation and Planning Department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

Ibid.

FFM interview with Ms Cansen Akkaya, Deputy Department Head, Investigation and Planning Department and with officials in her department, DSİ General Headquarters, 31st August 2004, Ankara.

FFM interview with Mr Nihat Üstundağı, Director of DSİ Diyarbakır, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

FFM interviews in Hakkari with Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004; Ms Rojbin Tugan, human rights lawyer, 28th August 2004; Hakkari residents including displaced villagers, 29th August 2004, Hakkari. The names of some interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

Ibid.

FFM meeting with displaced villagers, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; FFM interview with Mr Süleyman Ertuş, Chairperson of Göç-Der Hakkari, 29th August 2004, Hakkari.

FFM interview with Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

FFM meeting with displaced women villagers, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; FFM interview with Mr Süleyman Ertuş, Chairperson of Göç-Der Hakkari, 29th August 2004, Hakkari. The names of some interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

Ibid.

FFM meeting with displaced women villagers, 28th August 2004, Hakkari. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

Ibid and FFM interview with Mr Süleyman Ertuş, Chairperson of Göç-Der Hakkari, 29th August 2004, Hakkari.

FFM interview with Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

FFM interview with Mr Süleyman Ertuş, Chairperson of Göç-Der Hakkari, 29th August 2004,
FFM interviews in Hakkari with Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004; Mr Süleyman Ertuş, Chairperson of Göç-Der Hakkari, 29th August 2004; Mr Sebahattin Suvadci, Chairperson of DEHAP Hakkari, 28th August 2004; Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari, 28th August 2004.

FFM interview with Mr Süleyman Ertuş, Chairperson of Göç-Der Hakkari, 29th August 2004, Hakkari.

FFM interview with displaced woman villager, 28th August 2004, Hakkari. The name of the interviewee has been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

FFM interview with Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

Ibid.

FFM interview with Ms Rojbin Tugan, 28th August 2004, Hakkari. See also chapter three.

FFM interview with Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

Ibid.


After the delegation’s return, a court case took place concerning the detention of a Kurdish activist supporting people who wished to take cases to the European Court of Human Rights arising from the Baku-Tbilesi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Despite medical evidence of torture, the defendants were acquitted. See KHRP. *Turkey: Acquittal for Police Accused of Torturing BTC Campaigner.* Press Release, 22nd September 2004.

The delegation encountered such denials very frequently from officials. For example, during
the FFM meeting with Mr İlker Arıkan, Assistant Governor of Tunceli province, 24th August 2004, Tunceli, he claimed that there is no discrimination in Turkey.

495 The delegation interviewed human rights lawyers and İHD branch members from Tunceli, Diyarbakır, Batman and Hakkari. FFM interviews took place with Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), Mr Ladi Sari and Mr Nazif Akar (Administrative Board), İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman; Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, Chairperson of İHD Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır; Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Ms Rojbin Tugan, human rights lawyer, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Mr Hüseyin Aygün (President) and Mr İnan Yılmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

496 Ibid.
497 FFM interview with Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.
498 FFM interview with Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, Chairperson of İHD Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır.
499 Ibid.
500 Ibid.
501 Ibid.
502 These forms were described in particular detail in FFM interviews with Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), Mr Ladi Sari and Mr Nazif Akar (Administrative Board), İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman; Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.
503 The information on this application is from a FFM interview with Mr İsmail Akbulut, Chairperson, İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.
505 Ibid.
506 Ibid.
507 Ibid.
508 Ibid. This increase and the specific detentions following the attack on the military building were also confirmed by FFM interviews with Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Mr Sebahattin Suvadci, Chairperson of DEHAP Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.
509 The psychological methods listed here were described in FFM interviews with Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), Mr Ladi Sari and Mr Nazif Akar (Administrative Board), İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman; Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, Chairperson of İHD Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır; Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari. Instances are described below in the main text, particularly with regard to threats of sexual torture.
511 FFM interview with Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.
24 hours with extension, by warrant, to 48 hours and up to a further 7 days.

FFM interview with Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

FFM interview with Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, Chairperson of İHD Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

FFM interviews with Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), Mr Ladi Sari and Mr Nazif Akar (Administrative Board), İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman; Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, Chairperson of İHD Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır; Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Ms Songül Erol Abdil, Mayor of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

FFM interview with Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), Mr Ladi Sari and Mr Nazif Akar (Administrative Board), İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.

See chapter three for an account of the Munzur incident. Information from FFM interview with Ms Songül Erol Abdil, Mayor of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.


FFM interviews with Women’s Platform and Labourer Women’s Union, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

Ibid.


Ibid. Major General Antonio Taguba’s report on the torture at Abu Ghraib prison, as well as a number of media sources, have documented the occurrence of female rape, for example, L. Harding. The Other Prisoners. Guardian (UK), Thursday 20th May 2004.

FFM interview with Women’s Platform and Labourer Women’s Union, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

Ibid and Women’s Platform, 27th August 2004, Batman; KEDV, AÇEV and DIKASUM, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır; group of women from Meymuniye village in the İlîsu reservoir area, 26th August 2004, Meymuniye. No shelters exist in the Kurdish region and only around eleven in the rest of Turkey, some of which have no facilities for children so mothers are discouraged from using them.

FFM interviews with Women’s Platform, 27th August 2004, Batman; group of women from Meymuniye village in the İlîsu reservoir area, 26th August 2004, Meymuniye.
In 2003, she reported that unknown persons believed to be State agents kidnapped her off the street, raped and tortured her in other ways.

FFM interview with Women’s Platform and Labourer Women’s Union, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; women human rights activists in Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

FFM interview with Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

FFM interview with human rights defender, 28th August 2004, Hakkari. The name of the interviewee has been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

FFM interview with representative from the Labourer Women’s Union, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli. The name of the interviewee has been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

Ibid.

FFM interviews with Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, Chairperson of İHD Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır; Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; group of displaced women villagers, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; group of women from Meymuniye village in the Ilısu reservoir area, 26th August 2004, Meymuniye. The names of some interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

FFM interview with group of women from Meymuniye village in the Ilısu reservoir area, 26th August 2004, Meymuniye. The names of the interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

Ibid.

FFM interviews with Ms Saadet Becerikli, Chairperson, İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman; Women’s Platform, 27th August 2004, Batman; Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Mr Sebahattin Suvadci, Chairperson of DEHAP, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; group of women from Meymuniye village, 26th August 2004, Meymuniye. The names of some interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

Ibid.


FFM interview with Women’s Platform, 27th August 2004, Batman. The account of this incident is from information given to the delegation by the Women’s Platform during that interview.

Ibid.
FFM interview with Ms Saadet Becerikli, Chairperson, İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.

Ibid. He did not represent the same branch of the security forces which carried out the strip-search.


FFM interviews with Women’s Platform and Labourer Women’s Union, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli. Men have also been the subjects of sexual torture in the Kurdish region and this deserves further investigation and discussion elsewhere.

FFM interviews with Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Mr Sebahattin Suvadci, Chairperson of DEHAP Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

FFM interviews with Ms Songül Erol Abdil, Mayor of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; Mr Mehmet Şirin Baytar, Chairman of DEHAP branch in Hasankeyf and members of DEHAP branch, 26th August 2004, Hasankeyf; Mr İsmail Acar, Deputy Mayor of Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman; Mr Sebahattin Suvadci, Chairperson of DEHAP Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Mr Metin Tekce, Mayor of Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Mr Osman Baydemir, Mayor of Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

FFM interview with Mr Süleyman Ertuş, Chairperson of Göç-Der Hakkari, 29th August 2004, Hakkari.

FFM interviews with members of the Tigris-Euphrates Culture and Art Centre, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır; members of the Bahar Cultural Centre, 26th August 2004, Batman. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

FFM interviews with members of the Tigris-Euphrates Culture and Art Centre, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır.

FFM interview with Mr İsmail Akbulut, Chairperson of İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

Ibid.

FFM interview with Ms Songül Erol Abdil, Mayor of Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli. See chapter three for a full account of this incident.


This was reported in FFM interviews with the Tunceli branch of EMEP, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; Ms Saadet Becerikli, Chairperson, İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman; Women’s Platform, 27th August 2004, Batman; Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.


FFM interview with Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

FFM interview with Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD
Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

558 FFM interview with Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), Mr Ladi Sari and Mr Nazif Akar (Administrative Board), İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman; Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari; Labourer Women's Union, Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

559 FFM interview with Labourer Women's Union, Tunceli, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli.

560 FFM interview with Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, Chairperson of İHD Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır. Article 10 of the ECHR states, *inter alia*, that "[E]veryone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers…"


562 FFM interview with Journalists Association, 26th August 2004, Batman.

563 Ibid.

564 Ibid.

565 Ibid and FFM interviews with Mr Hüseyin Aygün (President) and Mr İnan Yılmaz, Tunceli Bar Association, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), Mr Ladi Sari and Mr Nazif Akar (Administrative Board), İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman; Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, Chairperson of İHD Diyarbakır, 30th August 2004, Diyarbakır; Mr İsmail Akbulut (Chairperson) and Ms Leyla Çiftçi (Secretary), İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

566 FFM interview with members of the Bahar Cultural Centre, 26th August 2004, Batman. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

567 Ibid.

568 FFM interviews with Women’s Platform, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; displaced villagers from Çaltepe and Yazlıca, province of Siirt, 26th August 2004, Batman; representatives of Göç-Der, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakır; the abandoning of bodies in the street was reported by Mr İsmail Akbulut, Chairperson of İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari from incidents he had documented and applications to his branch. The names of some interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

569 FFM interviews with Women’s Platform and Labourer Women’s Union, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; Women’s Platform, 27th August 2004, Batman; groups of displaced women villagers in Tunceli city, in the Munzur valley and Diyarbakır who were interviewed on 23rd, 24th and 25th August respectively; group of women from Meymuniye village in the Ilısu reservoir area, interviewed on 26th August 2004. The names of some interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

570 FFM interviews with Women’s Platform and Labourer Women’s Union, 23rd August 2004, Tunceli; Women’s Platform, 27th August 2004, Batman; group of women from Meymuniye village in the Ilısu reservoir area, interviewed on 26th August 2004. The names of some interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

571 Ibid.
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FFM interview with Mr Sebahattin Suvadci, Chairperson of DEHAP, 28th August 2004, Hakkari. The same opinion was expressed to the FFM by the Mayor of Hakkari, Mr Metin Tekce, in an interview on the 28th August 2004, Hakkari. The finding here on this issue is in contrast with a KHRP report in 2003, which suggested that ‘the Kurds’ sided with the US. See KHRP. 2003. The Kurds in Iraq. London: KHRP, p. 19.


Ibid.

FFM interview with Mr İsmail Akbulut, Chairperson of İHD Hakkari, 28th August 2004, Hakkari.

Ibid.

FFM interview with Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), Mr Ladi Sari and Mr Nazif Akar (Administrative Board), İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.

Ibid.

FFM interview with displaced villagers, now resident in Hevsel Gardens, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakir. The account in this paragraph is from that interview. The names of the interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.


FFM interview with villagers from Meymuniye, 26th August 2004, Meymuniye. The names of interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.

FFM interview with Ms Saadet Becerikli (Chairperson), Mr Ladi Sari and Mr Nazif Akar (Administrative Board), İHD Batman, 27th August 2004, Batman.

FFM interview with displaced villagers, now resident in Hevsel Gardens, 25th August 2004, Diyarbakir. The account in this paragraph is from that interview. The names of the interviewees have been withheld by the KHRP for reasons of personal safety.


Sinclair (1987, p. 252) gives 1962 as the year of destruction but does not mention the cause.

Such military displays are widespread in Turkey but their effect on a population living in a conflict zone must be considered.

In 2004, a motion was passed in the EU parliament linking Ilısu to the accession of Turkey to the EU. The motion urged: ‘in this respect, the Turkish government to apply EU environmental and human rights standards to large-impact projects like the construction of dams in the Munzur

595 EU Progress Report, p. 35.
The Cultural and Environmental Impact of Large Dams in Southeast Turkey

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