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Expression and Silence
The Language of Phenomenology in Wittgenstein and Heidegger

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Summary

This thesis is a comparative study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger in relation to their engagement with the problem of phenomenological expression. My central argument is that by reading Wittgenstein in this way, we can begin to make sense of the qualified equivalence he draws between his own phenomenology in 1929, and his earliest experiments in ordinary language philosophy in the *Philosophical Remarks*. The very same problem-set, I suggest, can be found in Heidegger’s early Freiburg lectures. Many of his key concepts, I argue, such as formal indication and phenomenological destruction, are developed as a direct response to the limits of language. By looking to the sense in which his hermeneutic phenomenology overcomes such linguistic constraints, we find the best correlate in the continental tradition for Wittgenstein’s account of philosophical grammar. It is on the basis of this comparison, I suggest, that the phenomenological relevance of Wittgenstein’s later work can be historically situated.
To my mother.
First and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisor Prof Felix Ó Murchadha. At every stage of this research, I have benefited from his enormous generosity, support and insight. I am particularly indebted to his vast knowledge of Heidegger and phenomenology, without which this project would simply not exist.

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Abbreviations

Throughout this work, I employ the convention of abbreviating Heidegger’s lecture series by semester and year.

KNS-1919

WS-1919

SS-1920
Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression, London: Bloomsbury, 2013

WS-1920
Phenomenology of Religious Life, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010

WS-1921

SS-1923
Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999

WS-1923
Introduction to Phenomenological Research, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005

SS-1925

WS-1925
Logic: The Question of Truth, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010

WS-1929

WS-1934

WS-1937
The Basic Questions of Philosophy, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994

TLP

PI

TS-213
The Big Typescript: TS-213, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2013
Introduction

“To be sure, I can imagine what Heidegger means by being and anxiety. Man feels the urge to run up against the limits of language. [...] But this inclination, the running up against something, indicates something.” (Wittgenstein, 2003, pp. 68-69)

In the relative vacuum of Nachlass records from the same period, the publication in 1964 of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Remarks* garnered understandable confusion regarding his relation to the school of Husserl. In the opening chapter of that text, dating from 1929/30, he writes,

> I do not now have phenomenological language, or ‘primary language’ as I used to call it, in mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary. All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what is inessential in our language. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)

Adding to this exegetical mystery, Wittgenstein adds that this move to ordinary language, which presumably prefigures the *Philosophical Investigations*, would nonetheless amount to a phenomenological language. He writes,

> A recognition of what is essential and what inessential in our language if it is to represent, a recognition of which parts of our language are wheels turning idly, *amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language*. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)

The principle aim of this thesis is to understand not only what Wittgenstein means by “Phänomenologie”, but more importantly, to understand the relation he draws between that method and his earliest work on ordinary language. This task can be best achieved, as I will argue, by comparison with its closest correlate in the continental school, viz., Heidegger’s earliest accounts of hermeneutic phenomenology. Although countless articles have been written since 1964 in the spirit of rapprochement between these schools, the emphasis placed on Wittgenstein’s own middle-period use of the term “Phänomenologie” has varied considerably. In this respect, two broad strands have arisen in the literature. The first, exemplified in earlier scholars such as Gier, Spiegelberg and the Hintikkas, understand Wittgenstein’s relation to continental phenomenology as being closest in his use of that term.¹ Accordingly, his implied rejection of that school (or at least some variant of it), at the very least

problematizes the possibility of such dialogue. This question is further complicated, moreover, by Wittgenstein’s continued interest in phenomenological themes long after 1929. As he reflects in the *Remarks on Colour*, from the last year of his life,

There is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems. (Wittgenstein, 1977, p. 9e)

A second, far more prevalent strand has likewise argued for the later Wittgenstein’s relation to the continental school, but without placing emphasis on this middle-period terminology. Correlations on this view certainly exist between these schools, but not necessarily because of what Wittgenstein understands by the term himself. With its relation to the problem-set of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, as some commentators have also noted, it is far from self-evident such a comparison could in any case be made. On the face of it, ordinary language proponents and phenomenologists have certainly shared a number of historical concerns. Allies to the cause of rapprochement, for this reason, have been suggested here in some surprising camps, such as Gilbert Ryle. In a late essay about *The Concept of Mind*, even Ryle himself would seem to be making this case. Referring to the method of that text, he writes,

Though it is entitled *The Concept of Mind*, it is actually an examination of multifarious specific mental concepts, such as those of knowing, learning, discovering, imagining, pretending, hoping, wanting, feeling depressed, feeling a pain, resolving, doing voluntarily, doing deliberately, perceiving, remembering and so on. The book could be described as a sustained essay in phenomenology, if you are at home with that label. (Ryle, 2009a, pp. 195-196)

In 1929, it was Ryle’s reasonably sympathetic review of *Being and Time* which introduced the text to an English-speaking audience. Though not nearly as critical as figures such as Rudolf Carnap, Ryle likewise took issue with Heidegger’s novel use of language. He writes,

[Heidegger] imposes on himself the hard task of coining, and on us the alarming task of understanding, a complete new vocabulary of terms—mostly many-barrelled compounds of

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2 There is too much literature to possibly provide an exhaustive list here. However, a small sample includes (Apel, 1967; Braver, 2014; Harries, 1968; Heinzig, 1987; Kerr, 1965; Minar, 2001; Munson, 1962; Overgaard, 2007; Overgaard & Zahavi, 2009; Philipse, 1992; Taylor, 1978; Van Peursen, 1959)
3 See for example, (Overgaard & Zahavi, 2009)
4 See for example, (Thomasson, 2002)
5 (Ryle, 2009b)
6 For Carnap’s account of Heidegger’s language, see (Carnap, 1996)
everyday ‘nursery’ words and phrases—made to denote roots and stems of Meaning more primitive than those in which Plato, Aristotle and subsequent scientists and philosophers have so taught us to talk and think, that we, by the strong force of habit, have come to regard as ultimate and pivotal ideas which are in fact composite and derivative. (Ryle, 2009b, pp. 214-215)

Later adding,

The hypothesis seems to me a perilous one, for it is at least arguable that it is here, and not in the language of the village and the nursery, that mankind has made a partial escape from metaphor. (Ryle, 2009b, p. 215)

At the time of its publication, the methodological work prefiguring Heidegger’s use of language was not publicly known. In spite of this, as Braver notes, Ryle is surprisingly sympathetic to Heidegger’s experimentation in this respect. In particular, he remarks positively on the “unflagging energy with which [Heidegger] tries to think beyond the stock categories of orthodox philosophy and psychology.” Even in one of his few substantial critiques, against Heidegger’s rejection of the ‘primacy of knowing’, Ryle was expounding a view on which he would arguably renege prior to The Concept of Mind. His review, overall, alternates between a negative prognosis for phenomenology, and a modest, positive assessment of Heidegger’s philosophical achievement. He finishes by saying,

He shows himself to be a thinker of real importance by the immense subtlety and searchingness of his examination of consciousness… [And] I must also say, in his behalf, that while it is my personal opinion that, qua First Philosophy, Phenomenology is at present heading for bankruptcy and disaster and will end either in self-ruinous Subjectivism or in a windy mysticism, I hazard this opinion with humility and with reservations since I am well aware how far I have fallen short of understanding this difficult work. (Ryle, 2009b, p. 222)

This mark of good-will on the part of Ryle, would seem at odds with an oft-repeated story from the infamous conference at Royaumont in 1958. Asked by Merleau-Ponty whether their projects are really the same, the story goes that Ryle responds by saying “I certainly hope not”. As with most such anecdotes, however, the truth is less interesting. This response, as Overgaard has pointed out, is actually Ryle’s answer to the question (from Merleau-Ponty), whether or not he was continuing the
project of Russell and Wittgenstein. His answer, accordingly, is as one would expect. The actual conference, nonetheless, was about as helpful as the anecdotal rebuttal. Similarities for example in the project of concept clarification and phenomenology never became common ground for its participants. This was true also of their view on science, and its relation to philosophy. The divergence between these schools had seemed so wide as to be unassailable. And this failure, as Overgaard puts it, “was thus due more to a certain methodological blind spot than to real, insurmountable differences.”

That ordinary language philosophy and phenomenology overlap is not without qualification. As Brandl points out, one possible objection is the view that phenomenology constitutes a first philosophy. As Ryle’s closing remarks on Heidegger suggest, it is _qua first philosophy_ that he regards the school as leading to bankruptcy and disaster. At least in the case of Heidegger, however, such terminology is qualified. Phenomenology is certainly the _Urwissenschaf_, but this is anything but a repository of first principles. It shares none of the axiomatizable outlines of the kind of vision to which Ryle would definitely object. Much as in the evaluation of ordinary grammar, phenomenology for Heidegger constitutes the basic _stance_ of philosophy itself. What this stance arguably most shares with ordinary language, as many commentators have noted, is a mutual vision of philosophy as being involved in concept clarification. This vision, moreover, has a historical basis. Just as with logicism, phenomenology grows out of the 19th century foundational crisis in mathematics. Husserl’s earliest studies were under the mathematician Karl Weierstrass in Berlin, and later under Leo Königsberger in Vienna. Especially during the period of his influence over Husserl, Weierstrass’s project of mathematical rigour evolved into a series of increasingly fundamental problems concerning its foundations. As Hartimo puts it,

> Over the years, Weierstrass’s lectures focused increasingly on the foundations of analysis […] To the great frustration of his students, Weierstrass’s sufficiently detailed mode of representation meant focusing on the concept of number and the operations on the numbers at the expense of discussing the latest results in analysis. (Hartimo, 2006, p. 323)

That the spirit of this project, and its precedent in figures such as Bolzano, influenced Husserl’s vision for phenomenology is clear from his later reflections. It is also through Weierstrass that Husserl began his interest specifically in mathematics. As he later recited,
The great Weierstrass was the one who raised in me an interest for a radical grounding of mathematics during my student years in his lectures on the theory of functions. I learned to appreciate his efforts to transform analysis, which was so much a mixture of rational thought and irrational instinct and tact into a purely rational theory. He was after the original roots. (Hartimo, 2010, p. 111)

Husserl’s turn to descriptive psychology, which he found in Brentano, coincides with his increasing interest in broader philosophical problems. Is it through Brentano, for example, that he first reads Hume and Mach, and develops his early disdain for German romanticism. What descriptive psychology provided, however, was arguably a vehicle for the clarifying zeal he had developed under Weierstrass. The result of this union is his 1891 text, *The Philosophy of Arithmetic*. The story of its reception is now well known. Frege’s critical review in 1894 accused Husserl of harbouring psychologism, an accusation with which Husserl seemed to agree. As a first beginning, nonetheless, the significance of that text has arguably been understated. As late as the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* in 1929, Husserl still reflects on the project as being proto-phenomenological. He writes,

> I had already acquired the definite direction with regard to the formal and a first understanding of its sense by my *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891), which, in spite of its immaturity as a first book, presented an initial attempt to go back to the spontaneous activities of collecting and counting…It was therefore, in my later terminology, a phenomenologico-constitutional investigation. (Husserl, 1969, pp. 86-87)

The full extent of Frege’s influence on the *Logical Investigations* is debated. As Husserl himself states in the preface to the first edition of that text, however, its contours consist in a corrective to the basic framework he presupposed in *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. This reworking begins, moreover, with a systematic deconstruction of the idea of psychologism. What it results in, is the first mature account of static phenomenology. Any such account of phenomenology’s origin is summary. But even this suffices I think to show the truth in Dummett’s view that a student of 1903 would not place Frege and Husserl at either side of an unsurmountable chasm. Why this would seem natural to a student of today is anything but obvious.

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15 Translated from (Schuhmann & IJsseling, 1977, p. 7)
16 (Moran, 2000, p. 69)
17 (Frege, 1972)
18 The validity of Frege’s critique, moreover, has been largely unquestioned. For a reassessment of this view, see (Hill, 1994)
19 (Husserl, 2001b, p. 2)
20 (Dummett, 1994, p. 26)
What such historical excursions certainly show, however, is the sense in which it was natural for Wittgenstein to consider phenomenology as an option for revising the *Tractatus*, understood as a project in the tradition of logicism. His remarks on this school date from the time of his return to Cambridge in January 1929, a period of extensive revisions to almost every aspect of his thought. The *Philosophical Remarks*, which created this mystery in 1964, was compiled in 1930 from manuscripts MSS 105-108. Its contents date from between February 2nd, 1929 and April 24th of the following year. Wittgenstein’s editorial style for compiling his typescripts is at best cryptic. As Denis Paul inimitably put it, “parts of *Philosophical Investigations* give the impression of being composed by a squirrel.”

His efforts at compilation from the middle-period, however, are especially unclear. And this lack of editorial clarity undoubtedly reflects a certain lack of conceptual perspicuity. Arguably nowhere is this more evident than in his engagement with Friedrich Waismann and Moritz Schlick. Many of the references to phenomenology in this period (including his only explicit mention of Husserl and Heidegger), occur in such conversations beginning in the winter of 1929. The purpose of such visits was to clarify the content of a publication, led by Waismann, that detailed Wittgenstein’s views in the *Tractatus*. Advertised in *Erkenntnis* I in 1930, *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie* was projected to clarify the logical component of the Vienna Circle’s scientific-worldview. Waismann’s attempts to consult with Wittgenstein, however, were immediately met with his growing hostility to the content of that early work. It was this hostility which ultimately led to the failure of the project. His frustration at this revisionary tumult is expressed in a letter to Moritz Schlick in 1934.

> He [Wittgenstein] has the great gift of seeing things as if for the first time. But it shows, I think, how difficult collaborative work with him is, since he is always following up the inspiration of the moment and demolishing what he has previously sketched out.

*(Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2013, p. xxvii)*

Before adding,

> But all one sees is that the structure is being demolished bit by bit and that everything is gradually taking on an entirely different appearance, so that one almost gets the feeling that it doesn’t matter at all how the thoughts are put together since in the end nothing is left as it was. *(Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2013, p. xxvii)*

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21 (Paul, 2007, p. 52)
22 As Paul adds, “confuses” is a fair comment on his attempt to put his 1929-1930 development between a single pair of covers”. (Paul, 2007, p. 52)
23 These conversations are recorded in (Wittgenstein, 2003; Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2013)
What these conversations with Waismann and Schlick say of Wittgenstein’s understanding of continental phenomenology is not much. They contain a single conversation about Husserl, and a short remark about the concept of Angst in Heidegger. Whether, or how deeply, Wittgenstein read either figure is not obvious. In reference to his own phenomenology, mention of Goethe and Mach seem to outnumber Husserl or Heidegger. In the opening of the *Philosophical Remarks*, it is Mach who he mentions by name, describing him with all the descriptors he does of phenomenology. He writes,

> What Mach calls a thought experiment is of course not an experiment at all. At bottom it is a grammatical investigation. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 52)

As Fisette notes, Husserl too takes an unusual line on Mach, regarding him both as proto-phenomenological and as embroiled in psychologism. In the Amsterdam lectures in 1928, he writes that phenomenology is “a certain radicalizing of an already existing phenomenological method which individual natural scientists and psychologists had previously demanded and practiced.” Regarding this he names Mach, Hering and Brentano. What these figures arguably lack, however, are conceptual tools such as the epoché, a fact which necessitates the ontological commitments that phenomenology disavows itself of. In this way Husserl regards them much as he does the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* in 1929: as laying the ground for his project, but arguably doomed to amount, as Ryle might put it, to “self-ruinous subjectivism”. To what extent Wittgenstein was aware of this sort of Husserlian distinction is unclear. Nicholas Gier has argued, in fact, that Wittgenstein harbours his own concept of epoché. It is certainly true that his distinction between phenomenology and physics, with its attendant ontological commitments, takes pride of place in his remarks in 1929. The language of ‘objects’, of ‘reality’ or the ‘real’ have no place in describing the phenomenon, on Wittgenstein’s view, but belong to the explanatory (physical) accounts whose grammar is phenomenological.

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24 His conversation on Husserl occurs in a section titled “Anti-Husserl”, dated 30th of December, 1929 (Wittgenstein, 2003, p. 67); His remarks on Heidegger occur on the following page, titled “Apropos of Heidegger” (Wittgenstein, 2003, p. 68)
25 On the lack of experiment in phenomenology, see for example, (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 324e); on grammar and phenomenology, see Ibid. p. 320e.
26 (Fisette, 2012)
27 (Husserl, 1997, p. 213)
29 (Ryle, 2009b, p. 222)
30 See for example, (Gier, 1990)
31 As he says in the *Philosophical Remarks*, “Phenomenology would be the grammar of the description of those facts upon which physics builds its theories.” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)
There appear to be simple colours. Simple as psychological phenomena. What I need is a psychological or rather phenomenological colour theory, not a physical and equally not a physiological one.

Furthermore, it must be a theory in pure phenomenology in which mention is only made of what is actually perceptible and in which no hypothetical objects – waves, rods, cones and all that – occur. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 273)

If this is something like an epoché in embryo, it is all the more striking that Wittgenstein too accuses Mach of marshalling a language foreign to immediate experience.\(^{32}\) ‘Reality’, on Wittgenstein’s view, is one example of a class of terms which must be ignored by phenomenology. Along with it, ‘Euclidean’ terms have no place in descriptions of lived space; the ‘time’ of physics has no place in memory; and ‘Maxwell’ has no place in descriptions of the visual. The problem for Wittgenstein is the wholesale relation between ordinary language and the phenomenological. Whether or not this constitutes a kind of epoché, however, (and somehow qualifies the claim that Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist), is not the kind of question I am concerned with in this thesis. Any such question is hampered by its rejection prior to chapter I of the Philosophical Remarks. The interesting puzzle at the heart of this story, it seems to me, is why Wittgenstein would nonetheless equate the ordinary language method of that text with any such phenomenological project. If this ordinary language analysis amounts to the “construction of a phenomenological language”, as he claims, can this fact make sense of his later overlaps with continental phenomenology?\(^{33}\) Does this equation, in other words, make sense of what Zahavi and Overgaard have called Wittgenstein’s “phenomenological contribution”?\(^ {34}\)

The key to reading this connection, I will argue, is to understand Wittgenstein’s critique of phenomenology as a case-study in the problem of phenomenological expression. In his rejection of phenomenology, that is, what he rejects is the availability of a language which can give it service. For commentators such as the Hintikkas, this impossibility implicitly undermines continental phenomenology.\(^ {35}\) What such views dismiss, however, is the extensive treatment of the same problem in that school. One clear example of this engagement can be found in Heidegger. In his early Freiburg lectures, (1919-1923) the problem of phenomenological expression is front and centre in his justification of phenomenology. The linguistic constraints of this problem, on Heidegger’s view,

\(^{32}\) See (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 267) As he says, “One of the clearest examples of the confusion between physical and phenomenological language is the picture Mach made of his visual field, in which the so-called blurredness of the figures near the edge of the visual field was reproduced by a blurredness (in a quite different sense) in the drawing. No, you can’t make a visual picture of our visual image.”

\(^{33}\) (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)

\(^{34}\) (Overgaard & Zahavi, 2009)

\(^{35}\) (Hintikka & Hintikka, 1986, p. 148) Quite apart from this problematic assumption, the Hintikka’s portrayal of the Husserlian position has likewise been problematized. See for example, (Overgaard, 2008)
certainly dictate the limits within which phenomenology can be done but are not conceptually fatal. Just as for Wittgenstein, hermeneutic phenomenology (understood as his response to this problem), is claimed to amount to the Husserlian project.

That Heidegger’s work remains in the tradition of Husserl, of course, has not been without controversy. So much so that in his history of the movement in 1960, Spiegelberg could pose the question “To what extent was Heidegger a phenomenologist?”36 The question of the relation between hermeneutic and classical phenomenology problematizes the very idea of there being a ‘continental phenomenology’. As Ó Murchadha puts it, “depending on how radically one sees the disagreement between these two thinkers, the very validity of the claim to a phenomenological tradition can be questioned or fully denied.”37 Separating the conceptual from the personal in this relationship has been especially problematic, a fact only lessened by the continuing publication of their Nachlass. Husserl’s critical reading of Being and Time, for example, came with seemingly little awareness of Heidegger’s specific methodological revisions in the 1920s. Insight into this fact can be seen from his 1931 letter to Alexander Pfänder. Referring to the early twenties, and his relation to Heidegger, he writes,

> It was in this period that Heidegger began to mature - for a number of years he was constantly at my side as my close assistant. He behaved entirely as a student of my work and as a future collaborator, who, as regards all the essentials of method and problematic, would stand on the ground of my constitutive phenomenology. (Husserl, 1997, p. 480)

Even in the Marburg years (1923-28), during which Heidegger’s work mostly sharply departs in style, Husserl “regarded his enormous success as a teacher as if it were [his] own success”.38 Of the conceptual specifics, however, of his work during this time, Heidegger was “rather vague or silent”, never sharing the prefatory studies for Being and Time. Even following the publication of that text in 1927, Husserl initially distrusted his own assessment of the project.39 It is only following the success of the Paris Lectures and the Formal and Transcendental Logic in 1929, that his growing confidence put an end to his faith in Heidegger. As he says in no uncertain terms,

> I devoted two months to studying Being and Time, as well as his more recent writings. I arrived at the distressing conclusion that philosophically I have nothing to do with this Heideggerian profundity, with this brilliant unscientific genius; that Heidegger's criticism,

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36 (Spiegelberg, 1994, p. 408)
37 (O'Murchadha, 2008, p. 375)
38 (Husserl, 1997, p. 480)
39 Ibid.
both open and veiled, is based upon a gross misunderstanding; that he may be involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which I have always considered it my life's work to make forever impossible. Everyone except me has realized this for a long time. I have not withheld my conclusion from Heidegger. (Husserl, 1997, p. 482)\textsuperscript{10}

The influence of this personal dimension on Husserl is profound, particularly as it relates to Heidegger’s disastrous political sympathies in the 1930s. Far from taking “charge of [Husserl’s] manuscripts when [he] passed away”, that political climate almost wiped them from the record of history, a fate only spared by figures such as Fr. Hermann van Breda.\textsuperscript{41} Heidegger, in the end, had almost no part in the restoration of Husserl’s stature in post-war philosophy. And this break down in their personal relationship predates the infamous rectorate post. As Husserl put it at the end of the Pfändler letter,

For almost a decade he was my closest friend; naturally this is all over: Inability to understand each other precludes friendship. This reversal in professional esteem and personal relations was one of the most difficult ordeals of my life. (Husserl, 1997, p. 482)

Heidegger’s methodological work in the 1920s, about which he was “rather vague or silent” to Husserl, is extensive. Much like Wittgenstein in 1929, his notes from this period portray a revisionary project to radicalise philosophy, a energy famously recalled by Arendt as spreading the “rumour of a hidden king”.\textsuperscript{42} Evidence from Heidegger’s correspondence to his wife seem to indicate that he himself regarded this radicalism as in opposition to Husserl’s more formal, scientific approach. The truth in such caricatures, however, is far from clear. A well-known anecdote from this period has Heidegger reproach Husserl for constructing a letterbox through iterative passive-synthesis, but not thinking to put a letter in it. Whatever their truth, caricatures such as this have had a persistent Nachleben. They have arguably contributed to a misleading view of the relation between their phenomenologies, even if such views were partially held by the figures themselves. What subsequent publications of the Husserliana have shown, are in many cases the misunderstanding in much of Heidegger’s critiques. What the publication of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe has shown, conversely, are his careful engagements with the methodological preconceptions of phenomenology. Contrary to the doubts implied by Spiegelberg, the fundamental differences between these methodological

\textsuperscript{10} Italics mine.

\textsuperscript{41} (Husserl, 1997, p. 480) See also, (Moran, 2000, p. 89)

\textsuperscript{42} “Heidegger at 80”, New York Review of Books, October 21\textsuperscript{4}, 1971. This view, moreover, was shared by many of Heidegger’s most famous students, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer. In his reflections on first seeing the Aristotle letter to Natorp at Marburg, he later recalled, “Reading this manuscript hit me like an electric shock. There was not a whole lot about Aristotle, but quite a bit about the young Luther, Gabriel Biel, Augustine, Saint Paul and the Old Testament. What language it was! What a peculiar and, for us at the time, completely novel use of strongly expressive German words and locutions for conceptual purposes!” (Gadamer, 2016, p. 210)
outlooks are, at the very least, less profound, it seems to me, than would have seemed natural to suppose in 1960.

At the heart of Heidegger’s methodological work is the problem of phenomenological language. As read through Paul Natorp in the *Kriegsnotsemester* of 1919, I will argue, it becomes a central focus of the justification of his phenomenology. To understand how the possibility of phenomenology remains for him, in spite of the linguistic limitations it is subject to, gives us the most fruitful case for rapprochement with the work of Wittgenstein. My principle aim in this thesis, accordingly, is not to ask whether Wittgenstein is a phenomenologist, as so much of the early literature had done. My aim instead is to understand both Wittgenstein and Heidegger as readers of a common phenomenological problem-set: viz., the problem of phenomenological expression. While their textual use of the term “expression” [*Ausdruck*] differed, my own use of the term in this thesis is a stand-in for that view of language which they mutually rejected. As I will argue, this view incorporates any understanding of language in which the truth of a phenomenological proposition can be mediated without the need for a lived-experience of its referent. In opposition to this, I contend, what both figures come to emphasize is the essential performativity of phenomenological insights. Understanding Wittgenstein’s later overlaps with the school, it seems to me, can be made sense of on the basis of such a comparison. In this respect, my thesis is an attempt to think from the juncture of the two strands of literature on this topic: my aim is to situate Wittgenstein’s later phenomenological insights in the methodological work of 1929; Not through his application of some direct phenomenology in that year, but through the relation he makes between that application and his later analysis of ordinary language.

In chapter 1, *Phenomenology and Expression*, I detail my reading of Wittgenstein’s middle-period phenomenology. In contrast to the well-known view of the Hintikkas, I argue that “Phänomenologie” enters his work a corrective to his earlier view on elementary statements in the *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*. Its rejection by the end of 1929, I argue, is twofold. Firstly, understood as a descriptive language, it presupposes a misleading relationship between human experience and language as such. Secondly, understood as a language whose syntax is the result of phenomenological reflection, its justification is a meaningless process. For Heidegger, this engagement with language comes through his reading of Natorp, specifically in the problem-set of 1919, that of Intuition and Expression. His linguistic solution to this problem is formal indication [*formale Anzeige*], understood as a performative language irreducible to representation. What this engagement amounts to, I argue, are two basic criteria that Heidegger shares with Wittgenstein: firstly, that ordinary language cannot be used in phenomenology; and secondly, that no ideal language could transcend its limitations. In this way, phenomenology on both accounts is subject to the same basic constraints.
In chapter 2, *Destroying the Idols of Language*, I offer a reading of how phenomenology can be done for both Wittgenstein and Heidegger in light of these criteria. In the case of Wittgenstein, the variational method of the *Philosophical Remarks*, achieves this through making perspicuous what the user of the language is already acquainted with, namely the logic of experience. It is in this sense, that the method amounts to a phenomenological language. As the germ of his mature method, I argue, this account helps us to make sense of why his later work harbours phenomenological insights. For Heidegger, to read a philosophical problem is conceivable only through phenomenological destruction [*Destruktion*]. It is in the relation of this concept to formal indication, understood as correlates of reading and speaking, I argue, that the outlines of his phenomenology surmount the problem of expression. Just as with Wittgenstein, phenomenological insights subvert the constraints of linguistic expression, by confining themselves to performative gestures.

In chapter 3, *The Path to Subjectivity*, I trace the development of Wittgenstein’s account of subjectivity as an example of a respect in which his philosophy overlaps with phenomenology. This development, I argue, consists in a deconstruction of the epistemological language underpinning both the dualist and behaviourist accounts. In precisely the same way, the development of Heidegger’s account of Dasein, occurs through his destructive readings of the history of subjectivity. Using §13 of *Being and Time* as a leitmotif, I trace this account through his readings of contemporary psychology, Aristotle and Kant. For both Wittgenstein and Heidegger, I argue, the failure of traditional accounts lies in their methodological preconceptions. The correlation between their own positions, and its evasion of such preconceptions, lies above all in their mutual concern with the language of the problem-set. In this way, it is grounded in their response to the problem of expression.

In chapter 4, *Expression and Silence*, I conclude my study by looking to Heidegger’s changing view on language after 1930. In particular, the relation between his engagement with the expression problem and the so-called ‘turning’ that follows *Being and Time*. In contrast to the most pervasive reading in the literature, I argue with Thomas Sheehan that the ‘turn’ [*die Kehre*] does not represent Heidegger’s abandonment of *Being and Time* or its phenomenological underpinnings. On the contrary, what it names is the fundamental subject of that text. The abandonment of formal indication after the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, and his subsequent interest in poetry in 1934, I argue, gives us the contours of a critique of one of its most fundamental preconceptions, viz., that there is an extra-linguistic position to do philosophy. In this sense, Heidegger’s movement away from his work in the 1920s, is a corrective against the key difference between his reading of this problem and that of Wittgenstein. In their mature incarnation, I argue, what both of the figures call for in their response to expression is ultimately the same: that the question of phenomenology, and the question of language ultimately coincides. In my concluding remarks, I finish this thesis by recalling Herbert Spiegelberg’s paper of 1968, *The Puzzle of Wittgenstein’s “Phänomenologie”* (1929-?). By way of
conclusion, I use the reading I have offered to suggest answers to the now-canonical questions he famously raised in that paper.
1

Phenomenology & Expression

“The traditional questions are not suited to a logical investigation of phenomena. These generate their own questions, or rather, give their own answers” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 83)

Arguably the most comprehensive attempt at understanding Wittgenstein’s use of the term “Phänomenologie” in 1929 was that of Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka, with Investigating Wittgenstein. On their influential view, ‘phenomenology’ in that year is a reference to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a reading they support by recourse to the question of what constitutes a Tractarian object. Accordingly, the “puzzle of Wittgenstein’s Phänomenologie”, as Herbert Spiegelberg put it, is solved as follows: his relation to the school of Husserl begins in 1922 (with publication of the Tractatus) and ends in 1929 with a rejection of the method equally fatal, they suggest, to its continental variety. A core assumption of this latter view, shared by many early commentators, is that the point of comparison with continental phenomenology is in Husserl. That Wittgenstein’s rebuttal undermines the latter, is taken to sound a death knell for the school at large. This assumption, however, obviously ignores the methodological work of other key figures from that school, such as Heidegger. Particularly in the early Freiburg lectures, Heidegger’s work concerns many of the methodological problems that underpin Wittgenstein’s engagement with phenomenology. The aim of this chapter is twofold: firstly, to offer an alternative reading of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology than that of the Hintikkas; and secondly, to argue that the linguistic criteria which he employs in its later rebuttal, makes this comparison with Heidegger a far more useful pursuit.

Phenomenology enters Wittgenstein’s work as a corrective to his account of elementary statements. In section I, I trace this change, marked by his paper for the Aristotelian society of 1929, Some Remarks on Logical Form. By misidentifying the importance of this move, the Hintikkas fail to see how the middle-period differs from the account of the Tractatus. It is precisely in the failure of that

43 (Hintikka & Hintikka, 1986
44 As the Hintikkas put it, “Wittgenstein’s conception [of phenomenology] turns out to be closely similar to those of phenomenologists. Their basic idea is precisely the same […] viz., that we can uncover the conceptual structure of the world by attending to our immediate experience. Hence, if Wittgenstein’s view is deemed absurd, then so must be deemed the whole Husserlian project.” (Hintikka & Hintikka, 1986, p. 148) For Spiegelberg’s paper, see (Spiegelberg, 1968)
45 See for example the dialogue between Nicholas Gier and Harry Reeder, (Gier, 1991; Reeder, 1989, 1991)
early account that phenomenology is required. Their claim that it doesn’t represent a distinct phase in Wittgenstein’s work is, consequently, unfounded. In 1929, I argue, Wittgenstein entertains two possible kinds of phenomenology: (i) firstly, a language whose syntax is the grammar of the phenomenon, a direct upshot of the Tractarian account; and (ii) secondly, a descriptive exercise in the more familiar, Husserlian sense. Both of these possibilities are rejected, and for different reasons, by the *Philosophical Remarks* in 1930. The mystery underpinning this rejection, however, is Wittgenstein’s claim of an equivalence between his new method and the phenomenology he leaves behind. In the opening remarks of that typescript, he writes,

> If we so to speak describe the class of languages which serve their purpose, then in so doing we have shown what is essential to them and given an immediate representation of immediate experience.
>
> [...]  
>
> A recognition of what is essential and what inessential in our language if it is to represent, a recognition of which parts of our language are wheels turning idly, *amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language*” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)

Understanding how this possibility (of “an immediate representation of immediate experience”) survives his critique of phenomenology requires comparison beyond Husserl. In section II, I argue that Heidegger’s early Freiburg lectures (1919-1923) give us a remarkably similar account along two common criteria: firstly, that ordinary language cannot be put to the task of phenomenology; and secondly, that no construction of an ideal alternative would solve this problem. In Heidegger’s work, phenomenology survives this critique by means of formal indication [*formale Anzeige*], a key term developed out of his problem-set in 1919. It is by looking to this case-study, I suggest, that we can begin to make sense not only of the relation between Wittgenstein’s middle and late periods (through this claim of equivalence), but between his work and continental phenomenology in general.

I.

The first sustained engagement with phenomenology in Wittgenstein’s output was in the *Philosophical Remarks* and occurs as part of an argument ostensibly claiming to refute its possibility. The published version of this text, which appeared in 1964, was the result of a typescript that Wittgenstein had prepared for Russell in advance of a grant application on his return to Cambridge. The manuscripts from which it is composed (MSS 105-108) date from February 1929 onwards, and
the typescript was given to Russell in May of 1930. For the Hintikkas, the phenomenology referenced in that typescript is the same method developed nearly a decade before in the Tractatus. Tractarian objects on their reading are in fact objects-of-acquaintance in the Russellian sense. Such an appropriation is in keeping, they argue, with the general trend of the early Wittgenstein. In this case, the key insight behind Tractarian objects is what the Hintikkas call, ‘the ineffability of objectual existence’.

It is in this sense that Wittgenstein, as a rejection of the Tractatus, opens the Philosophical Remarks by rejecting phenomenology. In this section, I do not wish to defend a strong rejection of the Hintikkas claim, i.e. that Tractarian objects are objects-of-acquaintance. In fact, I see no reason why this thesis conflicts with my own interpretation. What I will argue however, is that by failing to afford the independence thesis centrality, they fail to see the significance of Wittgenstein’s paper for the Aristotelian society of that year, Some Remarks on Logical Form. This paper forces Wittgenstein to adopt a systemic view of elementary statements and it is for this reason that he turns to phenomenology. In light of this, phenomenology is not Tractarian, but used precisely to solve the failure of the Tractatus as a middle-period project. In order to see this transition and its implications however, it is necessary to lay out some of the central claims of the Tractatus, particularly in relation to the logical constants and generality.

(i) The Independence Thesis and the Tractatus

The first reference to phenomenology in Wittgenstein’s work, without being named as such, was in a 1929 paper for the Aristotelian society called Some Remarks on Logical Form. True to the revisionary tumult of that year, Wittgenstein had abandoned its content before delivering it to the society, but it makes clear the sort of problem which returned him to philosophical research. The Tractarian issue it deals with is the independence thesis, one of two central pillars of the Tractatus’ account of elementary statements. Elementary statements are the atoms of the Tractatus’ account of language. As he puts it in Tractatus 5, “Propositions are truth functions of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself)”.

All complex statements, on Wittgenstein’s view, are truth functions of the simpler statements into which they divide. Their truth conditions therefore are determinable by the truth conditions of those simpler statements. One consequence of this view is that two conditions must be met by those elementary statements: (i) they must be capable of both truth and

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46 (Hintikka & Hintikka, 1986, p. 61) The Hintikkas support this reading by recourse to TLP 5.552, which refers to the relationship between experience and the a priori in logic. In particular, it states that “logic precedes every experience—that something is so. It is before the How, not before the What.” (Wittgenstein, 2009b, p. 61). In §46 of the Philosophical Investigations, moreover, Wittgenstein likewise conflates “both Russell’s ‘particulars’ and my ‘objects’ (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)” as primary elements in the sense of the Theaetetus, as elements for which there is no explanatory account, except their mere existence. (Wittgenstein, 2009a, p. 25e)

47 In this, I am broadly following Baker’s interpretation of independence, see (Baker, 1988)

48 (Wittgenstein, 2009b, p. 40)
falsity (their bivalence); and (ii) their truth and falsity must be independent of all other elementary statements (their independence). It is this latter point which allows the *Tractatus* to pre-determine the possibilities and scope of language. For two statements, P and Q, we can simply list possibilities for their truth values.

An interpretation, consisting of some combination of T and F in the final column, can be formed in $2^n$ different ways.\(^{49}\) In every case, the truth table would then correspond to a complex statement, which in Wittgenstein’s view would form a truth function on P and Q. To take a familiar example, the cases of conjunction and disjunction are as follows,

![Truth Table for P and Q](image)

The total number of ways we can do this exhausts the possibilities for complex statements built on P and Q. The only presupposition of this is their independence, i.e., that no combination must be ruled out of court.\(^{50}\) This alone guarantees that every line in the truth table has meaning. Wittgenstein’s philosophical aim here is to show that, against Frege, the constants are not “logical objects”, but abbreviate the ways we may arrange the truth values of elementary statements. In our notational use of ‘∧’ Wittgenstein contends that what we are doing is simply abbreviating the more cumbersome $T\cdot F$ notation of (TFFF). He writes,

\[^{49}\text{(Wittgenstein, 2009b, p. 36)}\]

\[^{50}\text{As he says in TLP 4.51, “Suppose all elementary propositions were given me: then we can simply ask: what propositions I can build out of them. And these are all propositions and so are they limited.” (Wittgenstein, 2009b, p. 40)\}
Chapter One

It is clear that to the complex of signs “F” and “T” no object (or complex of objects) corresponds; any more than to horizontal and vertical lines or to brackets. There are no “logical objects”. (Wittgenstein, 2009b, pp. 36-37)

The post hoc temptation, of course, is to suppose that truth tables were a supplementary clarification to his theory of symbolism, but this is not what Wittgenstein intended. The innovation of T-F notation, as with the earlier ab-notation, was to replace traditional symbolism. As he puts it in 4.442, “thus, e.g., [the truth table] is a propositional sign.”51 The purpose of symbolizing in this way, is to dispense with the misleading analogies which led to Frege’s misconceptions in the first place. Accounting for generality on this view, only requires one short extension. Famously, on Wittgenstein’s reading the universal quantifier is understood as a long conjunction ranging over all statements of the form F(x), such that,

$$\forall x. F(x) \equiv Fa \land Fb \land Fc \ldots \land Fn$$

While existential quantification could be done using its disjunctive analogue,

$$\exists x. F(x) \equiv Fa \lor Fb \lor Fc \ldots \lor Fn$$

As with the logical constants, this meant that generality was reducible to TF-notation, the perspicuity of which dispels our temptation to justify it as a relation within or part of the form of the world. The independence thesis, therefore, has a load-bearing place in the Tractarian account, an innovation notably absent from the earlier Notes on Logic. To abandon it from the former, however, as Baker put it, would be “to throw the whole philosophy of logic of the Tractatus back into the melting pot”.52 So why, in 1929, does Wittgenstein do exactly this in a paper on the nature of colour in our visual space? In fact, the Tractatus does deal with such statements, apparently dispelling them as a candidate for what might count as an elementary statement. In section 6.3751, he writes,

For two colours, e.g., to be at one place in the visual field, is impossible, logically impossible, for it is excluded by the logical structure of colour.

Let us consider how this contradiction presents itself in physics. Somewhat as follows: that a particle cannot at the same time have two velocities, i.e., that at the same time it cannot be in two places, i.e., that particles in different places at the same time cannot be identical.

(It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The assertion that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time, is a contradiction). (Wittgenstein, 2009, pp. 78-79)

51 (Wittgenstein, 2009b, p. 37)
52 (Baker, 1988, p. 95)
The conjunction of two such statements would be a contradiction. As this could not be true of elementary propositions, it follows that colour statements must in fact be truth functions, although the *Tractatus* is silent on how this might work. That is: into what kind of statements could a proposition about colour in visual space possibly divide? For Monk, this point alone suffices to undermine the argument of the Hintikkas.\(^53\) As a statement ostensibly claiming that colour statements are analysable, Monk reads Wittgenstein to mean that they parse out into statements about light waves, i.e. statements from physics. Were this the case, it is true that Tractarian objects could not be phenomenal in the sense of the Hintikkas, but it is far from clear that’s what Wittgenstein is referring to. In an article of 1963, Rush Rhees took up this issue in response to Alexander Maslow’s *A Study in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus*.\(^54\) Maslow, like Monk, was reading Wittgenstein as a physicalist in this respect, to which Rhees writes,

> The *Tractatus* says clearly that color propositions like "This is red" and "This is green" are not elementary propositions and that their conjunction is logically impossible. But since the structures were left obscure, perhaps it was natural for some to assume, as Maslow does, that Wittgenstein was thinking of the structures of the physical counterparts - the light waves. (Even in the early passage in the Notebooks – page 81 -Wittgenstein says clearly that it is not a physical impossibility but a logical one. (Rhees, 1963, p. 216)

The notebook entry in question, from August 1916, shows the relation between these statements and physics more clearly.

> A point cannot be red and green at the same time: at first sight there seems no need for this to be a logical impossibility. But the very language of physics reduces it to a kinetic impossibility. We see that there is a difference of structure between red and green. And then physics arranges them in a series. And then we see how here the true structure of the objects is brought to light. (Wittgenstein, 1961, p. 81)

This passage makes two points quite clear: firstly, that while ‘at first sight’ it does not seem to be a logical impossibility, it in fact is so; and secondly, that this is revealed by the very language of physics. Colour incompatibility is not a physical fact, but rather part of the grammar upon which physics establishes its facts. Considering again how Wittgenstein describes phenomenology in 1930, as that upon which “physics builds its theories” and it seems clear that at least the stronger version of this argument cannot be made from the Tractarian references to colour.\(^55\) Reflecting on this later in TS-213, Wittgenstein writes,

\(^{53}\) (Monk, 2014, p. 331)
\(^{54}\) (Rhees, 1963) see (Maslow, 1961)
\(^{55}\) (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51) He writes, “Physics differs from phenomenology in that it is concerned to established laws. Phenomenology only establishes the possibilities. Thus, phenomenology would be the
When I wrote the *Tractatus* (and later as well) I believed that \( fa = fa \& \neg fb \) would be possible only if \( fa \) were the logical product of some other proposition and \( \neg fb \) -and therefore \( fa = p \& \neg fb \) – and I was of the opinion that \( fa \) (e.g., a colour-statement) could be analysed into such a product. In this context I had no clear idea about how I was imagining the discovery of such an analysis. Or rather: I was probably thinking of the construction of a sign that, because of its make-up, would express the correct grammatical use in any context. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 340e)

Adding a few remarks later,

"Then, when I wanted to carry out such an analysis of a colour statement, it became apparent what I had imagined analysis to be. I believed I could understand a colour statement as a logical product \( r \& s \& t \ldots \), the discrete factors of which indicated the ingredients (if there were several) that the colour ("colour", not "pigment") consisted of. Then, of course, it also had to be said that these are all the ingredients, and this requirement has the effect that \( r \& s \& t \& S \) contradicts \( r \& s \& t \& u \& S \). Then the colour statement would run as follows: “Now these colours (or: this colour) and no others are (is) in this place”. (Wittgenstein, 2013, pp. 340e-341e)

By 1929, however, Wittgenstein came to believe that such decomposition of colour-statements was not possible. Such statements, in contrast to the *Tractatus*, are therefore both elementary and co-dependent. They cannot be analysed, that is, but they are likewise not independent from one another. Referring to this in *Some Remarks on Logical Form*, he writes,

"The mutual exclusion of unanalysable statements of degree contradicts an opinion which was published by me several years ago and which necessitated that atomic propositions could not exclude one another. (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 33)

The problem here is one of logical multiplicity. Recall that conjunction can be expressed by the tabular form in fig. 2. If we take a colour statement such as \( f(g) \) (the point \( p \) is ‘green’ at time \( T \)), and \( f(r) \) (the point \( p \) is ‘red’ at time \( T \)), then the truth table becomes,

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"grammar of the description of those facts on which physics builds its theories. To explain is more than to describe; but every explanation contains a description.”
The difficulty however, arises because the top line, (TTT) is not contingently wrong, but logically impossible. It has no meaning to say that the point can be two colours at the same time. As Wittgenstein writes,

It is, of course, a deficiency in our notation that it does not prevent the formation of such nonsensical constructions, and a perfect notation will have to exclude such structures by definite rules of syntax. (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 35)

The truth table admits of a greater logical multiplicity than ‘that of the actual possibilities’, the correction of which would mean deletion of the top line. This gives,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F(g)</th>
<th>F(r)</th>
<th>F(g) &amp; F(r)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>F</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
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<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast to the *Tractatus*, then, statements about visual space are therefore both (i) elementary and yet (ii) not independent. It follows, that not every combination of their truth values has meaning as their sense relies on a pre-existing system, which Wittgenstein now terms a *Satzsystem*, or propositional-system. In this case, the system is ‘colour’, but this would be true also of sound and space. This transition to a systemic picture has determined that in Fig. 4, there is no combination that makes the conjunction true. Given the importance of independence to the *Tractatus*, however, what does this say for Wittgenstein’s overall vision of logic? Addressing this a few months later in the *Philosophical Remarks*, he writes,

The proposition \( f(g) \land f(r) \) isn’t nonsense, since not all truth possibilities disappear, even if they are all rejected. We can, however, say that the ‘\&’ has a different meaning here, since ‘\( x \land y \)’ usually means (TFFF); here, on the other hand, it means (FFF). And something analogous holds for ‘\( x \lor y \)’, etc. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 107)
At least in 1929/30, Wittgenstein had not totally disregarded TF-notation. Dropping the independence thesis, however, and allowing for the construction of a satzsystem, enables us to see that the constants admit of more grammatical variety than logic has previously held. That is to say, conjunction when talking about colour is not the same as conjunction applied elsewhere. What now matters, is the logic of the phenomenon being spoken about. As he puts it a few remarks later,

The rules for ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, etc., which I represented by means of the T-F notation, are a part of the grammar of these words, but not the whole. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 111)

Regarding generality likewise, Wittgenstein now maintains that the account of the Tractatus, and the tradition of Russell and Frege, falsely sublimates genuine variety to a merely apparent uniformity. The independence thesis had supported the intuition behind this model, and yet the colour problem presented it with a fatal blow. This fact, moreover, applies to any propositional-system. With statements of sound, colour and space, for instance, there are combinations legitimated by our notation, which are nevertheless logically impossible. In TS-213 he writes,

The real difficulty lies in the concept of “(Ǝn)” and, in general terms, of “(Ǝx)”. This notation originates in this expression of our word-language: “There is a…with such and such a property”. And what replaces the dots here is, say, “book in my library” or “thing (body) in this room”, “word in this letter”, etc. Here one thinks of objects that one can go through, one after the other…even though it is quite clear that in many cases the grammar of “(Ǝx) etc.” is utterly different from the grammar of the primitive case that serves as the archetype. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 247e)

To this he adds, “So here I want to say that not much is gained by translating such a proposition from the word-language into Russellian notation”. In short, what Wittgenstein had determined was that, just as the independence thesis had supported the Russelian account of the constants, his new systemic picture undermined it. Conjunction, when applied to two different propositional systems, may mean something entirely different and this fact is the very antithesis to the whole project of ideal language philosophy. Against the Hintikkas, phenomenology on this reading does not initially belong the Tractarian project, but is marshalled in to address the previously unacknowledged variety of Tractarian objects. Elementary statements, contrary to that text, belong to propositional systems. And if we are to get clear on what this entails, then we must determine the nature of these systems. This is a task that cannot be done a priori, but requires, as he puts it, “the ultimate analysis of the phenomena in question”. It must, in this sense, literally be a phenomeno-logic. It is to solve this problem, a

56 (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 247e)
57 (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 35)
problem for which there is no Tractarian counterpart, that for the greater part of 1929 Wittgenstein advocates a phenomenological project.

So far, I have attempted to defend the claim that the phenomenology of the *Philosophical Remarks* does not refer to the Tractarian account, but to an intermediate project taken up in *Some Remarks on Logical Form*. It is precisely in the failure of the *Tractatus* (exemplified in section 6.3751), that Wittgenstein saw such a need. The account I have given does support at least one aspect of the Hintikka's interpretation: that phenomenology, so construed, is a part of the project of ideal language philosophy. In this sense, its rejection by late 1929 must be seen as part of Wittgenstein’s wider transition in this respect. Far from the expressive economy of the Tractarian vision, the modified account of language in the *Philosophical Remarks* has shown itself to be dependent on the phenomenon in question. Broadly speaking, this movement is at odds with the entire project of ideal language philosophy. As Baker put it,

> Grammatical differences abound, whereas the logical forms of judgements were held to be few in number and incapable of extension. According to this venerable tradition, the task of the logician must be to peer through symbols and thus to ground distinctions in the nature of the things symbolized. (Baker, 1988, p. 46)

Wittgenstein’s awareness of this unfurling complexity perhaps sheds some light on his lessening antipathy toward analysing the natural languages, a point he makes by comparison with the colour octahedron. As a representation of the grammar of colour, the octahedron shows by virtue of its form what can meaningfully be expressed in the satzsystem (colour) appropriate to it. If we try to replace this form with a representation of the colours on a straight line, then he writes,

> [You] have to introduce rules to exclude certain transitions, and in the end the representation on the line must be given the same kind of topological structure as the octahedron has. In this, it’s completely analogous to the relation of ordinary language to a ‘logically purified’ mode of expression. The two are completely equivalent; it’s just that one of them already wears the rules of grammar on its face. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 277)

Despite this increasing proximity, and the loss of expressive economy, the question still remains: Why does Wittgenstein open the *Philosophical Remarks* by rejecting this kind of ideal language project? The account of 1929/30 turns on a technical distinction that Wittgenstein begins to draw between *propositions* and *hypotheses*. A proposition is a statement of the kind we have so far considered, namely one pertaining to immediate experience. A phenomenological language, in this

(ii) Anti-Husserl
sense, is a language of propositions. A hypothesis, by contrast, has a different relation to truth functionality. Statements of physics, but equally statements with reference to the future or the past, on his view, are meaningful but not exhausted by their obtaining or not obtaining of the world. They bear a logical relation to the propositions, but it is a more complicated picture than that of complex to elementary statement. In chapter XXII of the Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein opens by saying,

A proposition, a hypothesis, is coupled with reality – with varying degrees of freedom. In the limit case there’s no longer any connection, reality can do anything it likes without coming into conflict with the proposition: in which case the proposition (hypothesis) is senseless! …That is, immediate experience need confirm only something about them, some facet of them. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 282)\(^{58}\)

In the same section he writes,

A hypothesis is a logical structure. That is, a symbol for which certain rules of representation hold. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 283)

This second statement in particular is of importance, because it identifies the hypothesis as a logical structure. As Rush Rhees put it, just as propositions are not self-contained in the sense of a satzsystem, so too does their relation to hypotheses become central in ordinary language.\(^{59}\) But what does a hypothesis look like? In one example, Wittgenstein speaks of the “hypothesis of a world of material objects”.\(^{60}\) We adopt such a hypothesis, he writes, “in view of its simplicity when compared with the unmanageably complicated phenomenological description”.\(^{61}\) When I see a complicated shape for Wittgenstein, the propositional form of my experience is extremely complicated. It incorporates infinitesimally small changes across positions in visual space. In Some Remarks on Logical Form, he had even suggested that numerals could play a part in such propositions.\(^{62}\) But to speak of seeing “the shape”, is hypothetical in the sense that it subsumes these visual propositions into a certain linguistic structure. This process, moreover, has obvious expressive economy. The relationship between proposition and hypothesis is not like that of a complex statement to an

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\(^{58}\) I am aware that Wittgenstein uses both terms, but its correction in two cases from proposition to hypothesis, coupled with the context of the statement in chapter XXII makes it clear that he is referring here to hypotheses. For more such remarks by Wittgenstein on this topic, see (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2013, p. 331)

\(^{59}\) (Rhees, 1963, p. 218)

\(^{60}\) (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 286)

\(^{61}\) Ibid.

\(^{62}\) (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 31) He writes, “And here I wish to make my first definite remark on the logical analysis of actual phenomena: it is this, that for their representation numbers (rational and irrational) must enter into the structure of the atomic propositions themselves. I will illustrate this by an example. Imagine a system of rectangular axes, as it were, cross wires, drawn in our field of vision and an arbitrary scale fixed. It is clear that we then can describe the shape and position of every patch of colour in our visual field by means of statements of numbers which have their significance relative to the system of co-ordinates and the unit chosen. Again, it is clear that this description will have the right logical multiplicity and that a description which has a smaller multiplicity will not do.”
elementary one in the Tractarian sense, because its form is determined by other factors than truth
functionality. In the above example, the logical structure (the hypothesis), is the way it is because
human beings speak about shapes. We may speak about a soul within a body, but it is wrong to
construe this necessarily as truth functional. Certainly, it incorporates a certain description of
experience, but its logical structure has been determined for Wittgenstein by the fact it has utility in
certain uses of language, such as pain-ascriptions. On his mature view, the occupational error of
philosophy is not getting clear on this distinction. As he puts it late in the Philosophical Remarks,

What is essential to a hypothesis is, I believe, that it arouses an expectation by admitting of
future confirmation. That is, it is of the essence of a hypothesis that its confirmation is never
completed.

When I say a hypothesis isn’t definitively verifiable, that doesn’t mean that there is a
verification of it which we may approach ever more nearly, without ever reaching it. That is
nonsense – of a kind into which we frequently lapse. No, a hypothesis simply has a different
formal relation to reality from that of verification. (Hence, of course, the words ‘true’ and
‘false’ are also inapplicable here, or else have a different meaning.) (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 285)

Returning to the opening of the Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein’s rejection of the possibility of
a phenomenology is tantamount to the rejection of a purely propositional language. But why must this
be? Why can we not build a language free of “hypothetical objects”, unmanageable though it might
be? For Robert Noë, the futility of the project lies in what Wittgenstein calls the arbitrariness of
grammar. Sometime around mid-1929, he realises that what a phenomenology amounts to, is stating
what it makes sense to say about the world in ordinary language. The transition comes for Noë,
when Wittgenstein realises that the grammar of ordinary language is however arbitrary. That is, it is
not indebted to reality in the way that a phenomenological language is. It is certainly true that the
form of such language for Wittgenstein is structured by its use. It makes sense to speak of a soul in the
body, not because we find one in experience necessarily, but because it serves our purposes. Once we
adopt this view, then a phenomenology, which aims to justify grammar, certainly does become
superfluous. To interpret, however, the arbitrariness of grammar as a complete disconnection between
language and the world, is to disregard the limit case that Wittgenstein sets on hypotheses. As he
writes,

63 See for example (Wittgenstein, 2003, p. 160)
64 (Noë, 1994)
65 Ibid, p. 20. It is in this sense, according to Noë, that Wittgenstein makes his equation between phenomenology
and grammar, e.g., (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 320)
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In the limit case there’s no longer any connection, reality can do anything it likes without coming into conflict with the proposition: in which case the proposition (hypothesis) is senseless!

All that matters is that the signs, in no matter how complicated a way, still in the end refer to immediate experience and not to an intermediary (a thing in itself). (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 282)

So construed, the arbitrariness of grammar does not divorce it from reality, but only affords it the “varying degrees of freedom” we have already seen. On this view, phenomenology remains not only a possibility but given Wittgenstein’s project in 1929, a necessity. Why then within ten months does he abandon it? The primary literature from this period is typically sporadic with reference to the subject but seems to indicate that Wittgenstein entertains two distinct approaches to the problem in the months of 1929. The first, hinted at in Some Remarks on Logical Form, dictates the syntax of language to account for propositional-systems. A second version, however, arguably more Husserlian, can be identified in the same period. Particularly in his conversations with the Vienna Circle from this time, Wittgenstein speaks of a phenomenal language, akin to pure description. To account for this transition therefore, it is necessary to look at these two directions in turn.

(a) Laws of Syntax

When Wittgenstein’s rejection first appears in the Philosophical Remarks, he equates phenomenology with dictating the rules of representation. A phenomenological language, that is, is one whose surface grammar reflects the grammar of propositional systems. The job of the phenomenologist is to determine what this grammar is, e.g. that two colours cannot be in the same place at the same time. In this sense, phenomenology places limits on the possibilities of experience, a fact with which Wittgenstein begins taking issue. In conservations with Friedrich Waismann and Moritz Schlick at the latter’s home in December 1929, Wittgenstein makes his only sustained remarks on Husserl. Asked by Schlick what he would say to “a philosopher who believes that the statements of

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66 As Rhees puts it, “[propositions] give sense to hypotheses: without them hypotheses would have no possible connection with reality. But they have their own sense in hypotheses – as “sections” through hypotheses.” (Rhees, 1963, p. 218)

67 Some commentators argue that Wittgenstein only entertains a single form, which he simply elaborates into the phenomenal language described in conversation with Waismann. The clearest reason, in my view, for separating these is that Wittgenstein offers two distinct counter-arguments in his refutation of phenomenology, neither of which would refute both cases. In any case, either solution would solve the problem he identifies in Some Remarks on Logical Form. For an interesting account of how Wittgenstein sees this phenomenology against my own reading, see (Engelmann, 2013)
phenomenology are synthetic a priori judgements”, he begins by parsing out the concept of synthetic judgements. He writes,

If I say, ‘I have not got stomach-ache’, then this presupposes the possibility of a state of stomach ache. My present state and the state of stomach-ache are in the same logical space as it were…The negative proposition presupposes the positive one and vice versa. (Wittgenstein, 2003, p. 67)

In the case of phenomenology, however, the claim is being made to attribute laws of possibility of experience. Taking his paradigm as the statement about colour incompatibility, he writes,

Is all I want to say by this that I have not yet seen such an object? obviously not. What I mean is, ‘I cannot see such an object’…The word ‘can’ is obviously a grammatical (logical) concept, not a material one. (Wittgenstein, 2003, p. 67)

To claim at the same time, however, that such a statement was synthetic, is precisely to acknowledge the possibility of its negation. It claims the contingency and the necessity of the proposition at once, that it’s a necessary limit of experience that could be otherwise. Accordingly, he says, we “reach the consequence that the impossible is possible”. Wittgenstein ends this critique enigmatically by claiming,

Here there remained only one way out for Husserl – to declare that there was a third possibility. To that I would reply that it is indeed possible to make up words, but I cannot associate a thought with them. (Wittgenstein, 2003, p. 68)

Ray Monk has argued that this critique of Husserl’s ‘third way’ is a veiled self-critique for the position he held for most of that year.68 He connects it in this respect with his final statements in Some Remarks on Logical Form, namely that,

Such rules however cannot be laid down until we have actually reached the ultimate analysis of the phenomena in question. (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 35)

Such a project cannot be a priori, but clearly claims to be a posteriori. Insofar as it discloses what is implicit within the subject-domain ‘colour’ it is moreover analytic. This middle-way, of the analytic a posteriori, becomes by proxy Wittgenstein’s understanding of the Husserlian project. In this critique of Husserl, however, Wittgenstein is affirming neither a synthetic or analytic understanding of phenomenological propositions: as he does elsewhere, he is denying the possibility of their being truth-functional at all. The issue at play here is the same one with which he opens the Philosophical Remarks: the possibility of justification. In the opening chapter of that text he writes,

68 (Monk, 2014, p. 331)
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If anything is to count as nonsense in the grammar which is to be justified, then it cannot at the same time pass for sense in the grammar of the propositions that justify it (etc.).

How could a proposition, of the type called for in Some Remarks on Logical Form, be verified over alternatives? Such, after all, is the activity of the phenomenologist. As he puts it,

If I could describe the point of grammatical conventions by saying they are made necessary by certain properties of the colours (say), then that would make the conventions superfluous, since in that case I would be able to say precisely that which the conventions exclude my saying. Conversely, if the conventions were necessary, i.e. if certain combinations of words had to be excluded as nonsensical, then for that very reason I cannot cite a property of colours that makes the conventions necessary, since it would then be conceivable that the colours should not have this property, and I could only express that by violating the conventions.
(Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 53)

Colour-incompatibility, as Wittgenstein points out in his remarks on Husserl, makes a logical claim in speaking of necessity. And precisely because the converse is a meaningless thought, the language of justification has no weight here. It proceeds only by presupposing what it aims to justify. As he says, we “cannot use language to go beyond the possibility of evidence”.69 For this reason, if it is truly necessary, there is no room for the language of reason-giving. He follows this point by saying,

It cannot be proved that it is nonsense to say of a colour that it is a semitone higher than another. I can only say “If anyone uses words with the meanings that I do, then he can connect no sense with this combination. If it makes sense to him, he must understand something different by these words from what I do”. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 53)

In TS-213, Wittgenstein makes the same kind of claim in distinguishing visual from Euclidean space. “One can say that [the geometry of visual space] lies before in full view”, he writes, “(as does everything that is logical) – in contrast to the practical geometry of physical space”.70 Accordingly, he adds, “nobody can teach us to get to know our visual space better”, there can be no experiments concerning visual space.71 It is precisely because, for Wittgenstein, the logic of the phenomenon determines the limits of sense, that the exercise of explanation is meaningless. To explain why colour-incompatibility must be the rule, is equivalent to explaining the similarity between red and pink to someone who has never seen. The meaningful language of colour does not precede the nature of colour but insofar as it is understandable, presupposes it. Among the many consequences of this view,

70 (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 323e) Italics mine.
71 Ibid, p. 324e
is the shift most characteristic of his late work: that all logic can deal with is language as it already stands. As he says,

I do not now have phenomenological language, or ‘primary language’ as I used to call it, in mind as my goal […] All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what is inessential in our language. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)

Adding a few remarks later,

How strange if logic were concerned with an ‘ideal’ language and not with ours…Logical analysis is the analysis of something we have, not of something we don’t have. Therefore it is the analysis of propositions as they stand. (It would be odd if the human race had been speaking all this time without ever putting together a genuine proposition.) (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 52)

Despite its cryptic structure, a central motif to this first chapter of the Philosophical Remarks is Wittgenstein’s middle-period concession that any meaningful means of expression essentially comes back to a map of the phenomenon. Or as he puts it, “no matter what idiom it may be written or expressed in”. As he puts it later in TS-213, grammar is arbitrary only in sense that a choice of measuring stick is. Imperial and metric are different means of representation. While they may be at home in different contexts, neither has more of a claim to capture reality, or the phenomena of extension and spatiality, than the other. The surface grammar seems to be distinct, but the logic of the phenomenon it brings to expression remains the same, even if the hypotheses into which it is subsumed can only be understood in light of the cultural practices for which it is brought to language.

(b) Description

In his remarks to Waismann and Schlick, Wittgenstein’s rebuttal turns on the claim that the ‘rules of syntax’ of a phenomenological language cannot be meaningfully determined. It may seem therefore, that he has not even addressed the possibility of description. In the Waismann Nachlass however, Wittgenstein is recorded to have offered an interesting account of what he calls a ‘phenomenal language’, which exclusively aims to describe experience. It attempts, according to the standard paradigm, simply to mirror what it is in front of the speaker. In this way, he argues, we inherit the misleading criteria of exactitude. He writes,

72 (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)
73 (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 186e)
74 For an account of the same outside of the Waismann Nachlass, see (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 97).
If I say to someone: ‘Describe the visual field that you had at that particular moment’ (in this case, from memory), then he will describe it in part, and in part he will see himself as unable to do so. (Such requests are actually made, e.g., in the course of psychological experiments.) Then one at any rate has the conception that the description approaches reality; and in such a way that one says either ‘In an ideal case it would reach reality’ or ‘The description can never reach all the way to reality’. (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2013, p. 313)

The second parentheses strike to the heart of Wittgenstein’s argument. Endemic to philosophical thought is a failure to distinguish criteria that goes by the same name in different ways of life. For Wittgenstein, this criterion is different in kind from that appropriate to the relation between language and experience as such. We believe that incremental refinement of our descriptions takes us ‘closer’ to that which is described, but this paradigm misconceives the nature of language. Having pushed linguistic description as far as it will go, he writes,

Now we could take up a quite different standpoint. We could say: let us leave description in word-language entirely out of account, and let us imagine the description to be given by means of a drawing or a painting. (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2013, p. 315)

Such a view again is conceived on the model of ‘exactitude’. But assuming my eyes had moved through the visual field in a specific way, affording prominence to some of its aspects above others, then replication of the field would amount to no more than a catalogue of what is available to perception. In chapter XX of the Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein accuses Ernst Mach of exactly this error. He writes,

One of the clearest examples of the confusion between physical and phenomenological language is the picture Mach made of his visual field, in which the so-called blurredness of the figures near the edge of the visual field was reproduced by a blurredness (in a quite different sense) in the drawing. No, you can’t make a visual picture of our visual image. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 267)

In the ordinary language of objects, blurredness corresponds as its opposite to clarity. But in visual experience, the periphery is a blurredness to which no clarity could correspond, i.e. it belongs to the essence of visual space. As he puts it in TS-213,

The blurredness, indefiniteness, of our sense impressions is nothing that can be remedied; and it not a blurredness to which absolute sharpness corresponds (or is opposed). Rather this general indefiniteness, intangibility, this swimming of sense impressions is what has been referred to by the expression “everything is in flux”. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 326e)
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Such is the logic of visual space, a logic not shared by the Euclidean.\textsuperscript{75} Our misled temptation here, relies on surreptitious use of the ordinary language of the physical for the phenomenological. Our idioms talk of visual space as a picture, but linguistic similarities here are misleading. For this reason, as he says, “someone who was asked to paint his visual image and seriously tried to do this would soon see that it is impossible.”\textsuperscript{76} Perception would still have its home in the viewer, and the representation, albeit complicated, has moved no closer to experience than a crude declaration. Corresponding to this misleading view of language, we are led to a misconception about experience itself. He writes,

\begin{quote}
Now we are beginning to get a grip on the whole misconception which underlies the search for such an ideal language. Anyone who wants to use signs to capture an experience is misled by the ambiguity of the words ‘roughly’, ‘approximately’, etc. He fails to notice that the word ‘roughly’ plays an entirely different role in the description of an experience than it does (say) in measuring a distance. In the latter case (here again in one definite sense) to every ‘roughly’ there corresponds an ‘exactly’. He seeks also in the former case for an ‘exactly’ – and he pursues a mirage which perpetually eludes him. (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2013, p. 317)
\end{quote}

The ideal language project of phenomenology introduced in \textit{Some Remarks on Logical Form} comes to exhaust itself by the end of 1929. This abandonment, as I have argued, is twofold: firstly, understood as a language whose syntax reflects phenomenological facts, its construction is an unjustifiable project; and secondly, understood merely as an act of description, it presupposes a misleading relation between representation in language and human experience. As he puts it,

\begin{quote}
With our language we find ourselves, so to speak, in the domain of the film, not of the projected picture. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 98)
\end{quote}

In this exhaustion, it coincides with the move to ordinary language. As I will argue in chapter 2, this is only because the latter already responds meaningfully, although partially, to what the phenomenon is like. As he says of hypotheses in the \textit{Philosophical Remarks}, “all that matters is that the signs, in no matter how complicated a way, still in the end refer to immediate experience”.\textsuperscript{77} It is by this criterion alone, to use the terminology of 1929, that we can say our means of representation are not all wheels turning idly. The enigma underpinning this rejection remains, however, the equivalence drawn between phenomenology, understood as this ideal language, and the ordinary language analysis described in its opening paragraphs. Or as he puts it in that opening chapter,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{75} For Wittgenstein’s account of such differences, c.f., §§ 96 – 98 (Wittgenstein, 2013).
\textsuperscript{76} (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 336e)
\textsuperscript{77} (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 282)
\end{flushright}
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That is, if we so to speak describe the class of languages which serve their purpose, then in so doing we have shown what is essential to them and given an immediate representation of immediate experience

[...]

A recognition of what is essential and what inessential in our language if it is to represent, a recognition of which parts of our language are wheels turning idly, *amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language*” (Wittgenstein 1998, p. 51)

II.

The equivalence that the *Philosophical Remarks* draws between the method described in that text and the propositional language it abandons is far from clear. In spite of this, some commentators, with differing accounts of the nature of this rejection, have still claimed that Wittgenstein’s critique of phenomenology proves fatal also for the continental school in general. That a critique fatal to Wittgenstein’s Husserl would be fatal also to figures as disparate as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and Levinas seems unlikely. Not least because the central point of divergence in these figures has often been on the problem of method. To situate his critique, therefore, against the backdrop of continental phenomenology, it is in comparison with cases such as these, and not Husserl, that the case for rapprochement can be better made. Arguably the best candidate for such a project is the early Heidegger. Exactly ten years prior to Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy (and the problem of phenomenology), Heidegger had taken up residence as assistant to Husserl at the university of Freiburg. Almost all of his early lecture content from this period concerns methodological problems. As he puts it,

Again, and again, the object-region of scientific philosophy must be sought anew; the entrances must always be newly opened. That does not lie in an accidental, historical, perhaps incomplete condition of philosophy, *but rather in it itself* – and this for many reasons, which likewise determine the complexity of the philosophical method. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 23)

As the *Urwissenschaft*, or primordial-science, the central problem of the early Freiburg years (1919-1923) is to justify phenomenology, understood as a pre-theoretical science. This Munchhausen trilemma of the spirit [*des Geistes*], as he calls it, of establishing a radically non-scientific science,

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78 As Becker records it in *WS-1919*, “Life as a correlate of origin-like understanding has neither an object-character nor the character of a state-of-affairs. The basic methodological stance of phenomenology is therefore completely different from that of object-science. The difficulty of maintaining the genuine phenomenological method in a pure way is great.” (Heidegger, 2013, p. 179)
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necessitates constant renewal of access to the problem of phenomenology itself.\(^{79}\) Nothing better defines a reading of the early Freiburg lectures than this repetitious leitmotif. As he says in WS-1919,

> But *life* is not an object and it cannot become an object. It is not anything like an object. Recognizing that is our primary goal. – But also reducing life to a *subject* (in the epistemological or psychological sense) is impossible. –

The basic stance of phenomenology is the most extreme radicalism. It must even exercise a radical critique against itself. For genuine philosophical critique is itself creative. The strictness of philosophical critique consists in the rejection of everything that is disingenuous in a genuine motive. (It requires more diligence than tidily applying a method in the individual sciences). (Heidegger, 2013, p. 178)

Many of the key concepts (or their progenitors) familiar from *Being and Time* are developed in these years. Of these, few have garnered less critical consensus than formal indication \[formale Anzeige\]. This is due in no small part to Heidegger’s relatively few references to the term after 1923, the period in which he turns more explicitly towards an ontological project.\(^{80}\) Renewed interest in the term in the literature, particularly in its relation to his early work, was spurred by the publication of Theodore Kisiel’s *Genesis of Being and Time*, a now canonical source on the early Freiburg years. With its connection to what Kisiel termed “the breakthrough semester” (the *Kriegsnotsemester*, 1919), this question naturally coincides with that of the relation between the early Heidegger and the work of Husserl. Much of this commentary has been divided on the extent to which formal indication defines the *hermeneutics of facticity*, understood as the distinctive feature of the former’s phenomenology.

Leslie MacAvoy, for example, has identified two strands in the literature: a weak thesis, according to which formal indication is an extension to the Husserlian project; and a strong thesis, according to which it is anti-Husserlian.\(^{81}\) In this section, I argue that Heidegger is best seen neither as continuous with nor polemical against Husserl. As a response to the problem of phenomenological language posed by the neo-Kantian Paul Natorp, formal indication enters Heidegger’s work precisely as a *defence* of the Husserlian project. Whether the latter would see it as reconcilable with his work is a separate question.

As a fundamental part of legitimizing phenomenology, formal indication lies at the heart of Heidegger’s claim to subscribe to that school. As with Wittgenstein, despite the face value differences in his mature approach, this claim of equivalence is obviously maintained. Its success depends, I will argue, not on justifying language as it stands, but on redefining the relationship between language and

\(^{79}\) (Heidegger, 2008, p. 15)

\(^{80}\) A short summary of these works includes, (Burch, 2011; Crowell, 2001; Dahlstrom, 1994; Kisiel, 1995; MacAvoy, 2010; Shockey, 2010; Streeter, 1997)

\(^{81}\) (MacAvoy, 2010)
phenomenology. There is, in this sense, no claim of an ideal nor pre-theoretical language, but an alteration to the *use* of language that sidesteps this constraint. To see how such a defence can be made, however, and its relation to the key problematic of his early work, requires first retracing the earliest movements of Heidegger’s mature research, the *Kriegsnotsemester* of 1919.

(i) Formal Indication

Between the KNS-1919 and his move to Marburg in 1923, there is no more formative problem-set for Heidegger than a justification of phenomenology itself.\(^82\) Throughout this period, the pervasiveness of the problem of method overruns almost all the declared subject matter of those lectures. This fact is partially unfortunate, as it was formal complaints to that effect which cuts short Heidegger on his most sustained treatment of formal indication in WS-1920, a term Kisiel refers to as the *cursus interruptus*.\(^83\) While his engagement is varied, the recurring theme of this period is a critique owing to Paul Natorp that he first deals with in the *Kriegsnotsemester*, namely, that of intuition and expression. Natorp’s critique had first appeared in the *Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode* in 1912. How was it, he asked, that phenomenology could immanently grasp the subjective, when reflective intentionality would always objectify it? As he writes,

> In order to grasp it [subjectivity] scientifically, one is forced to strip it of its subjective character. One kills subjectivity in order to dissect it, and believes that the life of the soul is on display in the result of the dissection! (Natorp, 1912, p. 103)\(^84\)

For Natorp, even if reflective analysis was not objectifying, the problematic aspect of expression certainly was. Putting the results of phenomenology into language, necessarily limits its scope outside of the subjective, and this includes above all, the life-stream. In the KNS-1919, Heidegger describes this double problem of intuition and expression, as the “only scientifically noteworthy objections against phenomenology”\(^85\), and as Zahavi notes, his response for the most part, is one of acceptance.\(^86\)

(a) Intuition

With respect to intuition, Heidegger’s counter-argument occurs in the latter half of the *Kriegsnotsemester*. Having characterised and rejected alternative candidates for primordial science

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82 This section, as with section II of chapter 2, was previously published in (O’Rourke, 2018)
83 (Kisiel, 1995, p. 170)
84 This translation is taken from (Zahavi, 2005, p. 75)
85 (Heidegger, 2008, p. 78)
86 (Zahavi, 2005, p. 76)
[Urwissenschaft], the lecture series abruptly shifts towards what, for Heidegger, is the problematic assumption at the heart of such approaches: the *primacy of the theoretical*. He writes,

> Our entire problematic has arrived at a crucial point, which, however appears insignificant and even miserly…We stand at an abyss: either into nothingness, that is, absolute reification, pure thingness, or we somehow leap into *another world*, more precisely, we manage for the first time to make the leap into the world as such. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 51)

The insignificance here concerns the abstract question “is there something?” Specifically, the interrogative comportment involved in such questioning. Such comportment, he argues, is characterised by offering a *minimal form* of self-apprehension. In asking the question “is there something?”, the intended sense is not “is there something for *me*?” but rather “is there something for anyone?”. He writes,

> [The experience] has a *now*, it is there – and is even somehow *my* experience. I am there with it, I experience it vitally, it belongs to *my* life, but it is still so detached from me in its sense, so absolutely far from the ‘I’, so absolutely ‘I-remote’,

> I ask: ‘Is there something?’ The ‘is there’ is a ‘there is’ for an ‘I’, and yet it is not *I* to and for whom the question relates. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 55)

Through depersonalizing the object of my intention, central to all theoretical positing, the interrogative comportment in such cases is, as he says, I-remote or “Ich-fern”. This is in stark contrast, however, with the environmental experience. In the example of that text, to approach the lectern as a speaker, is to encounter it in the light of one’s historical self. The objects of my environment are disclosed according to the sorts of normative roles I take part in, as student, as brother, as friend etc. And even those objects of which I am unfamiliar, precisely through their instrumental strangeness, are given to me in the relief of this same meaning context. In contrast to theoretical comportment, the environing experience offers a *maximal form* of self-apprehension. He writes,

> In seeing the lectern I am fully present in my ‘I’; it resonates with the experience, as we said. It is an experience proper to me and so do I see it. However, it is not a process but rather an event of appropriation [Ereignis]. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 60)

Through qualifying these accounts in their relation to self-apprehension, Heidegger descriptively grounds the division between what he calls theoretical and pre-theoretical comportment. As he points out moreover, this account of how the self is given seems to imply a genealogical relation. The I-Remote of theory, occurs only through de-contextualising the I-Historical of the environing

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87 (Heidegger, 2008, p. 58)
experience, a process he calls de-vivification [Ent-leben]. In such cases, the experience is reduced from an appropriating event to a mere process which “passes before my knowing ‘I’, to which it is related only by being-known, i.e. in a flaccid I-relatedness reduced to the minimum of life-experience”. Even in the KNS-1919, Heidegger is clear that the centrality afforded to the knowing subject in the history of philosophy has an existential basis: It arises as a correlate of the interrogative comportment implicit in that same tradition. As he says,

The historical ‘I’ is de-historicized into the residue of a specific ‘I-ness’ as the correlate of thingliness; and only in following through the theoretical does it have its ‘who’. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 70)

Returning to the circularity of primordial science, Heidegger follows Natorp in arguing that theoretical work necessarily distorts the subjective qualities of the life-world. Fundamental however to that critique, is the assumption that pre-theoretical life has no intelligible structure and as the above shows, this is manifestly not the case. The relationship between these comportments is genealogical. To de-vivify is, in Heidegger’s terms, to strip experience of its world-laden quality, but it is not to first attain intelligibility. Our inclination to think otherwise, is grounded in the myopia of precisely that theoretical vantage point. As he says,

At this point the puzzling presence of determination prior to all theoretical description is clarified. Theoretically I come out of experiencing as from a provenance; something experienceable is still brought along with this experiencing, with which one does not know what to do, and for which the convenient title of the irrational has been invented. (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 89-90)

The question of Heidegger’s relation to Husserl at this juncture has been a contentious one in the literature. But as Crowell I think has correctly shown, the defining feature of Heidegger’s argument here is in clarifying the existential sources of reflection, not in abandoning it. On this reading, phenomenology must, as he says, be “a specific kind of repetition of that movement of understanding locatable in life itself”. Against Natorp, this does not constitute an intrusion from a distorting, objectifying gaze. Rather, it is a radicalisation of Dasein’s historical way of being.

88 “Thing-experience is certainly a lived experience, but understood vis-à-vis its origin from the environmental experience it is already de-vivification.” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 70)
89 (Heidegger, 2008, p. 59) In a poetic example, he contrasts the processional comportment of the astronomer toward the sunrise (qua natural process) versus the Theban elders in Sophocles’ Antigone.
90 For an interesting perspective on the debate, c.f. (Burch, 2011).
91 (Crowell, 2001, p. 146)
Chapter One

(b) Expression

Matthew Burch has taken a similar vein to Crowell on the expression debate by arguing that Heidegger’s response to the language question is likewise to clarify its applicability to the pre-theoretical. As Burch puts it, “Pre-theoretical life has its own inner differentiation…and so it is far from artificial to suggest that this structure might be grasped in language. Since experience is articulated - or has structure - we can articulate it - or put that structure into language”.\(^{92}\) Lecture notes by Franz Josef Brecht from the KNS-1919 seem to confirm that Heidegger suggests this, but there’s little evidence in those lectures that he had worked out how it should be done.\(^{93}\) When the problem first appears in that text, it certainly seems that he dismisses the claim as founded on a naïve conception of language. He writes,

The crudest, but already sufficiently threatening objection, pertained to language. All description is a ‘grasping-in-words’ – ‘verbal expression’ is generalising. This objection rests on the opinion that all language is itself already objectifying, i.e. that living in meaning implies a theoretical grasping of what is meant, that the fulfilment of meaning is without further ado only object-giving. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 85)

However, rather than following on with this reductio, Heidegger immediately sidesteps the expression issue toward that of intuition. He writes,

*But* the theoretical prejudices go still deeper: phenomenological seeing (whose essence we have not exposed with greater precision) is simply identified with description. It is not yet settled that seeing, the intuition out of which a description first arises, has a totally different character. If description itself is always necessarily theoretization, that does not exclude the possibility that the founding intuition…would not be of a theoretical nature. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 85)

This final conditional I believe is key. In the following pages, he closes by justifying such hermeneutical intuition, and its claim to pre-theoretical intelligibility. Nowhere, prior to formal indication, does Heidegger show that description can have a non-objectifying quality. In fact, as he puts it earlier in the *Kriegsnotsemester*,

Already when I speak of *two* of my experiences I have objectified them: the one and the other, both are a something. For every experience that I want to consider I must isolate and

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\(^{92}\) (Burch, 2011, p. 264)

\(^{93}\) (Heidegger, 2008, p. 165) “If one grasps the un-theoretical character of the meaningful, what follows is the possibility of a communicative science of phenomenology.”
lift out, break up and destroy the contexture of the experience so that in the end and despite all efforts to the contrary, I have only a heap of things. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 60)

The first time a tenable solution appears in Heidegger’s work is in the winter semester of 1920, the *Phenomenology of Religious Life*. In the context of a definition of phenomenological research, he readdresses the problem of expression, understood now in terms of the formal ontological. The latter captures the problematic essence of expression for Heidegger, insofar as it claims to designate its object without presupposition. It is this intent, however, that prejudices philosophy toward its problematic “primacy of the theoretical.” To make this case, he employs a schema which recasts the hermeneutic outline of the KNS-1919. Parsing out the concept of the phenomenon, he writes,

“Each experience – as experiencing, and what is experienced – can “be taken in the phenomenon”, that is to say, one can ask:

1. After the original “what”, that is experienced therein (content).
2. After the original “how”, in which it is experienced (relation).
3. After the original “how”, in which the relational meaning is enacted (enactment).

But these three directions of sense (content-, relational-, enactment-sense) do not simply coexist. “Phenomenon” is the totality of sense in these three directions.” (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 43)

On these criteria, the failure of the formal ontological lies precisely in its indifference as to the content of the phenomenon it picks out. It prejudices philosophy not because it is erroneously determinate of its content, but because its indeterminacy of content prejudices the sort of relation we can take to it. Because it generalises the referent beyond all contexts, Heidegger writes, “it prescribes, or at least contributes to prescribing, a theoretical relational meaning. It hides the enactment-character [das Vollzugsmaßige] – which is possibly still more fatal – and turns one-sidedly to the content”.94

Framed in this way, the language of phenomenology must be one which does not necessitate theoretical comportment toward the phenomena it purports to pick out.

This is just what the *formal indication* achieves. It belongs to the phenomenological explication itself as a methodical moment. Why is it called “formal”? The formal is something relational. The indication should indicate beforehand the relation of the phenomenon – in the negative sense, however, the same as if to warn! A phenomenon must be so stipulated, such that its relational meaning is held in abeyance. One must prevent

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94 (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 43)
oneself from taking it for granted that its relational meaning is originally theoretical. (Heidegger, 2010d, pp. 43-44)

In the formal-ontological, the formality of the content is fatal, because it determines the enactment character of our relation. In formal indication, on the contrary, it is not the content but the relation that is formal. As he puts it in WS-1921,

The philosophical definition occasions a pre-“turning” to the object, such that I do indeed not “turn” to the content. The definition is “formally” indicative – the “the way”, the “approach”. What is pre-given is a bond that is indeterminate as to content but determinate as to the way of actualisation. (Heidegger, 2001, p. 17)

And again in the same text,

The definitory content is such that it refers to the “how” of a genuine encounter, determination, constitution, formation…The understanding that follows the genuine way of approach is not in the full sense a grasp of the ontological meaning but is precisely determined by the approach. (Heidegger, 2001, p. 27)

The relation of this account to the theoretical is made further explicit in §11 of the Religion lectures. There Heidegger writes,

We will name the methodical use of a sense that becomes a guiding one in phenomenological explication, a “formal indication” … One must become clear about the meaning of the formal indication, or else one falls either into an attitudinal consideration or into regional demarcations which one views as absolute. The problem of the “formal indication” belongs to the “theory” of the phenomenological method itself, in the broad sense, to the problem of the theoretical, of the theoretical act, the phenomenon of differentiating. Later the entire problem will occupy us. Preliminarily, we are seeking the difficulty only in the concrete case. (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 38)

Heidegger’s use of Husserlian language here is useful. In the first Logical Investigation, Husserl distinguishes indication [Anzeichen] from expression [Ausdruck] as functions of language. While expression may presuppose an indicative function, the latter, like a branding mark on an animal, is distinguished by simply marking, or pointing toward its object.95 Almost all of Heidegger’s treatment of Natorp is couched in these terms. In formal indication, as with Husserl, the indicational function simply points toward its phenomenon. What is formal, as we have seen, is the enactment sense of relation we are to take to it. In this way, it is a performative concept. It amounts to an injunction to the

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95 Husserl adopts the Humean language of association in this respect.
reader to comport themselves toward the phenomenon, a task the language of philosophy cannot spare them from. As late as *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, (1929/30), Heidegger writes,

> [philosophical concepts] do not directly intend what they mean as something present at hand, but that their meaning-function has the character of formal indication. The *one who attempts to understand is thereby already challenged to comprehend* that which is to be understood in their Dasein, which does not imply that every philosophical concept is one that can be related to Dasein. (Heidegger, 1995, p. 300 italics mine)

This account puts obvious limits on the logic of phenomenological language. Above all, it prohibits its sublimation into a deductive system. In *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, he writes

> A formal indication is always misunderstood when it is treated as a fixed universal proposition and used to make deductions from and fantasized with in a constructivistic dialectical fashion. (Heidegger, 1999, p. 62)

In lieu of such use, the task of phenomenology is to sustain what Heidegger calls “the revitalization of seeing”. As he says in WS-1919,

> A continual renewal and revitalization [Verlebendigung] of seeing is necessary. In the progress of the consideration, the phenomenon must always be kept vital. – This demand seems trivial, but it is often violated by philosophy today. One cannot create “fundamental principles” with “devised thoughts.” The objects of philosophy must be seen in their self-givenness. There are no proofs in phenomenology, since it is indeed constantly describing. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 165)

Daniel Dahlstrom has characterised formal indication as having what he terms a ‘referring-prohibitive function’. That is, a non-committal reference in respect of content. As we have seen however, formality in respect of content is what he attributes to the formal ontological. The function of formal indication, I argue, is best described as relating-prohibitive, as it is the relational meaning

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96 In *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, he writes, “On the contrary, [formal indication] merely indicates precisely the decisive task of grasping the relation in terms of its proper dimension, instead of levelling down this dimension through such formal characterisation.” (Heidegger, 1995, p. 293)

97 Taken from Becker’s record of the lecture series, Appendix B. c.f., Heidegger’s remark in *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, “This interconnection [between formal indications] does not consist in the relations that can be obtained by dialectically playing off such concepts against one another…or by thinking up something like a system of Dasein, for example.” (Heidegger, 1995, p. 298)

98 (Dahlstrom, 1994). Dahlstrom has also argued that formal indication is defined by a second function, the reversing-transforming function. While I agree that by the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* in 1929 this is a key part of Heidegger’s account, there is less evidence to suggest that prior to his explicit turn to the analytic of Dasein this is a key feature. Against the backdrop of 1919, formal indication is introduced as a means to solve the problem of expression. It is only after the move to Marburg, it seems to me, that this second function becomes essential.

99 In a similar vein, MacAvoy argues that formal indication inherits the Husserlian concept of empty intentionality.
that is “held in abeyance”.\footnote{Heidegger, 2010b, p. 44} It is true that content is not given, but only on the basis that the content is determined by what Heidegger has prohibited, the sense of enactment. As he puts it in WS-1921, the content is “determined by the approach – only by that but precisely by that”.\footnote{Heidegger, 2001, p. 27} This distinction is crucial, because it situates his account of language in this period within that of comportment. In the framework of the KNS-1919, the theoretical, objectifying quality of language is a problem of comportment.

Through reframing Natorp’s critique in terms of the schema in the Religion lectures, (content, relation, sense of enactment) Heidegger identifies formal indication as his solution to the problem of expression. In so doing however, it is certainly concessionary to the weight of Natorp’s critique. It succeeds only insofar as the reader is attentive to its prohibitive demand. A good indication that the outline of formal indication survives Heidegger’s change of terminology in the 1920s, lies in its discussion in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. In a reflection on method, he writes,

> Yet once philosophizing is expressed, then it is exposed to misinterpretation, and not merely that misinterpretation which lies in the relative ambiguity and unreliability of all terminology; rather it is exposed to that essential *substantive misinterpretation* for which *ordinary understanding* inevitably falls. (Heidegger, 1995, pp. 291-292)

This misinterpretation is twofold: firstly, it interprets what is indicated as present-at-hand; and secondly, it interprets the connection between concepts to lie in the proposition itself, a movement toward *system-building* exemplified in Kant.\footnote{Heidegger, 1995, p. 298} Formal indication, he argues, stands against both of these movements, but relies in so doing on the attentiveness of the reader. He writes,

> The meaning-content of these concepts does not directly intend or express what they refer to, but only gives an indication, a pointer to the fact that anyone who seeks to understand is called upon by this conceptual context to undertake a transformation of themselves into their Dasein. But as soon as one takes these concepts without reference to their indicative character, like a scientific concept…then philosophical questioning gets led astray with respect to every single problem. (Heidegger, 1995, p. 297)

Heidegger’s solution does not proceed by justifying the applicability of language directly to the pre-theoretical. Insofar as it answers Natorp, what it calls for is a change in the relation between language and the project of phenomenology in general. On this view, language cannot be marshalled to the task of description directly, except insofar as the reader leaves behind its conceptuality in the

\footnotetext{100}{Heidegger, 2010b, p. 44}\footnotetext{101}{Heidegger, 2001, p. 27} c.f., (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 9). He writes “Nothing is said here about the relation of the life-worlds; the primary point is that they become accessible to factical life experience. One can only characterise the manner, the how, of the experiencing of those worlds; that is, one can ask about the relational sense of factical life experience.”\footnotetext{102}{Heidegger, 1995, p. 298}
process. The distinction between Heidegger and Ryle’s polemical picture of phenomenology as first science comes to the fore here. There can be no repository of first principles upon which the Urwissenschaft can be built, precisely because language can only direct us to the task of primary intuition, a fact in need of constant renewal. Whether this is true or not in the case of Husserl, what is distinctly Heideggerian is twofold: firstly, in the resulting limits placed on the applicability of linguistic reasoning for phenomenology; and secondly in the centrality of the problem of the theoretical to that problem-set. As he says,

The “origin” is not an ultimate simple sentence, an axiom out of which everything would be derived, but rather something entirely different; nothing mystical or mythical, but rather something that we are trying to approach in a consideration that is becoming more and more strict and which, at the same time, always preserves itself in these ways, and this happens along various entrances – and, indeed, we approach it with a scientific, primal scientific method and only with it. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 22)

This “scientific, primal scientific method” is pre-theoretically scientific. In this sense, it shares in none of the theoretical preoccupations with concepts such as ‘thingliness’ and objectivity.

Heidegger’s relation to the word “science” changes significantly after the 1920s. Understood in the sense of the Basic Problems of 1919, however, his earliest use of the term is so heavily qualified as to revoke any claim of real discontinuity. It makes sense to speak of the pre-theoretical science, only because we have pre-theoretical access to the phenomenon (intuition), and a language (expression) whose limits are so circumscribed as to forbid our collapse into empty, deductive reasoning. It carries out what a science would wish to, but only by transcending the qualitative limitations associated with what it can do.

III.

What Heidegger’s work in the early Freiburg lectures show above all, is the centrality of language in his earliest justification of phenomenology. The possibility of expression for that school demands that we answer to the most fundamental constraints of language. Formal indication achieves this through altering the intention of such language. That is, phenomenological ‘propositions’ aim only to elicit primary intuition in the reader, after which they are to be discarded. Against the tendency to read Wittgenstein in the light of Husserl, my argument in this section is that the contours of Heidegger’s response to this problem, coalesce with Wittgenstein’s critique of phenomenology in two basic ways: (i) firstly, in its disavowing ordinary language as a means to describe the phenomenon; and (ii) secondly, in the impossibility of an ideal language, understood as transcending the limitations of the
former. It is these linguistic criteria that offer us the best framework, it seems to me, to understand Wittgenstein’s claim that his work after 1930, nonetheless “amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language”.

(i) Against Ordinary Language

At the same time as his distinction between hypothesis and proposition, Wittgenstein identifies ordinary language as being the language of physics. It is largely in these terms that he addresses the issue in conversation with Waismann. Such terminology (of physics vs. phenomenology), is grounded in his distinction between explanation and description. In the first chapter of the *Philosophical Remarks*, he writes,

> Physics differs from phenomenology in that it is concerned to establish laws.
> Phenomenology only establishes the possibilities. Thus, phenomenology would be the grammar of the description of those facts on which physics builds its theories.
> To explain is more than to describe; but every explanation contains a description.

(Wittgenstein 1998, p. 51)

Debating whether subjectivity, for example, consists in the mind or the soul is an argument over two explanatory (and therefore physical/hypothetical) accounts. Their relative success would depend on such criteria as economy, consistency, and scope etc. But insofar as they can be judged, it is because they both presuppose a certain description of the phenomenon in question, and this is the realm of the phenomenological. “Every explanation”, as he says, “contains a description”. But this is a realm to which the ordinary language of physics definitionally has no access. The criteria appropriate to ordinary language, therefore, cannot be phenomenological. As in the earlier quoted remark on hypotheses, he writes,

> No, a hypothesis simply has a different formal relation to reality from that of verification. (Hence, of course, the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ are also inapplicable here, or else have a different meaning.) (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 285)

It is in this way that Wittgenstein can connect hypotheses with the concept of predictability. In the last chapter of the *Philosophical Remarks*, he writes,

> If our experiences yield points lying on a straight line, the proposition that these experiences are various views of a straight line is a hypothesis.

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103 (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)
The hypothesis is a way of representing this reality, for a new experience may tally with it or not, or possibly make it necessary to modify the hypothesis. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 285)

In the case of the soul, the hypothesis of the ‘inner’ works precisely because it tallies with the human experiences for which it is marshalled into language. But it would be an error to reduce this criterion to a truth functional view. For Wittgenstein, it’s a sufficient explanatory model for what we use it for. As he puts it,

As long as someone imagines the soul as a thing, a body in our heads, there’s no harm in the hypothesis. The harm doesn’t lie in the imperfection and crudity of our models, but in their lack of clarity (vagueness). (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 287)

Philosophical confusion, on this view, only arises in conflating the criteria of the physical and the phenomenological, that is, “when we say thoughts aren’t in my head, they’re in my mind”. In such a case, we have confused the legitimate criteria of ordinary hypotheses for those of propositions. If we want to interrogate our means of expression, on Wittgenstein’s view, we may certainly do so, but it cannot be in terms of the icons of truth and falsity. What the terminology of 1929 shows is that for Wittgenstein, the natural languages, however refined, are qualitatively distinct from the phenomenological. The latter gives possible limits within which they would be answerable to what experience is like. But their answerability to experience is only defined within the context of what such means of expression are used for. Talk of the soul is answerable enough to what experience is like to act descriptively in the game of pain-reporting, but not in the language of medicine. The same phenomenon comes to expression in a different way, because the criteria of its purpose has changed. What experience is like, arguably the central question of phenomenology, is only one element of linguistic meaning. As he says in the Philosophical Remarks,

All our forms of speech are taken from ordinary, physical language and cannot be used in epistemology or phenomenology without casting a distorting light on their objects. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 88)

For Heidegger, the problem of ordinary language in 1919 stems from Natorp’s critical reading of Husserl. Specifically, the latter’s problematic claim that we can neutrally capture the subjective sphere, mediated though it must be in the objectifying activity of language. Language, on Natorp’s view, makes objects out of everything. In so doing, it closes the door that Husserl’s project depends upon. His own solution consisted in the iterative reconstruction of the subjective, as a means to allay the distortional effect of objectification. He erred above all, according to Heidegger, in failing to see the extent of his own problem. Lived experience in its most original and fullest sense is disturbed by mediation through language, and “in the end, despite all effort to the contrary, I have only a heap of

104 (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 287)
things”.

The quantitative steps along Natorp’s path of reconstruction never makes the qualitative leap into the subjective. Until this comportment is sidestepped, any attempt at the subjective, to borrow a phrase from William James, amounts to “seizing a spinning top to catch its motion”.

Formal indication succeeds in this not by reconstruction through language, but by limiting the scope of language as such. Its central claim is that he is precisely not capturing the phenomenon in language. Rather, he is directing the reader toward primary intuition, through putting aside the centrality of language as the location of truth. As he puts it SS-1923,

> The forehaving needs to be more closely examined and appropriated so that the empty intelligibility of the above formal indication can be filled out by looking in the direction of its concrete source in intuition. (Heidegger, 1999, p. 62)

> The voice of formal indication is inherently imperative, as it succeeds only if a reader observes its prohibitive demand. Heidegger is clearly aware that his use of traditional vocabulary leads the reader astray in this regard. As he adds in the same passage,

> Everything depends upon our understanding being guided from out of the indefinite and vague but still intelligible content of the indication onto the right path of looking. Successfully getting onto this path can and must be aided by a precautionary measure which takes the form of rejecting certain positions of looking which are dominant in the situation of research at the particular time, which seem relevant, and which thus of themselves crowd in upon us.

(Heidegger, 1999, p. 62)

The key point to note here, and the injunction implied above, is that ordinary language is the departure point, and not the final-destination for phenomenology. For this reason, his separation of phenomenology and linguistic reasoning is paramount. The only way to allay the tendency to believe that the proposition carries with it the form of the phenomenon, is to forbid its use qua proposition. It carries no truth through deduction when applied to the lived-sphere from which the possibility of the theoretical is first guaranteed. Far from a concession to the applicability of ordinary language, what Heidegger calls for, just as with Wittgenstein, is a reorientation of phenomenology’s relationship to language in general.

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105 (Heidegger, 2008, p. 60)
106 As he adds, “The insight into the non-primordiality of the theoretical comportment shows that Natorp, for all his acumen, has not exhausted all possibilities. His exclusively theoretical attitude, i.e., his absolutization of logic, also cannot exhaust them. His dispute with phenomenology does not get at its authentic sphere of problems at all.” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 83)
107 (James, 1891, p. 244)
If ordinary language cannot be used to describe immediate experience, then is there a possibility of building an ideal language to do so, e.g., can a language be built which has nothing but the grammar of the phenomenon as its basis or syntax? In the case of Wittgenstein, it is precisely the act of building such a language which is problematic. Justification of one rule of grammar over alternatives would imply its contingency as a possible limit of experience. This is exactly the paradox he ascribes to Husserl in conversations with Waismann and Schlick. As a language whose grammar has been reduced to the limits of experiential sense, it is here that justification breaks down. As he says,

If anything is to count as nonsense in the grammar which is to be justified, then it cannot at the same time pass for sense in the grammar of the propositions that justify it (etc.)

Consequently, the activity of distilling a pure phenomenology has no meaning. This passage already indicates why the coincidental transition to ordinary language occurs. If the latter is descriptively meaningful at all, if it “in the end speaks of the thing and not an intermediary”, then it is because on some level it sufficiently satisfies the logic of an ideal language, in however complicated and partial a way. Such “propositional” statements are subsumed naturally into hypotheses, as sections through them, to use Rush Rhees’ phrasing. But however partial and complex this relation might be, insofar as our language squares with the structures of experience, it does so phenomenologically.

The failure of building an ideal language occurs because of the inevitable dependence of this activity on language as it already stands. Husserl must make use of a meaningful language to express phenomenological limits. But for the listener who understands him, it is because they navigate already within such limits. It cannot be, as in the Munchausen trilemma, that language bootstraps itself to conceptualise its own possibility. “The possibility of explaining these things” as he says, “always depends on someone else using language in the same way as I do”. As he puts it,

But this means that any kind of explanation of a language presupposes a language already. And in a certain sense, the use of language is something that cannot be taught, i.e. I cannot use language to teach it in the way in which language could be used to teach someone to play the piano. – and that of course is just another way of saying: I cannot use language to get outside language. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 54)

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108 (Rhees, 1963, p. 218)
Chapter One

Returning to the distinction between physics and phenomenology, it is equally clear that a purely descriptive exercise would not do. The forms of the natural languages do speak in part of what experience is like, but only through a kaleidoscope of intention, function and culture, etc. This optical transformation cannot be reversed, leaving “representation” without remainder, so to speak, because representation is inseparable from the kaleidoscope. Conceptual problems, on Wittgenstein’s view, often turn on sustaining such a search for a representational language. On any such view, the misleading linguistic analogies drawn between domains of human experience can only be taken to reflect the logic of reality, and not, to use his later term, as grammatical fictions. As he says,

One keeps hearing the remark that philosophy really doesn’t make any progress, that the same philosophical problems that occupied the Greeks keep occupying us. But those who say that don’t understand the reason it must be so. That reason is that our language has remained constant and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. So long as there is a verb “be” that seems to function like “eat” and “drink”, so long as there are the adjectives “identical”, “true”, “false”, “possible”, so long as there is talk about a flow of time and an expanse of space, etc., etc., humans will continue to bump up against the same mysterious difficulties, and stare at something that no explanation seems able to remove. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 312e)

The complexity of philosophy is not in its matter, but in our tangled understanding. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 52)

Applying the forms of such language back to description, confines us as he says, “in the domain of the film, not of the projected picture”. And “if I want to make music to accompany” this, he adds, “whatever produces the music must again happen in the sphere of the film”. The language of subjectivity, with its commitments to the inner and outer, obfuscates the phenomenon by describing it with a grammar whose purpose is only partially descriptive, viz. human pain-reporting. To dispel such cultural facts moreover would not leave us any closer, for as long as we are misled about the ordinary, physical criteria of ‘closeness’ and ‘exactitude’.

In a late essay from 1964 on theology and language, Heidegger makes almost identical remarks on the project of constructing an ideal language. Comparing his own perspective with that of Carnap, who he mentions by name, he writes,

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110 (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 98)
111 Ibid.
112 (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 54) This paper was published as an appendix to his 1927 lecture, *Phenomenology and Theology*. 
The first position [Carnap’s] desires to subjugate all thinking and speaking, including that of philosophy, to a sign-system that can be constructed logically or technically, that is, to secure them as an instrument of science. The other position has arisen from the question: what is it that is to be experienced as the proper matter of philosophical thinking, and how is this matter (being as being) to be said? (Heidegger, 2009, p. 56)

A few remarks later, he adds,

Humans may be able to invent artificial speech constructions and signs, but they are able to do so only in reference to and from out of an already spoken language. (Heidegger, 2009, p. 57)

In his answer to Natorp between the KNS-1919 and WS-1920, Heidegger offers no justification of ordinary language. It is arguably true that unlike Wittgenstein, he wants to continue to do verbalized phenomenology. The limited sense, however, in which his project is verbalised makes no claim to transgress beyond what Natorp critiques in Husserl’s language. Formal indication is a concession to the limitations of ordinary language for phenomenology. Why, then, could it not plausibly be said to be an ideal language? One answer to this question lies in the association Heidegger makes with the technical and scientific. By claiming Carnap subjugates all language to the service of science, he situates his critique within the problem of the theoretical. In 1920, it was in its failure to answer this demand that Heidegger critiques the formal ontological. The indeterminacy of content in the latter, prejudices philosophy as a science, precisely because it necessitates a theoretical comportment toward its object. With its movement toward reducing experience to generalized variables, the formal ontological in this respect coalesces exactly with the assumptions of a project such as the Tractatus. It is against precisely such assumptions that Heidegger most distinguishes his approach to language. As he says in the Phenomenology of Religious life in 1920,

This is a stance which is opposed to science in the highest degree. There is no insertion into a material-domain, but rather the opposite: the formal indication is a defence, a preliminary securing, so that the enactment-character still remains free. The necessity of this precautionary measure arises from the falling tendency of factual life experience, which constantly threatens to slip into the objective, and out of which we must still retrieve the phenomena. (Heidegger, 2010, p. 44)

In the same Theology essay of 1964, having repeated the problem-set of the KNS-1919, Heidegger lists poetry as one kind of non-objectifying language. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that he regards it much as he regarded formal indication in 1920: distinct from the ideal language proponents, insofar as his project makes use of the communicative and gestural, rather than the representational in technical language. Formal indication does not capture the essence or logic of the phenomenon, less still in a way that claims to be independent from human experience: in complete distinction from this,
it merely says that something is to be seen. And once we have done so, we are told to abandon the same language. Nothing in this way could be further from the claim of a “‘logically purified’ mode of expression”.\textsuperscript{113}

IV. Concluding Remarks

Although their conception of what phenomenology amounts to is clearly distinct, for both Heidegger and Wittgenstein, the relation between language and the phenomenon requires a reorientation on the part of philosophy. This relation is more complex, moreover, than either read Husserl to have acknowledged. How faithful a reading this was, is beyond the scope of this chapter. The “Husserlian”, in both accounts, is the neutral view of the relation between the project of phenomenology and the service given to it by scientific language. Insofar as the latter fails, it would be due only to the “relative ambiguity and unreliability of all terminology”, a problem whose solution is incrementally available to us.\textsuperscript{114} For Wittgenstein and Heidegger, however, this problem is not incidental, and thereby fixable in refinement, but qualitative. And as with Natorp, nowhere along the quantitative steps to improvement is the qualitative leap to the solution found. Ordinary language is definitionally disavowed from phenomenology. And insofar as an ideal language could only be developed in the shadow of its meaning, it too is impossible.

Whatever a solution to this problem might consist in, for both Wittgenstein and Heidegger, the possibility of phenomenology is maintained. Both claim that their resultant work either amounts to or constitutes phenomenology. Nicholas Gier, therefore, is certainly correct when he asserts that although “Wittgenstein does give up a separate phenomenological language, [he] definitely does not give up the basic project of phenomenology itself, viz. his own eidetic science of grammar”.\textsuperscript{115} This statement of equivalence appears in the first pages of the \textit{Philosophical Remarks}.

A recognition of what is essential and what inessential in our language if it is to represent, a recognition of which parts of our language are wheels turning idly, amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)

How this ‘recognition’ is meant to be ascertained remains to be seen. In what way moreover does Wittgenstein’s mature method, such as in the \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, relate back to the problem-set of 1929? In the case of Heidegger, the natural question to arise regards the feasibility of reading philosophical problems. If phenomenology succeeds only by disavowing the search for a presuppositionless language, how can it engage with the history of thought, or any philosophical

\textsuperscript{113} (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 277)
\textsuperscript{114} (Heidegger, 1995, p. 291)
\textsuperscript{115} (Gier, 1990, p. 277)
problem, in a meaningful sense, written as it must be in the non-formally indicative? Given their respective view on language, in short, the crucial question is how phenomenology can be done. The central aim of the following chapters is to answer these questions. It is through their mutual convergence on this problem of expression, I will argue, that the case for rapprochement between their positions can be best understood.
Destroying the Idols of Language

“All that philosophy can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new one – say in the “absence of an idol”. ” (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 305e)

The relationship between language and phenomenology has been central to its history since Husserl. It is all the more unusual, therefore, that post-Husserlian conceptions of language have been practically absent from the discussion of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology.\textsuperscript{116} For the Hintikkas, his rejection of phenomenological language, insofar as it might be fatal to Husserl, is equally fatal to the school as a whole. This wholesale conflation between phenomenology and the work of Husserl has failed to centralise the dialogue on language found as early as Heidegger. Following from the \textit{KNS-1919}, the problem of expression, along with that of intuition, plays a crucial role in the establishment of his methodological outlook. Formal indication, as the language in which phenomenology must speak, sketches in its response to it, the outlines of that problem. That his work remains a project in phenomenology, is a position Heidegger clearly maintains. In chapter one, I argued that for both figures, the central challenge is to do phenomenology given two fundamental restraints: (i) language cannot be used directly in the sense they believe Husserl to be using it, i.e., as a means to pure description; and (ii) the construction of an ideal language, apart from the natural languages, cannot assuage this problem. The central question of this chapter, is how these challenges can be answered.

In section I, I argue that Wittgenstein’s variational method described in the \textit{Philosophical Remarks}, solves this problem through variation of the form of ordinary language. This process shows us, as he puts it, what is “logically essential” in the representation. The clearest examples of this method are found in his remarks on subjectivity in chapter VI of the \textit{Philosophical Remarks} and chapter 102 of TS-213. The transition in the latter text to Wittgenstein’s more mature reflections, I argue, is not a rejection of this method, but simply a change in the language of his philosophy. I make this claim by extending Hacker’s account of the linearity in Wittgenstein’s concept of grammar between 1933 (TS-

\textsuperscript{116} This is true especially in relation to Wittgenstein’s middle-period use of the term. Of his more general relation to language, however, and its connection with Husserl and Heidegger, see for example, (Harries, 1968; Kerr, 1965; Ricoeur, 2014)
In section II, I argue that Heidegger’s account of destruction, first developed in the *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression* in 1920, is developed out of the same problem-set as formal indication. As described in that text, destruction solves the open problem of the latter, insofar as it allows us to read a philosophical problem-set in a phenomenological sense. It circumvents the limits of the history, through giving access to the experience which lies at the heart of its language. As with formal indication, relationality is the key to Heidegger’s account. Using the same paradigm from chapter one, namely that of the relating-prohibitive, I contend that destruction is best understood in this way as relation-disclosing. Taken together, I argue, these concepts form a conceptual pair in Heidegger’s early outlook, understood as approaches to phenomenological ‘reading’ and ‘speaking’. Far from addendums to his phenomenology, as early as WS-1920, these concepts constitute “the phenomenological basic posture”.118

In my final section, I argue with Lee Braver that what the application of these methods presuppose is a certain explanatory bias.119 Their philosophical strategy consists, that is, largely in subverting the legitimacy of the given problem-set. For Wittgenstein, this means finding the specific analogies within language that are the well-spring of misunderstanding. For Heidegger, the apparent circularity of classical problems, arises not through the complexity of the phenomenon, but the failure of thinking to direct itself in an appropriate way. It is this relationality which is both disclosed in destruction, and conserved through formal indication. The central argument of this chapter is therefore twofold: firstly, (i) that both methods respond to and circumvent the constraints facing what language can do in relation to immediate experience; and secondly, (ii) it on this basis that we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim of equivalence between his later method and that of phenomenology. On both accounts, I contend, the possibility of a phenomenology remains, but demands a reorientation of the relation between that project and language in general.

I.

Phenomenology, understood as a language of immediate experience, was taken up by Wittgenstein in response to the failure of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. A ‘logically purified language’, as he came to believe in *Some Remarks on Logical Form*, must reflect the logic of the phenomenon. Within
ten months, the failure of this project is apparent to Wittgenstein. It reflects his belief that we “cannot use language to get outside language”, that the job of the logician here is impossible. There can be no ideal language, if its purported syntax represents the limits of meaning within which its rules could be decided upon. So too could there be no pure description in the more familiar phenomenological sense. Our fantasy to the contrary is based on a number of misconceptions, chief among which is of the neutral mediation between language and experience. It is not a question of refining our description, of a quantitative addition to its details, as it is qualitatively defined by other factors, such as ‘intent’. This move in particular becomes central to his middle-period work. As he puts it in chapter II of the *Philosophical Remarks*,

> A wrong conception of the way language functions destroys, of course, the whole of logic and everything that goes with it and doesn’t just create some merely local disturbance.

If you remove intent from language its whole function collapses. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 63) Given all of this, then, what remains for Wittgenstein after this turn? What relation, moreover, has his new philosophy to a project of describing immediate experience? In the opening of the *Philosophical Remarks*, Wittgenstein says that “a recognition of what is essential and what inessential in our language if it is to represent […] amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language.” Now confined, however, within our language, how can we demonstrate its representational core, without an external position to discuss it? The solution of the *Philosophical Remarks* is through a method of variations. As he puts it in chapter I, “each time I say, instead of such and such a representation, you could also use this other one, we take a further step towards the goal of grasping the essence of what is represented.” Such a process, he argues, does not result in a pure phenomenology, but understood in the light of our philosophical problems, it demonstrates what a phenomenological language would wish to express. It is in this sense, I argue, that the opening chapter of that text equates its methodology with the propositional language it ostensibly refutes.

(i) *Philosophical Remarks*, chapter VI

The most sustained example of the method of the *Philosophical Remarks* occurs in chapter VI of that text. It also marks one of Wittgenstein’s earliest engagements with the problem of subjectivity. As an ordinary idiom of representation, on his view, there is a meaningful reason that people discuss having a *soul*. The hypothesis is at least partially descriptive, moreover, in as much as it does not regularly come into conflict with our common experience. Conceptual difficulties (the mystery of the mind),

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120 (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 54)
121 Ibid, p. 51
122 Ibid. Italics mine.
only arise when we take the idiom to be truth functional, divorcing it from its context within ordinary language. Philosophers take this idiom of expression as propositional, and seeing its failure, attempt to modify on this assumption. As he writes,

> As long as someone imagines the soul as a thing, a body in our heads, there’s no harm in the hypothesis. The harm doesn’t lie in the imperfection and crudity of our models, but their lack of clarity (vagueness).

> The trouble starts when we notice that the old model is inadequate, but then, instead of altering it, only as it were sublimate it. While I say thoughts are in my head, everything’s all right; it becomes harmful when we say thoughts aren’t in my head, they’re in my mind.

(Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 287)

One way to avoid this sort of confusion, is to see what is essential to its representational component i.e., to remove those “wheels turning idly”, which belong only to the cultural functions of such language.  

123 If in so doing the model of the ‘inner’ disappeared, it would resolve the above temptation to swap ‘head’ for ‘mind’ and take us a step closer to an “immediate representation of immediate experience.”124 In chapter VI, Wittgenstein takes up the language of pain-reporting. At issue here is the use of the first-personal pronoun in speaking of sensations. He writes,

> One of the most misleading representational techniques in our language is the use of the word ‘I’, particularly when it is used in representing immediate experience, as in ‘I can see a red patch’.

> It would be instructive to replace this way of speaking by another in which immediate experience would be represented without using the personal pronoun; for then we'd be able to see that the previous representation wasn’t essential to the facts. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 88)

To offer an alternative means of speaking of personal experience, is to avail of the variety of forms hypothetical language can have. Such variation, moreover, need have no relation to the actual state of the natural languages. As he puts it later in TS-213,

> What is the nature of our investigation? Am I investigating the cases that I give as examples with a view toward their probability, or their actuality? No, I’m just presenting what is possible, and am therefore giving grammatical examples. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 312e)125

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123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 That an exercise concerned with possibilities is ‘therefore grammar’, already makes clear one sense in which Wittgenstein identifies phenomenology with grammar around the time of TS-213. As he says in the *Philosophical Remarks*, “Physics differs from phenomenology in that it is concerned to establish laws. Phenomenology only establishes the possibilities.” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)
In the example of chapter VI, Wittgenstein suggests a language in which, instead of ascribing pain to oneself as an object to a subject, one says “There is pain”. In the case of seeing others writhe in pain, we replace this form with “he/she is acting as L.W acts, when there is pain”. This language of course affords privileged status to the speaker and appears to adopt a behavioural stance in respect of other minds. But to construe this position as a substantive philosophical claim, however, is to miss the point. As he puts it,

Not that the [new] representation would be in any sense more correct than the old one, but it would serve to show clearly what was logically essential in the representation. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 88)

Varying the language in this way could also be extended to other so-called inner-states, such as thinking or feeling. Crucially this privileged status now afforded to the speaker would, on Wittgenstein’s view, reflect something fundamental about the phenomenon of pain. The central illusion of the first-personal pronoun is to create a false symmetry between feeling pain and inferring pain in another. By utilising the same language for both, namely that a subject has an object, the special status of the individual feeling pain disappears. As he writes,

The very expression, ‘I can perceive x’ is itself taken from the idiom of physics, and x ought to be a physical object – e.g. a body – here. Things have already gone wrong if this expression is used in phenomenology, where x must refer to a datum. For then ‘I’ and ‘perceive’ also cannot have their senses. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 88)

As he adds in TS-213,

That means that the subject-object form is not applicable to this. The subject-object form refers to the body and the things around it that have an effect on it. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 358e)

In the case of “I perceive a building”, it is meaningful to suppose that my place as perceiver is replaceable with anyone else. Accordingly, the first personal pronoun is replaceable with the third, without misleading us on the nature of perception itself. But this is not the case for feeling pain. As he puts it,

We say, ‘I cannot feel your toothache’; when we say this, do we only mean that so far we have never as a matter of fact felt someone else’s toothache? Isn’t it, rather, that it’s logically impossible? (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 90)

\[126\] Ibid, pp. 88-89

\[127\] A symmetry implied by the use of the same grammar as in third-personal cases.

\[128\] Or as he says earlier in the same text, “The primitive forms of our language – noun, adjective and verb – show the simple picture to whose form language tries to reduce everything.” (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 317e)
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The other-minds problem, to which we will return in chapter 3, begins by failing to take note of this sort of distinction. Empathy, which appears to be a perception of the other’s hidden object, disappears as a mystery once we make the necessary demarcations in the language of subjectivity. As he puts it, “when I feel sorry for someone with toothache, I put myself in his place. But I put myself in his place.” In the language that Wittgenstein proposes above, the privileged status of the speaker is already one such demarcation. Wittgenstein continues this application of the variational method in TS-213. In chapter 102 of that text, he shifts his attention to the problematic paradigm of possession. He writes,

(1) “I’m in pain”
   “N is in pain”
On the other hand, (2) “I have grey hair”
   “N has grey hair”

The various philosophical difficulties and confusions connected with the first example can be attributed, for the most part, to the confusing of the grammar of cases (1) and (2) (Wittgenstein, 2013, pp. 359-360).

While grammatical classes make no distinction between ‘hair’ and ‘pain’, it masks a phenomenological difference of great importance. As in the *Philosophical Remarks*, Wittgenstein’s method consists in demonstrating the efficacy of alternative forms of language. He writes,

I could suggest an asymmetrical form of expression:

Old form of expression: New form of expression:
W is in pain. There is pain present.
W has a pain in his left hand. There is a pain in W’s left hand.
N is in pain. N is behaving like W when there is pain present.
N is simulating pain in his hand. N is simulating W’s behaviour when there is pain present.
I feel sorry for N because he is in pain. I feel sorry for N because he behaves like, etc.

Since we’re writing down an expression of the new form for each meaningful expression of the old, and *different* new ones for *different* old ones, the new form of expression has to be

129 (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 92)
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equivalent to the old in terms of clearness and the absence of ambiguity. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 360e)

For as long as the asymmetrical variation maintains “clearness and the absence of ambiguity”, we see that symmetry was never essential to the representation. Such variability is not open to phenomenological language. For a hypothesis, however, so long as it would be descriptive enough for our purposes, we could economize on much of the idiom and still square it with experience. Had we removed something essential, conversely, there would be a loss of either: (i) expressive clarity; or (2) freedom from ambiguity. The purpose of chapter VI is showing that the first-personal pronoun can be lost at no descriptive cost. The efficacy of the alternative language, which forgoes its use, shows that it is logically superfluous. It belongs to that aspect of the hypothesis, that is, not determined by the logic of the phenomenon, but by the social factors for which this representation is brought into language. In the terminology of the Philosophical Remarks, it is “a wheel turning idly”.130

The relation between this method and phenomenology is not immediately obvious. But to discern what is ‘inessential’ to the means of representation, negatively brings to light the contours of what a phenomenological language would say. To further the analogy mentioned by Rush Rhees, variation of the hypothesis gives us a better sense of its propositional ‘sections’.131 Just as a warped mirror subsumes the reflected object into a new visual structure, ordinary language subsumes the phenomenological within the context of intent, use and culture. For Wittgenstein, to continuously vary the surface of the mirror, however warped each version would still be, would show the contingency of much of its reflections, while holding certain formal relations constant. Every step in this process, as he says, would take us “a further step towards […] grasping the essence of what is represented”.132 In conversations with Schlick from December 1929, Wittgenstein makes this connection even more explicit. He writes,

The word “I” belongs to those words that can be eliminated from language. Now it is very important if there are several languages; in that case it is possible to see what all these languages have in common and that common element is what depicts.  
[…]
All these languages can be translated into one another. Only what they have in common mirrors anything. (Wittgenstein, 2003, p. 49)

In the context of his analysis of ‘possession’ in TS-213, Wittgenstein crucially situates this method in the language of proposition/hypothesis. He writes,

130 (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)
131 (Rhees, 1963, p. 218)
In the non-hypothetical description of what has been seen, heard – here these words designate grammatical forms – the “I” does not appear, here there is no talk of subject and object. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 358e)

That this propositional fact can be seen by variation of the hypothetical account, shows precisely the relation between his new method and phenomenology. Iterations of the above process, of course, cannot exhaust themselves with a full description, independent of ordinary language. On Wittgenstein’s view, however, this aim is neither possible nor necessary. If the function of phenomenology is to stop philosophical problems from arising, it suffices to disavow ourselves of the first personal pronoun in the example above. This is not to write a propositional description of subjectivity. It is something that we see by varying the possibilities of our language. This clarification alone gives us the perspicuity needed to silence philosophical woes. In the Blue Book, just before turning to the problem of subjective experience, Wittgenstein raises the tentative nature of his late work by famously comparing it to organizing books on a shelf. He writes,

But some of the greatest achievements in philosophy could only be compared with taking up some books which seemed to belong together, and putting them on different shelves; nothing more being final about their positions than that they no longer lie side by side. The onlooker who doesn’t know the difficulty of the task might well think in such a case that nothing had been achieved. – The difficulty in philosophy is to say no more than we know. E.g., to see that when we have put two books together in their right order we have not thereby put them in their final places. (Wittgenstein, 2008, pp. 44-45)

In chapter 104 of TS-213, as in chapter VI of the Philosophical Remarks, the two books being separated are the ‘possession’ of pain and the ‘possession’ of an object. The similarity of these hypotheses is perfectly fine in ordinary life, provided it is not read back into the logic of the phenomena. By investigating more economic alternatives, it is precisely such linguistic analogies in their grammar that are revealed as logically superfluous. With it, Wittgenstein wants to say, does the foundation for a class of problems concerning subjectivity. So what, then, does this negative process of showing the inessential to representation do? To repeat his opening of the Philosophical Remarks,

Each time I say that, instead of such and such a representation you could also use this other one, we take a further step towards the goal of grasping the essence of what is represented.

A recognition of what is essential and what inessential in our language if it is to represent, a recognition of which parts of our language are wheels turning idly, amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)

In this way, the investigation of ordinary language, for Wittgenstein, does not attend merely to the linguistic practices surrounding our experience. But premised on a conception of our language as
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partially phenomenological, it suggests that by attending to the means of our representation, we can gain insight into that which is represented, i.e., immediate experience. This process is negative, in the sense of showing the inessential. It is likewise tentative and indirect, but through it, on Wittgenstein’s view, we can performatively demonstrate what a phenomenalistic language would wish to express.

(ii) Grammar through TS-213

The concept of grammatical investigation in the *Philosophical Remarks* is familiar in light of the mature Wittgenstein. As I have argued, it is not developed alongside the end of a pure phenomenology, but precisely out of it. As it appears in the *Philosophical Remarks*, there is no repudiation of the basic framework of proposition-hypothesis. What is rejected, however, is the chimerical search for the propositional basis of language on its own. This is the freshest version of ideal language on Wittgenstein’s mind. It is no temporary problem requiring a solution, moreover, but one of principle. As he says, “we cannot use language to go beyond the possibility of evidence”.\(^\text{133}\)

The obvious question, however, regards the extent to which this concept of philosophy (implied by the variational method) changes between the *Philosophical Remarks* and TS-213, the so-called *Big Typescript*. P. M. S. Hacker, in his article *Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism* has argued that the concept of grammar found in the latter, effectively remains unchanged until the pre-war draft of the *Philosophical Investigations*.\(^\text{134}\) On fourteen criteria, Hacker argues, the account of TS-213 matches that of the latter. His criteria for this claim are as follows:

2. The differences between words philosophy is interested in, is not that of the traditional grammarian.
3. Certain grammatical rules only become interesting when philosophers want to transgress them.
4. The meaning of a word is determined by the accepted rules for its use.
5. Categorical expressions indicate grammatical classes of rules.
6. There is no semantic connection between language and reality.
7. What counts as a proposition, and its verification, is determined by grammar.
8. A proposition is completely analysed when its grammar has been clarified.
9. Grammatical rules determine the sense of a sentence.
10. The rules of grammar are arbitrary.

\(^\text{133}\) (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 55)
\(^\text{134}\) (Hacker, 2012)
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12. Grammatical propositions are expressions of rules for language, not reality.
13. The essence of things is to be clarified by making its grammar clear.
14. Our grammar is deficient in perspicuity.

On Hacker’s view, the apparent inconsistencies in TS-213, insofar as they appear, are only as he says, “the decaying corpse of Wittgenstein’s phenomenological reflections in 1929/30”.135 My argument in this section, against Hacker, is that far from providing the inconsistencies in 1933, Wittgenstein’s engagement with phenomenology shows us the problem-set against which his mature method develops. These criteria, I argue, fall into 2 categories: (1) firstly, into direct responses to the engagement with phenomenology; and (2) secondly, their consequent effect on the nature of philosophy. Accordingly, these criteria are satisfied in TS-213 on the back of his engagement with phenomenology in the preceding years. That TS-213 has extensive remarks on phenomenological themes (such as chapters 94-107) is not a regression to the problem-set of 1929, moreover, but a continuation of his variational method. My final claim is that the subsiding of this terminology from Wittgenstein’s work owes not to a shift away from these claims, but from the logical vocabulary of his early career.

(a) Direct Phenomenological Claims

Of the fourteen above criteria, numbers 4-13 directly result from the engagement with phenomenology as described in chapter one. These includes reflections on the relation between language and reality; classes and essence; and how grammar determines linguistic sense. Wittgenstein’s engagement with phenomenology begins with a recognition of the existence of grammatical classes (5), a possibility he saw but denied in *Tractatus* 6.3751. In the earliest chapter of this story, *Some Remarks on Logical Form*, the paradigm of phenomenological statements was colour. Preference for the visual in phenomenology is common, but Wittgenstein is clear that colour forms only one class of grammatical rules, a fact equally true of ‘sound’, ‘number’, ‘time’, etc. In the *Philosophical Remarks* he writes,

> When a child learns ‘Blue is a colour, red is a colour, green, yellow – all are colours’, it learns nothing new about the colours but the meaning of a variable in such propositions as: ‘There are beautiful colours in that picture’ etc. The first proposition tells him the values of a variable.

135 (Hacker, 2012, p. 8)
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The words ‘Colour’, ‘Sound’, ‘Number’ etc. could appear in the chapter headings of our grammar. They need not occur within the chapters but that is where their structure is given. (Wittgenstein, 1998, pp. 52-53)\(^{136}\)

The only difference between TS-213 and *Some Remarks on Logical Form*, is that in the latter the grammar of these classes is thought to be determinable by study of the phenomenon. Though it survives its termination, this insight is the reason that Wittgenstein turned to phenomenology in the first place, transgressing as it does his earlier independence thesis.

The key movements of Wittgenstein’s 1929 excursion, occur in recognizing that the grammar of such classes can neither be *determined* nor *justified* by reference to the phenomenon (6, 10, 11, 12). It is on this basis that Wittgenstein can claim there is no semantic connection between language and reality (6). Hacker divides this criterion into two aspects: Firstly, ostensive definition remains within language in the sense familiar from the *Philosophical Investigations*; and secondly, intentionality likewise remains within language. On the first of these, there is little evidence that Wittgenstein holds explicitly his mature view any earlier than 1933. However, there is nothing to suggest that his account contradicts it. As we have seen, his rejection of a phenomenological language occurs precisely because grammar cannot be justified by recourse to an experience independent of language. In this context, prefiguring the *Brown Book*, he discusses the function of colour samples in relation to expectation. He writes,

> Our ordinary language has no means for describing a particular shade of colour, such as the brown of my table. Thus, is incapable of producing a picture of this colour.

> If I want to tell someone what colour some material is to be, I send him a sample, and obviously this sample belongs to language; and equally the memory or image of a colour that I conjure by a word, belongs to language.

> The memory and the reality must be in one space.

> I could also say: the image and the reality are in one space. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 73)

There is no need for a metaphysical link here between the intention expressed in language, and the real world it seems to reference. The colour sample is a linguistic component, no less than the sounds of my vocal chords. To use Wittgenstein’s phrase, both language and the sample (and in this case, memory) occur in the same logical space. It is precisely along these lines that his later critique of ostensive definition occurs.\(^{137}\) There is no departure from language into ‘reality’ which needs metaphysical explanation, because the concept of reality already functions here in a linguistic sense.

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\(^{136}\) C.f. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 358e) Wittgenstein refers to “what has been seen, [and] heard” as designating grammatical forms.

\(^{137}\) See for example §6 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, (Wittgenstein, 2009a, pp. 7e-8e)
This autonomy of language, moreover, underpins the claim that it can neither be justified nor determined by reference to what is ‘outside’ it, viz. the phenomenon (11). As in the case of his critique of Husserl, either the limits of sense require justification, and are contingent, or they do not and they are necessary. Accordingly, grammar cannot be established by recourse to the limits of meaning in which explanation already navigates. It would be, in this sense, an attempt to leave language behind. To repeat his refutation from the *Philosophical Remarks*,

But this means that any kind of explanation of a language presupposes a language already. And in a certain sense, the use of language is something that cannot be taught, i.e. I cannot use language to teach it in the way in which language could be used to teach someone to play the piano. – and that of course is just another way of saying: I cannot use language to get outside language. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 54)

If this is the case, then rules such as the paradigmatic colour-statements (“a point cannot be blue and red at the same time”) are not expressions about the limits of reality as he first thought but are instead rules about domains of our language. As Hacker’s criteria puts it: grammatical propositions are expressions of rules for language, not reality (12). Partly, this latter claim is due to the irrevocability of intention from language. Rules for the formation of hypotheses in our language (such as a world of material objects) are structured as much by their agreement with human experience as by what activities surrounding it consist in. It is no more correct to alter the language of a soul, in favour of a soul-less hypothesis, because ‘correctness’ is itself a linguistic concept misapplied here. Grammar, therefore, being in this sense unanswerable to the phenomenon, is arbitrary (10). Or as he puts it in TS-213,

The rules of grammar are arbitrary and not arbitrary, in the same sense as is the choice of a unit of measurement. This is also expressed by saying that these rules are “practical” or “impractical”, “useful” or “useless”, but not “true” or “false”. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 186e)

As a consequence of the above, Wittgenstein’s view on the scope and purpose of logic shift dramatically. This includes a reassessment of the concepts of proposition, sense and rules (4, 7, 8, 9). More and more, the place of human intention becomes central. As he says, “If you exclude the element of intention from language, its whole function then collapses”. This push centralises the place of utility. What a language is *for*, gives us the criteria by which to understand its limits. As he puts it,

A word only has meaning in the context of a proposition: that is like saying only in use is a rod a lever. Only this application makes it into a lever. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 59)

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138 (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 63)
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You might say: The sense of a proposition is its purpose. (Or, of a word ‘its meaning is its purpose’.) (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 59)

This relation of meaning and purpose becomes the basis for the oft cited comparison in Wittgenstein’s mature work, between language and chess. He writes,

The question, ‘What is a word?’ is completely analogous with the question ‘What is a chessman?’. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 61)

In contrast to the tradition of Frege and Russell (and the legacy of sense and reference), the meaning of a word is determined by the accepted rules for its use (4). Grammar not only determines the sense of a proposition (9), but solely gives the criteria for what can count as a proposition (7). And this closure, so to speak, of the outside of language from logic gives grammar its absolutely central role in Wittgenstein’s vision of meaning. It alone tells us: what is a proposition and what would count as its verification; what its sense is; and the meaning of the words that constitute it. In this way, the philosophical analysis of grammar exhausts what can be meaningfully said of any proposition (8). Hacker quotes in this respect (TS-213, p. 417). The precedent for this remark is set in the very first line of the Philosophical Remarks. There he writes,

A proposition is completely logically analysed if its grammar is made completely clear: no matter what idiom it may be written or expressed in. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)

Philosophical analysis can and need only address the grammar of ordinary language, i.e. the rules for its accepted use. As in the case of grammatical classes (5), the principle distinction between 1929 and 1933 here is that in the former such analysis required a phenomenology. In 1933, conversely, the ordinary language project does not require a phenomenology, but as I have argued, amounts to one. It is precisely in this sense that Wittgenstein names chapter 94 of TS-213, apparently some four years after its termination, “Phenomenology is grammar”. 139

Among the more striking upshots of this reorientation in Wittgenstein’s work, and a direct consequence of his detour through a pure phenomenology, is the view that essence is revealed in grammar (13). Or as Hacker puts it, that the essence of things is to be clarified by making its grammar clear. Grammatical analysis, in making perspicuous the grammar of consciousness is not merely a tool for dispelling misplaced problems surrounding it. The latter is certainly achieved, for Wittgenstein, but only through a process that lays bare the essence of what in ordinary language we call consciousness. Meta-philosophically, it is clear in this sense why it achieves what phenomenology aims to. To take a phrase from Gilbert Ryle, it lays bare the ‘logical geography’ of our most

139 (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 320e)
apparently problematic concepts.\footnote{Ryle, 1949} It is in so doing, that we see what is essential to it. As he puts it in an earlier terminology,

But the essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world; and philosophy as custodian of grammar can in fact grasp the essence of the world, only not in the propositions of language, but in rules for this language which exclude nonsensical combinations of signs. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 85)

(b) The Scope and Purpose of Philosophy

Having given an account of grammar, understood in TS-213 as autonomous, arbitrary and unanswerable to reality, the question remains: what is the task and purpose of philosophy? Wittgenstein’s meta-philosophy is prominent in his thought.\footnote{For an interesting account of this meta-philosophy, see (Horwich, 2013)} It is a topic he concerns himself with at all stages of his career. From TS-213 onwards, Hacker identifies four basic claims of his mature view: grammar, \textit{qua discipline}, is a normative descriptive of language (1); the differences between words philosophy is interested in is not that of traditional grammar (2); on the contrary, certain grammatical rules only become interesting when philosophers want to transgress them (3); and the reason for this inquiry is that our grammar is deficient in perspicuity (14). Among the technical phrases employed by Wittgenstein after 1929, that of a ‘perspicuous representation’ [\textit{übersichtliche Darstellung}] is arguably best represented. In the very first chapter of the \textit{Philosophical Remarks} he writes,

Using the octahedron as a representation [of colours] gives us a \textit{bird’s-eye view} \textit{[übersichtliche Darstellung]} of the grammatical rules.

The chief trouble with our grammar is that we don’t have a \textit{bird’s-eye view} of it. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 52)

To which he adds,

Why is philosophy so complicated? It ought, after all, to be \textit{completely} simple – Philosophy unties the knots in our thinking, which we have tangled up in an absurd way; but to do that, it must make movements which are just as complicated as the knots. Although the \textit{result} of philosophy is simple, its methods for arriving there cannot be so.

The complexity of philosophy is not in its matter, but in our tangled understanding. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 52)
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It is this confusion, of not seeing the linguistic forest for the trees, that tempts us with the grammatical similarities and fictions that populate philosophy. The metaphors of possession, privacy and knowledge, for example, as applied to private sensation are the route for Wittgenstein of the key problems in the philosophy of mind. And if such problems have their source in lack of perspicuity, then the principle aim of grammar is in its attainment. It is grammar’s job (qua discipline), to describe the distinctions that are not apparent to traditional philosophy (1).\textsuperscript{142} As he says,

> Asked whether philosophers have hitherto spoken nonsense, you could reply: no, they have only failed to notice that they are using a word in quite different senses. In this sense, if we say it’s nonsense to say that one thing is as identical as another, this needs qualification, since if anyone says this with conviction, then at that moment he means something by the word ‘identical’ (perhaps ‘large’), but isn’t aware that he is using the word here with a different meaning from that in $2+2=4$. (Wittgenstein, 1998, pp. 55-56)

Such remarks naturally view ‘hitherto philosophy’ monolithically. As Paul Horwich suggests, Wittgenstein views such variation largely as flowers of the same root: of what Horwich calls T-philosophy.\textsuperscript{143} Broadly speaking, all that stands in opposition to the study of ordinary language. Whereas the latter seeks perspicuity to get rid of problems, the former is already embroiled in them. The example already covered in chapter VI of the \textit{Philosophical Remarks} shows clearly the target of such an exercise. As Wittgenstein says, “the natural history of a word can’t be any concern of logic”.\textsuperscript{144} The differences he aims to distinguish between are conceptual (2). ‘Possession’ in private sensation and ‘possession’ of an object are conceptual homonyms, for example. But the concept of dispossession belongs only to one and not the other. Given that this metaphor harbours the language of privacy, fundamental problems of mind are already connected with it. Pointing out such differences therefore is not wordplay, but on Wittgenstein’s view, the real aim of philosophy. This situatedness in pre-existing problems gives grammar its subject matter. Not all grammatical differences are of interest. The analysis of ordinary language can and must take its cue from the problems and difficulties into which philosophy finds itself (3). Conceived as therapy, grammatical philosophy is not interested in all of language, but only those aspects that cause ailments.

\textsuperscript{142} As a descriptive exercise, moreover, philosophy can neither dictate nor justify ordinary grammar. See (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 308e). He writes, “Philosophy may in no way infringe upon what is really said; in the end it can only describe it. Neither can it justify it. It leaves everything as it is.”

\textsuperscript{143} As Horwich writes, “[For] Wittgenstein, the important revelations that are typically promised within our subject are impossible. In so far as theses are propounded in philosophy, they should be barely more than observations about the use of words—reminders offered to help loosen the grip of over-stretched analogies. The most we can hope for is the elimination of our traditional concerns. This, in a nutshell, is his revolutionary meta-philosophical perspective.” (Horwich, 2013, pp. 19-20) T-philosophy, broadly understood, is a class of accounts which most characterizes this error.

\textsuperscript{144} (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 59)
If Hacker’s 14 criteria show the linearity in Wittgenstein’s view between TS-213 and the pre-war draft of the *Philosophical Investigations*, it is not in spite of his work on phenomenology in 1929. Many of the key claims regarding what grammar is and how it relates to reality (and consequently what philosophy can be), stem from his continued engagement with the phenomenological. One point raised by Hacker is that Wittgenstein still oddly seems to be involved in his earlier phenomenology in TS-213. In chapters 94-107, Wittgenstein deals with such problems as colour in visual space, the visual versus the Euclidean, the nature of perception and description of the immediately given. But why should this be the case? If these problem-sets are directly those of a pure phenomenology, why do they survive its apparent termination in the *Philosophical Remarks*? In chapter 94, *Phenomenology is Grammar*, he opens with one such problem. He writes,

Say my visual image were of two red circles of equal size on a blue background: what is there here in two’s and what once? (and what does this question mean, anyway?) (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 320e)

What matters here, however, is not the subject matter, but the manner in which this is addressed. Rather than a descriptive analysis of the phenomenon, Wittgenstein immediately entertains alternative means of expression. He writes,

What disturbs us is the lack of clarity about the grammar of the sentence “I see two red circles on a blue background” – in particular its relations to the grammar of sentences such as “two red balls are lying on the table”, and “I see two colours in this picture” - Of course instead of the first sentence I’m allowed to say: “I see two spots with the properties of red and circular and in spatial relationship of being next to each other” and equally well: “I see the colour red at two circular locations next to each other” – If I stipulate that these expressions are to mean the same thing as the sentence above. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 320e)

Later, turning to the problem of after-images conceived on the metaphor of ‘vision’, he writes,

Compare: “I see the table clearly”;
“I see the after-image clearly”;
“I hear the music clearly”;
“I hear the ringing in my ears clearly”.

…

Instead of “see an after-image” couldn’t we perfectly well say: “have an after-image”? For: “see” an after-image? In contrast to what? – (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 321e)
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Far from a regression to the phenomenology of 1929, chapters 94-107 show an application of ordinary language to the basic concepts of perception. In chapter 96, *Visual Space in Contrast to the Euclidean*, he differentiates between the concepts of visual space and the space of mathematical reasoning. Among other claims, he argues that the visual has (i) absolute position; (ii) that it therefore has absolute motion; and (iii) that clarity and blurredness belong to its essence in a way distinct from our ordinary use of these terms. This latter point he revisits again in chapter 96, *Visual Space Compared to a Picture*. Although the problem-sets of these chapters is overtly phenomenological, Wittgenstein’s approach is precisely that he describes in chapter VI of the *Philosophical Remarks*, and consistent with that he describes in TS-213. In each case, the analysis is a grammatical one: description of the means of our language, and the suggestions of alternatives to show difference, offers not merely a solution to such problems, but discloses the essence of that which is being described. This is no regression to 1929, but an application of the advances of 1930. And its result, from a continental perspective, is clearly (and as he suggests) of phenomenological significance.

The most natural question concerning the transition between these texts is the extent to which Wittgenstein alters his account of the variational method. After TS-213, it is certainly true that the means of highlighting demarcations in language broadens significantly. Some commentators have even suggested that this account broadens to include descriptions of lived experience. Accordingly, to decentralize the first-personal pronoun, for example, does not require an alternative whose efficacy shows its minimal role. On his later account, the same result can be achieved by different means. This change, it seems to me, has more to do with Wittgenstein’s meta-philosophical concerns than it does with his faith in variation. If the dualist account, for example, turns on misreading the importance of “I” in language, then showing its redundant place in that language (through variation) subverts that account. Even in spite of his explicit claims to the contrary, however, this method would seem to suggest that such alternatives are more desirable. Or, worse still, that pure representation is what philosophy should be aspiring to. But to highlight the very same demarcations in a less misleading way, I argue, while keeping his account of grammar constant, places the middle and late approaches to this problem in the same relation to immediate experience. Whether we show that we don’t need the I (with its problematic suggestion of disavowing it, as in the middle-period), or show that we’re using it in a strictly social sense in this language game (as in the late period), the performative insight of such a method, it seems to me, would be the same.

The temptation to misread the middle-period in this respect is compounded by the terminology of the *Philosophical Remarks*. As Milkov argues, it maintains much of the representational language of his logic and ontology in 1922. It is not incidental however to that text that the concept of representation is delimited as much as it is. Wittgenstein certainly speaks of it in reference in

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145 (Overgaard & Zahavi, 2009)
146 (Milkov, 2012)
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hypotheses, his intermediary term for ordinary language. His comparative method, moreover, as he says, looks for the “wheels turning idly” in our language “if it is to represent”. But this concept is not incrementally within reach, but fundamentally unattainable. As he remarks in the already quoted section on hypotheses,

> What is essential to a hypothesis is, I believe, that it arouses an expectation by admitting of future confirmation. That is, it is of the essence of a hypothesis that its confirmation is never completed.

When I say a hypothesis isn’t definitively verifiable, that doesn’t mean that there is a verification of it which we may approach ever more nearly, without ever reaching it. That is nonsense – of a kind into which we frequently lapse. No, a hypothesis simply has a different formal relation to reality from that of verification. (Hence, of course, the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ are also inapplicable here, or else have a different meaning.) (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 285)

The dropping of this term after 1931 does not coincide with its first abandonment from his thinking. Its delimitation in the *Philosophical Remarks* already speaks to an intermediary use of the concept after that of 1922. Already representation: (i) cannot be achieved in isolation; (ii) nor can it be taken as the paradigm of what language is for or does. So why does he abandon it from his thinking? The clearest answer to this in my view, can be found by looking to the fate of similar terms from the middle-period. According to Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein had employed the term word-body, or *Bedeutungs-körper* in the same period as a means to express the multifaceted meaning of words. He connects it in this respect with his insight of 1929 that “the rules for ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, etc., which [he] represented by means of the T-F notation, are a part of the grammar of these words, but not the whole”. In the same period, however, Rhees writes,

> Wittgenstein came to distrust speaking or writing of *Bedeutungs-körper*, for he thought it opened the way to “mythology.” It was meant to represent the different "facets" of the grammars of words, which he now saw to be complicated in ways not allowed for in the Tractatus. (Rhees, 1963, p. 215)

As with much of the key terminology of 1929/30, Wittgenstein’s vocabulary more and more avoids the linguistic analogies he implicates in philosophical problems. Despite its qualifications, representation, as with the spatial analogies of meaning (as in *Bedeutungs-körper*) are abandoned in the name of clarity. The task of philosophy, on Wittgenstein’s view, is to clarify and not to contribute to the mythology of our language. The transition between his variational method and his later

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147 (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)
approach to the same problem, I argue, consists above all in this kind of effort. As he puts it in TS-213,

All reflections can be carried out in a much more homespun way than I used to do. And therefore, no new words have to be used in philosophy – the old ones suffice. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 309e)\(^{149}\)

The development of Wittgenstein’s method into that found in TS-213 does not occur in spite of his phenomenological musings. The continuation of those themes in chapters 94-107 of that text, moreover, does not represent “the decaying corpse of his phenomenological project”, as Hacker contends. They do not repudiate a single criterion for his mature picture of grammar and philosophy. On the contrary, what they show is the application of this picture to classical problems of perception and human experience. As part of the tentative quality of such results, as I have argued, these claims are not substantive ones. In chapter VI of the *Philosophical Remarks*, the insight for Wittgenstein is not the alternative language itself, with its attendant behaviourism, but what the efficacy of the model shows us. To say, “I have an after-image”, in lieu of “I see an after-image” is no better, except insofar as it shows us the misapplication of our ideas as philosophers. Ordinary language, as he says, is perfectly fine as it stands, because its structure is not reducible to representation.\(^{150}\) To gain perspicuity over that structure, however, as Wittgenstein contends, would take us “a further step towards the goal of grasping the essence of what is represented.”\(^{151}\)

II.

According to Wittgenstein, Husserl had adopted a particular stance on what phenomenological claims amounted to. He took for granted, that is, a certain propositional quality of language. Accordingly, when Wittgenstein critiques Husserl’s claim to Schlick that such propositions are synthetic a priori, as Monk has demonstrated, he is not suggesting that they are either analytic or *a posteriori*.\(^{152}\) In each case, these categories accept that such statements are essentially truth functional, and it is this assumption that Wittgenstein wants to problematize. For as long as the comparison with continental phenomenology continues to be drawn on Husserlian lines, it may seem that his relevance to contemporary research stops at the end of 1929. As I argued in chapter one, however, this is exactly the problem-set that Heidegger takes up in his critique of Paul Natorp. Formal Indication, as a non-

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\(^{149}\) A variant of the final section in the critical edition of TS-213 rephrases it as “the ordinary words of language suffice”.

\(^{150}\) See for example, (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 52); (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 308e)

\(^{151}\) (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)

\(^{152}\) (Wittgenstein, 2003, p. 67)
committal injunction toward the reader, was his solution. The open question of that chapter, was how phenomenology can nonetheless be done, given the restrictive limitations placed on the language that we speak. How, in other words, can a philosophical problem be solved? Wittgenstein’s method, as I have argued, proceeds by deconstructing the language of the problems in question. As he later puts it in §116 of the *Philosophical Investigations*,

> What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (Wittgenstein, 2009a, p. 53c)

What is disclosed in this grammatical exercise removes disquiet only insofar as it shows us what a phenomenological language would say. In what sense can Heidegger likewise engage with philosophical problems, without submitting to the mythology implicit within their language? His solution, I argue, which forms a pair with formal indication, works not by inheriting such mythology, but through its deconstruction. In this section, my argument is that phenomenological destruction, as it appears in the early Freiburg lectures, fulfils exactly this role.

(i) Phenomenological Destruction

Heidegger’s first systematic treatment of destruction occurs in SS-1920, *The Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*. The title naturally reflects the problem-set of 1919, although this is a connection that is initially unclear given the subject matter of those lectures. In the context of the Heidegger’s recurring distinction between phenomenology and worldview, §5 introduces destruction as the means of approach to the lecture’s problem-set. He writes,

> The leading towards the problem comes about by means of the phenomenological-critical destruction, such that above all the concealed sense-moments come to a philosophical terminus in a manner in which they press towards something decisive. (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 21)

Such an activity, he tells us, should not be mistaken for a “critical poking-around at individual concepts and word meanings”. Its decisive moment consists in tracing descriptive ambiguities back into their experiential context. As he puts it,

> Phenomenological destruction – as a fundamental part of phenomenological philosophizing – is therefore not without direction; it does not fortuitously take up meanings of words in order to explain them by means of other taken up meanings. It is not mere shattering but a

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153 (Heidegger, 2010c)
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‘directed’ deconstruction [Abbau]. It leads into the situation of the pursuit of the pre-delineations, of the enactment of the preconception and thereby of the fundamental experience. (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 25)

Such a project is decidedly Husserlian. In his Lectures on Transcendental Logic, given in the same year, Husserl writes of leading phenomenological inquiry back through language to the experience on which it is rooted. He writes,

If one goes back from theory that is dead, so to speak, and has become objective, to the living, streaming life in which it arises in an evident manner, and if one reflectively investigates the intentionality of this evident judging, deducing, etc., one will immediately be lead to the fact that what stands before us as the accomplishment of thought and was able to show itself linguistically rests upon deeper accomplishments of consciousness…In this way, all theoretical knowledge in general ultimately leads back to an experience. (Husserl, 2001a, p. 32)

The first application of this method is to a problem arising out of a direction within the contemporary philosophy of life: the tension between the contingency of empirical history on the one hand, and the necessity, on the other, of the a priori values which are claimed to unfold within it.155 His strategy is as follows: guided by the problematic’s key concept, “History”, destruction begins by sketching the varying ways this word has currency (1. Initial specification of the ambiguity). Following this, a relatively in-depth sketch parses out the kind of currency the term has in these contexts (2. First-bringing out of the pre-delineations). The leap from this analysis to phenomenology occurs third, with each sense-complex being understood from the perspective of experience (3. Right pursuit of the pre-delineations). These sketches are then ordered according to their relation to Dasein (4. Dijudication), after which the guiding pre-conception of the problem becomes clear (5. Understanding of the pre-conception). Insofar as the problem employs the concept of history, Heidegger’s aim is to test this pre-conception against its interrogative motivation. To begin, Heidegger identifies six concepts of history with currency.

I. History as the science of history, an object of academic study.
II. “The pre-established” of a field; the past as such.
III. History as that which imbues culture and tradition.
IV. History as “life’s great instructor, e.g. for politics”.
V. The personal course of one’s life, or of a city.

155 Or as he says, how is it that “the absolute attains form in the relative and the relative becomes form of an absolute?” (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 14). As a trend in the contemporary philosophy of life, Heidegger sees such a concept underpinning, although crudely, Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes.
VI. History as a singular event, or explanatory occurrence.

Such an ordering is only relevant, however, if the *situation* is made clear in which such concepts would arise. As he puts it,

[One needs] to put oneself into the *situation* in which such statements are factically enacted in order to thus gain the possible perspective in which the moments of sense that predominate and lead further can be brought out. (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 34)

What follows is a series of sketches in the style of ordinary language analysis. History I he tells us, “functions therefore in the sense of a science”. It consists not only in a directedness toward the past, but subjects that directedness to questions of method. For this reason, it is inseparable from historiography, or the question of access. In contrast, we can speak of History II without historiography, because it denotes rather, as he says, a “field of facts”. What is intended is understood as the past as such; not as it is made manifest in the science of history, but as that about which that science attempts to make a narrative. The more interesting examples for Heidegger are found in III and V. In contrast to the academic accounts already mentioned, History as tradition in III concerns the extent to which life is co-determined by the past-ness of one’s culture. In this context, he speaks of “history-less tribes” as a correlate of barbarianism. It is moreover, common to speak of history in this way as something one “has” or does not have. In V, this concept further narrows the scope, and denotes the determination of one’s *now*, by a history we speak of as being personal.

This “first bringing-out of the pre-delineations” is the analysis of word-meaning that Heidegger warns us against trivialising. But how do we move out of this sketch toward the problem of the *a priori*? And what differentiates this from simply being concept clarification? The key is to correlate this account with the hermeneutics of the *Kriegsnotsemester*. Above all, that is, in relation to comportment. He writes,

We now attempt a first and specific, initially one-sided articulation, in as much as we pursue the genuine forms and manners of the being-experienced, i.e. *the manners of access to what and how it is meant in the mentioned meanings*. (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 46)

The aim is to understand these cases in terms of the relational comportment one has toward the meaning of history. As we noted, in cases III and V, the analysis already indicated a notion of relation, namely history as something one *has* to some degree of intimacy. In a provisional sense, he notes, this is also true of IV and VI. The sense of history here has legitimacy only in reference to living Dasein. He writes,

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156 (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 35)
157 Ibid, p. 35
Chapter Two

…The genuine relation in III, IV, and V has the peculiar character that only in it and through it that which is meant by history receives its concrete sense, i.e. that the relation for its part points back to a concrete Dasein and that, in the latter, by virtue of the relation, what is meant by history factically exists. (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 50)

In case I, moreover, this relation is thematised as a fundamental problem, i.e. historiography. The problematic case is that of II. Understood as the past as such, this concept appears to dispel the necessity of a relation to concrete Dasein. It is, as he says, “an ideally conceived relation of an ideal subject, which as it were, stands completely outside this objective’s occurring.”\(^{158}\) Read in light of the Kriegsnotesemester, we can speak of relation, but only one of theoretical apprehension. In the language of that text, it is already a de-vivification [Ent-leben].\(^{159}\) So construed, what relation does the problem at hand have to this hierarchy? Most importantly, which of these concepts has the problem assumed? For Heidegger, it is exactly that concept most devoid of Dasein, case II. As he puts it,

In as much as among the sense-complexes III to V, the V displayed an especially pronounced intertwining with human Dasein, the one that was discussed in II and functions in the problem of the a priori stands furthest removed from concrete Dasein. (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 55)

The philosophical problem here arises out of an attempt to thematise the historicality of the human being. In so doing, however, it has presupposed that concept most removed from its proper subject matter.\(^{160}\) In this way, it ironically persists only in de-historicizing the human being. In this case-study of method, the genealogical relation of the different concepts of ‘history’ to living Dasein, is the criterion to test their appropriateness for the ‘philosophy of life’ in the sense which the problem intends. The apparent insolvability of that problem only arises in assuming a concept of history this process has shown to be inappropriate. In his programmatic summary he writes,

The sense of history posited in the problem of the a priori persists precisely at the cost of explicitly pushing away that towards which the problem itself is aimed. That towards which the problem tends precisely does not let the posing of the problem emerge at all. That is: the human being in its concrete, individual historical Dasein. (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 66)

In the case-study of SS-1920, it is easy to overlook the positive component of destruction. By undermining the legitimacy of the problem-set however, it proceeds only by taking seriously the

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\(^{158}\) Ibid, p. 50.

\(^{159}\) The criteria for this ordering process is that of proximity to Dasein, in a process he calls Dijudication. As he says, “the criterion can obviously not be taken from the outside but most co-result from the ultimate tendencies of the phenomenological problematic itself...self-worldly Dasein” (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 57)

\(^{160}\) That is to say, it has chosen that concept which most presupposes theoretical comportment toward Dasein.
existential basis of both its motivation and of theoretical apprehension itself. As he puts it in his first course on Aristotle, WS-1921,

What counts for us is not simply to identify the mistake but to understand the erroneous tendency in a positive sense. (Heidegger, 2001, p. 20)

Destruction proceeds by taking seriously the philosophical inquiry as an existential possibility of Dasein. In this sense, the negative connotations that have been associated with the term are, as it often noted, largely inappropriate.161 Dermot Moran has noted the pre-Lutheran roots of the term (destruere) in the Islamic peripatetic commentators of Ghazali and Averroës.162 The Latinization of Tahafut enters parlance as ‘destructio’, a term with considerably stronger connotations than the original, which means a ‘reduction to incoherence’. In neither case, it seems to me, do these words prefigure Heidegger’s intention. As Ó Murchadha put it, Heidegger’s aim is above all to “liberate experience from the history of ontology”.163 In both SS-1920 and the Natorp-Bericht of 1922, Heidegger qualifies his use of the term using the less negative ‘deconstruction’ [Abbau].164 Insofar as destruction [Destruktion] means to demolish, what it stands against in Heidegger’s view is a method such as Reconstruction, Natorp’s claim of access to the life-world. In the Kriegsnotsemester, Heidegger identifies this antagonism by saying, “Natorp in no way shows that his method is different from that of objectification. For Reconstruction is also construction…and it is precisely characteristic of objectification to be constructive, thus theoretical.”165 The negative moment of the term Destruktion, accordingly, is levelled only against what Heidegger sees as the problematic core of figures such as Natorp, i.e., the primacy of the theoretical. Speaking descriptively, it seems to me, deconstruction [Abbau] is a more accurate term. Despite the method being in the spirit of Husserl, the latter also took issue with such overtones of violence. In the marginalia from his copy of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Husserl responds to Heidegger’s claim that every interpretation of the intention of words does violence, by claiming,

161 In its first introduction in Being and Time, Heidegger writes “this demonstration of the provenance of the fundamental ontological concepts, as the investigation which displays their “birth certificate”, has nothing to do with a pernicious relativizing of ontological standpoints. The destruction has just as little the negative sense of disburdening ourselves of the ontological tradition…Destruction does not wish to bury the past in nullity; it has a positive intent. Its negative function remains tacit and indirect.” (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 22)
162 (Moran, 1994)
163 (O’Murchadha, 2013, p. 11) italics mine.
164 (Martin Heidegger, 2002, p. 124; Heidegger, 2010c, p. 25) As he puts it in the Natorp Bericht, “[insofar] as the phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity endeavours…to play its part in helping the contemporary situation with the possibility of being appropriated in a radical manner… it sees itself directed to the task of loosening up the reigning state of traditional interpretation… by way of deconstructive regress, [im abbauenden Rückgang] penetrating into the original motivational sources of these explications. Hermeneutics carries out its tasks only on the path of destruction [Destruktion]”.
165 (Heidegger, 2008, p. 82)
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!!!??? I differentiate between what they [the words] have wanted to say and what they [i.e. the authors] ultimately aimed at and wanted to say as they said them. (Husserl, 1997, p. 453)

The key to situating this method within Heidegger’s Freiburg project, it seems to me, lies in the relation of SS-1920 to his work of the previous year. With its ordering process, destruction hinges on understanding the enactment character of the relation, i.e. Heidegger identifies in the problem a theoretical comportment toward history, which he deems inappropriate to its interrogative motivation. In the appendix notes to that text, he makes a series of remarks that connects this with his earlier concept of attitude. He writes,

Phenomenological destruction is, as tracing the pre-delineations, as understanding their sense-according motives, at the same time preconception disclosing [vorgrißerschließend].
(Heidegger, 2010c, p. 139)

The relation between these concepts, he adds, is as follows:

…the pre-delineations are motivated in a pre-conception [Vor-griff] that also determines the how of the pre-delineations. (Heidegger, 2010c, pp. 138-139)

In the Kriegsnotsemester, Heidegger had made a similar connection between preconception and tendency (Tendenz)\textsuperscript{166}, a key term from the winter course of that year, Basic Problems of Phenomenology. The problem of that text is to justify phenomenology (qua primordial science) and its access above all to the self-world. In this context, Heidegger offers what can only be described as a proto-destructive reading of modern psychology. Psychology, as the science of the psychical, is legitimately motivated in an attempt to thematise the self-world. In adopting the scientific standpoint however, it goes awry. He writes,

Disingenuousness introduces itself here: People take [science] as a model in such a way that they adopt its basic attitude (tendency)\textsuperscript{167} and method at once – thus not only the scientific tendency in general, but rather the tendency specifically motivated out of its specific subject-area – and they do not take it as a model radically enough that they ask the question, just where does its greatness lie…The genuine motive is thus contorted into disingenuousness, from which all of the confusions derive. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 73)

The parallel here with the account of History in SS-1920 is unmistakable. In this case, Heidegger identifies the attitude [Grundleinstellung] of the inquirer as leading to disingenuousness. But this attitude is surreptitiously assumed on the basis of a pre-conception. He repeats this point of Dilthey late in SS-1920, “the preconception determines philosophy as a theoretical attitude”.\textsuperscript{168} This relation,

\textsuperscript{166} (Heidegger, 2008, p. 89)
\textsuperscript{167} “…Grund-einstellung [Tendenz]…”
\textsuperscript{168} (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 111)
between pre-conception and attitude, draws a line between destruction (as pre-conception disclosing) and the question of comportment. In disclosing the pre-conception, destruction at the same time discloses the comportment informing the problem-set. It is on the basis of this disclosure, that the phenomenological significance of the inquiry can be brought to light. In the case-study of SS-1920, the aim of that problem was historical Dasein. Its theoretical comportment toward history however precludes this possibility from the start, an error it shares with modern psychology. The battle cry of phenomenology, qua primordial science, therefore becomes “that we return wholly into the pre-theoretical and pre-theoretically take notice of the prominence of the self-world”.¹⁶⁹

To return to the open question of chapter I: It is in this way that destruction answers the problem raised by formal indication, the linguistic constraints of which are here reversed. To read an account couched in the language of ‘expression’, destruction attempts to disclose the kind of experience which gives rise to it. In the hermeneutics of the early Heidegger, with its diatribe against the primacy of the theoretical, this task amounts to disclosing the sense of enactment. In the spirit, but not the manner of Husserl, destruction aims to go back “from theory that is dead…to the living, streaming life in which it arises in an evident manner”.¹⁷⁰ Just as formal indication attempts to elicit primary intuition, destruction attempts to trace the language of philosophy back to the lived intuition from which it springs.

(ii)  

*Phenomenology of Religious Life* WS-1920

Although in Heidegger’s view, the problem-set of both WS-1919 and SS-1920 was misconceived, had either account directed itself pre-theoretically, it would still be a *destructive* reading which would disclose this to us. The most oft-cited positive case-study of this, and the most instructive for its relation to formal indication, is that of the religion course in WS-1920. A destructive reading of St. Paul’s first and second letter to the Thessalonians shows us, according to the Heidegger, a remarkable sensitivity to the phenomenality of time. For Heidegger, there is no way to separate Paul’s sensitivity from his Christianity. As he says, “Christian religiosity lives temporality”.¹⁷¹ It is this attitude alone which allows Paul to relate the ‘when’ of the παρουσία to the ‘how’ of Christian life experience.¹⁷² As early as the winter of the previous year, Heidegger distinguishes the methodological significance of early Christendom for this reason. In WS-1919, he writes,

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¹⁶⁹ (Heidegger, 2013, p. 73)  
¹⁷⁰ (Husserl, 2001, p. 32)  
¹⁷¹ (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 73)  
¹⁷² Prefiguring the account of temporality from *Being and Time*.  

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Chapter Two

The deepest historical paradigm for the peculiar process whereby the main focus of factual life and the life-world shifted into the self-world and the world of inner experiences gives itself to us in the emergence of Christianity. The self-world as such comes into life and is lived as such. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 47)

This “revolution against ancient science” is precisely the situation in which Paul must be understood and affords significance for Heidegger to everything from Paul’s station within the early church, to the epistolary character of his writing. He adds,

Only according to these basic motives for a new positioning of the self-world, which were breaking out anew, is it understandable why something like Augustine’s “Confessions” and “On the City of God” can encounter us…He gained a wholly original aspect, not at all just a theoretical one. Rather, he lived in it and brought it to expression. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 48)

For Heidegger, any attempt to understand this which is insensitive to the sense of relation, (pre-theoretical) precludes in advance access to the experience that St. Paul is expressing. In the case of the παρουσία, the resulting dogma surrounding its timeline ironically embodies the misapprehension that St. Paul himself identifies with ‘they that sleep…they that be drunken’. In sections §5-14, Heidegger draws a line between his own approach (of formal indication and destruction), and the scientific approach exemplified in figures such as Ernst Troeltsch. As in SS-1920, the initial intent of these lectures is determining Paul’s sense of enactment. The etymological moment is therefore no “plying of ‘mere meanings’”, but is the route through which this latter task is to be achieved.

Following the key section of the cursus interruptus, and in his last remarks on method, Heidegger recapitulates on the constraints facing the phenomenological project. In §22, he distils the three principle challenges as follows: (i) Understanding Paul’s experience from his language, and the constraints that this implies; (ii) The possibility of empathy with the account therein; and (iii) Submitting our results back into a language with its own conceptuality. In both the first and the last, it is language that poses the crucial stumbling block. Of the first of these he writes,

The language of the study of the material is not original. There is a more original conceptuality already in factual life experience, from out of which the material conceptuality that is common to us first derives. This reversal in conceptuality must be enacted, or else it is hopeless to ever grasp the situation. (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 59)

To read Paul phenomenologically, therefore, is to enact a reversal in conceptuality from his language back to the life experience from which it arises. As he puts it, “One may not simply take up

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173 (Heidegger, 2013, p. 47)
174 (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 24)
175 (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 59)
self-evident concepts…No material of explication has been understood as long as its indicated sense complex is not enacted”.\textsuperscript{176} This ‘reversal in conceptuality’, as is clear from the language of SS-1920, is precisely the process of destruction. As he puts it in that summer, destruction alone leads “into the situation…of the fundamental experience”.\textsuperscript{177} The second critique raised in this section concerns the possibility of empathizing with the world of St. Paul. As he does against the charge of circularity in the KNS-1919, Heidegger is quick to dismiss this epistemological critique for its dependence on a theoretical model of knowledge. The experience of Paul is not a construct to be comprehended, but a posture to be taken up, and is so precisely through destruction. As he says, “the environment of Paul is entirely foreign to us. But what is crucial to us is not the material character, the ideational of his surrounding world. This moment falls away entirely; the environment first gains its sense out of the understanding of the situation”.\textsuperscript{178}

Despite the explanatory scope of destruction, which offers us a solution to the first two of these challenges, the very real problem that remains for an analysis of St. Paul is that of expression. The final problem listed in §22, is the linguistic constraint that phenomenology becomes immediately subject to. As he puts it,

Through the completion of the explication, that which is explicated becomes apparently independent, released from its enactment. But this is a distorted view. It is peculiar to the theoretical, attitudinal abstraction that what is abstracted is grasped as a moment of a material region, so that thereby the basic determinations of the region are won. (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 59)

Such a view is only distorted, of course, if we assume use of the formal ontological. But this is precisely what formal indication, the contours of which he goes on to describe, intends to replace. Just as destruction is the solution to the first two of these issues, Heidegger’s linguistic response to Natorp becomes his claim to surmount the last. The letters of St. Paul, in short, can only be read destructively; their phenomenological content can only be expressed as formal indications.

In this crucial recapitulation of method, the relation between language and phenomenology is circumscribed firstly by destruction (as an act of reading), and secondly through formal indication (as one of expression). And this bookending of the process should not surprise us. As is clear from the analysis in SS-1920, and the problem-set of the previous year, it is already reflected in the mechanism through which these concepts claim to act. As I argued in chapter 1, just as formal indication is relating-prohibitive, the key moment of destruction in the early Freiburg lectures is relation-disclosing. What is brought to light in the destruction of St. Paul, namely his pre-theoretical

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{177} (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 25)
\textsuperscript{178} (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 59) c.f. (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 34)
comportment, is precisely what Heidegger cautions us to conserve through abandoning the language of the formal ontological. As he adds, moreover, this process “is not a separated succession of acts, grasping determinations”, but taken together, constitute what he earlier terms the “phenomenological basic posture”. As a response to the problem of language in 1919, such a posture is conceivable only on the basis of the essential link between destruction and formal indication as correlates of ‘reading’ and ‘speaking’. It is in the light of this connection, I contend, rather than its precedence in Husserl, that the latter is best understood. As Heidegger himself puts it a year later in WS-1921.

Concretely, formal indication is to be clarified partially where it comes into play in each case but more fundamentally in connection with phenomenological destruction as a basic element of the interpretation of the history of the spirit from a phenomenological standpoint.

(Heidegger, 2001, p. 105)

III.

If formal indication is Heidegger’s earliest conception of the language of phenomenology, then destruction is an attempt to read the history of philosophy with its limits in mind. In the first case, the task is to formalise the sense of enactment and warn against its pre-emptive determination. In the latter, the task is to read the history as a history of Dasein’s relation to experience. The tension between this aim and Heidegger’s inherited conception of history, as Moran has noted, is certainly problematic. The method itself, however, precedes its application to the history of ontology. In 1920, Heidegger applies it to his contemporary Neo-Kantians and does so as a response to the linguistic constraints set by his work in the Kriegsnotsemester. It is only in this way, he adds, that philosophy can be made readable in a phenomenological context. Along with formal indication, this is not a dispensable addendum to his project, but “a fundamental part of phenomenological philosophizing”. Given the relative poverty of reference to formal indication in Heidegger’s work, especially compared to that of destruction, it is easy to discount the importance of the former as a key moment of his phenomenological outlook. My argument has been that at least in the early Freiburg lectures, when Heidegger still speaks in relatively Husserlian language, the relationship between these concepts is much clearer than it later becomes. To what extent this connection survives his changing

179 Ibid, p. 60
180 (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 26)
181 (Moran, 1994)
182 On the history of religion, see for example (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 54) “Despite this, the modern history of religion accomplishes much for phenomenology, if it is subjected to a phenomenological destruction. Only then can the history of religion be considered for phenomenology.”
183 (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 25)
perspective on method in the 1920s is unclear. It is a question that can only be touched on again in chapter 4.

To return to the open question of chapter one: how, for both Wittgenstein and Heidegger, can we do a phenomenological philosophy? For Wittgenstein, grammatical investigation is an attempt to understand our language as it stands. In an important sense, however, philosophy does not disclose something new. His meta-philosophical view in this respect owes to the influence of Heinrich Hertz. As he says,

As I do philosophy, its entire task is to shape expression in such a way that certain worries disappear. (Hertz.) (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 310e)

Adding later,

The real discovery is the one that makes me able to stop doing philosophy when I want to. The one that quiets philosophy down, so that it is no longer lashed by questions that call itself into question. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 316e)

On this view, philosophical ‘truths’ simply return us to what already “lies open to view”. For this reason, “if one wanted to establish theses in philosophy”, he writes, “no debate about them could ever arise, because everyone would be in agreement with them”. As he adds,

Learning philosophy is really recollecting. We remember that we really did use words that way.

The aspects of language that are philosophically most important are hidden behind their simplicity and ordinariness. (one is unable to notice this importance because it is always (openly) before one’s eyes.) (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 309e)

As Hacker correctly describes, the propositional content of Wittgenstein’s grammar is not a statement about reality understood as independent to language. To polemically deconstruct a problem-area is not an address to experience. But how, then, could it constitute a phenomenology? Precisely because in disassociating the “I” from subjective experience, the grammatical exercise performatively shows us something that a phenomenology would describe directly. Though no such description could linguistically be given, what we see in chapter VI of the Philosophical Remarks amounts to the same thing. While the phenomenological proposition cannot meaningfully be said, it is through the

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184 (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 308e) C.f. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 314e) “We don’t encounter philosophical problems at all in practical life (as we do, for example, those of natural science). We encounter them only when we are guided not by practical purpose in forming our sentences, but by certain analogies within language”

185 (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 309e) C.f. ibid, p. 308e. There he writes, “Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain, either. For anything that might be hidden, is no interest to us”
expression of the grammatical proposition that its content can be seen.\(^\text{186}\) In this way, it exemplifies what in TS-213 he calls “the possibility of quiet progress”: the phenomenological, on Wittgenstein’s view, is silent.\(^\text{187}\) His variational method, moreover, does not make its grammatical claims as a partial description to be added to. Even in the *Philosophical Remarks*, where his language most suggests this, it is never pursued. Such facts are to be seen only in the light of the philosophical problems which motivate them. Understood as conceptual therapy, grammar is only interested in removing conceptual disquiet. This situatedness within pre-existing problematics is one that Wittgenstein shares with Heidegger. For the latter, destruction does not begin in isolation, but in the conceptual light of the problem itself. As he says in his 1922 work on Aristotle,

> Accordingly, insofar as the phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity endeavours, in its interpretation, to play its part in helping the contemporary situation with the possibility of its being appropriated in a radical manner, doing this by calling attention to concrete categories and allowing them to be given in advance, it sees itself directed to the task of loosening up the reigning state of traditional interpretation today with respect to its hidden motives and its unexpressed tendencies and modes of interpreting so that it can, by way of a *deconstructive regress*, penetrate into the original motivational sources of these explications. *Hermeneutics carries out its tasks only on the path of destruction* [*Destruktion*]. (Martin Heidegger, 2002, p. 124)

The explication of such destruction, as I have argued, can only occur through formal indications. Though not strictly silent, the phenomenological proposition, as it is for Wittgenstein, is reduced to a performative gesture. A natural question here, however, is whether Heidegger introduces a psychological element with comportment against his own anti-constructivist tendency. Is his emphasis on intentionality at odds with both Wittgenstein’s and his own purported anti-cognitivist outlook? The history of such nomenclature in phenomenology is complex. As Fréchette notes, terminological changes from the Brentanian were often a dance around the accusation of psychologism, typically by comparison with those who did not qualify such terms with zeal.\(^\text{188}\) In Heidegger’s case, quite apart from the qualifications he already makes in 1919, one observation is that these mentalist overtones in

\(^{186}\) As Monk I think correctly points out, quoting TS-213, it connects with Wittgenstein’s emphasis on “seeing connections.” See for example his remarks in (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 308e)

\(^{187}\) (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 316e)

\(^{188}\) Referring to Husserl’s abandonment of the term ‘descriptive psychology’ around the time of the Munich invasion in 1905, he writes “According to Lipps, descriptive psychology is a description of the experiences of the empirical I which is given as the pole of all perceptions. This conception of descriptive psychology has to handle heavier ontological commitments than the Brentanian, which is a science of acts or functions. According to Brentano, there is simply no ‘I’ that is given empirically, and therefore no need to postulate such an I in the external world…In short, Husserl had good reasons to abandon the label of descriptive psychology, but these reasons weren’t directly related to the Brentanian conception of descriptive psychology as such, but, in the first instance, with the conception of descriptive psychology advocated in Munich by Lipps.” (Fréchette, 2012, p. 155)
his language quickly change through the 1920s. It is against this backdrop that his most familiar neologisms such as being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein], attunement [Befindlichkeit] and indeed Dasein are introduced. And this search for a new vocabulary, characteristic of Heidegger’s work, is precisely for this reason. Part of the limitation in any such project, according to Heidegger, is the situatedness of the language of the problem-set. As he says, “at first it is necessary to lead more acutely out of the concrete contemporary situation towards the problem. That can only happen if we first and for a long time speak the language of the problem situation itself”.

In the Letter on Humanism in 1947, Heidegger identified the failure of such language as leading the reader into more traditional and familiar horizons. The impossibility of circumventing this simply lies in his belief that no appropriate language yet exists. As he says in the Phenomenology of Religious Life,

One does not pose the question, whether it is perhaps impossible to grasp the sense of factual Dasein with today’s philosophical means…Apparently, then, there is a gap in today’s philosophical system of categories to be filled. (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 36)

The language of comportment does not reflect a cognitivist streak in Heidegger, nor a conceptual threat he is unaware of. It is, like his terminology generally, formally indicative. It gestures towards a facet of experience which the reader is compelled to see, before abandoning the gesturing language. And this movement, as he says, is “opposed to science in the highest degree” insofar as it prohibits an assumption of theoretical comportment.

The vestigial remnants of cognitivist language in this period, on his view, though undoubtedly misleading, are a ladder to be kicked away once climbed.

What the application of these methods certainly exemplify is a hermeneutic of suspicion with respect to the history of philosophy. As Herman Philipse points out, their approach to the external-world problem, for example, commonly consists not in debating it on its own terms but in debunking the legitimacy of the question. The “scandal of philosophy” as Kant named it, is therefore not “that this proof is still lacking up to now, but in the fact that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again”. This approach to scepticism is only one example among many. Lee Braver has identified this general trend in what he calls Retrospective Rational Reconstruction (RRR), i.e., their common belief that traditional accounts arise in retrospective attempts to reconstruct the phenomenon out of explanatory, often scientific, concepts. To take the case of psychology, Heidegger’s argument in WS-1919 is that its problematic basis lies in its assumption of a scientific attitude. To use the later language of Being and Time, psychology grasps the domain of the psychical as present-at-
hand, distorting it into an object of scientific apprehension. It is not that we cannot legitimately grasp things in this way. However, the totalizing tendency of that attitude: (i) affords primacy to this comportment; and (ii) makes pre-theoretical apprehension (the basis from which we are motivated to ask about the psychical), either secondary or derivative. As he puts it,

> It was not said that psychology is false, its results invalid, wrong-headed, and worthless, but rather that as a science its problem has not yet been posed radically enough, i.e. that the theoretical possibilities of motivation and thereby all of the factual ways of looking at a problem have not been purely worked out, that the delimitation of the task-regions and its methods has not been clarified, that fortuitous initiatives and, in part, ingenious inspirations have been relinquished and are in constant danger of falling victim to new, falsifying infections. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 79)

The problem for Heidegger is that proponents of this view, “do not take [science] as a model radically enough that they ask the question, just where does its greatness lie”.\(^{195}\) Psychological problems in this sense become mysterious not because of the complexity of the subject matter, but because of its “inversion into the disingenuous through the adoption of […] the natural sciences”.\(^{196}\) It is this basis alone “from which all of the confusions derive”.\(^{197}\) For Wittgenstein, likewise, psychological mysteries arise through conceptual misfires on the part of the inquirer and not the complexity of the subject matter. This basis is likewise connected with the methods of the natural sciences (conceived as being in opposition to phenomenology). As he puts it,

> The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by its being a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather, with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology, there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof.)

> The existence of the experimental method makes us think that we have the means of getting rid of the problems which trouble us; but problem and method pass one another by. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 243e)

Method and problem pass each other by, because in its assumption, psychology inherits a conceptual framework inappropriate to its subject matter. The distinction between grammar (understood as phenomenology) and science is central. As he says, “to explain is more than to describe; but every explanation contains a description.”\(^{198}\) Correctly understood, problems such as scepticism, other-

\(^{195}\) (Heidegger, 2013, p. 73) italics mine.

\(^{196}\) Ibid, p. 72.

\(^{197}\) Ibid, p. 73.

\(^{198}\) (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)
minds and consciousness can be given no answers on the terms they demand, because as Braver notes, those terms are themselves the wellspring of the problem. For both Wittgenstein and Heidegger, what such questions require can only be an act of dissolution. As Wittgenstein says,

When I say: Here we are at the limits of language, that always sounds as if resignation were necessary at this point, whereas on the contrary complete satisfaction comes about, since no question remains.
The problems are solved in the literal sense of the word – dissolved like a lump of sugar in water. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 310e)

Access to the means of this dissolution was for both figures the central problem of phenomenology. In early 1929, Wittgenstein understood this to consist in a “primary language”, the syntax of which would prevent in advance “the formation of such nonsensical constructions”.\(^{199}\) For Heidegger, it consisted in a primordial science, one which forgoes the limits associated with the primacy of the theoretical. The limitations of language to both ends, as I have argued, necessitates a reorientation in its role. Though a language immune to fiction for Wittgenstein is impossible, the proper task of philosophy need only be to understand through variation and comparison the complicated structure of our own. To gain perspicuity over the misleading analogies in our talk about experience, returns us to what already lies ‘open to view’, namely the logic and limits of experiential meaning. This exercise, as he says, “amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language”.\(^{200}\) Just as with formal indication, phenomenological insights on this reading are something that can only be performatively seen; as with destruction, this can only occur through the language of the problem itself, and “by way of a deconstructive regress”.\(^{201}\)

IV. Concluding Remarks

The problem of phenomenological expression lies at the heart of Wittgenstein’s development between 1929 and 1933. As the equivalence of the Philosophical Remarks suggests, it entails a rejection of phenomenological language, but not of phenomenology itself. It is in this way, that as late as the Remarks on Colour written in 1950/51, he reflects,

There is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems.
(Wittgenstein, 1977, p. 9e)

\(^{199}\) (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 35)  
\(^{200}\) (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)  
\(^{201}\) (Martin Heidegger, 2002, p. 124)
Chapter Two

Here the temptation to believe in a phenomenology, something midway between science and logic, is very great. (Wittgenstein, 1977, p. 15e)

In these remarks, the impossibility is that of an ideal language. As with the early Heidegger, however, the possibility of a “communicative science of phenomenology” still remains for Wittgenstein. What it demands above all, is a reorientation in the role of language for that project. For Heidegger, this consists in a destructive reading of the history paired with an indicative language irreducible to representation. For Wittgenstein, it is about the attainment of perspicuity over our language. In the demonstrative function of this latter method, as he argues, what results is the same as in the indicative function of the former. As he says regarding the concept of ‘imagination’ in the Philosophical Investigations,

One ought to ask, not what images are or what happens when one imagines anything, but how the word ‘imagination’ [Vorstellung] is used. But that does not mean that I want to talk only about words. For the question as to the nature [Wesen] of the imagination is as much about the word ‘imagination’ as my question is. And I am only saying that this question is not to be decided – neither for the person who does the imagining, nor for anyone else – by pointing; nor yet by a description of any process. The first question also asks for a word to be explained but it makes us expect a wrong kind of answer. Essence is expressed by grammar. (Wittgenstein, 2009a, p. 123e)

With its attempt to verbalise phenomenology, Wittgenstein may well have suggested that Heidegger’s reading of this problem is to speak idly. But if it errs, it does so as a response to the linguistic assumption they have commonly problematized in Husserl. Making sense of the correlation between their positions, it seems to me, is best served by taking this methodological starting point. In chapter 3, this issue will be taken up with reference to their accounts of subjectivity. The similarity of these accounts, I argue, occurs at least in part because of their shared methodological commitments.

For Wittgenstein, in deconstructing the problems surrounding the mind, we see what is phenomenologically interesting begin to emerge. This process places strict limits on the possibility of utilizing these insights, but silently discloses what the phenomenological Wittgenstein would wish to say. It exemplifies, as he puts it in TS-213, the “possibility of quiet progress”. For Heidegger, through destruction, the experience which lies at the heart of psychological language, gives us phenomenological access to the movements of thinking implicit within the history of philosophy. Language on this reading does offer us the route to experience, but only insofar as we disavow the

202 (Heidegger, 2008, p. 165)
203 (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 316e)
tendency to grasp it in the mode of ‘mere usability’ and disclose instead the “original conceptuality already in factical life experience”.

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204 (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 59)
The Path to Subjectivity

“Philosophers who believe you can, in a manner of speaking, extend experience by thinking, ought to remember that you can transmit speech over the telephone, but not measles.” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 95)

One of the most frequent issues to occupy Wittgenstein after his return to Cambridge in January 1929 was the problem of other-minds. Given the problem-set which prompted that return, namely his perceived failure of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, it is not at first clear why this ought to have been the case. With its correlation, however, to the basic assumptions of contemporary epistemology and logic, it is arguable that Wittgenstein regarded problems of mind to especially contribute to philosophical errors. Typical to his late polemical style, it is difficult to discern a positive account of the mind from Wittgenstein’s mature writing. This fact has left his work open to accusations of both dualism and several varieties of behaviourism, positions which he openly denies. The similarity between what contours we have of such an account and continental phenomenology has been noted in the literature. With his emphasis on world-embeddedness, and the pervasiveness of culture and language, this seems especially convincing in the case of Heidegger. The methodological basis for this kind of similarity is unclear. For Zahavi and Overgaard, it relates to Wittgenstein’s use of phenomenological description in the later period, as part of his broadening analysis of language games. Whether or not this is true of the late work, as I argued in chapter 2, it is certainly against Wittgenstein’s stated aims. As he says in defence of grammar as late as the *Philosophical Investigations*,

I am only saying that this question is not to be decided – neither for the person who does the imagining, nor for anyone else – by pointing; nor yet by a description of any process.

(Wittgenstein, 2009a, p. 123e)

Naturally, such a defence (and its relation to the problem-set of 1929) does not mean there are no such descriptions in Wittgenstein’s work. My argument in this chapter, however, is that there are earlier methodological reasons to see why such a correlation should exist. My account, therefore, is in

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205 See for example, (Overgaard, 2007)
206 (Overgaard & Zahavi, 2009)
support of a phenomenological reading of Wittgenstein, but only insofar as he connects phenomenology with his account of grammar after the *Philosophical Remarks*. In section I, I recount the arguments of Søren Overgaard and Michel Ter Hark that neither the charge of dualism nor behaviourism can reasonably be applied to Wittgenstein. In both cases, what his work is attempting to do is to subvert the epistemological terms presupposed by these positions. The forum in which he overwhelmingly investigates this are case-studies of the language of pain-ascription, understood as the paradigm of psychological privacy. My account agrees with Overgaard, moreover, that the common-root of the dualist and behaviourist accounts lies in applying an object-schema for subjectivity. This is naturally a key feature that he shares with Heidegger’s account of Dasein. In section II, I offer one reading of the development of this Heideggerian concept, taking §13 of *Being and Time* as my leitmotif. This development consists in three stages: firstly (i) in the justification of phenomenology, understood as primordial science; secondly (ii), in a phenomenology of world; and thirdly, (iii) in the justification of theoretical cognition in terms of that account. The methodological preconceptions of Heidegger’s account, I argue, just as with Wittgenstein, are what undermine many of the paradigmatic terms in the contemporary philosophy of mind. In both cases, their emphasis on a non-objective, world-embedded subject does not come about through the use of descriptions, but through a deconstruction of the *language* of subjectivity. In precisely this way, it is grounded in their engagement with the problem of phenomenological expression.

I.

Wittgenstein’s work on subjectivity proper begins in the period around the *Philosophical Remarks* and continues for the length of his career. In this section, my argument is that neither the charge of dualism nor behaviourism can be held, because his development of these themes consists precisely in deconstructing the epistemological language which sustains them. It is only through such deconstruction, that the positive contours of his account can be seen.

(i) Against Dualism

That Wittgenstein was anti-Cartesian is a relatively uncontroversial claim.207 The details of his counter-arguments are important however in establishing the scope of his susceptibility to more

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207 In spite of this, partial accommodations to the position have been made by some commentators, see for example, (Hintikka & Hintikka, 1986)
difficult chargers to counter, such as logical behaviourism. That Wittgenstein himself was aware of
this is evident from his imaginary interlocutor in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

“Aren’t you nevertheless a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you nevertheless basically saying
that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?” – if I speak of a fiction, then it is of a
grammatical fiction. (Wittgenstein, 2009a, p. 109)

The first treatment of the other-minds problem begins in chapter VI of the *Philosophical Remarks*.
Between that text and TS-213, his approach is multi-faceted, but turns largely on an insight which as
Fergus Kerr has noted, spans the entire length of Wittgenstein’s career: that nothing in experience
points to an “I”. As early as his notebooks of 1916, he writes,

> All experience is world and does not need the subject…
> What kind of reason is there for the assumption of a willing subject?
> Is not my _world_ adequate for individuation? (Wittgenstein, 1961, p. 89)

As I argued in chapter 2, the account of the *Philosophical Remarks* attempts to illustrate this through
showing the sustainability of disavowing the first-personal pronoun. In TS-213, Wittgenstein likewise
turns to the possessive paradigm of private-states implied by its use. Naturally, such insights tacitly
undermine the dualist picture. Whether they address the epistemological assumptions that lead to it,
however, as some commentators have argued, is less clear. The real thrust of Wittgenstein’s mature
dualist critique, therefore, arguably begins when he takes aim at the two fundamental claims of that
view: (i) privileged self-access; and (ii) limited/no access to the other. Regarding the second of these,
Zahavi and Overgaard have pointed out that many of Wittgenstein’s most important
phenomenological insights consist in recognizing the availability of the other’s feeling in their
body. As Wittgenstein puts it in *Zettel*,

> Consciousness in another’s face. Look into someone else’s face and see the consciousness in
it and a particular _shade_ of consciousness. You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest,
excitement, torpor, and so on. The light in other people’s faces. Do you look into _yourself_ in
order to recognize the fury in _his_ face? It is there as clearly as in your own breast.

And in the same text,

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208 (Kerr, 1997, p. 96)
209 Robert Fogelin, for example, writes, “Wittgenstein concentrates upon what he takes to be the
misunderstandings of the first-person present. I do not think that he has given a very plausible account of the use
of this construction, but, more importantly, his one-sided interest in this issue leads him to neglect a close
examination of psychological concepts themselves. It is as if he assumes that a correct analysis of first-person
present utterances will at once solve the main problems concerning psychological concepts. That, however, is
not true.” (Fogelin, 1987, p. 201)
210 (Overgaard & Zahavi, 2009)
Chapter Three

‘We see emotion’. – As opposed to what? – We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features. – Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face. This belongs to the concept of emotion. (Wittgenstein, 1981, p. 40)

These notes immediately recall the most behaviourist sounding remarks of the Philosophical Investigations,

If one sees the behaviour of a living thing, one sees its mind. (Wittgenstein, 2009a, p. 120e)

Such ‘personification in the face’ of the other’s grief, may “belong to [that] concept”, but as I will argue against the logical behaviourist reading in section (ii), it crucially does not exhaust it. Whether behaviourist or not, however, third-personal remarks such as these clearly reject a key dualist assumption: against Descartes, the very concept of emotional states already entails their availability in a phenomenological sense. Beginning in the early 1930s, however, Wittgenstein’s emphasis is disproportionately on the first of these claims: privileged self-access. In a sense, nothing could seem more plausible than the certainty of my self-access to so-called private states. A component of this model clearly lies at the heart of the possessive grammar associated with inner-states (viz. I have a pain). In TS-213, Wittgenstein takes up exactly this issue. He writes,

In the way we express ourselves in everyday language, the phenomenon of feeling pain in a tooth, with which I am acquainted, is represented by “I have a pain in this or that tooth”. And not by an expression of the type “There is a feeling of pain at this location”. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 358e)

As an exemplar of inner-states, however, pain is not something I possess in the way I possess an object. In having a box, for example, the owner could be replaced while keeping the object constant. In such cases, the fact that “I have a box” and “he has a box” differs only in its personal pronoun is unproblematic: it makes no erroneous claims about the exchangeability of the object. In reference to emotional states, however, such grammar becomes obviously misleading. If the “I” in such cases could not be replaced even in principle by any other personal pronoun, then it cannot be serving a designative function. However, it is in assuming such problematic grammar, on Wittgenstein’s view, that it gives credence to a myth about the object of sense-data and its relation to the concepts of privacy, possession and authority. As he puts it,

One could also put the question this way: what in my experience justifies the “my” in “I feel my pain”? Where is the multiplicity of feeling that justifies this word? – and it can only be justified if it’s also possible for another to take its place. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 356e)
As Ter Hark has argued, the issue that Wittgenstein wants to clarify here is epistemological.²¹¹ At the heart of the dualist claim of self-access is an introspective account. That is, the asymmetry of access to the inner, presupposes a symmetry to the *means of access*: both I and the other *observe* mental states. This point however is precisely what Wittgenstein intends to undermine. Unlike the other, I do not observe that I have inner states which the other simply cannot see (like a concealed object).

Typical to his style of reasoning, Wittgenstein points out that such demarcations can already be better seen once we negate the language. In TS-213 he writes,

> The experience of feeling a toothache isn’t the experience that a person “I” has something.

> With regard to pain I discern an intensity, a location etc., but no owner.

> What would pains be like, for instance, that nobody *has* at the moment, that don’t belong to anybody at the moment? (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 357e)

The absurdity of *dis*possessed pain here demythologizes ‘possession’ as it underpins the dualist picture. Accordingly, our assumptions about *privacy* predicated on this model of ownership are misguided. If, as he says, “someone else cannot have my toothache, then – to that extent – I too cannot have it—what is essentially private, or seems that way, doesn’t have an owner.”²¹² Wittgenstein adds that this is neither a psychological nor scientific point. It concerns only the logical geography of the concept, i.e., the *grammar* of the concept ‘pain’. As he says,

> I’m collecting meaningful propositions about a toothache, as it were; that is the process characteristic of a grammatical investigation. I’m not collecting true propositions, but meaningful ones, and therefore this is not a psychological investigation. (One is often inclined to call it metapsychology) (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 357e)

The upshot of his revision in the early 1930s leads to his now famous dictum of the *Philosophical Investigations*,

> I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking.

> It is correct to say “I know what you are thinking”, and wrong to say “I know what I am thinking”. (A whole cloud of philosophy condenses into a drop of grammar) (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 233e)

Once again, the core issue here regards the symmetry of the concept of knowledge. Against the third person, there is no observational or inferential facts to be acquired in the first person. The concept

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²¹¹ (Ter Hark, 1991)
²¹² (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 358e) C.f. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 90) There he writes, “in the sense of the phrase ‘sense data’ in which it is inconceivable that someone else should have them, it cannot, for this very reason, be said that someone else does not have them. And by the same token, it’s senseless to say that *I*, as opposed to someone else, *have* them.”
‘knowledge’ is misleadingly applied and contributes to a mythology of the inner space. As he puts it in MS 173,

It is not as if I had direct evidence for my inner, he only indirect evidence. But he has evidence for it, (but) I do not. (Wittgenstein, MS 173, p. 42)²¹³

We may, at this point object that nothing could be more certain than my self-awareness of pain. But precisely because the concept of doubt is excluded in principle, then as with possession, ‘certainty’ designates nothing meaningful here. These concepts may have legitimate uses in the ordinary language of emotional reporting, but not in squaring with the logic of our experience, i.e. they are, in the representational language of the *Philosophical Remarks*, “wheels turning idly”.²¹⁴ Returning to the two central claims of dualism: Wittgenstein’s work in the 1930s clearly discounts the privileged self-access of that model; as is clear from his remarks in the 1940s, moreover, he manifestly disregards the opacity of the other. But understanding the relationship between this transparency and behaviourism is arguably much more difficult than the dualist claim. It is true moreover that his use of language often sounds, as Kripke famously put it, “much too behaviourist”.²¹⁵ To see how this is avoided, it is necessary again to look at how Wittgenstein is qualifying the epistemological concepts in play.

(ii) Against Behaviourism

In almost every stage of the publication of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, scholars have accused him of espousing some variation of behaviourism. As we saw in his rejection of dualism, the transparency of the other was explained in terms of their behaviour and used to denounce the concept of hidden inner-states. The question remains however to what extent Wittgenstein has simply externalised what the dualist would wish to keep internal. For Søren Overgaard, these critiques fall broadly into two categories: ontological; and logical behaviourism.²¹⁶ Proponents of the first of these argue that Wittgenstein denies the existence of mental processes behind human behaviour. The plausibility of this charge stems as much from his rejection of introspective first-person accounts, as his behavioural analysis of the third-person. In this light, the beetle-in-the-box analogy of the *Philosophical Investigations* comes to mind. Given the privacy condition of the beetle in the set up (read inner-states in dualism), Wittgenstein is clear that the beetle would no longer have any meaning within the language game of pain ascription. As he puts it,

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²¹³ This translation, as with those of MS 169 and MS 123, are taken from (Ter Hark, 1991)
²¹⁴ (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 51)
²¹⁵ (Kripke, 1982, p. 48)
²¹⁶ Overgaard further breaks this down into five camps, the first two being Ontological, the remaining three Logical. They are: eliminative behaviourism; reductive behaviourism; strong logical behaviourism; moderative logical behaviourism; and weak logical behaviourism. (Overgaard, 2007, p. 18)
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Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call a “beetle”. No one can ever look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. – here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. – But what if these people’s word “beetle” had a use nonetheless? – if so, it would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box doesn’t belong to the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. – no, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 106e)

On one reading, the analogy would seem to suggest the insignificance of the beetle to the game, without refuting the legitimacy of that game itself. As Overgaard I think correctly points out, however, the key moment here is not in refuting the significance of ‘mental processes’, but in refuting a paradigm of understanding them as “objects” within a mental sphere. Wittgenstein after all does not accept the legitimacy of the set-up, either in its account of privacy or its construal of the psychical as “object-like”. An early conceptual precedent for the analogy occurs in TS-213. He writes,

Pains are represented as something that one can perceive, in the sense in which one perceives a box of matches – Then, to be sure, the unpleasant thing is not the pains, but only perceiving them. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 357e)

Just as with PI §293, once we posit an ‘inner-state’ as observable in the same sense as a matchbox, then the state itself loses all relevance. The argument is not an affirmation of such irrelevance, however, but clearly a refutation of its inferential preconception. This critique of ontological behaviourism arguably receives its most explicit statement in PI §306. There Wittgenstein writes,

Why ever should I deny that there is a mental process? It is only that “There has just taken place in me the mental process of remembering…” means nothing more than “I have just remembered…” To deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering; to deny that anyone ever remembers anything. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 109e)

As with the analogy of possession in chapter 104 of TS-213, Wittgenstein is attempting to get clear on misleading paradigms for understanding mental processes, not in denying the function of the brain. Conversely, while he affirms such function, he is also clear, against the reductive materialist, that the psychical is not reducible to such physiological facts. In Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology 1, he writes,

No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes from brain-processes. (Wittgenstein, 1980b, pp. 159e-160e)
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As an explanatory model, the temptation here is to relegate confusion surrounding cognition to an idiom in which it is easier to explain. As he says in TS-213,

If one says that thought is a psychological activity, or an activity of the mind, then one thinks of the mind as a cloudy, gaseous entity in which a lot of things can happen that can’t happen outside this sphere. And of which one must expect a lot of things that are not possible otherwise (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 223)

To which he adds,

Here we’re thinking of a process analogous to that of digestion, and the idea is that within the body chemical changes take place that are different from those we can produce on the outside, that the organic part of digestion has a different chemistry from what we can do with food on the outside. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 223)

Such delegation of the burden of clarity, however, fails to see the linguistic source of this confusion. In the case of memory, it is not that physical impression plays no part, but it is a misleading and partial description which implies a problematic grammar.

A more difficult charge to defend Wittgenstein from is some variety of logical behaviourism: namely, that the ascription of emotion to the other is either exhausted by or amounts to a description of physical behaviour. For Ter Hark, Wittgenstein’s earlier rejection of the argument by analogy, coupled with his reliance on knowledge-by-acquaintance in the Philosophical Remarks, leads to a strong logical behaviourism akin to that of Carnap. It is only in qualifying knowledge claims about the other after that text, that real headway is made against this. By that time it is certainly true, as Overgaard points out, that Wittgenstein would reject the equivalence of such language with descriptions of behaviour. In Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I, he writes,

But if now someone were to say: “so after all, all that happens is that he reacts, behaves, in such-and-such a way,” - then here is a gross misunderstanding. For if someone gave the account: “I in some sense calculated the result of the multiplication, without writing etc.” – was he talking nonsense, or did he make a false report? It is a different employment of language from that of a description of behaviour. But one might indeed ask: wherein resides the importance of this new employment of language? Wherein resides the importance, e.g. of expression of intention? (Wittgenstein, 1980b, p. 120)

A few remarks later, he writes,

But if we dispose of the inner process in this way, - is the outer one now all that is left? – the language game of description of the outer process is not all that is left: no, there is also the

217 (Ter Hark, 1991, p. 229)
one whose starting point is the expression. Whatever way our expression may run; whatever the way, e.g., it relates to the ‘outward’ calculation. (Wittgenstein, 1980b, p. 122e)

While Wittgenstein is keen to reject this equivalence, it is difficult to see how such a third option, “whose starting point is the expression” ought to play out, without being exhausted by reference to behaviour. As Robert Fogelin has argued, the use of criteria for third-personal language as late as Zettel “seems straightforwardly behavioristic”. As both Ter Hark and Overgaard note, however, the key to understanding this account, is found by retracing Wittgenstein’s claim from the Philosophical Investigations,

My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 187e)

This aphorism is the linchpin in Wittgenstein’s epistemological revision for the other-minds problem. Its earliest precedent is MS 169.

Instead of saying “Attitude towards a soul” one could also say: ‘Attitude towards a human’. I could always say of a human, that it is an automaton (that I could learn at school during lessons in physiology) and yet it would not my influence my attitude towards the other. I could even say it of myself.

But what is the difference between an attitude and an opinion? I might say: the attitude comes before the opinion. An opinion can be mistaken. But how should a mistake look like here? (Wittgenstein, MS 169, pp. 60-61)

The error of logical behaviourism lies in understanding pain-ascription as a form of judgement subject to evidence, or what he here terms, an opinion. But concepts such as error, opinion, evidence etc., are misplaced. Our temptation to sustain them, as Ter Hark notes, may lie in our awareness of the possibility of lying. But lying is a complex language-game of its own, which children must learn to do long after the language of the inner has already been learned. The transparency with which children test-out lying is testament to that derivative complexity. As he puts it,

Are we perhaps over-hasty in our assumption that the smile of a baby is not pretence? – And on what experience is our assumption based?

(Lying is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other one.) (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 96e)

The epistemological terms associated with ‘opinion’, which philosophers have taken as the paradigm of inter-subjectivity, have meaning only within a narrow class of games. In the meaningful language surrounding inter-subjectivity, however, they are misapplied. Wittgenstein’s use of the automaton in

218 (Fogelin, 1987, p. 191)
MS 169, as a stock limit to other-mind scepticism, is enlightening in this respect. Even if the other was revealed to be an automaton, on Wittgenstein’s view, it could never undermine the legitimacy of the comportment involved in dealing with other minds: it would simply be understood as a case in which it was misplaced. In PI §420 he writes,

But can’t I imagine that people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way as usual? – If I imagine it now – alone in my room – I see people with fixed looks (as in a trance) going about their business – the idea is perhaps a little uncanny. But just try to hang on to this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others – in the street, say! Say to yourself, for example: “The children over there are mere automata; all their liveliness is mere automatism.” And you will either find these words becoming quite empty; or you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort.

Seeing a living human being as a automaton is analogous to seeing one figure as a limiting case or variant of another; the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika, for example.

(Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 133e)

While the interrogative comportment of philosophy takes concepts such as error and evidence as a neutral standard, they fail to take note of the cultural embeddedness of those same concepts. In the language games of inter-subjectivity, in which Wittgenstein grounds his analysis, the “knowledge” of inner-states is a misleading homonym with the knowledge of objects in space. It may seem more plausible to us, but their misapplication is analogous for Wittgenstein to interrogating sound in terms of its hue and saturation. These terms are legitimate criteria, but in the grammar of a different game. Such is precisely the case between behavioural description and the meaningful language of inter-subjectivity. As he puts it in MS 123,

The objection against a behaviouristic way of expressing of propositions about the immediate experience is not that his way of expressing would not be about experiences but about something else. But that actually we play a different/somewhat different/ game with the expressions of experiences in comparison with the descriptions of behaviour. (Wittgenstein, MS 123, p. 36-41)

As with his critique of dualism, what Wittgenstein rejects is the grammar that philosophy adopts in interrogating its phenomena. It is this very grammar which lays the seed of our problems in the first place. As he retorts to his interlocutor in the Philosophical Investigations,

If I speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction. (Wittgenstein, 2009a, p. 109e)
Against both the dualist and behaviourist accounts, Wittgenstein’s critique centres on the misuse of epistemological concepts. Throughout the 1930s, he rejects the primacy of self-access and the introspective account it takes for granted. Following this period, however, he qualifies access to the other in contrast to the stock terms associated with hypothesis, and grounds them in what he calls our “attitude towards a soul”. In both cases Wittgenstein illustrates one of the defining characteristics of his approach to subjectivity generally: his rejection of inferential accounts to the self. For Zahavi and Overgaard, Wittgenstein’s insight here is phenomenological, and squares with the facts of experience over the cognitive psychological approaches that we find in Simulation theory and theory-theory.\textsuperscript{219}

There seems to be in Wittgenstein moreover, as Lee Braver has noted, a belief that such inferential accounts arise by retrospectively constructing subjectivity out of primarily theoretical tools. They arise, that is, through: (i) our failure to pay attention to how we meaningfully deal with other minds, and (ii) our tendency to take natural science as an explanatory paradigm of experience.

However, there is another significant respect in which both dualism and behaviourism share in a common conceptual fallacy. Overgaard has noted that if the Beetle-in-the-Box is a \textit{reductio ad absurdum}, then what it denies is the legitimacy of an object-schema for inner states.\textsuperscript{220} The passage which follows that already quoted reads,

That is to say, if we construe the grammar of the expression of the sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (Wittgenstein, 2009a, p. 107e)

The set-up is misguided certainly in construing privacy as a condition of self-access, but also in conceiving of pain on the model of a beetle (thing) in a box (space). As he puts it elsewhere,

Where do we get the concept of the ‘content’ of an experience from? Well, the content of an experience is the private object, the sense-datum, the ‘object’ that I grasp immediately with the mental eye, ear, etc. The inner picture. (Wittgenstein, 1980b, p. 23e)

On the dualist account, moreover, Wittgenstein is clear about the kind of myth this builds: that of the ethereal space of thought. As he puts it,

We are accustomed to thinking of [thinking] as something ethereal and unexplored, as if we were dealing with something whose exterior alone is known to us, and whose interior is yet unknown like our brain. (Wittgenstein, 1980a, p. 108)

\textsuperscript{219} (Zahavi & Overgaard, 2009)

\textsuperscript{220} (Overgaard, 2007, pp. 24-25) See also (Varga, 2008)
The idea of thinking as a process in the head, in that completely closed-off space, endows it with an occult quality. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 173e)

As Overgaard points out, the root of this error is something that Wittgenstein levels likewise at behaviourist approaches. In the context of such a discussion, Wittgenstein famously speaks of the conjuring trick at play in thinking about subjectivity. He writes,

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise? – the first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states, and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we’ll know more about them – we think. But that’s just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a certain conception of what it means to learn to know a process better. (the decisive moment in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that seemed to us quite innocent.) – and now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them. (Wittgenstein, 2009a, pp. 109e-110e)

The final opposition of this passage, between an ethereal inner realm and a denial of any mental process, as we have seen, marks exactly the path that Wittgenstein himself has traced. Both apparent alternatives however are flowers of the same misguided root: in the first case conceiving of thoughts in terms of mysterious inner objects; and in the second, as external, physiological processes. But it is precisely this use of an object-schema for subjectivity that leads them jointly astray. As Wittgenstein puts it in TS-213, this paradigm begins with the “erroneous application of our physical mode of expression to sense data – “Objects”, i.e. things, bodies in the space of a room”.221 Polemics against object-oriented languages, as Braver notes, are central also to Heidegger’s account.222 As early as WS-1920, Heidegger identifies the defining feature of traditional accounts in taking Dasein as an object. In Being and Time, moreover, the misidentification of the analytic as anthropology is precisely in light of this difference. As he says,

The sources which are relevant for traditional anthropology – the Greek definition and the theological guideline – indicate that, over and above the attempt to determine the essence of “human being” as a being, the question of its being has remained forgotten; rather, this being [Sein] is understood as something “self-evident” in the sense of the being present of other created things. (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 48)

221 (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 320e)
222 (Braver, 2014, pp. 59-67)
Such “being-present”, as the mode in which anthropology (along with psychology and biology) takes Dasein, has its precedent in the earliest analysis of theoretical comportment. The correlate of such comportment are objects understood as “merely-there”, an ontological correlate that we arguably find in Wittgenstein. As applied to Dasein, as the examples of the early Freiburg lectures make clear, such comportment is fatal. In each case that Heidegger examines, it is the primacy of theoretical comportment that precludes access to a phenomenology of the subject. And this is so, because such comportment already discloses Dasein as a de-worlded, de-historical object among others. As Wittgenstein puts it, “we need new concepts and we continually resort to those of the language of physical objects.” Accounts that begin from this point, however, have no recourse to make sense of these same concepts as being linguistic possibilities of that very Dasein.

The above critique of an object-oriented language naturally connects with Wittgenstein’s private language argument. In PI §243, he takes a language which exclusively makes reference to private states as his paradigm. It is not that such a language purports to be cryptic, for as the paradigm of privacy, inner states are in principle indecipherable. The private language therefore is not one in which ordinary language has been modified (thereby being still wedded to it), but one in which the user simply assigns symbols to ‘inner states’, an activity into which they have not been socialised. For Wittgenstein, there are a number of misguided pictures at work which lead to the illusion of such a language. But a key error lies in its dependence on the idea of ostensive definition. In contrast to what he sees as the Augustinian picture, the language of inner states for Wittgenstein does not begin descriptively. In ordinary language, we learn to say “I am in pain” as a way of replacing more gestural alternatives such as wincing or moaning. As he puts it,

“So you are saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying?” – On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying, it does not describe it. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 95e)

The change is necessary for the lifeforms that we are being socialised into (healthcare, etc.), but in assuming a certain grammar, it retrospectively implies descriptive content. The inferential explanatory account it gives rise to, as he argues, turns on the symmetry implied between its first and third-personal cases. In relation to the ontological question, moreover, it presupposes that the human being is an object among others. Above all, it fails to make a grammatical distinction between a relation

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223 §10 (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 44)
224 As argued for example by (Overgaard, 2007, p. 26).
225 In SS-1920, it was history understood theoretically that precludes the possibility of access to Dasein; In the WS-1919, psychology reverts to disingenuousness through its adoption of the natural scientific standpoint; In the KNS-1919, moreover, the place of sense-data already nullifies Dasein into the basis for the Cartesian picture.
226 (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 266)
227 (Wittgenstein, 2009a, p. 95e)
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toward others, ourselves or the objects that populate the world. In the *Philosophical Remarks* he writes,

> The logic of our language is so difficult to grasp at this point: our language employs the phrases ‘my pain’ and ‘his pain’, and also the expressions ‘I have (or feel) a pain’ and ‘He has (or feels) a pain’. An expression ‘I feel my pain’ or ‘I feel his pain’ is nonsense. And it seems to me that, at bottom, the entire controversy over behaviourism turns on this. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 94)

The *linguistic* symmetry of our idioms of ordinary language, implies phenomenological symmetry.\(^{228}\) To disavow the first-personal pronoun in such cases, as Wittgenstein does, shows the functionality however of an asymmetrical language. As Overgaard has shown, such asymmetry would suggest a dualist or behaviourist account, only if one already assumes a certain ontology of the subject, which Wittgenstein clearly rejects. Sensation is not an object that I bring to expression neutrally in language but, understood as sensation, is something irrevocably tied up with linguisticality itself. The assumption of the private language proponent is of the neutral mediation of language between the human being and world. They fail, however, to see the linguistic embeddedness of those same terms. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, he writes,

> When one says ‘He gave a name to his sensation’ one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak of someone’s having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word ‘pain’; it shows the post where the new word is stationed. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 98e)

For this reason, as he says, to say that ‘Sensations are private’ amounts only to saying that one plays Solitaire alone: Privacy has meaning here, but only within a game that is already public.\(^{229}\) On his mature account, psychological concepts such as ‘pain’ are inherently linguistic. Their place in language may partially describe experience, but in subsuming it within a grammar of possession and objectivity, leads to the classical problems of the philosophy of mind. In the case of dualism and behaviourism, while frequent accusations to be levelled against Wittgenstein’s work, the common root of their error is the inferential, object-like account of sensations that they take for granted. Psychology, as the science of the psychical, is laden with such conceptual problems on this account.\(^{230}\) The apparent silence of his late work, and I believe its openness to such accusations, lies only in the tentative quality of his method, a fact which was not lost on Wittgenstein.\(^{231}\)

\(^{228}\) C.f. (Wittgenstein, 2008, p. 7)  
\(^{229}\) (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 96e)  
\(^{230}\) Ibid, p. 243e.  
\(^{231}\) (Wittgenstein, 2008, pp. 44-45)
The term *Dasein* begins to appear early in Heidegger’s lecture notes. As a consistent term of art, however, it seems to first appear in WS-1920, the *Phenomenology of Religious Life*. Having moved through an account of factical life concern, Heidegger makes an interesting remark in relation to the categories of human existence, foreshadowing many of the developments of the 1920s. He writes,

This sphere is not problematized in today’s philosophy, or at least is only grasped according to the conceptual schema of the respective philosophy. One does not pose the question, whether it is perhaps impossible to grasp the sense of factical Dasein with today’s philosophical means…Apparently, then, there is a gap in today’s philosophical system of categories to be filled. Yet we will see that, through the explication of factical Dasein, the entire traditional system of categories will be blown up – so radically new will the *categories of factical Dasein* be. (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 36)

Much of the formative work familiar from *Being and Time* takes place during the Marburg years, so much so that the language of the early Freiburg years seems unfamiliar to a reader only acquainted with that text. The formulaic style of *Being and Time*, is arguably out of place for Heidegger’s work in the 1920s. Whether this change in style in 1927 is against his own anti-systematic tendency is an issue we will return to in chapter 4. One example of such a change, however, seemingly at odds with his declared method, is in the ordering of its sections. In §29 he writes,

Like every ontological interpretation in general, the analytic can only listen in, so to speak, on beings already previously disclosed with regard to their being. And it will keep to the eminent disclosive possibilities of Dasein of the widest scope in order to gain from them information about this being. (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 136)

It is arguably for logical reasons that *Being and Time* begins with an account of *being-in-the-world* (§12). Yet the most important ‘disclosive possibility’ identified for this information about Dasein is anxiety. If the above method was observed, therefore, then §40 should precede §12, which in a phenomenological sense it discloses. This is arguably the sense in which *Being and Time* is most distinct from Heidegger’s lecture series.

To offer a genealogy of any of the core concepts of *Being and Time* is complicated therefore by its induction into a treatise distinct from the thinking it arises from. In the case of Dasein, however, Heidegger himself situates the analytic polemically against a tradition of subjectivity exemplified in Descartes. In §13, in a critique of the primacy of “knowing” as the paradigm of *being-in*, he situates
this argument within the context of the early Freiburg polemic: that is, within the primacy of the theoretical. He writes,

But even if it were feasible to give an ontological definition of being-in primarily in terms of being-in-the-world that knows, the first task required would still be the phenomenal characterisation of knowing as a being in and toward the world. (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 60)

Because it prioritizes knowing as a relation between world and knower, the onus is on us to characterise what sort of relation that is. This approach, however, leads us into the cabinet of consciousness. As he puts it,

If knowing “is” at all, it belongs solely to those beings which know. But even in those beings, the things called human beings, knowing is not objectively present. In any case, it cannot be ascertained externally like corporeal qualities. To the extent that knowing belongs to these beings and it is not an external characteristic, it must be “inside”…But in this approach, which has many variations, the question of the kind of being of this knowing subject is completed omitted, though its way of being was always included tacitly in the thematic when one spoke of its knowing. (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 60)

Heidegger adds an interesting note here regarding the logic of this set up. He writes,

Of course, one is sometimes assured that the subject’s inside and its “inner sphere” is certainly not to be thought as a kind of “box” or “cabinet”. But what the positive meaning is of the “inside” of immanence in which knowing is initially enclosed, …about this there is silence. (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 60)

The implication here, of course, is that there is no salient difference between this account and the cabinet of consciousness. It errs insofar as it is “blind to what was already implicitly implied in the preliminary thematization of the phenomenon of knowing”. That is, it fails to begin with Dasein qua being-in-the-world. The obvious question, therefore, is how this historical tendency can be overcome? A comprehensive genealogy of Dasein is beyond the remit of this thesis, but the contours of such a route can at least be sketched. Taking as our leitmotif the critique in Being and Time §13, then three steps are necessary. Firstly, (i) we must disavow ourselves of the primacy of the theoretical. This means, in the language of 1919, to establish a primordial science. This alone closes the door to the rationalist accounts insofar as it re-worlds the subject in a way that is foreign to them. Secondly, (ii) and on this basis, we develop an account of that worldliness insofar as it is necessary in speaking of the subject. Lastly, (iii) we must develop an account of the pre-theoretical basis upon which

232 A direct precedent for this section, which arguably makes its connection to the concept of world more clear, can be found in (Heidegger, 2009a, p. 160)
233 (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 61)
theoretical knowledge is possible. If the rationalist account proceeds by taking the world-less subject that *knows*, then Heidegger’s implied route must be to re-world the subject and establish the basis on which such knowing is at first conceivable. To read this back through the lecture series of the 1920s, in this section I will take each of these movements in turn.

(i) Pre-theoretical Science [*Urwissenschaft*] and Worldliness

In the schema of comportment in 1919, there is an inverse relationship between world-embeddedness and proximity to the theoretical. The more abstract the kind of relation one takes up, the less its worldliness is manifest. Such comportment is of course still *being-in-the-world*, but a mode of the latter which conceals its own possibility in worldliness. As he puts it,

> Thing-experience is certainly a lived experience, but understood vis-à-vis its origin from the environmental experience it is already de-vivification. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 70)

If one tries to find the contours of the subject, conceived as “that being which knows”, the central fact of that being for Heidegger is precisely what will not appear: its world-embeddedness. That is, for as long as we give primacy to the theoretical, we deny the possibility of access to Dasein. As he puts it,

> The historical ‘I’ is de-historicized into the residue of a specific ‘I-ness’ as the correlate of thingliness; and only in following through the theoretical does it have its ‘who’. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 70)

This ‘who’ in question even in 1919, is the same germ of rationalist thought that Heidegger is critiquing in 1927. Through affording primacy to this specific mode of being-in-the-world, *knowing*, the inquiry leads inevitably into a set of traditional pictures of subjectivity. Heidegger immediately repeats, moreover, the genealogical relation implied in the KNS-1919.\(^{234}\) He writes,

> In order for knowing to be possible as determining by observation what is objectively present, there must first be a *deficiency* of having to do with the world and taking care of it…In this “dwelling” - as refraining from every manipulation and use – the *perception* of what is objectively present takes place. (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 61)

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\(^{234}\) As he phrases it in 1919, “We can see, at least in a provisional way, that we frequently, indeed for the most part, live environmentally and experience in this way. However, a deeply ingrained obsession with the theoretical greatly hinders a genuine survey of the prevalent domain of environmental experience. The environmental experience is no spurious contingency but lies in the essence of life in and for itself; by contrast, we become theoretically oriented only in exceptional cases.”(Heidegger, 2008, p. 69)
Only when analysis pays attention to this prior basis from which theoretical apprehension is possible, can philosophy give an account of Dasein. It is only then, that “the entire traditional system of categories will be blown up”. As I argued in chapter one, this question is mediated by Heidegger’s engagement with Natorp. In the KNS-1919, hermeneutical intuition is justified as a non-distortional aspect of comportment. The more difficult challenge for phenomenology is to bring this intuition to expression. In 1919, Heidegger repeatedly asserts that this is not an impossibility. As Brecht records him as saying,

Fundamental difficulty: description, i.e. linguistic formulation, is supposed to be theoretically contaminated. This is because meaning is essentially such as to intend something objectively. It is the essence of meaning fulfilment to take an object as object. Further, the universality of word meaning must necessarily have the character of generalisation, thus of theoretization. Intuitive comportment is identified with description itself, as if the method of description were in the end a kind of intuition. I can indeed only describe what I have already seen. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 162)

Despite this, he adds,

To the extent that meaningfulness is not as such theoretical there arises the possibility of phenomenological intuition, directed toward the eidetic, not toward generalisations. Since that which possesses meaning does not have to be theoretical, expressions of meaning are not tied to generalisations.

If one grasps the un-theoretical character of the meaningful, what follows is the possibility of a communicative science of phenomenology. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 165)

The exact nature of this solution, as I have argued, and its relation to generalisation, does not occur until WS-1920, the Phenomenology of Religious Life. Phenomenological language directs us toward primary intuition but delimits its sphere outside that of formal logic. It can only consist, that is, in formal indications. In the KNS-1919, the central descriptive motif by which theoretical and pre-theoretical comportment are distinguished is the concept of world. In what Kisiel terms the “transitional thought experiment” of that text, it is the environing experience that is contrasted to abstract sceptical reasoning. He writes,

235 (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 36) Or as he says in SS-1925, “This peculiar fact, that the primary phenomenon of the world is passed over, along with the stubbornness and the constant pressure and intrusion of the kind of apprehension involved in the theoretical apprehension and determination of a thing, can itself be explained only by reference to Dasein’s essential kind of being. When this happens, when the kind of being involved in this specific theoretical apprehension and its precedence is itself understood, only then is this persistent prejudice rendered harmless for the primary analysis of the world.” (Heidegger, 2009a, p. 185) italics mine.

236 (Kisiel, 1995, p. 41)
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In the experience of seeing the lectern something is given to me from out of an immediate environment [Umwelt]. This environmental milieu (lectern, book, blackboard, notebook, fountain pen, caretaker, student fraternity, tram-car, motor-car, etc.) does not consist just of things, objects, which are then conceived as meaning this and this; rather, the meaningful is primary and immediately given to me without any mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension. Living in an environment, it signifies to me everywhere and always, everything has the character of world. It is everywhere the case that ‘it worlds’ [es weltet], which is something different it ‘it values’ [es wertet]. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 58)

Such language is reminiscent of Heidegger’s later work. It represents, moreover, the first real dialogue with the primacy of world-embeddedness. Phenomenological access to this region however, is contingent on the possibility of pre-theoretical science, the central project of that text. The failure of traditional reasoning to that end is precisely by committing us to such “mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension.” It is only in formal indication and destruction, as correlates of phenomenological reading and speaking, that access to such ‘worldliness’ for Heidegger is possible.

(ii) World

Having established access to a phenomenology of world between the KNS-1919 and WS-1920, what is Heidegger’s initial account? The first systematic engagement with the concept occurs almost immediately after the KNS-1919, in the winter semester course of that year, Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Much of the series rephrases the problematic of the previous semester. The register, however, of the investigation has been shifted from the cognitive overtones of comportment to one of worldliness. Nonetheless, the target of its polemic remains unchanged: how can we justify pre-theoretical science [or the science of factual life], given the distortional effects that scientific inquiry implies? Introducing this again by means of the concept of world, he writes,

Our life is our world, which we seldom see, but rather always, if also in a way that is wholly inconspicuous and hidden, “are by it”: “captivated”, “repelled”, “enjoying”, “renouncing.” “We are always somehow encountering.” Our life is the world, in which we live, into which

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237 Compare for example his remarks on the ready-to-hand in Being and Time. He writes, “the kind of being of these beings is handiness [Zuhandenheit]. But it must not be understood as a mere characteristic or interpretation, as if such “aspects” were discursively forced upon “beings” which we initially encounter, as if an initially objectively present world-stuff were “subjectively coloured” in this way…To expose what is merely objectively present, cognition must first penetrate beyond things at hand being taken care of.” (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 71)

238 (Heidegger, 2013)
and in each case within which the tendencies of life flow. And our life is only lived as life insofar as it lives in a world. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 27)

The lecture series fleshes this out in three overlapping directions: the environing-world [Umwelt]; the with-world; and most fundamentally, the self-world. Prefiguring somewhat the language of ecstasy, Heidegger speaks of the ‘outliftedness’ [Herausgehobenheiten] of these layers in the relief character of life experience.239 While one aspect may stand out in prominence, it is only against the relief of the others that it can do so. The self-world has a kind of precedence for Heidegger, precisely because it accompanies the richness of life in factual experience. As he says,

And the life world – the environing-world, the with-world, and the self-world – is lived in a situation of the self. The encounters of the life-world always encounter a situation of the self. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 48)

Adding a few remarks later,

These situations press themselves and are incessantly permeating one another under the pressure – seen from the inside, so to speak – what shows itself here is the turnedness [Zugekehrtheit] of all life-encounters and their qualitative forms and contents towards the self-world. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 49)

As argued in chapter one, such prominence of the self-world functions as the criteria by which Heidegger separates theoretical and pre-theoretical comportment. To experience the environing world, is to encounter it simultaneously within the context of my historical self. In the lectern example of that text, the object “resonates with the experience…It is an experience proper to me and so do I see it”. The relation, however, is not “a process but rather an event of appropriation [Ereignis].”240 This kind of self-disclosure is immediately familiar from Being and Time. That Dasein encounters itself “initially and for the most part” in terms of the world, is an idea with an early precedent in Heidegger’s lectures.241 As he puts it in 1919,

I experience myself, encounter myself in all possible ways, but in such a way that I also experience other things: the clock on the desk, the underlines, the marginal notes in the scientific study. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 77)242
Arguably the central motif of Heidegger’s mature concept of world is the hermeneutic-as structure. As he describes it in his 1925 lectures on *Logic*,

Every act of having things before our eyes, every act of perceiving them, is held within this [prior] disclosure of things, a disclosure that things get from a primary making-sense-of-things in terms of their what-they’re-for. Every act of having something before our eyes and perceiving it, is in and of itself a matter of “having” something *as* something...In short, it has the *as*-structure. (Heidegger, 2010b, p. 121)

The meaningful disclosure of things in the world presupposes such an as-structure. Objects are initially encountered not as chaotic sense-data on which meaning must accrue, but *as* something already understood in terms of what-they’re-for. As Heidegger says in *Being and Time*, “‘initially’ we never hear noises and complexes of sound, but the creaking wagon, the motorcycle…It requires a very artificial and complicated attitude in order to “hear” a pure “noise””. Much of the development of the *as*-structure occurs after Heidegger’s move to Marburg in 1923. However, its earliest precedent is arguably already hinted at in his remarks on “thing-oriented apprehension” in the KNS-1919.244

Even in that lecture series, where this account is embryonic, equipment already takes centre-stage. In reference to the experience of someone unfamiliar with the environment in question, he writes,

[He] will see the lectern much more as something ‘which he does not know what to make of’. The meaningful character of ‘instrumental strangeness’, and the meaningful character of the ‘lectern’, are in their essence absolutely identical. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 58)

On his mature view, this is true because of the centralality of instrumentality to lived understanding. Heidegger’s earliest account of the relation between “pure noise” and the “creaking wagon” moreover, is developed during these early years. In the KNS-1919, it is through de-vivification (viz. theoretitization) that the lectern is reduced from instrumental object to “largish box with another small one set upon it”.245 In the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, however, this account of de-vivification is again shifted to the concept of world. He writes,

All of the rich relations to the self-world are interrupted: living, flowing life “somehow” solidifies in the scientific context of expressions [or it stands in a wholly other form of life]. …Through sciences, life-worlds are taken into a tendency of devivification, and thereby factual life is robbed of the actual living possibility of its factically vital actualization. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 62)

243 (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 158)
244 (Heidegger, 2008, p. 58)
245 Ibid, p. 57.
The first appearance of the “as” in Heidegger’s work occurs in this lecture series. It initially appears in that text to describe a specifically theoretical apprehension (what he will later term the apophantic-as). Contrasting such apprehension with what he calls “taking-notice”, as the movement of lived-understanding, he writes,

Taking-notice – its form of expression – as an explicating modification of factual experiencing, is from the same boundless domain as this. Above all it does not need to make-prominent that which has been taken-notice of, in such a way that it places it in the regional characterization of an “as” or even that it would require the particular formation of a particular style of experience. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 89)

Crucially for Heidegger, however, this lived understanding has its own kind of as-structure. It is on this basis that Heidegger first describes the hermeneutic-as. He writes,

Even here in the factual context of experience and in the taking-notice that is expressing it, there is a highly peculiar “as” of characterization, but it is not the “as” of the general or the otherwise conceptual, regional characterization. It is rather the “as” of meaningfulness, which is necessarily always historical, growing out of the situation. (Heidegger, 2013, p. 90)

The movement between these structures, which the text goes on to describe, is the movement of de-vivification, a movement explored in more depth in his 1925 course on Logic. Already in 1919, however, the contours of Heidegger’s account of world are in place: in the primordial sense, the world is meaningful in a non-theoretical way. The movements of such understanding in lived-experience have a peculiar kind of as-structure. Theoretical cognition, also characterised by an as-structure, is possible only through modification to the former. Understanding this modification, and its relation to the being of Dasein, is one of the central questions in Heidegger’s work predating Being and Time.

(iii) The way through Aristotle and Kant

Having established (i) access to a phenomenology of world; and (ii) given his earliest account of it in WS-1919, the central challenge that remains is to justify the possibility of the theoretical. That is, how does theoretical apprehension come about as a modification of comportment? What does this tell us about Dasein? Heidegger’s most developed treatment of this is in his 1925 course called Logic, the Question of Truth. The course ostensibly deals with Aristotelian logic as the precursor of the discipline. Specifically, as it relates to the concepts of σύνθεσις and διάρρεως. Following the account of WS-1919, the as-structure of lived-experience is now named the hermeneutic-as, in opposition to that of the apophantic. Returning to the latter, as the theoretical “as” of predication, he writes,
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In actually showing and determining something, we grasp the subject matter. Or more precisely: the subject-matter is already present, and from that present thing the statement – the blackness of the chalkboard – is lifted out and highlighted, as it were, not as a new object but at first only in the sense of making the subject matter more accessible as what it is. (Heidegger, 2010b, p. 120)

But for such predication to be conceivable, “the subject matter must have already become accessible”.246 That is, “all speech speaks about something that is somehow already disclosed”.247 The predicative structure of this prior disclosure, moreover, (the hermeneutic-as) is understood in 1925 in terms of its serviceability. He writes,

What does this disclosure consist in? Answer: the thing we encounter is uncovered in terms of the end-for-which of its serviceability. It is already posited in meaning – it already makes sense [be-deutet]. Do not understand this to mean that we were first given a something that is free of meaning, and then a meaning gets attached to it. Rather, what is first of all “given” – and we still have to determine what that word means – is the “for-writing”, the “for-entering-and-exiting”, the “for-illuminating”, the “for-sitting”. (Heidegger, 2010b, p. 121)

So in what subjective alteration does this change consist? How do we move from the hermeneutic to the apophantic? In §12, Heidegger identifies the central motif of his mature account of human existence: temporality. The hermeneutic-as, by virtue of its determination in light of ends, has a distinctly futural component. He writes,

So in this apparently direct understanding of the things closest to me in the lived world, when I apprehend and understanding something, I have always already gone further ahead than the thing that is given (in an extreme sense) “directly” to me. I am always already further ahead by understanding the end-for-which and the what-as in terms of which I am taking the thing that is given and encountered at the moment. And only from the what-as and end-for-which (in terms of which the thing in question can serve me) – only from this end-for-which, where in fact I always already am – do I return to the thing that I encounter. (Heidegger, 2010b, pp. 123-124)

As Sartre puts it of the voyeur in Being and Nothingness, “the order is the reverse of the causal order, it is the end to be attained which organizes all the moments which precede it”.248 This account, for Heidegger, defines comportment understood in the pre-theoretical sense. He writes,

246 (Heidegger, 2010b, p. 120)
247 Ibid, p. 121
248 (Sartre, 1956, p. 259)
This way of being-always already living ahead in the end-for-which as returning-to and disclosing-is an original, unified, fundamental comportment whose structure expresses the “as”. (Heidegger, 2010b, p. 127)

Having altered the account of comportment, (i) firstly in light of the as-structure, and (ii) secondly in light of time, the question remains: what does the transformation (de-vivification) consist in? Heidegger refers to this modification as “a flattening out of the original structure...insofar as the statement is now directed thematically toward something (the chalk)...The thing about which I make the statement becomes merely something-there”.249 What was lost to Aristotle on Heidegger’s view, and the Greeks in general, was the temporal aspect to this flattening process.250 The hermeneutic-as structure, as the precondition for encountering the world consists, he argues, in a making-present. He writes,

“Making-present” means the very same as ‘letting a present being encounter us in a now-moment [Gegenwart]”. What gets disclosed in the act of making-present is thereby understood as something we encounter in a now-moment, something that, in this now-moment, can appear in its presence. But the presence of the thing we encounter need not be already and completely present-now, that is, it need not be completely uncovered. (Heidegger, 2010b, p. 162)

In the apophantic-as, however, in which the ‘blackness of the blackboard’ is “lifted out and highlighted”, it is precisely this incompleteness of presence that is altered. “Because of that”, he writes, “the things of the lived world – things of use or in general anything oriented to concern-about as a non-theoretical comportment – are levelled down to things that are merely present, so that they are no longer differentiated as being implements adapted to certain functions”.251 And this disruption to the ‘referential’ nature of making-present is the ‘flattening-out’ of the hermeneutic-as structure. In temporal terms, it is this movement which begins the path to de-vivification. As he says,

The only thing that is completely present is something that we encounter in an act of pure making-present, therefore something that, in itself and in its presence, can offer nothing except that as which it is present. Pure making-present or presenting is of such a nature that, in it there is nothing about the thing-to-be-uncovered that is not now-present. The thing to be uncovered is brought into pure, direct nearness. (Heidegger, 2010b, p. 162)

The above account draws a descriptive line between apophansis and the hermeneutic-as in terms of the problem of time. On Heidegger’s reading, moreover, it gives us “a light, as it were, to shine back

249 (Heidegger, 2010b, p. 133)
250 Ibid, p. 163. He writes, “The Greeks had no suspicion of this unfathomable problematic, which opens up before us once we have seen this connection [between being and time].”
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over the history of the problem of being”.\(^{252}\) This is so because the Platonic tradition identifies Being with presence-now (apophansis).\(^{253}\) The first post-Aristotelian to be aware of this problematic on Heidegger’s view was Kant. He writes,

In that process we come to see that Kant is the only philosopher who even suspected that the understanding of being and its characteristics is connected with time. But his very conception of time blocked him from achieving a fundamental understanding of the problem— that is, blocked him from asking the question at all. In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant did not attain the appropriate basis for synthesizing the schematism of the concepts of the understanding (where time is really the fundamental concept) with the basic function of consciousness, transcendental apperception. (Heidegger, 2010b, p. 163)

It was Kant who first realized the problem of time at the heart of cognition. His failure, however, had been in assuming what Heidegger calls “the vulgar conception of time”.\(^{254}\) For this reason, transcendental apperception and time come to exhibit a tension at the heart of his account of human subjectivity. Had Kant seen past his inherited vocabulary, then time and the basic function of consciousness (the “I think”) collapse into one another. As he says,

If we understand the “I think” as a mode of pure making-present, and if we understand making-present as the very way-of-being of human existence *qua* being-in-the-world, then Kant’s point of departure is fundamentally modified—in other words, the dogmatic starting-point of the Cartesian position is avoided from the very start. It is not the case that an “I think” is first given as the purest *a priori*, and then some “time” is added as the mediating point for the [I think] to come out to a world. Rather, the very being of the subject *qua* human existence is being-in-the-world, and human existence’s being-in-the-world is possible only because the basic structure of its being is time itself, specifically here in the mode of making-present. (Heidegger, 2010b, p. 336)

No tension would exist, because temporality and the possibility of cognition coalesce. “The “I think””, he writes, “is not in time (Kant is completely right to reject that) but *is* time itself, or more exactly, one mode of time – that of pure making-present”.\(^{255}\) Formal logic, through inheriting such

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\(^{252}\) Ibid, p. 163

\(^{253}\) Heidegger connects this tradition with the apparently problematic ordering of Book X of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. Against such a tradition he writes, “In the logic and doctrine of being of the Greeks, and in the tradition up to Husserl, λόγος as determination-via-statements has in fact been the guide for pursuing the inquiry into being…But once we recognize that this very determining, along with its entire structure, is a derived phenomenon, we also see that…[it] cannot be the starting point for the question of being”. (Heidegger, 2010b, p. 134)

\(^{254}\) Or as he calls it in the KNS-1919, “thing-time” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 70). Kant’s inheritance in this respect derives from Descartes. As he says, “it becomes possible as his starting-point only because of the fact that Kant orients himself dogmatically in terms of Descartes, and at the same time in terms of the idea of a certain pre-eminence of formal logic”. (Heidegger, 2010b, pp. 336-337)

\(^{255}\) Ibid, p. 335
unclarified concepts, is for this reason the most “imperfect of all philosophical disciplines”. As Heidegger finishes by saying,

But should more radical temporal possibilities be found in the temporality of human existence, these would necessarily set an essential limit to traditional logic and ontology. Whether philosophical research can be intense enough and firm enough to make this limit a lived fact is a question that concerns the very fate of philosophy. (Heidegger, 2010b, p. 343)

At few times does Heidegger’s work take on such a sharp change in style as this semester. The Logic course of 1925 clearly situates Being and Time in a unique sense. The stylistic precedent for that text is Kant’s first Critique, the very text that the Logic course identifies as first grasping the problem of time at the heart of truth and being. This early destruction of Kant not only situates truth (as first described in WS-1919) in terms of temporality but gives Heidegger the historical vista in which Being and Time takes up thinking. Whether this turn to an explicitly schematic style has ramifications for Heidegger’s project is unclear. It is a question I will return to in chapter 4.

III.

The development of Heidegger’s account of Dasein is mediated by his reading of the history of philosophy. Working backwards from §13 of Being and Time, the contours of one path to the analytic of that text come into focus:

(i) The breakthrough period of 1919-1921, in which pre-theoretical science is established, provides access definitionally closed to the theoretically based accounts modelled on the natural sciences.

(ii) The concept of world itself, the leitmotif of the analytic, is developed firstly in WS-1919 and in greater detail through the Marburg years.

(iii) Finally, the basic movements of this account are understood in terms of their relation to temporality, a motif that comes to maturity in the early Marburg years. This is expressed most clearly in WS-1925.

Subjectivity, for Heidegger (as for Wittgenstein), is indelibly tied to the question of world-hood. The above move (from pre-theoretical science to world to time) is not a move in abstraction from the

256 He writes, “Logic is the most imperfect of all philosophical disciplines, and it can be moved forward only if it reflects on the basic structures of its thematic phenomena, on the primary ontological structures of the logical as a comportment of human existence, and on the temporality of human existence itself.” (Ibid, p. 343, italics mine)
question of what human existence is. Such is exactly the error attributed to all non-primordial science. World-embedded temporality is not a separate question to Dasein, it is the question of Dasein. As Heidegger describes it in his 1924 lecture *On the Concept of Time,*

> Summing up, we may say: time is Dasein. Dasein is my specificity, and this can be specificity in what is futural by running ahead to the certain yet indeterminate past. Dasein always is in a manner of its possible temporal being. Dasein is time, time is temporal. Dasein is not time, but temporality. (Heidegger, 1992, p. 20e)

The relation between this account and more traditional questions concerning subjectivity has had a complicated history. The purpose of §13 itself was to side-step such questions as internalism and externalism by showing how they are based on a misconception about the nature of cognition. The rationalist account goes awry because it attributes primacy to ‘knowing’, and thus postpones the question of being-in-the-world. But this conceptual step is not a neutral one. As he says,

> In knowing, Dasein gains a new perspective of being toward the world always already discovered in Dasein […] Knowing is a mode of Dasein which is founded in being-in-the-world. Thus, being-in-the-world, as a fundamental constitution, requires a prior interpretation”. (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 62)

Later he writes,

> We get the answer to this question by recalling what we were charged with keeping in view phenomenologically when we pointed out this phenomenon: being-in in contradistinction to the objectively present insideness of something objectively present “in” another; being-in not as an attribute to an objectively present subject effected or even just triggered by the objective presence of the “world” […] This kind of approach [e.g. Descartes] always already splits the phenomenon beforehand, and there is no prospect of ever again putting it back together from the fragments… What is ontologically decisive is to avoid splitting the phenomenon beforehand, that is, to secure its positive phenomenal content. (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 128)

On Heidegger’s view, to begin with being-in-the-world would deny the roots from which such accounts flower. Extensive literature, in spite of this, has identified his position with a semantic or social externalism in opposition to Husserl’s internalism. It is in this vein that private language arguments are said to preclude phenomenology, which is taken to domesticate linguistic meaning to the privacy of consciousness. In Heidegger’s case, the related concepts of fallenness and cultural meaning are taken to externalize meaning beyond or outside Dasein. Both of these positions, however, are at odds with Husserl and Heidegger’s stated aims. As O Murchadha points out, they tacitly ignore

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257 A short summary of such works includes: (Carman, 2003; Dreyfus, 1982; Keller, 1999; Lafont, 2005). Writing against such interpretations, see: (Crowell, 2008; O’Murchadha, 2008; Zahavi, 2004, 2017)
the centrality of the reduction for both figures. As he puts it, “the reduction allows for nothing internal to consciousness as it understands consciousness in relation to its intentional objects which appear to it from the horizon of the world; as the same time it leaves nothing external to consciousness as it investigates all such objects only as they appear to consciousness.”

In the case of Heidegger, the analytic is every bit as self-referential as classical phenomenology. The possibility of reduction however is one that Dasein encounters in anxiety with that of authenticity. Linguistic meaning is found certainly to be ‘external’ to Dasein, but not if this term is understood as independent or ‘outside’ in any strong sense. As O Murchadha puts it, “[language…] external to individual Dasein and constitutive of its being.” Our temptation to be led astray here is grounded precisely in what Heidegger critiques in §13. As he puts it later,

In talking, Dasein expresses itself not because it has been initially cut off as “something internal” from something outside, but because as being-in-the-world it is already “outside” when it understands. What is expressed is precisely this being outside, that is, the actual mode of attunement (of mood) which we showed to pertain to the full disclosedness of being-in. (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 157)

As with Husserl, what is of culture is understood only insofar and in the “how” of its relation to Dasein; Dasein is understood however only in terms of its embeddedness in a cultural world. In spite of this fact, such claims have become a paradigm for distinguishing the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger. One small contribution can be made to this debate, I suggest, by returning to the question of method. In §16 of the KNS-1919, Heidegger gives his earliest account of the division between the realist and idealist positions in respect to external-world scepticism. He writes,

Does my environing world really exist? Is it so obvious that the external world is real and not rather only my representation, my lived experience? How shall this be decided? I cannot simply resolve to adopt one or another epistemological conception. Is it (critical) realism that is correct, or transcendental philosophy? Aristotle or Kant? How is this ‘burning’ question of the reality of the external world to be solved? (Heidegger, 2008, p. 61)

This question is immediately connected with his distinction between the environmental experience (the lectern) and that of the question “is there something?”. In the former, nowhere was consideration given to the epistemological basis for the experience. That is, the reality of the

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258 (O'Murchadha, 2008)
259 Ibid, p. 384
261 (Heidegger, 2008) §13
262 He sardonically writes, “epistemology arouses us out of this slumber and points to problems. These cannot be seen by clinging to immediate life-experience. One must rise to the critical standpoint. One must be free and able, in a progressive age of reason and culture, to place oneself over oneself. In this way one enters a new dimension, the philosophical.” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 63)
experience and its relation to ‘mere appearances’ was not problematized. Subjecting it to such critique, however, he writes,

If, from this standpoint, I consider the experience of the lectern, it is clear that what is primarily given are sensations, initially optical ones, or, if I simultaneously come into physical contact with the lectern, sensations of touch. These data of sense are given. Up to this point the two basic epistemological standpoints, critical realism and critical-transcendental idealism, are in agreement. But now they go off in opposed directions, posing the epistemological question in different ways.

Critical realism asks: how do I get out of the ‘subjective sphere’ of sense data to knowledge of the external world?

Critical-transcendental idealism poses the problem: how, remaining within the ‘subjective sphere’, do I arrive at objective knowledge? (Heidegger, 2008, p. 63)

The crucial point here is the commonality between these positions. It represents, moreover, an example of Braver’s Rational Retrospective Reconstruction. The apparent distinction between both positions belies the commonality of starting point. In both cases, a certain model of knowledge has been taken as the paradigm, that of sense-data. Such a model however belongs only to the most reified apprehension we can have of the world. He writes,

What does it mean that both solutions hold to the fact of natural science? It is not just naturalism, as some have opined (Husserl’s ‘logos’ essay), but rather the general prevalence of the theoretical, which deforms the true problematic. It is the primacy of the theoretical. In its very approach to the problem, with the isolation of sense data as the elements to be explained or eliminated as unclear residues alien to consciousness, the all-determining step into the theoretical has already been taken. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 68)

Both the realist and idealist positions develop from the epistemological question concerning the legitimacy and provenance of human experience. To take up this sceptical position, however, is to take a stance from within an experience already disclosed and meaningful. Only in the theoretical comportment that accompanies such interrogation, does the opposition between subject and world seem sufficiently great to accommodate the language of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ at all. The real mystery to Heidegger, as Philipse points out, is only the predominance of this comportment. As he says in Being and Time, “it is not a matter of proving that and how an “external world” is objectively present, but of demonstrating why Dasein as being-in-the-world has the tendency of “initially” burying the “external world” in nullity “epistemologically” in order to then resurrect it through proofs”. It is for

\[263\] (Philipse, 2007)
\[264\] (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 198)
these reasons that he claims the epistemological, as the starting point for such accounts, is circular.\footnote{(Heidegger, 2008, p. 74)} His own phenomenological project, \textit{qua} primordial science, begins precisely by rejecting this starting point. He writes,

If the circle is to be superseded, then there must be a science that is pre-theoretical or supra-theoretical, at any rate non-theoretical, a genuinely \textit{primordial} science from which the theoretical itself originates. This science of the origin is such that not only does it not \textit{need} to make \textit{presuppositions}, but because it is not theory, it \textit{cannot} make them: it is \textit{prior} to or \textit{beyond} the sphere where talk of presuppositions makes sense. \textit{This} sense is strictly derivative, ‘springing’ as it does from the original spring of the origin. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 75)

In the Waismann Nachlass, the commonality between idealism and realism is likewise taken up by Wittgenstein. He writes,

This misconceived framework of questioning confronts us in the case of most philosophical problems, e.g. in the problem of realism and idealism. The idealist who says, ‘my image of the chair \textit{is} the chair’ and the realist who says, ‘The chair is \textit{not} the image of the chair, the image is only a picture’ – both have basically the same goal: They want to say ‘what the chair is’. (Wittgenstein \& Waismann, 2013, p. 323)

Adding a few remarks later,

The error of idealism and realism alike consists in the fact that both incorrectly substitute an oversimplified system for our actual grammar. (Wittgenstein \& Waismann, 2013, p. 323)

This simplification for Wittgenstein, consists in the application of such epistemological concepts as ‘image’, ‘illusion’ and ‘real’, especially as it connects with the idea of sense-data. In TS-213 he takes the case of memory. It seems to us, he writes, that “compared to the experience of the present, memory is a somewhat \textit{secondary} kind of experience.”\footnote{(Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 347e) Idioms of expression such as this, however, are only misapplied when taken out of the context of ordinary life. He writes,}

We say, “We can \textit{only} remember something”. As if, in some primary sense, memory were a rather weak and uncertain image of what was originally before in complete clarity.

This is correct in physical language, for I say “I can \textit{only vaguely} remember this house”.

And why not leave it at that? For, after all, this mode of expression says everything we want to say and that can be said! But we want to say that it can be said in yet \textit{another} way; and that is important. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 347e)
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As in the later relation he draws between ‘attitude’ and knowledge in MS 169, the encroachment of epistemology here is not a means to the solution but the very source of the problem. As he adds,

In this other mode of expression, it’s as if the emphasis were placed on something else. For the words “to seem”, “error”, etc. have a certain emotional emphasis that isn’t essential to the phenomena. This emphasis is somehow connected to the will, and not merely to knowledge.

We talk about an optical illusion, for instance, and associate the idea of a mistake with this expression even though, really, this is not a case of a mistake; and if appearance were usually more important in life than the results of measurement, language too would present a different attitude towards such phenomena. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 347e)

As with Heidegger, this imposition of epistemology is exemplified in the language of sense-data.267 Such language gives philosophy an idiom of expression in which to discuss experience under the apparently neutral banner of epistemology. Accordingly, the concepts at home in the cases being discussed cannot dissuade us, because they are claimed to be taken as experiences as such. But as Heidegger says, “an ‘object as such’ means only the “to which” of the theoretical attitudinal relation”.268 For Wittgenstein, it is the very paradigm of the physical encroaching on the phenomenological. Solving problems such as this, accordingly, can only consist in side stepping their most problematic points of origin.

The development of Wittgenstein’s account of subjectivity, as I have argued, occurs along precisely these epistemological lines. This occurs on two fronts: firstly, (i) in a clarification of the first-personal language of pain-reporting; and secondly, (ii) in a third-personal correlate exemplified in his later remarks on the “attitude towards a soul”. The earliest engagement with the former took place in chapter VI of the Philosophical Remarks, explicitly in light of his phenomenological terminology. As he remarks immediately before introducing his alternative language,

The worst philosophical errors always arise when we try to apply our ordinary – physical-language in the area of the immediately given. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 88)

Before adding,

The very expression ‘I can perceive x’ is itself taken from the idioms of physics, and x ought to be a physical object – e.g., a body – here. Things have already gone wrong if this

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267 Ibid. He writes, “The time has now come to subject the expression “sense datum” to criticism. A sense datum is the appearance of this tree, whether there “really is a tree standing there”, or a prop, a mirror image, a hallucination, etc. A sense datum is the appearance of the tree, and what we want to say is that this linguistic representation is just one description, but not the essential one.”

268 (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 42)
expression is used in phenomenology, where x must refer to a datum. For then ‘I’ and ‘perceive’ also cannot have their previous senses. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 88)

The most unavoidable temptation is to read the alternative language of that chapter in a substantive (behaviourist) way. Wittgenstein is clear, however, that he is only testing its efficacy in relation to expressive “intelligibility and freedom from ambiguity”.269 As he says, it’s “not that the [new] representation would be in any sense more correct than the old one, but it would serve to show clearly what was logically essential in the representation”.270 If such a method could have propositional content, therefore, it would not be that:

(i) Pain is observed in another through self-analogy, as the alternative language suggests. But rather that,

(ii) The possibility of such a language, shows the “I” is not functioning here in the same way as in cases such as “I have the box”.

The partial nature of this latter claim is not something that can be overcome. Such overcoming, however, is unnecessary, sufficient as it already is to dispel a key dualist assumption. As he says, “solipsism could be disproved by the fact that the word “I” doesn’t occupy a central position in grammar but is a word like any other”.271 It is without contradiction, therefore, that in the same period we find his earliest attempts to undermine the behaviourist paradigm for third-personal statements. As he says in chapter 104 of TS-213,

Behaviourism: “It seems to me that I’m sad, my head is hanging so low.”

Why doesn’t one feel pity when a door hasn’t been oiled and it screeches as its opened and shut? Do we feel pity for someone else who behaves as we do when we’re in pain – feel it as a result of philosophical deliberations that have led to the conclusion that he is suffering like us? (Wittgenstein, 2013, pp. 358e-359e)

Separating such linguistic analogies (as in the first-personal case), does not commit Wittgenstein to behaviourism, any more than his separation of inference and empathy commits him to dualism. As he says, nothing more is “final about their positions than that they no longer lie side by side”.272 The difficulty in philosophy, he adds, is to “say no more than we know”.273 Just as for Heidegger, Wittgenstein’s methodological aim is to undermine the assumptions that sustain such paradigms of subjectivity. In both cases, what results is a world-involved social subject, fundamentally

269 (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 89)
271 (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 358e)
272 (Wittgenstein, 2008, p. 45)
273 Ibid.
irreconcilable with a dialogue of inner and outer.\footnote{For influential accounts arguing to the contrary in Wittgenstein’s case, especially as it relates to idealism, see (Findlay, 2006; Williams, 1974). Against such readings, see (Hutto, 1996; Kerr, 1997; Malcolm, 1982; Mulhall, 2009).} In their broadest contours, therefore, what these accounts most fundamentally share is twofold:

(i) Firstly, the claim that classical distinctions (such as between idealism/realism or internalism/externalism) turn on a series of related assumptions. These include: the separation of subject and world; the primacy of inferential knowledge; the privacy of ‘inner’ states; and an object-basis for discussing the subject.

(ii) Secondly, that the above assumptions have their basis in \textit{methodological} blind spots from traditional approaches, either through reification of the subject matter in theoretical comportment, or in the assumption of models of language from the natural sciences and epistemology.

If such assumptions have their basis in the methodological blind spots of traditional philosophy, however, then the most interesting question here, it seems to me, is how these figures should come to coalesce. Why should Heidegger be immune to the methodological blind-spot identified by Wittgenstein within T-philosophy? Why too should Wittgenstein evade the traps of the onto-theological tradition with respect to the basic claims of subjectivity? What is it, that grammar and primordial science are commonly doing?

The phenomenological insights of Wittgenstein’s variational method occur through deconstructing the meaningful ordinary language of pain-reporting. As with Heidegger, crucially, it is the \textit{language} of the problem-set that grants access to the phenomenological. The route to the logic of experience (in this case of human subjectivity) is through the descriptive content presupposed by the use of language. In both his critique of behaviourist and dualist accounts, as I have argued, the forums in which Wittgenstein’s insights take place are: (i) the first-personal ordinary language of pain-reporting; and (ii) its third-personal correlate of pain-ascription. For Heidegger, likewise, it consists in a series of destructive readings, beginning with the theoretical undertones of contemporary psychology. It is on the basis of this reading that the positive insights he finds in Aristotle and Kant lay the ground for \textit{Being and Time}. The meta-philosophical difference between these thinkers is naturally apparent here. For Wittgenstein, the “entire task” of philosophy, as he says, “is to shape expression in such a way that certain worries disappear.”\footnote{(Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 310e)} Such grammatical exercises accordingly end when we have found the misleading analogies from which the problem derives. For Heidegger, there is a more positive
The reading implied by §13 of *Being and Time* is emblematic in this respect. The rationalist language of contemporary psychology may harbour derivative descriptions of lived experience, but this is not necessarily so for St. Paul or Aristotle. As he says of Augustine in WS-1919, “in ‘inquietum cor nostrum’ [our hearts are restless] [he] saw the great incessant disquiet of life. He gained a wholly original aspect, not at all just a theoretical one – Rather, he lived in it and brought it to expression.”\(^{276}\) The contours of the analytic of Dasein in *Being and Time* have their precedent precisely in such destructive readings. Such readings are not negative, moreover, except insofar as they polemically write against the *contemporary* problem-set. As he says in WS-1923,

> Another concept of truth than that popular in science guides the destruction. The destruction is critical; the critique has a positive character by virtue of directing itself at the present within which the destruction is carried, by virtue of living in the very research that accomplishes the destruction; *living in it in such a way that the critique of the historical is nothing other than the critique of the present*, a critique such that, through it, the situation of the interpretation itself becomes transparent and critically tilled. (Heidegger, 2005, p. 88)

What destruction and grammatical philosophy satiate above all is the other’s demand for a reorientation in the role of language. In neither case, is their critical stance within such language an attempt to dispel it in favour of another. For Wittgenstein, to understand our language is to dispel the misleading analogies from which our problems arise. It acts in so doing, I have argued, as an incompletable theory of descriptions. In distinguishing: *possession* of things from sensations; *attitude* from inference; the ‘*knowledge*’ of self from others; and the language of objects from consciousness, the positive contours of a phenomenology gradually emerge - not as substantive philosophical claims, but as negative remarks on the use of language. For Heidegger, positive phenomenological movements can only be made through liberating the experience at the heart of such language. As in grammar, what follows cannot be substantive claims in the direct sense. All we can do, is formally indicate what we find. As he says,

> The meaning-content of these concepts does not directly intend or express what they refer to, but only gives an indication, a pointer to the fact that anyone who seeks to understand is called upon by this conceptual context to *undertake a transformation of themselves into their Dasein*. (Heidegger, 1995, p. 297)

\(^{276}\) (Heidegger, 2013, p. 48) Italics mine.
Attempts to understand *Being and Time* in terms of externalism and internalism, fundamentally misconstrue the methodological intention of that text. As early as 1919, Heidegger explicitly identifies the origin of such language as that against which his phenomenology begins. For as long we entertain such categories as the stock of philosophy, on his view, we are conceding to the movements of thought from which these problems initially arise. In his response to Lafont’s claim that Heidegger harbours a linguistic idealism, Hubert Dreyfus is correct to point out that Heidegger’s operating language is important here. The terminology of *Being and Time* is coerced into drawing distinctions between Dasein and world, but it does so only in formal indications, i.e., as injunctions to see something that cannot yet be wrangled into ‘useable’ concepts. Always when speaking of the relation between Dasein and world, for Heidegger, we can do so only “while keeping the whole phenomenon in mind from the outset”, namely being-in-the-world.

The temptation, likewise, to view Wittgenstein’s polemics as cornering him into either of these positions, tacitly ignores his methodological remarks. The purpose of grammar is not only negative, in aiming to subvert the legitimacy of problems, but its linguistic results are themselves tentative. As he says in TS-213,

> When I say: here we are at the limits of language, that always sounds as if resignation were necessary at this point, whereas on the contrary complete satisfaction comes about, since no question remains. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 310e)

To infer a behaviourist position from his dismissal of the opacity of the Other, implicitly sustains the basic assumptions he is attempting to undermine. On Wittgenstein’s view, such paradigms have their shared basis in the structure of our language. Its primitive forms, as he says, “- noun, adjective and verb – show the simple picture [to which it] tries to reduce everything.” Accordingly, all that grammatical philosophy can do “is to destroy idols – and that means not creating a new one.” The phenomenological contours of this account are manifest through the attainment of perspicuity over such linguistic structures. In so doing, it returns us to the experiential logic with which we are already familiar. The striking similarities between that account and Heidegger’s reading of Dasein, as I have argued, occurs at least in part because of shared methodological commitments such as this. For both Wittgenstein and Heidegger, the path to a phenomenology of subjectivity cannot be to partake in the

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277 (Dreyfus, 2002), responding to (Lafont, 2000)
278 (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 53)
279 (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 317e)
280 Ibid, p. 305e.
Chapter Three

mythology of our language: it can only occur, rather, through a deconstruction of its descriptive
preconceptions.
Expression & Silence

“Perhaps, then, language requires much less precipitate expression than proper silence. But who of us today would want to imagine that his attempts to think are at home on the path of silence?” (Heidegger, 2009b, pp. 261-262)

In their responses to the problem of expression, formal indication and grammar jointly demand a reorientation in how philosophy can make use of language. Against the most prevalent assumption of the tradition, language, when classically applied, not only fails to solve our problems, but through its application contributes to them. Although the possibility of a phenomenology remains for both Wittgenstein and Heidegger, it turns on our ability to subvert the force of this constraint. For Wittgenstein, accordingly, the philosophical use of language is reserved only for talking about its own linguistic structure. The function of language is not to speak about the phenomenon, but about the language which speaks of the phenomenon. What is phenomenologically decisive, in the classical sense, becomes apparent to one who understands. For this reason, as he says in TS-213, “philosophy is not laid down in propositions, but in a language.”

The most notable difference between this view and that of Heidegger, is that for the latter, the solution consists not in sidestepping the question of experience for language, but the reverse: formal indication requires that the reader puts aside language with a view toward experience. A problematic corollary of this view, however, is that it implies the possibility of disavowing our language. Whereas for Wittgenstein, the analysis of our language leads to understanding experience; Heidegger seems to imply that we can gain access to experience, while divorcing our linguistic horizons. This separation, moreover, would seem to be at odds with Heidegger’s own account. The reflexive character of Being and Time is clear: by the time I come to think, I am disclosed to myself as always already linguistic. And this linguisticality, and its relation to worldhood, is therefore something I cannot put aside. As he says,

281 (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 313e)
Chapter Four

Is it a matter of chance that the Greeks, whose everyday existence lay predominantly in speaking with one another, and who at the same time “had eyes” to see, determined the essence of human being as ζῷον λόγος ἔχων in the pre-philosophical as well as in the philosophical interpretation of Dasein?... The human being shows itself as a being who speaks. This does not mean that the possibility of vocal utterance belongs to it, but that this being is in the mode of discovering world and Dasein itself. (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 159)

Understanding this problematic preconception is made all the more difficult by Heidegger’s quickly changing views on language. Following WS-1929/30, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, almost all mention of formal indication disappears from his work. This same period coincides with his sudden turn to poetry, beginning in the 1934 lectures on Hölderlin’s Germania and The Rhine. While remarks on the indicative in general continue, its relation either to poetry or the supposed “turning” of the 1930s is unclear. This fact has been arguably worsened, moreover, by prevalent misconceptions in the literature about the nature of that “turning”. In this chapter, my central argument is that Heidegger’s movement away from formal indication and toward poetry, consists above all in a recognition of this fundamental problem with the former. It is through Hölderlin’s account of poetry, I argue, that he finds a way out of this shortcoming and toward a view of linguisticality encapsulated by Hölderlin’s famous line, “poetically man dwells”.

In section I, I argue that in contrast to the view of Richardson (and numerous others), the “turning” is not a change in Heidegger’s work following the realisation of an error. As Sheehan has argued, Heidegger’s own use of the term refers to the reciprocal determination of ex-sistence and the clearing, as manifest in the Ereignis. In section II, I argue that Heidegger’s remarks both in the Letter on Humanism and his preface for the Richardson text of 1963, suggest that he loses faith in indicative language for a number of reasons: firstly, in inheriting the grammar of traditional metaphysics; secondly, in the failure of readers to take seriously its indicative character; and thirdly, in maintaining an instrumental view of language. The turn to poetry, I argue, supplants formal indication precisely by avoiding these criticisms. This is most clearly evident through Hölderlin’s account of Holy attunement. In affiriming this attunement, as I argue in section III, Heidegger implicitly offers a corrective to the problematic claim of formal indication: that is, he reaffirms the essential linguisticality of Dasein. The central argument in this chapter, therefore, is that Heidegger’s key movement of the 1930s, is a movement to remove what he regards as the last vestige of an instrumental view of language. In so doing, he collapses the most significant respect in which his response to the problem of expression differs from that of Wittgenstein.
Ever since the publication of Heidegger’s post-*Being and Time* work, the concept of a ‘turn’ or fracture in his thinking has become a near universal. In spite of this, the exact nature of this “turn” or its relation to *Being and Time*, has attracted little consensus. As Laurence Paul Hemming notes, the pre-history of the most common reading, according to which Heidegger abandons the core of *Being and Time* in the decade following it, can be traced back to Karl Löwith’s work, *Heidegger – Denker in dürftiger Zeit*. Accordingly to Löwith, Heidegger’s work starting in the 1930s shows a marked shift away from the account of finitude in *Being and Time* towards, as he says, ‘an origin that remains’. He supports this reading by recourse specifically to remarks such as that in *The Pathway*, where Heidegger speaks of a “gate to the eternal”. An obvious temptation to sympathize with Löwith, comes through the apparently wholesale abandonment of the transcendental analytic of Dasein, a fact characteristic of Heidegger’s later work. If it was against the horizon of finite Dasein, with its relation to death, that *Being and Time* operates, it’s not hard to see why the horizon of time should seem so altered. Successive publications of the Gesamtausgabe, however, have put readings such as this to an end. Of the limited consensus that exists, it is clear that temporality and its relation to being (whatever its relation to *Being and Time*) remains the key problem for Heidegger. Within the English literature, arguably the most influential paradigm of the “turning” was given by William J. Richardson’s *Through Phenomenology to Thought*. First published in 1963, in the relative vacuum of Heidegger’s key works, Richardson offered a lens for this exegetical mystery. Famously, it also seemed to have the backing of Heidegger himself, who provided the preface to its first edition. In relation to the turn, the text made two central claims:

(i) Firstly, that Heidegger I, the author of *Being and Time*, is concerned with the relation between the finitude of Dasein and the comprehension of being. This Heidegger is succeeded by Heidegger II, for whom the central problem is radical thinking, conceived as a responsive openness to being.

(ii) Secondly, this “turning” represents a kind of reversal in his thought and occurs in the year 1930, the year of Heidegger’s lecture series *On the Essence of Truth*.

That Richardson’s influential reading of the turn is correct would seem to be confirmed by at least the absence of an outright rejection by Heidegger. Regarding the second claim specifically, Richardson’s dating of the ‘turn’ to 1930 was also reported by Heinrich Petzet’s account of conversations with

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282 For an overview of such literature, see (Hemming, 1998)
283 (Hemming, 1998, p. 397) in reference to (Löwith, 1995)
284 (Richardson, 2003)
Chapter Four

Heidegger, where he too situates it in the lecture series, *On the Essence of Truth.* What the prefatory letter seems to take issue with, however, was not the dating but rather the *nature* of the turn in question, or as he puts it sardonically, the “much discussed “reversal” [in my development]”. In contrast to the mounting literature which spoke of an abandonment of *Being and Time,* he writes,

> Your question admits of an answer only if first we make clear what “reversal” means, [or] more precisely, if one is ready to think through in becoming fashion what has already been said, instead of constantly circulating unwarranted assertions…The first time in my published writings that I spoke of the “reversal” was in the “Letter on Humanism” (1947, p.71; separate edition, p.17). The inference has thus been drawn that since 1947 Heidegger’s thought has undergone “in-version”, or even, since 1945, “con-version”. (Richardson, 2003, p. xvi)

Immediately after this remark, he adds a clarification of the “turn” repeated almost verbatim from the *Letter on Humanism* in 1947. He writes,

> The thinking of the reversal is a change in my thought. But this change is not a consequence of altering the standpoint, much less of abandoning the fundamental issue, of *Being and Time.* The thinking of the reversal results from the fact that I stayed with the matter-for-thought [of] “Being and Time,” sc. By inquiring into that perspective which already in *Being and Time* [p. 39] was designated as “Time and Being”. (Richardson, 2003, p. xvi)\(^{287}\)

Returning to the remarks referenced in the *Letter on Humanism,* Heidegger even more clearly connects the turn back to the missing third part of *Being and Time.* There he writes,

> The adequate execution and completion of this other thinking that abandons subjectivity is surely made more difficult by the fact that in the publication of *Being and Time* the third division of the first part, “Time and Being,” was held back (c.f. *Being and Time,* p. 39). Here everything is reversed. The division in question was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning [Kehre] and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics. The lecture *“On the Essence of Truth,”* thought out and delivered in 1930 but

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\(^{285}\) As published in (Petzet, 1983)

\(^{286}\) (Richardson, 2003, p. viii)

\(^{287}\) In a footnote to Heidegger’s introduction of the section “Time and Being” in 1927, he writes, “The difference bound to transcendence [transzendenzhaft Differenz]. The overcoming of the horizon as such. The turn back into the source [Herkunft]. The presencing from out of this source”. (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 37)

\(^{288}\) In the Richardson preface, he adds, “The reversal is above all not an operation of interrogative thought; it is inherent in the very matter designated by the headings: “Being and Time”, “Time and Being”. For this reason, the passage cited from the “Letter on Humanism” reads: “Here the Whole is reversed.” “The Whole”: this means the matter [involved] in “Being and Time”, “Time and Being”. The reversal is in play within the matter itself”. (Richardson, 2003, p. xviii)
not printed until 1943, provides a certain insight into the thinking of the turning from “Being and Time” to “Time and Being”. This turning is not a change of standpoint from *Being and Time*, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the locality of that dimension out of which *Being and Time* is experienced, that is to say, experienced in the fundamental experience of the oblivion of being. (Heidegger, 2009b, pp. 249-250)

The key sentence here, it seems to me, concerns the reason for this failure: “The division in question was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning [Kehre]”. But if this is so, then the standard reading is here reversed: the “turn” is not a result of the failure of *Being and Time*; on the contrary, the failure of *Being and Time* was not achieving the turn, which was its original and proper aim. The “turning” therefore, at least in the context of that text, somehow refers to the proposed final movement toward “Time and Being”. Its failure, as Hemming notes, is a failure in the *saying* of that movement. The above remarks also help to make sense of why *On the Essence of Truth* is the site of the “turning”, as reported by both Petzet and Richardson. Those lectures contain, as Heidegger says, a certain insight into the movement from “‘Being and Time’ to ‘Time and Being’”. In the final notes of that lecture in 1930, Heidegger writes,

> Already in the original project the lecture “On the Essence of Truth” was to have been completed by a second lecture “On the Truth of Essence”. The latter failed for reasons that are now indicated in the “*Letter on Humanism*”. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 154)

Just as with *Being and Time*, then, the failure of the lecture coincides with the failure to produce its final movement. As Bernasconi notes, a marginal note in Heidegger’s copy of the text between §5 “Essence of Truth” and §6 “Untruth as Concealing” situates the very moment of this ‘insight’. In his final notes on this lecture, Heidegger seemingly contextualizes this same transition as prefiguring a move away from metaphysics. He writes,

> Our thinking apparently remains on the path of metaphysics. Nevertheless, in its decisive steps, which lead from truth as correctness to ek-sistent freedom, and from the latter to truth as concealing and as errancy, it accomplishes a change in the questioning that belongs to the overcoming of metaphysics. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 154)

In this key movement, he writes, “every kind of anthropology and all subjectivity of the human being as subject is not merely left behind – as it was already in *Being and Time*”. Rather, its “questioning is

290 (Bernasconi, 1985, p. 67)
intrinsically the path of a thinking that, instead of furnishing representations and concepts, experiences and tests itself as a transformation of its relatedness to Being”. 291 The above reference to the Letter on Humanism, would seem to indicate that the Essence of Truth likewise fails only in its final “saying of the turn”. Its importance nonetheless for Heidegger, explains why he would give a conditional acceptance of Richardson’s timeline. In his closing remarks of his prefatory letter he enigmatically writes,

The distinction you make between Heidegger I and Heidegger II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II. (Richardson, 2003, p. xxii)

This extraordinary claim was read by Richardson as confirmation of the outline of his reading. While there is truth to this in relation to a basic timeline (viz. the importance of 1930), what Heidegger totally undermines is the view of the “turning” which informs it. On the Essence of Truth is not the historical point at which Heidegger realizes his error and turns away to a new problem or thinking; it is rather the point of access, conceivable only from within the horizon of thinking of Being and Time, to what that text sets as its final movement. As he says,

[The] basic question of Being and Time is not in any sense abandoned by reason of the reversal. Accordingly, the prefatory note to the seventh unrevised edition of Being and Time (1957) contains the remark: [This] “way still remains even today a necessary one, if the question about Being is to stir our There-being.” Contrary [to what is generally supposed], the question of Being and Time is decisively ful-filled in the thinking of the reversal. He alone can ful-fill who has a vision of fullness. (Richardson, 2003, p. xviii)

Heidegger’s second remark, that “the thought of Heidegger I becomes possible only if it contained in Heidegger II”, likewise would seem to upend entirely the timeline of Richardson’s reading. Contrary to what the latter believed, as Hemming puts it, “Heidegger does not confirm the validity of the interpretation; he stands it on its head. He reverses it.” 292 Once again, to understand the turn as a moment in a timeline, is to fail to grasp the turn at all. That the possibility of Heidegger I is secured by Heidegger II, points precisely away from the linearity implied by talk of “pre” and “post” turn, toward the conceptual reciprocity implied by “Being and Time”, “Time and Being”. If the

291 (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 154)
292 (Hemming, 1998, p. 402)
transition to the latter is meant to be understood as part of Heidegger’s increasingly primordial, reflexive steps in *Being and Time*, then this statement becomes less surprising. As with each of these movements, the view secured from our new horizon of thought (Heidegger II), is itself the guarantor of that very horizon (Heidegger I).

For this reason, far from an abandonment of the central problem of *Being and Time* or its horizon of thought, the “turning” somehow remains its central aim. In this respect, it connects with arguably the central concept of Heidegger’s later work, the *Ereignis*. In the Richardson preface, Heidegger writes,

Rather, the reversal between *Being* and *Time*, between *Time* and *Being*, is determined by the way *Being* is granted, *Time* is granted. I tried to say a word about this “is granted” [es gibt] in the lecture “Time and *Being*”, which you heard yourself here [in Freiburg] on January 30th, 1962. (Richardson, 2003, p. xx)

Before adding,

It is [due] neither [to] the merit of my questioning nor [to some] arbitrary decision of my thought that this reciprocal bearing reposes in a [mutual] ap-propropriation and is called e-vent [*Ereignis*]. (Richardson, 2003, p. xx)

In the 1962 lecture series he references, *Time and *Being*, Heidegger likewise draws out this connection between the turn and concept of the *Ereignis*. He writes,

Now it’s clear: what lets the two matters belong together, what brings the two into their own, and even more, maintains and holds them in their belonging together – the way the two matters stand, the matter at stake – is *Ereignis*...Accordingly ‘it’, that ‘gives’ in ‘it beings’, ‘it times’, proves to be *Ereignis*. (M. Heidegger, 2002, p. 19)

The positive meaning of this connection is far from clear. As Sheehan notes, an obvious roadblock is the obscurity of Heidegger’s term *Ereignis*. Usually translated as either ‘event’ or ‘event of appropriation’, the term in fact first appeared in the KNS-1919 before a lengthy disappearance. After 1936, however, Heidegger identifies it as “a key term in the service of thinking”. Contrary either to a moment *in* time or *act* of appropriation (suggested by these English alternatives),

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293 (Sheehan, 2015).
294 See for example, (Heidegger, 2008, p. 60)
295 (Heidegger, 1969, p. 36) To this he adds, “As such a key term, it can no more be translated than the Greek λόγος or the Chinese Tao.”
Heidegger’s interest, as Sheehan points out, is etymological. From the Old High German “ouga” meaning ‘eye’, the term correlates with the Latin verbs *monstrare* and *ostendere*, meaning “to show or display”. It’s co-mingling with ‘appropriation’, only comes through a misleading similarity to “eigen”, meaning ‘one’s own’. Heidegger’s own use of the term plays variously on these meanings. In the first case [ouga], the Ereignis is an event only in the sense of an appearance or occurrence (such as “it occurs to me”). Naturally for Heidegger this should not be understood as in time, with a before and after, but is something always already done. In the second case [eigen], appropriation should not be heard in the sense of ownership, but in the sense of the Latin *proprietas*, as properties or qualities. As Sheehan writes, “Heidegger’s meaning of *Er-eignis/ap-propri-ation* is less about “owning” something and more about bringing something *ad proprium*, into its *own proper state* such that it comes into its own, into its essential “something” that it is”.

Hearing the etymological roots of *Ereignis* together, what the concept gives us is the manifestation, or occurrence, of the ap-propri-ation. It is in this sense that he says in *Time and Being*, what “lets [these concepts] belong together, what brings the two into their own […] proves to be *Ereignis*”. In this way, according to Sheehan, the term recasts Heidegger’s earlier use of the term “thrown-openness”. As with the latter, what *Ereignis* names is the possibility of bringing-into-itself that-which-is. Both concepts are, as Sheehan says, “existentially the same and constitute the very possibility of intelligibility”. So what relation, then, has the ‘turn’ to this change in terminology? In the *Contributions to Philosophy* between 1936 and 1938, Heidegger makes a peculiar remark in this respect. In section §255, “The turning in the event”, he writes,

The event has its innermost occurrence and its further reach in the turning. The turning which essentially occurs in the event is the concealed ground of all other, subordinate turnings, circles, and loops (c.f., for example, the turning in the structure of the guiding questions or the circle in understanding), ones whose origin remains obscured and unquestioned, although they are readily taken in themselves as the “last”.

(Heidegger, 2012, pp. 322-323)

Putting aside for a moment Heidegger’s cryptic reference to “other, subordinate turnings, circles, and loops”, what possible definition of “turning” could he have in mind here? In what way, that is,
could it make sense to speak of the “turning” as being something “in” the Ereignis, if that turning is to be understood in some connection with the final movement of Being and Time? As Sheehan has shown, this use of the term becomes much clearer when we view the problem through a synonym briefly used by Heidegger in the same period: Gegenschwung, or Oscillation.300 When Heidegger speaks of a “turning” in the mid-1930s, such as in the Contributions, what he is referring to is the oscillation, or reciprocal determination of ex-sistence and the clearing. In a different language, according to Sheehan, it is the mutual determination of Dasein and the world, understood as the possible space of meaning.301 And just as with being-in-the-world, neither ex-sistence nor the clearing can be understood as separate, except as perspectives on the same phenomenon. Ex-sistence is the site of the clearing; but it is through that very clearing that Dasein is determined. As he says poetically in the same chapter of the Contributions, referring to this oscillating relation between Dasein and being,

If, through the event, Da-sein as the open centre of the selfhood that grounds truth is first thrown to itself and becomes a self, then Dasein again, as the concealed possibility of the grounding essential occurrence of beyng, must belong to the event. (Heidegger, 2012, p. 323)

When Heidegger says in §255, therefore, that “the event has its innermost occurrence and its further reach in the turning”, his use of this latter term is a reference to the fundamental oscillation [Gegenschwung] that belongs to the structure of intelligibility. The Ereignis, as the ap-propri-ating event, has its basis in the oscillating relation [the turning] between Dasein and world. If this is so, however, then what does Heidegger mean in connecting the ‘turn’ to division III of Being and Time? It is useful here to recall what the purpose of that division was set to be. In the projected outline for that text, Heidegger describes part one (comprising divisions I-III) as follows:

**Part One: The interpretation of Dasein on the basis of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being.** (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 37)

The task of the missing third division was to comprise this secondary aim, “the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being”. As Sheehan notes, its aim therefore was to move from the question of transcendence, exemplified in the analytic of Dasein, to the transcendent itself. As he says, it is “a transition from focusing on ex-sistence in its horizon-forming function to focusing on that transcendentally shaped horizon itself.”302 As Heidegger himself seems to rephrase this transition in WS-1937, Basic Question of Philosophy,

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300 Ibid, p. 239.
302 Ibid, p. 244.
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Man is here in question in the most profound and the most extensive respect, the one properly foundational; i.e., we are questioning man in his relation to Being, or, after the turning, we are questioning Being and its truth in relation to man. (Heidegger, 1994, p. 181)

If Sheehan is correct, therefore, then what the transition to division III of Being and Time exemplifies, is a transition in viewpoint to the opposite side, so to speak, of the Ereignis. That is, it aimed to move from the perspective of ex-sistence to that of the clearing itself. It is exactly with such a paradigm in mind that Heidegger prefaces §255 of the Contributions, by saying “here the event is viewed with respect to the human being, who is determined as Dasein on the basis of the event”.

To return to the Letter on Humanism, it is in this way that Heidegger says “this turning is not a change of standpoint from Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the locality of that dimension out of which Being and Time is experienced…the fundamental experience of the oblivion of being”. The ‘failure’ of Being and Time on this reading is not a failure to describe the turn, nor is that ‘turn’ itself brought about in this failure. What Being and Time falls short of, is to think from the other perspective of that ‘turning’, or oscillation, which belongs to the condition of intelligibility itself.

If the Richardson preface is not an outright rejection, it is a careful deconstruction of the author’s assumption about the nature of the turn. Heidegger’s enigmatic correction to the timeline that Richardson offers, leaves the years in question entirely in place. What it undermines is the ordinary way of framing his thought “pre” and “post” turn, as though to imply a discontinuity punctuated by an error. The influence of such a view on Heidegger scholarship has been immense. Against such views, Heidegger’s thinking after Being and Time, is done from precisely that perspective which was won in that text. Just as his aim for Richardson’s work is that it may “help set in motion the manifold thinking of the simple business of thought, which, by reason of its very simplicity, abounds in hidden plenitude”, to understand the “turning” for Heidegger, is best served in taking up the task of thinking it for oneself.

Instead of the groundless, endless prattle about the “reversal”, it would be more advisable and fruitful if people would simply engage themselves in the matter mentioned. Refusal to do so obliges one ipso facto to demonstrate that the Being-question developed in Being and Time is unjustified, superfluous and impossible. Any criticism of Being and Time starting in this fashion, however, must obviously first be set straight. (Richardson, 2003, p. xviii)

303 (Heidegger, 2012, p. 322)
304 (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 250)
305 (Richardson, 2003, p. xxii)
II.

If the turn does not constitute a break or change in Heidegger’s thinking, but that oscillation, or “turning” that belongs to the structure of intelligibility, the question remains: what part does formal indication play in the failure of its “saying”? In what way, moreover, does this relate to his increasing interest in poetry and poetic speech? The full extent of this question is naturally beyond the remit of this chapter. But a positive step can be made, I suggest, by looking to Heidegger’s remarks on indicative language after 1930. To the extent that the poetic overcomes the failures he identifies in it, especially those he identifies in the Letter on Humanism, what this engagement shows above all, I argue, is Heidegger’s move away from an instrumental view of language.

(i) Indicative languages after 1930

On the opening page of the Richardson preface, Heidegger writes,

I hesitate with my answers, for they are necessarily no more than indications [of much more to be said]. The lesson of long experience leads me to surmise that such indications will not be taken as directions for the road of independent reflection on the matter pointed out which each must travel for himself. [Instead they] will gain notice as though they were an opinion I had expressed and will be propagated as such. Every effort to bring what has been thought closer to the prevailing modes of (re)presentation must assimilate what-is-to-be-thought to those (re)presentations and thereby inevitably deform the matter. (Richardson, 2003, p. viii)

As we have seen, it is precisely in this vein, moreover, that he most ardently critiques superficial readers of the turn. As with much of the Richardson preface, these remarks on indication have their precedent in the Letter on Humanism. Responding to the commonly held assumption, as he says, “that Being and Time ended in a blind alley”, Heidegger lays blame on the metaphysical and subjective vocabulary against which it is written. He writes,

But in order to make the attempt a thinking recognizable and at the same time understandable for existing philosophy, it could at first be expressed only within the horizon of that existing philosophy and the use of its current terms. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 271)
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Such terms were naturally used in the prohibitive sense of formal indications. But it is precisely this prohibition that his readers failed to heed. He adds,

In the meantime, I have learned to see that these very terms were bound to lead immediately and inevitably into error. For the terms and the conceptual language corresponding to them were not rethought by readers from the matter particularly to be thought; rather, the matter was conceived according to the established terminology in its customary meaning.

(Heidegger, 2009b, p. 271)

It is noteworthy that Heidegger separates “the terms” from the “conceptual language corresponding to them”. While his terminology is obviously novel, the conceptual language that corresponds to it may well harbour a more familiar and problematic grammar. As noted in chapter 3, being-in-the-world is one such case. The qualifications of Being and Time clearly tell us to take it as a unified relation. It indicates, as he says, “in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unified phenomenon- this primary datum must be seen as a whole.” It is arguably in utilizing the language of subject and object however, even provisionally, that it seems to permit interpretations such as the externalist account. In the Dialogue on Language, Heidegger makes an almost identical accusation against his earlier use of the term expression in 1920. He writes,

I. I must be frank and tell you that here you are mistaken. The lecture series “Expression and Appearance” (or was not the title “Expression and Meaning”?) was still rather controversial, even though it remained informed by what we now call the historic character of thinking dialogue.

J. The title, then, was to point up a contrast.

I. In any event, I was concerned to bring into view that which is wholly different – of which, however, I had only an obscure if not confused intimation. Such youthful capers easily lead to doing injustice. (Heidegger, 1982, pp. 34-35)

This lecture series was in fact presented as Intuition and Expression in SS-1920, the series in which he introduces phenomenological destruction. As noted by his interlocutor, however, this frame itself already harbours the language of subjectivity. As he writes,

J. But then I no longer understand how you could choose the title “Expression and Appearance”. It was intended, was it not, to announce a contrast. “Expression” is the

306 (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 53)
307 (Heidegger, 2010c)
utterance of something internal and refers to the subjective. “Appearance”, on the contrary, names the objective, if I may here recall Kant’s usage according to which appearances are the objects, the objects of experience. By giving your lecture that title, you did commit yourself to the subject-object relation.

I. In a certain respect your objection is justified, if only for the reason that much had to remain unclear in those lectures. Nobody can in just one single leap take distance from the predominant circle of ideas, especially not if he is dealing with the well-worn tracks of traditional thinking. (Heidegger, 1982, p. 36)

The Letter on Humanism clearly implicates conceptual language such as this in the failure of Being and Time to be understood. Through its use, as he says, “the matter of thinking is not achieved in the fact that idle talk about the “truth of being” and the “history of being” is set in motion.” But crucially, the conceptual baggage of such language only becomes problematic if the reader disregards its prohibitive command. This fact may explain why the indicative does not die out in spite of Heidegger’s critique of it. In a remarkable disjunction on the possibility of philosophical language from the Letter on Humanism, he writes,

Perhaps, then, language requires much less precipitate expression than proper silence. But who of us today would want to imagine that his attempts to think are at home on the path of silence?

At best, thinking could perhaps point toward the truth of being, and indeed toward it as what is to be thought. It would thus be more easily weaned from mere supposing and opining and directed to the now rare handicap of writing. Things that really matter, although they are not defined for all eternity, even when they come very late still come at the right time.

(Heidegger, 2009b, pp. 261-262)

That Heidegger sustains new approaches to the indicative after this time, would seem to be further confirmed by his short-lived experiment with sous-rature. In his well-known 1955 letter to Ernst Jünger, “On the Question of Being”, Heidegger raises sous-rature in the context of propositional definition. In a section whose essentials could be from the early twenties, he writes,

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308 In Being and Time, Heidegger likewise qualifies the language of expression by situating it in being-in-the-world. Whether such qualifications are successful, however, is not clear. In that text, he writes, “In talking, Dasein expresses itself not because it has been initially cut off as “something internal” from something outside, but because as being-in-the-world it is already “outside” when it understands. What is expressed is precisely this being outside, that is, the actual mode of attunement (of mood) which we showed to pertain to the full disclosedness of being-in.” (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 157)

309 (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 261)
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Whatever is good in the “good definition” that you rightfully demand will prove its worth in our giving up the desire to define, to the extent that this desire must become fixed in propositional statements in which thinking dies out. Yet it remains a slight, because merely negative, gain if we learn to heed the fact that no information can be provided concerning the nothing or being or nihilism, concerning their essence or concerning the essential (verbal) unfolding of such essence (nominal), that might lie ready before us in the form of propositional statements waiting to be seized. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 310)

One step toward a solution, he argues, could take the following form:

Accordingly, a thoughtful look ahead into this realm can write “being” only in the following way: being. The crossing out of this word initially has only a preventive role, namely, that of preventing the almost ineradicable habit of representing “being” as something standing somewhere on its own that then on occasion first comes face-to-face with human beings. In accordance with this way of representing matters, it appears as though the human being is excepted from “being”. However, he is not only not excepted, i.e., not only included in “being”, but “being,” in needing the human being, is obliged to relinquish this appearance of independence. And this is why it is also other in essence than the representation of an inclusive concept might have it, one that embraces the subject-other relation. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 310)[310]

As with being-in-the-world, the prohibition made evident by the typographic mark draws our attention to a tendency to grasp being as something present-at-hand. In the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, it is exactly in these terms that Heidegger describes formal indication.311 The novelty of sous-rature, which would arguably exempt it from the misreading discussed in the Letter on Humanism, is making this prohibition visually obvious. As a word, it signifies within a philosophical tradition; but as crossed-out, it simultaneously points away from the fundamental presuppositions of that same tradition. In contrast to the silent caveat of formal indication, sous-rature wears its prohibitive command on its face. Why this experiment is so short lived, or why it applies only to “being” for that matter, is unclear. What is clear is that its concern is precisely that of the 1920s. Its specific aim, moreover, is to subvert that error he identifies in the Letter on Humanism in 1947.

The failure of indicative experiments such as the above no doubt explains the change in terminology during the 1930s. Gadamer has argued that Heidegger’s most identifiable move after Being and Time

310 In the original, the typographic mark is an x-shape. Heidegger draws a comparison with its four points and the coalescence of the four-fold.
311 See for example, (Heidegger, 1995, p. 291)
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is in fact a return to his vocabulary from the early work under Husserl, a fact seen most clearly in his return to phrases such as “it worlds”, and “Ereignis”. He connects this especially with an undoing of the transcendental turn prior to Being and Time. It is certainly true that Heidegger’s turn to an explicit transcendentalism is at odds with his opposition to Husserl’s own turn in the Ideas. This opposition was grounded in his belief, as Gadamer puts it, “that transcendental philosophy [was] the obfuscation of the true question of being.” However, he adds,

Heidegger was left, so to speak, with no other way than to adopt the framework of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to begin with, even if he was perhaps always trying to render phenomenology more concrete and radical… It is only with the failure of his overarching programme in the anticipated third part of Being and Time that something decisive happened to him. (Gadamer, 2016, p. 222)

There is some evidence to suggest that Gadamer is correct in linking the terminological shift to the transcendentalism of Being and Time. As Dahlstrom points out, the Contributions contains an explicit rebuke of its transcendental logic. He connects it, in that text, to the failure to overcome the ontological difference. In a section titled Beyng and beings, he writes,

Accordingly, the effort to go beyond the first approach to the question of being as it was instituted in Being and Time and in the works which radiated out from it (“On the Essence of Ground” and the Kant book) required various attempts to master the “ontological difference” and to grasp its origin itself, i.e., its genuine unity. Therefore, the endeavour had to be made to get free of the “condition of possibility” as a merely “mathematical” retrogression and to grasp the truth of beyng out of the latter’s own essence (event). (Heidegger, 2012, p. 197)

But if, as Heidegger himself suggests in On the Essence of Truth, the language of metaphysics was a tentative framework always due to be overcome, then implicating the transcendental in the failure of the “saying” is a more complicated issue. Given, in other words, that Heidegger already concedes to its metaphysical baggage, the question is why his projected overcoming of it fails? Is it the case, that just as with the rationalist assumptions of the relation between Dasein and world, this tentative step toward a schematism is already fatal? What is certainly true, is that his discomfort with metaphysical

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312 As he puts it in Remembering Heidegger’s Beginnings, “History teaches what is becoming increasingly clear to me in the last decades: Heidegger’s so-called ‘turn’ is in fact only the return to his proper intention, which he had already often anticipated in his youthful internal confrontation with Husserl.” (Gadamer, 2016, p. 216)

313 Naturally, Heidegger’s vision of the transcendental cannot be directly equated with either Husserl or Kant. For perspectives on this relation, and its connection to the Husserl/Heidegger confrontation, see: (Crowell, 1990; Luft, 2005; Moran, 2007)

314 (Gadamer, 2016, p. 222)

315 (Dahlstrom, 2005)
terminology as expressed in the *Letter on Humanism*, however qualified such terms may be, certainly implicates a project which is bound to be read within the tradition of Kant. In the Richardson preface, Heidegger still seems to make such qualifications for *Being and Time*. He writes,

> Meanwhile “phenomenology” in Husserl’s sense was elaborated into a distinctive philosophical position according to a pattern set by Descartes, Kant and Fichte. The historicity of thought remained completely foreign to such a position (see the too little observed work of Husserl: “Philosophy as a strict Science”, which appeared 1910-11 in the review *Logos*, pp. 289, ff.).

> The Being-question, unfolded in *Being and Time*, parted company with this philosophical position, and that on the basis of what to this day I still consider a more faithful adherence to the principle of phenomenology. (Richardson, 2003, p. xiv)

As with any question of this kind, however, one which straddles a line between conceptual and historical motives, the failure of *Being and Time* and its relation to its transcendental logic has many, and arguably diffuse, answers. As Heidegger adds,

> What a few strokes can thus sketch, in retrospect that verges constantly on *retractatio*, was, in its historical reality, a tangled process, inscrutable even to me. This process inevitably remained captive to contemporary modes of (re)presentation and language and was accompanied by inadequate explanations of its own intentions. (Richardson, 2003, p. xiv)

Gadamer’s suggestion is not a strong reading of the transcendental’s role in *Being and Time*’s failure. As he adds, “there have constantly been such turn arounds in Heidegger - this is why he could call his paths of thinking ‘forest paths’.”316 Any strong reading, moreover, would have to make sense of the vestigial transcendental thought that pervades his later work.317 What we can at least say, is that the role of *Being and Time*’s structure, and its conceptual precedents, compound the failure identified in the *Letter on Humanism* for readers to rethink the matters by themselves. Or as put it in 1929, it compounds a failure to see that “the one who attempts to understand is thereby already challenged to comprehend that which is to be understood in their Dasein”318. As Gadamer correctly observed, echoing Heidegger, “what matters is to experience the turn in *actu exercito*, and this means: in doing the thinking”.319

316(Gadamer, 2016, p. 224)
317 See (Dahlstrom, 2005)
318 (Heidegger, 1995, p. 300)
319 (Gadamer, 2016, p. 224)
In spite of his novel experiments after the end of formal indication in the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, there can be little doubt that Heidegger’s faith in the indicative function of language wanes after 1930. Because of its terminology, and in spite of its prohibition, such language inevitably fails to be taken as anything other than traditional metaphysics. The same period coincides, moreover, with his increasing interest in the importance of poetry. In *Being and Time*, the poetic receives almost cursory mention. From 1934 onwards, however, it becomes the primary form of language with which he is concerned. The relation between poetry and the wider aspects of his thinking is complex. For Heidegger, poetizing founds the truth of being. Insofar as other forms of art disclose truth, they do so by virtue of that disclosure that belongs most fundamentally to poetry. As he says in the *Origin of the Work of Art*, “the essence of art is poetry. The essence of poetry, in turn, is the founding of truth.”

In contrast, then, to the assumption that poetry is a function of culture or history, poetizing for Heidegger grounds the very possibility of any such history. In this section, the wider implications of this view can only be touched on. My aim, however, is to understand poetry as a mode of language, only from the perspective of the problem of expression in the 1920s. Is there a sense in which the poetic overcomes the failure of formal indication, which he initially saw as the true language of thinking? In his first lectures on Hölderlin’s hymns *Germania* and *The Rhine* in 1934, Heidegger writes,

> Yet viewed with respect to its essence, language is in itself the most originary poetizing, and that which is poetized in language, in the narrower sense – that which we specifically call ‘poetry’ – is the originary language of a people, which then disseminates itself as prose and becomes levelled out in such dissemination, so that poetry appears to be a deviation and exception. (Heidegger, 2014, pp. 198-199)

And in an earlier segment of the same text,

> It is from this everyday use of words, this fallen version, therefore, that scientific reflection on language and the philosophy of language proceed, which then view ‘poetry’ as an exception to the rule. (Heidegger, 2014, p. 59)

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320 (Heidegger, 1993, p. 199)
321 As he puts it in his 1934 lectures on Holderlin, “Poetizing configures the ground of historical Dasein: language as such constitutes the originary essence of the historical being of humans.” (Heidegger, 2014, p. 62)
322 For an overview of these wider aspects see for example, (Gosetti-Ferencei, 2004). For the relation of poetry to Heidegger’s reflection on philosophy in the *Contributions* see (Keane, 2016)
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Reading this distinction through Hölderlin, Heidegger identifies this double nature of language, available as both the essential founding of being and the inessential language of reportage, as its dangerousness. Language is the most dangerous of goods, as he says, “because by its very essence it bears decline within it, whether into a mere reciting or reporting of what has been said, or the decline that falls into idle talk”. That poetry, qua language, precedes the scientific for Heidegger is in itself hardly surprising. Even in 1919, he contrasts the processional view of a sunrise with that of the Theban elders in Sophocles’ Antigone. In the context of that text, moreover, phenomenology’s aim is to remain on the poetic side of this divide. He writes,

Let us place ourselves into the comportment of the astronomer, who in astrophysics investigates the phenomenon of sunrise simply as a process in nature before which he is basically indifferent, and on the other hand the experience of the chorus of Theban elders, which in Sophocles’ Antigone looks at the rising sun on the first friendly morning after a successful battle…This contrast does not solve but only initially poses the problem of the how of different modes of experience. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 59)

The modes of experience referenced here are understood in terms of the criteria of de-vivification, i.e., as theoretical and pre-theoretical modes of comportment. But in what sense does poetry feature in Heidegger’s view on the language of philosophy? In a late essay of 1964, published as an appendix to his 1927 talk Phenomenology and Theology, Heidegger poses the question of a non-objectifying thinking and speaking in theology. Despite being given 45 years after the KNS-1919, the analysis shares many features of Heidegger’s earliest engagement with Natorp. Under the rubric of the question “Is all language objectifying?”, Heidegger begins by separating two views on language: (1) that of Carnap, for whom language is subservient to the task of science; and (2) that of Heidegger, for whom language is about the appropriate response to being. As he puts it,

The first position desires to subjugate all thinking and speaking, including that of philosophy, to a sign-system that can be constructed logically or technically, that is, to secure them as an instrument of science. The other position has arisen from the question: what is it that is to be experienced as the proper matter of philosophical thinking, and how is this matter (being as being) to be said? (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 56)

This distinction, moreover, insofar as it concerns the essence of language, concerns also the nature of Dasein. As he says,

323 (Heidegger, 2014, p. 67)
324 Published as “The Theological Discussion of “The Problem of a Non-Objectifying Thinking and Speaking in Today’s Theology” - Some Pointers to its Major Aspects” in Pathmarks, pp. 54-62, dated March 11th, 1964.
Insofar as the Western tradition has tended to determine the essence of man as that living being that “has language”, as ζῷον λόγος ἔχων (even man as an acting being is such only as one that “has language”), the debate between the two positions has nothing less at stake than the question of human existence and its determination (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 56)

Carnap himself had famously analysed Heidegger’s inaugural Freiburg lecture, What is Metaphysics? In that essay, he takes issue with Heidegger’s talk of the ‘nothing’, as exemplifying what he terms “metaphysical pseudo-statements”.325 This critique would only be compounded by Heidegger’s later use of more figurative constructions. As Gadamer put it, such views “congeal into the dominant prejudice: what Heidegger says after Being and Time is no longer verifiable; it is poetry or better; a pseudo-mythology…Compared to the ‘nihilating nothing’ of the inaugural Freiburg lecture, which so infuriated Carnap, this [later language] is something still totally different. The ‘nothing’ appears almost innocuous”.326 It does not seem to occur to Carnap that Heidegger’s philosophical intention could be itself a subversion of precisely the scientific aspirations that underpin Carnap’s vision of language. This is exactly the difference, however, that Heidegger points out in 1964. He connects it, moreover, with his wider critique of technology. He writes,

But today there is a growing danger that the scientific-technological manner of thinking will spread to all realms of life. And this magnifies the deceptive appearance that makes all thinking and speaking seem objectifying…Language is deformed into an instrument of reportage and calculable information. It is treated like a manipulable object, to which our manner of thinking must conform. And yet the saying of language is not necessarily an expressing of propositions about objects. Language, in what is most proper to it, is a saying of that which reveals itself to human beings in manifold ways and which addresses itself to human beings insofar as they do not, under the dominion of objectifying thinking, confine themselves to the latter and close themselves off from what shows itself. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 60)

Just as in the KNS-1919, it is the non-objectifying nature of intuition, of lived experience, that enables the possibility of non-objectifying language. In 1920, the solution that Heidegger found to exactly this question was formal indication; at the very same punchline, however, in 1964, he instead identifies the poetic. He writes,

An example of an outstanding non-objectifying thinking and speaking is poetry.

In the third of the Sonnets to Orpheus, Rilke says in poetic speech by what means poetic thinking and saying is determined. “Gesang ist Dasein”- “Song is existence” (cf. Holzwege,
Song, the singing saying of the poet, is “not coveting”, “not soliciting” that which is ultimately accomplished by humans as an affect…Such saying does not posit and represent anything as standing over against us or as object. There is nothing here that could be placed before a grasping or comprehending representation. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 61)

If in the Theology lecture, poetry supplants the function of formal indication, specifically as a non-objectifying language, then the question remains: in what sense does it solve the same problem, yet evade the flaws of the latter? The full extent of this question is beyond the remit of this chapter. However, two themes can at least be sketched, I argue, which go some way toward such an answer. Firstly, the transition to a multivocal form of speech and away from a non-vocal one, both conceived as a response to the univocity of metaphysics; and secondly, in the concept of the Holy, understood as a relinquishment of an instrumental language. It is in the latter above all, I argue, that poetry for Heidegger supplants the failures of formal indication, and enables him to distance thinking, as he sees it, from the horizon of metaphysics.\(^{327}\)

(a) Univocity and Poetry

In the Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression in 1920, during which Heidegger introduces destruction, a central assumption of that process was the univocity of traditional philosophy. In the many meanings to which the word “history” accrues, the ‘problem of the a priori’ had surreptitiously taken one as its guide. As Gadamer describes the kind of conceptual analysis presupposed by this,

Conceptual analysis, thus, distinguishes several meanings, which are all alive in language, but these meanings only gain their circumscribed determination in the context of speech. This is what the theory of the implicit definition has always noted. Eventually, in a proposition a meaning will take the lead over others in a forceful manner and the other connotations will at most play a subsidiary role. This is what the thoughtful use of words looks like. (Gadamer, 2016, p. 235)

In SS-1920, the meaning which took the “lead over others in a forceful manner” was phenomenologically derivative for the problem-set at hand. But in a counter move to such a tendency, phenomenology cannot replace it with another determinate proposition in its place. Such determination of the problem-area is exactly what Heidegger identifies as part of the reifying primacy

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\(^{327}\) As he puts it at the end of the Letter on Humanism, “The thinking that is to come is no longer philosophy, because it thinks more originally than metaphysics – a name identical to philosophy”. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 276)
of the theoretical. Qua formal indication, all philosophy can be is a prohibitive indication to a task. As he puts it in SS-1920,

Philosophizing – as I understand its task – is only entitled to draw attention, with all strictness, not, to be precise, in the concept- and thought- according object determination with regard to the individual sciences with the strictness that is pre-delineated by the task and the goal of the drawing attention.

If this annoys you and you become irritated about the presented nonsense, enough has been already achieved. No revelations about the absolute are pronounced here. In order to later become aware of the scope of including the moments of enactment, it must be taken into account on what occasion we are led toward this. (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 145)

This task is explicitly understood in opposition to the univocity of the sciences, for whom correct determination of the subject-matter in an objective sense is the proper aim. As he says almost in passing in the appendix of SS-1920,

Destruction and its explication; the setting out of the proper primordial phenomenological-philosophical enactment and origin reflection [Ursprungsbesinnung]; of the clarifying description and descriptive clarification. Provided that in philosophy scientific knowing predominates (certainty, univocity, strictness, etc.), the destruction seems to be essentially related to this. (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 143)

As in the WS-1920, formal indication is conceived “against science in the highest degree. Here there is no insertion into a material domain”. This opposition is grounded not in replacing the univocal concept at the heart of a philosophical account. Rather, it is a rejection of the vision of language presupposed by this univocity. Formal indication, correctly understood, is non-vocal. Insofar as it speaks of the phenomenon or the concept, it only acts as an injunction to encounter it for oneself, exactly the prohibition Heidegger regards in the Letter on Humanism as unheeded. Although this injunction takes the form of a description and is written against the horizon of traditional terminology, Heidegger is clear that he intends such language to act only as pointers away from propositional definitions. To repeat his remark in his letter to Jünger, On the Question of Being,

Whatever is good in the “good definition” that you rightfully demand will prove its worth in our giving up the desire to define, to the extent that this desire must become fixed in propositional statements in which thinking dies out. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 310)

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328 (Heidegger, 2010d, p. 44)
An obvious limitation of such language, simply put, is that it doesn’t look to be such. Such terms are taken, as he reports in the Richardson preface, “as though they were an opinion I had expressed and will be propagated as such”. Poetry too rejects the univocity of determination. Unlike in formal indication, however, it does so not by limiting its reference to pre-established meanings, but by acquiescing in them. As Gadamer puts it,

In poetry things are not completely different [than implicit definition]. There, we hear several meanings of a word, but even here the usage of words will happen to have the proper direction of meaning fixed to such a large extent that the unity of the sense of the discourse remains within reach. Nevertheless, there we see the potential of language to develop even further. What really constitutes the volume of poetic discourse is the fact that this discourse enriches itself through the many meanings and many facets that the words have and put into play. (Gadamer, 2016, pp. 235-236)

As Gadamer points out, playing with the multivocity of words long predates Heidegger’s interest in poetry. It is with great irony that Carnap would accuse Heidegger of carelessness with language, even if it amounts to pseudoscience in Carnap’s view. Ambiguity and multivocity have methodological significance for Heidegger, as moments to draw attention to phenomenological facts. This emphasis on ambiguity may well stem from Heidegger’s early inheritance from Kierkegaard. In his 1986 essay, *On the Beginning of Thought*, Gadamer mentions almost in passing that formal indication stemmed from his reading of indirect communication in Kierkegaard. As Poul Lübcke has argued, the latter’s use of indirect communication was not a concession to the belief there were inexpressible statements but was used when “we intend to produce a very specific perlocutionary act, namely, a decision”. As with Heidegger and Wittgenstein, indirect communication aims to elicit a performative insight. For Anti-Climacus in *Training in Christianity*, this mode of speech purposefully takes the form of a contradiction. He writes,

Indirect communication can be produced by the art of reduplicating the communication. This art consists in reducing oneself, the communicator, to nobody, something purely objective, and then incessantly composing qualitative opposites into unity. This is what some of the pseudonyms are accustomed to call “double reflection”. An example of such indirect communication is, so to compose jest and earnest that the composition is a dialectical knot –

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329 (Richardson, 2003, p. viii)
330 (Gadamer, 2016, p. 241)
331 (Lübcke, 1990, p. 38)
and with this to be nobody. If anyone is to profit by this sort of communication, he must himself undo the knot for himself. (Kierkegaard, 1972, pp. 132-133)

To write purposefully in the form of a contradiction, “to compose jest and earnest” together, is to present the reader with a “dialectical knot”. As no immediate meaning can therefore be taken away, the reader has no choice but to “undo the knot for himself”. As Lübcke says, “he must decide for himself whether he wants to accept the one or the other side of the contradiction. It is the decision of the listener, which is the main thing”.332 In this way, the pseudonymous authorship of Kierkegaard’s work can be understood precisely as an indirect communication to elicit a decision in the reader. As Lübcke says, “and so doing we can read them all as though they were pressing the question: is it better to be a Christian or to live aesthetically?”.333

Such a model of language is designed precisely to bring about an action on the part of the reader, and to allay the tendency to be read as propositional tokens of fact. Heidegger’s purposeful use of ambiguity and multivocity likewise aims not to be resolved, but to bring the reader’s attention to the ambiguity, as a sign post to something phenomenological. It is precisely such ‘resolution’, in fact, that it actively resists. In Gadamer’s example, the double meaning of “to call” in Heidegger’s lecture “What is called Thinking?”, as both “to mean”, and “to call for”, demands no resolution.334 Instead it attempts to draw our attention to the nature of thought, while resisting a reduction into more familiar concepts from the history of metaphysics. If Heidegger grows to distrust the indicative, non-vocal character of philosophical language through the 1930s, his use and faith in the multivocity of poetic speech never fades. As with his own experiments in ambiguity, poetry resists an attempt at resolution or determination, precisely because its silent intention is often to merely draw attention to that ambiguity. Unlike formal indication, moreover, such language could hardly be mistaken for an attempt in the spirit of scientific determination. Poetic language does not resist its proximity to analogous meanings, but by embracing such proximity, can call attention to the movements of language which often remain hidden by our familiarity with it.

(b) The Concept of the Holy

Arguably the central difference between Heidegger and Wittgenstein’s response to the problem of expression is that despite its caveat and qualified use, formal indication remains an attempt to speak the phenomenon. In his aforementioned disjunction from the Letter on Humanism, in which

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332 Ibid, p. 33
333 Ibid, p. 36.
334 (Gadamer, 2016, p. 236)
Heidegger contrasts silence with indication, he disregards the possibility that silence may still consist in a process of showing, as Wittgenstein does. As I argued in chapter 2, philosophical grammar achieves the same result as a positive phenomenology, but it does so only through an examination of meaningful ordinary language. While the grammatical proposition is therefore expressed, the phenomenological proposition, on Wittgenstein’s view, remains silent. To use the distinction of the Tractatus, the phenomenality of experience is something that we can only be led to see, but not to say. In Heidegger’s work, conversely, there remains a clear effort to maintain a positive language in spite of the linguistic constraints he acknowledges. This effort is evident in his renewed attempts at indication, such as sous-rature. In all of the remarks we have so far considered, Heidegger’s critique has been directed toward his reader. In this way, he has not linked such language with his own failure in the “saying of the turning”. In the Letter on Humanism, however, Heidegger makes a remark which connects Being and Time to a central motif of his mature account of poetry, namely, the relinquishment of interest. He writes,

In the poverty of its first breakthrough, the thinking that tries to advance thought into the truth of being brings only a small part of that wholly other dimension to language. This language even falsifies itself, for it does not yet succeed in retaining the essential help of phenomenological seeing while dispensing with the inappropriate concern with “science” and “research”. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 271)

In Heidegger’s 1934 lectures on Hölderlin’s Germania and The Rhine, it is precisely against such “inappropriate concern with “science” and “research”” that he describes the attunement of the poet. Following Hölderlin, he identifies this attunement with the concept of the holy. He writes,

Hölderlin names the holy something ‘disinterested’ [uneigennützig]. ‘Disinterest’ here refers not merely to a relinquishing of self-interest for the benefit of the common interest, but rather to that disinterestedness that removes all self-interest even from the common interest – that is, removes from it its tendency toward self-limitation. It refers to a disinterestedness that no longer stands at all within the realm of utility – and nor, therefore, within that of what is useless either, since the latter is still evaluated with reference to interest. (Heidegger, 2014, p. 77)

Poetic language, insofar as it is grounded in such attunement, begins with a fundamental disavowal of a relationship of utility. Nothing in this way could be further from the technical language identified in the figure of Carnap. Such an account, for Heidegger, can be traced back to Hölderlin’s own remarks in “On the Operations of the Poetic Spirit” from between 1798 and 1800. There Hölderlin writes,
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[The poet] comes to recognize himself as a unity contained within divine, harmonious opposites, just as, conversely, he comes to recognize the divine, united, harmonious opposites as unity contained within him. *For this is possible only in beautiful, holy, divine sentiment [Empfindung],* in a sentiment that is beautiful because it is neither merely pleasant and happy, nor merely sublime and powerful, nor merely unified and peaceful, but that is all at once, and can be such only in a sentiment, one that is holy because it is neither disinterestedly given over to its object, nor merely disinterestedly resting on its own inner ground, nor merely disinterestedly hovering between its inner ground and its object, but is all at once, and can be such only in a sentiment. (Heidegger, 2014, p. 78)

Hölderlin’s language here regarding the reciprocity of “divine, harmonious opposites” and one’s Dasein bring to mind immediately Heidegger’s own account of the turning. Hölderlin himself identifies, moreover, this sentiment (or attunement) as transgressing beyond the subject-object divide. Crucially to the question of language, however, this overcoming is conceivable only insofar as poetry puts aside a relation of interest. It is exactly in these terms that Heidegger spoke of poetry in the 1964 lecture on *Theology.* To repeat,

> [The] singing saying of the poet, is “not coveting”, “not soliciting” that which is ultimately accomplished by humans as an affect…Such saying does not posit and represent anything as standing over against us or as object. There is nothing here that could be placed before a grasping or comprehending representation. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 61)

It is because it disavows an act of “coveting”, or “soliciting”, that poetry creates no object that stands in opposition to one’s own Dasein. As Hölderlin might put it, no such distinctions between self and objects are given in the disinterested attunement from which the poetic speaks. As Heidegger says in the final remarks of that lecture,

> Being as presence can show itself in various modes of presence. What is present does not have to stand over against us; what stands over against us does not have to be empirically perceived as an object. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 62)

This lack of a relation to an object, not only qualifies the poetic as non-objectifying, but coincides with the abandonment of an instrumental view of language. Because there is no task or utility understood in relation to experience, language in poetry is not being implicitly marshalled as a tool to any end. Insofar as it functions in the poetic, it is not as an auxiliary tool that links the poet and the world. This is precisely because, as Hölderlin says, the line between the poet, world and language are
no longer given in the tradition of subjectivism against which Heidegger writes. To render such insights in contemporary terminology, of course, is again to define the lines between such concepts. As he says in the Richardson preface, “every effort to bring what has been thought closer to prevailing modes of (re)presentation must assimilate what-is-to-be-thought to those (re)presentations [and] deform the matter”. Returning to formal indication, Heidegger’s remarks in the early Freiburg lectures certainly indicate that he already sees the instrumental view of language as problematic. Formal indication, after all, along with destruction, is conceived against the fading of the language of lived experience into the mode of “mere usability”. As he says,

The content that in this way is divested of the primordiality of its accompanying relation and enactment stands in an average ‘interest’ and is in this way available in the ambit of experience. With the distance from the origin, availability more and more approaches mere usability. (Heidegger, 2010c, p. 141)

He follows this by saying,

It is not merely that they only at the outset and in the initiating decision are not primordial; even where something primordial succeeds, the fading is at work in the factical time of the enactment so that scientific theories, propositions and concepts just like philosophical explica (in the mode of usability) of the no longer primordially experienced are taken up, handed down and further developed. If philosophy has to be determined as primordially enactmentally understanding and attention-drawing explication of factical life experience, then this explication necessarily always starts with the destruction. It begins in the faded. (Heidegger, 2010c, pp. 141-142)

If phenomenology consists, that is, of “enactmentally understanding and attention-drawing explication”, (of destruction and formal indication) then this must begin by reclaiming the lived experience which has been reduced to a concept “in the mode of usability”. To grasp the cogito phenomenologically, is to begin in the object of philosophical research into which it has solidified, and to attempt to enact the experience of Descartes. What we find in this process “with the help of phenomenological seeing” can only be indicated, as precisely to treat it as an object of research is to take up a distortional objective relation to it. To take for granted the instrumental function of language here is to take a certain stance with regard to the phenomenon in question. In 1920, Heidegger claims that formal indication forgoes this insofar as it is a tool only to stimulate thought in others. The

335 (Richardson, 2003, p. viii)
336 Italics mine.
phenomenon is not its object, but only that to which it performatively draws attention. In this way it evades a reduction of lived experience into concepts in the mode of “usability”. In the Letter on Humanism, however, it is before exactly this aim that formal indication is said to fall short. Such language fails, as he says, because it does not succeed “in retaining the essential help of phenomenological seeing while dispensing with the inappropriate concern with “science” and “research””. For poetry, conversely, this ‘dispensing’ lies in the very attunement which secures its possibility.

After 1934, the proximity between formal indication and an interrogative mode of philosophy is held with greater suspicion. In this respect Richardson is correct to claim Heidegger’s thought moves above all toward a thinking that is a responsive-openness to Being. This responsiveness for Heidegger, is exemplified above all in poetry and its presupposition of the attunement that Hölderlin calls the holy. Precisely because the poetic disavows itself of an interrogative interest, it disavows itself of the instrumental view of language held (in extrema) by Carnap. As the Letter on Humanism would suggest, despite its intention, such a view is also latently implied by the formally indicative. To abandon the urge to reduce language to the service of philosophy, is to move toward a new thinking that is irreducible to theoretical or practical concerns. As he puts it in the Letter on Humanism,

But now in what relation does the thinking of being stand to theoretical and practical comportment? It exceeds all contemplation because it cares for the light in which a seeing, as theoria, can first live and move. Thinking attends to the clearing of being in that it put its saying of being into language as the home of eksistence. Thus thinking is a deed. But a deed that also surpasses all praxis. Thinking permeates action and production, not through the grandeur of its achievement and not as a consequence of its effect, but through the humbleness of its inconsequential accomplishment. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 274)

III.

Heidegger’s turn to poetry, and the concept of the holy, is tantamount to a reorientation in his view of the purpose of language. Though central to his early work, the peculiar relation between Dasein and its language takes further prominence in the 1930s as it calls into question the possibility of philosophy. Insofar as formal indication responded to an earlier understanding of this problem, it did so while presupposing an ability to separate experience from language. In so doing, it Harboured

337 (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 271)
an instrumental view of what language is, however much Heidegger was aware of the problematic nature of such positions. As he says in *Being and Time*,

Attempts to grasp the “essence of language” have always taken their orientation toward a single one of these factors and have understood language guided by the idea of “expression”, “symbolic forms”, communication as “statement”, “making known” experiences or the “form” of life. But nothing would be gained for a completely sufficient definition of language if we were to put these different fragmentary definitions together in a syncretistic way. What is decisive is to develop the ontological-existential totality of the structure of discourse beforehand on the basis of the analytic of Dasein. (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 157)

Adding later,

In the end, philosophical research must finally decide to ask what mode of being belongs to language in general. Is it an innerworldly useful thing at hand or does it have the mode of being of Dasein, or neither of the two? (Heidegger, 2010a, p. 160)

In the *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger’s suggestion is that his language of the 1920s, in failing to disavow the “inappropriate concern with “science” and “research””, presupposed precisely the view here given that it is “an innerworldly useful thing at hand”. Because it suggests we can put language aside, it presupposes that language is something we merely take up like an external tool. For Hölderlin, conversely, the poetic is precisely that form of language which begins in abandonment of all interest. For this reason, it conserves in a way formal indication does not, the irrevocable link between Dasein, language and being. As Heidegger says of this relation in 1947,

Thus language is at once the house of being and the home of the human essence. Only because language is the home of the essence of the human being can historical humankind and human beings not be at home in their language, so that for them language becomes a mere container for their sundry preoccupations. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 274)

This position is precisely that which Heidegger develops in the 1934 readings of Hölderlin. There he writes,

By virtue of language, the human being is the witness of beyng. He testifies on its behalf, stands up to it, and falls victim to it. Where there is no language, as in the case of animals and

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338 Ibid.
plants, there, despite all life, is no manifestness of beyng and, for this reason, there is no non-being either and none of the emptiness belonging to the Nothing. Plant and animal stand on this side of such things; here there reign only blind pursuit and opaque flight. Only where there is language does world prevail. (Heidegger, 2014, p. 58)\textsuperscript{339}

As in \textit{Being and Time}, such a view is conceived precisely against the instrumental view of language. As he adds,

\begin{quote}
From all that has been cited thus far, it must become clear that language is \textit{not something that the human being has among other faculties and tools}. Rather, language is that which has the human being, that which configures and determines his Dasein as such in this way or that, and from the ground up. (Heidegger, 2014, p. 61)
\end{quote}

Poetry, on Heidegger’s reading, is therefore not merely a technique for lyrical writing, nor about the “‘expression’ of lived experiences in the soul”. Of course, “a poem and poetry are presumably all these things too”, but “this view fundamentally misses their essence”.\textsuperscript{340} By virtue of the specific sort of relation it presupposes toward being and ones Dasein, the poetic is the primary site of this “home of the human essence”.\textsuperscript{341} Traditional accounts, however, have understood poetry as an exception to standard speech precisely by prioritizing an instrumental picture. As he says,

\begin{quote}
In this manner, everything gets turned upside down. \textit{Even when one conceives of language as a means of artistic creation, one remains fundamentally wedded to an instrumental view of language as expression}. To conceive of language in this way is a well-established custom, because it seems plausible. (Heidegger, 2014, p. 59)\textsuperscript{342}
\end{quote}

To take up an instrumental view of language, on Heidegger’s view, or to interrogate experience in a traditional metaphysical sense, is itself to presuppose a certain relation toward being, Dasein and language, a relation that is derivative to the poetic. If his turn to poetry is indeed a response to what he calls the failure of the “saying of the turn”, then it is from the perspective of this presupposed relation, that the abandonment of subjectivism implied by \textit{Being and Time} cannot be achieved. Nonetheless, as his remarks in the Richardson preface make clear, it is only from this same perspective, that the reasons for this can be properly seen. It is in this sense then, I argue, that Heidegger regards poetry as

\textsuperscript{339} To this he adds, “Language itself has this character of \textit{being}, which it opens up and brings to humans. In language as such there occurs the confrontational setting apart [\textit{Aus-einander-setzung}] of beyng and non-being.” (Heidegger, 2014, p. 61)

\textsuperscript{340} Ibid, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{341} (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 274)

\textsuperscript{342} Italics mine.
moving beyond formal indication as a mode of language: firstly, in its multivocity, it allays the
tendency of the reader to reduce such terms to scientific concepts (as they did of formal indication);
and secondly, through a radicalisation of the comportment presupposed by its use, it allays that
‘inappropriate concern’ which falsifies phenomenological seeing.

The critique that Heidegger lays against formal indication ultimately amounts to the fallacy that
there is an extra-linguistic position from which philosophy can be done, i.e., that language can be set
aside in order to view experience. To suppose it could, in his view, already harbours a problematic
view on what language is and its relation to the human being. As he argues in Being and Time,
language is disclosed as always already constitutive of my being by the time I come to think. It cannot
function as a ladder to kick away once climbed (as in formal indication), because the possibility of
kicking and climbing belong only to linguistic beings. As Heidegger says, “only where there is
language does world prevail”. 343 This same rejection, as I argued in chapter 1, lies at the heart of
Wittgenstein’s turn from phenomenology in 1929. As he says in the opening of the Philosophical
Remarks,

And besides, the whole question is a matter of indifference because a child learning a
language only learns it by beginning to think in it. Suddenly beginning: I mean: there is no
preliminary stage in which a child already uses a language, so to speak uses it for
communication, but does not yet think in it. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 54) 344

The possibility of thought and the linguisticality of the thinker, for both figures, is not an incidental
relationship. In contrast to the view of Carnap, therefore, language is not a tool to supplement correct
thinking, even if this is a narrow relation we can later take up to it. Such an instrumental relation
would, however, blind us to the more fundamental sense in which language grounds our cognition.
Philosophy, for both Heidegger and Wittgenstein, is an activity which only belongs to the users of a
language. Whatever that might mean for the provenance of philosophical problems, it certainly limits
what language can do for the philosopher. For Wittgenstein, the limits of meaning cannot be
described. To do so would be to misunderstand the relation between language and explanation. As he
says,

[Any] kind of explanation of a language presupposes a language already. And in a certain
sense, the use of language is something that cannot be taught […] and that of course is just

343 (Heidegger, 2014, p. 58)
344 Italics mine.
another way of saying: I cannot use language to get outside language. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 54)\textsuperscript{345}

Accordingly, the development of his method after 1929 is an attempt precisely to disavow this extra-linguistic fantasy. His variational method, in his view, certainly enables a return to the phenomenological. Crucially, however, this is not a move beyond language, but a move from within. In his revisions, for example, to the epistemological basis of subjectivity, as I argued in chapter 3, his method does not reduce language to an instrument in a way that hides its role in the philosophical question. On the contrary, the phenomenological question and its language coincide. To take a paradigm example of his results, he writes,

I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking. It is correct to say, “I know what you are thinking”, and wrong to say, “I know what I am thinking”. (A whole cloud of philosophy condenses into a drop of grammar) (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 233e)

The difference in the first and second phrasing is only the clarity with which the problem is identified as being concerned with language. But to think that this ignores experience, misconstrues his vision of the relation between language and that experience. Critical dissatisfaction with Wittgenstein has overwhelmingly turned on this misreading. As Russell disparagingly remarked of the Philosophical Investigations,

The earlier Wittgenstein, whom I knew intimately, was a man addicted to passionately intense thinking, profoundly aware of difficult problems of which I, like him, felt the importance, and possessed (or at least so I thought) of true philosophical genius. The later Wittgenstein, on the contrary, seems to have grown tired of serious thinking and to have invented a doctrine which would make such an activity unnecessary. I do not for one moment believe that the doctrine which has these lazy consequences is true. I realize, however, that I have an overpoweringly strong bias against it, for, if it is true, philosophy is, at best, a slight help to lexicographers, and at worst, an idle tea-table amusement. (Russell, 1959, pp. 216-217)\textsuperscript{346}

\textsuperscript{345} c.f. (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 130e) He writes, “The explanation of a language (of the signs of a language) merely leads us from one language to another.” And later, “It is only through explanations that a child learns one language by means of another.”

\textsuperscript{346} Russell was no doubt thinking of Wittgenstein’s strong critiques of what Horwich calls T-philosophy. But the idea that he “grew tired of serious thinking” and invented a doctrine which would make it unnecessary, is patently disingenuous. Not least so because Wittgenstein has nothing but reverence for the difficulty of what he understood as the true task of philosophy, namely grammar. As he says, “Why is philosophy so complicated? It
Such criticisms, which unite on the view that philosophy becomes, in the words of Russell, “a slight help to lexicographers”, fundamentally miss Wittgenstein’s point. To understand the language surrounding subjectivity and the philosophy of mind, is not to reduce the mind to a linguistic puzzle. It’s to acknowledge the inextricable link between thinking and such language. For as long as one holds the view that language is like a tool we can set down, then Wittgenstein’s thought seems completely insignificant. To accept, however, the linguisticality of the problems that trouble us, according to Wittgenstein, necessitates that language becomes the central study of philosophy. This is not to push aside experience, because no such meaningful distinction would remain. To ask about the world and the human being, as Russell is content to do, is to ask about concepts that are themselves already linguistic. As Wittgenstein says, Russell’s questions “also asks for a word to be explained but it makes us expect a wrong kind of answer.”

Returning to the fate of formal indication: what the key texts of the so-called “turning” show, is a secondary reorientation in Heidegger’s view of language in the 1930s. In his move to poetry, as in the change to his account of thinking, the view that most subsides from his perspective is the interrogative stance of philosophy, and the instrumental view of language it presupposes. In this sense, I argue, he comes to close the most fundamental gap between himself and Wittgenstein in relation to phenomenological expression. While formal indication and destruction are responses to the invasive and distortional view of the ‘theoretical’, they remain in one sense wedded to that tradition: namely, they presuppose a distance attainable from our language in the face of the phenomenon. Undoubtedly, Heidegger would not accept this accusation in 1920. Indeed, his later critique of the indicative in this period is never tout court. The question is to what extent such aspirations at determining the phenomenon beyond language creep into his work in the period around Being and Time. Tracing such a movement is no small question. Whatever the case may be, however, it is the relation presupposed by such a language of research that Heidegger later critiques in it. And it is precisely such a relation that is radicalised in the figure of the poet. While formal indication and destruction were conceived as responses to just such a problem, understood in the context of Natorp’s critique, it is their shortcoming in this respect which most characterises Heidegger’s changing view on language in the years after Being and Time. As he says,

Nobody can in in just one single leap take distance from the predominant circle of ideas, especially not if he is dealing with the well-worn tracks of traditional thinking. (Heidegger, 1982, p. 36)

_ought, after all, to be completely simple…Although the result of philosophy is simple, its methods for arriving there cannot be so.” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 52)
_347 (Wittgenstein, 2009a, p. 123e)_
IV. Concluding Remarks

The development of both Wittgenstein and Heidegger’s methods takes place in the light of the problem of phenomenological language. In the case of Wittgenstein, this process was an intermediary point in his career. The project of the *Tractatus*, specifically in its relation to the independence thesis, necessitates a phenomeno-logic. By no means is such a project identical to the Husserlian position, especially so, as many commentators have noted, in 1929.\(^{348}\) Phenomenology for Wittgenstein was that of the *Logical Investigations*, a text he certainly read against the horizon of the 19\(^{th}\) century foundational crisis in mathematics. This view was no doubt supplemented through conversations with the Vienna circle, in whose view likewise Husserl’s relevance ended before the transcendental turn. Accordingly, his paradigm claims for what phenomenology is, such as colour-exclusion, concern an atomistic picture of experience that Heidegger would have deemed abhorrent. Such atomism, however, quickly disappears from Wittgenstein’s work. And through its equation with grammar, phenomenology survives its succession to the *seeing-as* which characterises his late philosophy. For Wittgenstein, phenomenology comes to mean the limits of sense. And it is in this respect, that like the limits of language, it can be brought to no meaningful expression.

Despite working under the Husserl of the 1920s, Heidegger’s interest in phenomenology likewise began with the *Logical Investigations*.\(^ {349}\) There can be little doubt that the horizon against which he read this early work was not the foundational crisis. Much more than Wittgenstein, Heidegger is a figure wedded to the history of philosophy. In the *Investigations*, Heidegger found a form of seeing which could lay the ground for the ontological turn in his work, a connection he explicitly drew during the Marburg years.\(^ {350}\) Crucially, he also found the framework to express a concept of language derived from his readings of Kierkegaard. The commonalities between both thinkers, understood as readers of this problem-set, goes some way, I argue, toward explaining the commonalities in much of their accounts. The question remains, however: What can phenomenology, and by extension philosophy, be according to Heidegger and Wittgenstein?

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\(^ {348}\) See for example, (Vrahimis, 2014)

\(^ {349}\) As Gadamer writes, “*Ideas I* appeared in 1913 and Heidegger saw it as a relapse into neo-Kantian transcendental idealism. Instead, he engaged with the *Logical Investigations*. He managed to do this with Husserl (as he himself told me) by saying: ‘Eminent Professor, students must first go through the phase of the *Logical Investigations*. They are not yet ready for the present stage of your phenomenological insights.’ In truth, this obviously amounted to a critical stance, namely that Heidegger did not follow Husserl in his later turn toward transcendental idealism, even if he did not succumb to a shallow relapse into a phenomenological realism in the style of Scheler or the Munich school.” (Gadamer, 2016, p. 212)

\(^ {350}\) Ibid, pp. 211-212.
Chapter Four

Like Wittgenstein, the phenomenological for Heidegger can be brought to no meaningful expression. At first this seems as though an indicative language, which can be discarded, fulfils the task. The central argument of this chapter, however, has been that precisely such task-orientated views of language are what he comes to regard as the misleading core of this problem. The revelations of what is ordinarily referred to as the “turn”, exemplified in the figure of the poet, is precisely a relinquishment of an instrumental view of language. In the case of formal indication, this was harboured by Heidegger’s view that there is distance to be taken from our own linguisticality. To abandon such a view, however, is to disavow phenomenology of one of its core assumptions: language is not the means through which it approaches the world, but “at once the house of being and the home of the human essence”.351 To question human subjectivity, for both Wittgenstein and Heidegger, is to ask after an irrevocably linguistic concept. This linguisticality extends certainly beyond words and grammar but is likewise not removable from a horizon constituted by them. It is unique, moreover, insofar as it is external to, but constitutive of Dasein. It is this uniqueness that Heidegger draws attention to in saying that “language speaks”.352 Or as he puts it in the Hölderlin lectures, “language is therefore not something that the human being has, but the reverse: that which has the human being”.353 Whatever phenomenology can be, for Heidegger, it must begin in a relation to language which does not withdraw this central place of human linguisticality. Such a relation, on the contrary, must be one which centralises it. As he says in the Richardson preface,

Meanwhile, every formulation is open to misunderstanding. In proportion to the intrinsically manifold matter of Being and Time, all words which give it utterance (like reversal, forgotten-ness and mittence) are always ambiguous. Only a [commensurately] manifold thought succeeds in uttering the heart of this matter in a way that cor-responds with it.

This manifold thought requires, however, not a new language but a transformed relationship to the essence[-ing] of the old one. (Richardson, 2003, p. xxii)

In 1919, it seemed to Heidegger (as to Natorp) that phenomenology asked too much of language. Correctly understood, according to the Heidegger of 1934, the problem was asking anything of language at all. Language on this view is not an instrument to be taken up in phenomenology only as a means to the phenomenon. Any such view misconceives the relation between these concepts. On the

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351 (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 274)
352 Ibid, p. 57. Or as he says in The Way to Language, “We are, then, within language and with language before all else. A way to language is not needed. Besides, the way to language is impossible if we indeed are already at that point to which the way is to take us.” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 112)
353 To this he adds, “What the human being is – we are a dialogue. We are since we have been a dialogue, addressed and brought to language”. (Heidegger, 2014, p. 67)
contrary, and as for Wittgenstein, the question of the phenomenon and the question of language must in the end coincide. As he puts it in the lecture on *Theology* in 1964,

> For the phenomenon most worthy of thought and questioning remains the mystery of language – wherein our entire reflection has to gather itself – above all when it dawns on us that language is not a work of human beings: language speaks. Humans speak only insofar as they co-respond to language. These statements are not the offspring of some fantastic “mysticism”. Language is a primal phenomenon which, in what is proper to it, is not amenable to factual proof but can be caught sight of only in an unprejudiced experience of language. (Heidegger, 2009b, p. 57)
Concluding Remarks

Four years after the publication of the *Philosophical Remarks*, Herbert Spiegelberg published an influential paper titled “*The Puzzle of Wittgenstein’s “Phänomenologie”*(1929-?)”[^354]. The paper posed a set of canonical questions regarding Wittgenstein’s use of the term *Phänomenologie* in that text. These questions were as follows:

i. What did Wittgenstein really mean by “Phänomenologie”?  
ii. When did he adopt it? For what reasons? What were his relations to the Phenomenological movement of the time?  
iii. How far did he abandon this *Phänomenologie*? When? For what reasons?  
v. What was its role in Wittgenstein’s development?  
vi. What is its philosophical merit?

By way of conclusion, I want to suggest some answers to these questions on the basis of the account I have given. Firstly, as to What, When and Why of his phenomenology (questions i, ii, iv), the story of its assumption is relatively straightforward. Phenomenology, for Wittgenstein, was a method introduced to solve the problem he identified in *Some Remarks on Logical Form*. This problem, which he deals with in the first half of 1929, pertained to the form of elementary statements, specifically to that issue he side-steps in TLP 6.3751. In contrast to the view expressed in that text, such elementary statements (such as about points in visual space) are not semantically independent. Certain combinations of these propositions have no logical meaning. Accordingly, any language which sought to show the limits of meaning (as the *Tractatus* had done), would have to determine what those restrictions would be. But such limits belong to the propositional-system in question, that is: they belong to the essence of colour. For this reason, the possibility of such a language turns on being able to determine the logic of the phenomenon. In this way, it becomes a phenomeno-logic.

What form exactly this logic took is not altogether clear, nor was it, I suggest, to Wittgenstein himself. Arguably its clearest expression can be seen in its two-fold rejection. Firstly, he rejects the idea that the limits of experiential meaning can be laid down as a rule of grammar. On this view, therefore, the task of the phenomenologist is to explain the possibilities of experience in justifying

[^354]: (Spiegelberg, 1968)
logical syntax. This is why he takes as his paradigm Husserlian claim, “two colours cannot be in the same place at the same time”. A secondary critique, however, is levelled against the idea of a language confined only to phenomenological description. Whether he saw this language as supplementing the task of the first, or as a separate attempt at the same, is unclear. Both would, it seems to me, solve the same problem. Whether we forbid colour-incompatibility in advance (as in the first case), or simply describe our visual field (as in the second), our language would never make the nonsensical claim he identifies in Some Remarks on Logical Form. Whatever the case may be, his rejection of phenomenology takes aim at these as being separate options.

The relation between this phenomenology and his awareness of the work of his contemporaries is at best questionable. At the very least, it seems clear that Wittgenstein would have seen the school as a cousin to logicism in the clarification of fundamental concepts. His references to Husserl and Heidegger to the Vienna circle show no knowledge of their positions that could not have been gleaned from those same conversations. The likelihood, moreover, that he would have seen Heidegger as a phenomenologist in the Husserlian tradition is slim. None of this, of course, rules out the possibility that Wittgenstein found historical precedent for his position in the continental school. But that position gives little indication as to what such precedents might be. Phenomenology replaces logic for Wittgenstein in the same way that these schools relate through the foundational crisis of the 19th century. Its place in his development, accordingly, is in his engagement with the project of ideal language philosophy.

The most complicated questions posed by Spiegelberg, however, relate to the extent to which Wittgenstein abandoned this phenomenology. The question of its philosophical merit, it seems to me, can only follow from such a consideration. By the winter of 1929, as evident from his conversations with Schlick and Waismann, this phenomenological project comes to an end. The best precedent for chapter I of the Philosophical Remarks, is his conversation about Husserl during this time. If the explanation of logical syntax, it now seems to Wittgenstein, presupposes that the listener navigates within the possible limits of meaning, then that logical syntax cannot be about those same limits. But this is exactly what a phenomenological limit would amount to. To show why we must exclude colour-incompatibility, for example, presupposes acquaintance with the experiential logic of colour. Any such acquaintance, however, precedes the explanatory tools of language. That is to say, the meaningful language about colour in which Husserl’s explanation must be couched (on Wittgenstein’s view), definitionally follows from such acquaintance. Its possible limits cannot be explained in language, because they define the limits within which meaningful language can exist. To use one of his favourite metaphors, such attempts place us up against the walls of our language.

Wittgenstein’s secondary rebuttal against phenomenology, is aimed at a language that is purely descriptive. In the terminology of 1929, it attempts to make no use of hypothetical constructs, but
simply to mirror human experience. To imagine the difference between ordinary language and ideal language, however, as being a matter of precision lies at the heart of our misconceptions about what language is. It is not the case that the practical concerns of our language simply muddy its representational waters. Temptations to think in this way misconceive the essence of language. They connect, moreover, with the failure to see the significance of ‘intent’. The logic of ordinary language is not simply the logic of experience (phenomenology), but the human being’s relation to experience. This relation is mediated by practical, historical and cultural concerns. There is no language which disavows intent, because any language already presupposes culture and communication. Accordingly, its logic is always that of a cultural relation to the limits of experience. The myth of a purely representational language, and indeed of a private language, is a failure to see exactly this point.

As I have argued in this thesis, however, the real mystery in this story is Wittgenstein’s qualified remarks on the failure of phenomenology. By 1930, the variational method of the *Philosophical Remarks* is claimed not only to succeed this project, but to amount to the same thing. In this way, the key question is the first part of Spiegelberg’s third question – just how far did Wittgenstein abandon this method? The central insight of the variational method follows from his second critique of phenomenology. While no language can be directly representational, every language speaks of experience through the lens of a practical relation to it. While that practical relation might be different in every case, the logic of the phenomenon to which it relates is not. The grammar of such languages, accordingly, is arbitrary only in the sense that a unit of measurement is. Grammars differ not by truth, but by utility in human life.

The possibility of phenomenological insights remains for Wittgenstein, when we realize that every language implies a kind of partial description. One manner of access to such description, could be to see what any conceivable language could not do without. In the language of subjectivity, for example, much of its apparently descriptive content has little to do with a phenomenology. But if one could see every variation of that language that enabled us to continue speaking of our emotions, however absurd they might be, we could get a better sense of what the logic of subjectivity at the very least entails. As he phrases it in conversation with the Vienna circle,

> Now it is very important if there are several languages; in that case it is possible to see what all these languages have in common and that common element is what depicts. [...]

> All these languages can be translated into one another. Only what they have in common mirrors anything. (Wittgenstein, 2003, p. 49)

That Wittgenstein’s critique of dualism accordingly corresponds to the perspective of continental phenomenology, I argue, is unsurprising. The earliest accounts of this critique occur entirely in such examples. The natural question, of course, is how long this variational method lasts in his work. As I
argued in chapter 2, the single biggest difference between the middle and later period in respect of such questions is in fact meta-philosophical. If our conceptual problems derive from misapprehensions on the nature of our language, then seeing what is necessary to any meaningful expression (the phenomenological) is no longer required. Problems can be dissolved much earlier than that. That is to say, correcting behaviourist and dualist accounts of the mind does not require pursuing a phenomenology of the mind. It only requires pointing out the specific missteps underpinning such accounts. Such an exercise, however, is already a step toward the variational method. To point out, for example, that ‘I have’ in the possessive paradigm of private states is not the same as in ownership of an object, is already to make the same demarcation that the variational method would. In the latter, the possessive paradigm would be lost in variation at no descriptive cost. We would know on this basis it does not belong to a phenomenology of emotion. In the former, Wittgenstein makes exactly this demarcation, but simply by following the problem back to its root in ordinary language. No further steps toward a phenomenology are necessary on his view, because the problem which had motivated its use has now vanished. The more that linguistic confusions are removed, the less we are pulled away from what already lies before us as open to view, namely the nature of human experience.

In response to Spiegelberg, therefore, we can answer the question of Wittgenstein’s abandonment of phenomenology in two ways: firstly, by saying that the method of 1929, conceived either as direct description or as predetermining the limits of meaning, is abandoned completely by the time of his conversations with the Vienna circle in December of that year; In spite of this, however, to the extent that he connects his very first ordinary-language project in 1930 with that method, the ‘phenomenological’ never leaves his work. To examine consciousness by means of grammar, does not reduce consciousness to a trick of language. It leads us toward grasping the essence of consciousness, but this was always already a linguistic question. Wittgenstein’s phenomenological insights, as I have argued, are not achieved through description, but by understanding the descriptive presuppositions of our already meaningful language.

The central aim of this thesis has been to read Wittgenstein and Heidegger as case-studies in the problem of phenomenological expression. How is it that the ‘phenomenological’ can remain the aim of philosophy, given the constraints that such a project places on the availability of language? It seems to me that Spiegelberg’s final question, concerning the relevance of Wittgenstein for the contemporary school lies exactly in this. If we are to take Wittgenstein seriously as a thinker of phenomenology, then above all, it entails we take seriously the problem posed by language for that school. This problem was at the heart of Heidegger’s justification of hermeneutic phenomenology. Many of his key concepts, as I have argued, such as formal indication and destruction, are developed in response to it. To engage with either Wittgenstein or Heidegger while ignoring their emphasis on the performative character of phenomenological insights, would be to sustain precisely those errors they implicate in the failure of the tradition. Conversely, to take these accounts seriously, would be to
call for a reorientation of the relationship between language and the possibility of that school. In the philosophy of both figures, the question of the phenomenon and its relation to the language which speaks of the phenomenon, became the guiding methodological issue. The implications of this view for current research remains to be seen. But it is in this respect, it seems to me, that Wittgenstein’s place in the history of phenomenology can be best understood.


