Abstract:
This thesis critically analyzes the status of hate speech and incitement in international criminal law. It begins by examining the harm and dangers of hate speech. Firstly, the danger of public hate propaganda is considered in terms of its effect on society. Secondly, it is contended that hate speech violates the victims¿ right to respect for their dignity.
Any restriction of hate speech raises free speech concerns. The thesis contends that whilst freedom of speech is of immense importance, imposing restrictions on hate speech in certain circumstances is justified. Thus, systematic hate speech employed by a State government or a State-like body as part of an on-going persecutory campaign against a minority group does not warrant free speech protections. In such circumstances, hate speech is appropriately regarded as the crime against humanity of persecution. The author supports this view by drawing on the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals, the Nuremberg Tribunal and post-World War II judgments. The thesis agrees with the Rwanda Tribunal Appeal Chamber¿s finding in the Nahimana et al. case that hate speech may amount to persecution if, considering the context, it is of equal gravity as other crimes against humanity.
The thesis then turns to consider direct and public incitement in light of the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals and of the Nuremberg Tribunal. It is contended that this inchoate crime should apply not only to genocide, but also to other international crimes within the International Criminal Court¿s jurisdiction. Finally, modes of liability related to incitement are examined, including instigation under the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals, and soliciting and inducing under the Rome Statute. The author proposes ways in which they are distinguishable from related forms of liability, including commission through another person and aiding and abetting.