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Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules

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dc.contributor.author Piggins, Ashley. en
dc.date.accessioned 2010-05-18T15:27:29Z en
dc.date.available 2010-05-18T15:27:29Z en
dc.date.issued 2005 en
dc.identifier.citation Perote-Pena, J., & Piggins A. (2005)"Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules"(Working Paper No. 0098) Department of Economics, National University of Ireland, Galway. en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10379/1076 en
dc.description.abstract We investigate the structure of fuzzy aggregation rules which, for every permissible profile of fuzzy individual preferences, specify a fuzzy social preference. We show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategyproof and satisfy a minimal range condition are dictatorial. In other words, there is an individual whose fuzzy preferences determine the entire fuzzy social ranking at every profile in the domain of the aggregation rule. To prove this theorem, we show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategyproof and satisfy the minimal range condition must also satisfy counterparts of independence of irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto criterion. There has been hardly any treatment of the manipulability problem in the literature on social choice with fuzzy preferences. en
dc.format application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher National University of Ireland, Galway en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Paper;No. 0098 en
dc.subject Fuzzy aggregation rules en
dc.subject Strategy-proofness en
dc.subject Economics en
dc.title Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.description.peer-reviewed peer-reviewed en

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